An Illustrated Guide to the Modern Soviet Ground Forces

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AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO

WEAPONS OF THE MODERN

GROUND FORCES Major Equipment of Today's Red Army

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Edited by

Ray Bonds

AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO

WEAPONS OF TltE MODERN

GROUND FORCES

Published by Salamander Books limited LONDON

AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO

WEAPONS OF THE MODERN

GROUND FORCES

A Salamander Book 1981 Salamander Books Ltd .. Salamander House, 27 Old Gloucester Street, LOrldonWC1N3AF, United Kingdom .

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ISBN 086101115 5 Distribuled in the United Kingdom by New Engl ish Library/ Hodder & Stoughlon

Contents

AND IN

All rig hts reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, sto red in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, witho ut the prior permiss ion of Salamander Books Ltd.

Credits Ed itor : Ray Bonds

Designer : 8arry Savage Colour drawings: Terry Had ler and J . Wood & Assoc iates

(IC Salamander Books Lld ,): arld (pages 38-39. 44-45) © Profile Pub lications Ltd . Pri nted : in Be lgium by Hem; Proos! et Cie .

Photographs: The publishe rs wish to thank all the officia l intematiot'lal government archives (especially the British Ministry of Defence and the US Department of De/ensel. Novostf IInd Tass and the private collections and otl1er organisations who have supplied photographs for this book.

Organisation of the Soviet Ground Forces On e o f the basic tenets of Soviet tactical doctrine is th at the offensive is the only pra ctica bl e form 'Of

E ROLE of the Communist Party 01 the Soviet Union (CPSU) is to guide Clnd direct

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Soviet society along the road to communism. In ful filment of what it believes to be a historic mission, the Communist Party feels obliged to exert control over all aspects of human behaviour. Every branch of Soviet society is subject to the direction and supervision of the CPSU, and the armed forces are obviously no exception , Indeed, because they constitu te the party's main instrument for control ling Soviet society as a whole, yet are

at the same time the only organisation within that society which could ever succeed in overthrow ing the dictatorship of the party, the armed fo rces are sing led out for especially thorough political control and supelVision. The brain of an army can usually be found in its General Staff, and this applies particularly to the Soviet Army which has a very strong staff system. Nevertheless, the CPSU can justifiably cla imto be the Soviet Army'S centra l nelVous system and animating spirit. Moreover, it is precisely because the CPSU fulfils this same function in the whole of Soviet society that the term Soviet "'war machine"' has real meaning. By inserting party members into every socia l institution at all levels. and by ensuring that professional promotion rel ies on party approval, the CPSU contrives to achieve a unity of aim and purpose - albeit enforced - in Soviet society which is rarely to be found in the West. Because Marxist ideology insists that the hosti le cap italist West w ill

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seek to destroy the Soviet state and end the ru le of the Commun ist Party (and the history of the USSR over the past 70 years tends to reinforce this belief in the minds of Soviet citizens). it is hardly surpris ing that the party has made use of its position of power during this time to prepare the Soviet economy and people for wa r. While it is difficult to reach a preci se figure. many Western specialists would agree that a good third of all public

warfare for the Soviet Union, and everything about the army - tactics, organisation, equipment - i s designed w ith thi s in v iew . The Soviet ground forces are far more powerful than is necessary to d eter NATO from i nv ading Russia and may be SUfficient, gi v en the right circumstances, to invade Western Euro pe, defeat the for ces of NATO and bring most of Western Europe under Soviet domination. The purpose of this guide is to show and describe in detail the major weaponry and equipment o f the modern Soviet Army, with the exception of helicopters w hich can be found in a companion,v olume.

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f>OO mll ...

SIlO kllomelres

expenditure and resources in the Soviet Union is earmarked for arms. What is more, the characteristics of the Soyiet system mean that it is fa r easier to divert resources into defence projects tha n it would be in a Weste rn society.

The Ground Forces The Soviet Ground Forces constitute a separate arm of service in th e Soviet Union, secon d in importance only 10 I he Strategic

Abov e : The USSR is div ided in peacetime into 16 "Military Dist r icts", each of w hich has ... w ide- ranging respon s ibilities. Outs ide t he USSR the organisa tions are different . Sov iet f o rces in Eastern Europe are div ided into "'Groups", whil e there a re auto nomous com mand s in Afgh a n ist an a nd M ongolia. In wa r "'Theatres of War " , " Theatres of Combat Action " and " Fronts" are formed , 7

Above: The Soviet Army has the services of some excel le nt designers. as witnessed by this form idable helicopter - the Hi nd-D. Rocket Forces. Troops making up the Ground Forces fall into four categories: Teeth arms motor-rifle (motorised infantry), tank and airborne troops; Artillery missile troops. air- defence and field artillery; Special troops eng ineer, signals and chemica l troops; Rear services transport. medica l. traffic control, police, and so on . A division is the basic al l- arms formation, of which there are three types: motor-rifle, tank and airborne. The basic unit of the Soviet Ground Forces is the regiment. which is made up of three or four battalions plus support elements.

Battalion Organisation The motor-rifle battalion's teeth are its three compan ies, each of three platoons, each of three sections, a section travelling in an armoured personnel carrier (APC). Art illery support is provided by si)( 120mm mortars and, in batta lions not equipped w ith the BMP (which carries an anti -tank missile on each vehicle), an anti tank platoon

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of two recoilless anti -tank guns and anti-tank gu ided weapons (ATGWs) Log istics support is contained in a "tail"' of only 15 or 16 vehic les, A tank battalion is organised on similar lines, but has no mortars or anti-tank support, and has a slightly larger "tail". Tank platoons in the tank batta lions of a tank regiment have ten tanks per company (31 per battalion) whereas motor-rifle regi ments have four tanks per platoon (40 per battalion).

Regimental Organisation The basis of a motor-rifle regiment is three motor-rifle battalions plus one tan k battalion of 40 tanks. In addition a reg iment has strong support elements including a reconnaissance company. Total strength is some 2,180 all ranks. A tank regiment is considerably smaller, with 1,300 officers and men. Its basl"s is three tank battalions, 95 tan ks in all. In the past, tank regiments had no organic motor-rifle troops, but front -line units now include at least a company, and in some cases a batta lion, of motor-rifl e troops. Artillery sup-

Sov iet Ground'Forces Weapons Total armad f o rce s: Active 4,1 mi llion; , ese,ve 9 mi llion. Ground Forces Command: 1.9 mill ion act ive regu lar and conscripted troops (KG B troops 375.000, inc lud ing border gua,ds. Min ist ry of Inte ri or troops 200.000. Construction troops 250,000). Th e USSR is divid ed into 16 M il itary Districts and Soviet tmops abmad are formed into 4 'gmups of forces', In peacetime. teeth arms are organised in divisions o f 3 ty pes: 119 Mo tor Rifle Divisions; 46 Tank Divis ions; 8 Ai rbo rne Divisions. There are 3 sta ges o f com b a t readiness First category over 75 per cent manned w ith full equipmen t sca les Second category 50 · 75 per cent manned w it h full sca les of fighting veh icles but not necessarily of the latest ty pe Th i rd Category 10-30 pe r cent manned with 30--50 per cent equ ip ment sca les plus 'mothballed' obso lescent equipment First category equipment sca les Tank Divs. 325 tan ks; 170 combat Af'C; 98 battle reconna issance vehicles; 96 guns. rocket launcher vehicles' or heavy mo rta rs. p lus 60 AA miss ile vehic les or rada, contro ll ed gun systems; 4 FFR ( FROGs)' 81 .heavy anti· tank weapons. MO/Of Rifle Divs: 266 tanks: up to 372 comba t APCs: 125 battle reconna issan ce vehicles; 144 field guns; rocket launcher veh icles or heavy mortars; 60 AA m iss il e veh icles or rada, · eontml led gun systems ; 4 FFR ( Fmgs); 81 heavy anti· ta nk weapons. Airborne Divs; 102 BMD combat vehic les; 30 ASU·85 Sf' guns; 36 field guns: 15 battle reconna issance vehicles. Second category equ i pment scal es Tank Div$: 310 tanks, less AA defence. M%r Rifle Divs: 215 tanks; 312 combat APCs; less AA and ant i·tank weapons. Th i rd c ateg o ry equip ment scales These va, y to accommodate stockp il ing req u irements . Combat ready vehicles usu~lIy comprise 7 5 p~r cent of Second Category scales. E$/imltt ~d

Major w eapo ns and equipme nt Tanks: T·72, T-64, T-62. T- 5 5. T-54. T·lO

APCs end M/CVs Artillery:

AA Artillery:

BMP, BMD. PT- 76, BRDM, BTR · 60, BTR · 70, BTR ·1 52, MT· LB

60.000 +

, 152 and 122mm SP guns, 180mm, 152mm. 130mm. 20,000 + 122mm field guns; 1 22mm, 140mm, 200mm, 240mm, mu lti - barrelled rocket launchers; 120mm, 160mm, 240mm. heavy mortars, Sp igot. 8 to 10,000 Spandrel, Spiral 57mm, 73mm. 82mm,85mm, 1 OOmm, 1 07mm anti·tank guns and,Snapper. Sagger and Swatter anti · tank gu ided weapons.

6 to 7,000 23mm. 57mm. towed AA guns; ZSU·23·4 AA SP guns; 85mm, 100 m m, 1 30mm emplaced guns; SA · 7 (hand he ld), (excluding SA·4, SA-6, SA-7. SA · 8, SA - 9. SA-l1 mobile AA miss iles. SA - 7)

Per annum product ion rates (USSR only) TankS 2.600 An il lery 1.400

AP C/MICV 3.700

Frontal A v iati o n (Unde r Ground. Forc es control) H~IiC(Jpters: Hind, Hip, Hook, Hound (un de' Divisional and A rmy Control)

Fixed wing

To/8/s

44.000

3.000 +

Tota l: 6,000 aircraft: 1,000 fighters, 2,000 fighter bombers, 3,000 strike aircraft. Grouped in Tactical Ai r Armies, one w ith each'of 12 border Military Districts and Eu ro pean M ilitary Districts in USSR. and one with each Group of Forces ab road. La rgest is 16 TAA with GSFG . Approx. 4.200 airc raft in Europe and European USSR and 1,800 in Centra l and Eastern USSR.

Aircraftlypes. M iG 25. M iG 27. M iG· 23, Su · 17{20, Su 24, MiG · 21. Su-7. MiG 19, M iG 17, Yak · 28. An -12.

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port is notably absent; the tank regiment has only anti -aircraft weapons for protection (ZSU -23-4 and SA- 9). Both tank and motor-rifle regi· ments have engineer mine-clearing and river-crossing support, and decontaminating equ ipment. The light regimental tail provides scanty field recovery and repa ir facilities, and a sma ll medica l post as well as cargo and fuel veh icles to resupply the sub -units.

Division Organisation The basic all - arms formation, th& division, comprises three motor· rifle regiments and one tank reg iment for motor-rifle divisions, and three tank regiments and one motoHifle regiment for tank divisions. Recent increases in the numbers of tan ks in motor-rifle regiments and divisio ns have, however, tended to make the motor-rifle division an equally balanced tank and infantry formation. whi le the tank d ivision remains an armourheavy formation. Both divisions have strong reconnaissance battalions with a "commando -type" parachute company for deep penetratio n; they also have effective battlefield radar and directi on-finding equipment, as well as armoured vehic les for ground reconnaissance in conventional and nuclear war. Motor- rifle and tank divisions have a considerable amount of artillery in addition to that held by the ir regiments, including antiaircraft guns and missiles, towed and self-propelled howitzers, surface to surface missile and rocket launchers. A division has particularly strong mine-clearing end river - crossing support, much of the equipment having been proven in the Yom Kippur Israeli-Arab war of 1973. The engineers also have obstaclecreating ability using m ine-laying vehicles and trench -diggers. Chemical defence troops provide good decontamination ability wi th personnel and vehic le decontaminat ing equipment. The division's logistic tail is true to the principles of lightness and flexib ility. The faci lities of the techn ical support battal ion are

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neither extensive nor are they designed for repairing heavi ly damaged vehicles. The med ical battalion's field hospital is designed to treat 60 bed cases at a time, but pro vides light treatment or immediate evacuation for many more. The divisional supply transport battalion has the task of carrying fuel and supplies forward to the regiments. Divisional movement is controlled by a strong detachment of traffic police (the "Com· mandanfs Service") who organ ise routes and deployment areas, site depots, and so on.

Military Districts The USSR itself is divided in peace into Military Districts, wh ich provide an administrat ive framework for raising, tra ining and command ing military units, and the organisa t ion and supply of military forma tions in a given territorial area. In peacetime the M ilitary District is responsib le for the garrisoning, training, and rear supply of forces; and also for mi litary integration with the civi l population, including Civil Defence organisations, preservice train ing, conscription, m ilitary farms, etc. In wartime, the Military District is responsible for moving formations on to a war footing, transporting them to the

Soviet Ground Force formations, organised in peace into Groups of Forces outside the USSR. w ould in w ar be organised as ""Fronts"", an d several Fronts' wou ld probably be combined into a "Theatre 01 Military Action", For example, the 21 Soviet d ivisions now forming the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG )

would probably become a Fron t in war, and along with the Northern (Poland) and Central (C:techo, slovakia) Group of Forces, might be classed as the " Central European Theatre". It is to the Front com mander that the Soviet tactical air force (Front Aviation) w oul d be subordinated. Th e Front commander wou ld deploy his air power in coord ination with his ground fo~es, allotting it 10 whichev9f sector of the battle, f ield he considered most important. The Front commander has in addi· ti on medium' range nuclear missiles (Shaddock and Scaleboard ) which he can deploy as he w ishes. The airborne forces would also come under Front control; but, as a result of the limited amount of air transport available to drop or airland troops, and the great vulnerabi lity of large-s cale assault groups. the Front comma nder would prob ably detach a proportion of the airborne troops allotted to him to armies under his control. A Soviet Fron t can have any number of armies, bul in practice four or five would be about average. An army is likewise comprised of

Be low left : Th e ar ti ll ery has g reat hitting po we r, r anging fro m fi eld guns t o t h is SCUO- B.

Below: Th e USSR pos sesses more tank s than any other nation and is st ill bu ilding .

battlefront, supplying them and eventually replac ing them with fresh forces, The importance of individual Military Oistrictsdepends mainly on their geographical loca , tion, wh ich itself largely determines the level of fo rc es maintained within them, In the event of a war, formations of 8 Military District will be formed into groups of armies (Russian ""FRONTY"), Several "" FRONTY"" in a g iven geographical area would constitute a Theatre of Combat Act ion (TVD), A Soviet TVD would be roughly com parable to, say, "AFCENT' or "AFNORTH" in NATO. Two or more TVO. and associated Ileel (s) where approp' ria te, in a given geographical area, would constitute a Theatre of War,

Fro nts

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any number 01 divisions, but similarly, lour would appear to be the norm nowadays. Armies with a preponderance of tank formations Bre known as " Tank Armies". Armies with a more even balance of tank end motor-rifle formatio ns, or composad of a preponderance of motor-rifle formations. are called "Combined Arms Arm ies". The term " Shock Army" is a traditional title maintained for historical reasons. Military activity at front or army level is termed "operational" . end the Russian word "operatsiya" (operation) is normally used in specific reference to army or Front. The weapons of the Strategic Rocket Forces are employed for strategic (i.e., TVD or National) aims. but may on occasion be employed in support of a major operation to supplement the tacti cal and operational muscles olthe Front Commanders. A lthoug h the air borne forces are organisationally part of the Ground Forces. in practice they too are strategic troops maintained under d irect control of the Stavka. They can, of course, be subord inated to the TVD or lront commandar, if necessary.

Arm y Organisa tion The organisation of a Soviet arm y is flexible, wi th a yariable number of divisions of all types. A ty pical combination might be three tank divisions plus two motor-rifle d ivisions. An army d isposes of a large amount of artillery, some of wh ich in w ar would probably be retained for army- use, with the balance being allocated to wh ichever divisions the army commander thought to be in most need of it. An army commander would be extremely unlikely to allot any of his mediumra nge 55 -1C Scud nuclear missiles to a division. He would also have a tank resefYe which cou ld be used to strangthen an important axis, and a large amount of enginaer equipment to co nstruct more permanent riyer-crossing sites. Most of the army's logistic capability is held at high leyal, because the supply of lower formations is the responsibility of the higher formation. In other words, the logistics ta il of a d ivision is not

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A b oy e : Vi r t ually every army has d i scard ed the f lame thrower but no t that of t he USSR. there to keep the division supplied. but to furnish supplies down to that diyision's regimen ts and batta lions; divisional supply is the res pon sibili ty of the army commander, and so on. Not only does this prevent d ivision and lower units from being encumbered with large logistic tails. thus increasing their mobility, it also enables the army or Front commandef to concentra te his supplies more easily on those axes wh ere they will be of greatest ya lue in the conflict.

Airborne Forces Airborne forces are the elite of the Soviet Ground Forces. There ere eight d ivisions, all stationed in the USSR as a stra teg ic resefYe of the High Command. They (Ire con sidered the most reliable of the nation's troops, and are chosen to spearhead major operati ons. being used in this way in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afg hanistan in

1979/ 1980. Soviet airborne forces are trained to operate in seyera l roles. They could be dropped in small teams by advanced parachuting techn iques

Above: Nobo dy c o uld d eny t hat t he Soviet soldier is brave and reso lu t e in t he d ef e nce of his h o m eland . W het her he w ou ld be so d eterm ined in a war o f fo r ei gn c onqu est i s, h owever. no t so sure. to operate secretly as reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the enemy rear. Considerably larger un its, up to a banal ion or larger, might also be deployed deep in the enemy re~r on special "suicide" missions of strategic importance. such as the 'destruction of 8 communications centre or government buildings in a city. Finally. they could be used in the traditional role, landed by aircraft. parachu te or helicopter in the enemy rear to fight conve ntiona lly until relieved by the advancing main forces. An airborne banalion is org anised on similar lines to a motor-rifle banalion: three companies. mort a,s, anti-tank support and a light ta il. although its equipment will vary depending on its role. The banalion is usua lly equipped with tha BMD - the air-droppable infantry com bat vehicle-which would give it a significant offensive capability and eXlra protection in an NBC environ menl. An airborne banalion group operating in the enemy rear would be quite a formidable force . It could be strengthened still further by helicopter-born e and air· landed

equipment, if local mastery of the air could be maintained and if, in t he case of transport aeroplanes, a suitable landing field could be found . The great increase in the number of helicopters in the Soviet Army In recent years gives commarn:iers the capability to lih severat banalion groups. with light scales, at a time. one particular advantage being that ordinary motor- rifle troops can be used with minim~1 training. This makes it more likely that helicopters would be deployed under divisional control to enable tactical operations to be conducted in close SlJpport of leading fOrmations, and at very short notice. Equipping helicopters with heavy armament has enabled them to deliver heavy fire support to any landing operation. Airborne forces, however trans· ported, would have only a limited amount of supplies and ammunition. and cou ld not be expected to operate Without support or rein· forcement for very long. The excep· tion would be long range " diver _ sionary" teams of up to 12 men dropped in the enemy rear to ca rry

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out a mission of strategic importance. such as the sabotage of a vita l installation or the assassinat ion of an important person. Having completed their task, there might be no way fo r such groups to return or escape. This is their misfortune, as the strictly pragmatic Soviet High Command is not likely to worry about the loss of a few soldiers if they are able to accomplish a mission of sufficient importance .• Formida ble though the airborne forces may appear, however. their role is only subsidiary to. and in support of, th e operations of the motor-rifle and tank forma tions; for it is on the ground that the Soviets consider the war wil l be lost or won .

Roles of G round Forces

Middle East or China. and secondly, they must be capable of prosecuting a war beyond the Socia list bloc w ith the aim of extending Soviet commun ist influence to other countr ies. Close study of troop dispositions quickly shows that the force level which the Soviet High Command maintains facing China, while adequate to repel any Chil)ese invasion of the Asiatic USSR. is nothing like sufficient to ensure success in a major invasion of that country. The force level maintained in t he European USSR and Eastern Europe. however, is much higher than necessary to deter NATO from invading Russia and may also be sufficient. under the right conditions, \0 invade Western Europe, defeat the forces of NATO and bring most of Western Europe under Soviet domination.

The deployment of the Soviet Ground Forces leads to the conclusion that the High Command envisages two major ro les for them. in addition to the responsibi lity for interna l security in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which they share with the paramil itary troops of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). First, they must defend the USSR from invasion by land from Western Europe. the

The principles of Soviet military doctrine. and therefore the shape and form of the Ground forces, are hea vi ly influenced by the geography and economics of the USSR. The country is so vast and the population density (even in European Russia) so low, that the state simply could not bear the cost of fixed fortificat ions along its borders. even assuming that this

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Military Doctrine

strength for the USSR to repe l any surprise attack and (c) to enable the USSR to launch (or to rep ly to) a surprise attack capable of achieving primary strategic object ives in the opening stages of a war. An important considerat ion is that the 177 divisions of the Ground Forces maintained in peacetime are merely the framework 'of the Soviet Army. Only the "front-line" d ivisioflS in Eastern Europe, t he strategical ly important airborne d ivisions, plus a very few elite divisions in the USSR, are mainta ined at full strength. All the Above: Soviet mi l itary d octr i ne others - t hree-q uarters of the total emph as ises r elentl ess offe nsiv e - are maintained at half strength, act io n af te r surprise attac ks. or even cadre strength (t to -l strength). The real basis of . the Soviet Army'S strength lies in its Le ft : Great effort has been ability to mobilise reservtsts who devot ed t o build ing u p a ir pave recently completed conscrip defences wh ic h w ill cove r th e tion service. Some 1.700.000 conadvance. scripts are demobilised into the kind of fort ification could be made reserves each year. These men can effective. A lmost all of European fill out the under-strength divisions USSR is a vast plain, bounded by and man the mothballed equipment the Baltic Sea to the north and the comparat ively quickly, bring ing the Black Sea to the south. while to the strength of the Ground Forces up west the plain stretches unbroken to over 5 million with in a few weeks. to Holland. Eastwards, only the It is the function 01 the Military roiling hil ls of the southern Urals District 10 accomplish this mobil isa lie between Moscow and the Tien tion. covertly if possible, although Shan mountains, where the border it Sl!ems improbable that such a with China runs . Along her mount- massive operation could be ainous border with China the USSR ach ieved unnoticed by the West. The Soviet Union's experience of has made' an effort to create physical defensive lines in strength, being t he vict im of surprise attack, because the natu/I! of the ground the geostralegic features of the and the composit ion of thl! poten- country. the military assessment of tial enemy's army make static the features of modern weaponry, defence an attractive measure for and the national and ideolog ical deterrence, and for buying time in drive 10 spread her influence are the even t of attack. factors which lead Sqviet military The greatest obstacles to any doctrine to stress the absolute military operations within the USSR primacy of the offensive as a means are the massive size of the country of waging war. Th is lays great and t he large rivers which dissect it. value on the seizure of the initiat ive, Consequently. Soviet mil itary think- the ability to cover large distances ing is bound to reckon with these at great speed an d the achievement fac tors. which affect attacker and of the max imum of effect by defender alike. and plan the manoeuvre, concent ration and sur development of the Ground Forces prise, together with vigorous fighting to the very depths of th e accordingly. The size of the Soviet armed enemy's position. Thus, through fo rces in peacetime is limited only out these pages the reader will by the level of the Soviet economy. notice the ever- increasing emphasis However. sufficient forces are on mobility. rap idity of movement maintained (a) to deter any possible and the ability to concentrate or attacker, (b) to provide sufficient disperse quickly.

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I

Main Battle Yanks Despite all the deve lopments of modern w eapon technology, the Russians still consider the tank to be the most suitable instrument of their o ffensive. The Sov iet

commitment to the tank remains total, and much of their weapons systems development since the w ar has aimed at giving other arms the same mobility, protec tion and firepower that the tank forces possess. It, is

T-72 Main Battle Tank Combat w eight : 39 ·3 tons (40,OOOkg) Len gth : (Gun to front) 29·511 (9'02m): (hull) 20-46ft ( 6-35m). Width : 10·0311 (3·375 m) Height : (To cupola) 7A l ft (2- 265m) Engine : Water -coo led diesel of about 700bhp_ Armament: 125mm smoothbore gun fir ing fin- sta bilised APFSDS and HEAT ammun it ion , wit h automatic loader: one 7·6Zmm coax ial machinegun and one 1 Z'7mm remote-contro lled DShK AAMG. Speed : 50mph (80km/h) Range : 310 mi les (500km). Armour: Ma ximum abou t l Z0mm. possibly of modern " special" ' malerial res istanllO shaped charges_ Below : The T- 72 is now t he principal MBT of th e Soviet A rmy. It hasa combat weight of 39·3 tons (40,OOOkg j and is po w er ed by a 700bhp diesel engine. Hull and turret are of special arm o ur.

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recognised that today, on a battlefield saturated w ith guided weapons, the tank cannot survive alone, even in large numbers. Consequently all units and formations are to a greater or lesser extent composed of "combined arms" which afford each other mutual protection. This does not mean that all Soviet fighting formations tend towards the same composition . however. The Soviets still maintain tank- heavy formations. convinced that these formations are the best sort for rapid thrusts deep into the enemy's position. delivering a " shock " blow so as to precipitate his rapid military and political collapse.

Cons iderabl e con fusion was caused in the West over the correct designation of the MBTs wh ich followed the T- 62 . This was eventua lly resolved and it is now quite clear tha t there are two distinct designs : the T- 64 and the T-72, The latter is a progressive development of the T-64. w ith revised suspension and a slightly d ifferent turret. It is also frequent ly suggeste d that T -72. may be const ructed of a new type of armou r. simil ar in concept to that developed in the United Kingdom and known as " Chobham armour" ' Should th is be so, of cou rse. it wou ld mean that a large pan of Nato's anti- tank armour cou ld be negated. especially those projectiles and missiles equ ipped w ith a '"hol low -charge" warhead . The principal difference between T-72 and T- 64 is that the newer tan k has six large road - whee ls, whereas T- 64 has six rather sma ll road-wheels wh ich are qu ite unlike those on any other Soviet M ST. There may w ell also be internal diffe rences between the two tanks. but th is w il l not become apparent until examp les of each become ava ilable for deta iled examination by Western experts. The T- 72 is armed w ith a 125mm main gun . wh ich is fitte d w ith a fume fires A rmour-Piercing Fi n-Stabil ised Disca rd ing Sa bot extractor, The (APFSDS) . I (HE). or High Explosive Ant i-Tank (HEAT) ",

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.. rounds and an Integrated Fi re Control System ( IFCS) is installed , The IFCS re lieves both commander and gunner of some of their tas ks as well as significantly increasing the probability of a first -round hit. An automatic loader is fi tted and this. as w ith T-64, enables the crew to be reduced to three men This reduction in the nu mber of crew men is most significant as it has been strenuously res isted in Western armies. who do, of course, have a much more acute manpower problem than the Soviet Army. This means that the Soviets have been able to "save" 95 soldiers in every tank regiment and th is w ill have helped them to achieve the rec ent expans ion of tank battalions in motor- rifle regiments from 31 to 40 MBTs. T-72 was put into production in 1974 and entered .service w ith the Soviet Ar my shortly afterwards. It is now in production in severa l State armament factories in the USSR. and is also being produce d in Po land and Czechosbvakia. Current production is runn ing at over 2.000 per year. which is sufficient to replace the entire tank fleets of both th e British and French armies every year ! All Soviet Ar my front -li ne divisions have now been re-equ ipped w ith th is excel lent MBT. and the oth er Wa rsaw Pact armies are in the process of putting it into service A specia l command vers ion ex ists wh ich ca rries add itional commun ica tions equipment in place of the 12'7mm mach ine- gun. When stationary a 32ft (1 Om) mast can be erected. This vers ion is designated T-72 K. ..

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Above: A T-72 ofthe Tumansky Guards Division on parade in Red Square, Moscow . This picture shows the low, sleek outline of the tank to advantage. An infra - red light is fitted beside the barrel and there is another in front of the commander 's hatch . The two boxes on the side of the turret contain ammunition for the anti - aircraft machine -gun. Note also the fuel tanks fitted into the track-guards; if the fuel is ignited due to a hit it will burn harmlessly w ithout affecting the cre w .

Left: A column of tanks moves forward escorted by its air defence: the SA- 8 Gecko. The tanks are T -72s which have been specifically designed to fit in with the Soviet tactical concepts of rapid advance, early breakthrough of enemy defences, and penetration of the rear areas. However, tank columns such as this will need very strong air defences if they are to advance in line as they w ill offer very good targets to the increasingly effective NATO ground attack aircraft.

19

Above: A T-72 of theTumansky Guards Div is ion is inspected by French gener als. The 125mm fin - stabilised ammun ition is on d isplay a nd the dozer blade can be c learly seen.

20

~

Not satisfied w ith th is tan k the Soviet Army has had a new MBT under developmen t since the early 1970s, known in the West as T- 80. Curren t informa tion is. not unnaturally. somewhat scanty. although most reports agree tha t the new tan k is generally similar in size and shape to T-72. but w ith a slightly longer hu ll. The gun is probably the same. although it wou ld be in li ne w ith previous Soviet prac tice 10 up- gun th eir next generation M BT, moving on to either 130mm, or even 152mm. The T-80 is cert ain to have some fo rm of specia l armour. although whe the r this w il l be the sa me as on T-72 is a matter for conjecture. The USSR has been a world leader in metallurgy for many yea rs and the re is no reason why they shou ld lag behind the West in new armours, One of the most interesting fea tures of Soviet tank design is the way in wh ich they seem to be able to produce M BTs wh ich excite the envy of Western so ldiers fo r a co mbat weight some 30 per cent less th an MBTs they use. T-72 we ighs some 39 ·3 tons (40.000kg). whi le Leopa rd 2 is a massive 54 tons (55 .000kg)

Above: AT -72emerges from a river after an under-w ate r crossing. This type of operation is essential to Soviet plans fora rapid ad v ance across Western Europe. but ·is considered very ha:/!ardous by W estern ex perts. Left : This rear v ie w of an early model T-72 again emphasises the uncluttered design. The large t ube on the sid e of the t urret is theschnorkel. which is shown mount ed for r i ver - crossing in the pict ure above.

Z1

T-64 Main Battle Tank Combat w e ight : 39 -3 tons (40,OOOkg) length: (Gun 10 fron t ) 295ft (9-02m ); (hu ll ) 20·46ft (6·35 m) . Width: l Q·Q3ft (3 ' 375m) Height : (To cu pola) 7-41f1 (2 -265ml . Engine : Water -coo led diesel. 700bhp. Armament: 125mm smoothbore main gun. firing fi n- stabil ised APFSDS an d HEAT ammun iti on, automa ti c loader. One 7 '62mm coax ial machinegun . One 12 -7mm remote -contro lled DShK AAMG. Speed: 50mph (80km/h). Rang e : 310 miles ( 500km) . Armour : M aximum abou t 120mm. Western milita ry com mentators have suggested that the T- 64 has proved to be less than satisfactory, and it is ce n ainly true that th e tank has nOI been exported on the scale of T - 54/55, nor has it been produced in the Pol ish and Czechoslovakian tank factories. Nevertheless, it represents a major mile stone in the development of Soviet MBTs. A new experimental tan k was run ni ng in the late 1960s which was designated M -1 970 in the West : th is mated the T- 62 tur ret and gun to a new hu ll wi th six sma ll road -whee ls an d retu rn ro llers. When th is M8T first entered product ion as the T - 64 it had the M - 1970 hu ll and suspension, the 115mm smoothbore gun from the T-62. and a 'comp letely new tu rret and automatic loader. Th is latter device enabled the Soviet Army- to the great su rprise of Western armies - to reduce the tank crew from the trad iti onal fou r to three. A few yea rs after entering service a modificat ion pro gramme was started in wh ich the 115mm smoothbore gun was replace d by a new an d even larger 125mm gun . New production veh icles. of course, we re fi tted w ith t he new gun as standard. continu9d~ Below: The T -64 preceded the T -72 in production, but has only entered service with the Soviet Army. It has the same 125mm main gun as the T - 72 ; the suspension is, however. quite different with six small road wheels of stamped metal . The 12·7mm machine- gun can be fired by ~emote - control from ins ide the turret .

.'- -'-

22

Above: This view shows the infra-red searchlight fitted on the left of the main gun, and the AAMG ammunition boxes on the left of the turret; all are on the right of the T -72 turret.

23

..

The 12 5mm gun is a smoothbore weapon. firing Armour-Piercing FinStabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS). High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT). and High Explosive (HE) rounds. Forty rounds are carried. the normal mix being 12 APFSDS. 6 HEAT and 22 HE. although this can be varied in accordance with the tactical situation. The automatic loader enabled th e Soviet Ar my to " save" one-quarter of its tra ined ta nk crews. Th e eng ine and tran smission are mounted at the re ar of the veh icle, the engine being a ne w des ign of w ater- cooled diesel. Initial reports credited this with a power output of 1.000bhp. but a more realistic ligure 01 700 to 760hp is now generally accepTed. Despite its apparent lack 01 success. and its being superseded by the T-72. the T-64 has remained in production lor many years. and some 600 ale still being produced annually_ It is probable. however. that the T -64 factories will be the lirst to convert to production 01 th e new T-80. Many th ousends 01 T-645 have been produced, but none of these seems to have gone to any of the non-Soviet armies in the Warsaw Pact. One featu re of the T-64 w hich has cl ea rly been less than successfu l is the suspension_ All Soviet medium tanks from T-34 onwards had used five road-wheels without any return rollers. so quite why the change was made to the very small ro ad -wheels 01 T -64 is not immediately apparent. although it is known that the T-62 has a tendency to shed its tracks. The T -64 concept appears to have failed as T -72 employs a completely different system. while some mOdified T-625 have been seen with the T-72 style suspension_ Left : On thi s T -64 n ote th e schn o rkel tube sto w ed acr o ss the re ar of t he t urret a nd the unditc h ing bea m at the b ack of the tank b elow t h e exhausts. Th e auto m atic loader o n th e 125mm main g un has e nabled the Sov iet A rmy t o re duce th e no rma l f o ur- man c rew t o three.

24

• Abo '".,: The formidable Hlnd- D combat helicopter is used to provide

a ir s upport to large formations of t a n ka, s uch as these T-645. Note the close formation s being used by the tank s.

l eft: This view shows very c learly the s harp co rner between the walls and top of the turret : one of the fir st indications to Western experts that T -64 might be constructed of "special" armour.

25

T-62 Main Battle Tank Combat weight: (Fu lly stowed, no crew) 36·93 tons (37 ,500kg) . Length : (Gun to front ) 30ft 8in (9488 or 9770mm), (gun to re ar) 22ft (6 705mm ) Width : 11ft (3352mm) , Height: 7ft 11 in (2400mml. Engine: V-2-62 vee- 12 wate rcoo led diesel, 700hp. Armament: U-5TS 115 mm smooth·bore gun. 40 rounds APFSDS, HEAT, HE . one 762mm (co -axial) with 2000 or 3500 rounds.

Speed: Up to 34mph (50km/hJ Range : Typical ly 310 miles (500kml. Armour : Up to lQOmm , mantle! up to 170mm.

The T-62 was developed in the late 19505 as the successor 10 the earlier T - 54/55 ser ies. f irst being seen in public in 1 965. It is very simi la r in appear ance to the ea rlier M BT. but does, in fact. have a longer and wider hull giving a more even spacing between the road-wheels , a new tur ret and a much more powerful main gun. fitled w ith a bore evacuator. When it first entered service the T - 62 d id not have an anti -aircraft machinEt- gun, but in the early 19705 many we re retrofitted with the stan dard 12'7mm DShK weapon which is mounted on the loader's cu pola T-62s thus fi tted are designated T-62 A. cont;nulld'-

26

Above : The T - 62 introduced the 115mm smoothbore main gun with its APFSDS ammunition. The tank itself, however, has not been an outstanding success and i s being replaced byT-64and T-72. Below: Senior Lieutenant Yesaulkov (centre) wit h members of his tank platoon on training in the Siberian Military District. The characteristic Soviet tank suit is shown to advantage, together w ith the padded helmet. Notatheabsence of an AAMG on T - 62s.

27

Abo v e : These t w o T - 62s are on training in the Siberian Militap{ District. Thel15mm main gun fires APFSDS, HEAT and HEammunition and a total of 40 round s ca n be carried. A st abili ser is fitted and the normal rate of fire is four rounds per mi nute. ...

The main gun cause d consi derable su rp rise in the West as it appeared al a time w hen the majority of NATO armies had just decided to standardi se on 105mm ca li bre. The Soviet 115m m gun was not only larger. but w as also smooth -bore. a major departu re from the accepted ideas at that tim e. The 115mm round is manual ly loaded. bu t once the gun has been fired it automatica lly returns to a set ang le at which the empty ca rtridge case is ejected from the breech, after wh ich it moves down a chute and is then thrown ou t through a small hatch in the rea r of the tu rret. The tank has an average rate of fire of some fou r rounds per minute. and a stabil iser is fi tted. A "schnorkel" ' tube can b€ fi tte d on the loader's hatch, and is held upright by w ire stays With this devi ce the T- 62 can fo rd rivers to a depth of 18ft (5 ·486m). although even under the most ideal con ditions th is is a fa irly hazardous underta king. Very ca reful reconna issance is requ ired and the chosen crossing place must have good entrances and exits, as we ll as a firm bottom. Reports have reached the West from time to time of tan k crews and even who le un its refus ing to take part in such exercises. Where Western tanks have been fi tted for "schnorke lling" it has always involved a tube of su ffi cien t diameter to enable the crew to escape through it. The Soviets. however. use a tube on ly some 2ft {51cm) in diameter through which the re is no possibility of escape. continued'"

Z8

,,

Below : A closed - down T - 62showing the sma ll fronta l area and well -rounded turret typica l of al l modern Soviet MBTs. T- 62 is apparent ly the last Soviet MBT to have a fo ur-m an c r ew as su bsequent tanks have been designed to m anage w it h on ly three.

29

....

From 1973 onwards. eight yea rs after T-62 entered service, these tan ks have been upgraded by fitt ing laser range- fi nders and a 12·7mm AAMG In 1977 a much revised version was shown in Moscow fitted w ith six large road -wheels and ret urn rol lers simi lar to the T-72. but it is not known whethe r th is was ever put into production The T- 62 seems only to have been a success with the Soviet Army and the re latively few wh ich served w ith other Warsaw Pact coun tries have now been w ithdrawn. It wou ld seem, however, that despite this. and even w ith the appearance of the newer and better T-64 and T-72. the T-62 is stil l in limited prOduction , The ma in shortcomings of the T- 62 are reported to be a poor gearbox, a tendency 10 shed its tracks, th in armour. vu lnerable amf\lunit ion and fuel storage. and poor operat ing conditi ons for the crew. It wou ld. however, be a mista ke to over-estimate this last point as the average height of the Soviet soldier is rather less than that of his Western counte rpart.

30

Top left: A T-62 on a realistic looking exercise. This picture shows the length of the main gun and the excellent ballistic shape of the turret. Tracks are. however. easily shed. Bottom left: T -62s crossing a river during the Oder-Neisse exercises. Note the schnorkel, the hatch on the rear of the turret for eject ing spent cases and the long- range fuel tanks. Bottom right: A closed down T - 62advancing as part ofa tank/ infantry combat team. The U - 5TS main gun has an elevation of +17' and a depression of-4· . A 7·62mm PKT MG i s also fitted. Below : A platoon of T- 62s advancing across open country. Forma tions such as this would offer ideal targets for NATO defenders but the Warsaw Pact has many thousand of tanks to be destroyed.

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T-54/55 Main Battle Tank Combat weight: (fu lly stowed. no crew). About 35·9 101"15 (36,500kg ) .. Length : (Gun to front) 29ft7in (9020mm) (gun to rear) 21 It 7in (6 570mm) W idth : 10ft 9tin (3265mm) Height: 7ft W in ( 2380mm) .

Engine : T-54, V -2-54 vee -12 water-cooled diesel. 520hp: T-55. V-2-55 vee-12 . 580hp. Armament: 0 - lOT, 0 -10TG or D- 10T2S l00mm gun (T·54. 34 rounds, T- 55, 43 rounds), 7-62mm SGMT or PKT mach ine gun (co . axial) with 3000 ro unds: T - 54 also one l Z7mm DSh K w ith 500 rounds fo r AA use. and one 7·62mm SGMT (bow) Speed: 30mph (48 km/h) Rang e : T- 54. 250 miles (400km): T- 55, 310 miles (500~m) Armour: Up to 100mm , mantle! up to 170mm. The Soviet Army's T- 34 medium tank is considered by most experts to have been the best all-round tank design of Wor ld War II and many are stil l in service w ith some of the sma ller armies around the wor ld. Some are believed sti ll to be in reserve in the USSR. although whether this is for potential sales or for some use in a futu re war is not re adi ly appa rent The first step in tryin g to rep lace this excel lent tan k was the T- 44 which ap pea red towards the end of the wa r. If any pro duction of T- 44 too k place it was on a very lim ited scale. and litt le has ever been hea rd of it. The next step resulted in the T-54 wh ich did enter production and which has. in large measure. repeated the success of the T- 34. No accu rate production figures are ever li kely to become available. but it seems prob able that some 60,000 to 70.000 T- 54s and T- 55s were bu ilt. and these have served in at least 38 different armies The hu ll of the T-54 is of all-welded construction and th e turret is cast. with the top then we lded into position. The driver is seated at the front of the hull on the right. with the other th ree members in the turret The com mander and gunner are on the left w ith the loader on the ri ght. The engine and tran smission are in the re ar. separa ted from the crew compartment by a bu lkhead. The suspension consists of five road -wheels each side w ith th e drive sprocket at the rear and the idler at the front There are no ret urn ro llers as the top of the track rests on the tops of the road -w heels. The suspension is of the we ll-tr ied torsion -bar ty pe. continued'"

32

Above : This early ve rsion of T -54 does not have a fume -extractor on the muzz le, but isstill in service with the Warsaw Pact. The gun is 100mm D-10 with an elevation of +17" and a depres s ion of--4· . Left : AT -55 with its obsolescent 100mm gun. This weapon would have little effect on modern NATO MBTs except at very close range , but would still be effect ive against APCs and SP guns. Below: Soviet ArmyT -54sseen in the suburbs of Prague during the invasion of Czechos lovakia in 1968. The policy of the USSR towards its neighbouring states is indistinguishable from that of Imperialist Russia .

33

...

Main arma ment is the l 00mm 0 -1 0T ri fled gun fir ing A rmour- Pierci ng High Explosive (APH E). High Explosive Ant i -Tank (HEAT) or HE rounds. Th irty- fou r 100mm rounds can be ca rr ied. the mix depend ing upon the tactica l situa ti on. Most T- 54 and T- 55 tanks now have a full range of nightv ision devices and retrofi tt ing prog rammes are constantly bring ing the tank up to date. There are at least f ive models of the T- 54. differing in minor detail. In 1960 the re appeared th e T - 55 w ith many improvemen ts over the T- 54 includin g a more powerful 580bhp engine and increased ammuniti on stowa ge. bu t w ith no anti- aircraft armament. although th is las t was sub · sequently co rrecte d by the fitt ing of the usual 12·7mm OShK AA M G. The basic T - 54/T - 55 chass is has been used as the basis fo r numerous specialised veh icles including armoured recovery veh icles. en gineer veh icles, minelayers and bridges, There are at least fou r differen t types of related armoured recovery veh icl e. these being known as T- 54T. T- 54A - ARV. T- 54S · A RV and T- 54C-ARV, respec tive ly. The most com mon is the T- 54T w hich has a spade at the rear. a platform for ca rrying spare lank co mponen ts and a j ib

Above : The main gun at th e top of the picture shows the 23mm sub-calibre dev ice fitted for training in o'rder to red uce costs. These tanks and soldiers belong to the Polish Army. Above centre: A column of T- 55s advancing in close country. Th e schnorkel tube is stowed at the rear and long- range fuel tanks are fitted , which can be jettisoned w hen no longer required . Above right : Traditional Soviet tactics took no account of undulations in terrain. on ly of obstacles or commanding fea tures. Modern N ATO anti - tank ta ctics are forcing a r ethink. Right : A T - 55 c r ossing a PM P assault bridge. An infra- red search light is mounted beside the100mm main gun. and the 12·7mm DShK anti·aircraft MG is mounted on the cupola.

34

crane, Two basic types of mine-clearing tank are in service, on e being of the plough and the other of the roller types. Three bridgelayers are in service in the Soviet Army, with a further \wo having been produced in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, The latest variant to appear is the IMA Combat Engineer Tractor, which has a 'dozer blade mounted at the front of the hull and a hydraulically operated crane that can be traversed through 360 degrees, Components of the T- 54 are also used in the ZSU-57-2 antiaircraft tank. the ATS-59 tractor, and the PTS amphibian. Although still in wide -scale service with the Soviet Army it is questionable as to how effective the T-54 and T- 55 would be in a major theatre of wa r. such as aga inst the NATO armies in Cen tra l Eu rope, Their armo ur is thin by modern stendards, but above al l th e l00mm main gu n would have little effect against soph isticated modern tanks such as Chieftain . Leopards 1 and 2. and the US Army's Ml Abrams, The T-54 / T-55 would. however, still be effective in secondary theatres. or even in the main theatre as antiAPC weapons. Thus. despite being some 35 years old in conception these tanks are likely to remain in service with the Soviet Army for some years to come. and with other armies probably well Into the next century.

T-iO Heavy Tank Combat weight : (T-1QM, no crew) 48-23 tons (49'{lOOkg). 54 US tons. Length : (Gun to front) 341t gin (1O.490mm typ ica l), (gun to re ar) 23ft 1in (7400mm) . Width : 11It Bin (3440mm) Heig ht : (Excl. AA gun) 7ft 5in (2260mm). Engine : V-10 we - 12 wcll8r-cooled diesel, 700hp Armament : M -1955122mrn gun, 30 rounds ; (T-10M) two 14·5mm KPV (co-axial and AA), 1.000 rounds; (T-l0) two 12 ·7mm DShl:.. 1.000 rounds. Speed: 26mph (42km/h). Range: 155 miles (Z50Km ). Armour : Up to 210mm. Th e Jose! Sta lin serie s of World Wa r I1 heavy tan ks Culminated in the T· l 0 which entered production in 1956. having the same engine as the JS-3 but 8 more powerful gun and much improved armour ~nd rayout. It is important 10 note that. although considered to be very large and heavy by the Soviet Army. the T·l0 at 51 ·2 tons (52.000kg) is. in fact. lighter than the British Chieftain. German Leopard 2. and US Ml Abrams. The fi rst model 10 enter service wa s the T. l0. armed with a 122mm main gun an d 12-7mm OShK anti·aircraft and coax ial mach ine-guns. The T-1OM was a further development w ith a nu mber of major improvements to increase its co mbat effec tivenes s. The 12 ·7mm MGs we re rep laced by 14·5mm weapons and the main armament stabilised in both elevation and azimuth. Infra-red night-vision devices have also been litted and a "schnorkel" is available. If required_

Left : The T -1 OM is fitted with a 14·5mm KPV anti · aircraft machine-gun which ha5 a maximum r ange of 2000m and a cyc l ic fate of fire of 150 round 5 per minute. Note al50 t he infra · red 5earchlight C~ tnecupola, and the smooth lines of the turret.

36

The 122mm gun has an elevation of +17 deg. and a depression of -3 deg .. and 30 rounds of ammunition are carried. The T -1OM fires three types of ammunition : Armour Piercing High Explosive (APHE). High Explosive Anti -Tank (HEAT) and HE. The APHE round will penetrate 7·3in (185mm) of armour at 1.092yds (l000m). while th e HEAT round wil l penetrate 18in (460mm) at the same range. Surprisingly. it appears th at th e Soviet Army sti ll inte nds to use this tank to provide long-range an ti - tan k support. and possibly as the spearhead of an armoured thrust on a vital sector. where its very thick armour would provide protection. The T-10M does. however. have some shortcomings. Firs!. it is slower than other Soviet MBTs. which would mean that other tanks might have to slow down to allow it to keep pace. Secondly. it has a poor depression on its main gun. making it difficult to use from reverse slopes in the anti-tank rOle. Thirdly. its ammunition is of the separa te loading type. wh ich reduces its rate of fire. Nevertheless its very th ick armour cou ld still make it the most d iff icult of the Soviet tanks to destroy.

Abo ve : Tha T -10firsl appear ed at the November1957 Moscow pere dea nd has proved to be the last in a long line of Soviet " heavy" tanks although at 49 tonnes i t is lighter t han most Western tank s. left : This drawing of th e T -10 emphasises the low silhouette. Below : Rear view of T ·10 heavy tank. It appaars that t he Soviat Army still uses this e lderly tank. probably as a tank -d estroye r .

37

Reconnaissance Vehicles Naturally, the Soviet Army fully appreciates the value of

reconnaissance, and the re is good reason to believe that much recce of possible routes in Western Europe has been do ne already. The field armies w ill. however. still need

PT-76 Amphibious Light Tank Co mbat w eight : (No crew) 13 ·78 tons (14.000lo:g). Length : (Gun to IrOnl) 25ft Din (7625mm).

Le ngth : (Gun to rear) 22ft 7in (6910mm). W idth : 10ft Sin (3180mm) . Height : 7ft Sin (2260mm) (early models, 2195mm). Engine: V-6 six -in-l ine water-cooled diesel. 240hp. Armament : 76mm Qun (O-S6T. multi ·slotted muzzle brake. PT-76-1. 0-56TM, double-baffle, brake plus bore evacuator, Mode l 11. unknown gun designation. plain barrel, Model Ill). 40 rounds: 7·62mm SGMT (co-axiaIL 1,000 rounds. Speed : 27mph (44km/h) on land: 7mph (l1km/h) on water. Range : 155 miles (250km) on land. 52! miles (100km) on water. Armour : Usually 11to 14mm. Since it appeared in 1952 th is large, lightly armoured bu t highly mobi le veh icle has appea red in at least 15 different guises. and been buil t in very large numbers. The basic PT-76 (PT- 76S when fitted wi th stabilized gun) is still the most numerous reconnaissance tank of the Wa rsaw Pact armies. To swim. the twin hydrojets at the rear are uncovered and clutched-in, and a trim board i!; folded down at the front. Smokelaying equipment is standard . Its basic design of chaSSIS is used in the ASU-85. SA-6 Gainful SAM vehicle. BTA-50, FROG-2 /- 3/- 4/- 5. GSP bridgel. M-1970. QT · 62 APC. Pinguin. PVA and ZSU-23-4, In front-line Soviet divisions. the PT-76 is now al mos t comp letely replaced by a recce version of th e BMP.

detailed intelligence as operations proceed and the information will be obtained by deep penetration patrols, air recce and by vehicle- borne units. Both tank and motor-rifle divisions have a recce battalion, while each tank and motorrifle regiment has a recce company. Engineer units also conduct specialised recce. Another means of obtaining inmation on the enemy is by electronic surveillance (radio and radar monitoring) and the Soviet Army has a good cap ability in this field also. It must not be overlooked, however, that modern recce will produce so much information that there is now a problem in handling it all.

Below : The PT-76 light reconnaissance tank has served the Soviet Army for many years but is being replaced by a version of BMP.

Left: Propulsion afloat is provided by water jets; the intakes can be seen just abo ve the rear idler whee l. PT-76 chassis has been used as the basis for many other Soviet and Warsa w Pact veh icles .

39

BTR-40/BRDM-1 and BRDM-2 Recce Vehicles Combat w eight: -40. 5,2 tons (5300k g), - 4QP, 6-5 tons (5588kg); ·4QPB . 689 tons (7000 l< g). Length : -40, 161t 5in (5000mm), - 40P, 1811 Bin {5700mm} , -40PB. 18ft lOin (5750mm) Width : - 40. 6ft 3in (1900mm), -40P, 7ft 6in ( 2285mm) , - 40PB. 7ft B-}in (Z350mm). Height : -40, 5ft Si-in (1750mm), - 40P, 6ft 3in (1900mm') -40PB. 7ft 7in (Z3 1Omm). Engine : - 40, GAZ- 40. six -in- line water-coo led gaso li ne, 80hp ; - 40P. GAZ·4QP. 90hp. ·40PB, GAZ- 41 lIee- eight. 140hp_ Armament : Most. 7 ' 62 mm SGMB , 1.250 rounds . PS has 14 ·5mm KPVT

turret. 500 rounds.

Speed : -40, 50mph (80km/h), -4QP, land 50mph (80km/h), wate r 6mph (9 km/h): - 40PB , land 62mph ( l 00km/h) , wate r 6~ mph (10km/ h) Range: BTR- 40. 404 miles (650km) ; - 40P, 310 miles (500km), ·40PB, 465 miles (750km) Armour : Al l l0mm. The standard re conna issance veh ic les in the Soviet A rmy in the early 19505 we re the elderly BA· 64 armoured ca r and th e BTR· 40, whic h had appea red in 1948, Bo th had ma jor drawbacks in that they were not amph ibious and .

Right : A closed- down BRDM·2 patrols a heavily rutted track in Western Russia . The turret is identical to that on BTR · 60PB. Right and below right : Two views of BRDM · 2. which is sometimes also known as BTR · 40PB or · 40P2. Note the belly-wheels which can just be seen in the raised position in the lo w er side vie w. left: This version of the earlier BR OM · ' is a specialised N BG recce vehicle. BROM -lrkh . Equip ment includes an automatic flag dispenserabove t he rear nearside wheel ; the flags are "shot" into the ground by a cartridge.

40

41

Above: This BRDM -l has come under fire and is withdrawing under cover of smoke. Unlike some Western armies th e USSR has never lost faith in wheeled reconnaissance v ehicles. Below: Officers of a Guards division reconnaissance battalion w ith their BRD M - 2 scout vehicles. T urret-mounted machine- gun is a 14·5mm KPVTwith a coaxial7·62mm PKT machine- gun to its left.

42

~ they

lacked an adequate cross· coun try performance. this made them Quite unsatisfactory to the army commanders as they did not fit in with their tactical concepts, In the late 1950s, therefore. a new vehicle entered produc tion: the BRO M -l . which was also designated BTR. 40P. This vehicle has a hul l of all-welded steel which provides protection from smallarms fire . All four wheels are powered and a central tyre-pressure regu lation system is provided. One most unusual feature is that there are two bellywheels on each side. which can be lowered by the driver when crossing rough country. The vehicle is fully amphibious. water propulsion being by a sin gle water -jet in the rear of the hull. There are many versions, some car rying either Sna pper. Swatter or Sagger anti-tank gu ided- weapons (ATGW) Other models include BRO M -U. a com mard vehicle, and BRDM-' rkh. which is used to mark lanes through NBe-contaminated areas. In 1966 a further vehicle appeared. known variously as BROM -2. BTR-40PB, or BTR·40P-2. This has a modified hull. a more powerful engine, ~ gun turret simi lar to that fitted on BTR· 60PB. and a land· navigation sys tem. Ag ain. many d ifferent versions have been developed. including one armed with Sagger ATGW. and a new air defence veh icl e mounting four launch-tubes for modified SA-7 Grail SAMs. A major difference between BROM -1 and -2 is that the former has the engine in front and the crew compartment in the rear. while the laner has the crew in the front. There are many thousands of both these types in service with-the Soviet Army and w ith other Warsaw Pact notions. They w ill normally be found in the rec onnaissance un its at battalion. regimen t and divisiona l level , w ith the -rkh versions serving in chemical recce compan ies.

43

APCsand Command Vehicles As with t hei r ta n ks, t he Soviet Army has po u red e no r mo us reso urces in t o t h e deve lopment and producti o n of a huge f l eet o f purpose - bu ilt, effect ive and r ugged A Pes. A ll these ve h icles have b een d esigned t o p r ovid e t he m ean s t o en abl e

BMP Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle Weight : Empty. 11·32 tons (11.500kg). laden in combat. 12·5 tons

(l2JOOkgl· Length : 22ft 2in (6750mm). Width: 9ft 9in (2970mmj Height: Over hu ll. 4ft 1Din (1 470mm) over tu rrellR light. 6ft 5in (1980mm). Engine : V-6 six-in -l ine wate r-c ooled d iesel. 280hp. A.rmament: 73mm smooth -bOle gun. 40 rounds: AT-3 (""5agger") ATGW launcher: 7·62PKT (co-axial), 1,000 rounds. Speed : Land. 34mph (55km/h); deep snow. 2Smph (40km/h): water Smph (8km/h). Range: 310 miles (500km). Armour : Mainly 14mm. When it was fir st seen by Western observers in 1967 the BMP was though t 10 be exactly what the West"s own armies needed: a true Mechan ised Infantry Comba t Vehicle (MICV). It was significantly smaller Ihan the West"s own APCs. but with much greater firepower. The eight trOOps have multiple ~eriscopes and can. at least in theory. fire on the move. There is a vehicle crew of three: commander (who is also commander of the dis · mounted infantry section). driver. and gunner. 80th crew and passengers .Below : T his view of Cl BMP shows a vehic le used by t he amphibio us assau lt t r oops of the Polish Arm y. Note the finer bo w of later production models and sleek lines of th is exce l lent AP:C~ .... .;;:-;;~. .""-.::~:2~:ljI1

44

J

the infantry to move rapidly over the battlefield, keeping up with the tanks, and maintaining the inexorable advance across Western Europe. The BM P and BTR - 60/70 are still leaders in their field, classic designs which have stood the test of time. The Soviet preoccupation with the rapid advance has also led to emphas is on command posts (CP) vehicles which can keep up with the pace of the battle. New CP vehicles are now being fielded to achieve this. In Western armies such CP vehi c les are minimal modifications of standard APes; in the Soviet Army they are custombuilt forthe job.

Above: The BMP is designed for rapid and mass exploitation of a breakthrough of a l ightly defended point. in support of infantry.

45

Above: An assa u lt river cross ing . Th e BM Ps have halted in the shal lows an d the t r oops have exited through r oof hatches. Th e raised trim-boards stop water from wash ing up over the bo w. have nuclear/biologica l/chem ica l wa rfare protection in the pressu rised hull, and air filte rs are fi tte d as standard. The 73mm low-pres sure gun has a smooth bore and fires fin-stabilised HEAT rou nds, the automatic loa der giving a firing ra te of eight roun ds per minute. The missile launcher above th e gun carries one roun d ready to fire, and three more rounds are carried inside the veh icle. In addition , one of the in fantrymen inside the vehicle normally carries an SA-7 Grail SAM . The driver is seated at the fron t of the hu ll on the left. w ith the vehicle commander to his rea r, the eng ine being moun ted to the d rive r's right. BM P is fu lly amph ibious, being propelled in the water by its tracks_ A full ra nge of night- v ision equ ipment is fitted. al though only the o ld-fash ioned active infra-red ty pes have been seen so far, wh ich is. of course. easily detected on a modern battl efield. A number of variants have been developed_ One minor modification to the basic veh icle was that a sharper bow has been fitted to all ve rsions appea ring since 1970. clear ly designed to improve the handling cha rac teristics in wate r. In 1975 a va riant was seen w ith the troop com part men t re placed by a rear-moun ted tu rret mounting a battlefield radar. known as BMP-SON no clear picture is yet ava ilable in the West A recon na issance ve rsion is now rap idly rep lacin g the age ing PT· 76 The ra dar vers ion is armed w ith on ly a machine-gun ; the recce vers ion lacks an ATGW. but ca rries observati on equipmen t as we ll as its 73mm gun in an en larged tu rret. The recce ve rsion is designated BMP-R. The Sov iet Army received a rude shock when the BMP was used in co mbat for the first tim e in the 1973 Yam Kippur wa r. Used by the Egypti ans exactly as tau ght in the Soviet tactica l text-books the result frequentl y verged on disaster, It was demonstrated beyon d doubt that the idea of a M ICV wh ich wou ld charge onto enemy positions w ith all armament blazing away- i ncl ud ing the infantry men's rifles fir ing through ports - was

46

1

Below: BMPs usually fol low the infantry in an assau l t; here they are leading, suggest ing that this picture was taken before tactical doctrine was amended as a result of the Yom Kippurwar.

47

" very nice in theory, but tota lly unworkab le in practice_ There fo llowed a very open, extremely frank, and va luable discussion in Soviet mil itary journals, as a resul t of wh ich the who le concept of the use of BMP was revised. Soviet doctrine now dictates that the norma l use of APCs w ill involve the infantry dismoun ti ng some 220 to 330 yards ( 200 to 300m) short of the objective and complet ing the final phase of the assau lt on fool. covered by fire from artillery. tanks and the BMPs, It is. inc idental ly, in· te resting to note tha t the We st learned a gre at deal fro m the Soviet discus sions on the role of MI CVs and APCs. and probably avoided some ve ry expensive mistakes as a result I A rep lacement for BMP is we ll overdue. the ir normal equ ipment cyc le resu lting in major types being supersede d every te n yea rs_ There is no doubt. however. that the great tact ical debate on the ro le of APCs has led to a slowing down of this process where the BMP replacement is concerned, Now tha t firm conc lusions have been reached the APC design bu reau is work ing on a veh icle wh ich wil l be matched w ith the new teach ings and compatible in perfo rmance w ith the newT- SO MBT. It had been thought at one time that the Soviets were producing so many BMPs tha t they in tended to phase ou t whee led APCs altogether, bu t the recent appea rance of the BTR -70 eight- whee led APC indicates that th is is not so, Desp ite the change in tac tica l use resu ltin g from the Yam Kippu r war there is no doubt th at th e BMP has been a tremendo us succesSjlnd today. some 15 yea rs after its fi rst appearance, it is stil l one of the most effective APCs in service w ith any army_ Right: Rather m ore typical of modern Soviet infantry tactics than those s hown on page 47. the BMPs here fol low the infantry in the assau lt . The 73mm lowpressure gun fires fin-stabil ised HEAT round s;