Duns Scotus - Questions on Prophyry_s Isagoge

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Questions on the science of logic

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge John Duns Scotus Translated by Thomas Williams

[Question 1: Is logic a science?] The question is whether logic is a science. 1 It appears that logic is not a science. For a mode of knowing [sciendi] is not a science; logic is a mode of knowing; therefore, etc. The major premise is evident by analogy: for example, a mode of seeing is not sight. The proof of the minor premise is given by Aristotle in Metaphysics II [3, 995a14-15]: "It is absurd to investigate science and the mode of knowing simultaneously." And 'mode of knowing' is explained as meaning 'logic'. 2 Moreover, in Metaphysics VI [1, 1026a18-19] Aristotle divides the sciences into the mathematical, the natural, and the divine or metaphysical; logic is not included under any of these three. 3 Moreover, science, like demonstration, proceeds from proper principles, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I [9-10, 76a17-b16]. Logic proceeds from common principles. Therefore, etc. 4 Arguments for the opposite view: Science is an effect of demonstration, and many demonstrations are put forward in logic. Therefore, etc. 5 Moreover, "One who has mastered logic is one who has science" is per se. Therefore, logic is a science, since where there is per se predication, the inference from concrete to abstract is valid. [I. The Resolution of the Question] 6 One must say that logic is a science, since the things taught in logic are conclusions on the basis of demonstrations, as is the case in the other sciences. Therefore, they are objects of scientific knowledge [sciuntur], since "demonstration is a syllogism that makes scientific knowledge." (1) Also, logic contains everything necessary for a demonstration: a subject, and a quality that can be demonstrated of the subject through a middle term, which is the definition. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph1-3.htm (1 of 8)11/01/2007 03:41:33 p.m.

Questions on the science of logic

7 But one must realize that logic is considered in two ways. In one way, it is considered insofar as it teaches. Regarded in this way, it proceeds from necessary and proper principles to necessary conclusions and is a science. It is considered in the other way insofar as we make use of logic by applying it in those matters in which it is of use. Regarded in that way, it does not proceed from proper principles but from common principles, and it is not a science. This is evident in the natural treatises, where Aristotle offers logical arguments that proceed from a common middle term and do not cause scientific knowledge in the strict sense. (2) [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 8 One response (3) to the first argument is that a mode of knowing is not a special science, but it can be a common science. 9 On the contrary: If "A mode of knowing is a science" is true in any way, then, since it is a predication in the abstract, it will be per se in the first mode. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. The inference is evident, since every predication in the abstract is essentially true [if it is true at all]. The falsity of the consequent is evident, since the predicate is not included in the intelligible content [ratio] of the subject. 10 Moreover, a mode of knowing is posterior to knowing; therefore, it is posterior to science, since knowing is posterior to science. 11 For that reason another response to the first argument is to say that its minor premise ["Logic is a mode of knowing"] is false, formally speaking. 12 Alternatively, one could say that its major premise ["A mode of knowing is not a science"] is false, since there is genuine scientific knowledge of a mode of knowing. Thus, the intellect understands its object, of which it has scientific knowledge; and in turn, by reflecting on that act of understanding, it can acquire knowledge of itself. So although at first it was, as it were, a mode, it can then have itself as object. 13 As for the proof [of the minor premise taken from Aristotle], one can say that the explanation [of 'mode of knowing' as 'logic'] should be understood materially. And in that way, the predication "A mode of knowing is a science" is true, since logic teaches the mode of knowing insofar as it treats syllogism or argument, by which alone scientific knowledge is acquired. 14 Alternatively, one could say that if 'mode of knowing' is explained as 'logic', the copulation should not be placed between 'science' and 'mode of knowing', but between 'investigate science' and 'investigate the mode of knowing'. For to investigate the one is to investigate the other, since they are concomitant, just as to investigate one thing is to investigate whatever is necessarily conjoined with that thing, even though the one thing is not identical with the other thing.

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Questions on the science of logic

15 To the second argument I say that in that passage Aristotle is distinguishing the real sciences. Logic, however, is a rational science. 16 As for the third argument, it is evident that logic [as teaching] proves passions on the basis of proper principles, although it is used with regard to common principles.

[Question 2: Is logic a common science?] The question is whether logic is a common science. 1 It appears that it is not. For a science is common because its subject is common, but the subject of logic is distinct from the subjects of other sciences. 2 An argument for the opposite is drawn from Boethius (4): "Logic concerns second intentions applied to first intentions." But these second intentions can be applied to all first intentions. [I. The Resolution of the Question] 3 One should say that a science is called 'common' on the basis of its subject. Consequently, a science can be understood as common in two ways: either because the subject is predicable of the subjects of other sciences, or because its subject is at the disposal of other sciences. 4 Logic is not common in the first way, except perhaps accidentally, if its subject can be applied to all [subjects of the other sciences]. It is, however, common in the second way.

[Question 3: Is the syllogism the subject of logic?] The question is whether the subject of logic is the syllogism. 1 It appears that it is not. For all science comes through syllogism. So if there is a science of syllogism, it will be on the basis of syllogism, which is false, for two reasons: 2 First, a syllogism of which one seeks science is unknown, whereas a syllogism through which one has science is known, since there is no science through something unknown. 3 Second, I pose this dilemma concerning the syllogism through which one has science: either there is science of that syllogism or there is not. If there is not, then by parity of reasoning there http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph1-3.htm (3 of 8)11/01/2007 03:41:33 p.m.

Questions on the science of logic

is no science of syllogism in general, since whatever is known scientifically regarding the general is known scientifically of each particular. If there is, then that science is through another syllogism, and there will be an infinite regress in syllogisms in order to have science; and that is absurd, since if it were true, nothing would be known scientifically. For the infinite is unknown [incognitum], according to Aristotle in Physics I [4, 187b7-8]; therefore, one and the same thing is both known and unknown [ignotum]. 4 Moreover, nothing is the subject both of the whole and of a part. But syllogism is the subject of a part of logic, namely of the Prior Analytics. Therefore, etc. 5 Moreover, there was never a syllogism in sense; therefore, there was also never a syllogism in the intellect. The inference is evident from what Aristotle says in De sensu et sensato. (5) 6 Argument for the opposite view: The passions of the syllogism are principally demonstrated in logic with respect to the syllogism itself, and with respect to other things on account of the syllogism. Therefore, etc. [I. Various Views about the Subject of Logic] 7 One view (6) is that the subject of logic is the conception formed by an act of reason, since that is what is common to everything considered in logic. Now the act of reason is threefold: first, the understanding of indivisibles; second, the composition or division of those indivisibles; and third, discursive reasoning from the known to the unknown. Accordingly, the Categories is about the conception formed by the first act of reason; the De interpretatione, which is about statements, is about the conception formed by the second act; and the New Logic, (7) which is about the syllogism and its subjective parts, is about the conception formed by the third act. 8 Another view is that logic is about second intentions applied to first intentions. As Boethius (8) says, these are common to all the things treated in logic. 9 A third view is that the subject of logic is being, since according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV [2, 1004b22-23], metaphysics, dialectic, and sophistry all deal with the same thing. Now metaphysics deals with being; therefore, etc. 10 A fourth view is that the subject of logic is the statement [oratio], (9) since the old logic treats the statement and its parts, since the statement is a type of utterance [enuntiatio]. Also, statement appears in the definition of the syllogism in Prior Analytics I [1, 24b18-20]. 11 A fifth view is that the subject of logic is argumentation, (10) since the whole of logic concerns the species and parts of argumentation.

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Questions on the science of logic

12 A sixth view is that the subject of logic is the syllogism, since everything else considered in logic is concerned on account of the syllogism. [I. Reply to the Question A. Requirements for the Subject of a Science] 13 In order to see which view is closest to the truth, one must note that there are three requirements for the subject of a science. First, both what-it-is and that-it-is must be known, since demonstration must presuppose both, as Posterior Analytics I [1, 71a11-16] says. The second is that the passions of the subject be demonstrated of that subject within the science on the basis of what-it-is. The third is that all the other things treated in the science are reduced to (11) that subject and are considered on account of it -- for otherwise the unity of the subject would not make for the unity of the science. 14 The first two conditions are not met by the first three views, since there is in logic no definition according to a general notion [ratio] of any of the subjects identified in those views. Nor is any of them premised as a principle of a science, nor is any passion demonstrated of them in general. Therefore, each of them is too general a subject. Indeed, the three do not differ from each other. That is obvious in the case of the first two. And I will prove it in the case of the third: the subject here is either (a) real being or (b) rational being. If (a), then logic is a real science, which is false. If (b), then either (b1) logic exclusively concerns rational being, i.e., being as considered by the intellect, or else (b2) it concerns rational being as caused by reason. If (b1), then logic could still be a real science, since nothing is the subject of any science except as considered by intellect or reason, since nothing is the subject of any science except as universal. Therefore, one should grant (b2): logic concerns rational being as caused by reason. And that is the same as the first two. 15 As for the argument offered for the first view [in n. 7], it is clear that it argues on the basis of an insufficient premise and commits the fallacy of the consequent, since two other requirements for the subject of a science are lacking. 16 To the authoritative passage from Boethius [in n. 8] I say that logic is about those things, but they are not its first subject, but are common to the subject. It's like the way we say that every science concerns being, since there is no science of non-being. 17 To the argument for the third view [in n. 9] I say that they concern the same thing, not because their subject is the same thing, but because what is considered in logic is the basis for dealing with anything and everything. For many things are dealt with in a science, but it does not follow that every single one of them is the principal subject in the science. 18 The subject identified in the fourth view [in n. 10], namely, the statement, meets neither the

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Questions on the science of logic

second nor the third condition. And as for the claim that statement pertains to syllogism, I say that this is not so unless 'statement' is used equivocally in speaking of the syllogism and of utterance [enuntiatio]. And an equivocal is not the subject [of a science], since it cannot be defined. For in the definition of syllogism 'statement' is used to mean a piece of argumentation. 19 The subject identified in the fifth view [in n. 11], namely, argumentation, fails to meet the first condition. For Aristotle never defines argumentation in general, and he does not offer a definition of it as the principle of a science. Boethius, however, does define it in his Topics. (12) It fails to meet the second condition as well, as is evident from the general argument. (13) And I offer this proof that it also fails to meet the third condition: either 'argumentation' is equivocal, in which case it is evident that there is no unitary science on the basis of the unity of argumentation, since it is neither one knowable thing nor one intelligible thing; or else it is analogous with respect to the things contained under it, in which case the science will not derive its unity from it, but rather from the unity of the first thing to which the others are attributed -and that is the syllogism -- in the same way that the unity of metaphysics derives from the unity of substance, to which other beings are attributed. [B. Resolution of the Question] 20 So one must say that the first and proper subject of logic is the syllogism. For this meets the first condition, since immediately after determining the parts of the syllogism in the old logic, Aristotle places the definition of the syllogism at the beginning of the Prior Analytics. (14) It also meets the second condition, since in the same work Aristotle shows many passions of the syllogism on the basis of that definition: for example, mode and figure, and then I'm not clear on the rest of this sentence. It also meets the third condition, since it is on account of the syllogism that he considers its parts -- namely, the incomplex and the sentence [enuntiatio] and its integral subjective parts -- in the Prior and Posterior Analytics; as well as the other species of argumentation, since they are reduced to the syllogism as the imperfect to the perfect; as well as the sophistic syllogism as the privation of the syllogism, since it belongs to the same science to know both the positive thing and its privation. Thus the division of logic is evident from the division of the syllogism and the things attributed to it. [III. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 21 As for the first argument [in n. 1], I concede that logic is a science of syllogism that is based on some particular syllogism. 22 To the first argument against this response [in n. 2], I say that the syllogism [on which the science of logic is based] is known with respect to both the truth of the premises (since they are immediate propositions) and the inference of the conclusion from those premises (since that is evident through itself, since "a perfect syllogism is one that is lacking nothing to keep it from appearing necessary" (15)). But it is unknown with respect to the passion that is demonstrated of the syllogism in general; with respect to that passion, the syllogism in general is unknown. For http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph1-3.htm (6 of 8)11/01/2007 03:41:33 p.m.

Questions on the science of logic

one seeks knowledge of the syllogism in general only with respect to its passion, and so it is not the case that one and the same thing is both known and unknown in the same respect. 23 To the other argument against this response [in n. 3], I do affirm that there is science of the syllogism through which there is science. In answer to the question "through which syllogism [is there such science]?" I say: through that syllogism itself. For insofar as through that syllogism some passion is demonstrated of every syllogism, that passion is shown to hold of that syllogism qua syllogism. And this is the only way in which there is scientific knowledge of a particular. 24 To the second preliminary argument [n. 4] I say that the syllogism with respect to the properties that follow formally from it is the subject of the Prior Analytics. But the syllogism is the subject of the whole of logic with respect to all the passions in itself or in its integral or subjective parts or in the things reducible to it. Nor is it required that the subject of a science be predicated of all the things treated in that science, but merely that it be that on account of which the other things are treated. This is clear in the case of natural science. Its subject is the movable body, and yet it deals with motion and nature, which are not movable bodies. An alternative response is to say that the major premise ["nothing is the subject of both the whole and a part"] is false in the case of sciences in which the subject of the whole requires that determinations be made concerning many points in order for the subject to be known. In such a case, within that science one will have to make determinations concerning those many points and, thereby, concerning the subject itself. And so one part of the science will be about the subject that is the subject of the whole science. That is the case here, as it clearly is for the Physics with respect to the whole of natural science. 25 To the third argument [in n. 5] I say that Aristotle's claim that "nothing is in the intellect [unless it is first in the sense]" is true of that which is the primary intelligible, which is the 'what' of a material thing; but it is not true of everything that is intelligible in itself, since many things are understood in themselves, not because they cause a species in the sense, through the reflection of the intellect. And that is the way it is in the case of the syllogism. As it says in Posterior Analytics I [4, 73b38-39], "'in itself' has a wider application than 'primarily'." For the isosceles triangle has three sides in itself, but not primarily. 1. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.2, 71b18-20. 2. See Aristotle, Physics I.2, 184b25-185a4. 3. Given by Robert Kilwardby, Anal. priora (ed. Venetiis 1499 f. 1ra). 4. Actually from Avicenna, Metaph I.2. 5. Aristotle, De sensu et sensato 6, 445b16-17: "Our intellect understand nothing apart from http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph1-3.htm (7 of 8)11/01/2007 03:41:33 p.m.

Questions on the science of logic

sense." 6. That of Thomas Aquinas in Expos. libri Post. I prooem. The critical Latin edition of the present work cites a passage from Expos. libri. Post.I lect. 20 in connection with the sixth view (see [12]), but that passage in fact rehearses the view that logic concerns all three acts of reason. 7. The New Logic comprised the Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle, all of which were first reintroduced to the West in the middle of the twelfth century. It was distinguished from the Old Logic, which comprised Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione, Porphyry's Isagoge, and several commentaries and original works by Boethius. A point of trivia: the De interpretatione was, oddly enough, always known in the medieval Latin West by its Greek title, Peri hermeneias, sometimes written as one word, and often very eccentrically spelled. 8. Actually Avicenna, Metaph. I.2. 9. Boethius, In Categ. Aristot. I. 10. Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus I.4, attributes this view to Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel and then himself asserts the claim that the subject of logic is "argumentation or the syllogism." 11. Not in the modern sense of "shown to be nothing other than it," but in the sense of "traced back to it" or "discussed in terms of its relation to it." 12. Boethius, De differentiis topicis I (PL 64, 1180C). 13. Presumably, the argument given in the second sentence of n. 14. 14. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I.1, 24b22-24. 15. Ibid.

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Questions on the universal

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge John Duns Scotus Translated by Thomas Williams

[Preface to the Questions on the Universal] We need to investigate the universal in particular. Now what is said by the name is a preliminary to every investigation, so it is important to note that 'universal', like other concrete terms, is taken in three ways. Sometimes it is taken for the subject: that is, for the thing of first intention to which the intention of the universal is applied. In this way, the universal is the first object of the intellect. Sometimes it is taken for the form: that is, for the thing of second intention caused by the intellect and applicable to things of first intention. It is in this way that the logician as such speaks of the universal. In the third way it is taken for the aggregate of subject and form, and that is a being per accidens, since it aggregates diverse natures that do not produce something one per se. In this way it is not an object of consideration for the practitioner of any art, since according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VI [2, 1027a20-26] there is no science of a being per accidens, since such a being is not definible. So the remaining discussion will deal exclusively with the universal taken in the second sense.

[Question 4: Is the universal a being?] The question is whether the universal is a being. 1 It appears that it is not: For according to Boethius, "whatever is, is because it is one in number." (1) A universal is not one in number, since it is predicated of many. Therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, according to Aristotle in the Categories [ch. 5], everything that is other than primary substance either is said of primary substance or is in primary substance. The universal is other than primary substance, and it is neither said of primary substance nor in primary substance; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: only secondary substances are said of primary substances, according to Aristotle. (2) Since the universal is an accident, it is not a secondary substance. Nor is it in primary substances, since if it were, a primary substance would be universal -- in the same way that if whiteness is in something, that thing is white. 3 Moreover, the universal is either from nature or from the intellect. It is not from nature, since if it were, it would be singular and would be the terminus of a change. Therefore, it is from the intellect alone, and so it is a fictive item and therefore a non-being. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (1 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

4 Arguments for the opposite view: The universal is defined by Aristotle in De interpretatione I [7, 17a39-40], but there is no definition of a non-being; therefore, etc. 5 Moreover, according to Boethius (3) secondary substances are applied to primary substances; but a non-being is not applied to a being. [I. Resolution of the Question] 6 One must say that the universal is a being, since nothing is understood under the notion of nonbeing, since the intelligible moves the intellect. For since the intellect is a passive power according to Aristotle in De anima III [4, 429a21-24], it operates only if its moved by an object. A non-being cannot move anything, since moving belongs to a being in actuality. Therefore, nothing is understood under the notion of non-being. And yet whatever is understood is understood under the notion of a universal. Therefore, that notion is not a non-being. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 7 As for the first argument [in n. 1]: Boethius understands this as applying to that which exists apart from an operation of the intellect, and a universal is not of that sort. 8 The same sort of response applies to the second argument [in n. 2]: Aristotle understands this claim as subject to the same qualification. 9 One might object, however, that the argument reaches its conclusion through the claim that secondary substances are said of primary substances and accidents are in primary substances. But secondary substances, as Aristotle is speaking of them in this passage, do not exist apart from an operation of the intellect. Proof of the minor premise: at the beginning of the chapter Aristotle divides substance into primary and secondary. Now if that division is correct, it follows that the members, as he understands them in that passage, are opposed. But that which is a "secondary substance apart from an operation of the intellect" is not opposed to primary substance but is in fact identical with primary substance. Therefore, he does not understand this claim to hold of secondary substance as that which is a being apart from an operation of the intellect. 10 Therefore, the objection goes, the universal is said of primary substances. 11 In response to this objection, which contradicts the claim that only secondary substances are said of primary substances, I say that secondary substances as Aristotle is speaking of them in that passage are accidents. They are not real accidents, for which he offers the classification 'be-

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Questions on the universal

in', but intentional accidents, which of themselves belong to the classification 'said-of'. But the universal is something more general than secondary substance, since secondary substance implies a universal applied to something in the genus of substance. 12 To the third argument [in n. 3] I say that the universal is from the intellect. But I say that the claim "therefore it is a fictive item" does not follow, since nothing outside the intellect corresponds to a fictive item, whereas something external to the intellect corresponds to a universal, and it is by that external something that the intellect is moved to cause such an intention. For according to Boethius (4) a species is an attenuated likeness of individuals, and a genus is an even more attenuated likeness of species. So I say that the universal is effectively from the intellect, but it is materially or originally or occasionally from a property in the thing. Such is not the case for a fictive item, so the universal is not a fictive item.

[Question 5: Is the universal intelligible of itself?] The question is whether the universal is intelligible of itself. 1 It appears that it is not. For according to Aristotle in De sensu et sensato [ch. 6, 445b16-17], "Nothing is in the intellect but what was first in the sense"; but a universal was never in the sense; therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, every passive power presupposes its object in actuality before its operation, since it is from the object that it receives its own actuality, in virtue of which it can operate. But the intellect does not presuppose the universal: it causes the universal, as the Commentator says on De anima II. (5) Therefore, etc. 3 Argument for the opposite view: Whatever is defined is of itself an object of intellect. Now the universal is defined by Aristotle. (6) Therefore, etc. [I. Resolution of the Question] 4 One must say that the universal is intelligible of itself. This is evident as follows. The primary object of intellect, "what a thing is," is understood under the notion of a universal. Now that notion is not essentially identical with the "what a thing is"; rather, it is an accidental mode of the "what a thing is." Therefore, the intellect can cognize the difference between its primary object and that mode, since it can distinguish between any things that are not essentially the same. But every power that of itself cognizes the difference between two things cognizes each of the two under its proper notion, according to Aristotle in De anima II [2, 426b15-23] -- that's how he proves that there is a common sense. Therefore, the intellect can cognize that mode or notion of http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (3 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

a universal of itself and under its proper notion. In this way, by reflection, the intellect cognizes itself and its own operation and mode of operation and the other things that are in it. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 5 In response to the first argument [in n. 1], it was said above [in q. 3, n. 25] that Aristotle understands this as applying to the primary object of intellect, which is the "what" of a material thing. Alternatively: he understands it in accordance with the sensory nature -- that is, as applying to sensibles. And the universal is not that sort of thing. 6 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the possible intellect is a passive power, and it does presuppose the universal, which is its object. But the agent intellect does not presuppose the universal, since it is not a passive power. And the universal is not the object of the agent intellect. Rather, its object is the "what a thing is" in phantasms, and the universal is its end.

[Question 6: Does the universal have any properties?] The question is whether the universal has any properties. 1 It appears that it does not. For a property of the universal cannot be singular, since if it were, it would not be convertible with the universal; therefore, any property of the universal is itself universal. Therefore, it is not distinct from the universal whose property it allegedly is. But that is absurd, since a property does not express the being of that whose property it is, according to Aristotle in Topics I [4, 101b19-23]. 2 Moreover, if the universal has some passion, that passion will be in that universal "in every case, in it alone, and always." (7) Therefore, that passion will be a property. But that is absurd, since if it were a property, it would be contained under property, which is a species of universal, and it will be convertible with the universal itself, which is absurd. 3 Moreover, an accident is not the subject of an accident, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV [4, 1007b2-4]; the universal is an accident; therefore, etc. 4 Moreover, every passion is less a being than its subject. Now what is less a being than a being of reason is a non-being. So since the universal is a being of reason, its passion would have to be a non-being. 5 Porphyry argues for the opposite view. (8) He identifies some commonality among all five http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (4 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

universals. Hence it is evident that they share some property. Now if that property is in them univocally, it will be through some common character that is in them, and so it will be the passion of that common character. For if that passion is univocal, its primary subject will be univocal, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I [28, 87a38-39]. Therefore, such a passion belongs primarily to the universal itself. [I. Resolution of the Question] 6 The right answer is yes. The reason is that a fully adequate definition expresses the essence of whatever is defined. So if something is in an item convertibly, and that something is not among the things put forward in the definition of the item, it inheres as a passion in that item. Now something is in the universal in just this way. For if the correct definition is that "the universal is what can be predicated of many," as put forward in De interpretation I [7, 17a39-40], then what is put forward in Posterior Analytics I [I.19, 100a6-8] -- namely, that the universal is a one in many and of many -- will be convertible with the universal but not part of its essence. And vice versa: if the latter is the correct definition of the universal, then the former will be a property. And thus from the definition of the universal either of these features of the universal can be demonstratively concluded and thus known scientifically. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 7 To the first argument I say that the passion of the universal -- call it a -- is universal: not because it is essentially identical with its subject, but because 'universal' is applied to it as a mode of it, and 'a is universal' will be a denominative predication. 8 Now one might object that a subject is not predicated denominatively of an accident and does not express a mode of it. Therefore, neither does 'universal' express a mode of its passion. 9 I say that 'universal' can be taken either as what or as mode. The argument [in n. 8] reaches its conclusion by taking 'universal' in the first way. 10 On this same basis I say to the second argument that it is a property denominatively but is not contained under property. For it is possible, especially in intentions, for something to be convertible with the genus but denominated from the species. 11 To the third argument I say that an accident is not the primary subject of an accident that it underlies and supports. Only a substance is like that. Nevertheless, an accident can be the proximate and immediate subject of an accident, since it is the ground of inherence [ratio susceptiva] through which the other accident is in the substance: for example, a surface is the subject of whiteness. It is in this way that there is among accidents the subject of a passion. 12 To the fourth argument I say that there are many gradations in beings of reason, just as there http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (5 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

are in beings of nature, since a mode of understanding is less a being than an intelligible being. Hence, what is less a being than a being of reason in the lowest gradation is a non-being, but the property that is convertible with the universal is not of that sort.

[Question 7: Is the universal the subject of Porphyry's book?] Now that we have seen that the universal meets the conditions for the subject of a science -namely, that it is a being [q. 4], that it is definible [q. 6, n. 6], and that it has passions that can be demonstrated of it [q. 6, n. 6] -- the question is whether the universal itself is the subject of Porphyry's book. 1 It appears that it is not. For [if the subject of Porphyry's book is the universal, it must be] either the universal either (a) insofar as it is an intention or (b) insofar as it can be applied to a thing. Not (a), since in this way intention is treated by metaphysics. Here's the proof: the metaphysician treats everything qua being; consequently, he treats intention qua being. Therefore, he also treats intention qua intention, since intention qua intention is the same as intention qua being, just as man qua man is the same as man qua being. Not (b), since universal-insofar-as-it-can-be-applied-to-a-thing is a being per accidens, and there is no science of a being per accidens. (9) 2 Moreover, every real science is of the universal, since "there is no science of singulars." (10) Therefore, this rational science is not of the universal. 3 Moreover, in this book he treats these five according to their proper notion by distinguishing and defining each on the basis of its properties and making no mention of the universal as such, with respect to either its 'what it is' or its passions. Therefore, these five are the subject, and not the universal. 4 Argument for the opposite: This science is one; therefore, it has one subject. Therefore, these five are not the subject except insofar as they agree in one common [feature], which is the primary subject. And that is the universal.

[Question 8: Is 'universal' univocal with respect to the five predicables?] A related question concerns the unity of these five as "universal." The question is whether 'universal' is univocal with respect to these five.

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5 I argue that it is not. Anything that is univocal with respect to many is related to them under some universal notion. Universal is not related to the five predicables under a universal notion. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: universal is not related to them under the notion of any of the five, since none of them agrees with the others, but instead each is distinguished from the others. But if it is related to them under some other notion, there will be a sixth universal. 6 One view (11) is that it is related to the five under the notion of a genus, since it is predicated of them in quid, and they differ from one another in species. 7 But there is the following argument against that view. If the universal is the genus with respect to the five predicables, then each of them is a species. Therefore, genus [which is one of the five] is a species. This is false, since one opposed species is not predicated truly of another using the verb 'is'; but genus and species are disparate species under universal, if universal is held to be the genus of the five predicables. 8 Moreover, "a genus is not predicated of its species according to more and less," according to Porphyry in the chapter "On difference." But universal is predicated of the five predicables according to more and less, since a genus is more a universal than a species or differentia, since it is predicated of more things. 9 Argument for the opposite view: Universal is predicated [of all five predicables] according to its name and notion; therefore, it is predicated [of them] univocally. The inference is clear from what Aristotle says at the beginning of the Categories [1, 1a6-8). The antecedent is evident, since each of them is "apt by nature to be said of many," which is how Aristotle defines the universal in De interpretatione I [7, 17a39-40]. [I. The View of Albert the Great] 10 One view (12) in response to Question 8 is that universal is analogous with respect to these five, since it is said per prius of genus and per posterius of the others, as is evident from the third argument offered for the negative answer [n. 8]. 11 And in keeping with this response, one response given to Question 7 is that the universal is not the subject of Porphyry's book, but the five universals are, and that nevertheless the science is one on account of the unity of the first item to which the others are attributed, which is the genus. 12 An argument against this opinion: In every genus one species participates the nature of the genus more perfectly than another. That is why the natural scientist says that "equivocations lie hidden within a genus" (Physics VII.4, 249a22-24). The logician, by contrast, puts forward a http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (7 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

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univocal genus on the basis of the unity of the notion. For example, at the beginning of the Categories [Aristotle says that] 'animal' is univocal to man and ox. Therefore, speaking in terms of logic, the universal can be the genus of these five, even if genus is in some way more perfect than the others. 13 Moreover, the answer to Question 8 [in n. 10] is incorrect, as is evident from the fact that at the beginning of Metaphysics VII [1, 1028b7-8] Aristotle argues that because substance is the first being, "therefore we should exclusively, chiefly, and first engage in speculative reasoning about what is in this way." From this remark one takes it that in order to make determinations about many things that are spoken of by way of attribution to some first thing, it is enough to make a determination about that first thing. Accordingly, therefore, it would be enough for Porphyry to make determinations about genus alone. 14 Moreover, the argument of those who hold this view is invalid. Number, after all, is a multitude aggregated from unities, (13) and yet it is not said analogically of two and three, even though three is from more unities. Rather, number is predicated of two and three unqualifiedly univocally. [II. Resolution of Question 8] 15 For this reason, and on account of the argument given above (14) [in n. 9] for the opposite view on Question 8, one must say that universal is predicated univocally of these five. [III. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments of Question 8] 16 To the first argument [in n. 5] I say that the intention of genus is applied to [universal (15)] with respect to these five. As for the claim that "each of them is distinguished from the others," that is true. Therefore, they are not predicated of each other by a performed predication, nor is anything predicated of one of them under the notion of another. But they are predicated of each other by designated predication, since the notion of genus is extraneous to universal when it is united to them [the five predicables] by the verb 'is', just as the notion of genus is extraneous to animal in the predication "Man is an animal." 17 As for the first argument against this view [see n. 7], I concede that each of them is a species, and it is not absurd for species of the same genus in accidents to be predicated of each other denominatively. 18 One might object that it is absurd for species of the same genus. For just as "Whiteness is blackness" is false, so too is "White is black." 19 But I say that this is not true universally. Even if perhaps that's how it is with absolutes, it's not the case with relatives. For example, a father and a son are identical. For just as the inference http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (8 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

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"He is the father of so-and-so; therefore, he is a father" is valid, by parity of reasoning the inference "He is the son of such-and-such; therefore, he is a son" is also valid. So if the antecedents are both true at the same time, so too are the consequents. In the same way, such relatives can be said of the same thing and of each other, but not as relative opposites, since they are only opposites with respect to one and the same thing. By contrast, they are relatives according to their common notion. For father is primarily relative to son; it is not the case the father-of-so-and-so is primarily relative to son-of-such-and-such. That's how things are in the case of "Genus is a species": it is not both genus and species with respect to one and the same thing. 20 Alternatively, it is said that predications like "Genus is a species" can be true by denominative predication. Any of these intentions can be taken as a 'what' or as a 'mode'. When it is that which is understood, it is a 'what'; when it is the notion under which something else is understood, then it is taken as a 'mode'. Therefore, second intentions are not opposed unless both are taken as 'what' or both are taken as 'mode'. (16) Now when "Genus is a species" is true, 'genus' is taken as a 'what', since it is understood by reference to universal, which is its genus, and 'species' is taken as a 'mode', since genus is understood under such a mode with respect to universal. 21 But if one infers from this that an opposite is being predicated of its opposite, one would commit the fallacy of a figure of speech by confusing a mode with a what and vice versa. For example, "Plural is singular" is true if 'plural' is taken as a 'what' and 'singular' as a 'mode', since what is signified by 'singular' is a mode of what is signified by 'plural', and there is no opposition. 22 Nonetheless, it is said that 'singular' expresses a 'what', because it is taken for its significate with respect to the subject, and 'plural' expresses a 'mode', since it is taken for its mode with respect to the predicate. For the predicate is not in it [as taken] for the thing signified. It does not matter for present purposes which of the two solutions is given. 23 To the other argument [in n. 8] I say that genus is not more a universal -- since 'more' expresses an intensification of the form of that to which it is joined -- but in some sense a greater universal, since it extends to more items, just as four is a great number than two but is not more a number than two. And in the same way one most-specific-species is not said to be more a species than another, even if it has more individuals falling under it. [IV. Resolution of Question 7] 24 To the first question one should say that the universal is the subject of this science. Now there are three principal conditions for the subject of a science. (17) The universal meets the first condition, since in this book what-it-is and that-it-is are presupposed as known. Nor would it be possible for any species of the universal to be known scientifically if one did not know what-it-is and that-it-is. But in this book its species are defined, and there was no need for a definition of the universal to be put forward, since the author assumes that the definition was adequately established by Aristotle in De interpretatione I [7, 17a39-b1] or Posterior Analytics I [4, 73b26http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (9 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

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27]. That is why the author uses the formula [ratio] of universal, "to be predicated of many," in the definition of these universals. 25 It also meets the second condition for a subject, since if any passion univocal to these five is shown of them through the formula of universal, it is thereby shown of the universal itself as of the primary subject; and if in this book he demonstrates through the notion of universal that one of them is predicable of many, he thereby shows this of the universal, since the medium of demonstration is equated with a passion; otherwise there would be an absurdity. But that is what is done in this book, as is evident, since "differs from an individual" is demonstrated of genus through the particle "is predicated of many," and the assumption is that it can be demonstrated of the others in the same way. 26 The third condition is evident, since each of them is a species of universal, and universal is divided into these five by Porphyry, since once he has given a definition of the genus, he offers the division by way of further explanation of the genus. One member of the division is "to be predicated of many," by which he means the universal, which is subdivided into these five. [V. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments of Question 7] 27 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that this division is not on the basis of opposites, since intention qua intention is applicable to a thing. For this reason I concede both members [i.e., both (a) and (b)], since they are identical. 28 As for the objection against the first alternative [(a)], it can be said that the metaphysician deals with all real being, not with rational being, which is the sort of being the universal is as it is being discussed here. Alternatively, one might concede that the metaphysician deals with the intention qua being, but it doesn't follow that he deals with intention qua intention, since these are not the same. That's always what happens when the term repeated after 'qua' does not signify an essence absolutely. For example, 'the moveable qua moveable' is not the same as 'the moveable qua being'. On this basis it is evident that the example using 'man' is not analogous. 29 As for the objection against the other alternative [(b)] -- that it is a being per accidens -- I say that it is not a being per accidens in the way that an aggregate is, since the "thing" does not figure in the understanding of it as a part but as determining a relation. In this way an accident is understood in dependence on a substance, but nonetheless not as a being per accidens. 30 The response to the third argument is evident from what was said in the resolution of the question, etc.

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Question 9: Is the universal in the thing or in the intellect?] The question is, given that the universal as it is spoken of here is an accident, in what subject is it: in the thing or in the intellect? 1 I prove that it is not in the thing: Every accident that is in a thing is either proper or common. If it is proper, it is present in individuals, although not primarily, since a proper accident is present per se in the species, and per se presupposes that it is present in all. If it is common, it is primarily in individuals. So if it were an accident in a thing, it would be primarily in individuals. This is false, since if it were primarily in individuals, the individual would be universal. Therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, the intellect is a passive power, according to Aristotle in De anima III [4, 429a2124]. Therefore, it does not act by transmitting something outside -- as is also true of the sense, as Aristotle says in Topics I [14, 105b6-10]. So when it causes the universal, it does not transmit the universal outside itself. Therefore, the universal is not in some subject outside the intellect. 3 Moreover, according to the Commentator in De anima III [com. 5], what comes to be from intellect and the intelligible is more truly one than what comes to be from matter and form. Now form is not outside matter, nor vice versa. Therefore, neither is the intelligible outside the intellect, nor vice versa. Therefore, neither is the intelligible mode outside the intellect, Therefore, neither is the universal. 4 Arguments for the opposite view: "Matter and the efficient cause do not coincide," according to Aristotle in Physics II [7, 198a2427]. The intellect is the efficient cause of the universal; therefore, it is not the matter. Therefore, neither is it the subject, since accidents do not have [matter from which] but only matter in which, (18) which is called their subject. 5 Moreover, according to the Commentator in De anima I [com. 8], "The intellect brings about universality in things"; therefore, universality is in the thing and not in the intellect. 6 Moreover, the subject of an accident is what it denominates. The universal denominates the thing, not the intellect. Therefore, etc.

[Question 10: Is "Man is universal" true?] In connection with this, another question concerns the truth of "Man is universal" and other quite similar [statements] in which an intention is predicated. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (11 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

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7 I prove that they are false: The subject signifies a genuine nature; therefore, it supposits that nature. The predicate does not predicate a genuine nature, since it also does not signify a genuine nature. Therefore, not a genuine nature is predicated of a genuine nature; therefore, an opposite is predicated of an opposite. 8 Moreover, if man is a species, and species is an intention, then man is an intention. The conclusion is false, and the minor premise is not, so the major premise is false. 9 Moreover, a true predication in the abstract is true per se in the first mode. "Man is a species" is not true per se in the first mode, and both the predicate and the subject are abstract. Therefore, the proposition is false. 10 Argument for the opposite view Whatever a definition is predicated of, the item defined is predicated of as well. Now 'man' is predicated of many numerically different items[, and "predicated of many numerically different items" is the definition of 'species']. Therefore, man is a species and so a universal.

[Question 11: Are propositions like "Man is universal" per se?] In connection with this, another question is whether such propositions are per se. 11 It appears that they are: Whatever a definition is in per se, the item defined is in per se as well. Now 'man' is predicated per se of many numerically different items. Therefore, man is per se a species. 12 Moreover, what is intelligible per se is universal per se. Man is intelligible per se, since man is intelligible through his 'what-it-is', which is identical with man. 13 Moreover, universal belongs to man as abstracted from every accident; therefore, universal does not inhere in man as an accident. The antecedent is evident, since man as conjoined with accidents is singular. 14 An argument for the opposite view: 'Per se' presupposes that it holds of all. Therefore, if man is universal per se, every man is universal. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.

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[I. Response to Question 9] 15 To the first question one must say that the universal is in the thing as in its subject, since the universal denominates the thing, not the intellect. But it is in the intellect as in its efficient cause and as cognized object in its cognizer. 16 But one must realize that the significate of a common term signifying a true nature can be considered in three way. First, according to its being in the supposits, which is called its material being; and in this way the common accidents are present in it. In the second way it is considered absolutely according to its quidditative being; and in this way the essential predicates are present in it. In the third way it is considered as it is apprehended by the intellect through an intelligible form. This is its cognized being, and in this way intentions are present in it. 17 For the intellect, considering the one nature of man in many and of many, is moved by some property found in the nature thus considered to cause an intention, and the intellect attributes that caused intention to the nature to which belongs the property from which the intention is taken. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments of Question 9] 18 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that the argument proceeds from the real accident that is present in the nature according to material being. 19 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the intellect does not contribute any property to the thing by changing the thing, since it is not a factive power. It can, however, contribute some property that implies a relation of the thing to the intellect, especially if [that property] is received from a property of the thing, as the intellect contributes modes of signifying to significant speech. These modes of signifying are in the utterance as in their subject, but they are from the intellect as their efficient cause. 20 As for the third argument, what the Commentator says cannot be understood as meaning that there comes to be one item composed of intellect and the intelligible: if that were the case, then the intellect would be composed of the quiddities of all sensibles. Instead, one must understand this to mean that the intellect in act more truly receives the predication of 'one' with the intelligible in act than does matter with form, since the intellect in act just is the intelligible in act, since the intellect by reflection can understand itself through the species of the intelligible in act. By contrast, matter is not the same as form just because it is in a composite with form. [III. Response to Question 10] 21 To the second question I say that "Man is universal" is true in the way that has just been explained [viz., the third way of n. 16]. This accident is present in the thing because the definition

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of the intention is present in the thing in this way. 22 One might object: species is present in man insofar as 'man' is said of many [numerically different particulars]. But it is said of them precisely insofar as it is in them, and this is according to its material being. Therefore, the proposition is true in the first way. 23 To this I say that species is present in many insofar as 'man' is predicated of individuals, speaking of designated predication, not of performed predication: that is, not as it is identical with the supposits, which is the first alternative in the division. [IV. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments of Question 10] 24 To the first argument [in n. 7] I say that 'genuine nature' can be supposited in three ways. This does not mean, however, that the proposition must be distinguished [according to different senses], since diversity of supposition is consistent with unity of subject. But this is more a multiplicity of figure of speech, if there is such a thing. Therefore, the proposition is true without qualification, since insofar as the subject, 'man', supposits a true nature as it is related to the intellect, such an accident, 'species', is in it. For what is multiple according to figure of speech is not genuinely multiple, but only fantastically so. That's why "Socrates is a man" is not distinguished [according to different senses], even though it would be false if 'man' were taken as it is in "Man is a species." 25 To the second argument [in n. 8] I say that "Species is an intention" is false, just like "The white [thing] (19) is a color,"since 'species' implies denominatively something different from what 'intention' implies in the abstract. 26 One might object that if this is so, then "Species is intentional" is true, and thus it follows that "Man is intentional." -- In reply, it can be said that this is a fallacy of the accident, since 'species' with respect to man is taken as a mode, but with respect to intention it is taken as a what, since everything in its genus is a what. 27 To the third argument [in n. 9] I say that this is not a case of predication in the abstract, since 'species' is concrete and is predicated denominatively of the thing. [V. Response to Question 11] 28 To the third question one should say that such statements are not per se. That they are not per se in the first mode is evident as follows: in the first mode a definition or a part of the definition is predicated of the item defined. But it is impossible for a thing of second intention to define a thing of first intention, (20) since if that were possible, a thing would, according to its very essence, be in part from nature and in part from the intellect, and thus it would be from diverse non-ordered causes, and so it would not be essentially one. Therefore, it is impossible for

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any intention to be predicated per se in the first mode of a thing. Nor are they per se in the second mode, since an intention is not caused by the per se principles of the subject. Nor are they per se in the fourth mode, since the thing is not an efficient cause of the intention, but rather the intellect is. Nor are they per se in any mode, since if they were, the nature would be a sufficient cause of such an accident. Therefore, in whatever item that nature would be, that accident would be in it too -- which is false. [VI. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments of Question 11] 29 As for the first argument [in n. 11], I deny the minor premise. 30 One might object that if this is not predicated per se, then it is predicated per accidens. Therefore, "Man is an animal" is per accidens. And this response contravenes the generally accepted use of these terms. 31 In light of this objection I say that 'per se' in the minor premise can qualify either the inherence of the predicate "is predicated of many" or the item that inheres, i.e., the predicate. Taken in the first way, the minor premise is false and the conclusion that follows is false. Taken in the second way, the minor premise is true, but then the conclusion does not follow. Analogously, this is evident in the case of "An accident is a being per se." If 'per se' qualifies the inherence, the statement is true; if it qualifies the item inhering, it is false. 32 The reply to the second argument [n. 12] rests on the same distinction. The minor premise is true if 'per se' qualifies the item inhering, but then the major premise is false. 33 To the third argument [in n 13] I say that universal is present in man as man is abstracted from every real accident consequent on man according to material being, not as man is abstracted from every intentional accident.

[Question 12: Are there exactly five universals?] The question is whether the number of universals is exactly five. 1 It appears that it is not. For to be predicated is a property of the universal; so there are as many universals as there are predicates. But in Topics I [4, 101b24-26] only four predicates are set forth; therefore, etc. By this same argument one could show that there are only three universals, since in that passage species and difference are not listed; therefore, they are not universals. One could also show that there are six, since definition is listed in that passage; therefore, in addition to these five, there will be a sixth universal.

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2 Moreover, "in however many ways one opposite is spoken of, the other opposite is spoken of in just that many ways," according to Aristotle in Topics I [15, 106b14-15]. Universal and singular are opposites. "Singulars are infinite" (21); therefore, so are universals. 3 Moreover, individual is universal, since it is predicated of many; and it is not one of the five, as is evident by examining them one by one. Therefore, etc. 4 Moreover, being is universal. And being is not a genus, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics III [3, 998b21-28], since it is predicated per se of the differentia. Nor is being a species, since if it were, it would have some genus above it. Nor is it any of the other three universals, since they are predicated in quale, whereas being is predicated in quid of everything, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics IV [2, 1003b5-10]. 5 The argument for the opposite is given by Porphyry. [I. Views on the Question] One must say that there are exactly five universals. But this view is put forward in different ways. [A. The View of Albert the Great 1. Exposition of the view] 6 One approach understands the adequacy of these five in the following way. Universal signifies either substance or accident. If it signifies substance, it signifies either the whole or a part. If it signifies a part, it signifies either the material part, and so it is the genus, or the formal part, and so it is the difference. If it signifies the whole substance, then it is the species, since "the species expresses the whole being of the individuals." (22) If it signifies an accident, then it signifies either a convertible accident, and so it is the property, or a non-convertible accident, and so it is the fifth universal. Therefore, since it is not possible to signify anything that can be said of many otherwise than in one of these ways, there are no universals other than these five. [2. Refutation of the view] 7 Objections to this approach: Since universals are second intentions, they are accidental to things of first intention. But nothing is distinguished per se according to that to which it is accidental, and so intentions are not distinguished per se according to things. But the logician treats intentions per se. Therefore, this division is not appropriate for logic. 8 Moreover, all universals are found in the genus of accident. Therefore, the dichotomy between signifying substance and signifying accident is not a proper distinction to make.

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[B. A Second View 1. Exposition of the view] 9 That's why there is another defense of their adequacy based on "being ordered." The claim (23) is that this book is ordered immediately to the Categories, where the topic is what can be ordered in a genus. So here Porphyry is speaking of universals insofar as they can be ordered in a genus. And thus the adequacy of the five predicables is established as follows. There can be an internal ordering of things that are in the same genus or an ordering of things that are in one genus to things that are in another. Within a single genus there can be a direct order according to 'above' and 'below', and thus there are two universals, namely genus and species; or an indirect order, and thus there is the difference above the species indirectly and below the genus. But there is also an ordering of accidents -- either of convertible or of non-convertible accidents -- to substances, and in accordance with this ordering there are the other two universals. [2. Refutation of the view] 10 Objections to this approach: Insofar as items can be ordered in a genus according to 'above' and 'below', they can serve as predicates and subjects. So really this view is treating the five universals insofar as they can serve as predicates and subjects. 11 Moreover, each item in this argument is defined by 'to be predicated' or something equivalent to that. 12 Moreover, if the discrepancy between this book and the Topics is to be accounted for in this way, (24) then difference ought to be listed in the Topics rather than here, since the difference has the character of what can be predicated more than of what can be ordered. 13 Moreover, an individual can be ordered per se in a genus. Therefore, even though an individual does not properly serve as a predicate, it would still have to be put forward here as a sixth universal, since according to those who make this argument, this book is not about universals insofar as they can serve as predicates. 14 Moreover, just as accidents have an order to their subject, which is a substance or another accident, so too does a subject have an order to an accident. Therefore, two universals can be derived from the subject in accordance with its twofold ordering to the accident, just as two universals can be derived from the accident. [II. Scotus's View] 15 On account of these three [!] arguments, this approach should be rejected. One should say instead that the adequacy of the five predicables is established on the basis of "to be predicated" http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (17 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

as follows. To be predicated is divided into 'in quid' and 'in quale' as into per se differences, since these are the primary modes of predication. To be predicated in quid is to for the essence to be predicated of the subject in the mode of an essence, i.e., in the mode of something subsisting, not in the mode of something denominating. But this happens in two ways. First, one might predicate the whole essence of the subject, and in this way we have the species. For if something were in the essence of an individual apart from the essence of the species, two individuals [of the same species] would differ essentially; and on the basis of the differences derived from this extra something in this individual and that one, a species could be divided formally and an individual could be defined, which is absurd. Second, one might predicate part of the essence of the subject, and in this way we have the genus. For if the genus expressed the whole essence of the species, it would be sufficient to define the species, and the difference would be superfluous. 16 To be predicated in quale is to be predicated in the mode of something denominating, which happens in two ways. The first is that something predicates the essence of the subject in the mode of something denominating; in that case it is predicated in quale substantiale, and in this way we have the difference. "For the difference is a quality of a substance," according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [9, 1018a13-17]. The second is that something predicates an accident in the mode of something denominating; in that case it is predicated in quale accidentale. [This sort of predication in turn happens in two ways.] Either it predicates a convertible accident that issues from the principles of the subject, and in this way we have the property; or it predicates a common accident, and in this way we have the last universal. Porphyry explains how he understands this accident in the course of making the distinctions by which he explains his definition of genus. (25) 17 Therefore, since "to be predicated of many" happens only in these five ways, which are the per se divisions of "to be predicated of many," which is the formula of universal itself, it follows that universal is divided into exactly these five. And this division appears to be appropriate, since it divides the formula of the genus [viz., universal] by per se differences. And from this division is evident not only the adequacy of these five universals but also their order and the explanation for their order as given by Porphyry in his treatment of them. 18 One might object to this approach as follows. If Porphyry is treating these five insofar as they can be predicated, and Aristotle speaks of them in the same way in Topics I, then it appears that there is no way to resolve the discrepancy between the two treatments. -- But the answer to this objection will become clear in the course of replying to the preliminary arguments. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 19 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that in Topics I Aristotle distinguishes predicates on the basis of whether they predicate the essence or not, or convertibly or not. Distinguished in this way, there are no predicates other than the four he puts forward there. In Porphyry's book, by contrast, even though universals are considered on the basis of "to be predicated," they are not considered with respect to the same thing as in Aristotle. After all, only one of the five is http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (18 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

predicated convertibly; three predicate the essence non-convertibly, but [they are distinguished] on the basis of their being predicated in quid or in quale, as was said above [in n. 15]. He doesn't mention the difference there because, as had been said there, (26) the difference is reduced to the genus. For it predicates the essence of the subject non-convertibly. That's why in Topics IV [5, 127b37-128a30], where he explains how to construct and deconstruct the genus, he explans this also for difference. There is also an ultimate specific difference that is converted with the species, which is predicated of it reciprocally, which is to be reduced to the definition. And perhaps on account of this diversity of diferentias he did not mention the differentia in connection with any one predicate. He doesn't list the definition there because it does not have some one mode of being predicated in quid or in quale. He doesn't list the species there because it is either reduced to the definition, since the definition is a property of the species, or rather to the genus, since it is predicated essentially and non-convertibly of what it is predicated of. And that is why in Topics IV [3, 123b1] there are considerations of constructing and deconstructing puzzles concercning species just like genus. Alternatively, species is not a predicate of a dialectical proposition, since it is common only with respect to the singular. For in Topics I [11, 105a3-4] Aristotle excludes from the consideration of dialectic those things that are evident to the sense: "it is not appropriate for it to treat just any proposition, but only that which an ignorant person is unsure of -- someone who needs argument, not punishment or sense." Now the least common is species, and so it is more appropriately the subject rather than the predicate in a dialectical proposition. 20 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that the sense of that proposition is this: "However many significates there are of one opposite, there are that many significates of the other opposite," assuming that one is the opposite of the other according to every signification -- not that however many supposits there are of one opposite, there are that many supposits of the other. So this proposition is irrelevant to the question at hand. 21 To the third argument [in n. 3] I say that the intention individual is a species. I explained above in question 8 [qq. 7-8, nn. 6-8, 17-23] how one intention is predicated of another. 22 To the fourth argument [in n. 4] I say that being is equivocal; therefore, it is not predicated [praedicatur], that is, "said before another" [prae alio dicitur]. For what is prior to another is univocal. Therefore, being is not a universal. 23 One might object that being is univocal if taken as the genus of substance. Therefore, being is a universal, and it is not one of these five, as was argued above [in n. 4]. 24 The thing to say is that it is still equivocal with respect to three items. For it is impossible for something univocal to be predicated per se in the first mode of species and differentias, or of one differentia and another opposed differentia, through a superior differentia that is predicated univocally -- since if this were possible, there would be species of the species of which there are differences, which is impossible. Therefore, being in substance is equivocal as http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (19 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

it is said of species in a genus and of the differentias, on the one hand, and [as it is said] of opposed differentias[, on the other]. This is why Avicenna (27) concludes that there are three primary beings in each genus but not that there are three predicates, since the two hierarchies of differences in every genus are reduced to the hierarchy of species. 1. Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] I.10 (CSEL 48: 162). 2. Aristotle, Categories 5, 2b29-31. 3. Actually Avicenna, Metaph. I tr. 1 c. 2. 4. Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] I.11 (CSEL 48:166), says something a bit like this, but Themistius, De an. I (CLCAG I:8-9), is much closer. 5. Averroes, De an. I com. 8. 6. Aristotle, De interpretatione I.7, 17a39-40. 7. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De proprio'. 8. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere'. 9. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.2, 1027a20-26. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 6, q. 2. 10. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.15, 1039b27-1040a5. 11. That of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 2 c. 9. 12. Ibid. 13. This is an almost verbatim echo of the definition given in Euclid's Elements VII def. 2. 14. Reading "Propter hoc et rationem supra positam" with D and R, against the critical edition's "Propter hoc ad rationem suppositam." 15. All the manuscripts read 'sibi', 'itself', which under normal circumstances should refer to "intention of genus." I take it that circumstances are never quite normal when Scotus is writing Latin, and surely 'sibi' stands for "universal." Thus the claim is that universal is a genus with respect to the five predicables. 16. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Praed qq. 37-38, n. 43. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph4-12.htm (20 of 21)11/01/2007 03:42:17 p.m.

Questions on the universal

17. See q. 3, n. 13. 18. Cf. John Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 9, q. 14, n. 111. 19. The Latin term, album, unambiguously denominates something concrete - the white [thing] as opposed to whiteness, albedo, in the abstract. 20. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 5, q. 4, n. 27. 21. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De specie'. 22. Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus I.4. 23. Cf. Anonymous, Porph. q. 8 (cod. Berolin. SB lat. f. 624, f. 5rb. 24. The text given in the critical edition is "si non datur diversitas inter hunc librum et librum Topicorum," but I cannot figure out how to make sense of that reading. My conjecture in the text represents a plausible reading of some of the numerous variants. 25. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De differentia'. 26. Aristotle, Topics I.3, 101b18-19. 27. Avicenna, Logica pars I c. 8.

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A question concerning place

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge John Duns Scotus Translated by Thomas Williams [Question 13: Is place a principle of generation?] The question is whether place is a principle of generation in the way that a father is. 1 It appears that it is not: For a father is a principle per se, whereas place is a principle per accidens, since it does not move. 2 Moreover, time is a principle of generation, since it is an extrinsic measure, as is place. 3 Porphyry speaks for the opposite view. (1) [I. Resolution of the Question] 4 One must say that the proposition is true if the similarity is understood with respect to the genus of cause, since both are in the genus of efficient cause; and this is how Porphyry understands the claim. That is why he says 'principle', which is uniquely suitable for the efficient cause. But the proposition is false if the similarity is understood with respect to the mode of the cause, since a father is efficient cause per se, whereas place is [an efficient cause that] merely contributes (coadiuvans) to generation and conserves the being of things. Now generation terminates at being. And an indication that place is a principle of generation is that lions are generated only in the second and third climate of the earth, and not in others. Similarly, certain plants bear fruit in some parts of the world, but if they were planted in another part of the world they would not bear fruit. 5 Hence the argument can be formulated like this: Something by means of which the power of the principal generator is received in the secondary generator is a principle of generation. This is how the supracelestial bodies are related to inferior bodies, "for man and the sun generate a man," according to Physics II [2, 194b13]. For the secondary generator does not generate except through the power of the primary generator. Now place is something by means of which the power of the primary generator is received in every secondary generator. Therefore, etc. 6 One must notice, however, that place has a twofold nature. The first is its qualitative nature, by which it conserves and generates insofar as it receives some power that flows into it from the http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph13.htm (1 of 2)11/01/2007 03:42:31 p.m.

A question concerning place

supracelestial bodies, which power is by nature apt to generate and conserve the placed body. And in this way the place in which we are is a principle of human beings and of other animals. Hence, on account of such power that has flowed into it, place can also be called an efficient cause. Place also has a quantitative nature through which it contains [placed bodies], and in this way it is not a cause. The difference between these two is evident from Physics II [3, 195a32-35] and Metaphysics V [2, 1013b34-1014a1]. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 7 The reply to the first argument [in n. 1] is evident. 8 To the second argument [in n. 2] I say that time does not contribute per se to generation nor does it save per se the thing generated. It is rather a cause of corruption per se, as is shown in Physics IV [12, 221a30-b8]. 9 Note Physics IV: all things waste away and are corrupted in time. For time carries things away from the way they used to be. (2) For time is the number of motion, and in the number of motion is a successive corruption of the parts. Therefore, time does not contribute per se to generation. 1. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere'. 2. More literally, "For time makes a thing distant from the disposition in which it was."

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge John Duns Scotus Translated by Thomas Williams

[Question 14: What is defined in the definition of genus?] Concerning the definition "genus is what is predicated of many [things that differ in species]," (1) the first question is what is being defined here: an intention, or not? 1 It appears that it is not an intention: For since an intention is an accident, it is not predicated in quid of a thing. But what is being defined here is predicated in quid of a thing. Therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, an intention is not predicated in quid except of this intention and that intention, which are only numerically different because they are only materially different; but a difference in species is a formal difference. But what is defined here is predicated in quid of many specifically different items; therefore, etc. The assumption is evident, since the intention of genus in animal and in color differs only in virtue of that to which it is applied accidentally. 3 Moreover, if the intention of genus is being defined here, then by parity of reasoning the intention of species is being defined a bit later on. So since these are disparate intentions, and a disparate item is not predicated of another disparate item, it follows that genus, as Porphyry is speaking of genus in this book, is not predicated of species. But Porphyry says just the opposite in the chapter "On species." (2) 4 Moreover, in expounding the definition, Porphyry uses animal and man as an example. (3) Therefore, he understood the definition to apply to them; otherwise, the example would have been beside the point. 5 Argument for the opposite view: The logician ought to define only what he considers per se, which is intention. Therefore, etc. The major premise is evident, since what is defined by someone is known by him in accordance with its what-it-is, and thus is known by him per se. Proof of the minor premise: What is primarily considered by the logician is something common that has one sense [intellectum], since a being per accidens is not knowable. Therefore, either that something common is a thing -- in which case, logic will be called a real science on the basis of what it primarily considers -- or else it is an intention, which is what we are claiming.

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

[I. A Reply to the Question: The View of Albert the Great and his Followers] 6 One reply to the question (4) is that what is defined here is a thing as falling under an intention, since that is how a thing is considered by the logician. And thus the replies to the arguments for both sides are evident. 7 An objection against this view: What is defined here applies [convenit] univocally to things of all genera, such as animal, color, figure, and so forth, since it applies to them according to the same name and the same definition. But it is impossible for any thing, in whatever way it is under an intention, to apply univocally to things of all genera. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: A thing cannot be signified by an more common name than 'being'. Therefore, if any thing-under-an-intention were univocal to all [things], then being under the intention of genus could be univocal to them, and thus there would be only one genus of things. 8 One view (5) is that the thing that is defined is not univocal but merely has a unity of proportion. Nonetheless, the mode under which the thing is defined is univocal with respect to diverse genera. 9 An objection: If what is defined here is a thing under an intention, it is a thing per accidens, since it is [a thing defined] on the basis of the fact that the intention accrues to [accidit] it. But "everything per accidens is reduced to something per se" (6) on the basis of which the other is spoken of per accidens. Therefore, since the thing is defined here only on the basis of the intention, it follows that what is defined per se is the intention. 10 Moreover, if the thing is defined per accidens because it is defined under an intention that is accidental to it, it follows that the thing is not defined at all, since a definition applies per se to the thing defined. [II. Resolution of the Question] 11 One should say, given the arguments made thus far, that a thing is not defined in any way. Neither is the aggregate [of thing and intention], since that is a being per accidens, and according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VI [2, 1027a22-26] and VII [5-6, 1031a1-31] there is no definition of a being per accidens. Nor is a thing under an intention, since that will be either an aggregate, a thing, or an intention. What is defined is the intention alone. For what is defined is nothing other than that in which the definition is present per se in the first mode. And that is the intention alone, since the features put forward in the definition are intentional features, namely, "to be predicated of many" and so forth, which cannot hold of anything in the first mode other than an intention. Therefore, etc. Even so, an intention (7) can be signified either in the concrete or in the abstract. The name 'genus' signifies an intention in the first way -- properly, and qua http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (2 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

intention -- since it is qua intention that genus is applicable to a thing. Therefore, genus is defined here in accordance with the way the name 'genus' signifies, that is, qua intention. By contrast, genus is to be defined by the metaphysician qua 'what it is'. (8) 12 In order to deal with the arguments one needs to know that since "to be predicated" is an intention, it is per se of intentions but per accidens of things, whereas "being" is per se of a thing. One also needs to know that 'being' in things of first intention performs what 'to be predicated' designates in second intentions. From these two points follows a third: concrete nouns of second imposition with respect to 'to be predicated' supposit for their foundations or subjects with respect to being. From this it follows that an inference from designated predication to performed predication (in other words, from designated predication to being) does not hold per se in the same terms; but the inference from 'predicated per se' in intentions to being in the foundations is valid: for example: "A genus is predicated of the species; therefore, man is an animal." For in this what is designated in the first intention is performed in the second intention. The difference between a designated and a performed act is evident in many cases. For example: negation is performed by 'not' and designated by 'I deny'; an exclusion is performed by 'only' and designated by 'I exclude' (and the same for 'apart from' and 'I have excepted'). So this is how an argument ought to go: 'From the negation of the superior follows the negation of the inferior; therefore, if it is not an animal, it is not a man." In this argument what was first designated by 'follows' is then performed; 'not' performs what 'negation' signifies. The foundations, namely animal and man, are put in place of the intentions 'superior' and 'inferior'. 13 One might object to this as follows: 'Animal is predicated of man; therefore, man is an animal' is a valid inference in the same terms. 14 I say that the consequent can be true, but not because of the antecedent. It is, after all, quite clear that the consequent is per se and the antecedent per accidens. Now the more true does not have its truth from the less true. Therefore, the inference is not valid. 15 Alternatively, one could say that there are not the same terms in the antecedent and in the consequent, since in the antecedent the terms are understood as designated items are informed by intentions that can be predicated of them per se, whereas in the consequent they are substituted for items designated absolutely, to which those intentions are extraneous. And thus they are not the same terms, since such diversity is sufficient for a fallacy of the accident. (9) Therefore, it is also sufficient to diversify the terms, since the term that is varied in a fallacy of the accident is in fact two terms. [III. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 16 To the first argument [in n. 1] I say that an intention is not the 'what' of a thing. Nonetheless, it is predicated in quid of a thing in such a way that 'in quid' qualifies the inhering item and not the inherence, (10) since 'to be predicated in quid' is an accident, since it is an intention, as the item defined is also. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (3 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

17 I reply to the second argument [in n. 2] on the same basis: this intention 'genus' is not the 'what' of anything other than items differing in number. Nonetheless, it is predicated of items differing in species. 18 I reply to the third argument [in n. 3] on the same basis: genus is predicated of species even though the intentions are disparate; nonetheless, it is not the case that one of them just is the other. 19 To the fourth argument [in n. 4] I say that the same item that is designated by a definition in intentions is performed in things. And so Porphyry uses things as an example because they are more evident, not because they are what he was defining.

[Question 15: Is genus defined appropriately?] The question is whether genus is defined appropriately. 1 It appears that it is not: For every accident is defined through a substance, since substance precedes every accident, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [1, 1028a32-34]. But nothing is put forward in this definition that pertains to substance. Therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, a concrete item is not defined; therefore, etc. The proof of the antecedent is drawn from Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [6, 1031b19-30]: in what is said according to an accident, 'what it is' is not the same as that of which it is. He gives the example of "The musical is white." But whatever items are defined properly have a 'what it is' identical with themselves; therefore, etc. 3 Moreover, there is a proof from reason. What is defined is in a genus. But a concrete item is not in a genus, according to Aristotle in Topics III [1, 116a21-24], where he says one ought to prefer "what is in a genus to what is not, as justice rather than what is just." 4 Moreover, definition is only of a species. Genus is not a species. Therefore, etc. 5 Moreover, this definition does not state genus and difference, which are required for a correct definition according to Aristotle in Topics VI [4, 141b24-28]. 6 Moreover, according to Aristotle in Topics VI [4, 141a27-28], "a definition is given for the sake of knowing [the defined item]," and so it should be given on the basis of what is prior and betterknown. Species is not like this, since it is either posterior to genus or simultaneous by nature, and so it is not prior or better-known.

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

7 Moreover, it is redundant to say 'several things differing'. I prove this as follows: 'differing' per se includes manyness as a species includes its genus. This is evident from Aristotle in Metaphysics V [9, 1018a12-15] and X [4, 1055a3-16]. Therefore, 'differing' taken concretely includes many. Therefore, to say 'many things differing' is redundant. And in this definition 'several' is used with the sense 'many'; or, if it used comparatively, it still signifies the same. 8 One reply to this argument (11) is to say that redundancy involves placing an inferior before a superior of the same part of speech, not vice versa, since if the superior is put before the inferior, the inferior then gives the species of the superior. 9 Arguments against this reply: In Topics VI [3, 141a15-18], where he teaches the demolition of definitions on account of redundancy, Aristotle says this: "Again, if someone has added the particular when the universal has already been said," read: there is redundancy; "for example, if the just is said to be expedient, since the just is contained in the expedient" as the inferior in the superior. "Therefore, the just is excessive," that is, superfluous, in the definition, given that 'expedient' has already appeared in it. (12)

Moreover, in the chapter of Metaphysics VII on the unity of definition, Aristotle says that there is redundancy in putting the superior difference before the inferior, as in "An animal having feet that is bipedal." Two proofs of this claim are given in that chapter: One is based on the per se mode of knowing redundancy, which is to replace names with definitions. "For he had said nothing other than 'An animal having feet, having two feet'." (13) 11 The same claim is also proved there through transposition: "Now it will be clear if someone transposes such definitions," and says, "a bipedal animal that has feet; for once 'bipedal' has been said, it is superfluous to say 'having feet'." (14) Therefore, the first formulation was a redundancy. If these two techniques -- replacing names with definitions, and transposition -- are valid, they refute the aforementioned reply [in n. 8] in this case and in all others. 12 The argument for the opposite view is taken from Porphyry, as well as from Aristotle, who gives a similar definition of genus in Topics I [5, 102a31-32]. [I. A Reply to the Question: The View of Boethius] 13 One answer (15) to the question is that this is a description, not a genuine definition. And this

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

is hinted at in the text where it says "and describing this." (16) 14 But one could easily evade the question in this way for just about any definition. And that bit of text doesn't help, since the text also says "they assigned" -- in other words, they defined. 15 Moreover, further down in the chapter "On species," Porphyry says, "One must use the formula [ratio] of each in the definition of each." Now the formula that the name signifies is the definition. (17) 16 Moreover, this formula is convertible with the item defined, as Porphyry proves; and it is not predicated of it as an accident, since the features put forward in this formula are of the same genus as the definition, since they are intentions. Now whatever in a given genus is predicated per se of another item in that genus is superior to that other item, since it is neither inferior nor disparate. Therefore, this formula is the definition. 17 Moreover, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [4, 1029b12-22], a formula that is [composed] of items predicated per se in whose definition the subject does not appear, if it is convertible with the subject, is a definition. The definition now under discussion is like this, since the item defined does not appear in the definition of any of the components of the definition. 18 Moreover, it is predicated per se and convertibly. And it is not predicated as property, since if it were, this formula as a whole could itself be defined. Nor is it predicated as ultimate difference, since if it were, one would have to add the genus to it. But if one were to add 'universal', which is the genus of the item defined in this definition, there would be a redundancy. Therefore, this is a definition. [II. Resolution of the Question] 19 In answer to this question one should say that this is a genuine definition. That is shown in the following way: The formula of universal is "to be predicated of many," according to Aristotle in De interpretatione I [7, 17a39-b1]. So "to be predicated of many" in the definition of genus states its genus. After that comes "items differing in species" and "in quid," which are per se differentias of the genus. Here is the proof: They divide per se the superior, i.e., "to be predicated of many"; therefore, they constitute per se the inferior to which the superior is appropriated through them. For "to be predicated of many" is divided per se into "items differing in species" and "items differing in number," since nothing is predicated per se of items differing in genus as such. It is also divided into 'in quid' and 'in quale' as through the primary modes of predicating. And it is evident that through these differences that divide ["to be predicated of many"], universal is contracted into genus, since a convertible formula is made in that way. Therefore, etc. [III. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments]

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

20 One reply (18) to the first argument [in n. 1] is that this is true of conjoined accidents, that is, those that determine their subjects -- they are called 'conjoined' in Metaphysics VII [5, 1030b1420]. Intentions, by contrast, do not determine a thing of any particular genus, since they are applied univocally to all. 21 Objections to this reply: If a passion is univocal, so too is its subject, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I. (19) So if an intention is univocal in many genera, its subject will be too. 22 Moreover, if an actuality is univocal, so too is the potentiality [that corresponds to it], since potentiality is ordered per se to actuality. The subject is in potentiality to an accident in the way that matter is to form, since an accident has no matter other than matter 'in which'. 23 It can be said that Aristotle's claim [in n. 21] is true of a real passion that proceeds from the principles of its subject, which is what Aristotle is talking about in that passage -- in other words, one that can be demonstrated of its subject. But an intention, which is from the intellect as efficient cause, is not like that. 24 On the basis of this one can reply to the other objection [in n. 22] that this is true of a potentiality that is ordered per se to actuality. But the potentiality in the subject of an intention with respect to the intention itself is not like this, since an intention is not in a thing by nature but only as it is considered by reason. 25 Another objection: if there is no unity in this thing and that one, and this intention is univocal to them both, then the intention is not received from anything that is in this thing and that one. Therefore, it is fictive. 26 One reply (20) is that some unity in the thing is sufficient, namely, unity of proportion, by which the intellect is moved to attribute this univocal intention to this item and to that. For color is related to whiteness in the same way that animal is to man. 27 An objection to this reply: the unity of univocation is great than unity of proportion, so the latter is not derived from the former. 28 It can be said that a lesser unity can be an occasion for receiving the greater unity, just not the total cause. So the unity in the thing is merely an occasion for the unity in the intention insofar as the intellect is moved by it. Nevertheless, the intellect, once moved, can cause the greater unity in the intention. 29 Alternatively, it could be conceded that it has a univocal subject, since although one and the same thing is not in diverse genera, one and the same thing as considered by reason can be in http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (7 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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diverse genera, and it is only in this way that it is the subject of an intention. 30 Alternatively, it could be said in reply to the [first] preliminary argument [in n. 1] that it is true of accidents that have their being from the subject, since the only reason something is defined through substance is that it is through the substance. For the 'what it is' and the definition of anything in reality corresponds to the being of that thing. An intention, by contrast, does not have its being through its subject; rather, it has being from the intellect. 31 To the second preliminary argument [in n. 2] I say that a concrete item can be defined. I say that where Aristotle says otherwise, in Metaphysics VII [6, 1031a19-21], what he is calling 'items said per accidens' are those that aggregate in themselves diverse natures -- for example, a white man. After all, he offers that example at the beginning of the chapter where he says "in things said according to an accident, for example, a white man." Therefore, everything said after that should be understood accordingly. So he says "The musical" for "The musical man." For 'musical' signifies in two ways. 32 To the next argument [in n. 3], from the Topics, it can be said that the just is not in the genus of virtue, so it does not make the one who has it good, as justice does. Nonetheless, it is in a predicable genus. 33 Alternatively: the most general genera of accidents are abstract, and the only items in them per se are abstracta, that is, items that receive such predication per se. Nonetheless, their respective concreta are per se in a genus with respect to each other, since they are related to each other as superior and inferior: and that is enough for them to be defined. But speaking without qualification, conreta are in a genus only through reduction, since the only reason they are in any category is that a hierarchy of concreta is reduced to a hierarchy of abstracta. 34 To the third preliminary argument [in n. 4] I say that genus is a species, as was said above in question 8. (21) 35 The reply to the fourth argument [in n. 5] is evident through what was said in the resolution of the question [in n. 19], since the definition of genus states the genus and along with it the per se difference. 36 To the fifth argument [in n. 6] I say that an absolute can be known in itself through essential [features] and better-known items, and so other items should not be included in its definition. But something that depends per se -- in virtue of what it is -- on another cannot be known apart from that other, as is said in the Categories [7, 8a35-37] concerning relatives. And that is why the correlative is included [in the definition]: not as something better-known, but because without it, the item defined cannot be known. 37 To the sixth argument [in n. 7] I say that 'differing in species' is exposition. It is not put

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forward in the definition as diverse parts of 'several', that is, as meaning that they are several because they differ in species.

[Question 16: Is 'Man is animal' true?] Concerning the phrase "genus is predicated of species," the question is whether a genus is predicated of a species by a performed predication in the foundations of those intentions, so that 'Man is animal', and other such statements, are true. 1 It seems that they are not: For a part is not predicated of the whole, according to Aristotle in Topics IV [5, 126a27-29]. That's why he claims that it is a mistake to say a part is the genus. The genus is a part of the species, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [25, 1023b24-25], in the chapter "On the whole." And here is the proof: what is a part of the definition is a part of the item defined; the genus is a part of the definition; therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, matter is not predicated of the item whose matter it is; genus is the matter of a species; therefore, etc. The major premise is evident, since matter is per se in potentiality to that whose matter it is. The composite is a being in actuality. The minor premise is proved on the basis of what Porphyry says in this chapter: "Genus is a principle of species." And so he says that this fits with the second signification. (22) Now it is not a formal principle, since it does not distinguish one species from others, whereas a form does distinguish them. Neither is it an efficient principle, since it does not make the species to be in actuality. Neither is it an end, since the species is not on account of the genus, since the genus is more imperfect than the species. Therefore, it is a material principle. The same conclusion is evident on the basis of what Porphyry says in the chapter "On difference," (23) where he argues for the second definition of difference on the basis of the claim that the difference has a likeness to form and the genus to matter. 3 One reply to this second argument is that genus is not matter but form, since according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [25, 1023b17-25], all the parts of a definition are like forms. (24) As for the claim that "a form distinguishes," that is true of the ultimate and completive form (25); but a genus is not that sort of form. 4 And to the second dictum from Porphyry they (26) say that it does not mean that the genus is matter, but that it is similar to matter in that it is determinate. 5 An objection to this view: Form is not predicated of the composite, just as it is not predicated of the matter, since form is incompatible with the composite by reason of the matter, by reason of which the composite is in potentiality.

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6 By way of reply to this objection, it is said that form is twofold. There is form that is one of the two parts of the composite, and there is also form that is consequent to the composite. An example of the first is the soul; this sort of form is not predicated of the composite. An example of the second is humanity, which results from the composition of matter with form. The genus is this sort of form, and it is predicated of the composite. 7 An objection to this reply: The second sort of form is predicated of the composite only in the concrete. After all, "Man is humanity" is false. But in this way -- that is, in the concrete -- matter too can be predicated of the composite. Therefore, the first response, which denies that genus is matter and concedes that it is form, does not help salvage the claim that the genus is predicated of the species. 8 For this reason an alternative argument is given (27) in response to both preliminary arguments. The claim is that a part, or matter in the abstract, is not predicated of the whole; but it can be predicated in the concrete of the whole, and in this way it is signified by the genus. 9 An objection: Every concrete term is denominative. Therefore, if the genus is predicated in the concrete of the species, it will be predicated denominatively. Proof of the first proposition: "'Denominatives' is the name given to terms that derive their name from another, with only a difference in case" (28); all concrete terms are of this sort with respect to their abstract counterparts. The consequent is false, since a genus is predicated univocally of the species, and so it is not predicated denominatively, since those are disparate modes of predication. And the same conclusion is demonstrated in a similar way at the beginning of Topics II [2, 109b4-7] 10 Moreover, every concrete term signifies a form as it inheres in a subject. No substance is in a subject, according to Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter "On substance." (29) Therefore, nothing signifying a substance is concrete. 11 Alternatively, another response (30) is that real matter or a real part is not predicated of the whole, whereas rational matter or a rational part is, and that's the sort of item the genus is. 12 An objection to this response: In Metaphysics VII [10, 1034b20-24], Aristotle says, "As reason is to the thing, so are the rational parts to the parts of the thing." Therefore, by permutation, as the parts of the thing are to the thing, so are the rational parts to reason. But the parts of the thing, according to this view, are not predicated of the whole; therefore, neither are the rational parts. 13 Another response (31) follows Boethius (32) in saying that in a definition the genus is a part, but in predication it is a whole. 14 An objection to this response: Insofar as the genus is included in the definition of the species, it is predicated of the species per se in the first mode, since the first mode is when [sic] a part of http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (10 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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the definition, or the definition itself, is predicated of the item defined. Therefore, it is under the same notion both as it occurs in the definition and as it is predicated. 15 Moreover, whether in definition or in predication, it is either univocal or equivocal. If equivocal, then it is not the genus or an item in the definition. If univocal, then it signifies the same in both uses, and so it is a part either in both uses or in neither. 16 A further argument with respect to the principal question: The inference "Man is animal; therefore, humanity is animality" is valid; the consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. Proof of the inference: When there is per se predication in the antecedent, then the inference from concretes to abstracts is valid, since if the predicatio] is per se, then there is truth in the concretes by reason of the essence signified, not by reason of what is concreted. For in a predication that is per se in the first mode, the predicate predicates the subject's essence; but the essence abstracted from what is concreted is properly signified by an abstract [term]; therefore, [such a predication] is true in the abstract. 17 Moreover, this is made clear by way of examples. For although the inference "The musical is white; therefore, music is whiteness" is not valid, the inference "The white is colored per se in the first mode; therefore, whiteness is a color" is valid, since in virtue of the terms' mode of signifying, the same item is put forward in the consequent as is expressed per se in the antecedent. Proof of the falsity of the consequent: If humanity is animality, then by parity of reasoning humanity is rationality, since 'rational' is predicated per se of man just as much as 'animal' is. And from these two it follows in the third figure "therefore rationality is animality," which is false. Therefore, so is the major premise, since the minor premise follows from the major. Moreover, if the minor premise is false, it follows that the major premise is also false, since the argument is parallel in both cases. 18 Here is my proof that that conclusion is false. Every true predication in the abstract is per se in the first mode. (33) "Rationality is animality" is not per se, since a genus is not predicated per se of the difference, according to Aristotle in Topics VI [6, 144a29-31] and Metaphysics III [3, 998b24-26]; therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: In Metaphysics VII [12, 1038a9-15], where Aristotle sets out to show that a superior difference is included in the intelligible content [intellectu] of an inferior, he shows this on the basis of the claim that "clovenness of the foot is a sort of footedness" -- because, that is, it is a true predication in the abstract in which a superior difference is predicated of an inferior. (34) But what is included in the intelligible content of another item is predicated of that item per se in the first mode. 19 Moreover, this is proved by argument: Abstracts signify an essence in and of themselves. Therefore, if one abstract term is truly said of another with the verb 'is', then this essence is that essence, and so the predicate is predicated essentially of the subject, since it is predicated per se in the first mode. 20 Moreover, another argument with respect to the principal question can be made on the basis http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (11 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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of common middle terms. For where the genus is the predicate, the proposition is false. Likewise where the species is the predicate, since the subject and predicate are understood under opposed notions; therefore, the proposition is false. The inference is evident, since "Whiteness is white" is false for precisely that reason. 21 Moreover, as the affirmation of ass is to the affirmation of animal, so is the negation of ass to the negation of animal. But the inference "Man is an ass; therefore, man is an animal" is valid, since the opposite of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent. Therefore, the inference "Man is not an ass; therefore, man is not an animal" is valid. The antecedent is true; therefore, so is the consequent. 22 Proof of the first proposition [i.e., the major premise of n. 21] from Posterior Analytics I [13, 78b21-22]: If an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, the negation is the cause of a negation. Moreover, this is proved by argument: As the affirmation of ass is to its negation, so is the affirmation of animal to its negation. Therefore, by permutation, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth. That this form of argument is a good one is evident from Aristotle in Prior Analytics II [22, 67b28-29, 68a4-5] in the chapter "Since, however, the extremes are exchanged." There he lays down two rules that manifestly contain this form of argument. Plus, he uses this form of argument in De interpretatione II [14, 23a27-28], near the end, in order to answer the question beginning "Are contraries." 23 Moreover, what is predicated of man is either the 'animal' that is the same as man or the 'animal' that is other than man. If the same, then the same is predicated of itself; if other, then that other could not be predicated. 24 Moreover, if man is animal, then the whole nature of animal is in man, since otherwise man would be animal only secundum quid. But a whole is that outside of which there is nothing, according to Aristotle in Physics III [6, 207a8-10]. Therefore, outside of man there is nothing of the nature of animal. Therefore, ass is not animal. 25 Moreover, if man is animal and animal is a genus, it follows that man is a genus. 26 One approach (35) is to say that here there is a fallacy of the accident on account of a variation of the middle terms, since as animal is predicated of man it is understood according to its being in the supposits, or [in other words] its quidditative being; by contrast, as the intention [of genus] applies to it, it is understood according to the being that it has as it is compared to the intellect. These make for a shift [extraneitas] in the term. 27 An objection to this approach: Everything that is predicated properly is predicated under the notion of some universal. Therefore, if 'animal' is predicated properly in "Man is animal," it is predicated under the notion of some universal. Now it is not predicated under any notion other than that of genus. Therefore, that notion is not extraneous to animal as it is understood in "Man

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is animal." 28 One argument focus specially on the species: What is incorruptible is not predicated of the corruptible. The individual is corruptible, whereas according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [10, 1035b4-31; 15, 1039b20-1040a5] the species is incorruptible. Therefore, etc. 29 An argument for the opposite is drawn from Porphyry in the chapter "On species," (36) where he says that "all superiors are predicated of inferiors." And after giving the aforementioned definition, he gives the following example: "Animal is predicated of man, therefore of any given man." 30 Moreover, according to Aristotle in the Categories [5, 3a17-20], secondary substances are predicated of primary substances. He proves this on the grounds that animal is predicated of man, and therefore also of any given man. 31 Moreover, the first mode of per se predication is when the definition or a part of the definition is predicated of the defined item. Therefore, "Man is animal" is per se in the first mode. Therefore, it is necessary. Therefore, it is true. The inferences are clear from Posterior Analytics I [4, 73a34-38], and likewise the first antecedent. 32 Moreover, the inference "A man runs; therefore, an animal runs" is valid, as is said in the Categories [5, 2b31-3a6] before Aristotle states the properties of substance. And it is proved by argument. For the opposite of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent. Now every enthymematic inference is valid in virtue of some necessary middle by which it can be reduced to a syllogism. That middle in the present case is "Man is animal." Therefore, that is necessary, since every good inference is necessary. That a middle is necessary for the inference in the present case is evident from what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics [I.6, 6, 74b26], and an inference is never valid except in virtue of the necessity of the middle. Therefore, in every enthymematic inference the middle must be necessary. 33 The same conclusion is proved on the basis of what Aristotle says in Prior Analytics I [1, 24b22-24]: only a syllogism requires nothing additional in order to be necessary. Therefore, an enthymeme requires something additional. 34 Moreover, [the same conclusion follows from what is said in] Prior Analytics I [23, 40b30-37] and Posterior Analytics I [3, 73a6-11], where Aristotle says that nothing follows from one [premise]. That is, nothing follows sufficiently, unless another [premise] is supplied. [I. Reply to the Question] 35 To this question one should say that a predication in which a superior is predicated of an inferior is universally true. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (13 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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[II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 36 In order to resolve the first argument [in n. 1], note that a genus is taken from something material (37) in a species and primarily implies that [something material] in virtue of its determinate intelligible content. Nonetheless, the genus does not signify that [something material] through the mode of a part but through the mode of a whole, and therefore it implies the whole consequently. In the same way, the difference primarily signifies something formal of the species from which it is taken, but it signifies the whole consequently, since it implies that something formal through the mode of a whole. For if both genus and difference primarily implied the same item, it would be impossible to avoid a redundancy in the definition, since if one replaced the names with definitions, (38) the very same item (which would belong to the intelligible content of both) would be stated twice over. And if one or the other had its signification through the mode of a part, the predication that predicated it [of the species] would be false because of the incompatible mode. 37 Therefore, in reply to the first and second argument [in nn. 1-2] it can be said that matter or a part understood through the mode of a part is not predicated truly of the whole; nonetheless, understood through the mode of a whole, it can be predicated truly, as Avicenna (39) shows through his example of 'handed' and 'headed', which signify diverse items. They primarily signify hand and head, but both consequently signify the whole because they signify the part through the mode of a whole. For example, 'handed' is expounded by 'having a hand', where 'having' does not belong to the significate of 'handed' but to its mode of signifying through the mode of the whole. For having-a-hand is not of a part but of a whole. In this way 'animal' is expounded by 'having sense' and 'rational' as 'having intellect'. 38 Now since the other responses stated above, except for the first, can be reduced to this one, one must respond to the objections made against them. And since the second response [in n. 8] concedes that the genus signifies the material part through the mode of a concrete -- a point on which these first two responses agree -- and on that basis the previous response is successful, one must reply to the arguments against the second response [in nn. 9-10]. 39 As for the claim in the first argument [in n. 9] that "every concrete term is denominative," one must make a distinction. Just as the abstract is twofold (40) -- what abstracts from the subject, and what abstracts from the form as it is in the supposit -- so too the concrete is twofold by way of opposite [to the abstract] -- what is joined with [concernit] the subject and what is joined with the supposit. The stated proposition is true of the concrete in the first sense, false of the concrete in the second sense. 40 The reply to the second argument [in n. 10] relies on the same distinction. A concrete term in the first sense signifies a form as it is in the subject, and [such a form] is merely among accidents: for example, 'white' with respect to whiteness. A concrete term in the second sense signifies a form as it is in the supposits, and in this way [such a form] is [also] among substances: http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (14 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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for example, 'man' with respect to humanity. 41 As for the claim in the proof [given in n. 9] that every concrete term satisfies the definition of denominative, one must say that a substantial concrete term does not, since it does not differ from the corresponding abstract term only in its case (that is, only in its relation to the subject, which is how 'case' is understood in this claim). Rather, it differs with respect to the relation of the form to the supposit. (41) 42 There is an alternative argument (42) against the response [in n. 8] that concedes that matter is predicated in the concrete. According to this argument, 'animal' signifies the matter of man in the concrete in the same way that 'wood' signifies the matter of a chest in the concrete. Therefore, just as 'The chest is wood" (43) is false, notwithstanding that concretion, so too "Man is animal" is false. The first proposition is evident, for just as 'animal' is concrete with respect to animality, so too is 'wood' with respect to woodenness. 43 To this one should say that 'animal' is concrete as to the supposit with respect to man, since man is its supposit. That's not how things are with 'wood' with respect to a chest. For although 'wood' is concrete with respect to woodenness, and therefore 'wood' is predicated of this wood, it is nonetheless not concrete with respect to the chest, since 'chest', with respect to the form that it principally signifies, is artificial. Now an artificial form is to a natural form as an accident is to its subject; and nothing, insofar as it is concrete, is concrete with respect to its accident. Hence, the two cases are not parallel, since in the present case ["The chest is wood"] what is signified is matter in the concrete that is is joined with the materiated item, whereas in the other case ["Man is animal"] that is not so. 44 As for the argument against the third response given above [in n. 12], I say that Aristotle's comparison is not to be understood as applying to "being predicated" but as applying to "determinately conveying." For just as the whole definition distinctly expresses the whole item defined, so too a part of the definition distinctly expresses just a part of the thing; but it is not the case that a part of the definition is predicated of a part of the thing in just the same way that the whole definition is predicated of the whole thing. For "Animal is rational" is false, so far as 'rational' is understood as the difference of man. So if the permutation is done according to "determinately conveying," I concede the conclusion; but the comparison is not legitimate on any other terms. 45 The fourth response [in nn. 13-14], that of Boethius, should be understood in the following way. In both definition and predication, genus is both a part and the whole. That is, it distinctly conveys the part through the mode of a whole. Nonetheless, by appropriation it is predicated because it is a whole (that is, it is predicated as having the mode of a whole); and by appropriation it figures in the definition because it signifies a part. For a definition ought to express distinctly the principles of the item defined, and what the genus distinctly expresses is a prt. Therefore, speaking in terms of appropriation, genus figures in the a defiition as a part; nonetheless, in itself genus is similarly both whole and part in both predication and definition. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (15 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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46 As for the third preliminary argument [n. 16], I reject the inference ["Man is animal; therefore, humanity is animality"]. The reply to the proof is that the inference holds only from concrete terms said from their concretion with the per se subject. It does not hold in other cases. 47 To the fourth preliminary argument [nn. 16-19] I say that there are certain modes that are properly called modes of signifying, which belong to an expression [dictio] in virtue of imposition, and they are inseparable from the significate. For the significate, insofar as it is signified by such an expression, cannot be understood under the opposite of such a mode of signification without repugnance. For example, 'man', insofar as it is singular, cannot be understood under the plural mode. There are other modes, properly called modes of understanding, which are in the significate only insofar as it is conceived under a certain mode. These are separable from the significate, since the significate, insofar as it is signified under such an expression, can be understood under the opposite of such a mode without repugnance, in the same way that these intentions are related to the items to which they are applied]. For 'man' can be understood under the opposite of this intention 'species' without opposition, as in "this man." The first modes, which are inseparable from the significate insofar as it is signified by such an expression, do not abandon the significate with respect to any predicate whatsoever; and although the modes are not the items that are united [to make a statement], they are nonetheless formal principles under which the significates are united. Therefore, such repugnant modes cause falsity when they are with respect to the same significate, as in "Whiteness is white," not when they are with respect to diverse significates, as in "Man is white," since in the later [the modes] are not opposed. The second modes are extraneous to the significates as united by the verb 'is'. For being is of a thing per se. These intentions are not in things per se, but insofar as they are compared to the intellect. Therefore, these modes are not united per se; nor are they formal principles under which the formal significates are united. Therefore, their repugnance does not cause falsity. 48 As for the fifth argument [n. 21], I reject the analogy, since it commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent. As for the first proof [n. 22], it must be said that Aristotle understands it as applying to precise causes, as he illustrates by example (44): if "having lungs" is the cause of breathing, then "not having lungs" is the cause of not breathing. But the affirmation of a species is not the precise cause for inferring the affirmation of the genus. To the other argument [of n. 22] it must be said that the first analogy holds with respect to opposition. With respect to opposition, therefore, the inference holds only in a case of permutation; but by permutation the conclusion is reached that there is an analogy with respect to being antecedent and being consequent. [I have no clue what Scotus is saying here.] 49 To the sixth argument [23] one must say that the 'animal' that is predicated of man is http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (16 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:02 p.m.

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indifferent to 'the same as man' and 'other than man'. Nonetheless, it is made true by the animal that is the same as man. 50 An objection: If 'animal' is predicated as it is indifferent to many, then any one [of those animals] can be predicated of [man]. 51 I say that this inference is invalid, since the indifference is in the mode of a disjunction. From something related disjunctively to many does not follow from any given one of those many, since [the something related disjunctively] can be made true by any given one of them, as in the case under discussion. 52 The reply to the seventh argument [n. 24] is that the definition of 'whole' should be understood as follows: 'outside of which there is nothing' means 'which lacks nothing requisite for itself', as the nature of animal in man lacks nothing of the nature of animal. It doesn't mean that there is precisely that nature [and nothing else] in man. 53 The reply to the eighth argument [n. 25] is that it commits a fallacy of the accident, as was said above [in n. 26]. 54 As for the argument against this reply [n. 27]: The claim that everything that is predicated is predicated under the notion of some universal is true of designated predication but not of performed predication, since the notion of universal is extraneous to something insofar as it is predicated in a performed predication that is made using 'is'. 55 There are two replies to the ninth argument [n. 28]. The first is that the per se common supposit includes only the designated nature of its common [something] and no accident, and for that reason it is not corruptible per se, just as it is not common per se. Rather, it is both corruptible and common secundum quid, that is, per accidens. [I really don't know what's going on here. Too much 'communis'.] 56 The other reply is that the species as it is in individuals is corruptible, but in and of itself it is incorruptible in virtue of its being always carried on through a succession of diverse individuals.

[Question 17: Is 'differing in species' appropriately included in the definition of genus?] The question is whether the second phrase in the definition of genus, 'differing in species', is appropriately included. 1 It appears that it is not For it is included in order to distinguish genus from species. But that does not happen, since the http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (17 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

inference "Differing in species, therefore differing in number" is valid, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [6, 1016b32-1017a3] in the chapter "On one"; and 'differing in number' is included in the definition of species. But the antecedent is not distinguished from the consequent. 2 Moreover, this phrase is included in order to distinguish genus from property. But that does not happen. Therefore, it is included in vain. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is evident, since certain intermediate genera have properties: for example, number, figure, triangle, etc. So either those properties are predicated of items differing in species, and so my point is made, since the phrase in question would apply to property; or else they are not predicated of items differing in species, in which case they are not properties, since "a property is convertible with that of which it is a property." (45) 3 Moreover, if this phrase is appropriately included, then 'being predicated of items differing in species' is present per se in the item defined. And if this is so, then items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus. This is false; therefore, so is the first antecedent. The first inference is evident from the notion of the first mode of per seity. 4 Here is a proof of the second inference on the basis of an analogy to other relatives. Double is related per se to half; therefore, half is related per se to double. The same thing is shown by argument. Nothing is said to be related per se except to its per se correlative. For if [something were related per se] to a per accidens correlative, then since there can be many [per accidens correlatives], the same [relative] would be said per se with respect to many. That is absurd, and for three reasons. First, it is contrary to authority, since in Metaphysics V [15, 1021a31-b2], in the chapter "On relation," Aristotle holds that it is absurd. Second, it contravenes the notion of a relative, since the "being" of a relative "is to be related to another." (46) Therefore, being-related is of the essence of a relative. Now to diverse relata there are diverse relations; therefore, what is per se related to two items is not one essentially. Third, it contravenes the property of relatives, since they are "simultaneous in nature." (47) For if a is said per se with respect to both c and b, then if c does not exist, a will not exist; and b, for its part, can exist; therefore, a will exist. Therefore, a will simultaneously exist and not exist. Here is a proof of the falsity of the main consequent ["Items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus"]. It is only intentions that are subordinated per se to a genus, since being subordinated is a feature of intentions, just as being predicated is; therefore, it belongs per se only to intentions. But those intentions differ only in virtue of the matter to which they are applied. Therefore, they differ only in number, not in species, since "a specific difference is a formal difference." (48) Universally, however, the difference of accidents in virtue of their subject is only a material difference. 5 Porphyry defends the opposite view. (49)

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

[I. Reply to the Question] 6 In reply to this question one must say that the phrase is appropriately included, since that phrase provides the difference by which the genus 'universal' descends into the species 'genus'. For the intelligible nature of universal is "to be predicated of many," which is divided per se into "many in species" and "many in number." And the former is included [in the definition] because the defined item is relative per se. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 7 One reply (50) to the first argument [n. 1] is to say that genus qua genus is not predicated of many items differing in number; rather, it is accidental [to genus that it is predicated of many items differing in number], just as one and the same item can be both genus and species under extraneous notions. 8 An objection to this reply: Insofar as something is predicated of items differing in species, it is predicated of items differing in number; therefore, it is not predicated extraneously [of items differing in number]. The antecedent is evident, since 'differing in number' follows from 'differing in species'; and the consequent is predicated of the antecedent with reduplication. 9 Therefore, it can be said that the definition of species should be understood restrictively: "differing only in number"; and thus it does not follow from "differing in species.' (51) 10 Alternatively, it can be said that the species is predicated immediately of items differing in number, whereas the genus is not; the genus is predicated of them with the species as intermediate. (52) 11 To the second argument [n. 2] I say that there is not a property of anything insofar as it is a genus, but [only] insofar as it is a species; and in this way it is convertible with that [of which it is the proprium] insofar as it is predicated of items differing in number. The argument for the assumption is that there is a property of something only insofar as it is by nature apt to be a subject of demonstration, and that is the case only insofar as it is a species, since it is only insofar as a species that it is defined. For one must presuppose of a subject both what it is and that it is, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics I [1, 71a11-16]. But insofar as it is defined, it has a genus and differentia, and thus it is a species. 12 One reply to the third argument [n. 3] is that 'items differing in species' is understood as meaning 'different species', which, however, do not differ in species, as the argument shows. (53) 13 Alternatively, one can deny the second inference ["If 'being predicated of items differing in species' is present per se in the item defined, then items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus"], on the grounds that per se is being related to different relata in the antecedent http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (19 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

and the consequent. 14 If one concedes the inference, the final consequent ["items differing in species are subordinated per se to a genus"] can also be conceded. And with this, that those items that are subordinated per se to a genus differ only in number, since items differing in species do not differ in species but only in number, understanding 'items differing in species' in the subject for the supposits of that which is differing in species, which [supposits] are items differing in species. (54) For a common term in the plural is predicated of many supposits simultaneously. And in that case 'items differing in species' is understood as expressing a 'what' with respect to the supposits. But those supposits are not items differing in species, insofar as 'items differing in species' expresses a mode (just as 'genus' is a genus as 'genus' expresses a 'what', not as it expresses a mode); rather, they are species. In this way the difference is not a difference but a species. Thus, many genera -- that is to say, many supposits of a genus -- are not many genera -- that is to say, items to which 'genus' is applied as a mode. Nor is there opposition of a mode to a 'what' or vice versa.

[Question 18: Does one genus require many species?] The question is whether a genus necessarily requires many species. 1 It appears that it does: For that is included in the definition of genus; therefore, it is of the essence of genus. 2 Moreover, in the chapter "On species" Porphyry writes, "one genus, but a plurality of species." (55) He proves it thus: "The division of a genus is always made into a plurality of species." It can be proved like this: A genus, by its very nature, is divided by opposed differences; now either difference, added to the genus, constitutes a species. Hence, Boethius concludes in The Book of Divisions (56): "Therefore, there cannot be fewer than two species under a genus." 3 Moreover, according to Topics IV [4, 125a22-24], if a species is predicated of equally many items as the genus, the species is abolished, because it is put in the place of a genus. 4 Moreover, in another discussion (57): "Since there is a plurality of species for every genus . . ." And later (58): if a genus is destroyed when the species is destroyed, the genus is improperly assigned. And later (59): the species ought to be predicated of fewer items than the genus is. And there are many authoritative passages to this effect: in Metaphysics VII [12, 1038a6-9] and in the logical works of Boethius (60) and Porphyry. (61) 5 Arguments for the opposite view:

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

Genus is to species as species is to individual. Now a species does not require many individuals, so neither does a genus require many species. The minor premise is evident in the cases of the sun, the phoenix, and similar species. 6 According to one view, (62) the analogy fails, since it is of the nature of genus to be divided by opposed differences, which together with the genus constitute at least two species. But that is not how a species descends into individuals. 7 An objection to this view: What is stated equally in something's definition is equally essential to it. But "differing in number" is stated equally in the definition of species as "differing in species" is stated in the definition of genus. Therefore, etc. [I. First Reply to the Question] 8 One reply to the question (63) is that a genus, whether it is taken for the intention or for that to which the intention is applied, does not require many species, either in actuality or in potentiality. 9 Here is the proof as regards the intention of genus: That intention is related to the intention of species. So as long as one species exists, there is a genus, since relatives are simultaneous in nature. 10 There is a similar proof as regards the foundation of the intention: That foundation is a material 'what' in the species. Now it is impossible for something to exist without its material. Therefore, it is impossible for a species to exist unless the genus exists in that way. Nonetheless, just as a universal aptitudinally requires many, since it is defined as what is "apt by nature to be predicated of many," so also it is required for the intelligible nature of genus that it be said aptitudinally of items differing in species. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 11 On this basis one can reply to the arguments [of nn. 1-4]. All the authoritative passages must be understood in terms of aptitude, not in terms of either actuality or potentiality. Now aptitude differs from potentiality. For aptitude is something's inclination -- or at least non-repugnance -- in and of itself with respect to something, whereas potentiality is an ordering to actuality. Consequently, there can be potentiality without aptitude: for example, it is possible for the heavy to be above, and yet it is not by nature apt to be there, since being above is repugnant to the heavy in and of itself. And there is aptitude without potentiality, as a blind man is apt for seeing. For one speaks of a privation of something only when what is deprived is by nature apt to possess it, according to Aristotle in the Categories and in Metaphysics V [22, 1022b22-31], in the chapter "On privation." Yet it is not possible for a http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (21 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

blind man to see, since "there is no getting from privation to possession." (64) Thus, it is not repugnant to any universal, insofar as it is in virtue of its form, to be said of many; yet this aptitude can be impeded, in that there are not many items for it to be said of. 12 An objection to this way of speaking: It seems to be beside the point, since it seems to proceed in terms of intentions, as if it were being supposed that there is one intention of species that is related to the genus, and the worry were whether the intention of genus exists [given only one intention of species that relates to it]. But that's not the question. For genus is primarily related to species, not to this or that species. Hence, it is accidental to a genus that it is related in this way to many. Nor is the question whether the nature of a genus exists if the nature of a species exists. Rather, the question is whether, if there are not many items to which the intention of species is applied, but instead only one -- call it b -- the intention of genus is applied to that nature to which it would be applied if the intention of species were applied to many natures -say, b, c, and d -- with respect to that nature, namely, a. And if the question is understood in this way, neither element of the proposed response is on point. 13 Moreover, it doesn't even seem to be true, since it is impossible for something to be apt to be said of many species unless those many species can be apprehended by the intellect through diverse [intelligible] species. But if they can be conceived in this way, then there are many species of the genus in actuality, since this is the actuality of a nature insofar as it is said to be a species: its being actually conceived by the intellect through an intelligible species. For it is according to this that the intention of species is attributed to it. 14 Moreover, if x is by nature apt to be said of many items differing in species, it follows that many items [differing] in species are apt to receive the predication of x. So if the aptitude [appealed to in n. 11] is sufficient for a genus, the exactly similar aptitude for participating [in the genus] is sufficient on the part of the species. Therefore, if something is a genus in actuality on account of such an aptitude, the many items that participate in the genus aptitudinally will be a species in actuality. Therefore, every genus has many species in actuality. The assumption is evident, since equal being suffices for each of two correlatives, since they are simultaneous in nature. [III. Another reply to the question] 15 Another possible reply to the question is that for the intelligible nature of genus what is required is that the genus have many species in actuality: not many species that exist in actuality or in potentiality, but merely many species that are actually conceived through an intelligible species received from individuals that exist at some time or other; and that [these species] actually have an aptitude for participating in a genus, since such actuality belongs to them insofar as they are called species of a genus. [IV. Reply to the Arguments for the Opposite View]

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

16 A reply to the argument for the opposite view [n. 5] is that species likewise require many individuals aptitudinally. 17 By way of defending the first reply [nn. 8-10], one can reply to the first argument [n. 12] against that response as follows: if the intention of species is applied to this nature alone, the intention of genus is still applied in a prior way to that nature that is in this matter, since when that nature is conceived, it has less of the intelligible content than that which is the species, and it descends into the species through the difference. And in this way the reply is on point. 18 As for the second argument [n. 13]: [one can reply] that being able to be conceived by the intellect is not sufficient for there being a species of some [genus]; [what is sufficient is] that in its intelligible content there is a genus with respect to which it should be said to be a species. That is not true of those many items with respect to which there is an aptitude of the genus to predicated of them. Nonetheless, if a genus that at one time was said is in this way apt to be said of them, and they are conceived by the intellect through the same species through which they existed at that time, they are many species in actuality, which actuality is required for a species in actuality, since the genus is included in their intelligible content at that time, as it also was when they existed. 19 As for the third argument [n. 14]: one can deny the first inference on the grounds that the form of the sun is, as far as that form itelf is concerned, by nature apt to exist in matter other than that in which it exists. Nonetheless, there is no other matter that is by nature apt to receive such a form. For if this line of argument were valid with respect to aptitude, there would always be aptitude in both of the extremes, and thus there would always be potentiality in both of the extremes, since the only thing that keeps aptitude in one extreme from being potentiality is a defect of aptitude in the other extreme. 20 Note that one can hold unqualifiedly that a genus is not apt to be said of many unless they are conceived by the intellect [in such a way that] the genus is included in their intelligible content. And such items are species in actuality, whether they exist or can exist or not. [So one can hold that such a] genus has many species in actuality.

[Question 19: Is 'in quid' appropriately included in the definition of genus?] The question is whether the third phrase of the definition of genus, 'in quid', is appropriately included. 1 It seems that it is not: For that is predicated in quid which is an appropriate response to a question asked per quid, as is evident from Porphyry's proof. (65) But genus as defined here is not like that, since whether the http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (23 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

question is about the thing or about the intention of the species, genus as it denotes an intention is not an appropriate answer. But what is defined here is genus as an intention, as was said above [q. 14, n. 11]. Therefore, etc. 2 Moreover, this phrase is included in order to distinguish genus from difference, according to Porphyry. But it cannot do that, so it is included in vain. Proof of the minor premise: A superior difference is predicated per se in the first mode of an inferior difference, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VII [12, 1038a10-15]; and it is not predicated as difference, since if it were, the superior would descend through itself into this inferior difference; therefore, the superior is predicated of the inferior in quid. 3 Moreover, it is included in order to separate genus from accident. But that doesn't happen, since accident is predicated in quid, since "in every genus one must ascertain the 'what'," according to Aristotle in Topics I [9, 103b35-37]. 4 An argument for the opposite view is given by Porphyry. (66) [I. Reply to the Question] 5 It must be said that this phrase is included appropriately, since 'to be predicated' is divided by 'to be predicated in quid' and 'to be predicated in quale' as into the primary modes of being predicated. Therefore, universal descends into species through these two. Now genus is not predicated in quale, so it is predicated in quid. 6 One must understand that to be predicated in quid is to predicate the essence through the mode of essence. This is a characteristic of the genus, since the genus is taken from the material part and therefore predicates the essence through the mode of a substrate, which is the mode of essence. By contrast, the difference is taken from the formal part and therefore predicates the essence through the mode of something informing, and therefore in quale. 7 An objection to this resolution of the question: if to be predicated in quid is to be predicated through the mode of essence, then "Man is rock" is a predication in quid. 8 Moreover, if to be predicated in quid is to predicate the essence through the mode of essence, and that mode is not univocal with respect to things of diverse genera -- since essence too is not univocal with respect to things of diverse genera -- then the phrase 'in quid' does not apply to things of diverse genera. Therefore, genus as defined here is also not univocal with respect to all those genera. 9 I say that to be predicated in quid is to predicated the essence through the mode of essence, and that rock or another disparate [predicate] is not predicated of man through the mode of essence, since it is not predicated of man. For only an abstract term is predicated of the items http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (24 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

contained under it, and regarding them it is evident that they are predicated in quid. It is also univocal, even if essence is not univocal, since it is sufficient for a univocal term to be predicated that the essence is similarly related in this predication and in that, since "to be predicated" indicates a relation. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 10 To the first argument [n. 1] I say that there is a twofold question concerning species taken as an intention: "What is it?" and "What is predicated [of it]?" The proper question in intentions is what is predicated [of it], and it is appropriate to reply to this question with the genus as defined here. Thus, to someone who asks "What is predicated of species?" the correct answer is "The genus." If the question is asked using 'is', it is proper to the foundations, and through a performed predication the foundation of the genus is predicated in quid of the foundation of the species. 11 To the second argument [n. 2] I say that the difference is not predicated in quid of something with respect to which it is the difference, but of something with respect to which it is the genus, since the superior [difference] is a genus with respect to the inferior. 12 An objection to this reply: It would follow that in every genus there are three most general [genera]: that of the species [plural] and that of the two diffferences. 13 Moreover, if the inferior difference is a species, then it is has the superior difference in itself as genus, plus another difference superadded [to the superior difference]. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, that [superadded] difference will be a species with respect to the superior difference, and it will have another difference, which cannot be in another genus, since if it were, a nonsubstance would be prior to a substance. Therefore, if one goes on in this way, there will be infinitely many differences in the genus of substance, and so nothing will be knowable, since there will be no arriving at the first of those differences. 14 To this objection [nn. 12-13] one must say that the whole hierarchy of differences is reduced to the hierarchy of species. 15 To the third preliminary argument [n. 3] I say that nothing is predicated in quid of that with respect to which it is an accident, but it is predicated in quid of that with respect to which it is genus. For example, color is not predicated in quid of substance, but it is predicated in quid of whiteness, with respect to which color is a genus.

[Question 20: Is genus a principle of species?] The question is whether genus is a principle of the species.

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

1 It appears that it is not: For one and the same item is not both principle and principiated, since principle and principiated are distinct. But genus is the same as species. Therefore, it cannot be a principle of species. The major principle is evident, and there are two proofs for the minor premise. The first is this: According to the Philosopher, (67) a genus is nothing "beyond the things that are species of the genus," and for that reason the genus is predicated per se of the species. For "Man is an animal" is per se. But what is predicated per se of something is not distinct from it. Therefore, it is the same as it. 2 Moreover, a genus is a whole with respect to a species; therefore, it is not a principle of a species. Proof of the inference: a principle is more simple than the principiated, whereas a whole is more composite than that of which it is [composed]. And the antecedent is evident from what the author [Porphyry] says in the text: "A genus is a whole with respect to the species." (68) 3 An argument for the opposite view is what the author says in the text when comparing the third signification of genus with the first. He says there (69) that just as genus said in the third way is a principle of species, so also genus said in the first way is a principle of multitude. [I. Reply to the Question] 4 The correct answer to the question is yes, if one takes 'genus' for the nature in which the intention of genus is founded, and not for the intention itself. This is made clear in the following way: Genus is an essential princple for cognizing a species; therefore, it is an essential principle of species. Proof of the inference: A definition that makes its defined item known expresses the essential principles of the defined item, which is only the species, properly speaking, since nothing is properly defined except a species. The antecedent is evident on the basis of what the Philosopher says in Topics VI [1, 139a24-35]. 5 But it is important to realize that "essential principle of a species" is twofold: (1) according to the thing -- that is a part of the thing in its existing, such as matter and form; (2) according to reason -- that implies the same thing under an indeterminate mode that the species implies in a determinate mode; and if this is imposed in order to designate that thing, it does so insofar as it is taken either from the matter or from the form. Now a genus (say, animal) is not a principle of a species (say, man) in the first way, according to the thing; for if it were, the genus would not be predicated truly of the species. Therefore, it is a principle of the species in the second way. And so if one ought to define man -- since giving a definition is an act of reason -- then 'animal' ought to be included in its definition as a principle according to reason, as should 'rational'. Now in the thing, the nature of matter is extraneous to the nature of form in such a way that neither can be said of the other. Likewise, in reason the intelligible content of the genus is extraneous to the intelligible content of the difference, even though the same thing is implied by both. For 'animal' signifies the same as 'man', apart from the determination of the ultimate form; and 'animal' signifies this through the mode of a 'what' and a per se being, and therefore, according to http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (26 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

Porphyry, (70) it is predicated in quid. 'Rational', by contrast, signifies the very same item with a determination of the ultimate form, but through the mode of a 'what sort' and of something denominating. Therefore, in reason [as opposed to in the thing], the concepts of the genus and the difference are extraneous. 6 And on account of the arguments it is important to realize that this is the difference between rational parts and parts according to the thing. For although both signify parts of the whole, parts according to reason signify parts of the whole through the mode of the whole, whereas parts according to the thing signify parts of the whole through the mode of a part. For example, the genus of man, i.e., animal, is a part of man according to reason. For from its first imposition it is imposed in order to signify a part of man, i.e., having a sensitive soul. Nonetheless, since it signifies that part through the mode of a whole and not through the mode of a part, it is predicated truly of man. But that's not how things are with a part according to the thing. For bronze, which is a material part of the statue, signifies a part through the mode of a part; therefore, it cannot be predicated of the statue. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 7 On this basis one should reply to the arguments [nn. 1-2] that it is not absurd for one and the same item to be both the whole and a part in diverse ways. That is why Boethius says in the Book of Divisions (71) that in predication the genus is the whole, but in the definition it is a part.

1. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.15-18). 2. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 4.9-10). 3. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 4.21-25). 4. Given by Albert the Great in Liber de praedicabilibus III c. 3 (Borgnet I 46a) and William Arnaldi in Porph. (f. 5va). 5. That of Andrew of Cornwall in Porph. q. 7. Andrew, unlike Albert, maintains that what is defined per se in the definition of genus is an intention; even so, Scotus seems to think Andrew allows the thing too great a role. 6. Aristotle, Physics II.6, 198a5-9. 7. The critical edition has 'intention' in mention quotes, but I take it that Scotus is saying that the name 'genus' signifies an intention in the concrete, not that it signifies 'intention' in the concrete. 8. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q. 7, nn. 14-25. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (27 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

9. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Soph. El. qq. 43-44, n. 14. 10. See qq. 8-11, n. 31, for this distinction. 11. Given by Lambert de Latiniaco, Logica (formely attributed to Lambert of Auxerre). 12. Scotus's quotation from Aristotle is so elliptical as to be nearly unintelligible. The passage reads as follows: "Again, if a [definition] has added the particular when the universal has always been said [there is redundancy]: for example, if [one were to define] mercy as the mitigating of what is expedient and just. For the just is something expedient, so it is contained in the expedient. Therefore 'just' is excessive, for [the definition] has stated the universal and then added the particular." 13. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.12, 1038a21-23. 14. Ibid., 1038a30-31. 15. Given by Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] II c. 4. 16. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere'. 17. Scotus here is not quite quoting Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.4, 1029b12-22, and very nearly quoting Thomas Aquinas, Metaph. IV lect. 16. 18. Given by Thomas Aquinas, Metaph. VII lect. 4. 19. Actually Posterior Analytics II.28, 87a38-39. 20. Given by Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 7. 21. qq. 7-8, n. 20. 22. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.12-13). Porphyry acknowledges three significations of 'genus'. The second signification is "the origin [principium] of each person's birth," and the third (which Porphyry notes is the one philosophers talk about) is "that to which a species is subordinated." In the passage to which Scotus is referring here, Porphyry notes that this third and philosophically important sense fits with the second sense because genus in the third sense "is a kind of principle [principium] for the things under it." 23. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De differentia' (Busse 11.12-17) http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (28 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

24. Cf. In Metaph. 7, q. 16, n. 41. 25. Cf. Lect. 1, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 121-123; Ord. 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 159. 26. Guillelmus Arnaldi, Porph. (f. 6va), Petrus de Alvernia, Porph. (cod. Paris. bibl. nat. lat. 16170, f. 85rb), 27. Cf. Peter of John Olivi, Quaestions logicales q. 11 (Brown 360) and Nicholas of Cornwall, Porph. c. 'De genere' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christi 293, f. 71ra 28. Aristotle, Categories 1, 1a13-14. 29. Aristotle, Categories 5, 3a7-10. 30. Defended by Peter of John Olivi in Quaestions logicales q. 11 (Brown 361), and Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 6 (cod. Monach. SB Clm. 14383, f. 87ra). 31. Cf. Nicholas of Cornwall, Porph. c. 'De genere' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christi 293, f. 71ra). 32. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 38). 33. See above, q. 1, n. 9. 34. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q. 17, nn. 21-22. 35. That of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 3 c. 3 (Borgnet I 46b). 36. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 7.2-3 and 13-14). 37. Cf. Duns Scotus, Lect. 1, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 121-123; 1, d. 8, q. 1, nn. 102-103; Ord. 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 159, 161; 1, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 105-107. 38. See above, q. 15, n. 10. 39. Cf. Simiplicius, In Praedicamenta praed. 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V1 272); Duns Scotus, In Metaph . 7, q. 19, n. 60. 40. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 7, q. 17, n. 22; 3, q. un., nn. 11-2. 41. Duns Scotus, In Praed. q. 8, nn. 14-33. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (29 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

42. Offered by Simon of Faversham, Porph. q. 29 (Mazzarella 56), and Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 6 (cod. Monach. SB Clm. 14383, f. 87ra). 43. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.7, 1033a16-19. In English we might very well say "The chest is wood," but in Latin, as in Aristotle's Greek, the word used here for 'wood' cannot be used to mean "wooden" or "of wood." 44. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.13, 78b16-27; cf. Robert Grosseteste, Anal. post. I.12 (Rossi 193). 45. Auctoritates Aristotelis (Hamesse 301); resp. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De proprio' (Busse 12.20-21). 46. Aristotle, Categories 7, 8a32-33. 47. Aristotle, Categories 7, 7b15-16. 48. See above, q. 14, n. 2. 49. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 3.15-18) 50. We do not know who gave this reply. 51. This is the view of Avicenna, Logica pars I c. 9 (Venice 1508, f. 7va). 52. This is the view of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus IV.1 (Borgnet I 58b), and Nicholas of Cornwall, Porphyry. c. 'De specie' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christ 293, f. 71ra72ra). 53. I am not at all certain about this passage. 54. Or about this one. 55. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 2 (Busse 7.1-3). 56. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 8). 57. Aristotle, Topics IV.3, 123a30. 58. Aristotle, Topics IV.5, 125b37-38. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph14-20.htm (30 of 31)11/01/2007 03:43:03 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 14-20

59. Aristotle, Topics IV.5, 126a2. 60. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 8); In Isagogen Porphyrii [ed. secunda] II c. 4 (CSEL 48:179). 61. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.10-13). 62. Defended by Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 3 c. 3 (Borgnet I.47b), tr. 4 c. 6 (Borgnet I.74b). 63. Cf. Andrew of Cornwall, Porph. q. 8 (cod. Monach. SB Clm. 14383, f. 88ra). 64. Aristotle, Categories 10, 13a32-34. 65. Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 3.13-14). 66. Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 3.14-19). 67. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.12, 1038a6-9. 68. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 8.1-2). 69. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.12-14). 70. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De genere' (Busse 2.15-17). 71. Boethius, Liber de divisione (Magee 38).

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge John Duns Scotus Translated by Thomas Williams

[Question 21: Is the following definition of species appropriate: "Species is what is predicated in eo quod quid of many items differing in number"?] Concerning the chapter "On species," the question is whether the definition of species -- "Species is what is predicated of many items differing in number" -- is appropriately given. 1 It appear that it is not: For according to Porphyry, since genus and species are correlatives, "one must make use of each in defining the other." (1) But nothing is stated in this definition that expresses the correlative, namely genus. Therefore, it is a bad definition of species. 2 Moreover, this definition also holds of genus, as is evident, given that "differing in species" implies "differing in number." 3 Moreover, there are not many definitions [of one and the same item], according to Aristotle in Topics VI [4, 141a31-b1], just as there are not many essences. For if there were, an item would not be definible. Therefore, since species is appropriately defined as "what is subordinated to a designated genus," it is not appropriately defined by this definition. 4 Moreover, the definition "subordinated to a genus" implies that a species is per se capable of being a subject; therefore, it is not per se predicable. (2) Therefore, the other definition is false, since opposites are not present in one and the same item per se. 5 One view (3) is that relative opposites can be present in one and the same item, although not with respect to the same item, since with respect to the same item they are opposites. Now what is predicable with respect to individuals is capable of being a subject with respect to a genus. 6 An objection to this view: If what is related to a genus is appropriately defined through the genus, then it is related to the genus per se. It is also related to the individuals through which it is defined in this second definition [given in n. 4]. Therefore, one and the same item is said twice relatively, which is contrary to what Aristotle says in Metaphysics V [15, 1021a31-b2]. 7 Moreover, as to the main question: This definition does not separate species from definition.

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

8 Moreover, species is not a predicate, according to Aristotle in Topics I [4, 101b24-26]. Therefore, it is badly defined on the basis of "being predicated." 9 Porphyry argues for the opposite view. (4) 10 Arguments both for and against the view in question, as well as objections, could be given here is very much the same ways as above [q. 15, nn. 1-11], where the question concerned the definition of genus. [I. Reply to the Question] 11 It must be said that the definition is appropriate, in just the same ways as I argued above [q. 15, n. 19] concerning the definition of genus. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 12 To the first argument [n. 1] it is said that species is said relatively to genus, and so it is necessary that some definition of species be given in which genus is included. That definition is "Species is what is subjected to a designated genus." But species has another relation to individuals, not according to which it is related to the genus -- since Porphyry denies that the extremes have two relations in this way (5) -- but according to which it is a species. And for that reason it must have another definition that relates it to individuals. 13 A reply to the second argument [n. 2] was given above, in question 17 [nn. 7-10]. 14 To the third argument [n. 3] it is said that are not many definition of one absolute item of which there is a definition that expresses its being in itself. But species is per se related to two items. 15 An objection to this reply: Even if that were true, species would have just the two definition, since it would have just one relating it to individuals and just one relating it to genus. But Porphyry gives two definitions [see n. 4] relating it to genus. For he says [n. 9] that this designation, namely, being predicated of many, is proper to the most specific species, "but there will be others, and not of the most specific species." So there are at least two other definitions of species besides this one. 16 One approach (6) is to concede this point and to say that species can have a twofold relation to genus: one as it is ordered beneath the genus, and another as the genus is predicated [enuntiatur] of a species in a proposition. The definition "Species is what is subordinated to a designated genus" is given in the first way; "Species is that is of which the genus is predicated in eo quod quid" is given in the second way.

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

17 An objection to this approach: The Categories is more immediately ordered to De interpretatione than Porphyry's book is. But in the Categories no determination is made concerning simples insofar as one is predicated of another -- otherwise it would be redundant for De interpretatione to determine that noun and verb signify simples under those notions. Therefore, much less is species defined here as genus is predicated of it. 18 Here it can be conceded that Porphyry offers only one definition relating species to genus. And then the notion "what is subordinated to a genus" is expounded through what follows, namely, "of which [the genus is predicated in eo quod quid]." When he says "there will be others, not of the most specific species," he means other statements that make the species known [notificationes], not other definitions, since on the basis of a certain diversity they make the species known secundum quid. For an exactly similar diversity could be found by relating the species to individuals, and yet only one definition of species is given on the basis of that relation. 19 The reply to the fourth argument [n. 4] was given above [n. 5]. 20 To the argument against this reply [n. 6] it can be said that species is not related to both genus and individuals merely on account of diverse items that are accidental to itself -- for if that were the case, it would not be defined in terms of either of them, just as human being is not [defined in terms of double], even if a human being is accidentally double. (7) Rather, it is related to both essentially and per se. As for the claim that "the same item is not related twice," Aristotle understands this to mean that an accident is not related to its subject, as he indicates in the text where he says "it is not understanding [because it is related] to the one who understands and to the intelligible." (8) So understood, this claims is not contrary to what was said above. 21 (9) Alternatively, one ought to say (10) that one and the same item is not related primarily to diverse items, but it can be related per se to diverse items. Species is related primarily to one item through its definition but per se to another item according to the definition of its genus. For a relative according to its genus is relative per se, since it includes in its essence that through which it is a relative. For it is impossible that an absolute essentially includes a relative in its essence. In this way, species according to its proper definition is said with respect to genus; but according to the definition of its genus, i.e. universal, it is said relatively to those items of which it is predicated, since "to be said of" belongs to it qua universal. (11) For example: the double according to itself is related to the half, but according to its genus it is related to the fractional. (12) Still, the analogy is not perfect, since in the latter case, but not in the former, the correlative of the genus contains the correlative of the species. For this reason the first definition of species is the proper definition according to itself, since it is given on the basis of its first correlative; the second definition is given later, since it is more relevant to the inquiry at hand. For it is proper to species qua universal. 22 To the fifth argument [n. 7; cf. q. 12, nn. 19, 15-16] it can be conceded that definition is not a universal distinct from species as far as this present treatment of universals is concerned. http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph21-22.htm (3 of 7)11/01/2007 03:43:38 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

Alternatively: Species is not predicated in quid, but in quid-quale, since it does not have unqualifiedly one mode of being predicated, but two, like genus and difference, of which it is composed. 23 The reply to the sixth argument [n. 8] was given in question 12 [nn. 18-19].

[Question 22: Is "Many men are one man" true?] The question is about the truth of "Many men are one man." 1 It appears that it is true: The following inference is valid: "By participation in the species, many men are one man; therefore, many men [are one man]." According to Porphyry, (13) the antecedent is true; therefore, so is the consequent. Proof of the inference: Nothing is restricted by another unless it is placed with it on the part of the same extreme. (14) "By participation in the species" is placed in the antecedent on the part of the subject, and "one" is not. Therefore, 'one' is not restricted in the antecedent. 2 Moreover, when something is related to others unqualifiedly and secundum quid, if something is added that determines it secundum quid, it stands only for [what it is related to secundum quid]. 'One' is related to one-in-number unqualifiedly and to one-in-species secundum quid. Therefore, in the proposition at issue, when the name of the species, man, is added, it will stand for unity of species, and in this way the proposition is true. Therefore, the proposition is true unqualifiedly. 3 Moreover, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics V [6, 1016b4-6], "Universally, insofar as certain items admit no division, in that respect they are one." The many men admit no division with respect to man, since the form of man is in them univocally. Therefore, they are one man. 4 Moreover, each of them is one man; therefore, the whole lot of them are one man. The antecedent is true, since any given one of them is singular. Proof of the inference: The opposite of the consequent -- namely, "Only one man is one man" -- is incompatible with the antecedent, "Each [man is one man]," since in the antecedent 'one man' is attributed to the subject for at least two. 5 Arguments for the opposite view: If 'Many men are one men," then by conversion it follows that "One man is many men." The consequent is false, since its contradictory -- "No man is many men" -- is true. 6 Moreover, in the subject and the predicate the same item is taken under opposite modes that http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph21-22.htm (4 of 7)11/01/2007 03:43:38 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

are not separable from the significate insofar as it is signified by those locutions [dictiones]. Therefore, the proposition is false. [I. Reply to the Question] 7 It must be said that 'one' can be taken categorematically, and in that way it signifies a difference of being. This is how Aristotle speaks of 'one' in Metaphysics V [6, 1017b10-1020a6] and X [1-3, 1052a15-1054b3], and he divides it accordingly into many modes in Metaphysics V. At the end, however, in the chapter "On one," (15) he puts forward four modes to which all the previous modes are reduced: one in number, in species, in genus, and in proportion. If the categorematic 'one' is related equivocally to these four, then the proposition at issue still has to be distinguished [into different senses] according to the equivocation of the categorematic 'one', and in three of those senses it is true. It is false in the fourth sense - that is, where 'one' is taken as 'one in number'. 8 On the other hand, if (as is perhaps more true) 'one' is related to these four as to unqualifiedly and secundum quid (which appears to be the case from what Aristotle says in Metaphysics V, and from the fact that from 'one in number' follows 'one in species' and, further, 'one in genus' and 'one in proportion', and not vice versa, as though there is a lesser character [ratio] of unity in what is one in species than in what is one in number, and in what is one in genus than in what is one in species), then what one should say is that the proposition is false insofar as 'one' is categorematic. For since nothing is added here to limit it to unity secundum quid, 'one' stands only for one-in-number, which is one unqualifiedly. 9 Alternatively, 'one' is taken as syncategorematic, (16) and in this way it expresses a mode of understanding the term for a determinate supposite, but indeterminately. And 'man', taken in this way for its supposit, is not in its subject. So in that way the proposition is false. For there is nothing in the subject in virtue of which one man could be confused and taken for diverse [men], since conjunction does not confuse [the conjuncts]. For if it did, "Two and two are two" would be true in the composed sense. But that is false, since in the composed sense "Two and two are four" is true. And from these two claims it follows that four are two, which is impossible. Therefore, one of the premises is false in the composed sense, in which they imply that conclusion. [II. Replies to the Preliminary Arguments] 10 As for the first argument [n. 1], I reject the inference. As for the proof, I say that that determination is to be understood in the predicate, as follows: Many men are one man by participation in the species, that is, by participating in the species. 11 To the second argument [n. 2] I say that the determinable does not restrict the determination, but vice versa -- and especially not to 'secundum quid'. Thus, in 'dead man', 'dead' does not stand http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorph21-22.htm (5 of 7)11/01/2007 03:43:38 p.m.

Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

secundum quid, even though it sometimes restricts man to supposits. For in 'white man' 'white' stands only for white in man. [Someone please explain this argument to me.] 12 To the third argument [n. 3] I say that the inference "they are undivided with respect to man, or (in other words) with respect to the form of man; therefore, they are one man, or an undivided man" is invalid. For in the antecedent man is signified as having the nature of a determination with respect to one, whereas in the consequent man is signified as determinable. 13 As for the fourth argument [n. 4], I reject the inference. As for the proof, I say that what is put in the place of the consequent, if it is one in the same way as in "This man and that man are one man," is true in the divided sense. And its opposite is not "Only one man" but "Not many men," which is perfectly compatible with the antecedent. For in this proposition the predicate is denied of many taken through the mode of many; in the other proposition that same predicate is affirmed of many taken through the mode of one. For in the original proposition the predicate is [applied] distributively to this man and that man -- after all, "each" is a sign of distribution -whereas in the other proposition it is [applied] jointly to both.

14 Alternatively, it can be conceded that only one man is one man and that each man is one man. For since 'each' distributes for the supposits distributively, no supposit is excluded in this proposition. "Only one" [distributes for them] under that aspect by which 'each' distributes for them. [I'm not at all certain about nn. 13-14] 1. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 4.6-9). 2. See above, q. 12, n. 10. 3. That of Nicholas of Cornwall, Porph. c. 'De specie' (cod. Oxon. coll. Corporis Christi 293, f. 71vb-72ra). 4. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium, c. 'De specie' (Busse 4.12-14). 5. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 5.9-16). 6. That of Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus tr. 4 c. 1 (Borgnet I 57b). 7. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. V.15, 1021b8-11. 8. Aristotle, Metaphysics V.15, 1021a30-32: "For 'intelligible' signifies that of which there is understanding, but it is not understanding because it is related to that of which there is understading, for then the same thing would be said twice"; cf. Duns Scotus, In Metaph. 5, qq. 1214, nn. 21, 24-25.

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Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge, qq. 2-21

9. The critical edition places this marginal number two lines earlier, surely incorrectly. 10. Duns Scotus, In Praed q. 29, n. 8; In Metaph. 5, qq. 12-14, nn. 21, 24-25. 11. See above, qq. 7-9, n. 9. 12. submultiplex: A whole number that is evenly divisible more than once into some other whole number is said to be submultiplex with respect to that other number, which is in turn multiplex with respect to it. See Isidore, Etymologies III.6.6. 13. Porphyry, Liber praedicabilium c. 'De specie' (Busse 6.21). 14. Cf. Aristotle, De soph. el. 5, 12a21-36. 15. Aristotle, Metaphysics V.6, 1016b31-35. 16. Cf. Duns Scotus, In Praed. q. 12, n. 27.

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Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's questions on Porphyry

Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's Questions on Porphyry's Isagoge I hope it will be evident that these comments are not offered in a spirit of captious criticism. The achievement of the editors in putting together this edition is solid and admirable, and I in no way wish to disparage the editors or the edition. Having worked through the text very carefully and with a critical eye, I have come to have great respect for the editors' judgment, and I venture to differ from them here and there only with great reluctance and a certain sense of temerity. So I offer these notes primarily as aids to other readers of the text. In text editing, as in medicine, it is often useful to have a second opinion.

General comments The editors' use of mention quotes is haphazard throughout. For example, on p. 189: [QUAESTIO 30 UTRUM 'PROPRIUM' SIT UNIVERSALE] Circa capitulum 'De proprio' quaeritur utrum proprium sit universale. If mention quotes belong around the first 'proprium', they also belong around the second. This kind of inconsistency in the use of mention quotes is pervasive, and it can sometimes confuse the reader. At q. 29, n. 25, the stray mention quotes make the passage unintelligible. The edition reads: Ad aliud de ratione aequivocorum, dico quod 'aequivocum' in utroque sensu est univocum significans aliquid et non tantum vox; tamen nihil est commune significatis nisi tantum vox. This sounds like a reply to an argument that distinguished senses of 'aequivocum', but it is actually a reply to the following argument: Item, "aequivoca sunt quorum nomen solum commune est." Igitur si rationale sit aequivocum illis [sc. Intelligentiis] et nobis, sequitur quod tantum sit commune secundum nomen; sed nos sumus intelligentes secundum rem; igitur ipsae tantum secundum nomen. [n. 18]

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Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's questions on Porphyry

(I note in passing that there are no mention quotes for 'rationale' here, though there are for 'irrationale' in the preceding paragraph where the use is exactly parallel.) So Scotus's point in the reply has nothing to do with the word 'aequivocum'. Rather, he is saying that an equivocal term is, in each of its senses, univocal and has a signification; it is not a mere empty noise, as the argument suggests it must be a mere empty noise as applied to the Intelligences. So the mention quotes around 'aequivocum' in the reply are wrong.

Specific passages q. 3, n. 12 [13.14] For the view that the subject of logic is the syllogism, the editors cite Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. But the cited text from Aquinas's Exposition on the Posterior Analytics I, lect. 20, actually rehearses the view -- for which the editors at n. 7 correctly cite the prologue of that same work -- that logic concerns the products of all three acts of reason: "Considerat enim logica sicut subiecta syllogismum et enuntiationem et praedicamentum, aut aliquid huiusmodi."

qq. 7-8, n. 15 [37.13-14] The edition reads: Propter hoc ad rationem suppositam ad oppositum quaestionis dicendum quod universale praedicatur univoce de istis quinque [sc. universalibus]. This is puzzling. The wording suggests that Scotus is giving a reply to the argument put forward in favor of the opposite view on the question. But the opposite view is the one Scotus himself takes, and why would he counter an argument in favor of his own view? He might do so, of course, in order to show that such an argument fails, but only if he then goes on to give a better argument for his conclusion. But there is no argument in qq. 7-8 for the position Scotus takes, other than the one given above, to which this statement would supposedly constitute a reply. Two of the collated manuscripts read et rationem supra positam instead of ad rationem suppositam. That reading makes good sense of the passage: "On account of this [presumably, the arguments of nn. 13-14] and the argument given above in favor of the opposite view . . ."

q. 12, n. 12 [57.3-5] http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorphednotes.htm (2 of 6)11/01/2007 03:43:58 p.m.

Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's questions on Porphyry

The question is whether there are exactly five universals. One of the views Scotus canvases is that one can derive the sufficiency of Porphyry's five from the fact that Porphyry is speaking of universals as they are capable of being ordered within a genus. One of Scotus's objections to this view reads, in the edition, as follows: Item, si non datur diversitas inter hunc librum et librum Topicorum, tunc differentia magis esset ibi numeranda quam hic, cum magis habeat rationem praedicabilis quam ordinabilis. I don't see how to make sense of this: "If the discrepancy between this book and the Topics is not admitted, then difference ought to be listed in the Topics rather than here, since difference has the character of what can be predicated rather than the character of what can be ordered." The discrepancy between the Isagoge and the Topics is precisely the fact that the two works list different universals, so it seems odd to say that if that discrepancy is not admitted (allowed? acknowledged?), one of the universals belongs in the Topics rather than in the Isagoge. My suggestion is that we read with one manuscript (the gist of which is supported by a handful of others) and substitute the following: Item, si per hoc detur diversitas . . . Then the sense is clear: "If this is the way we're meant to explain the discrepancy between the Isagoge and the Topics, that explanation would have the false implication that difference would be found in the latter rather than in the former."

q. 21, n. 21 [136.8] The marginal number appears to be placed two lines above its correct position. q. 23, n. 1 [145.8-11] The question is whether the division of difference into difference in general, difference taken properly, and difference taken more properly is appropriate. The first argument that the division is inappropriate begins, according to the edition, like this: Quia non est divisio generis in species, genus enim aeque proprie dicitur de speciebus; nec totius in partes integrales, quia 'totum' non praedicatur de talibus partibus -- divisim hic praedicatur de dividentibus.

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Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's questions on Porphyry

First, one must drop the quotation marks around 'totum'. Scotus's claim is not that 'whole' is not predicated of integral parts -- which is not true anyway, since an item can be an integral part with respect to some whole and at the same time a whole with respect to its own integral parts -but that a whole is not predicated of its integral parts. With this correction made, however, it is hard to make sense of the part after the dash. What is the subject of 'praedicatur'? Presumably it's 'totum', but then what does it mean to say that "in this case the whole is predicated dividedly of the items in the division"? Here the apparatus comes to the rescue. There is good manuscript support for 'divisum' instead of 'divisim', and with 'divisum' the argument makes sense: "in this case the divided item [difference] is predicated of the [three] items in the division." So now we have an intelligible argument: ● ● ●

A whole is not predicated of its integral parts. 'Difference' is predicated of the three kinds of difference. Therefore, the three kinds of difference are not integral parts of difference.

So for the last two clauses quoted above, read instead: quia totum non praedicatur de talibus partibus -- divisum hic praedicatur de dividentibus. q. 24, n. 3 [150.1-5] The question is whether "Old Socrates differs from young Socrates" is true. The third argument for the negative reads like this: Item, si sequitur 'Socrates senex differt a se puero, igitur Socrates senex et Socrates puer differunt, igitur Socrates senex et Socrates puer sunt multa', et ultra, 'igitur Socrates et Socrates sunt multa', et ultra, 'igitur Socrates senex et Socrates puer sunt, igitur Socrates senex est'. There is very good manuscript support for omitting 'si' in the first line, and the argument reads better without it. With 'si', we have to read Scotus as saying that if the first two inferences are legitimate, then the third one is, and so forth. But that's an odd line of argument to take, since no one is claiming that the first two inferences are valid. The question is simply whether the antecedent in the first inference is true, and the objector's point is that it is not, because by a legitimate chain of inferences -- beginning with the inference that old Socrates and young Socrates differ -- we can derive the false claim that old Socrates exists. (In fact, in the very next sentence, the objector says "Consequens falsum, igitur primum antecedens." Strictly speaking, with 'si' in place, the first antecedent would have to be the claim that everything within the

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Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's questions on Porphyry

opening set of quotation marks represents a valid inference, and the consequent would be the claim everything within the final set of quotation marks represents a valid inference. Clearly that can't be what Scotus means.) 'si' should be omitted. q. 26, n. 5 [161.14-18] The question is whether difference can be defined. One argument for the negative answer is that if it could, there would have to be a difference of difference, since definitions involve stating a difference; but that would produce an infinite regress. Scotus's reply runs as follows: Ad primum concedo quod differentiae non est differentia respectu cuius differentia habet rationem differentiae. Sed potest habere differentiam respectu cuius ipsum sit species, sicut hoc quod est 'praedicari in quale' per quod constuitur differentia in sua specie, sicut homo per rationale. The first 'sicut' in the second sentence can at least be construed intelligibly, but it carries a hint of 'for example' that is out of place here. Scotus's view is not that being predicated in quale is the sort of thing that would do nicely as a difference by which difference is constituted as a species of universal. It's that being predicated in quale is in fact the very difference that does the trick. So 'scilicet' would make better sense here. It is found in only one manuscript, but it seems a much better reading than 'sicut'. q. 27, n. 7 [165.2-8] Scotus is distinguishing between ultimate difference and intermediate difference, and he is arguing that the definition 'differentia praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale' applies to intermediate difference: Haec definitio convenit differentiae intermediae universaliter, et est vera definitio, quia ponuntur ibi genus et differentia ipsius differentiae, quia differentia species est respectu universalis, sicut dictum est de genere quod universale descendit in ipsam per differentias additas, quia illae per se dividunt universale et contrahunt ipsum ad differentiam. 'quod universale descendit in ipsam' must be wrong: if we read "as was said concerning genus that the universal descends into it," the 'it' has to be 'genus', and 'ipsam' is the wrong gender. (It is just barely possibly that 'ipsam' could be 'a species', but that would be awkward even by Scotus's standards.) One alternative is to read 'ipsum', as three manuscripts do. A better one is to read 'quia' for 'quod', as six manuscripts do (and presumably put a comma just after the preceding 'genere'). Thus: "difference is a species with respect to universal, just as we said genus is; for universal descends into difference through added differences . . ." http://www.nd.edu/~wwillia5/dunsscotus/InPorphednotes.htm (5 of 6)11/01/2007 03:43:58 p.m.

Notes on the critical edition of Scotus's questions on Porphyry

q. 30, n. 3 [189.15-190.2] Here is a case of confusing punctuation. The edition reads: Secunda pars [minoris, sc. quod proprium non est ad aliquid] probatur, quia proprium non refertur ad illud cuius est; nam nullum accidens refertur ad suum subiectum, quia tunc omne accidens esset relativum. -- Similiter, illud cuius est proprium, est naturaliter prius proprio; relativum est simul naturá cum correlativo, nec ad aliam intentionem refertur, ut patet inductive, sicut argutum est supra de differentia. The punctuation obscures the fact that Scotus is offering two arguments for the claim that proprium is not related: (1) it is not related to that to which it belongs, and (2) it is not related to some other intention. There are two subarguments for (1): (1a) no accident is related to its subject, and (1b) proprium is naturally posterior to that to which it belongs, whereas a relative is naturally simultaneous with its correlative. The editors' punctuation makes (2) subordinate to (1b) and makes a bigger break between (1a) and (1b) than between (1) and (2). A better punctuation would go like this:

Secunda pars probatur: Quia proprium non refertur ad illud cuius est, nam nullum accidens refertur ad suum subiectum, quia tunc omne accidens esset relativum. Similiter, illud cuius est proprium est naturaliter prius proprio; relativum est simul naturá cum correlativo. Nec ad aliam . . . q. 31, heading [195.2-3] In the heading the editors give the question as "Utrum definition proprii quarto modo dicta sit conveienter data." 'dicta' would have to modify 'definitio', but it is not the definition that is said in multiple ways; it is proprium that is said in multiple ways, and there is a definition corresponding to each way of saying it. So 'dicti', modifying 'proprii', is what we should expect. And the manuscripts almost without exception have 'dicti' in their statement of the question, a reading followed by the editors (see line 4). So I take 'dicta' in the editorial heading to be there by inadvertence. q. 32, n. 9 [201.2] Read 'haec' (with five of the collated manuscripts) for 'hoc'. 'hoc' is very hard to construe, and it can be explained by attraction to the 'hoc' in the previous sentence. That previous 'hoc' makes sense if one supplies 'est' afterwards (as some of the manuscripts do), but supplying 'est' with this 'hoc' makes nonsense, and I don't see any other way to make sense of it.

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