The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

ALSO BY TOM WOMACK The Dutch Naval Air Force Against Japan: The Defense of the Netherlands East Indies, 1941–1942 (McFarland, 2006)

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942 Tom Womack

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUING -IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Womack, Tom, 1967– author. The allied defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942 / Tom Womack. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4766-6293-0 (softcover : acid free paper) ISBN 978-1-4766-2267-5 (ebook)

♾

1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Indonesia. 2. World War, 1939–1945— Participation, Dutch. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations, Dutch. 4. Espionage, Japanese—Indonesia. 5. Netherlands—Colonies—Asia—Defenses. 6. Netherlands—Military relations—History—20th century. 7. Netherlands. Koninklijke Marine—History—20th century. 8. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations. 9. Indonesia—History, Naval—20th century. I. Title. D767.7.W65 2016

940.54'2598—dc23

2015031087

BRITISH LIBRARY CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE

© 2016 Tom Womack. All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Front cover image: Painting by Joes Wanders showing Van Nes sinking in the Banka Strait, 1970 (courtesy Dutch Navy Museum) Printed in the United States of America

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina 28640 www.mcfarlandpub.com

For Dad When I was twenty-something, I asked my father, “When did you start feeling like a grownup?” His response: “Never.” Jack Thomas Womack September 5, 1932–February 9, 2009

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Table of Contents Preface and Acknowledgments

1

Abbreviations and Acronyms

3

Introduction

5

1. Trade Wars

8

2. Build-Up to War

15

3. Spies, Lies and Secret Ties

21

4. On the Edge of Darkness

30

5. The Fleet Plan of 1940

39

6. The East Indies Squadron

47

7. The MLD

66

8. Command and Control

76

9. The Deployment of Force Z

82

10. The Japanese Land

90

11. The Formation of ABDA

99

12. Japan Declares War

108

13. Balikpapan and Sinkawang II

115

14. The Japanese Move South

122

15. The Formation of the Combined Striking Force

132

16. The Battle of Banka Strait

141

17. The Inglorious End of ABDA

152

18. The Destruction of Port Darwin

158

19. Fire in the Night: The Loss of Bali and Timor

169

20. The Japanese Move Against Java

179

21. “In the afterlife, Sonny”

188

22. “We spanked the Japs … and we’ll do it again!”

195

23. “We will lead you to the enemy”

202

24. The Battle Begins

207 vii

viii

Table of Contents

25. The Withdrawal of Exeter

215

26. “Bravely but not very skillfully”

222

27. Aftermath

233

28. Hopeless Fights

241

29. The Final Line of Defense

254

30. Evacuation

267

31. The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok

284

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?”

294

Chapter Notes

313

Bibliography

343

Index

351

Preface and Acknowledgments My interest in military history began in the summer of 1974 at the age of seven. With money earned from my job on the family farm I bought my first plastic model, a Revell 1/32 scale M4 Sherman tank. At the time it didn’t matter that I knew absolutely nothing about either the Sherman or the Second World War. All I knew is that it looked really cool and I had fun building it. My parents provided encouragement, but it was it was my first solo “war time” project. By the time I applied the last decal I was hooked. Growing up on a dairy farm in central Texas, every Saturday followed the same routine. My brother, sister and I would deposit our weekly paychecks into the local savings and loan before heading to the library. There, we checked out reading material for the upcoming week. Afterwards, our parents took us across the street to the local five and dime. There, I planned my personal conquest of the world with a new bag of plastic soldiers. It was at that same five and dime where I was first exposed to the Bantam War Books Series. These illustrated paperbacks fueled my interest in military history by leaps and bounds. Each week I purchased a new volume to supplement my stack of history books from the library. The swashbuckling writing style of books like Samurai and The Ragged, Rugged Warriors, by aviation author Martin Caidin, fascinated me. Within the pages of these books appeared exotic, often unpronounceable names like Java, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Makassar, Borneo, Tjilatjap and Soerabaja. They were part of an immense European colony known as the Netherlands East Indies in December 1941. Yet, few books included more than a paragraph or two about their role in the Pacific War. But it was enough to stoke my curiosity that Holland, a tiny nation with a population of 8.7 million, ruled a colony of some 80 million inhabitants on the far side of the world. This fragmented introduction was the start of my lifelong interest in the role played by the Netherlands East Indies in the early months of the Pacific War. The colony held enormous reserves of oil and raw materials coveted by the Empire of Japan in the early 1940s. This juxtaposition of Dutch forces fighting Japanese invaders fascinated me. But unlike other battles such as Pearl Harbor, Guadalcanal, Midway, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Japan’s invasion of the Netherlands East Indies remains largely unexplored in comparison. As I grew older, so did my desire to learn more.

This text culminates a 30-year process to document Japan’s invasion of the Netherlands East Indies following their attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Not only does it document battlefield operations, but I have also attempted to synopsize from a Dutch point of view those events before the outbreak of war. As a “lesser” ally previously displaced by the war in Europe, prewar Dutch goals and strategies regarding a conflict with Japan are largely minimized in English language texts. Following the publication of my first book, The Dutch Naval Air Force Against Japan: The Defense of the Netherlands East Indies, 1941–1942, in 2006, I was contacted by numerous veterans of the Pacific War. I heard time and again how grateful they were that someone had remembered them. As these heroes pass away at the rate of nearly 1,000 a day it is more important than ever to tell their story. This is my attempt to correct the many inaccuracies and dispel decades-old myths surrounding this murky phase of the Pacific War in the most complete and accurate manner possible. My efforts to do so were facilitated by several key developments. As a student at the University of Texas at Austin I took Dutch language classes for two years. I was no longer limited to traditional English language sources that were frequently old and outdated. Then came the Internet revolution and the advent of the World Wide Web. I could now access foreign documents from the comfort of my home office. American, Australian, British, Dutch and Japanese military and diplomatic records shed new light on what is easily the most poorly documented campaign of the Pacific War. The end result is entirely my own design and I fully accept responsibility for any errors, omissions or related oversights. But I could not possibly have gotten to this point without the assistance of dozens of friends, colleagues and historians worldwide. Via the Internet, related blog sites and personal correspondence they provided input, facts and research. There are far too many contributors over the past three decades to list individually; but do know that all helped immeasurably in one way or another. That said, I must recognize several individuals who provided invaluable assistance. Mark Jones, who reviewed my first manuscript in 2005, again stepped up. Nine years makes a world of difference in one’s scope of family and work commitments, yet he made it a top priority. After 24 years working in com-

1

2

Preface and Acknowledgments

munications, I can say with all candor that Mark is one of the best copy editors with whom I have worked. Ron de Bakker, a former commissioned officer in the Royal Netherlands Navy and merchant marine officer, was also kind enough to review my manuscript. His detailed knowledge of both the Netherlands East Indies campaign and maritime matters helped to identify and clarify various inconsistencies that inevitably work their way into a manuscript of this nature. Mark and Ron offered immeasurable help in the way of proofreading, editing and fact-checking. Their level of detail and attention to accuracy in reviewing a text of this scope and length was beyond fantastic. A big thank-you to also goes to Jim West, a first-rate graphic artist in Dallas whom I have known and worked with since 1995. He was creative director at the very first advertising agency at which I worked as a copywriter out of college. All along it was my goal to provide a level of graphic detail above that found in other texts detailing the Netherlands East Indies campaign. Thanks to Jim’s patience and design skills I was able to make this happen.

I must give a huge acknowledgment to Jan Klootwijk of Den Helder, the Netherlands. He possesses one of the finest private maritime photo archives in existence. I can only imagine Jan’s initial reaction when he saw my rather lengthy list of desired photos. Nonetheless, he immediately confirmed his ability to help and that he was glad to do so. Jan proceeded to send me nearly 200 high-resolution photos of ships and personnel; many were taken by his late father, former KM sailor Maarten Klootwijk. In addition, Jan put me in contact with Gerard Horneman, Marien Lindenborn and Joes Wandering along with Leon Homburg at the Dutch Naval Museum. These three men graciously provided me with several dozen more high-resolution photos. Dr. Dirk Janse at the Netherlands Institute of Military History provided even more images. All played a vital role in helping illustrate this text in the way that it deserves. Thus, it is with tremendous pride and satisfaction that I present this book. I truly hope you enjoy reading it as much as I enjoyed compiling it. And may it likewise ignite and expand the imaginations of countless other future historians worldwide.

Abbreviations and Acronyms AA ABDA ABDA-AIR ABDA-ARM ABDA-COM ABDA-FLOAT ANIEM

ANZAC AP A/S ASDIC BPM CAP CKM CMM CMR CSF CZM DVO EC ESF GL GM GVT HAA HMAS HMIS HMNZS HMS HQ Hr.Ms.

Anti-Aircraft American-British-Dutch-Australian American-British-Dutch-Australian Air Command American-British-Dutch-Australian Army Command American-British-Dutch-Australian Command American-British-Dutch-Australian Naval Command Algemeen Nederlandsch-Indische Electriciteits Maatschappij (General Netherlands East Indies Electric Company) Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Associated Press Anti-Submarine Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (Batavia Petroleum Company) Combat Air Patrol Celebes Kustvaart Maatschappij (Celebes Coastal Navigation Company) Commandant Maritieme Middelen (Port Naval Commander) Commandant der Marine (Naval Commander) Combined Striking Force Commandant Zeemacht (Naval Commander, East Indies Squadron) Department Van Oorlog (Department of War) Escadrille Commandant (Squadron Commander) Eastern Strike Force (see CSF) Gun Laying (Radar) Gouvernmentsmarine Groep Vliegtuigen (Aircraft Group) Heavy Anti-Aircraft His Majesty’s Australian Ship His Majesty’s Indian Ship His Majesty’s New Zealand Ship His Majesty’s Ship Headquarters Her Royal Majesty’s Ship

IJA IJN IJNS JAC JCJL JST KIA KIM KM KMR KNIL KNILM

KNSM

KPM LAA ME MLD ML-KNIL

MMS MRU MS MTB MVK NATO NEI NISHM

NITM

NKPM

3

Imperial Japanese Army Imperial Japanese Navy Imperial Japanese Navy Ship Java Air Command Java China Japan Line Java Standard Time (GMT + 7½ hours) Killed in Action Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine (Royal Netherlands Naval Academy) Koninklijke Marine (Royal Netherlands Navy) Koninklijke Marine Reserve (Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve) Koninklijke Nederlands Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) Koninklijke Nederlandse Indische Lucht Maatschappij (Royal Netherlands Indies Air Company) Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij (Royal Netherlands Steamship Company) Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (Royal Packet Company) Light Anti-Aircraft Marine Establishment Marine Luchtvaartdienst (Royal Netherlands Naval Air Force) Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indisch LegerMilitare Luchtvaart (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force) Motor Minesweeper Mobile Radar Unit Motor Ship Motor Torpedo Boat Marine Vliegtuig Kamp (Naval Air Station) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Netherlands East Indies Nederlandsche Indische Steenkolen Handel Maatschappij (Netherlands Indies Coal Trading Company) Nederlandsche-Indische Tankstoomboot Maatschappij (Netherlands East Indies Tanker Company) Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum

4

NKTM

NPPM

OJR POW Qantas RAAF RAF RAN RECGROUP RFA RIMU RL

Abbreviations and Acronyms Maatschappij (Netherlands Colonial Petroleum Company) Nederlandsche Koloniale Tankvaart Maatschappij (Netherlands Colonial Tanker Company) Nederlandsche Pacific Petroleum Maatschappij (Netherlands Pacific Petroleum Company) Onderzeebootjager (Submarine Chaser) Prisoner of War Queensland and Northern Territory Aerial Services Royal Australian Air Force Royal Air Force Royal Australian Navy Reconnaissance Group (ABDA) Royal Fleet Auxiliary Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit Rotterdam Lloyd

RN RNVR 2/21st Regiment SNLF SONAR SS TBS UKG UPI USAAF USAT USN USNR USS VVC WIA WSF XO

Royal Navy Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment Special Naval Landing Force Sound Navigation and Ranging Steam Ship Talk Between Ships Ultra Kort Golf (Ultra Short Wave) United Press International United States Army Air Force United States Army Transport United States Navy United States Naval Reserve United States Ship Vrijwilleger Vlieger Corps (Volunteer Flying Corps) Wounded in Action Western Strike Force Executive Officer

Introduction Although few realize it, in the 1930s the Netherlands controlled the third largest empire in the world, behind only those of Britain and France. Their colonies were built on the back of Dutch naval and economic power in the 1600s. These territories stretched from the Caribbean to the southern tip of Africa to the Far East and brought the Dutch crown enormous wealth and prestige. The crown jewel of this empire was the Netherlands East Indies, which today is the nation of Indonesia. Dutch traders moved into the region in 1596 in search of spices and trade routes between Asia and Europe. In the process they shouldered aside Portuguese traders who had arrived several years earlier. Over the next 300 years the Dutch built on this empire. From its formation in 1830, the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijke Nederlands Indisch Leger or KNIL) mounted a series of military expeditions that brought the last independent indigenous kingdoms under Dutch rule by the early 1900s. It was an amazing triumph. Holland, with only 8.7 million inhabitants,1 controlled a colony of some 80 million over a distance of 7,000 miles.2 This was largely accomplished through the efforts of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Throughout the 1700s the Koninklijke Marine, or KM, was one of the strongest fleets in the world.3 It ruled the seas with a dominance that allowed Holland to maintain the vast lines of communication and trade between Europe and its colonies. Dutch global dominance had been established in the age of wooden ships and sail power. The onset of the Industrial Revolution in the mid–1800s saw the world adopt new technology and production techniques on a mass scale. In the process navies around the globe transitioned to steel-hulled ships and steam propulsion. Holland found that its relatively small industrial base made it difficult to compete on a global scale. As result, the KM quickly fell from its dominant position. The bulk of the KM had traditionally been based in the colonies, with most ships in the East Indies. But a lack of initiative and funding by the Dutch Government saw a dramatic decline in its size and effectiveness. By extension, the East Indies Government was responsible for maintaining those ships operating in the colony. The colonial government also became so complacent in matters of defense that by the First World War the KM had been relegated to second-tier status. The timing of Holland’s decline on the world stage was un-

fortunate. In the early 1900s Japan was coming out of its decadeslong period of self-isolation. As one of only two Asian states not subjugated to Western rule, the Japanese held a strong sense of moral superiority to its Asian neighbors.4 Japan also remained highly feudal and militaristic and began to quickly modernize its military forces along Western lines. In 1904 Japan soundly defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, becoming the first Asian nation to defeat a European power. Japan then seized the Kurile Islands. Fueled by this success Japan moved to expand its new empire. They seized control of Korea in 1910 and annexed it in 1911. With the rest of the world distracted by the Great War they grabbed additional territory in China, which was fragmented and weak. In 1920 the League of Nations granted Japan a mandate to administer the former German colonies in the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall islands. Although not allowed to militarize the islands, Japan immediately built vast harbor facilities, supply depots and fuel installations. These were initially civilian in nature, but the military quickly assumed control. By the 1930s the Japanese Mandated Islands, as they were termed, were firmly controlled by the military and heavily fortified. In 1934 the Japanese began building a series of airfields to provide an interlocking defensive air grid. Several islands were built up into submarine repair facilities, torpedo workshops, seaplane bases and major fleet bases. Communications capabilities were also heavily beefed up. These improvements continued right up to the start of the Pacific War and the Mandated Islands provided a base for several operations against the Netherlands East Indies.5 In 1931 Japan invaded Northern China and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. They then looked south toward the Netherlands East Indies. Like a priceless jewel glittering in the sun, the East Indies were a tempting prize for the Japanese. It and the British possessions of British Borneo, Brunei and Malaya held vast natural resources such as aluminum, bauxite, cotton, gypsum, rubber, tin and petroleum. As an overcrowded island nation with virtually no natural resources of its own, the import of raw materials—particularly oil—was the lifeblood of Japan’s very existence. As Japan continued its quest to gain more territory it invaded mainland China in 1937.6 To combat this act of naked aggression the United States, Great Britain and France, among

5

6

Introduction

others, provided arms, munitions and financing to the Nationalist Chinese Government. Then war spilled over to Europe and saw Nazi Germany invade and occupy most of the continent. In May 1940 Holland was invaded and forced to surrender in just five days. This left the Netherlands East Indies alone and exposed to the territorial ambitions of an increasingly hostile Japan. France was also overrun, leaving its Asian colony of Indochina isolated and forced to fend for itself.7 Taking full advantage of this lack of support, the Japanese quickly occupied French Indochina. The rationale initially given was the need to shut off the flow of war materials reaching China via French territory. However, it was obvious that Southern Indochina was also a perfect springboard for the invasion of American, British and Dutch territories throughout Southwest Asia. Japan’s occupation of Southern Indochina prompted severe concern among those Western nations whose colonies were now at risk. In an effort to force Japan’s withdrawal from China and French Indochina Britain, Holland and the United States implemented a total trade embargo against Japan. This included supplies of oil, raw materials and scrap iron, among others. These commodities were the lifeblood of Japan’s very existence; without them, the country and its war machine would grind to a halt. Faced with the prospect of a humiliating withdrawal, Japan made preparations for all-out war. Although Japan drew up specific war plans for an invasion of the NEI in 1941, in reality, it had been preparing for war against the West for more than a decade. These preparations included the use of thousands of consular personnel and civilian

expatriates for covert espionage duties throughout Western colonies. Operating under the guise of fishermen, merchant seamen, business executives, small business owners and consular officials, these Japanese collected a wealth of information on the East Indies throughout the 1930s. Labeled the “Southern Operation,” the campaign would include simultaneous strikes against the Philippines, Malaya and Netherlands East Indies. The attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor was intended to cripple the United States Pacific Fleet and prevent its interference with these plans. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had been rigorously trained and battletested in the China campaign and border skirmishes with the Red Army in the 1930s. For its part, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was powerful, well-equipped and eager for battle.8 Most Allied defenses they faced were weak and ravaged by years of neglect brought about by the Great Depression. The Netherlands East Indies’ economy, in particular, was badly damaged. By 1934, total income of the colony had been reduced to ƒ256,000,000, which was less than half its revenue in 1929.9 Corporate tax revenue amounted to ƒ59,300,000 in 1929; by 1934 it fell to just ƒ7,800,000. Because the East Indies Government operated a strict balanced budget, there was a massive financial hit to the overall economy.10 Defense spending by all the European colonial powers was cut to a minimum. In particular, the Dutch were grossly deficient in maintaining their military forces. Despite the vast natural wealth of the Netherlands East Indies they tended to look to the British and Americans for defense throughout the early and mid–

Introduction 1930s. As a result, the glory days of the East Indies Squadron were long past by the outbreak of war; it was now small and burdened with elderly equipment. Although the Dutch fought with valor and courage, they simply did not have the equipment or manpower to prevent the Japanese from taking an empire which they had owned for 300 years. Leading the defense was the KM, which fought and lost no fewer than four major sea battles—the Flores Sea, Gaspar Strait, Badoeng Strait and Java Sea—in February 1942. There were multiple smaller engagements in which Dutch warships also participated, but in the end, it was a hopeless fight. In a period of just 90 days the Dutch were pushed out of the East Indies. The KM lost all but a fraction of its remaining

7

aircraft and ships in the process. Personnel losses were also high due to a hastily planned and poorly executed evacuation from the island of Java in the closing days of the East Indies campaign. While the material losses could be replaced, the KM faced a crippling shortage of manpower for the remainder of the war. The KM was forced to rely on the goodwill of the United States, Australia and Britain for the bases, equipment and supplies it needed to continue the war. But despite the tragedy and hardship, the KM maintained both its honor and fighting spirit. Those officers, men and ships who survived formed the basis of Holland’s post-war navy which successfully helped defend Europe against the perils of Communism. A position that it proudly maintains to this day.

Chapter 1

Trade Wars In December 1941 the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies was tenuous. After the German invasion of Holland in May 1940 Dutch possessions in both Asia and the Caribbean were isolated and unsupported. Although the Dutch Government escaped to England and continued to function in exile, no more personnel or reinforcements would reach the Far East from the mother country. As a result, their weakly defended East Indies empire offered a tempting prize to Japan which had long coveted its immense petroleum supplies and raw materials.

creasingly protective of its relationship with the East Indies and took what could be called an unhealthy interest in the region. Throughout the 1930s, the Dutch became increasingly apprehensive of Japan. In June 1933 the first signs of hostility, however muted, appeared in Japan’s political stance toward the Dutch. They rather cavalierly assumed that they should have a say in developing and shaping the colony’s future. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, a Japanese analyst with the Eastern Department, noted that their actions were dismissive of the Dutch Government and mirrored those in Manchuria.4 Prior to the 1930s the primary threat to stability in the East Indies came from Nationalist and Communist agitators. As early as mid–1934 some British officials believed Japan might try to stir up Nationalist sympathies and then use the unrest as an excuse to intervene in order to protect their citizens and national interests. It was the same tactic used by Japan previously in Manchuria and their influence proved impossible to eradicate once established.5

Chart 1: Percentage of World’s Raw Materials Supplied by NEI1 Commodity

Percentage

Ranking

Rubber 40% 1st Tin 30% 2nd Sugar 7% 3rd Oil 3% 5th Quinine 90% global monopoly Pepper 80% global monopoly Kapok 75% global monopoly Copra 33% ? Sisal 23% ? Palm Oil 20% ? Tea 17% ? Rice 15% ? The NEI also provided Asia with 75 percent of its Bauxite supply.

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere From the end of World War I Japan promoted a unified sphere of economic influence in Southeast Asia. This Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of Economic Influence would join together the Western colonies of Asia under the economic umbrella of Japan to improve their standard of living while creating an economic powerhouse. The program would also create a new Asian empire under the control of Japan. Nonetheless, it still represented a call to action for many Nationalists struggling to remove Western influence from their respective colonies. For European colonial powers such as England, France and Holland, these calls for Asian economic independence held an ominous tone. Not only did they promote Japan’s economic well-being but they also called for the elimination of Western influence. For the European powers, these immense colonial empires provided a reliable source of petroleum, raw materials and other resources that were of great economic importance to their respective mother countries. So great were Dutch concerns about Japan, that they formed an Office for an Advisor for Japanese Affairs in 1925. Its sole purpose was to oversee economic relations between the

Following the Great War, the Dutch initially encouraged strong Japanese trade ties with the Netherlands East Indies. This was done to balance out the colony’s commercial ties with England and the United States and to prevent one nation from becoming too dominant. Although Japan expressed a desire to obtain Dutch petroleum products from an early stage, their initial interest throughout the 1920s was considered neither hostile nor particularly threatening.2 Nonetheless, the British Foreign Office’s Eastern Department did note that Japan was “obsessed by the idea that their country is and one day destined to be mistress of the Pacific and its islands.” Although not yet a dominant theme in mainstream Japanese politics, certain elements of Japan society regarded Holland as a very weak power with a colonial empire that was doomed to fail. They felt that Japan must have a say in how the Netherlands East Indies was reshaped and its resources utilized.3 As those radicals gained power Japan grew in-

8

1. Trade Wars East Indies and Japan. Economically, the Dutch were justified in their concerns. Using bases established in the Mandated Islands, the Japanese worked their way into areas of trade previously monopolized by the Dutch. Despite these concerns trade relations between the East Indies and Japan remained fairly normal until the start of the Great Depression.6 But after 1929 there were few Dutch goods that could compete with Japanese imports at a reasonable price by 1934. By 1935 Japanese goods represented 30 percent of all imports to the East Indies—up from 11 percent in 1929.7 In the same period, Dutch exports to Japan fell to only 5 percent (from 22 percent in 1929) of that country’s imports as the Japanese became increasingly protectionist in their trade policies.8 The East Indies were tied to the Netherlands monetarily, which badly affected the colony’s ability to compete economically. Great Britain went off the gold standard in September 1931 and was quickly followed by Japan in December 1931. This devalued the pound by 40 percent and the yen by a whopping 60 percent. The East Indies Government remained on the gold standard until 1936 which made it extremely costly to do business with its two primary trading partners.9 The colony’s public debt had also been secured in Metropolitan Holland, which required principal and interest payments in hard cash. The Netherlands Government refused to assume any of the debt, so no less than 26 percent of the East Indies’ annual budget was eventually earmarked for these debt payments. As a result there was little economic progress for years. The League of Nations awarded the NEI the dubious distinction of being the country most affected by the Great Depression.10 As a colony the East Indies had very little industrial infrastructure. They relied heavily on exports and the Dutch were concerned about the economic ramifications any kind of trade imbalance would have. When Japan devalued the yen in an effort to grab a stronger hold on trade in the East Indies, the Dutch took quick action. By placing strict limits on the amount of goods Japan could receive from the East Indies, they hoped to slow the ballooning trade deficit. At the same time, licensing requirements for goods and businesses went into effect to limit foreign imports. Although the law applied to 25 percent of all imports it still safeguarded existing businesses and provided generous import quotas for preferred customers. It also left the market open for the cheap consumer products that were the mainstay of Japanese goods then being imported to the East Indies.11

The Hart-Ishizawa Accord 12 Although the law allowed them generous growth within established parameters, Japan loudly proclaimed that it was the victim of anti–Japanese bias. They demanded treatment on a most preferred nation basis and sent a trade delegation to Batavia in mid–1934. Despite heated negotiations, little came of these talks and the Japanese returned home at year’s end. In the meantime, the East Indies Government implemented the trade restrictions detailed above.

9

Despite the failure of the formal trade delegation, talks continued at a lower level. In 1937 Director of Economic Affairs Dr. G.H.C. Hart and Japanese Consul General Y. Ishizawa successfully concluded the Hart-Ishizawa Accord. In the agreement, Japan accepted the new trade levels as long as the Dutch did not reduce them any further. The Japanese also agreed to purchase more sugar, coffee, copra and kapok, which were important export items in the Indonesian economy. The agreement effectively normalized trade relations between the two parties.13

The van Mook-Kotani Accord The van Mook-Kotani Accord of 1938 was hammered out by the new Director of Economic Affairs H.J. van Mook14 and Japan’s Acting Consult General Tanun Kotani. This further reduced tensions between the East Indies and Japan. This agreement strengthened the position of Dutch exporters in Japan who had previously been locked out of the shipment of Japanese export products to the East Indies. Huge Japanese shipping companies formed “exporters’ associations” that were little more than monopolies designed to close Japan’s export market to outsiders. The van Mook-Kotani Accord relaxed these monopolies slightly to allow Dutch merchants greater access to Japanese markets. A “pool system” was adopted which allowed non–Japanese shipping companies a better chance of participating.15

Japan Demands Special Consideration Despite the Hart- Ishizawa and Van Mook- Kotani Accords, Dutch exports to Japan continued to fall from 1936. This was largely attributed to Japan’s shift from a peacetime economy to that of a country gearing for war. Japan’s military now absorbed a disproportionate share of the country’s gross national product and needed raw materials to manufacture weapons and munitions for its war in China. In particular, Japan now sought increased amounts of cheap raw materials versus expensive, refined products.16 Thus, fewer “weak products”—such as sugar, copra, kapok, coffee, palm oil, tobacco, maize, timber, gums and cane—were exported to Japan.17 While consumer materials such as sugar, tapioca and lumber were neither flashy nor exciting, they were the lifeblood of East Indies trade.

Chart 2: Reduction of Dutch Exports to Japan, 1936–39 Product

1936

1939

Sugar Tapioca Mineral Oil Lumber

200,000 tons 43,000 tons 927,000 tons (1937) 20,800 square feet

500 tons 2,500 tons 547,000 tons 15,400 square feet

Trade relations remained in this state until February 1940, when Japan informed the Dutch Government that they would no longer abide by the current trade agreements. They asked for immediate negotiations that would let them import in-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

creased amounts of raw materials from the East Indies. Japan also requested a number of changes regarding trade and the travel of its citizens to and from the East Indies.18 I. Matters Relating to Commerce (1) Japanese Side: (a) Japan is to refrain, as far as circumstances permit, from adopting any measure, prohibiting or restricting the exportation of its principal goods required by the Netherlands Indies. (It is to be understood that the exportation may sometimes be difficult for economic reasons.) (b) Japan is to adopt such measures as deemed to be appropriate with a view to furthering the importation of goods from the Netherlands Indies. (2) Netherlands Side: (a) The Netherlands Indies is likewise to refrain from adopting any measure prohibiting or restricting the exportation of its principal goods; the prohibitive or restrictive measures, to which the exportation of certain goods has already been subjected are to be so modified as to render the flow of goods easier between Japan and the Netherlands Indies. (b) The existing measures of import restrictions in respect of Japanese goods are to be abolished or moderated. II. Matters Relating to Entry (1) Japanese Side: Japan is, as at present, to adopt no restrictive measures in future in respect of the entry of employees of Netherlands firms in Japan. (2) Netherlands Side: The existing Foreigners Labour Ordnance in the Netherlands Indies is to be abolished or moderated. III. Matters Relating to Enterprise and Investment (1) Japanese Side: (a) Japan is to afford, within its influence and competence, reasonable protection to Netherlands interests in Manchukuo and China. (b) Facilities are to be afforded in respect of new Netherlands investments in Japan; its offer of investment in Manchukuo and China is to be recommended by Japan to be accommodated, to the Governments concerned. (2) Netherlands Side: (a) Further facilities are to be extended to the existing Japanese enterprises in the Netherlands Indies. (b) Facilities are to be granted to new enterprises, including those under joint control of Japan and the Netherlands. IV. Control of Press and Other Publications of Anti-Japanese Nature The anti–Netherlands tendency, if any, of the press, magazines and other publications in Japan on one hand, and the anti–Japanese tendency of the press, magazines and other publications in Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies on the other, are to be placed respectively under strict control in conformity with the friendly spirit prevailing between Japan and the Netherlands.

Although these proposals appeared fairly balanced there were a number of red flags and other considerations. Most of Europe was at war by that time. As a neutral power, Holland had regulated exports from the East Indies to avoid accusations of collaboration with any of the belligerent nations. To give Japan unrestricted access to raw materials would indicate a pattern of favoritism to other trade partners and invite unwanted questions. The Dutch Government was still considering the proposal when Germany invaded Holland.19

The Imperial Japanese Navy Pushes for Invasion Barely had the German blitzkrieg rolled into Holland on May 10 than the British approached the East Indies Government with a request to open defense talks to ensure that the East Indies remained unoccupied. Dutch Governor General Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer declined almost immediately on May 13.20 He feared that any British or French presence would give Japan the impression that the East Indies needed protection. The Dutch did not want to give the Japanese any excuse for a possible incursion into East Indies territory.21 Within days the Dutch ambassador in Tokyo, General (Ret.) J.C. Pabst signaled that the Imperial Japanese Navy was strongly pushing for an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.22 Due to Holland’s weak status as a belligerent state, the IJN argued that Japan’s source of fuel and raw materials was threatened. An invasion was the only way to ensure their continued access. Although the Imperial Japanese Army agreed in principle, Prime Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Foreign Affairs Minister Hachiro Arita opposed the operation.23 In late May the IJA stated that it had no interest in the “NEI problem.” Many saw this as a signal to the Japanese Government that it had carte blanche to move against the NEI. Indeed, the Japanese press was already calling for action. Japan, however, remained unprepared to move decisively until assured of German success in Europe. At the same time, the United States Navy moved its Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, which served as a powerful deterrent against Japanese invasion. As balanced as their earlier demands might have appeared, Japan wasted no time in taking advantage of the very weak Dutch position. In Tokyo on May 20, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita presented a note to Ambassador Pabst that rather politely requested immediate concession of certain raw materials and other commodities.24 At the same time, the Japanese also requested that additional trade talks take place in Batavia as soon as possible.

Chart 3: Japanese Trade Demands, May 1941 Materials Mineral Oil Wolfram Bauxite Nickel Ore Scrap Iron Salt Manganese Ore Chrome Iron Ore Castor Seeds Molybdenum Quinine Bark

Quantity (in Tons) 1,000,000 1,000,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 100,000 50,000 5,000 4,000 1,000 600

The Japanese requested an immediate response although they knew this was impossible. The Dutch Government in Exile had just reached London and had not yet reformed. Japan re-

1. Trade Wars fused to appoint a representative to the new government. This meant talks regarding trade matters could only take place in Tokyo or Batavia. The Japanese hoped to pressure Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer into making a premature decision without guidance from the Dutch Government. But he firmly refused to negotiate without first consulting London. The Japanese again pressed for a response on May 28. They stated Governor General Jonkheer A.W.L. that if one was not re- Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer ceived, extremists in the (courtesy Gerard Horneman). Japanese military might become uncontrollable and endanger the stability of Japan’s current ruling Cabinet.25 Nonetheless, the Dutch delayed until June 6. It then rejected the request, stating its desire to maintain the status quo regarding trade issues with Japan. In response, the Japanese formed a naval task force later that month and stationed it at Palau. This was to put pressure on the Dutch and to prevent another country from taking the East Indies into protective custody. Japan was determined to be successful in its trade talks with the Dutch and wanted no outside influences strengthening their weak bargaining position. They also requested that Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer be given the authority to negotiate without the direct approval of the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina or her Cabinet. A primary reason why Japan sought to separate the East Indies Government from the Netherlands Government in Exile is that they believed Queen Wilhelmina and her ministers to be under the control of Britain. The Japanese refused to believe that the British would allow an exiled Government to function on its territory without pressuring or influencing its decisions. In the summer of 1940, Dr. N.A.C. Slotmaker de Brüine—head of the Dutch News Service ANETA—traveled extensively through Japan and Manchuria. He found that Japanese of all ranks were convinced that the Netherlands Government in Exile was being controlled by the British.26

The First Trade Mission To the irritation of Japan, the Dutch Government resisted every demand. With each rebuff, the Japanese hinted at what could happen to the Indies if they did not cooperate. On July 16, 1940, the Japanese expressed their desire to send a delega-

11

tion to Batavia for the purpose of discussing trade matters.27 Although Japan refused to disclose the specific subjects to be discussed, the Dutch did not feel it prudent to refuse in light of the tense international situation.28 They gave their approval on August 1 and a Japanese delegation headed by Ichizō Kobayashi, Japan’s sitting Cabinet Minister of Commerce and Industry, left the following day.29 How important the Japanese considered this mission can be deduced from the fact that this was only the third time in modern Japanese history, that a mission was sent outside Japan, headed by a Cabinet Minister. The first time was to Peking in 1905, which resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth and the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The second time was during the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament.30

Australian intelligence sources later reported that the primary goal of the trade delegation was to infuse the Dutch with a false sense of security and slow their ongoing military buildup as much as possible. At the same time, it was to prevent the Dutch from preparing a preplanned demolition program that would destroy the oil wells and refineries sought by Japan. Minister Kobayashi was to entice the Dutch to leave the protective cloak of the United States and Britain and instead join Japan’s sphere of influence. And finally, the trade mission was to also secure increase quantities of oil, petroleum products and various raw materials.31 In the meantime there were a number of international incidents that were not confined to ugly Japanese behavior. While contemporary Dutch sources often mention Japanese slights, they simultaneously minimize, or overlook altogether, a number of ugly incidents involving Japanese citizens. In these cases, the Dutch acted just as poorly as the Japanese. A number of events helped poison the atmosphere of the trade talks before they even started.32

Chart 4: International Incidents in NEI, Summer 1940 July 3 July 13 July 22 August 11 August 11 August 11

Cook of Japanese Consul-General in Batavia sexually assaulted by drunken Dutch soldier. Japanese hotel owner in Medan beaten by Indonesian soldier. Japanese civilian sexually assaulted in Magelang by four drunken soldiers. Dutch patrons at Chinese restaurant in Bandoeng assault party of Japanese diners. Drunken Dutch soldier burns Japanese flag. Member of Japanese Consulate in Batavia roughed up by Batavia police while photographing Governor-General’s residence; still permissible at the time.

Subsequent investigation showed that Japanese complaints were valid in each of these instances. The growing number of cases reflected a pattern of growing Dutch dislike toward the Japanese. In retaliation, on August 2, 1940, the Japanese military police arrested a Dutch shipping agent in Kobe and held him for two weeks on the charge of espionage. He was released on August 17.33 Against this backdrop the Kobayashi trade delegates reached

12

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Tandjoeng Priok on September 12. The 29 trade delegates were accompanied by no less than 75 journalists.34 Although the Japanese were warmly greeted there was an air of tension throughout their stay. Once negotiations started their disdain for the Dutch was obvious. Loutish behavior, such as Japanese delegates putting their feet on the table during negotiations, showed a lack of respect. Others repeatedly insulted staff at the Batavia Golf Club in an attempt to create an international incident.35 The Japanese also sought to exclude the Netherlands Government in Exile from the trade talks. One way of doing so was their refusal to appoint an ambassador to London. Repeated Dutch requests to have the Japanese minister in occupied Holland transferred to London were ignored. At the time it was strongly suspected that he was otherwise busy reviewing captured financial records of the East Indies with German assistance. Talks began in mid–September amid the backdrop of Japan’s signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Despite their alliance with the very country that now occupied Holland, the Japanese stated that their only concern was to protect peace in the Pacific. In the same breath, they asked the Dutch to distance themselves from the powerful political support of the United States and “shake hands firmly” with Japan. The “benevolent protection” of Japan would be enough to ensure the security of the East Indies and Holland. Although the Dutch politely led the Japanese back to economic matters, they soon realized that the Japanese delegation had few demands outside a request for increased mineral oil and petroleum exports. Although a 1934 agreement allowed them to import 600,000 tons of petroleum annually, the Japanese asked the Governor-General to guarantee a minimum of more than 3,000,000 tons annually.36 When certain members of Mr. Kobayashi’s delegation pounded Dr. van Mook’s desk and demanded 3,150,000 tons of petroleum products per annum over a period of five years with availability guaranteed by the Government of the Indies, Dr. van Mook said… Gentlemen, if you are through pounding my desk, I shall pound it myself. I am no damned oil broker. If you want to buy some oil, see the oil companies.”37

With that, the Japanese were referred to the oil companies who would negotiate their own contracts individually. Although the Government only supervised in these matters, the Japanese were informed that internal petroleum stocks were low and most was reserved for domestic consumption. Much of the remainder was reserved for Allied powers at war with Germany. Japan was free to negotiate individual deals but its request for 3,150,000 tons was impossible to meet regarding the limited oil stocks available for export to third parties.38 In response, the Japanese dropped their request for guaranteed minimums. Several days later their chief mediator presented a request for comprehensive data on oil production in the East Indies, including: 1. Petroleum products and their qualities in the Netherlands East Indies. 2. Equipment for oil refining and its capacities.

3. Loading and shipping facilities and its capacities per port. 4. The present situation and condition of all concessions under exploitation. 5. Present situations and conditions of mining areas reserved by the government.

Apparently the Japanese wished to determine the amount of petroleum they could realistically expect to obtain for export. The Dutch were happy to provide general data on oil production and refining as it was easily available from published sources. However, they declined to supply detailed information on oil refining facilities and ports until the Japanese narrowed the parameters of their request to include specific information and how it related to exports to Japan.39

Chart 5: Japanese Petroleum Demands, September 194040

Crude Oil Aviation Crude Crude Oil for Lubricants Miscellaneous Aviation Grade (87 Octane)41 Diesel Fuel Total

Amount Requested (Tons)

Amount Allocated (Tons)

1,100,000 100,000 1,050,000 400,000 500,000 3,150,000

120,000 100,000 540,000 33,00042 116,500 909,500

In the end, Japan barely got a fraction of the 3,150,000 tons it had requested. Two days after accepting these figures, the Japanese Government recalled Cabinet Minister Kobayashi on October 20, 1940. The official reason given was that his presence was needed for the anniversary of the Japanese Empire. Many suspected the Japanese had decided to cut their losses, take the oil concessions and call it a day.43 The Japanese were disappointed by the “lack of enthusiasm” which the Dutch showed for their offers to protect the East Indies against incursion by another third-party nation (i.e., Britain or the United States).44 They were also decidedly cool to Japanese economic development plans for the colony. During the negotiations Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, which pledged mutual political, economic and military support to one another. This only widened the chasm; the Dutch refused to provide unrestricted quantities of raw material to the ally of a foreign power that currently occupied their homeland. Although the chief negotiator had been recalled, two delegates remained in Batavia with a large staff. There was no serious attempt to negotiate further, the official reason being that the delegates were awaiting instructions from Tokyo. It did not take the Dutch long to realize that the unusually large staff of delegates was gathering data unrelated to economic matters. 45 Instead, they were often seen around sensitive military installations and other similar points of interest. In mid–October American intelligence received reports that Japan had demanded their troops be allowed to enter Dutch territory. They would join KNIL troops to jointly “protect” the colony’s oil wells. At this point the United States was

1. Trade Wars still very concerned about Dutch resolve to resist Japanese military pressure. In Batavia, United States Consul General Walter A. Foote, Ph.D., received a cable on October 22 from the State Department requesting him to investigate. Following a series of discrete and unofficial inquiries Dr. Foote responded two days later. The Japanese had only requested to inspect the wells; the Dutch assured him that any such request would result in diplomatic relations with Japan being severed.46

The Second Trade Mission A new Japanese chief negotiator, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, reached Batavia on December 28, 1940, aboard the passenger liner Nisso Maru. His trade mission would last until June 27, 1941. Although the mood surrounding the new mission was slightly more relaxed, the Japanese arrived amid a time of growing tension throughout the Far East. This time they came not under the guise of negotiating trade agreements, rather with a list of demands, which if the Dutch accepted, would make the Netherlands East Indies a virtual Japanese protectorate. The Japanese presented their first demands on January 16, 1941.47 These called for: I. Entry of Japanese Nationals and the Establishment of Business Enterprises. A. The abolition of immigration quotas, allowing free entry into the East Indies for all Japanese citizens carrying a valid passport. B. The elimination of all Government laws prohibiting unrestricted Japanese economic and mining activities. C. That Dutch law be altered, allowing Japanese doctors and medical professionals to set up practices throughout the East Indies and be allowed to operate under laws and regulations currently in effect throughout Japan. D. That the Dutch Government protect and promote the well-being and favorable treatment of Japanese-managed business. In addition, favorable treatment would also be accorded to all Japanese firms requiring labor, transportation and other equipment. E. That applications and requests from Japanese citizens be treated in a “favorable and friendly” spirit. II. Business Enterprises A. Mining—That Japanese nationals be promptly and generously awarded mining concessions in any/all areas of their choosing, including those reserved for use by the Dutch Government. B. Fishing—That Japanese nationals be allowed to fish in Dutch territorial waters at will, as long as they were not in direct competition with local native fishing operations. These enterprises would be allowed unrestricted personnel growth together with the construction of new fisheries and factories. Fish caught by Japanese nationals for sale in the East Indies would be exempted from Dutch import duties. III. Transportation and Communications. A. The establishment of unrestricted direct air service between Japan and the East Indies by Japanese airlines. In addition, the Dutch would provide all of the communications and meteorological services necessary to support this venture. B. The abolition of restrictions on Japanese shipping, including: 1. An immediate increase in the amount of Japanese shipping allowed to navigate Dutch coastal waters; all tonnage restrictions on Japanese shipping would also be abolished. 2. That Japanese shipping be allowed to enter Dutch coastal waters at will without regard to existing customs laws and regulations when servicing Japanese enterprises.

13

3. That certain ports (the numbers and locations to be designated by Japan) be declared “open ports” for the purpose of unrestricted trade and shipping traffic between Japan and the East Indies. 4. That restrictions and regulations regarding Japanese shipping in “non-open” East Indies ports immediately be substantially eased or abolished altogether. 5. Improved communications between Japan and the East Indies, including: a. Dutch consent to the laying of a series of submarine cables that would remain under Japanese management. b. That existing Dutch security restrictions prohibiting the use of the Japanese language in telegrams between Japan and the East Indies be lifted. IV. The Regulation of Japanese Businesses in the East Indies. A. That applications by Japanese nationals regarding the establishment and operation of business enterprises in the East Indies be approved without reservation or restriction. V. Commerce and Trade. A. That import quotas be established for Japanese goods according to a list that was to be provided. B. Japan would purchase certain products from the East Indies, the types and quantities of which would be detailed in a list that was to follow. C. Increased import quotas for Japanese importers in the East Indies. D. That Japanese importers in the East Indies be excluded from laws requiring them to export trade goods from third-party nations in addition to Dutch goods. E. That “friendly measures” be enacted regarding customs tariffs and regulations on Japanese goods imported to the East Indies.

These demands were designed to make the East Indies a protectorate of Japan. Although the Dutch planned to refuse all of them, they did want to leave the road open for further talks. Before they could respond the Japanese Foreign Minister spoke to the Japanese Diet and asserted that for all practical purposes, the East Indies had already joined the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. His remarks were widely circulated throughout both Japan and the East Indies by Japanese language newspapers. The Dutch were forced to respond publicly; to ignore his comments would mutely signal their acquiescence and invite additional Japanese demands. Residents of the East Indies themselves would also be confused.48 On January 31, 1941, Ambassador Pabst provided his Government’s response. In a strongly worded letter it flatly rejected any suggestion that the East Indies join Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Nor would the Dutch Government allow the political or trade actions of the East Indies to be dictated by a foreign power— either in spirit or action. In response, a Japanese spokesman held a press conference for the foreign press. He stated Japan’s intentions to continue trade talks with the East Indies Government despite a clear lack of interest on the part of the Dutch. At the same time, he attempted to undermine the legality of the Dutch Government In Exile, stating that it was nothing more than a puppet organization under British control.49 When the trade talks threatened to break down as a result, the Japanese backed off and blamed them on inaccurate press reports.

14

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Reasons for the Dutch continuing trade negotiations at this point hinged on their desire to play for time. Although Japan spoke aggressively, it made no move to annex the East Indies. The current Government was experiencing a power struggle between the military and a number of civilian political parties. Although the civilian branch still exerted limited control, an increasingly dominant military presence slowly pushed the country toward war. Unsure of Japanese intentions, the Dutch decided to play for time until an agreement was reached, or until the United States or England would commit to a military alliance. As a result, the trade talks in Batavia continued. Although the demands remained virtually unchanged, the wording was much softer and less direct.50 Apparently the Japanese hoped tact would help them make inroads with the Dutch, who firmly held their ground with subtle political support from the United States and Britain. Although the Japanese requested increased amounts of raw materials, they were unable to win the desired concessions. Much to the surprise of the Dutch, the Japanese simply took what was offered in most cases. At the same time, the state-run Japanese media put increased pressure on the Dutch. The Japan Times and Advertiser newspaper was generally considered to be the primary mouthpiece of the Japanese Foreign Office.51 Other papers included Nichi Nichi, Miyako and the Japan Times Weekly. In a series of scathing articles, it accused the Dutch of negotiating in bad faith, while making threats about the fate of the East Indies if they did not fall into line.52,53 On June 6, 1941, the Dutch notified the Japanese delegation that they could no longer negotiate amid this type of atmosphere; they provided a list of their final concessions in an attached memorandum.

While expressing disappointment in their inability to reach a complete agreement, the Dutch agreed to several Japanese requests. These included a slight relaxation of medical laws so more Japanese doctors could practice in the East Indies. They also expressed a desire to improve communications, provided the result was a jointly operated enterprise that benefited both parties. However, the Japanese request for communications lines connecting the East Indies to their Central Pacific outpost at Yap was refused as being unnecessary and too costly. In most of the remaining matters, the Dutch stated their desire to maintain the status quo regarding trade relations. They saw no reason to alter the agreements reached in the HartIshizawa and van Mook-Kotani accords. The two sides met one last time on June 10 to ensure that there were no misunderstandings. The talks officially ended a week later in a subdued, although friendly mood. Most of the Japanese delegation left Batavia on June 27—289 days after its arrival.54 A wave of relief swept over the East Indies at having weathered the initial storm. However, the negotiations were considered a national disgrace in Japan. Although the Japanese trade delegation urged its country’s Diet to accept the Dutch terms, a wave of resentment swept the nation. An enraged press corps (quietly encouraged by the military) fanned dissent by stating that war was the only way to deal with the insolent Dutch and obtain the raw materials Japan vitally needed. Japan then introduced a system of export licenses, cutting off nearly all Japanese exports to the East Indies. No trade could take place and the Dutch now had to pay cash for all goods. At the same time, fewer and fewer Japanese merchant ships visited East Indies ports. Although the Dutch desired to maintain normal trade relations with Japan, the military had seized power and they were longer in a talking mood.55

Chapter 2

Build-Up to War The Seizure of French Indochina

French complied with these demands on July 24; this gave Japan military control over the entire colony while the French retained nominal administrative power. Although Vichy agreed to only 40,000 troops, the Japanese promptly inserted 125,000.7

As the trade talks foundered in Batavia, Japan was approaching a critical position in regard to her war in China. Despite its best efforts during four bloody years of fighting, the Imperial Japanese Army was no closer to victory than when its troops first entered Shanghai in 1937. Now, unable to obtain a secure supply of raw materials from the Dutch, Japan would find it difficult to sustain its war effort. Despite this lack of closure on the mainland, Japan chose to proceed with plans to seize by force the raw materials that they could not peacefully obtain. Japanese pressure on French Indochina began in 1939 with their seizure of Hainan and the Spratly Islands.1 From early 1940 Tokyo pressured Indochina’s French colonial government to let Japanese forces enter the country.2 Mainland France was still free at the time and all of their requests were rejected. However, the invasion and subsequent surrender of France to Germany in June 1940 greatly weakened both the military strength and political resolve of French Indochina. Within weeks of France’s surrender, French Indochina Governor General Jean Decoux signed an agreement giving Japan control over the colony’s northern border with China. This was done to cut off war supplies and material that had been reaching Nationalist China via that route. In August 1940 Japan pressured Decoux to let its troops occupy Northern Indochina.3 To help convince him the Imperial Japanese Army’s 5th Infantry Division massed on the border and threatened to invade. A preliminary agreement was in place on September 5, 1940. But without orders a rogue Japanese battalion commander took his unit across the border the following day and essentially invaded North Indochina.4 By September 20 Japan had 6,000 troops in the colony and was in possession of Haiphong Harbor.5 By October they fully occupied Northern Indochina. The French remained nominally in charge but Japan controlled the airfields, ports and railroads. On July 12, 1941, the Japanese government demanded that the French Vichy government allow the Japanese military full use of eight air bases and two naval bases in southern Indochina.6 They gave the French until July 25 to comply. To back up their demands Japanese warships took up station off the coast. The

The Oil Embargo With the Dutch proving obstinate to Japanese demands for oil and raw materials, Japan began planning for war against the Western powers. They planned to use southern Indochina as a springboard for their planned invasions of the Netherlands East Indies, Philippines and Malaysia. As these plans swung into high gear tens of thousands of their troops poured into the colony and dozens of warships, auxiliaries and transports filled the harbors. Two days after their seizure of southern Indochina, the United States froze all trade with Japan. Exports of oil and scrap metal were banned.8 For an island nation with virtually no natural resources of its own, this was a death sentence for the Japanese military. Likewise, all monetary transactions were suspended and Japanese bank accounts assets were seized. Conditions for removal of the boycott centered on ceasing its military operations in mainland China. The Dutch intended to follow their lead but could not get any direction from Washington regarding official U.S. policy. Nor could Dr. Walter A. Foote—the U.S. Counsel General in Batavia—provide any indication of which tack the United States might follow.9 When word of the American boycott reached Batavia, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer met with his Cabinet and it was decided that the East Indies would follow suit. Although some information was received five days later the United Sates never shared a roadmap of its strategy regarding the Japanese trade embargo. Part of the reason for this lack of communication was that the United States itself had little direction internally. As originally drawn up, the embargo was part of a “carrot and stick” effort intended to pressure Japan into leaving Indochina and ending its war in China. Depending on Japan’s cooperation the embargo would slowly constrict or allow access to oil, scrap metal and foreign capital. Actual execution of the effort was badly bungled and a complete boycott was implemented overnight, which effectively negated the United States’ bargaining power.

15

16

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

In 1941 it was assumed that the Japanese moved into Indochina based on a calculated risk that neither Britain nor the U.S. would intervene. It is now known that the Imperial Japanese Navy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs both broke the diplomatic codes of Britain, China, France and the United States.10 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decrypted at least 30 American, British and Chinese diplomatic ciphers in 1941. In total, the Japanese Ministry of Defense held more than 150 decrypted American, British, Chinese and French diplomatic cables.11 In 1934 the Japanese broke the United States Diplomatic Service “Gray Code” and the British Intergovernmental code. In 1938 they also succeeded in breaking the U.S. Diplomatic Service’s “Brown Code” (an advanced version of “Gray Code”) and the British ID cipher “BI2.” That same year they broke China’s “CF1” and “CF3” diplomatic and military ciphers. Beyond those of China, they did not break any high-level military codes. However, they still obtained much of that information when it was resent using the lower-grade diplomatic codes.12 There is no evidence Japan cracked any Dutch military or diplomatic codes. From these efforts, the Japanese were able to determine that neither Britain nor the U.S. was prepared to intervene militarily in French Indochina. The British in particular would not get involved without a firm commitment from the Americans. Thus, the Japanese felt secure to make demands on Governor General Decoux with risking a broader conflict. American signals also revealed what the Japanese assumed to be hard-line support for a crippling trade embargo. As a result, Japan felt cornered by America, Britain and Holland and now believed that their only solution was all-out war to seize oil and raw materials from Malaysia and the East Indies. Because southern Indochina had no rail links to China and no direct connection to that conflict, Japan’s occupation of the region set off alarms in Batavia, London and Washington. Their bombers were now within easy striking distance of Malaya and Singapore. Southern Indochina also provided a perfect springboard for an invasion of British, Dutch and Thai territory. On July 31 American intelligence intercepted the following Japanese diplomatic message to consular stations throughout the Pacific: Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. This is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.13

Japan had claimed that the occupation of French Indochina was not a springboard for further conquests in Asia. This telegram exposed their lie. At the same time, Japan began dialing down its presence in the Pacific. By November 1941 the sea was bare of their merchant ships. In the East Indies the Japanese population fell from 7,000 to 2,000 in months.14 Dutch

intelligence services kept close tabs on those who remained and effectively negated Japan’s final intelligence efforts prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. But after a decade of burrowing, the damage had already been done. Although the Japanese military had sufficient fuel reserves for the moment, the ban on scrap was serious. Much of the world depended on the United States for its scrap metal; Japan, however, was by far the most reliant due to its massive military buildup. In 1937, the Japanese led the world in scrap metal imports, buying 2,741,000 tons abroad. This figure was nearly three times that of Britain, which imported a distant 966,000 tons that year. At the start of war in China, Japan imported 1,904,000 tons from the United States alone; by 1939, the figure was 2,515,000 tons. With the ban, Japan’s import of American steel fell to 1,369,000 tons by the end of 1940; by the outbreak of the Pacific War, the figure was a mere 199,000 tons. By 1943, Japanese imports of scrap metal stood at only 29,527 tons, causing severe problems for the Japanese Navy’s shipbuilding and repair programs. In January 1941, the United States banned all copper and brass exports. These commodities were absolutely vital if Japan was to continue her war in China. Without them, her war effort would slowly grind to a halt. The final blow came when the Dutch followed the American lead and stopped all oil exports from the East Indies. With her vital resources cut off, and surrounded by what she regarded as enemies, Japan made ready to fight.

First Step Toward War First among Japan’s preparations for war was to intensify covert intelligence operations throughout the East Indies. A large fleet of Japanese fishing boats assigned to these operations posed a concern for the Dutch fleet. A naval squadron was deployed off Celebes. At the same time, seaplanes were sent to Djampea and Soembawa, while a submarine division went to Ambon and Birma. But even with the help of the Gouvernmentsmarine15 and extensive air patrols there was still much open space in which the Japanese could easily operate. The Dutch merchant fleet was also ordered to begin arming its ships. This proceeded smoothly until stocks of weapons ran low and the Dutch were forced to purchase additional weapons abroad. To keep the program moving, President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the transfer of American lendlease naval weapons to exiled Dutch, Greek, Norwegian and Yugoslav forces to use in arming their tankers. This allowed most Dutch merchant ships to be armed by the outbreak of war. Almost immediately after the occupation of Holland, various branches of the Dutch military and government dispatched representatives to the United States to obtain new weapons and equipment for their remaining forces. The first arrived in Washington, D.C., five days after the fall of Holland. At one point, there were no less than four separate groups, including buyers from the KM. The process was initially uncoordinated until the Netherlands Purchasing Commission (NPC) was estab-

2. Build-Up to War lished in early 1941 to serve as the central purchasing office for the Dutch government.16 The NPC was headed by Dr. J. van den Broek, a former Director with the Billiton Company, the largest mining company in the Netherlands East Indies.17 Dr. van den Broek was a skilled executive who soon had the organization working smoothly, and it remained in operation for several years after the Second World War ended. At its height the NPC was headquartered in New York City and employed nearly 400 people, most of whom were Americans.18 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Britain, Germany and Sweden had been Holland’s primary arms suppliers. But with much of Europe either occupied or at war by 1940, the United States was now the lone viable source for armaments. In June and July alone, the Dutch placed massive orders with American defense contractors. They included small submarine chasers, hundreds of aircraft, trucks, armored cars and related equipment of all shapes, types and sizes. The KNIL ordered 600 light tanks and 100,000 rifles for its forces in the East and West Indies.19 There were also orders for artillery, ammunition, searchlights, gas masks and every other kind equipment. The orders were typically marked for rush production and delivery. But the Dutch were just one of multiple countries, including the British, Chinese, French, Greeks and Russians, seeking to buy weapons in America. The Dutch were considered minor players in the overall scheme. While the defense contractors were happy to take their money, the orders were frequently pushed down in priority so that larger powers like the British and Russians could be equipped first. They were fighting for survival while the East Indies were not yet even engaged in a war.20 American industry was also still transforming from a civilian economy to that of a wartime economy. Its manufacturing capabilities were not yet fully developed so the United States was nowhere near the industrial giant it would soon become in the next 12–24 months. Nonetheless, by March 1942 the NPC had ordered $262 million worth of materials and paid $202 million in cash.21 Most of this came from the East Indies gold reserves. But less than 25 percent of this equipment—totaling $65 million—was delivered before the eventual surrender of Dutch forces on Java.22 Between December 7, 1941, and March 9, 1942, $60,000,000 worth of war materiel sailed for the Indies aboard various merchant vessels. This included $25,000,00023 worth of light tanks, aircraft and other equipment via Pacific shipping routes. The remainder was routed across the Atlantic and around the Cape of South Africa. Most of the ships sailed alone as there was no time to organize convoys. With the fall of Java, those ships still in the Pacific were rerouted to Australia and those in the Atlantic were rerouted to ports in India.

The Money Grab 24 These purchases were not only funded by State coffers. The Netherlands Government in Exile seized the financial as-

17

sets of Dutch corporations operating abroad. Many commercial transactions in the United States were disrupted by the German invasion and thrown into limbo. In response, the U.S. Government simply blocked the accounts or froze the funds. Desperate for revenue, the London Government moved to seize not only these finances, but also the bank accounts of expatriate Dutch citizens living overseas. Not surprisingly, neither group proved receptive to this rather blatant money grab and a lawsuit was filed in the United States. In response, the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that the Dutch Government In Exile was the sole trustee of the funds until war’s end. As such, it alone had authority to invest and dispose of cash and securities deposits belonging to Dutch nationals in the United States. In early 1942 U.S. financial institutions received cables instructing them to transfer funds in their possession to either bank accounts in Java or the account of the Netherlands Purchasing Commission. Transactions were administered by the main branch of the Java Bank. E.C. Zimmerman, former Trade Commissioner of the Netherlands East Indies, oversaw the accounts throughout the war. Seizure of these funds was justified in the name of national security. It does not appear that any of them were returned or paid back after the war.

A State of Cold War In February 1941, a large Japanese naval task force assembled off Indochina. At the same time, the IJA began stockpiling war supplies throughout Indochina and Formosa. Alarmed by this buildup, the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Squadron25 Vice-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich ordered all Dutch ships to concentrate in the southern part of the South China Sea. At the same time, he ordered those warships under repair or in overhaul to be ready to put to sea within 24 hours of receiving orders. On February 11, Dutch merchant ships in Chinese and Japanese waters were ordered to head south for safer waters. That same day, Vice Admiral Helfrich also closed all Dutch harbors to Japanese shipping. The Dutch clearly expected a Japanese invasion in the immediate future. They believed there would be a direct attack on Java itself and all available warships concentrated at Soekadana Bay on Western Vice-Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich (courtesy Borneo to intercept Gerard Horneman).

18

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

such a thrust. Here, shallow water prevented Japanese submarine attacks and the MLD carried out long-range patrols to the north; cruiser floatplanes searched the immediate area. The Dutch plan for thwarting a Japanese invasion of Java hinged on attacking the invasion convoy as far north as possible with bombers. Then, if possible, it would be dragged across a line of submarines, which would weaken the convoy and its escorts. A night torpedo attack by the destroyers would follow, after which, the cruisers would engage. The air force would resume the attack at dawn. The anticipated attack never materialized and eventually the Dutch state of readiness lapsed. They were given a few more months to prepare their defenses for the inevitable. Tensions, which were already high, had been taken almost to the breaking point. Both sides seemed to know that there was no turning back a full nine months before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. The Dutch now implemented a massive minelaying program throughout the East Indies. It started with a remotecontrolled minefield in the Bay of Batavia. The initial effort was hampered by the shortage of new ground-fired mines. But by the outbreak of war barrages had been laid, or were being laid, at Ambon, Balikpapan, Tarakan and Soerabaja. In May 1941, Dutch planes sighted the Japanese cargo ship Zuiyo Maru in the Halmahera Sea with a suspicious deck cargo. However, no ships were near enough to intercept and contact was lost. On May 22 the Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boat Arend stopped and boarded the Asahi Maru in Dutch waters off New Guinea. Nothing untoward was found and Arend was forced to let the ship and her grinning master go about their business. Following their invasion of French Indochina the Dutch become increasingly wary of Japanese intentions. There was another invasion scare when a large Japanese convoy assembled off the coast of China and appeared to move south on June 6, 1941. Fearing invasion, Admiral Helfrich concentrated his few immediately available ships near the South China Sea. A force consisting of the light cruiser De Ruyter, destroyers Banckert and Piet Hein and submarines K-XVII and K-XVIII was dispatched to Soekadana Bay on the south coast of Borneo. They were supported by the supply ship Janssens and tanker Petronella (TAN 8). Helfrich also transferred a second destroyer division from the Moluccas into the Java Sea. The Moluccas were a major hub and he worried about leaving them unguarded. However, not doing so could have meant the loss of Java. Fortunately, the scare was another false alarm; it was a troop convoy destined for northern Indochina. In December, these troops and ships would undertake the invasion of Malaya and Borneo. As the convoy moved south, the KM prepared to make a preemptive submarine strike if it showed any signs of moving into the East Indies. The skipper of K-XVIII was ordered to ready his boat and stand by for a top-secret mission to Cam Ranh Bay. There, he would attack the Japanese convoy and inflict as much damage as possible. However, when the latest round of tension dissipated, he was ordered to stand down and the mission was canceled.

Throughout 1941 the KM continued to increase the number of ships on patrol throughout the archipelago. On September 24 a squadron of Dornier Do. 24K flying boats was deployed to Pontianak, Borneo.26 They had orders to patrol the area around the Anambas, Natoena and Tambelan Islands in tandem with the militarized GM vessel Poolster. There had been persistent reports of Japanese fishing boats repeatedly violating Dutch territorial waters in all of those areas.27 On September 28 a Dutch patrol plane sighted a suspicious ship in the Sea of Ceram between Ambon and the south coast of Dutch New Guinea. The GM patrol boat Valk patrolled the area, but could not reach its reported location on a timely basis; so instead, two destroyers were routed to the area but they also failed to make contract. The strange ship was assumed to be a Japanese naval auxiliary as Australian listening stations picked up a series of signals on known naval frequencies between a ship and Japanese naval stations. The location of these signals was later localized in the same general area.28 The Dutch had sufficient reason to be concerned about Japanese merchant ships operating in their waters. Like the fishing boats, many were manned by naval officers who routinely recorded shipping schedules, harbor installations and defenses. Although this was strictly forbidden, a Dutch harbor pilot at Tandjoeng Priok caught an officer aboard a merchant ship mapping the harbor. Reporting this to the port commander, his superior replied he could do nothing since the Government had issued strict orders to avoid anything that might cause an incident. Piet Hein stopped and boarded the Japanese merchant ship Joko Maru in the Banda Sea on October 1. Despite an extensive search, no contraband was found and her paperwork was in order, so the destroyer was forced to let the ship go. This ship was part of the Japanese invasion convoys entering the East Indies several months later.

Friction with the French The Japanese were not the only concern. The Australian Combined Operational Intelligence Center in Melbourne reported that four Vichy French submarines had entered the Indian Ocean in January 1941. Two were to operate from Madagascar and two from ports in Indochina, respectively. It was later learned that Vichy ships had standing orders to attack any Free French warship on sight.29 When Vichy France let Japanese troops occupy Indochina, the Netherlands Government in Exile gave orders to deny French ships use of the Karimata and Soenda Straits, effective June 5, 1941.30 It feared that rubber from Indochina would reach Germany. This was also done in retaliation for Vichy’s earlier seizure of two Dutch merchant ships in French North Africa.31 And finally, these waterways represented a critical line of communication between Indochina and Madagascar. Without access to the Soenda Strait, interaction between the two French colonies would be severely disrupted. To enforce this order Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered the

2. Build-Up to War GM to form a task force of patrol boats. The first vessel seized in the Soenda Strait was the cargo ship Compiègne by the patrol boat Sirius on June 19, which took her into Tandjoeng Priok. Her cargo was seized but the ship was released. On August 2 the GM patrol boat Bellatrix stopped the steamer Dupleix which was en route to Madagascar with a cargo of brick coal. She too was brought into Tandjoeng Priok. Her crew was interned and the ship transferred to Dutch control. In light of these seizures the French now adopted a new, more confrontational policy. If necessary, their merchant ships would now force passage of the Soenda Strait under armed escort of the French navy. On September 22 COIC reported that four Vichy merchant ships had departed Saigon on September 4. Three were escorted by a submarine and a sloop. On September 12 the merchant ships Sikiang, Cap Touraine and Compiègne were sighted approaching the Soenda Strait with the submarine Monge and an Admiral Charner class sloop in escort.32 Without instructions on how to deal with this new development, Vice-Admiral Helfrich let the convoy proceed while he requested instructions from London. On November 7 he was directed to regard all Vichy ships as allies of Germany. Their merchant ships were to be stopped and searched to ensure that no critical raw materials, specifically rubber, could reach Germany from Indochina. This was to happen even if they were under naval escort. When Helfrich pointed out that an escorting submarine would probably torpedo any Dutch ship that attempted to stop them, he was told to make sure that sufficient “firepower” was present. In response, Helfrich ordered the light cruiser Tromp and a destroyer into the Soenda Strait the following day. On September 29 COIC again reported that four more Vichy French merchant ships would depart Madagascar on October 10.33 Their destination would be Saigon via the Soenda Strait. They had orders to force the Strait if necessary and would be escorted by the same warships detailed above. In response, Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered his ships to prepare for a fight. But there is no further mention of this convoy and it appears to have been recalled. Although the KM was ready for a fight, French warships based in Indochina had badly mauled the Royal Thai Navy during a brief border dispute earlier that year.34 After this highly successful naval action, it is doubtful that they were particularly squeamish about taking on the less-experienced Dutch. In any event, the KM could ill-afford to lose any ships in a largely academic dispute with what had been a friendly ally just a year earlier. French ships were not the only ones seized by the Dutch. On April 13, 1941, the destroyer Kortenaer stopped and seized the Hungarian freighter Nyugat in international waters in the Timor Sea. She had been under charter to the Australian Wheat Board since December 1940 and was en route to Shanghai from Adelaide with 7,300 tons of flour.35 However, the Dutch suspected Nyugat was attempting to resupply a German commerce raider believed to be operating in the region.36 Although no state of war formally existed between Hol-

19

land and Hungary, the latter was an ally of Germany which occupied Holland. As such, Hungary was labeled a hostile nation.37 Legal action on surrounding the ship’s seizure continued into the post-war years with the Netherlands government eventually prevailing. The Dutch and British now signed a series of military agreements letting the KM stockpile spare parts and supplies for its submarines at Singapore. The MLD was also able to stockpile fuel and ordnance at British ports. This included a remote seaplane base on Cocos Islands in anticipation of supporting Royal Navy operations in the Indian Ocean.

The Timor Equation The island of Timor, located on the eastern fringe of the Netherlands East Indies, was jointly ruled by Holland and Portugal. The Dutch ruled the south end of the island with the Portuguese to the north. The Dutch developed their territory into a trading post for the eastern half of the Lesser Soenda Islands. In contrast, Portugal largely ignored Timor and primarily used it as a penal colony for criminals and dumping ground for exiled political prisoners.38 Although wary of each other’s colonial intentions, the two nations had peacefully co-existed for centuries.39 In 1898 Holland and Portugal went so far as to sign a treaty which disallowed any third-party nation from establishing a coaling or naval station on Timor.40 From the mid–1930s both the Australians and Dutch grew increasingly concerned about Japanese attention toward Portuguese Timor. At the least, the neutral Portuguese colony offered a convenient refuge for Japanese espionage efforts. If occupied it would be a hostile base deep inside Allied territory. Just 450 miles from Timor, the northern Australian port of Darwin would be within easy range of Japanese bombers. The Portuguese colony of Macao on the Chinese mainland was completely surrounded by Japanese forces. Through a combination of both implied and more direct threats to the territorial integrity of this colony, Japan secured a number of economic inroads into Portuguese Timor.41 These included the right to invest in agricultural enterprises and various mining and oil concessions.42 As was the case throughout Dutch territory, most of these operations were little more than a cover for covert intelligence gathering operations against the Dutch. Prior to the Pacific War the Dutch shipping line KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij or Royal Packet Navigation Company) held a monopoly on inter-island trade to and from Dili. But their rates were very high, which helped the Japanese successfully break the monopoly in 1934.43 But again, these ships likely fulfilled a more sinister purpose. They frequently took soundings of the local harbor which were sent back to Japan.44 Nor were their crews typical merchant seamen. This led David Ross, the senior Australian representative on Timor, to report: “The personnel of the Japanese vessels has been of a very high grade, and has constantly changed between voyages … a fact which strongly suggests that naval men were

20

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

being used, and that as large a number of possible were being given experience in these waters.”45 Throughout the years Japan repeatedly approached the Dutch seeking to establish air service between Timor and their primary air and naval base at Palau in the Caroline Islands. Wary of their intentions, the Dutch consistently refused these requests. Rebuffed, the Japanese turned to Portugal, whose neutral fascist government was on friendly terms with Germany. Reports soon reached Batavia that Japan had requested through Berlin, the rights to establish themselves on Portuguese Timor. The Portuguese were equally suspicious of Japanese intentions and now found themselves in a quandary. They feared invasion of Timor if they refused, but did not have the local strength to defend Timor. Long neglected, their garrison comprised only 300 native levies, of whom 15 were European. Their weaponry consisted of 570 rifles, 10 machine guns and nine 20mm cannons, all dating from the turn of the century. Artillery support consisted of a single 47mm field gun.46 Although reinforced in March 1941 by 150 well-armed European troops from Macao,47 their numbers were still too small to hold off any kind of large invasion force. The Portuguese government in Lisbon viewed the Australians and Dutch as a lesser threat to the integrity of their Timor colony. In May 1939, through British intervention, Lisbon allowed the Australian airline Qantas to establish a Darwin-Dili flight.48 They were later given rights to stop at Dili on flights between Darwin and Batavia. A month later Dili replaced Koepang (Dutch Timor) as the stopover point for Darwin-Singapore flights.49 Not unexpectedly, the Japanese were furious and successfully lobbied Lisbon to delay the Darwin-Dili service for more than a year. To placate them Lisbon approved six Palau-Dili “trial flights” between December 1940 and June 1941.50 Despite the flights being very irregularly scheduled, the Japanese dispatched an official from Greater Japan Airways who arrived with five mechanics.51 These men entrenched themselves in Dili for the entire seven months of the program. Japan clearly used these flights for covert intelligence gathering.52 During the fifth flight, on May 19, their civilian flying boat took on 1,320 gallons of fuel.53 This should have let it easily make the 1,270 mile flight with fuel to spare. Yet, the flying boat arrived with near empty fuel tanks, which indicated that it had substantially deviated from the normal flight path somewhere between Palau and Dili. 54 The plane’s arrival was preceded by that of a nearly empty Japanese merchant ship which was to serve as a “guard ship” for this particular plane. The Portuguese did not allow Japan to establish a regular

air route between Palau and Dili until December 1941, several days after their attack on Pearl Harbor. Even then, they attempted to maintain an air of neutrality by not allowing either the Australians or Japanese to station a radio or wireless operator at Dili.55 The Japanese population on Portuguese Timor in 1941 numbered 13 men, women and children. This made them the largest foreign community in Dili. All had been placed there by various Japanese agencies. As early as 1934 agriculture specialists sent soil samples from the local airfield to naval intelligence authorities in Japan. Portuguese customs officials later confiscated meteorology equipment that had been delivered “by mistake” to the local Japanese consulate.56 As a result of these and other suspicious activities, the movements of Japanese residents and visitors were closely monitored and their communications censored. Mirroring a similar Dutch regulation, the Portuguese also required that all Japanese communications with Palau to be conducted in English so that their censors could monitor the exchange.57 Nonetheless, Japanese threats against Portuguese Timor continued to grow. These were leveraged by the precarious position of Macao which Lisbon had no ability or hope of defending with anything other than economic concessions. As a result, Dutch fears about Timor remained so great that the KNIL kept a permanent force ready for immediate dispatch to the island in the event of Japanese invasion. In late 1941 the Dutch again faced yet another “invasion scare.” On November 17, 1941, the East Indies government again received reports from Tokyo which indicated that the Japanese planned to launch a surprise invasion of either Tarakan or Portuguese Timor.58 In response, Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered the submarines K-XIV, K-XV and K-XVI into the waters east of Tarakan with orders to patrol the area and report whatever they saw. De Ruyter, with the destroyers Witte de With and Kortenaer, was deployed in the area of Timor. The coastal defense ship Soerabaja followed them out of Soerabaja. The naval air force also sent out extra patrols throughout the East Indies. On November 20 the Dutch ships were ordered to stand down. Intelligence monitoring of radio reports indicated that the feared invasion convoy was an expeditionary force en route to the Japanese base at Palau.59 On November 23 the final Japanese test flight allowed from Palau landed in the harbor at Dili. It joined three Japanese schooners that had arrived several days earlier.60 None of it suggested anything untoward, but Soerabaja remained at Koepang to provide local defense and to assist in the occupation of Dili if necessary.

Chapter 3

Spies, Lies and Secret Ties With war just months away, the East Indies government took steps to shut down what had been a long-term espionage effort by the Japanese. Even before the First World War Japan began laying the foundation of an extensive covert network throughout the East Indies. On October 1, 1936, the Batavia daily newspaper Nieuws Van Den Dag reported that no less than 34,660 Japanese resided in Siam and various Western colonies throughout the Far East.1

to be near to the island was so obvious that the Dutch closed the area to foreign concessions. The company persisted and the Dutch offered a site farther south at Sangkoelirang Bay that the Japanese accepted, giving them a presence near Tarakan. Their methods of operation were so amateurish that by 1936, the Southern Seas Timber Company had lost more than ƒ2,000,000 on the project.8 In a report that same year, a Dutch official wrote: “there is every reason to doubt whether it was ever intended that the company should be worked on genuine commercial lines. Judging from the names of those who financed the concern, it was more probable that the object was to have a Japanese establishment near the much desired oilfields no matter what the cost.”9 Exactly when the Dutch caught on to these covert ventures is unknown, but they had strong suspicions long before the official’s critical report. Japanese espionage rapidly expanded throughout the East Indies after the Great War. In 1932–33 they attempted to get a foothold in Dutch New Guinea. Japan was granted a cotton concession and later tried to have the surrounding area opened to broad Japanese colonization.10 They then constructed a barbed wire fence around the concession and prohibited entrance. The KNIL quickly moved in and forced its removal. By late 1940 the entire area was regularly patrolled by the Dutch.11 Dutch New Guinea continued to be a hotbed of covert activity. Much of it was covered by the guise of botanical research carried out by the South Seas Development Company, which also was heavily subsidized by the Japanese government. All its operations were controlled directly by the naval commander on the Japanese Mandate Island of Pelieu, to whom operatives reported. Japan continued to assert that it had no designs on the Netherlands East Indies. However, on March 6, 1937, Het Vaderland newspaper12 in The Hague reported that a member of Japan’s Lower House had openly called for the Netherlands to place Dutch New Guinea “at the disposal of Japanese nationals” for economic and industrial purposes.13 Because the Dutch had failed to devote the necessary resources it was unpopulated and “undeveloped” and should have been turned over to Japan for proper utilization. To the great annoyance of the Dutch government, the Japanese Prime Minister did not refute his comments; instead, he agreed to review the suggestion.14 On Celebes, four Japanese civilians relocated from Japan

An atmosphere of nervousness was created, rumors of espionage were in the air and although it was exaggerated to consider every Japanese barber as a disguised officer, or to believe that every fisherman had a rank in the Navy, it could not be denied that there was sufficient room for suspicion.2

Throughout the 1930s thousands of these expatriates formed a vast economic spy ring.3 They often operated under the guise of seemingly benign commercial operations such as agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining ventures. Their activities were closely monitored and supervised by Japanese intelligence agencies which controlled their activities through local Japanese associations.4 Japanese consular officials believed their primary duty was to collect military intelligence. Their information was sent to Tokyo via diplomatic pouch.5 The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy both had agents in key areas; but, as was typical between these services, they did not pool resources or share information. In particular, a great deal of attention and money was expended on propaganda toward the archipelago’s Chinese and Indonesian residents.6 As part of this effort many Chinese were brought in from Japanese-occupied China to agitate against the Nationalist Government.7 Large commercial ventures were subsidized in some fashion—either directly or indirectly—by the Japanese government. A common denominator amongst these firms was that very few ever turned a profit, no matter how much financial support they received. And when the Japanese set them up they inevitably sought locations near strategic military bases or other sensitive areas. An early example of espionage involved the Southern Seas Timber Company. It was a subsidiary of the Oriental Development Company and owned by a Japanese shipping magnate subsidized by the Japanese government. The company sought timber concessions near the oil-rich island of Tarakan. Their desire

21

22

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

and opened small shops. However, this appeared to be little more than a cover for espionage activities as they were repeatedly sighted collecting samples of nickel, iron and ore deposits from nearby mines. This went on for some time and raised the suspicion of Dutch authorities who brought the “shopkeepers” in for questioning. It was then discovered that they all had geology diplomas from prominent German universities.15 Other companies operating in the East Indies did no visible business, but were set up only to gather information and support propaganda efforts. At the same time, highly placed Japanese military officials visited the East Indies. Many used false names, but others (often members of the Imperial Japanese Naval Staff ) visited openly. Covertly and openly, they visited Dutch military bases throughout the 1920s and 1930s, always asking seemingly innocent questions to glean information about current Dutch defenses. The naval base at Soerabaja was of particular interest. While their espionage activity was extensive it did not become focused until 1931 when the Japanese undertook a series of commercial actions designed to undercut Dutch trade. One method coined the phrase “Japanese goods through Japanese hands” as their shipping lines, banks and other entities attempted to gain commercial trade monopolies and cut the Dutch out of their own markets. The Dutch quickly put limits on the amount of goods that Japan could import. Had they not, the Japanese actions could have seriously destabilized the region’s economy. Another program offered large amounts of credit with lax terms to native firms who would buy and import goods from Japan. The intent was to again cut the Dutch out of their own markets by creating a distribution network of Indonesian firms entirely dependent on Japanese goods. However, three centuries of sound Dutch trade policies had financially benefited many Chinese and Indonesian businessmen and they hesitated to change horses. Nor did they entirely trust the Japanese plan and it quickly failed.16 Propaganda efforts were also intense, including one plan that advertised cheap education in Japan. When the students arrived, they were quickly subjected to intense propaganda and pressured or coerced to engage in anti–Dutch programs or outright espionage for the Japanese. The Japanese tried to drive a wedge between Indonesian politicians and Dutch authorities with a whisper campaign based on local legends and myth. Their journalists and businessmen spread propaganda about Japan’s invincible military strength and the weakness of the Dutch, while promising Java independence after a period of prosperity under a “Yellow Race.” There were unconfirmed reports by Australian intelligence that the Japanese had unsuccessfully offered a reward of 10,000 guilders to any Indonesian political leader who would incite a general revolt against the Dutch. It was also believed that at some point, Indonesian agents in the pay of Japanese intelligence would murder a number of Japanese shopkeepers or fishermen. Japan would protest these transgressions and then use them as an excuse to occupy all or part of the East Indies.17

When this failed, they started a pro–Japanese newsletter, controlled by the Consulate-General in Batavia and financed by the Bureau of Economic Research (another cover for espionage operations). However, financial improprieties by the editor generated unwanted attention in the mainstream press and caused its collapse. Dutch counterintelligences did a good job of keeping up with these activities, and one raid even produced documents pointing to a widespread espionage network throughout the entire archipelago. It was headed by the Japanese Foreign Office, which controlled an immense spy network of journalists, businessmen, fishermen, individuals and Indonesian nationalists in the pay of Japan. There were also shadowy criminal societies at work, including the Black Dragons and Yakuza ( Japanese organized crime). Distinctions between the latter and military were sometimes blurred. It is known that IJA officers in Manchuria were involved in the drug trade to obtain money to fund unauthorized, covert operations.18

Chinese Propaganda There were efforts by Japan to split the loyalties of Chinese living in the East Indies. Early on, they drove Nationalist Chinese forces out of their prewar capital of Nanking. In March 1940 Japan installed a pro–Japanese puppet government under the nominal leadership of a collaborator named Wang ChingWei. Much of the propaganda focused on Chinese living abroad, the intent being to turn them against Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. Much of this propaganda was also heavily anti–Dutch.19 These efforts succeeded in helping cause a number of Chinese riots, although they were more labor-related than political. As a result, in August 1940 Dutch authorities searched the homes of 40 Chinese residents throughout the East Indies. All were suspected of carrying out covert propaganda on behalf of China’s Nanking puppet government. These suspicions were confirmed when a great deal of incriminating literature and related materials were found.20 On August 21, 1941, the Marechaussee21 arrested the editors of Shinarusutan and To-Indo, two subversive Chinese language newspapers funded by the Japanese Consulate. Both were prevented from publishing for a short time and were closely watched when they did resume distribution. On the same day, the government announced that it was putting a telephone monitoring system into effect. All calls made to and from the East Indies now had to be made in Dutch, English or Malay. As 1941 wore on, Japanese agents redoubled their espionage and propaganda efforts. Simultaneously, Tokyo ordered the evacuation of 6,000 of the 8,000 Japanese citizens on Java. Those left behind comprised the core of their 5th Column agents, who were well-known by Dutch counterintelligence and carefully watched. With the start of war, they were rounded up and interned, officially ending Japanese espionage activities in the East Indies.

3. Spies, Lies and Secret Ties

Captured Japanese fishing boat (author’s collection).

One propaganda effort which the Dutch never countered was a Japanese radio broadcast from Formosa which began in September 1941. Broadcast in Indonesian, it stoked the concept of self-rule and overall Asian freedom from the tyranny of Western colonialism. For whatever reason, the Dutch never attempted to jam or disrupt these broadcasts.22 They proved quite effective with many Indonesians, particularly those harboring Nationalist sympathies. Dutch police had to also contend with the British. Soon after the start of war in September 1939, the British Consul General at Batavia requested permission to post six retired RN officers at Ambon, Balikpapan, Batavia, Endeh, Medan, Sabang and Soerabaja. They were to keep an eye on German shipping activities. The request was refused. Not only was it a questionable activity for the still neutral Dutch, but they simply did not want to keep track of them as well.23 Even so, the Australians— and most certainly the British as well—secured a steady stream of intelligence reports through their various diplomatic staffs on Java.

March Southward! Japanese Fishing Industry! 24 By 1940 there were more than 4,000 Japanese fishermen in the East Indies, most of whom were under the control of the naval commander at Pelieu.25 Their deck hands were typically rough characters from the Lu Chu Islands26 who had little respect for any law.27 Their duties included intimidation and the bullying of local fishermen into accepting the inevitability of Japanese rule. Officers were often regular or reserve naval personnel whose job description included taking soundings around strategic points, developing weather reports and composing detailed maps.28 They illegally flew Dutch and Filipino flags and fished in Dutch waters. It was not uncommon for insolent Japanese to

23

feign ignorance when police and sailors spoke to them in Dutch or Malay. Their level of disrespect grew so brazen by 1937–38 that the East Indies Government lodged a protest. In response, Japanese officials ordered their fishermen to dial down the attitude. Not surprisingly, they immediately became more cooperative and their comprehension of Dutch and Malay magically increased. But the fishing boats gradually grew more arrogant and before long they fell back into their old habits.29 In December 1937 there were no less than 137 Japanese fishing vessels in the Arafua Sea.30 More were expected to arrive the following year despite a slump in volume due to over-fishing. They had driven the Celebes Trading Company out of business and Australian pearlers were expected to soon follow. As a result, the Arafua Sea was now all but completely controlled by the Japanese. At the time it was believed that they intended to increase their fleet to more than 200 fishing boats.31 Despite their prolific presence few cargoes were landed at Dutch ports. And rarely did the Japanese boats put into port in the Indies; they instead returned to Pelieu for maintenance and overhaul. Nor did the boats remain in international waters, but consistently and blatantly entered Dutch territorial waters around strategic points and had to be repeatedly driven away. To control them the Japanese Consul-General suggested that the Dutch allow a fleet of fast Japanese boats to operate independently in NEI waters to limit these activities. Needless to say, the Dutch declined. Each time, the Japanese boat’s captain would claim ignorance of his true position and apologize profusely. Or, he would simply play dumb and state that he did not realize the seriousness of his offense. These transgressions started in the early 1930s. The Dutch tended to treat first time offenses with leniency and usually imposed only a small fine. As the number of cases and repeat offenders grew they imposed stiffer fines and later began seizing fishing boats. Close inspection of one fishing boat revealed its true identity. The size of a trawler with powerful engines and modern sounding equipment, it also had a chart room capable of making detailed maps. The radio room was equipped with a powerful wireless capable of communicating directly with any mainland Japanese station on both short and medium band frequencies. None of this sophisticated equipment was standard for a simple fishing boat, which of course they were not, as the boats were primarily manned by naval officers in disguise. Another Japanese boat stopped in Dutch waters off Benkoelen, Sumatra, had virtually no fishing gear aboard.32 Her crew was in the process of making a detailed chart of the area. Her captain was well educated with a full understanding of Malay; it was noted at the time that he seemed more like a naval officer than a simple fisherman. This was the third time his boat had been stopped; at least one of those times he had been stopped along the south coast of Java. This time he claimed

24

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

that his engines were out and that he had drifted into Dutch waters.33 A Japanese ship put into Palembang where a crewman was observed to be taking sounds of the harbor. He was told to stop and to request any necessary data from the harbormaster. A short time later the same ship then put into Soengei Gerong and was found to be doing the same thing. Her crew also had made a detailed sketch of the harbor installations and were taking measurements of the oil pipelines.34 These activities were the brainchild of a proposal put forth in 1934 by a Japanese fishing executive named Kunishi Kosuke.35 Twelve years earlier the Japanese government had mutually agreed to accept limitations established at the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, which limited the size and number of warships in its fleet. Strongly patriotic, Kosuke felt that the Washington treaty restricted the IJN’s ability to conduct reconnaissance throughout the Southeast Pacific. As a remedy he proposed that Japan build up a modern fleet of longrange fishing boats that could help the IJN effectively circumvent this restriction.36 They would operate far from Japanese waters as a quasi-military auxiliary force. The IJN accepted Kosuke’s proposal. Beginning in 1936 it began a program that encouraged Japanese fishing boats to migrate southwards into American, British and Dutch territories in ever-increasing numbers. The operations of these vessels were two-fold; the first was to help alleviate a growing food shortage inside Japan proper that had persisted throughout the late 1930s due to declining rice harvests and increased demands brought about by the war in China. The second was to covertly gather information to help lay the groundwork for future potential military operations against the European powers. From an economic standpoint, their commercial operations were also intended to lay the groundwork for the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The result of this program was a literal explosion of Japanese fishing and pearling craft throughout all corners of the East Indies, Malaysia and the Philippines. Part of this exodus was due to strong Japanese rules regulating the size and scope of certain fishing activities. Regardless of the reason, both the British and Filipino governments quickly enacted a series of protectionist policies of their own to preserve not only their domestic fishing industries, but also to maintain national security.

International Incidents There were a number of highly volatile international incidents involving these fishing boats. Several featured the Dutch gunboat Flores, which had orders to patrol the area in and around the Karimata Strait. Flores was equipped with a floatplane to increase her patrol radius. On September 24, 1937, the plane sighted the Japanese fishing boat Hiyoshi Maru towing four prauws.37 They flew no flag and were illegally operating inside the 3-mile limit near Billiton Island.38 It was the ninth time this flotilla had been found illegally operating in Dutch waters.39

Hiyoshi Maru and her charges immediately turned northeast in an effort to reach international waters. The seaplane’s pilot signaled them to stop with a red light which the Japanese captain ignored. The floatplane’s observer then fired several machine gun bursts across her bow. This prompted Hiyoshi Maru to raise a Japanese flag and come to a stop. The ship was then boarded by crewmen from Flores and ordered into harbor at Billiton where her papers were inspected. Although Hiyoshi Maru had the necessary permits, the fishing boats did not and were seized.40 Three days later, on the morning of September 30, 1937, Flores’ seaplane sighted the fishing boat Tokei Maru No. 7 towing three prauws.41 They too were operating illegally in Dutch waters near the Abang Strait in the Lingga Archipelago. The captain of Tokei Maru No. 7 ignored a red light ordering him to halt and fled toward international waters. The plane’s observer fired 100 rounds from his 7.7mm machine gun across the Japanese ship’s bow, but Tokei Maru No. 7 continued on. He fired another 100 rounds into her bow but the ship still refused to stop. The observer then fired directly into Tokei Maru No. 7 without directly targeting her crew. This finally prompted the ship and her flotilla of prauws to stop. However, four of her five crewmen were wounded.42 Her captain and engineer were badly wounded and died while being taken aboard Flores. Two other crewmen were less severely wounded and taken to Billiton where they received medical attention and all the Japanese vessels were seized.43 In response to strong Japanese protests the use of Dutch seaplanes for stopping fishing boats was discontinued. On January 5, 1938, the Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boat Valk intercepted the Japanese fishing boat Fuku Maru 38 in the Bangka Strait. She flew no flag and had no name painted on her hull. As was becoming normal, the Japanese vessel was in Dutch waters and only stopped when Valk put a 75mm round across her bow.44 Two days later the destroyer Kortenaer was patrolling off the Badas Islands in the South China Sea. At 1030 she sighted a motor vessel towing four fishing boats. At a range of about 1,000 yards the destroyer signaled them to heave-to for inspection. The motor vessel promptly raised the Japanese flag and increased speed in an effort to get into international waters. At that point, Kortenaer encouraged her to stop with a warning shot that landed within 75 yards of the larger ship. When searched none of the Japanese ships had proper paperwork and were taken to Billiton Island.45 A total of 43 Japanese fishermen were interned. Kortenaer was recalled to Tandjoeng Priok several days later. On the return trip on January 13, her scout plane46 sighted two motor vessels without flags or identification sailing in Dutch waters southeast of Bangka Island. The plane landed near the ships and ordered them to anchor near the coast for inspection by Kortenaer; the Japanese somewhat surprisingly obeyed immediately. Soon after, five more small fishing boats were located nearby, all in Dutch waters illegally with no na-

3. Spies, Lies and Secret Ties

25 is being reported by captains of the various vessels reaching port recently. According to their reports, it appears that the ships are stopped at least once or twice a day by flying boats and are subjected to intimidating inspection. Most of these flying boats are tri-motored (with a crew of six or seven). However, northeast of [Banka], occasionally a four-motored flying boat is encountered. Although no warships are encountered in these areas, there are always two or three in the vicinity of Etna, 50 miles north of Batavia; these are patrol boats on duty at night. On the night of the 18th, several of these were recognized … the fact that our fishing vessels have become the objects of strong suspicion and oppression by the government here deserves our attention.52

Anti-Espionage Laws53 Banckert with float plane (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

tional markings; none were fishing. Kortenaer took aboard a total of 33 Japanese fishermen and escorted the two motor vessels into Tandjoeng Priok.47 On February 5, 1938, the Batavia newspaper, Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, reported the arrival of the Dutch destroyer Van Ghent at Tandjoeng Priok.48 She had been on patrol between Batavia and Singapore in waters, “where Japanese fishing boats, which trespass against our fishing laws, swarm.” On her most recent patrol Van Ghent had seized four fishing boats inside the 3-mile limit and took them to Muntok Harbor. A fifth was seized off the coast of Sumatra.49 On May 6, 1940, a Dutch flying boat on routine reconnaissance in the South China Sea sighted a Japanese fishing boat in Dutch waters in the Riouw Archipelago. Despite repeated signals the fishing boat refused to leave. When the pilot attempted to land and board the ship, her captain tried to ram the seaplane. In self-defense the flying boat’s gunners fired a series of warning shots across the bow. At the same time, Ototsugu Saito, Japan’s Consul-General in Batavia, heard a Dutch soldier speaking in English. This prompted him to write a highly inflammatory account of the fishing boat account. He embellished it to include a false claim that 2,000 British troops had landed on Java to take the East Indies into protective custody. He hoped to spur Japanese sentiment which would lead to an invasion of the East Indies.50 The Japanese press increased the number of troops to 20,000 and labeled the incident as “Cruel firing at innocent Japanese fishermen by the Netherlands Navy.”51 As war neared in 1941, the Dutch and British severely clamped down on these fishing boats by increasing surveillance over them. Their harassment of the Japanese fishing boats was so intense that Yutaka Ishizawa, the Japanese Consul General in Batavia sent Tokyo the following message: The surveillance of Japanese fishing boats in the vicinity of Gaspar [Strait] and Billiton [Island] is becoming more and more strict [and]

In the East Indies the Dutch, already leery of Japanese intentions regarding their territory, also took protective action. Already strict immigration laws were further tightened in order to more effectively control the number of Japanese fishermen allowed into the colony. And in 1937, the East Indies government formally barred foreign fishing vessels from Dutch territorial waters. Although these regulations had some impact, Japanese fishing and pearling vessels continued to operate in and around the NEI right up to the start of the Pacific War. Ashore, Japanese seamen and local “businessmen” often wandered near important defensive positions. As long they did not leave the road or produce cameras, there was little the Marechaussee could do. It was obvious they were memorizing the locations and strength of beach defenses and positions. But with the Dutch desperately playing for time to build up their defenses they were unwilling to provoke the Japanese. The Dutch passed a number of laws to curb espionage activities in mid–1941. On May 14, Military Ordinance 76 prohibited the composition or copying of any map fully or partially illustrating the NEI without a letter of authorization. On May 21, Military Ordinance 81 banned the possession, concealment or carrying of photographic equipment on a train without military permission. On May 27, Government Statute 150 banned foreign aircraft from flying over or landing in the waters near Ambon without prior permission. Military Ordinance 73 went into effect on May 28; it required all temporary foreign visitors to the East Indies to provide their travel itinerary to local officials; they also had to check in upon arrival and prior to departing.54 The prison term for illegally entering, sketching or photographing prohibited military installations was tripled to six years. The mapping law did not apply to land that was under private cultivation or already being mined. The maps had to be of a certain scale and used for strictly commercial purposes such as construction or renovation. The penalty for violation was up to one year in jail or a fine of ƒ10,000.55 There were also pro-

26

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

visions to address anyone who might unintentionally violate these laws.56 Nonetheless, they still gave authorities the legal means to prosecute Japanese spies if necessary. In August, the Dutch required that all phone calls from the Netherlands East Indies to the Americas, Bangkok and Manila could only take place in English, French or Malay. Calls to Australia, Japan and London could only be in English. This was heavily criticized by the Japanese-owned, Chinese newspaper Tohindo Nippo. As a result, that publication was shut down by Dutch authorities for one week for printing anti–Chinese and anti–Western content.57 It may be hard for the reader to envision how the Japanese could carry on without arousing the ire of the Dutch. Indeed, the East Indies government was fully aware of these operations and detailed counterintelligence to keep them in check. Many of these efforts also took place throughout the 1920 and 1930s, long before the obvious signs of war manifested themselves. When one nation discovers spies in its midst during peacetime it is rarely cause for war. In such cases the Dutch followed the standard practice of deporting or expelling the offending individuals. The Dutch were also in a difficult position. Cut off from reinforcements and possessing a weak military in the midst of a rearmament and reorganization program, the East Indies could not afford to provoke the much more powerful Japanese. At the same time, Britain and America strongly encouraged the East Indies to resist Japanese demands for raw material concessions, but would not guarantee military support in the event of an attack. As a result, the Dutch were forced to walk a fine line between compromise and resistance to Japanese demands while playing for time in order to complete their military buildup. When in June 1941 Japan sent an economic mission to Batavia to negotiate increased petroleum export quotas, senior KNIL officers were reluctant to admit several of its members. However, the government sought to avoid a confrontation and reluctantly admitted colonels Maeda, Onga and Ishii of the Imperial Japanese Army. Ishii was a firebrand who had previously disobeyed orders and was responsible for involving the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in a bloody border war with Russia in 1939. Although closely watched during their stay, none of the officers participated in the trade talks, and instead reconnoitered Dutch defenses and military bases.

Afdeling 1 and Kamer 14 The roots of modern Dutch military intelligence can be traced back to the start of the First World War. In order to better maintain its neutrality, the Dutch Government felt it necessary to more effectively monitor the communications of those belligerent nations which it bordered. So in 1914 its military beefed up the country’s censorship, counter-espionage, countersmuggling and cryptology capabilities.58 In 1918 Dutch military intelligence capabilities were well

established and the department was not demobilized. Financial stress brought about by the Great Depression eventually forced a reduction in its capabilities. By the early 1930s the military leadership anticipated that their forces would be unable to effectively defend the East Indies against a Japanese invasion. At the same time, Dutch intelligence admitted that it knew very little about the ship building programs, tactical doctrine or operational training of the Imperial Japanese Navy.59 Thus, military intelligence capabilities returned to prominence. While Dutch counter-intelligence operatives strove to keep Japanese espionage operations in check, other more secret “Black Room” organizations also worked intently. These were Afdeling (Section) 1, the KM’s intelligence section, and Kamer 14, the KNIL’s secret code breaking section, which was named for the room that the clandestine unit operated out of at army headquarters in Batavia. The first Dutch monitoring station was set up by the KM in Batavia on March 7, 1933. Initial operations were not directed solely toward the Japanese, but also to eavesdrop on British, French and American naval signals as well.60 Emphasis quickly shifted and the first serious efforts to crack Japanese codes came in 1934, when the light cruiser Kuma visited Tandjoeng Priok and KM radio operators began copying its signals. They were sent back to a professor of Japanese studies at the University of Leiden. However, he was unable to break the code, and passed the documents along to Lieutenant J.F.W. Nuboer (later head of the KM’s Naval Intelligence Section as a Rear-Admiral), who had just been posted to the newly formed Adeling 1. Nuboer arrived in Batavia in August 1934 and immediately began working to break Japanese naval and diplomatic codes. He had previously worked with limited success on breaking German codes generated by their Enigma machine. Kamer 14 was staffed by Lieutenant J.A. Verkuyl and Lieutenant W. van der Beek, two KNIL officers who had been sent to Japan to learn the language and were now codebreakers fluent in Japanese. They concentrated on diplomatic codes between the Japanese consulate in Batavia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. They were helped by having copies of Japanese consular cables, which under Dutch law, had to be sent from the local telegraph office, which was operated by the East Indies government. While the United States strictly adhered to national and international laws regarding the privacy of foreign nations’ diplomatic mail, the Dutch had no qualms about monitoring and breaking them. Codebreakers of Kamer 14 broke Japanese diplomatic codes in 1932.61 They were eventually able to completely decipher Japan’s Purple and Red codes that were used for diplomatic transmissions between Batavia and Tokyo. From these intercepts the Dutch learned that German diplomats in Batavia were in frequent contact with both Japanese secret agents and Indonesian Nationalists.62 In the meantime, Dutch codebreakers continued to intercept Japanese military signals. Although they never broke it

3. Spies, Lies and Secret Ties completely, codebreakers made progress reading parts of Japan’s JN-25 code without American or British assistance. The highly sophisticated Japanese Navy code was too tough a nut to crack and much valuable information remained out of reach. Still, from 1935 Dutch codebreakers were able provide a “very reliable and current” order of battle for the IJN.63 These intercepts were shared on a daily basis with the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), the British codebreaking section at Singapore, via a secret, direct radio link and liaison officers. Information FECB shared with Kamer 14 was gathered with a top-secret “Purple” machine, which they had obtained from the United States through somewhat underhanded means. As they could not read Japan’s Purple code, and the United States wanted a copy of Germany’s Enigma machine (which the British broke with substantial assistance from exiled Polish codebreakers, who had already deciphered the machine’s coding methodology), a trade was proposed—an Enigma machine for Purple machines and code books pertaining to JN-25. There was much resistance from the USN, as very few Purple machines were available, and sending three to the British would deprive codebreaking operations in the Philippines and Hawaii of critically needed equipment. Nonetheless, it was decided to go ahead with the exchange. However, once the British had obtained the machines, they refused to provide an Enigma machine in return, coldly stating that it was “against British policy to share its codebreaking secrets with a neutral.” 6 4 The Americans were livid, as their regulations concerning codebreaking were equally stringent. Bletchley Park never did provide the promised Enigma, and not until two years later was the affair exposed (to a degree), implicating Winston Churchill himself. No mention of it was ever acknowledged by the British government during or after the war, nor has it ever been allowed into its official history.65 Interestingly, when Vice-Admiral Helfrich and American Rear-Admiral W.R. Purnell (Chief of Staff of the USN Asiatic Fleet) secretly met in Batavia in January 1941, neither revealed their respective success in breaking Japanese codes.66 Helfrich’s reasons are unclear, but the Dutch were still trying to avoid antagonizing Japan. For their part, the Americans remained unsure about Dutch intentions regarding Japan. The United States did not want to provide highly classified information that might reach Tokyo should the East Indies elect to enter the Japanese sphere of influence.

Reading the Mail As early as March 1940 H.C. Walsh, the British ConsulGeneral in Batavia, received reports from Indonesian informants that Germany planned to invade Holland.67 At the same time Japan became more active in her contacts with Indonesian leaders. With the exception of the Ambonese and Menadoese68 few Indonesians were concerned with the occupation of Holland.69 The same informants reported that Indonesian nationalists had secretly passed a resolution calling for independence.70 If that was not achieved then they preferred Dutch rule if given

27

a large measure of autonomy.71 After May 1940, 20 percent of all outgoing mail to Japan— and approximately 10 percent of incoming Japanese mail—was being read by Dutch Intelligence.72 These letters showed no major shift in Japanese attitudes toward the East Indies. They did indicate that Japan believed there to be—real or perceived— strong anti–Japanese feelings on the part of the Dutch. At the same time there was widespread satisfaction for the German invasion of Holland with virtually no sympathy for the Dutch.73 These intercepts suggested that Japanese planning for an invasion of the East Indies was already underway. Many expatriates believed such an attack would soon take place and that they would be sacrificed. Others believed that it was a good time for Japan to seize the East Indies from the Dutch and fulfill her destiny.74 After May 1940 many of the expats wanted to return home but were ordered by their Consulate to remain in the East Indies and maintain good relations with the Dutch. This led Dutch officials to suspect the possibility of 5th Column activities by civilians.75 Through their deciphered intercepts, the Dutch had determined that the Japanese would make no serious threat toward the East Indies as long as the United States Pacific Fleet remained based at Pearl Harbor.76 Still, in late 1941 Dutch Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten concluded from fragmented JN-25 intercepts that a sizeable portion of the Japanese fleet was concentrating at Tankan Bay in the Kurile Islands. He correctly believed that it would shortly set sail with the mission of initiating a Pacific war with a surprise attack. He later wrote: “During the first days of December 1941, our intelligence reports showed Japanese naval concentrations near the Kuriles. Former informations had me already convinced that Japan was about to start a Pacific war, and this would be done with a surprise attack similar to its attack in 1904 at the opening of hostilities against Russia.”77 His suspicions were confirmed on November 25, when Kamer 14 decrypted a JN-25 message from Tokyo ordering the fleet to refuel at a designated rendezvous point eight days after sailing. However, no destination was given. Two days later, Kamer 14 decrypted another message ordering the fleet to sail.78 Although the Dutch, British and Americans now had clear confirmation that the Japanese fleet was on the move, they still had no destination. Dutch codebreakers also intercepted a signal from Tokyo to Japanese embassies abroad that referenced the phrase “Nishi No Kaze, Hare.” This was one of three pre-determined code signals, known as the “Winds Messages,” that would indicate war in the event diplomatic relations with various nations broke down.79 Based on earlier intercepts this cable indicated that an attack on Dutch territory in the Far East was imminent, and that military action against the United States was very likely. Then on November 29, Dutch codebreakers intercepted the following signal from the Japanese Consul-General in Batavia:

28

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Batavia—All Consulates Very Secret Government Circular No. 2431 Very Urgent Request by Dec 1 report via telegram: nationality, name, port of arrival or departure, date of arrival or departure, destination, etc., of all foreign merchant vessels and warships, that are present in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.80

This signal was interpreted as a final request for information prior to opening hostilities. The following day Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered his warships out to sea. He did not want them bottled up and destroyed in port as was the Russian fleet at Port Arthur at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.81 An even more direct indication of an impending attack was a signal from Tokyo to its embassies in key hotspots: From: Tokyo To: Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London Destroy immediately all code machines and burn all codebooks, excluding codebook No. ? (reserved for emergency code) and all related secret documents. The Batavia-code machine has already reached Tokyo.82

This was followed on December 1 by the IJN changing every one of its codes. This included JN-25 and call signs for ships and naval bases. As intended, the move completely disrupted Allied efforts to track the movement and location of Japanese warships throughout the Pacific. Although American codebreakers were able to re-identify 200 of the most important call signs within two days, it was yet another indicator of a pending attack. War was now inevitable. Based on this report the KNIL was ordered to fully mobilize and it would be at full strength within hours. The KM had already called up its conscripts and reserves and was at full strength. Ter Poorten believed the fleet in the Kuriles was headed south for Dutch territory, and sent the entire message with his opinions to the Dutch naval attaches in Washington and Singapore. After reading all parts to the message, the man in Washington concluded that the fleet was sailing east with the intention of attacking the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. He promptly notified OP-20-G (the American codebreaking section), but despite his repeated attempts to follow up, heard nothing more from the Americans. Ter Poorten also called on Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott R. Thorpe, USA who had been posted to Java in the summer of 1941 as the United States’ military observer and lend-lease program administrator. In his memoirs, Thorpe writes about a visit ter Poorten’s made to his office in Bandoeng in early December: Very early in December about two o’clock one afternoon, General Ter Poorten, commander in chief of the Dutch army, came to my office in a building adjacent to the DVO.83 This was most unusual, for it was customary that when the army chief wanted to talk with any of the foreign attachés he would send a request that they come to his office. Ter Poorten, whose wife had been captured by the Germans in Holland, lived alone and I was without my family, so we saw a good deal of each other at the club where we frequently ate or other such places. But during duty hours protocol was carefully observed.

As the general came into my office, after greeting me, he turned to my secretary and asked her to leave the room. When she had gone he locked the door, sat down, and said to me, “I have something here I believe of great interest to your government.” He then unfolded a paper he was carrying and handed it to me. It was an intercept of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok who was to direct the military action in that area. The intercepted dispatch was a lengthy one and told of the upcoming attacks on Hawaii, the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand. As these attacks were to take place simultaneously it would be necessary to have all fleets in the proper positions when the attack signal was given. Weather at sea could not be completely predicted so it would be necessary to give the “go” signal from Tokyo. This would be given in the form of a weather broadcast over Radio Tokyo that would reach all involved in the vast effort at the same time. Hence this became known as the “Winds” message in the discussions that have followed the Pearl Harbor disaster. The go signal for attack on the United States was “East Wind, Rain.”84

Thorpe immediately left Bandoeng for Batavia to inform Consul General Foot and Commander Paul Slawson, senior USN attaché on Java. The afternoon flight to Batavia had already left but he caught the 3pm train and arrived around 6:30 that evening. Although it was after hours and the consulate had already closed for the day he easily contacted both officials at the Hotel des Indies where they resided. Thorpe’s memoirs don’t record his emotions, but he was surely dismayed when Foote promptly “belittled” the importance of the document and entire matter in general while questioning the Colonel’s urgency. However, Slawson agreed with Thorpe and assisted him in forwarding the intercepted document to the War Department via the naval communications center in Washington, D.C.85 By midnight, the two officers had translated the document into code and sent it to Washington via cable where its receipt was acknowledged. The following morning Thorpe again met with Dr. Foote before returning to Bandoeng where the Counsel General’s scandalous inaction continued as Thorpe again details in his memoirs” The next morning after I had displaced the intercepted Jap message, I called on the consul general before returning to my station in Bandung. We talked over the matter of the dispatch I had sent and he volunteered to show me a message he had sent the State Department that morning. In it he had told the State Department I had shown him my information the previous evening and that he viewed it as being of uncertain origin and little value and added in effect that I was a new boy at school and when I was older I’d be wiser. As the days went by the Dutch cryptanalysts came up with more intercepts bearing out the first one given me. I continued to read these revealing messages and watched the picture develop, but sent no more to our War Department as ordered.86

Foote’s cable to his superiors at the State Department all but discredited Thorpe and the information passed along by Lieutenant-General ter Poorten: FROM: Batavia Dated December 4, 1941 Received 9:19am This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated

3. Spies, Lies and Secret Ties to anyone. (SC) Secretary of State, Washington. December 4, 10am War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo: When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports; one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers. Same re following Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia: When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies. Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936. HSM FOOTE87

Doctor Foote was clearly alluding to the multiple invasion scares which had periodically gripped the East Indies. In particular, there had been several false alerts since the Germans invaded Holland 18 months earlier. Perhaps his cavalier attitude might have been justified a year earlier. But the geopolitical landscape of the entire Far East had completely changed in recent months. Japan’s civilian government had collapsed. The country was now controlled by the military; there was little resistance to its plans to wage all-out war in the South Pacific. Efforts to secure Dutch oil and raw materials for their war in China had failed. Faced with the possibility of being economically strangled into submission, the Japanese grew increasingly desperate.

29

And finally, no one could miss the troops and warships massing in French Indochina. For an experienced overseas diplomat such as Foote to so casually dismiss the Japanese threat in light of these developments borders on professional incompetence.88

The Final Days of Peace In the meantime, the Japanese strike force, which included six heavy fleet carriers, was indeed headed for Pearl Harbor. After leaving Tankan Bay, it assumed complete radio silence and took a little traveled route across the Arctic region of the Pacific Ocean with orders to sink any ship it encountered en route to the Hawaiian Islands. Allied codebreaker units now had no idea where it was and could only guess at its destination. The final days of peace were now swiftly running out. On December 1, Consul General Ishizawa advised Tokyo that he was converting all his monetary funds into readily available cash, and that all secret documents had been destroyed. The next day, he wired: All copies of wires dispatched or received by this office up to and including the first of this month (including radio transmissions), have been burned. Henceforth, at the end of each day we will burn all copies of wires received or despatched by this office during that day. Furthermore, please be advised that we will send you an itemized list of everything destroyed, either by a Japanese vessel of [sic] by the next courier plane reaching Batavia.

However, no more courier planes or vessels reached Java before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the entire Japanese diplomatic staff was immediately detained when the Netherlands East Indies declared war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Chapter 4

On the Edge of Darkness Life in the East Indies

furnished homes with chauffeured cars. They often employed large staffs of maids, cooks and yard help. In 1929, annual per capita income for an Indonesian was ƒ78; for Europeans it was ƒ4,017.9 Despite a fair amount of unease, the period following the German invasion of Poland and their occupation of Holland was rather prosperous for the East Indies. Dutch exporters of kapok, sugar and tea, among others, experienced a near instant boom in business with Europe. This also drove an increase in the need for shipping. The flipside of this prosperity was increased shipping and insurance costs. Despite losing virtually all of their European rubber markets by 1940, increased orders from the United States more than made up the shortfall as that country built up its own war production capabilities.10 The buildup to war came at a price, both literally and figuratively. Defense spending in 1939 represented 28 percent of the Netherlands East Indies annual budget. By 1941 it was 63 percent.11 During this period yearly defense expenditures rose from ƒ142,000,000 to ƒ537,000,000 million.12 As a result of this huge influx of spending the colony, particularly Java, experienced rapid inflation. In 1941 alone the cost of living rose every month. By the outbreak of war in December inflation had risen 25 percent to 33 percent for a Dutch family of four living in Batavia.13 For Dutch military forces, much like their American, British and French counterparts, prewar life in the East Indies was idyllic and seemingly timeless. Throughout the 1930s enlisted ranks were generally considered “low brow”; soldiers and sailors were often unwelcome in respectable establishments outside the seedy dives, tattoo parlors and brothels that often surround military bases. Even for officers, long-term military service could be regarded as a dead-end career. For many it was seen as a way to jump-start one’s career in business or politics. This all changed after May 1940. Service in the military, once viewed with some disdain by the general populace, was now regarded as grandly patriotic and dashing. Dutch reservists of all ages and branches were called into service. There they drilled, trained and paraded in preparation for a Japanese invasion that all knew was coming at some point. No longer social outcasts, they were warmly welcomed into bars, restaurants and clubs where their crisp uniforms, added a buzz of excitement.

The Cold War with Japan did much to strengthen Dutch resolve. This was largely achieved through smoke and mirrors. Government newsreels, newspaper op-eds1 and impressive military parades—most little more than propaganda—heavily promoted the strength of the Dutch military.2 As a result, the typical Dutch colonial believed their defenses to be much stronger than reality allowed. And of course, racism regarding the supposed shortcomings of Japanese physical and military capabilities ran rampant. No one expected them to be so well prepared. The population of Soerabaja was around 300,000; it was a cosmopolitan city with impressive art deco government buildings, electric street trams, fashionable “European” shopping districts, quaint sidewalk cafes, restaurants, theaters, museums, parks, night clubs, swimming pools and a zoo. Despite the threat of war, the Dutch continued to live their lives as normally as possible. Life simply went on; they went to work, raised their families and socialized with friends3: Refusing to be worried by the ever worsening news, we welcome every excuse for going out to movies, parties or just some dancing. To the stirring beat of drums, percussion and bass we dance, lost to the world. Suddenly the sirens howl, waiters run to draw the curtains for another snap black-out practice in war-prepared Surabaya. Tactfully, the band leader switches to national songs and everybody is singing away about Holland’s Flag, about Piet Hein who took the Spanish Silver Fleet and about the Girl By the Mill. People singing perhaps louder, smiling perhaps more than ever before.4

Amidst this façade of bravado, Batavia, Soerabaja and other major population centers on Java assumed a distinct war look and feel. Civilian bomb shelters were erected, while pillboxes and other prepared positions appeared at strategic points. With the German invasion of Holland still fresh in mind, the Dutch also drove piles of 6-inch bamboo stakes into the canals to prevent Japanese seaplanes from making surprise landings near key buildings and other points.5 Life in the East Indies was an idyllic tropical paradise for the typical Dutch expatriate.6 Not unlike other colonies of the era, they lived comfortably at the expense of those Indonesians whom they had subjected.7 Many “Tuans”8—particularly those in positions of authority (plantation managers, white-collar executives, government officials)—lived in well-

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4. On the Edge of Darkness

31

American prewar planning centered on the Philippines and did not include the British or Dutch. American and Filipino forces would hold out until the United States Pacific Fleet defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy in a decisive Jutland-style battle naval in the mid– Pacific Ocean. Then a huge convoy of warships and transports loaded with reinforcements would steam into Manila Bay and drive back the Japanese for good. Long-term plans the Dutch held for defending the East Indies hinged entirely on receiving support from the Americans or British. They would hold strategic points—mostly oil centers— long enough to destroy the facilities. The garrisons would then retire into the Crewmen prepare fresh meat on the deck of K-XIV or K-XV (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). jungle and conduct guerrilla warfare. The main battles would be fought in the Java Sea and on Java itself. The idea was to hold out until The Malay Barrier American or British reinforcements arrived. At no time did the Prior to 1940–41 the “Malay Barrier” as a physical locaDutch realistically believe that they alone could ultimately detion could not be found on any map. Nor did it exist in confeat a Japanese invasion force. temporary military terminology. First widespread use of the Singapore was the linchpin of British defenses in Southphrase was during Allied planning talks in 1941. It generally reeast Asia and all prewar planning was conducted to that end. ferred to the long string of islands that formed the southern Even so, the British recognized the strategic importance of the edge of Western colonial territories in the Southwest Pacific. East Indies in the retention of Singapore and Malaysia. But they The Malay Barrier initially included the Malay Peninsula, still remained wary of giving the Dutch a firm commitment of Sumatra, Java and Lesser Soenda Islands. However, it can insupport. Throughout much of the 1920 and 1930s the East Include other territories such as Borneo, Celebes and Netherlands dies government showed little resolve to build a military capable New Guinea. of defending the archipelago against an external threat. As early The British saw this theoretical line as a way to deflect a as 1936, the British Committee for Imperial Defense secretly Japanese attack away from Malaysia. Their interest in the Malay concluded: Barrier extended only as far as the defense of Singapore, which We are of the opinion that the integrity of the Dutch East Indies is vital to our security in the Far East and the occupation of the Dutch they considered the linchpin of Allied defenses in the region. islands near Singapore by a hostile Power would be a most serious After the attack on Pearl Harbor the United States saw it as a event. We do not, however, recommend that a guarantee of military base from which to support the defense of the Philippines. Only support under all circumstances should be offered to the Dutch. the Australians were firmly dedicated to defending the Malay Even if we intended to come to their assistance under all circumBarrier; they considered it both a figurative and literal barrier stances it would be inadvisable to commit ourselves openly to this policy, which would no doubt cause the Dutch to rely on us and against Japanese invasion of Australia. take little or no action to improve their defenses.14 Military considerations aside, the Malay Barrier as a whole contained vast quantities of raw materials. Loss of these terriWith the outbreak of war in Europe Britain became even tories would provide unrestricted access to near limitless more phobic toward giving the Dutch a guarantee of support amounts of petroleum, tin, bauxite, iron ore and rubber, among should the Japanese attack. With their resources stretched to others. Not only would this severely hamper the Allied, it would the limit, the British, more than ever, banked on support from also let Japan achieve its dream of becoming entirely selfthe United States Pacific Fleet. Unfortunately for the British— sufficient. even more so for the Dutch—the United States was unwilling Until 1941 no Allied power had a fully integrated war stratto commit to any binding agreements. Yet, her planners were egy that called for cooperation with any other colonial power hard at work drafting plans for war against Japan. Not until in the Southwest Pacific. British plans were to proactively push very late did these plans include any mention of cooperation into neutral Siam to blunt any Japanese attack before they could with the Dutch. reach Malaya or Singapore. They would then be pushed back The primary war plan for the Pacific area was known as with the anticipated help of American and Dutch naval forces. Rainbow 2, which assumed war would be fought with Britain

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

and France as the main allies. Under this plan the United States would assume Japan had taken Hong Kong and French Indochina’s strategic Cam Ranh Bay, while moving against the East Indies. The United States would then concentrate its maximum war effort in the Western Pacific against Japan alone. It was assumed that Britain and France would be the primary allies in this fight. There was little or no mention of the Dutch forces in any of the five Rainbow War Plans developed just prior to World War II. The British, hard pressed in both Europe and North Africa in 1941, pressured the United States vigorously for a firm commitment. They sought strategy meetings and a promise of military assistance in the event of war with Japan. The United States refused each request in light of strong public desire for isolationism. A key point for American refusal was that the USN was understrength and ill-prepared for defending her own territory, much less that of the British or Dutch. The American desire was to play for time and hold Japan at bay for as long as possible while building up her strength at the same time. The United States hoped to keep Japan at the negotiation table for as long as possible in order to prevent war. She definitely did not want to prematurely provoke Japan with direct promises of aid to Britain. Nor did the United States want to prematurely commit itself to a given plan of action in advance. The Dutch were alarmed by the American refusal to send ships to Singapore. British aid to them was entirely contingent on American support. Without it, the British would not even open defense talks with the Dutch. With this knowledge firmly in mind, the Dutch began making plans to go it alone, help or no help from Britain or the United States. However, the position changed entirely in October 1940 when the Japanese moved into Southern Indochina. The Roosevelt Administration issued a statement declaring that it would not idly stand by and allow Japan to seize the East Indies or Singapore. With this, the United States announced itself willing to open talks with the British and Dutch concerning mutual defense treaties. Despite Roosevelt’s firm stance, the rest of the American government was far less resolved, as were the American people. Nonetheless, a continued American presence in the Far East—however muted—greatly reassured many potential foreign allies. This was manifested in February 1941 as the United States government quietly prepared to evacuate non-essential citizens from the Philippines and foreign colonies. The State Department requested that its Consulates gauge local response to the potential withdrawal of U.S. citizens. In Java, Consul General Foote responded with the following: The sudden withdrawal of Americans would be met with regret by this Government and would be viewed with mild contempt by the local population. The only other local reaction would be a slight increase in uneasiness or fear of invasion. The presence of Americans has had a calming effect up to the present time.15

Foote also stated that the withdrawal of American citizens would see an uncertain response by the Japanese. On one hand,

they might see it as a sign that the United States was unwilling to commit should it move against the Dutch. However, the action could also be interpreted as “clearing the deck” for war. Either way, Foote recommended that the evacuation of American citizens take place immediately.16

The Obstinate Dutchman The need to cooperate with both the United States and Great Britain was obvious. That said, it was not the most politically advantageous course of action for the East Indies Government in 1940–41.17 A guarantee of military support from either the Americans or British still eluded the Dutch. Indeed, both remained coy on the subject right up to the last month of peace in December 1941. Until such a show of support was ironclad, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer elected to follow a course of action that would least antagonize the Japanese. Even so, Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer remained cool to an alliance with his Pacific allies. Despite the sincere promises of America and Britain he doubted the effectiveness of their joint defense plans.18 On another level, the Governor General also maintained a “strongly legalistic concept of Dutch independence and aloofness.”19 This policy was a bedrock of Netherlands foreign policy and helped it remain neutral for 125 years. This approach quickly changed out of necessity when the Netherlands Government in Exile reached London in May 1940. However, it still resonated strongly with Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. Despite the critical weakness of Dutch forces, he allowed this outdated mindset to dictate planning in the East Indies throughout 1940. It meant no military missions, liaison arrangements or joint training operations could take place between American, Commonwealth or Dutch forces. However, the Netherlands Government in Exile now favored close cooperation with both London and Washington, D.C., regardless of how it appeared to the Japanese. The highest civil servant at the Dutch Foreign Office, W.F.L. Count van Bylandt, disagreed with Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. On October 16, 1940, he advised the Dutch Cabinet in London: This status quo only has the effect of doing nothing, which gives Japan a pretext to accuse us of breaking the status quo…. There is no longer any justification for the maintenance of such a delicate neutrality, in order to keep us out of the war. We have to face a coalition war with all its inherent problems.20

His note effectively signaled an end to the Dutch policy of political aloofness in the Far East.21 This position was strongly supported by Dutch arms buyers in America. They correctly feared that lack of cooperation on defense planning would impair their efforts to purchase weapons and equipment.22 This was demonstrated by the Roosevelt Administration cancelling several aircraft contracts during Dutch trade negotiations with the Japanese to demonstrate what would happen if the East Indies caved to Japanese demands. The metropolitan Dutch government traditionally did

4. On the Edge of Darkness not interfere in the political affairs of the Netherlands East Indies, giving Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer a wide measure of latitude. Not unsurprisingly, his reluctant attitude quickly earned him a reputation amongst the British military leadership. There were numerous complaints from Singapore to British and Dutch leaders in London. His stubbornness was somewhat embarrassing to the Netherlands Government in Exile which recognized the need for closer relations with their new British allies. London now felt compelled to “arm twist” Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer on the matter of coalition warfare. In November 1940 he finally gave into pressure from both his own Government and the British Admiralty and sent representatives to Singapore for early joint planning talks. They were to exchange information but make no binding political agreements.23 Consequently, other military missions took place between Java, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines, but civilian clothing had to be worn in order to minimize Japanese sensitivities. Although it may appear that Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was anti–British, this was not the case. The Governor General was highly pragmatic and followed a path he believed would best maintain the independence of the Netherlands East Indies. That said, Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer did not believe Japan would leave the East Indies unmolested. But he could not, and would not, enter into a military alliance with Great Britain that could possibly drag the East Indies into an Anglo-Japanese war without a similar measure of support in return.24 Concerns about the Governor General’s commitment to defending the East Indies were greatly alleviated by the East Indies Government approving hundreds of millions of Guilders for national defense. This, together with his blunt and unambiguous comments regarding the threat of Japan, eventually convinced the Americans and British alike that the Dutch were fully committed to defending their territory. British Air Marshal Sir H.R.M. Brooke-Popham later commented: I consider that reports to the effect that the Governor-General is lukewarm are misleading. He was determined to maintain status quo for the Netherlands East Indies for as long as possible and therefore was opposed to giving Japanese any opening for lodging complaints against the Netherlands East Indies…. I believe he is fully determined to resist aggression should it occur, with all the resources he can utilize…. Governor-General was very frank during his conversation with me and there is much soundness in his argument.25

Prewar Conversations Begin Although the first Anglo American and Anglo Dutch talks got under way in November 1940, there were no serious decisions made. In what would be an ongoing pattern, the British sought the lion’s share of available aid for the purpose of defending Malaya and Singapore. They repeatedly requested that the United States Navy’s Pacific Fleet be transferred to Singapore. On this point, the United States refused to budge as they regarded Singapore as exposed and weakly defended.

33

Despite having the most territory to defend with the least strength the Dutch offered up a good deal of their military strength to help defend British territory. But when it came down to the end, the British refused Dutch requests for the same sacrifices. The Royal Navy consistently refused to deploy the capital ships of their Far Eastern Fleet based at Ceylon to Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. Despite the November strategy talks, the position of the British, Dutch and Americans remained little changed. Because the Roosevelt Administration refused to commit to any planned action in advance, the British and Dutch could not get the United States to confirm at what point it would consider Japan’s actions serious enough to warrant war. This indecision stemmed from the fact that in 1938, the United States had decided that Germany was more dangerous because of its stronger industrial and technological base. This led to a “Europe First” mentality in the event of simultaneous war in the Pacific and Europe. Already in 1940, there was fierce debate in Washington over the importance of the Pacific Rim. In 1941, there was an even stronger backlash over the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii instead of its traditional West Coast bases. Indeed, the order to move the fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor was not popular with senior officers.

The ABC-1 Staff Agreement Between January and March 1941 the United States and Great Britain held a series of secret meetings in Washington, D.C. The purpose of these meetings was to determine the best manner in which the two countries could work together to coordinate their defenses against the Axis forces. It hammered out command arrangements, specific areas of responsibility, military strategy and the level of collaboration between the two countries should the United States enter into war. The primary result of the ABC-1 Staff Agreement was a decision to focus on Nazi Germany. Because of its greater technological capabilities a “Europe First” war policy was adopted. Although unknown at the time, this decision essentially undercut any realistic Allied defense of the Southwest Pacific. It also all but doomed Dutch chances of receiving any substantial military aid on which they counted to hold the East Indies. Three other provisions included: 1. The United States would deploy the bulk of its military strength to the European theater as part of the “Europe First” strategy. 2. The United States agreed to bolster its naval strength in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, allowing the British to reinforce their Far Eastern Fleet.26 3. American forces would remain on the defensive in the Pacific. However, they would carry out several offensive operations in that theater to keep the Japanese engaged.

Another key decision was an agreement to coordinate the Anglo-British war effort through a joint command known as the “Supreme War Council.” Based in Washington, D.C., this group was later renamed the “Combined Chiefs of Staff.” Although serious differences remained over the importance of Malaya and Singapore consensus on the ABC-1 Staff Agree-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

ment was reached on March 27, 1941. Even then, the United States did not commit to entering the war. The ABC-1 Staff Agreement for the most part, outlined the basic American strategy for World War II, although Pacific operations were larger than anticipated. No other nations in the Pacific Rim were consulted. Due to their Dominion status Britain spoke on behalf of Australia and New Zealand. Not unsurprisingly, the Dutch felt left of the loop on prewar planning, despite their vast swath of territory. Although it created some hard feelings at a high level, cooperation, particularly with the British, remained strong. Their common colonial backgrounds made the two states natural allies. “For most Dutch Authorities Great Britain was a European neighbor, while the United States remained a distant and different country.”27 Dutch cooperation with the ABC-1 Staff Agreement was ensured with the following key points: 1. There would be Allied cooperation and common strategic planning. 2. Each country was responsible for the defense of its own territory. 3. The British Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Fleet, was responsible for the strategic leadership of the sea forces of the three powers (with the exception of those American naval forces defending the Philippines).

What was promised to the Dutch and what really transpired was completely different. Due to their weak military and diplomatic position, the Dutch were eager to be team players in a coordinated Allied effort to defend against Japanese aggression. This set them up to be used by the British. Dutch naval strength suffered grievous losses trying to further the British cause in Malaya. As for the key points which initially ensured Dutch cooperation, the following points detail what actually happened: 1. There was virtually no Allied cooperation, nor was there any strategic planning. Not until the ABDA command was activated on January 10, 1942, a full month after the outbreak of war was there even a single supreme Allied command. Even then, the British, who also headed ABDA, waited until very late in the campaign to release their ships from convoy duty in the Indian Ocean to fight. 2. Although each country was supposed to be responsible for the defense of its own territory, the British, at the outbreak of war, promptly moved a Dutch cruiser and two destroyers to help escort convoys to Malaya. From India and Ceylon the British moved in almost nothing for the naval defense of Malaya. On the other hand, when the United States Asiatic Fleet abandoned its Philippine bases, it did move into the East Indies and made its final stand there. 3. Even though the British Commander-in-Chief Far Eastern Fleet theoretically had control over all British, Dutch and American ships, he in reality, controlled only his own and those of the Dutch forces. For the most part, Dutch ships were often poorly deployed on convoy duty under British operational control. For much of the campaign, the Asiatic Fleet operated under its own command with little or no direction from its British commander.

The British-Dutch Conversations With the guidelines of the ABC-1 Staff Agreement in place, the British and Dutch initiated a series of strategy talks known as the BD (British-Dutch) Conversations. These talks assumed the United States would remain neutral and laid the permanent groundwork for the future Anglo-Dutch defense of

their colonial empires throughout East Asia. These plans primarily determined the naval and air deployment to be utilized if war broke out with Japan. According to the terms of the BD talks, it was agreed to that the primary goal in the event of war was to hold Singapore and Malaya. Other Allied points throughout the East Indies would be defended as necessary. All efforts—including those of Australian and New Zealand—were to be expended to defend these areas. Commanders were to have control of their own forces in local areas while carrying out the directives of the British Royal Navy (RN) Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Fleet. Specifics of the BD Conversations regarding naval deployment stated that in the event of war with Japan, the Dutch light cruiser Java and two destroyers would resort to British operational control for the purpose of escorting supply convoys to Singapore. In addition, the Royal Navy would have strategic control over two additional Dutch light cruisers, four destroyers and six submarines. Using the term “Strategic Control,” Dutch ships would operate under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Fleet. They would be used to defend Malaya and the East Indies. “Operational Control” meant that they would receive their orders directly from the KM according to strategic goals set by the RN. However, it was up to the Dutch on how to achieve them. Only major fighting ships were affected by these agreements. There were restrictions on letting the British have the latter ships. The Dutch insisted that they would be released only if no immediate attack on the East Indies was expected. Nor could they leave Dutch waters for any other reason. As it turned out, the RN never got the ships, which almost surely would have been wasted on convoy duty between the Indian Ocean and Singapore.

American-British-Dutch Talks About the same the BD Talks took place, another series of strategy meetings known as the American-British-Dutch (ABD) Talks were organized. These talks assumed the United States was no longer neutral and support from its powerful Pacific Fleet was guaranteed. There would be a joint defense of the Southeast Pacific by all three powers. The only main difference from the BD talks was that the Philippines were included in the area’s defenses. The KM remained in a subordinate role. The Dutch and British initially hoped that the Japanese would not advance farther than the northern areas of the NEI before they captured the Philippines. The premature capture of Dutch territory would cut key communications and supply routes between Malaysia, the NEI and the Philippines. All three Allied powers considered a direct Japanese attack on Malaya and Singapore to be extremely risky before the Philippines had been secured. At the same time they figured the capture of British Borneo would greatly simplify the capture

4. On the Edge of Darkness of the Philippines because of the airfields and support bases it would deliver. For the same reasons, Singapore lay exposed if the Japanese took British Borneo. Allied plans were divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 began with the outbreak of war and would initiate the movement of a Royal Navy task force to the Far East. These units had the responsibility of escorting convoys and keeping lines of communication open. The Pacific Fleet would deploy from Pearl Harbor to maintain and protect sea lanes between the United States and Asia. At the same time, the submarines, naval aircraft and small warships of the United States Asiatic Fleet were to remain in the Philippines and support the campaign there. The surface units and auxiliaries of the Asiatic Fleet were to retire to Singapore and operate under the strategic command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far Eastern Fleet. After engaging in a local defense of the Philippines for as long as possible, the submarines would retire to Soerabaja to continue operations. Under the agreements of the BD talks, each country was assigned a prearranged sphere of influence where its ships and aircraft would operate. Those Dutch ships not deployed to Singapore were responsible for defending the East Indies Archipelago and keeping its sea lanes open for Allied traffic. Phase 2 would begin with the arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore 70 to 90 days after its dispatch. The Allies would then counterattack to regain any territory lost in the initial Japanese drive. Unfortunately, the bulk of the British fleet (excluding the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse) did not arrive until after Singapore fell; instead, it played a passive role in the Indian Ocean. Defense plans were classified as Operational Plans A-D: A. There was no prior knowledge of where the initial Japanese attack would fall. All available Allied forces would be directed to the area to resist it. B. The initial Japanese attack fell on Malaya. All naval action would be concentrated in the South China Sea. Dutch submarines would be deployed against Japanese shipping to hinder the landings. C. The initial Japanese attack fell on the Philippines. The Asiatic Fleet would retire to Singapore or Soerabaja at a point when its commander thought it appropriate to do so. Its submarines would carry out offensive operations from Singapore or Soerabaja. D. The initial Japanese attack fell on the East coast of Borneo or some other part of the East Indies (as long as attack came through the Moluccas Islands) archipelago. The Asiatic Fleet would retire to Soerabaja and operate from there as an offensive striking force (the Asiatic Fleet did retire to Soerabaja, but it showed very little inclination to strike offensively on its own.) There was no command structure set up to take care of this eventuality.

The Americans Commit In the final six month of peace the Dutch began taking a firmer stance with the Japanese. Buoyed by their defense talks with the Americans and British, the Dutch took a more direct approach with the Japanese. Japanese merchant, fishing and pearling vessels still prowled all corners of the East Indies. The

35

Dutch now asked Japan to provide information on their whereabouts and movements so to avoid “misunderstandings and incidents.”28 It was a marked shift from their earlier cautious attitude. Between August 2 and 15, 1941, a United States Army Air Corps mission under the command of Brigadier-General H.B. Clagett visited Java while on a fact finding mission to Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Clagett’s team visited a number of airfields and consulted with various Dutch air force officers. Upon his return to Manila Clagett wrote a highly favorable report on Dutch fighting capabilities.29 The biggest thaw in American concerns came in September 1941 when a personal friend of President Roosevelt visited Java.30 He toured Soerabaja, the KNIL air base at Andir, weapons plants and the Dutch General Headquarters at Bandoeng. On September 12 he sent a report to the State Department: Accomplishment of much of this development [of the wharves, repair facilities and drydocks at Surabaya] has occurred in the past year, and the present efficiency and the prospects for increased efficiency and expansion impressed me very much. In all bases are not only facilities for repair and maintenance, but a considerable degree of manufacturing airplane parts, munitions containers, etc. They are even producing certain precision instruments. Training of native labor for skilled work is carried on successfully. The Dutch will maintain in excellent condition whatever we can find to let them have of the supplies, machines and planes they need and in case of need their facilities for serving airplanes and naval units (even large cruisers) will be available for the British and for ourselves. To find in this part of the world such present and prospective facilities … is most encouraging. Excellent morale has been noted among all I have met. It has not come to my attention if any appeasement sentiment exists in the Netherlands Indies.31

These two reports effectively negated any concerns Washington had about the willingness of the Dutch to keep the East Indies out of Japanese hands. Although the Dutch still found it difficult to buy large quantities of modern weapons, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer received a series of informal assurances from the Americans. These were soon followed by similar assurances from the British. Internally, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill went further in a private note sent to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden: A Japanese attack on Dutch possessions may be made at any time. This would be a direct affront to the United States following upon their negotiations with Japan. We should tell the Dutch that we should do nothing to prevent the full impact of this Japanese aggression presenting itself to the United States as a direct issue between them and Japan. If the United States declares war on Japan, we follow within the hour. If after a reasonable interval, the United States is found to be incapable of taking any decisive action, even with our immediate support, we will nevertheless, although alone, make common cause with the Dutch.32

The British Commit Two days before Pearl Harbor, the Dutch still faced the possibility of fending off a Japanese invasion completely alone. It was not until December 5, 1941, that Britain finally gave a firm commitment of support. This support of course, was de-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

pendent on the United States becoming involved as well. Nonetheless, the Dutch Minister in London was greatly relieved to receive the following note: In my note of 5th September, I explained to Your Excellency the attitude of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom toward an attack on the Netherlands East Indies. The note stated that His Majesty’s Government considered themselves to have already assumed the duty to safeguarding and restoring the possessions and rights of the Netherlands to the best of their ability during the war and at peace. It followed therefore, that an attack upon the Netherlands East Indies would leave them to do the utmost in their power to this end, though His Majesty’s Government must remain the sole judge of what action or military measures on their part where practicable and likely to achieve the common cause. His Majesty’s Government have again reviewed the position in the light of recent developments and they feel that is of urgent importance to provide the firmest basis for effective cooperation in meeting the present Japanese threat. They are according for their part, prepared to enter at once into a mutual understanding with the Netherlands Government whereby each party will undertake to cooperate immediately with the other to the fullest extent of its available resources in the event of the other party being forced to take military action to repel an attack on any of its territories in the Far East. His Majesty’s Government have reason to believe that their views are shared by His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand, and if the Netherlands Government are prepared to enter into such an understanding, His Majesty’s Government will at once suggest to the Governments of the two Dominions that they should also participate.

Reluctant Allies Despite the British pledge however, the Commonwealth naval leadership from Australia and New Zealand refused to play ball. In their view the Dutch were not fully committed to the defense of Singapore, which was the region’s first line of defense. If Malaya fell, they would need these naval units to provide for their own defense. Not until late in the campaign did the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) finally relent and send naval units north of the Malay Barrier. Although the Australians refused to commit naval units to the East Indies, they were more forthcoming with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). In response to a Dutch request, 2 Squadron flew into Timor’s Penfoi Airfield for reconnaissance duties on December 6. At the same time, 13 Squadron dispatched ground crews to the islands of Ambon and Namlea. The next day six Hudson bombers arrived at Laha Airstrip on Ambon. Three days later, bombers arrived at Namlea. As Dutch air power in the region was nonexistent, they briefly operated from the primitive airstrip at Babo, New Guinea. For their part, the Americans questioned British deployment of major surface units as convoy escorts. This hampered their ability to strike quickly if the opportunity arose. While the heart of Allied plans centered on offensive action, the deployment of major warships to convoy duty indicated a defensive strategy on the part of the British. Yet, the RN refused to release major surface units for offensive actions until after the fall of Malaya and Singapore in mid February.

On the Edge of Darkness On November 28, 1941, Prime Minister P.S. Gerbrandy, head of the Netherlands Government in Exile in London, signaled Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer to dispatch two Dutch submarines to Singapore to operate under British Operational Control.33 The Governor General pushed back. Two days later he replied that the submarines should not be transferred as they would almost certainly be subjected to “unacceptable hazards” while under Royal Navy control. In short, he did not trust the British to effectively safeguard Dutch military assets. The matter had already been debated and approved in London, apparently with little or no input from Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. It was a political decision and Gerbrandy responded that the need for “unity of command was strategically imperative” at Singapore and overruled his concerns. On December 1 the 1st Submarine Division was placed at the disposal of British forces in Singapore and the boats began moving north to their new base.34 On November 29 Vice-Admiral Helfrich received a special liaison officer from Admiral Thomas C. Hart. Hart commanded the United States Asiatic Fleet based at Subic Bay, approximately 60 miles north of Manila. He requested that several USN warships be allowed to refuel at the port of Tarakan. They were already deploying outside Philippine waters in anticipation of a Japanese attack. Plan C of the ABD talks was in effect and all American ships had orders to stay at sea until further notice. With Helfrich’s approval, the light cruiser Marblehead and a screen of four destroyers put into Tarakan later that day. The following day the destroyer tender Black Hawk and four more destroyers put into Balikpapan with several small auxiliaries bound for Dutch ports. The heavy cruiser Houston was expected to follow soon after. They were ordered to fuel and depart immediately, for Helfrich had warned of the strong possibility of a surprise Japanese attack on the island. The destroyers with the tender Black Hawk were only under the guise of operating in that area. Their real intention was to refuel at Tarakan and then head west for Singapore. From there, they would operate with the British Far Eastern Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Three British destroyers at Hong Kong were to also move to Singapore to work in the same capacity. On December 1 Vice-Admiral Helfrich flashed urgent messages to all his ships at sea and in port—the situation in the Pacific was critical and they were to immediately prepare for action under wartime conditions. All ships in overhaul were to break it off as soon as possible and get ready for sea; those at sea were to return home or move to new positions. It was no drill; the time for training was over. Vice-Admiral Helfrich also began deploying his submarines. In accordance with Prime Minister Gerbrandy’s directive he ordered the 1st Submarine Division (O-16 and KXVII; K-XVIII lay in overhaul at Soerabaja and was not ready

4. On the Edge of Darkness

37

she mined the harbor and laid a boom in the channel until the Japanese invasion on January 10. Willem van der Zaan was on patrol in the Riouw Archipelago when she received orders to mine the Singapore approaches and patrol the area. Soemenep returned to the ME on December 2 and mined the Eastwater Channel to Soerabaja. By the outbreak of war, she was at Palembang mining the river approaches and laying booms in the channels. Gouden Leeuw left Soerabaja at the same time. She had the task of mining Bill Bay and the waters around Ambon, which was a key air and seaplane base for Dutch, Australian, and American planes. At Soerabaja Gouden Leeuw, Krakatau and 2½ divisions of small coastal minesweepers worked to complete mining operations off the Target practice with the 88mm deck gun aboard K-XIV or K-XV (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). coast of Java. At Tandjoeng Priok, Rigel and 1½ divisions of the small coastal for immediate action) into the South China Sea to operate off minelayers worked on the same task on the east end of the isthe coast of Malaya. Specifically, they were to operate at a point land. bearing 5–00 N / 104–30 E in the entrance of the Gulf of Siam. Dispersion of the large warships was disjointed and scatBoth were lost by Christmas. tered. Operating alone or in pairs, many Dutch surface ships The 2nd Submarine Division (K-XI, K-XII, K-XIII) rewere on the lookout for Japanese forces attempting a surprise ceived orders to break off their six-month overhaul and make attack on Java or Sumatra from the Indian Ocean. Had the KM for the Karimata Strait. When war broke out, it was ordered to encountered a Japanese force at sea in early December the Singapore where the boats operated under British operational Dutch would likely have lost a great deal of their naval strength. control. The division operated off the Natoena Islands in the The light cruiser Java was also undergoing her six-month Gulf of Siam and off the West coast of Malaya. It would harry overhaul when Helfrich ordered her out to sea. By December the initial Japanese convoys heading for Malaya. K-XIII limped 8 she was in the Karimata Strait on her way to Singapore for home to Soerabaja with serious engine damage before Christconvoy duty. De Ruyter and Witte de With were ordered into mas. the Eastern Java Sea to patrol between the Alas Strait (between The 3rd Submarine Division (K-XIV, K-XV, K-XVI) made Lombok and Soembawa) and the Postillion Islands. for the Makassar Strait to operate off Tarakan. It was later orAt the same time, the destroyer Kortenaer patrolled off dered into the Gaspar Straits via Soerabaja with the outbreak the month of the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok Isof war. K-XVI was dead by the end of the first week of hostililand. The destroyers Banckert and Piet Hein also were in the ties. area, the former in the Sape Strait and the latter off Timor. DeThe 4th Submarine Division (O-19 and O-20) was orstroyers Van Nes and Evertsen patrolled the Soenda Strait; atdered to patrol off the Postillion Islands in the Eastern Java Sea. tached to the Royal Navy, they later escorted British convoys There they joined the light cruiser De Ruyter, destroyers Korthrough the passage to Singapore from the Indian Ocean. tenaer and Witte de With and fleet supply ship Zuiderkruis. The light cruiser Tromp was en route to Sydney, Australia, On December 8 the submarines made for Singapore where they when she was recalled on December 1. She returned home at came under British Operational Control. The British posifull speed where she patrolled the Madoera Strait from Decemtioned them in the South China Sea. ber 12. Vice-Admiral Helfrich also ordered out all minelayers and Vice-Admiral Helfrich also ordered ships in material reminesweepers not already on station. The program to mine serve to be readied for immediate sea duty. This was no small Java’s harbors was also intensified with several divisions of the task for yard workers at the Soerabaja naval base, as budgetary ships operating in the ME and off Batavia. Previously prepared and manpower problems had left many of these ships in harbor plans to lay secret minefields throughout the Indies also went for long periods in most cases. Problems with the submarines into effect. were massive. The minelayer Prins van Oranje went to Tarakan where Although extensive overhaul on K-VII began December

38

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Ghent was lost in mid February these men were rescued and transferred back to Witte de With in time for the Battle of the Java Sea, where they were again sunk. On December 1, Vice-Admiral Helfrich received reports of Japanese warships massing off the coast of British Borneo. He immediately ordered a reconnaissance sweep of the area by dawn of the following morning. This was conducted but revealed no Japanese ships in the area. All the Dutch could do now was to wait. They did not have to wait much longer, for the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor a week later. In the process, they destroyed the United States Pacific Fleet, upon which, the entire Dutch defense rested. There would be no help for the Dutch now, and they were effectively on their own. The forward guns aboard Kortenaer during target practice (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). But the Dutch kept hope, partly 1, old age defied all attempts to get her seaworthy. Work also because they did not know the full extent of the damage from commenced on K-VIII on the same date, but she was still not the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Also because they knew ready for service by February 18. Her crew then had to come war was coming long before it broke out. Despite having the from the crippled K-XIII, which had just entered overhaul. On weakest military forces in the Pacific (except for the Free French December 8 K-IX entered drydock for extended overhaul (her on New Caledonia) the Dutch had prepared themselves mencrew manned K-XIII in the meantime) that kept her out of actally for the war that was to come. tion until mid February. On February 18 she was still fitting However, nothing could have prepared the Dutch for the out for sea duty with a partially trained crew. losses they were about to endure. They were about to lose their Van Ghent also lay in drydock for her six month overhaul. entire East Indies empire and virtually their entire remaining She did not rejoin the fleet until early January when Witte de naval force and its air arm. But in early December 1941 this was With entered drydock with condenser problems. The latter’s unthinkable. The Dutch stood prepared on the cliff and looked crew transferred to Van Ghent and went back to sea. When Van into a valley clouded with darkness and uncertainty.

Chapter 5

The Fleet Plan of 1940 • 8 destroyers • 22 submarines

The Fleet Plan of 1940 was the KM’s final attempt to build a viable naval defense for the East Indies. It was designed squarely with the threat of Japan in mind. The roots of the Plan went back more than three decades. In 1902 Great Britain and Japan signed a defense treaty, under which, protection of British colonies in Southeast Asia fell largely to the Imperial Japanese Navy. The agreement was viewed with suspicion by the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand.1 For many, it was akin to letting the proverbial fox guard the hen house.2 This treaty remained in effect throughout the Great War. Until the last months of the conflict the only Allied warships in the region were virtually all Japanese. They patrolled as far south as Singapore and into the Indian Ocean at British request. By war’s end, the Dutch in both Batavia and The Hague were thoroughly concerned about Japan’s enhanced status in Southeast Asia. They feared greater Japanese influence in the postwar period would come at their expense.3 These concerns were stoked when the British Consul General in Batavia, W.R.D. Beckett, stated that Britain must eventually recognize Japanese military dominance. He stressed that Holland, although neutral in the First World War, had been too “Pro German” during the conflict. As punishment, he advocated that Great Britain and Japan seize and partition the bulk of the East Indies between them. The Dutch would only be left with the island of Java. However, the British government made it clear that it was not prepared to trade the standoffish and somewhat unfriendly Dutch for a much more powerful and possibly hostile Japanese neighbor. 4 There would be no change in relations with the Dutch and their informational alliance with the East Indies would remain in force. Not surprisingly, Beckett was withdrawn from Batavia in 1917.5 The Dutch were now concerned about Britain’s ability to defend her position in the Far East. Without the powerful Royal Navy to help keep a potential enemy at bay, the Dutch resolved to defend themselves in 1912. This would be done with a large, powerful navy based on Java and capable of defending their vast East Indies colony. Known as the Battleship Plan of 1912, it would have consisted of

This plan did not pass the Dutch Parliament due to budget concerns and the end of the Great War, which was now referred to as “The War to End All Wars.” With peace seemingly at hand there was no need for Holland to have a huge navy. The proposal was killed for good in 1922; the only ships built from this plan were the light cruisers Java and Sumatra.6 It also dawned on the Dutch Government that no fleet which the KM could build would be sufficient to realistically counter that of Japan. Thus, the Battleship Plan of 1912 was replaced by a submarine-first strategy in the 1920s. The program was gradually perfected throughout the 1930’s. At the same time, additional funding and resources for the surface fleet and MLD were authorized to support submarine operations against an invasion fleet against Java. Instead, the Dutch would rely on assistance from Britain and the United States.7 It was believed that the East Indies were so strategically important in terms of oil and other natural resources, that these countries would never let it fall into the hands of an unfriendly power.8 Thus, the KM would delay the enemy advance until outside assistance arrived. A second construction initiative was proposed, consisting of • • • •

18 submarines 2 light cruisers 6 destroyers 98 seaplanes

This proposal was strongly opposed in the Dutch Parliament. In addition, 1.3 million Dutch residents signed a petition against the construction plan. As a result, it failed to pass by a single vote when 10 members of the Catholic Party changed their allegiance in the final vote.9 The defeat of this program, as small as it was, effectively sealed the fate of the East Indies. Although the growth of Nazi Germany and Japanese threat in Asia would finally result in the Fleet Plan of 1940 being approved, there was simply no time to execute it.10,11 As a result, the position of the KM in December 1941 was extremely weak. Although roughly numerically equal to Royal Navy forces based at Singapore, the quality of many of its ships and material were below that of their allied counterparts and the Imperial Japanese Navy; however, personnel training and morale were generally high. But despite these shortcomings,

• 9 battleships • 6 cruisers

39

40

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

the KM covered itself with all the glory any country could ask Despite a top speed of just 21 knots, their 10 × 14-inch of its navy. Once in battle, the Dutch proved themselves couramain guns would have greatly strengthened the East Indies geous and willing to sacrifice. Squadron. But the KM was critically short of manpower and The Fleet Plan of 1940—the main goal of which was to there was a question if the Dutch could form crews to man build up the East Indies Naval Squadron—was totally elimithem. The abstract called for the KM to recruit Chinese engine nated by the German invasion of Holland. This left only those room personnel and Arab deckhands.14 Main armament would have been reduced to a single two-gun turret. The secondary few ships that had been overseas in May 1940 to continue the battery would have been reduced from 16 × 5-inch guns to fight. They were joined by a handful of warships that had been eight. This would reduce the number of crew from 1,250 to able to escape to England. Although not completed, the Fleet about 1,000.15 Plan warrants coverage as its main construction was intended The Governor General, Vice-Admiral Helfrich and cerfor the East Indies where 70 percent of the KM had traditiontain members of the Dutch Government in Exile in London ally been stationed. reviewed the proposal, but there is no indication they seriously Initial funding for the Plan was authorized in the Fiscal considered it.16 It is important to remember that in September Years of 1938–39 and 1939–40; additional funds were also earmarked for 1940–41 and 1941–42. Although the Plan was scheduled for completion by 1942, the financial hardship of such a large buildup was tremendous for a nation with a tax base as small as that of Holland. Therefore, the new construction was merely intended to be a small, but quality fleet that could hold out until reinforced by a larger ally. The pride of this new fleet was to be its nucleus of three 27,950 ton battlecruisers. Armed with 9 × 11 inch and 12 × 4.7 inch guns, these ships were to have a top speed of 34 knots. They were to counterbalance the overwhelming superiority of heavy cruisers possessed by the Japanese. Based on the German Scharnhorst The German battlecruiser Scharnhorst (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). design, these ships would have resembled the American Alaska Class battlecruisers in size, speed and use had they been completed. As it turned out, none were ever laid down before the German invasion. Failure to complete the Battlecruiser phase of the Fleet Plan of 1940 left the East Indies Squadron with a gaping deficiency in firepower. In September 1940 Lieutenant-Commander A.J. Bussemaker and a civilian engineer named H. Egeter presented a plan in the naval publication Sea power.12 They recommended purchasing the battleships New York and Texas from the United States Navy.13 Both had been launched in 1911–14 and it was expected they would be replaced by the new battleships North Carolina and Washington that were The USS Texas circa 1937 (TPWD—Battleship Texas Archives). about to enter service.

5. The Fleet Plan of 1940 1940 Seapower was a progressive and outspoken publication that encouraged innovative, out-of-the-box thinking. Bussemaker was closely connected to its editorial staff; he was likely simply embracing the spirit of the publication rather than seriously believing that the abstract would be seriously considered. The Fleet Plan of 1940 also called for two modern cruisers (De Zeven Provinciën and Eendracht of the Provinciën Class) to replace the aging Sumatra and Java on the East Indies station. These 32 knot ships were to carry 10 six inch main guns and six 21 inch torpedo tubes for a main battery. Fully loaded, they would have displaced 10,800 tons as first designed. Due to the German invasion of Holland though, the two incomplete hulls were scuttled in 1940. They were redesigned after the war and launched in the 1950s. The four destroyers of the Tjerk Hiddes Class were the first of eight ships laid down with the intention of putting more destroyers on the East Indies line. Displacing 2,228 tons with a main armament of 5 × 4.7-inch guns and 8 × 21-inch torpedo tubes, they would have been the equal of any modern Japanese destroyers. However, none of these ships—Gerard Callenburgh, Isaac Sweers, Philips van Almonde or Tjerk Hiddes made it to the East Indies. The German invasion ended all construction and only Isaac Sweers escaped to fight with the Royal Navy. Tjerk Hiddes and Gerard Callenburgh had been launched in October 1939, but were still incomplete. Although the KM planned to tow both ships to England for completion, no tugs were available and they were scuttled as German forces neared the shipyard. Attempts were also made to launch Philips van Almonde so she could be towed to England. These efforts failed and yard personnel blew up her incomplete hull on May 17. Under the Plan, the KM also received funding for nine additional submarines of the O-21 Class. Of these, O-28 and O-29 were never laid down; O-21–O-24 reached England and served with the RN, while the Germans captured the remainder. All were big, modern boats with good armament and speed—both underwater and on the surface. And unlike any other submarines in the world at that time, the new Dutch boats carried snorkels, which allowed them substantially greater mobility under the water. Funding was also authorized for seven small gunboats to replace those of the Brinio Class, which had been launched in 1912. Shortages of labor and materials slowed their construction and all were still on the slip when the Germans invaded Holland. Attempts to destroy them on the stocks failed and three were eventually completed and commissioned into the Kriegsmarine in 1941–42. Twelve 325 ton subchasers/minesweepers were authorized at the beginning of 1940. Orders for six were placed with De Vriesch Lentsch Shipyard in Amsterdam, but only two were completed prior to the invasion. The Kriegsmarine completed the remaining four and commissioned all six boats. Although another order for six additional units was placed with the German shipyard Abeking & Rasmussen in March 1940, this order lapsed for obvious reasons. Although the KM operated a number of converted tankers

41

in the Far East, the Fleet Plan of 1940 allocated funds for its first purpose-built fleet oiler. Simply designated Naval Tanker 1, she was laid down in December 1939. During the invasion, yard personnel proved unable to destroy the incomplete hull and it was left to the Germans still on the slip. They completed the tanker and commissioned her as the Kärnten in October 1941. After the war she was seized in Norway by the Soviet Union and commissioned as the Polyarnik. She eventually served with the Soviet Navy well into the 1980s. The MLD also received substantial funding for additional planes, equipment and material. Both the Fokker and Koolhoven aircraft factories received large orders to help strengthen and rebuild the Naval Air Service. Although the East Indies Squadron would again have been the primary beneficiary of this buildup, very few of these efforts came about in time. There were also pay raises for the crews of the ships and planes as well as large scale recruitment drives by the KM. The goal was to raise fleet manpower from 11,000 men upwards to around 15,000 men. This push came both at home and in the East Indies, where Indonesians made up the bulk of the lower ranks. But by the time the Pacific War broke out the KM still faced a serious personnel shortage. As a result, several ships remained in reserve status due to the lack of trained crews. At the same time, the KM initiated an ambitious naval construction program in the East Indies. Although East Indian shipyards did not have the facilities, material or skilled specialists necessary to build large warships, they could construct smaller vessels. These included minelayers, minesweepers, patrol boats, MTBs, launches, support ships and inter-island steamers up to 2,000 tons. The main naval base at Soerabaja—the Marine Establishment, more typically referred to as the ME—also proved capable of repairing all but the most seriously damaged ships. When the Japanese attacked, the Soerabaja Drydock Company had a number of projects under construction. These included a 2,400 ton floating drydock, six motor torpedo boats and four 65 ton patrol boats. Materials for a 700-ton oceangoing minelayer were also being assembled. Although funding for a 40,000 ton drydock was allocated it was never completed. Construction of the smaller dock was also delayed due to a shortage of steel. Steel from Australia was supplied in 1941 and it was completed just before the outbreak of war. A 4,782 ton merchant ship—the Roggeveen—was also undergoing reconstruction at Soerabaja. Launched in 1915, she had previously served as a civilian merchant vessel until acquired by the KM in late 1941 for conversion into an oceangoing workship. Upon completion she would have been capable of replenishing the fleet and carrying out repairs at sea. None of these ships were completed before the Japanese captured Java. There is debate over what happened to the supplies used to build the MTBs. It is unknown if the Japanese used them to build new boats or completed the partially completed hulls that had been blown up on the slips. In any event, the Japanese commissioned a substantial number of MTBs of Dutch design during the war. Most were lost with the remainder returned to the KM at the end of the war.

42

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942 In response to questions about the current state of the East Indies Squadron, Vice-Admiral Helfrich addressed the People’s Council on August 19, 1941. In a short summary he detailed the KM’s progress since May 1940: The naval forces present in the Netherlands East Indies in May 1940 have since been strengthened by the addition of the following: 1. One cruiser; 2. A number of torpedo motorboats, built in the Netherlands East Indies; 3. One small and one large minelayer, the first by converting a vessel, the second from Europe; 4. Some divisions of minesweepers, built here; 5. A large number of patrol vessels, also suitable for anti-submarine work; 6. A number seaplanes of various kinds; 7. A large number of trainer aircraft from the USA; 8. Large reconnaissance aircraft are shortly expected; 9. Some small docks for aircraft and torpedo motorboats; 10. A number of small, very fast motorboats, some received from abroad, some built here; 11. A number of chartered tankers equipped by the Navy Yard; 12. A small minelayer will shortly be finished.

Roggeveen before her conversion into an ocean-going workship (courtesy Marien Lindenborn).

At Batavia, the Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company had two ships under construction. These were the 2,400 ton minelayers Ram and Regulus. Ram was launched on December 10, 1941; she was towed to Tjilatjap and scuttled on March 2. Regulus was destroyed on her slip and was later salvaged by the Japanese. Four patrol boats were under construction at Palembang’s N.V. Industrial Company. These were similar to those under construction at Soerabaja. However, they too were never completed and all were blown up in mid February to prevent their capture when the Japanese overran Southern Sumatra. The ME was a large facility and the Fleet Plan of 1940 allowed tremendous construction and expansion to take place. From 1940 onward, the Dutch built it into one of the largest and best equipped naval bases in the Pacific. By the outbreak of the Pacific War, the submarine base was considered by many to be one of the best in the world and eventually proved capable of carrying out virtually all repairs.

Chart 6: Supplementary Defense Budget, 194117 Line Item

Guilders

1941 / 2012 (USD)

Torpedo Bombers Aircraft Hangars Pilot Training Infirmary Fleet Communications Barracks / Installations

ƒ14,340,000 ƒ550,000 ƒ454,750 ƒ128,000 ƒ450,000 ƒ800,000 ƒ16,722,750

$7, 648,000 / $119,000,000 $293,300 / $4,570,000 $242,500 / $3,780,000 $68,000 / $1,060,000 $240,000 / $3,740,000 $426,700 / $6,650,000 $8,918,800 / $139,000,000

Further, an ex–German ship, no longer seaworthy, has been converted for use as a boomship. Large numbers of mines were received or made; the supply of heavy machine guns was increased; a large amount of wireless material was received and minesweeping material was greatly developed. Merchant ships were fitted with guns. Ammunition supplies were increased; defensive measures against submarines and mines were improved and developed and demagnetizing of warships and merchant ships carried out on a large scale. A new torpedo service is being set up. The ground organization for the Naval Air Service has been greatly improved, making Soerabaja more independent. The recreational side of the naval organization has also been attended to.18

Funding was also provided to expand and strengthen naval bases throughout the East Indies. The primary naval yard at Soerabaja received the bulk of these funds, but other stations, such as Tandjoeng Priok, Tjilatjap and smaller support bases were also expanded and received new installations and equipment. However, much of this work remained incomplete in December 1941.

Soerabaja The Oedjong Naval Complex (the formal name of the ME) at Soerabaja was the heart of Dutch naval operations in the East Indies. All overhaul of warships took place here as did new construction. It also featured torpedo workshops, barracks and a fully equipped submarine base. Oedjong Naval Barracks provided quarters for shore personnel, ships crews and served as a “halfway house” for personnel

5. The Fleet Plan of 1940

43

range of capabilities. In this regard it was considered to be the best all-around base in Asia outside Japan.19 The ME was capable of making all repairs to warships up to 10,000 tons. It could not, however, repair or replace armor. The East Indies had little industrial capacity and was forced to import its steel from Australia. There were two drydocks for submarines, two floating drydocks of 3,000 and 1,500 tons respectively and a smaller dock measuring approximately 265 feet. Ships larger than 3,000 tons were forced to use one of three private drydocks displacing 15,500, 3,500 and 1,400 tons. Directly adjacent was the civilian harbor of Tandjoeng Perak, through which all civilian merchant shipping and related cargo flowed. Both harbors and the outer roadstead were a beehive of activity with cranes dotting the shorePartial view of the Oedjoeng Naval Base. Note the floating drydocks with the canalized Mas line and dozens of lighters and barges River in the background (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). plying their waters. Located on the northeast coast of temporarily visiting the ME. A short distance away, Goebang Java, Soerabaja was sheltered by the island of Madoera, making Barracks housed the KM’s marine detachment. Much training it an excellent anchorage. Two channels—the Westwater and and personnel development took place at these installations. Eastwater, provided access to the port. The Westwater Channel The ME was a huge complex with numerous research and was the primary entrance thanks to its ample depth and favordevelopment labs, technical sections and workshops of all sizes. able currents. The Eastwater Channel was narrower and shalVirtually any type of equipment could be built or replicated. lower, which prevented most large ships from using it except Precision balancing of turbine rotors could be done. While the during high tide. Even then it had to be navigated with caution. British naval base at Singapore could accommodate and service The Westwater was to be widened to 300 yards under the battleships and aircraft carriers, the ME offered a much broader Fleet Plan of 1940. Depth was also to be dredged out to 30 feet to accommodate the new battlecruisers and Allied battleships and aircraft carriers. The project received top priority and work continued 24 hours a day with the use of full night lighting. However, by the outbreak of the Pacific War, channel width was only 100 yards, with the 30-foot depth reached only during high tide. Work stopped when the Japanese took over and all but a small path silted over again. At the same time, Madoera was built into a fortress designed to proThe submarine docks at Oedjoeng Naval Base (courtesy Gerard Horneman). tect both water entrances

44

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

to Soerabaja. The Dutch deployed several large and medium caliber shore batteries in well constructed forts sited at strategic points. The heaviest of these weapons were a number of old 7inch naval guns bought from the United States in the late 1930s. In March 1942, Soerabaja’s garrison withdrew to Madoera and entered strong, defensive positions. Fortunately for the Japanese, fighting on Java ended before they were forced to storm the island. A “very elaborate and modern ammunition depot” was under construction at Batoe Porrong on Madoera. It was a complex of underground magazines and workshops built into rugged coral. The workshops were designed to overhaul torpedoes and load bombs and shells with explosives. Upon completion it would store the entire ammunition supply for the East Indies Squadron and be all but impervious to air attack. In August

1941 it was 60 percent complete and ƒ60,000,000 spent to date.20 It was estimated that another ƒ40,000,000 were required to complete the complex.21 The Dutch also had plans to reclaim several coral reefs and built them into small forts. The largest was Djamoeang Reef in the Westwater Channel. It was to be raised with several tons of sand and made into an operational base with a harbor for small craft, primarily the motor torpedo boat squadron. This base was never completed before the outbreak of war. The KM planned to mount six 5.9 inch guns from the scrapped armored cruiser Heemskerck on the reef in reinforced concrete positions. The weapons did not arrive from Holland before the German invasion. Tremendous expansion also took place ashore. An entire section of the port was built into berths, drydocks, slips and work yards. New buildings sprang up everywhere, while magazines and fuel depots were completed in the new battlecruiser port. A new 1,300 foot pier was built and existing ones widened and lengthened to handle operations of the expected fleet. The naval air station received enhanced fire-fighting equipment, additional freshwater capabilities and a new sick bay. This was all completed in the two years prior to the Japanese attack. Because of construction the Kali River—which ran through the heart of the port and fed into the harbor— had to be canalized to handle the excess traffic. The ME was now becoming very congested and Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered new plans drawn up for greater dispersion of the facilities in the event of air attack. His fears were justified when Japanese air attacks in February caused severe damage to the base. In 1938 the ME employed between 8,500 and 10,500 workers. By January 1942 this figure rose to more than 15,000, including 8,000 semi-skilled workers and 6,000 coolies. The remaining workers comprised some 1,200 Europeans in management and engineering positions. 22 However, when the Japanese began bombing the port on a regular basis, many Indonesian workers bolted for the interior of Java. Their absence caused severe hardship to many Allied ship crews, who sometimes had to fuel their own ships after long hours in action.

5. The Fleet Plan of 1940

45 a shipyard, only small wooden lighters, motorboats and tugs of various sizes had traditionally been built there.25 As part of their expansion the Dutch sent agents to Britain and the United States to locate the necessary material.26 In 1941 Australia approached the East Indies Government with a joint shipbuilding proposal.27 Under the program Australia would provide the Dutch with steel for hulls that would be built and launched on Java. The ships would move to Semarang or Australia for fitting out. The Dutch expressed interest but requested assistance with certain equipment. It is unclear how far this joint Australian-Dutch program progressed before the outbreak of war.28

Tjilatjap Prewar, Tjilatjap on Java’s south coast was a relatively minor port with only moderate traffic. It was a sleepy administrative town that served as a commercial hub for the region’s cassava, copra, cotton, rubber, tea and tobacco plantations. A key industry was its cotton mill.29 Although visiting ships could obtain coal and water, availability of fuel oil itself required four days notice as late as 1935.30 Nor was it suited for large-scale logistical operations. Ships entering or leaving harbor had to traverse a winding, three mile channel littered with shallows and rocks. The entrance was 1½ miles wide but fickle currents and a large sandbank made it dangerous; if great caution was not exercised, a ship’s master could easily run his vessel aground. And should anything larger than a small tug sink in the channel all ships in the harbor would be trapped until the wreck could be cleared. Unlike Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok, Tjilatjap was characterized by poor logistical capabilities, a weak communications grid and an under-developed transportation network; storage facilities and accommodations were also lacking. Although it could accommodate ships drawing up to 30 feet, these obstacles easily made Tjilatjap one of the worst ports on Java. Nonetheless, the KM picked Tjilatjap for expansion because it was the only good-sized sheltered port on the southern coast. Throughout 1940–41 Tjilatjap and its port received a new railway system, electric cranes, warehouses, quays, piers, hospitals and barracks. A series of navigation lights were placed along the channel with a dozen mooring buoys in the harbor. The harbor entrance was dredged out three feet. A coastal fortress housing 3 × 75mm and 2 × 150mm gun emplacements was built to protect the harbor and a protective minefield could be laid in the event of war. When complete, Tjilatjap could unload seven ships simultaneously and handle nearly 250,000 tons of cargo each month.31 But the port still had a number of obvious drawbacks.

Tandjoeng Priok harbor. Basin No. 1 is to the right. The hangars of Priok Naval Air Station are at the top far left side (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

Tandjoeng Priok Tandjoeng Priok, the port of Batavia, was the secondary Dutch naval base. The civilian port was also sizeable but secondary in both scope and importance to the facilities at Soerabaja. That said, the port was of great importance in terms of naval construction and repair capabilities. Equally important were the BPM Black Oil Storage Company and Southeast Oil Storage Company, which both provided military as well as civilian shipping with enormous fuel resources.23 Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company was a massive complex capable of performing any kind of repairs on ships of nearly any size. It featured a 4,000 ton floating drydock and an 8,000 ton floating drydock. Soerabaja Drydock Company was the second largest shipbuilding and drydock company in the East Indies. Situated on the east side of the harbor, it included three floating drydocks, two slips capable of handling small freighters and an extensive machine shop. Tandjoeng Priok also received new construction, and modernization during the prewar period, but nowhere near what Soerabaja and the ME received. New buildings, piers and wharfs were constructed or expanded to handle the expected new ships of the fleet. At the same time, the MLD base—MVKPriok—received new hangars, slips, ramps and shops.24

Semarang Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company had plans to expand shipbuilding operations at the large port city of Semarang on the north coast of Java. Despite having a population of approximately 218,000 the city’s harbor was not large. Although it had

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

There were only four piers capable of handling large ships; only one of these was equipped for use by tankers.32 A short distance away was a tank farm that was linked by pipes to the fueling pier. To the south was a coaling wharf. The piers themselves were too short to handle all ships simultaneously; cargo still had to be brought ashore by lighters, 100 of which were shipped to Tjilatjap in 1941. The mooring buoy wires also proved too thin and easily broke, often letting large ships drift out of control in the busy harbor.33 The biggest problem was the inability to expand the national railway line connecting Tjilatjap with the rest of Java. This would cause severe bottleneck issues as shipping volume increased. Nonetheless Tjilatjap’s role as a major logistics hub grew dramatically in both scope and importance before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In mid–December large numbers of merchant ships were rerouted to Tjilatjap from the Java Sea. Throughout the East Indies campaign, an average of 40 merchant ships were in the harbor at any given time to load/unload cargo or to take on fuel.34 The port was also serviced by civilian Qantas flying boats from Australia.35 The KM was building a radio station when the war started and it was never completed before the fall of Java. In the meantime, ship-to-shore communications were funneled through the harbor offices.36 By late February the port’s workforce numbered approximately 1,000 Europeans (most of whom were administrators) and 8,000 coolie laborers.37 As shipping volume grew so did the Harbor Service, which was increased to number four harbor masters and six pilots.38 Harbor operations were handled by the tugs Gelis, Kapoeas, Anne Marie and Overijsel; customs was handled by the militarized GM patrol boat Canopus. Only Overijsel and Canopus were considered fully operational, although all served as patrol boats. The patrol boat P 4 and a motor launch provided additional security both inside and outside the harbor entrance.39 The naval commander of Tjilatjap was Commander (KMR) B.J.G. Schokking who received his orders directly from ViceAdmiral Helfrich in Bandoeng.40 With a staff of 80 personnel he controlled all water functions related to the harbor, including the seaport, harbor administration, harbor masters, pilot services and ship travel.41 He had no authority over any of the land defenses, which fell into the realm of the KNIL. When Tjilatjap’s inner minefield was laid several months before the start of the Pacific War, the port was closed to nonDutch shipping for security reasons. The harbor pilot aboard an approaching KPM ship got lost in his conversation with her master and failed to issue the proper coded signal before attempting to enter the channel. As a result, he was severely reprimanded by the fort commander with the threat of being fired upon by the shore batteries if he forgot again. Later that day though, the same pilot boarded a Japanese freighter that had ignored the “Port Closed” flag clearly flying from the lighthouse. She came within a mile of the port before stopping in full view of the mining operation. After his experience aboard the KPM ship, the pilot was greatly surprised by

the fort’s lack of action, as the Japanese ship was much closer. When questioned, her master feigned ignorance and offered the explanation that he had not seen the signal. Meanwhile, five bridge officers intently observed the mining operation with powerful binoculars until the ship moved out of sight. When confronted by his pilot, the Harbor Master was straightforward in his explanation about the vastly different treatment he offered the Dutch and Japanese ships. He fully understood the Japanese threat, but was restricted by government orders not to provoke the Japanese in any way. He also made it clear that he was not going to be the one who started the war everyone knew was coming. It was amid restrictions and attitudes such as these that the KM and other Dutch military forces prepared for war.

The Japanese Response The Fleet Plan of 1940 and its related programs did not go unnoticed by the Japanese. Not unsurprisingly, they felt the plan was unnecessary and detrimental to peaceful Japanese intentions in the region. On February 12, 1940, the Japanese Domei News Agency blasted the buildup in a radio editorial: The Netherlands naval expansion plan is being opposed by the native population of the Netherlands East Indies, according to a press message from Batavia which says that the vernacular “Pemandangan”42 in its issue of the 9th February declares that the strengthening of the National defence of the Netherlands East Indies, which has no political status, is as dangerous as the arms given an infant to play with. Pointing out that the naval expansion plan is primarily designed as unemployment relief, “Pemandangan” declares that all expenses incurred are to be borne by the Netherlands itself, not by the Netherlands East Indies. Referring to a recent statement by the spokesman of the Japanese Navy that the construction of three battleships and the establishment of a naval base at Soerabaja by the Netherlands is possibly due to her misunderstanding of Japanese policy towards the southern regions which are entirely economic, one paper says that the naval expansion plan as formulated by the Netherlands Government only serves to render the situation between the two countries unpleasant. The paper concludes that in case Japanese sentiment towards the Netherlands will be aggravated, the naval expansion plan places not only the Netherlands, but the Netherlands East Indies in a precarious plight, instead of protecting the East Indies.

Despite this adverse feedback the Dutch military buildup continued unabated. Although further along than they had been in May 1940 Dutch defenses were incomplete in December 1941. In particular, this applied to the KM which had not been able to dramatically increase its material strength during that time. Despite having a number of excellent ports, they simply did not have the ships, materiel, manpower and training to stop the powerful Japanese thrust that was about to hit them. Despite the vast sums spent on prewar defenses and installations, the Japanese rolled over the Dutch and broke the tenuous hold they held on their immense empire. Although raw materials from the world’s third largest empire bought vast quantities of equipment and material, they did not buy the time the Dutch desperately needed to receive, assemble and use it. So not unlike the British at Singapore, the Dutch had a fine base, but no fleet to put in it.

Chapter 6

The East Indies Squadron Submarines

fered greater range in home waters and could also operate in Asian waters. In December 1941, the East Indies Squadron included 12 “K” and three “O” boats. Of the 15 submarines, 12 were ready for immediate action. The remainder were in overhaul or material reserve due to personnel shortages. As war loomed, the KM stripped personnel from active boats in order to activate those in reserve. By the start of war some boats were operating with half their complement, making their task difficult and exhausting the crews. Dutch submarines in the East Indies were organized into four divisions and deployed to the Java Sea and South China Sea. Each division included two to four boats. K-VII was being readied for action but would not see action. K-VIII was activated on January 6 with the crew of K-XIII. K-X was activated on December 8, 1941, with the crew of K-IX when that boat entered extended overhaul. Senior officer over the Submarine Flotilla was Lieutenant-Commander A.J. Bussemaker.

The KM received its first submarine, the O-1, in August 1905. Although initial boats were of American and British design, all construction took place in Dutch shipyards. Fijenoord Shipyard successfully completed Holland’s first domestic design in 1918. Dutch boats were consistently modern for their day with excellent sea keeping traits and innovative equipment. Later designs especially showed hull strength, speed, range and armament on a level with those built by major European naval powers. The KM was among the first to recognize the danger of by air attack. Starting with the O-12 class it began equipping its submarines with the Bofors 40mm AA gun. These were fitted to hydraulic, watertight mounts that disappeared into the conning tower. Their most important innovation was the snorkel, a long, skinny pipe resembling another periscope. The snorkel was a novel apparatus that allowed a submarine to “breathe” underwater and it was the most important submarine development to date. When Dutch submarines reached England after the German invasion of Holland in May 1940 the British Royal Navy found little use for the snorkel and ordered them removed.1 The Germans also discovered the snorkel on captured Dutch submarines but were far more receptive to the application of such new technology. They quickly refined the concept and installed it on their submarines for use throughout the war. Allied submarines did not employ snorkels again until late in the war.2 With each new class, size and displacement grew, while handling characteristics remained equal to any other nation’s boats. The Dutch reputation for building quality submarines led the Polish Navy to order two minelaying boats in 1935 after several bad experiences with French shipyards.3 Both were delivered in 1939; Orzel was lost in June 1940, but her sister ship Sep served until 1970. Dutch KM submarines initially included two classes. “K” (Koloniaal) boats were designed for service in the Far East and included air conditioning and additional venting that made them habitable in hot environments. They were also larger with greater range than the smaller, short range “O” (Onderzeeër) boats built for service in European waters. In 1937 it was decided to standardize the submarine force and apply the “O” label to all new construction. This led to O-16 which was the blueprint for all future submarine construction. This class of-

Chart 7: KM Submarine Divisions—December 1941 1st

O-16 (Flag)—LieutenantCommander A.J. Bussemaker K-XVII—Lieutenant-Commander H.C. Besançon K-XVIII—Lieutenant-Commander C.A.J. van Well Groenveld 2nd Lieutenant-Commander K-XIII (Flag)—LieutenantM.A.J. Derksema Commander M.A.J. Derksema K-IX—Lieutenant-Commander P.G. de Back (Replaced by K-X 12/8/41 when she entered overhaul) K-XI—Lieutenant-Commander A.H. Deketh K-XII—Lieutenant-Commander (KMR) H.J. Coumou 3rd Lieutenant-Commander P.A. K-XIV (Flag)—LieutenantMulock van der Vlies Bik Commander P.A. Mulock van der Vlies Bik K-XV—Lieutenant-Commander C.W. Th. baron van Boetzelaer K-XVI—Lieutenant-Commander L.J. Jarman 4th Lieutenant-Commander O-19 (Flag)—LieutenantF.J.A. Knoops Commander F.J.A. Knoops O-20—Lieutenant-Commander P.G.J. Snippe

47

Lieutenant-Commander A.J. Bussemaker

48

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

K-VII was the oldest boat on hand. She had been designed by the British firm of Denny prior to World War I. Dominant features included a saddle tank and revolving torpedo tube mounted externally forward of the conning tower. Authorized under the 1916 Naval Program, K-VII was launched at Fijenoord in 1921 and entered service in 1922. Too small and obsolete to function in anything more than a training role by the time they were launched, the K-VII class still provided valuable construction experience.

K-V Class (K-V, K-VI, K-VII) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery

Fijenoord Shipyard, Rotterdam 188 × 18.4 × 12.5 569 (surface) / 649 (submerged) 2 × Shafts; 2 × 6-cylinder Sulzer Diesels / 2 × Electric Motors Speed 13.5 knots (surface) / 8 knots (submerged) Range (nautical miles) 3,500/11 knots (surface) / 1⅜ knots (submerged) Armament 8 × 17.7 inch torpedo tubes (2 × bow, 2x stern, 2 × deck); 1 × 75mm; 1 × 12.7mm Complement 31

K-V and K-VI were stricken from service in 1937. Limited by an outdated single-layer hull design, K-VII’s diving depth was just 132 feet, which was completely insufficient by the start of the Second World War. Four of her 17.7 inch torpedo tubes were mounted in pairs at the bow and stern. The remaining pair were on a revolving mount forward of the conning tower. The mount was trained and fired from inside.

K-VIII Class (K-VIII, K-IX, K-X) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery

Royal Deschelde Shipyard, Vlissingen 211.3 × 18.4 × 11.6 582 (surface) / 722 (submerged) 2 × Shafts; 2 × 8-cylinder MAN Diesels / 2 × Electric Motors Speed 16 knots (surface) / 8 knots (submerged) Range (nautical miles) 3,500/11 knots (surface) / 2⅝ knots (submerged) Armament 4 × 17.7 inch torpedo tubes (2 × bow, 2x stern); 1 × 88mm; 1 × 12.7mm Complement 31

An updated design of the K-V class, the K-VIII boats were laid down in 1917 19 as part of the 1916 Naval Program. Political infighting and budget cuts delayed their launch to 1922–23. The hull was still a single-layer design so depth limit remained at 132 feet. K-IX and K-X were equipped with a pair of 2 shaft Schelder Sulze diesels, which generated 1,500 BHP. K-VIII received two 2 shaft MAN diesels capable of 1,800 BHP. All were fitted with one 630-SHP electric engine. This class abandoned the external torpedo mount, keeping only the 17.7 inch bow and stern tubes. An 88mm dual-purpose cannon replaced the 75mm deck gun and became standard on all subsequent Dutch boats. The 12.7mm machine gun was retained. K-X was scuttled on Java in March 1942 in damaged condition.

K-XI Class (K-XI, K-XII, K-XIII) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery

Fijenoord Shipyard, Rotterdam 218.9 × 20.2 × 12.4 688 (surface) / 828 (submerged) 2 × Shafts; 2 × 6-cylinder Sulzer Diesels / 2 × Electric Motors Speed 17 knots (surface) / 8 knots (submerged) Range (nautical miles) 3,500/12 knots (surface) / 1⅜ knots (submerged) Armament 4 × 17.7-inch torpedo tubes (2 × bow, 2 × stern); 2 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (2 × bow); 1 × 88mm; 1 × 12.7mm Complement 31

The K-XI class was authorized in the 1918 Naval Program. They were larger than all prior boats and featured a stronger hull, which allowed a depth limit of 200 feet. They were the first Dutch boats to mount 21 inch torpedo tubes. Two 21 inch tubes were located in the bow with two 17.7 inch tubes; the stern retained two 17.7 inch tubes. For the first time one reload was provided for each tube.

K-XIV Class (K-XIV, K-XV, K-XVI, K-XVII, K-XVIII) Builder

Rotterdam Drydock Company, Rotterdam / Fijenoord Shipyard, Rotterdam

An idyllic prewar photograph of K-XIII and D-15 at an unknown location (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

6. The East Indies Squadron Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery

242.1 × 21.4 × 12.5 765 (surface) / 1,020 (submerged) 2 × Shafts; 2 × 8-cylinder Sulzer Diesels / 2 × Electric Motors Speed 17 knots (surface) / 9 knots (submerged) Range (nautical miles) 3,500/11 knots (surface) / 26/8.5 knots (submerged) Armament 8 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (4 × bow, 2 × stern, 2 × amidships); 1 × 88mm; 2 × 40mm Complement 37

The K-XIV class was laid down in 1929 30. Rotterdam Ship Yard built K-XIV, K-XV and K-XVI and launched them in November and December 1932 and April 1933 respectively. Fijenoord built the K-XVII and K-XVIII and launched both in July 1932.They were enlarged versions of the O-12 class operating in European waters. This was the last class to differentiate between Domestic (“O Class”) and Koloniaal, or Colonial, (“K Class”) designs. A new hull design also allowed operations at a maximum of 264 feet. Power and speed increased thanks to two 2 shaft MAN diesels capable of 3,200 BHP. They pushed maximum surface speed up to 17 knots. At 11 knots, the cruising radius remained at 3,500 nautical miles. Two 1,000 HP electric engines gave the K-XIV class a submerged top speed of nine knots. By reducing submerged speed to 8½ knots, a maximum endurance of 26 nautical miles could be achieved. Torpedo tubes numbered eight, all of which were 21 inch. Four were in the bow, two in the stern and the remaining pair in external side mounts forward of the conning tower. One reload was provided for each internal tube. The 88mm/45 gun remained but the 12.7mm machine gun disappeared in favor of two single Bofors 40mm AA guns on disappearing mounts in the conning tower.

O-16 Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage

Royal Deschelde Shipyard, Vlissingen 198.8 × 18.7 × 11.8 548 (surface) / 715 (submerged)

49

Machinery

2 × Shafts; 2 × 6-cylinder Sulzer Diesels / 2 × Electric Motors Speed 18 knots (surface) / 9 knots (submerged) Range (nautical miles) 10,000/12 knots (surface) / 26/8.5 knots (submerged) Armament 8 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (4 × bow, 2 × stern, 2 × amidships); 1 × 88mm; 2 × 40mm; 1 × 12.7mm Complement 31

De Schelde launched O-16 in January 1936; she was nearly identical to the K-XIV class. With O-16 the KM abandoned its distinction between large “Koloniaal” submarines and smaller boats designed for operations in the North Sea. All future boats received the “O” prefix and followed a common theme for deployment. Large boats with greater range offered greater mobility in European waters and could operate in the Far East if necessary.

O-19 Class (O-19, O-20) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery

Wilton Fijenoord, Schiedam 264.8 × 24.4 × 12.8 967 (surface) / 1,492 (submerged) 2 × Shafts; 2 × 7-cylinder Sulzer Diesels / 2 × Electric Motors Speed 19.25 knots (surface) / 9 knots (submerged) Range (nautical miles) 10,000/12 knots (surface) / 26/8.5 knots (submerged) Armament 8 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (4 × bow, 2 × stern, 2 × amidships); 1 × 88mm; 2 × 40mm; 1 × 12.7mm; 40 × mines Complement 39

O-19 and O-20 were based on Orzel and Sep, a pair of highly successful minelaying submarines built for the Polish Navy. They were the first submarines in the world fitted with snorkels and the only boats in the East Indies to have them. O19 was launched in September 1938 and O-20 followed in January 1939. They were initially designated K-XIX and K-XX, but later had their designation changed to “O.” The O-19 Class was the largest and most advanced Dutch submarines built to date.

O-19 was one of the most modern submarines in the Netherlands East Indies Squadron. Her admidships tubes can be clearly seen (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

The minelaying tubes forced substantial dimensional increases. A reinforced hull now allowed operations down to 320 feet. Stronger diesels allowed an increase in speed despite the larger hull. A pair of 2-shaft Sulzer diesels generated 5,200 brake horsepower that increased the surface speed to 19¼ knots; the 1,000 HP electric engine kept submerged speed at nine knots. Torpedo armament numbered eight tubes, including four in the bow, two in the stern and two amidships. The 88mm gun remained as did the two 40mm guns in disappearing mounts. A 12.7mm machine gun reappeared on the conning tower. Both submarines could lay up to 40 mines. They were arranged in 20 vertical tubes (two mines per tube) inside the saddle tanks with 10 tubes per side.

backdrop many felt that there was no need for the navy to have large numbers of new ships. Another attempt to bolster the aging destroyer fleet came in 1923 when the KM submitted a reduced program to Parliament asking for 12 vessels. Despite another strong recommendation this too was rejected. The 1930s saw the Dutch become increasingly aware of the Japanese threat to their East Indies Empire. Concerned about the threat of invasion, Parliament authorized funds for 16 modern destroyers, most of which were to be stationed in the East Indies. Only four were laid down and the German invasion ended the entire program. None would see action in the East Indies and only two were completed—one by the British Royal Navy and the other by the German Kriegsmarine.

Chart 8: 1st Destroyer Division, December 1941

Destroyers December 7, 1941, saw the East Indies Squadron with only seven small destroyers dating from the mid–1920s. All were outclassed by their Japanese counterparts, which were larger and more heavily armed. It had been recommended in 1920 by a Dutch Naval Committee that no less than 24 destroyers be permanently based in the East Indies. This plan was met with violent rejection in the Dutch parliament for a number of reasons. The first was because a plan this large was well beyond the economic capability of a nation so small as the Netherlands. Second, it came too soon after the end of the Great War. Although the Dutch remained neutral throughout the conflict, they had been close enough to see the carnage. Combined with the belief that there would never be another world war, much of the Dutch population (as did much of the world in the 1920s) developed a strong anti-war attitude. Amidst this

Lieutenant-Commander F.J.E. Krips4 Group 1 Van Ghent Overhaul at Soerabaja Witte de With Lieutenant-Commander P. Schotel Kortenaer Lieutenant-Commander A. Kroese Group 2 Piet Hein Lieutenant-Commander J.M.L.I. Chömpff Banckert Lieutenant-Commander L.J. Goslings Group 3 Evertsen Lieutenant-Commander W.M. de Vries Van Nes Lieutenant-Commander C.A. Lagaay

Although undersized when compared to the more modern Japanese destroyers they would later encounter, these destroyers were in line with comparable vessels launched by other navies in the same period. Dutch shipyards had an excellent reputation and the design and construction of their destroyers was second to none. At the same time, the KM’s willingness to adopt cutting edge communications, gunnery and range-finding equipment further enhanced their ability to operate. So despite being somewhat dated in December 1941, Dutch destroyers were still well maintained and equipped.

Van Ghent Class (Evertsen, Kortenaer, Piet Hein, Van Ghent) Builder

Royal De Schelde Shipyard, Vlissingen and Burgerhout’s Shipyard, Rotterdam Dimensions (feet) 322 × 31 × 9.7 Tonnage 1,316 (standard) / 1,650 (full load) Machinery 2-Shaft Parson geared turbines, 3 × Yarrow boilers Speed 34 knots Armament 4 × 120mm (4 × 1); 2 × 75mm AA (2 × 1); 4 × 12.7mm (4 × 1); 6 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (2 × 3); 12 × depth charges; 24 × mines Complement 143

Kortenaer immediately after launching a brace of torpedoes during a prewar exercise (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

The Van Ghent class destroyers entered service in 1926–27 and replaced the small, very obsolete Fret Class dating from the early 1900s. They were very slightly modified versions of the

6. The East Indies Squadron

Evertsen tied up alongside the Juliana Pier in Makassar Harbor (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

51 plane as part of a test program in the late 1930s. The practice was deemed unsuitable for wartime use as the destroyers had to come to a full stop to both hoist the aircraft over the side and recover it. Also, the “X” and “Y” 4.7-inch mounts were completely immobilized. Given their anticipated operation with cruisers and landbased reconnaissance aircraft the practice was discontinued.5 Although somewhat smaller than Japanese destroyers of the mid–1920s, they were larger than their contemporary American counterparts, which had all been launched in 1918–22. They were comparable with British destroyers launched during the same time period. The Van Ghent class was completely outclassed by later Japanese frontline destroyers, most of which were nearly twice their size in tonnage and firepower. All were lost in the East Indies campaign.

Van Galen Class (Banckert, Van Galen, Van Nes, Witte de With) Builder

Fijenoord Shipyard, Rotterdam Dimensions (feet) 322 × 31 × 9.8 Tonnage 1,316 (standard) / 1,650 (full load) Machinery 2-Shaft Parson geared turbines, 3 × Yarrow boilers Speed 36 knots Armament 4 × 120mm (4 × 1); 1 × 75mm AA; 4 × 40mm AA (2 × 2); 4 × 12.7mm (4 × 1); 6 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (2 × 3); 24 × depth charges Complement 143

The Van Galen class entered service 1929–31 and was virtually identiBanckert sailing from Den Helder for the East Indies in December 1933 (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). cal to the Van Ghent class. They had the same dimensions but for the RN Admiralty Class destroyer HMS Ambuscade, which was an draught, which increased by one inch due to changes in the AA experimental design dating from 1924–25. They were the first battery. Speed also remained at a rather pedestrian 34 knots.6 modern KM destroyers built in 20 years and were built in HolReflecting the changing face of air power, four 40mm AA guns land with technical assistance from Britain’s Yarrow Shipyard. replaced one of the 75mm mounts. The machine guns were reAlthough not designed for it, several Van Ghents in the tained. Banckert, Van Nes and Witte de With were all lost durEast Indies were briefly equipped with a single observation ing the East Indies campaign.7

52

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Prior to 1940 Dutch destroyers were poorly prepared for Seven destroyers were nowhere near the number needed modern Anti-Submarine (A/S) warfare. Most were equipped for patrols, convoy escort and fleet duty. The burden was eased with ASDIC, a rather crude technology developed toward the somewhat when 13 USN destroyers arrived from the Philipend of the First World War. Only after Dutch ships retired to pines in mid–December. The arrival of a handful of RN deEngland in May 1940 did they receive modern A/S equipment stroyers in January and February also helped. They helped by in the form of SONAR. The first Dutch warship in the East carrying out patrols in their respective ABDA zones but the Indies to have such equipment was the minelayer Willem van war still took its toll of the Dutch ships. der Zaan, which had been previously installed in England. Even before the arrival of Willem van der Zaan ViceCruisers Admiral Helfrich attempted to upgrade the A/S capabilities of In December 1941 the KM satisfied its longtime goal of his destroyers. In November 1940 he requested that the RN permanently keeping four light cruisers—De Ruyter, Java, provide the KM with an advanced SONAR training simulator Sumatra and Tromp—on station in the East Indies. This similar to that which he had seen on a recent visit to Singapore. stemmed from 1920 when a naval committee recommended Although this request was denied the RN later trained two that no less than four cruisers remain in the NEI. This plan was classes of Dutch SONAR operators. At the same time, the KM rebuffed for budgetary reasons. It lay dormant until 1930 when initiated its own A/S training program at the ME. it was pointed out that the East Indies Squadron was too weak In March 1941 Vice-Admiral Helfrich requested that the to defend the colony. A new plan suggested that at least three RN provide the East Indies Squadron with 38 SONAR systems. cruisers be stationed in the NEI. He set his needs at seven sets for the destroyers, one set for the This time the Dutch Parliament realized the growing dangunboat Soemba, eight sets for his large minelayers and mineger of Japan. It approved funds for construction of De Ruyter sweepers and 22 sets for various patrol boats and A/S vessels.8 to augment Java and Sumatra, which were already in the East The British partially complied with this request and shipped a Indies. Although Dutch shipyards had ample experience buildtotal of 19 units to Singapore in June and July. But by August ing ships of this size, funding for the new cruiser was not great. 20 the KM received only two sets that were installed aboard As a result, De Ruyter’s design changed several times as naval the gunboat Soemba and Van Ghent. architects walked a fine line between building an effective warPart of the reason for the shortfall appears to be that the ship without spending a large sum of money. RN at Singapore itself was short of the sophisticated equipThe original design called for a main armament of 6 × 5.9ment. A number of SONAR sets sent from England never cominch deck guns on a 5,250 ton hull with a maximum speed of pleted the voyage and were lost en route. At least three had been 32 knots. This blueprint was heavily criticized because of its lost when the cargo vessel Automedon was captured and sunk small size and weak armament; thus, the hull was lengthened by the German merchant cruiser Atlantis in November 1940.9 and the main armament increased to 7 × 5.9-inch guns. A pair Eventually Van Ghent, Witte de With, Soemba, patrol of Fokker C.XIV-W floatplanes was mounted behind the funboat Rigel, minelayer Gouden Leeuw, minesweepers Jan van nel. They used a catapult designed by the Heinkel aircraft facAmstel and Abraham Crijnssen and 10 small patrol vessels were tory in Germany. She was laid down according to these specireceived SONAR.10 Together with Van Ghent, Soemba and fications in 1932. Willem van der Zaan, they represented the KM’s entire modern A/S capabilities throughout the NEI campaign. Evertsen only entered service the first week of December 1941. Her crew was young and inexperienced; most were fresh out of technical training schools. As a result, Evertsen was not yet considered operational. Her activities during of the East Indies campaign consisted primarily of convoy escort to let her crew work up. Throughout December Evertsen escorted convoys to Singapore. She then escorted an 8,000 ton floating drydock from Tandjoeng Priok to Tjilatjap. She saw no action on any of De Ruyter at sea in an undated photograph (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). these milk runs.

6. The East Indies Squadron

53

Laid down in 1936, Tromp was the newest ship operated by the East Indies Squadron in 1941. Although envisioned as a destroyer flotilla leader she was reclassified as a light cruiser due to her tonnage. Although built to supplement destroyer forces in the East Indies, Tromp never played this part. The only time she led destroyers in battle was at the Badoeng Strait in February 1942. Tromp had a maxiTromp before the loss of her floatplane during the search for HMAS Sydney in November 1941 (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). mum speed of 33½ knots, which allowed her to operHr.Ms. De Ruyter ate with contemporary destroyers under normal sea conditions. Builder N.V. Wilton Fijenoord, Schiedam This speed was obtained at the expense of reduced armor. It Dimensions (feet) 560.4 × 51.3 × 16.1 was sorely missed in the Badoeng Strait where she absorbed 11 Tonnage 6,442 (standard) / 7,548 (full load) hits in a matter of minutes. Machinery 2 × Shafts, 3 × Parsons geared turbines, 6 × Yarrow Speed Armor Armament Complement

boilers 32 knots11 Conning Tower: 25mm; Deck: 30mm 7 × 150mm (3 × 2, 1 × 1); 10 × 40mm AA (5 × 2); 8 × 12.7mm (4 × 1); 4 × 7.7mm, 2 × aircraft 436

When De Ruyter was launched on March 11, 1935, she sported 7 × 5.9-inch guns in three double turrets and one single mount. Her AA armament consisted of 10 × 40mm guns in five double mounts and 8 × 12.7mm machine guns. The arrangement of the 40mm guns brought on an additional round of criticism. Because they were grouped in a circular pattern around the AA rangefinder on the afterdeck, there was concern of a single bomb or shell hit knocking out her entire AA defense.

Sumatra Class ( Java, Sumatra) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armor Armament Complement

Deschelde Shipyard, Vlissingen 509.5 × 52.5 × 18 6,670 (standard) / 8,208 (full load) 3 × Shafts; 3 × Zoelly turbines; 8 × Thorneycroft boilers 30.63 knots Belt: 75mm; Conning Tower: 100–125mm; Deck: 25–50mm; Turret Faces: 127mm 10 × 150mm (10 × 1); 8 × 40mm AA (8 × 1); 6 × 12.7mm (3 × 2); 2 × aircraft 526

Hr.Ms. Tromp Builder

Netherlands Shipyard, Amsterdam Dimensions (feet) 432.9 × 40.8 × 14.2 Tonnage 3,450 (standard) / 4,025 (full load) Machinery 2 × Shafts, 2 × Parsons geared turbines, 4 × Yarrow boilers Speed 32.5 knots Armor Belt: 15mm; Deck: 15– 25mm; Turrets: 12– 25mm Armament 6 × 150mm (3 × 2); 8 × 40mm AA (4 × 2); 4 × 12.7mm (2 × 2); 6 × 21-inch torpedo tubes; 1 × aircraft Complement 295

Designed in the First World War, Java was unsuited for frontline duty in the Pacific War (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

54

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Java and Sumatra were originally designed with the standards of Jutland in mind. This completely outdated them for frontline service in the Second World War. The most serious limitation was their poor compartmentation and lack of centerline main armament. Although laid down in 1916, material shortages and budget cuts delayed delivery until 1925. This made them obsolete long before they ever entered service. In 1941 Java and Sumatra retained their original main armament of 10 × 5.9-inch guns, but their AA armament had been upgraded. They had provisions for 12 mines and two Fokker C.XIV-W floatplanes, but neither had a catapult. The latter was another serious drawback, for it meant that they had to stop completely in order to launch an observation aircraft. They could recover the aircraft while underway at a reduced speed.

De Zeven Provinciën Class Builder

N.V. Dock Shipyard, Rotterdam & Wilton Fijenoord Shipyard, Schiedam Dimensions (feet) 614.6 × 56.6 × 21.8 Tonnage 8,350 (standard) / 10,800 (full load) Machinery 2 × Shafts; 3 × Parsons turbines; 6 × Thorneycroft boilers Speed 32 knots Armor Belt: 75–100mm; Deck: 20–25mm; Turrets: 50–100mm Armament 10 × 15mm (2 × 3, 2x2); 14 × 40mm AA (7 × 2); 8 × 12.7mm (4 × 2); 6 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (2 × 3); 2 × aircraft Complement 700

Gunboats Soemba Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armor Armament Complement

Fijenoord Shipyard, Rotterdam 248 × 37.7 × 11.8 1,457 (standard) / 1,793 (full load) 2 × Shafts; 2 × Triple Expansion Engines; 4 × Yarrow boilers 15 knots Conning Tower: 25mm; Deck: 25mm 3 × 150mm (3 × 1); 1 × 75mm AA; 4 × 12.7mm (4 × 1); 1 × aircraft 136

Soemba was the only gunboat present in the East Indies Squadron. She was the second ship of the Flores class, which had originally been designed and built for the purpose of protecting entrances to key harbors and minefields. Soemba spent the entire campaign patrolling the Soenda Strait or escorting convoys to outlying islands before being ordered to Colombo in early March. Soemba entered service in March 1926. Although large for a gunboat and featuring a high freeboard that allowed greater mobility at sea, she was never intended for fleet duty. She had the displacement and crew of a destroyer. As was the case with most gunboats, her low speed and heavy armament betrayed her true purpose. The main armament consisted of 3 × 5.9 inch guns in single mounts. For AA defense were a single 75mm mount overlooking the rear 5.9 inch gun and 4 × 12.7mm machine guns in twin mounts. There was a crane and matt equipment for handling a small reconnaissance floatplane, although it was never shipped.

Shortly after De Ruyter joined the fleet the Dutch Parliament authorized funds for a wide-scale modernization of the KM. Among the funds authorized were those for two new light cruisers to replace Java and Sumatra on the East Indies station. Based on an improved De Ruyter design, these ships had the benefit of being liberally financed, unlike their predecessor. Eendracht was laid down in May 1939 and De Zeven Provinciën in September. Little work had been completed when Germany invaded. Although the Kriegsmarine ordered work to continue, construction proceeded slowly due to a shortage of skilled labor and materials.12 Neither cruiser was completed during the war, although De Zeven Provinciën was nearly launched as a blockship in November 1944. After the war both were finished as missile cruisers. The Peruvian Navy later bought them in the mid– Former coast defense ship De Zeven Provinciën following her conversion into the gunnery training 1970s. ship Soerabaja (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

6. The East Indies Squadron

Soerabaja13 Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armor Armament Complement

Rijkswerf Shipyard, Amsterdam 333 × 56.1 × 20.2 5,644 (standard) / ? (full load) 2 × shafts; 1 × turbine engine; 8 × Yarrow boilers 16 knots Belt: 100–150mm; Conning Tower: 200mm; Deck: 50mm; Turrets: 248mm 2 × 280mm (2 × 1); 2 × 150mm (2 × 1); 2 × 75mm (2 × 1); 6 × 40mm; 6 × 12.7mm (4 × 1) 367

Soerabaja was laid down by the Amsterdam Dock Yard in February 1908 and launched in March 1909. She entered service as the coast defense ship De Zeven Provinciën in October 1910. She was deployed to the Far East in 1921 and served as flagship of the East Indies Squadron until the arrival of Java. In 1928 De Zeven Provinciën became a gunnery training ship; recruits typically came aboard for a six-month training program.14 Originally, the ship’s eight Yarrow boilers provided 8,000 IHP to a 2 shaft turbine that turned three screws. Top speed was 16 knots with coal bunkerage of 700 tons, although 1,030 tons could be taken on if required. Armament was 2 × 11 inch guns, 4 × 5.9 inch guns, 10 × 75mm and 4 × 37mm guns. Rounding out this armament was a 9 pound mortar and 2 machine guns. The economic devastation resulting from the Great Depression impacted the Netherlands East Indies and forced many austerity measures. The KM faced substantial unrest amongst both its European and Indonesian personnel as a result of a proposed 10 percent pay cut. In February 1933 the crew of De Zeven Provinciën mutinied and seized the ship for 10 days. Following their surrender the ship was decommissioned. Two years later, in 1935-36, the KM reactivated De Zeven Provinciën and converted her into a gunnery training ship with the new name of Soerabaja. Soerabaja re-entered service in 1937 after a major refit and extensive alterations to her original layout. Five of eight boilers were removed along with the forward funnel. The remaining boilers were converted to burn fuel oil, for which Soerabaja had bunkerage for 1,100 tons. Despite losing five boilers, power remained at 7,500 IHP due to modern machinery and speed at 16 knots. Because of these and other changes in armament, her displacement dropped to 5,644 tons. The crew now numbered 111 Europeans (increased from 30) and 256 Indonesians.15 The 2 × 11 inch/42.5 guns remained with 2 × 5.9 inch/40 guns, although the latter weapons were later removed. Eight of her 10 × 75mm/40 guns were removed during the refit. The 37mm guns and 9 pounder mortar gave way to 6 × Bofors 40mm AA guns and 6 × 12.7mm machine guns. Prewar, Soerabaja was pressed into active service again as a coast defense ship and patrolled off Timor.16 She then returned to Soerabaja and was used as a mobile AA platform in the ME and off Madoera. She was disabled on February 18 when a Japanese bomb penetrated the main deck and gutted her engine room. She was scuttled in the harbor, but was raised

55

by the Japanese and used as a blockship in 1942-43. Scuttled yet again at the end of the war, Soerabaja’s hulk was ultimately used as a gunnery target for Dutch warships following the Japanese surrender.

Patrol Craft With thousands of miles of coastline, shallow rivers and inter-island channels throughout the East Indies, the Dutch became interested in the cost efficiency offered by motor torpedo boats early on. The KM operated a large fleet of small patrol vessels of mostly indigenous design and construction. These were used throughout the East Indies campaign for attack, patrol and A/S duties at important military harbors and other points of interest. The first MTBs in service with the KM received were designed and built by the Thornycroft shipyard between 1927 and 1928. They were 13-ton wooden hull boats capable of 37 knots. Armament consisted of 2 × 17.7-inch torpedo tubes, 2 × 7.7mm machine guns and depth charges. TM I, II and IV were withdrawn from service in the 1930s and kept in reserve at the ME. They gave Dutch shipyards the operational experience and expertise necessary to launch their own MTB program.

TM III Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Soerabaja Naval Yard 1938 61 × ? × ? 16 tons 38 knots 2 × 17.7 inch torpedo tubes; 2 × 7.7mm 6

The second torpedo boat designated TM III was the first indigenous Dutch design. She was a 16-ton boat with a stainless steel hull that was built as an experimental project in 1938. Although 2 × 1,000 HP aircraft engines generated 38 knots, TM III suffered constant engine problems and she never became fully operational. TM III saw no action in the East Indies campaign and was scuttled on March 2. Although the Japanese raised and commissioned her as Patrol Boat No. 101, they had no better luck than did the KM.

TM 4–21 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Soerabaja Naval Yard 1940–42 63 × 14.1 × 4.6 17.5 tons 36 knots 2 × 17.7 inch torpedo tubes; 2 × 7.7mm (1 × 2) 7

Using this experience, the KM next initiated a program to build a squadron of 18 smaller motor torpedo boats that were to be based in the East Indies. TM 4–21 were entirely designed and built at Soerabaja between 1940 and 1942. Only TM 4–15 were completed before the outbreak of the Pacific War. TM 4–15 primarily operated as patrol boats at Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok.

56

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

TM 22–33 Builder

Canadian Powerboat, Montreal Year 1941–42 Dimensions (feet) ? × ? × ? Tonnage 45 tons Speed 45 knots Armament 4 × 7.7mm machine guns (2 × 2); 4–8 depth charges Complement 12

The KM received funding for additional MTBs under the Fleet Plan of 1940. The first of these boats were TM 22–33, which were contracted to the Canadian Powerboat Company in Montreal. They were ordered for use in the TM 9 preparing to tie up alongside a pier in Oedjoeng Naval Base. Note the cushions to prevent damage East Indies but Java fell before they could arrive. As a result, to her hull (courtesy Gerard Horneman) TM 22–33 were delivered to The engines came from Dornier Do. 15 and Fokker T.4 seathe Netherlands West Indies, while TM 34–37 were sold to the planes in the process of being phased of service. Not unlike those USN and operated in the Pacific. on TM III, these engines were old and required a great deal of maintenance.17 Most boats carried 2 × 17.7 inch torpedo tubes from decommissioned Wolf class destroyers and Z class torpedo boats. Their surface armament consisted of 2 × 7.7mm light machine guns on the forward deck. TM 12–14 were armed with four depth charges instead of torpedo tubes.18 The latter were used exclusively for local harbor patrol duties at Soerabaja. All had very short range and could only be used for close-in defense. TM 16-21 were still under construction when the Japanese captured Soerabaja. The incomplete boats were blown up to prevent capture. Even had they been finished the KM had no crews to man them. Negotiations between the British and Dutch to use excess RN personnel from Singapore fell through. The Japanese used the wrecks and material to reconstruct or finish many boats. They were commissioned MTBs 101 20. Of these, 102, 109 113 and 115–117 became war losses; the rest OJR 4 being loaded aboard the freighter Poelau Tello in New Orleans in November 1941 for were returned to the KM in 1945. delivery to Java (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

6. The East Indies Squadron

OJR 1–8 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Higgins Yard, New Orleans 1941 70 × 16.5 × 4.7 48 tons 24 knots 1 × 20mm cannon; 4 × 12.7mm machine guns (2 × 2); 16 × depth charges 12

In 1941 the East Indies Naval Squadron had a serious deficiency in its Anti-Submarine capabilities. To fix it the Dutch sent a purchasing committee to the Higgins Boat Company in New Orleans. They purchased eight wood hull Air/Sea rescue boats that were custom-built to KM specifications for use in a submarine chaser role.19 All were poorly finished and had multiple technical flaws.20 The most dangerous was a poorly vented engine compartment that contributed to several non-combat losses. In the galley, lighting the stove would often result in a blast of flame shooting out the deck exhaust vent. The first six boats were delivered in three groups beginning in December 1941. OJR 1 and OJR 2 arrived at Soerabaja as deck cargo aboard a Dutch freighter on December 10, 1941. They were followed by OJR 3 and OJR 4 on December 22. The first pair became operational on December 16 and the latter by the end of the year.21 All were assigned to patrol duty in the Westwater Channel. OJR 2 and OJR 3 were lost to internal explosion on February 2 and 22, respectively. None of the boats had been delivered with engine room extractor fans.22 This made the engine rooms become extremely hot very quickly. It also made them vulnerable to explosion sparked by accumulated gasoline fumes. Although unproven, one might hypothesize that the flame caused when lighting the galley stove possibly led to the fatal explosions. OJR 5 and OJR 6 reached Soerabaja on February 1. However, it does not appear that the KM had the personnel to crew them and they were destroyed on March 2 having never become operational. OJR 1 and OJR 4 were also scuttled to prevent their capture. The latter boat was salvaged by the Japanese and later sunk by Allied surface ships off Tawi Tawi in 1945. Java surrendered to the Japanese before OJR 7 and OJR 8 arrived. They were rerouted to the Netherlands West Indies. Upon arrival at Curacao they were commissioned as H 7 and H 8. Later in 1942 both received ASDIC and new engines and operated until stricken from service in January 1946.

P 1–P 4 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja 1939 52 × 13.1 × ? 23 tons 12 knots 2 × 7.7mm machine guns 10

Although incapable of constructing first-line warships, Dutch shipyards on Java built many small, wood hull ships. From 1939 to 1942, they built substantial numbers of small “P”

57

class patrol boats in five different variations. Unfortunately, the first attempt was an abject failure in both design and performance. P 1–P 4 entered service in 1939, and were considered to be poorly designed vessels.23 Some of our patrol boats, locally built, were sailors’ headaches. One brought into Tandjoeng Priok looked like a half-flattened beer barrel. Equipped with a pair of magnificent motors, it was too stubby to take advantage of them. Intended to cruise at 14 knots, it could only galumph along at nine in smooth water. In a bit of sea it could not even maintain this speed without shipping so much water (on account of its too little freeboard and bad lines) that it was in danger of becoming waterlogged. Altogether four or five of these patrol boats were built at a cost of many thousands of pounds and the waste of good crews.24

P 5–P 8 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja 1939 60.7 × 12.1 × ? 26 tons 12.5 knots 2 × 12.7mm machine guns 10

The deficiencies of the P 1 class were quickly realized and remedied in the next attempt. The dimensions of P 5–P 8 were nearly nine feet longer and a foot narrower. The long, narrower construction dramatically increased performance and seaworthiness so there were few complaints about these boats. All four of this class were scuttled at Soerabaja or Tandjoeng Priok to prevent capture.

P 9–P 16 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja 1940–41 62 × 12.9 × 3.8 26 tons 14 knots 2 × 12.7mm machine guns 10

P 9–P 16 were simply slightly larger repeats of the P 5 class. Although slightly heavier at 26 tons, speed increased to 14½ knots. Their armament remained light with only two heavy machine guns. P 10 and P12 were loaned to the British at Singapore where they arrived from Tandjoeng Priok in the first week of February. Both were manned by Royal Navy reserve crews and were evacuated to Sumatra on February 1325; they were lost or scuttled at Djambi.26 All of the Dutch boats were lost or scuttled. The Japanese raised five of these boats and put them into IJN service. Most were returned to the KM in 1945.

P 17–P 20 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja 1941 83.5 × 13.8 × 4.6 40 tons 18 knots 2 × 12.7mm machine guns; 10 × depth charges 12

58

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

P 17–P 22 launched in 1941. These boats were much larger and built to serve in the A/S role. Overall length increased to 83.5 feet with a beam of 13.8 feet. More powerful machinery boosted their top speed to 18 knots. Armament remained unchanged and the capability to carry and drop depth charges was added. Nothing is known about P 23–P 27. Sources show no new construction and it is possible that they were simply among the myriad of armed harbor tugs or launches that had been taken over by the KM. Likewise, nothing more is known about their eventual fate. However, it can be safely assumed that all or most were scuttled or destroyed to prevent their capture by the Japanese. P 28–P 31 were armed tugs of various sizes that had been taken over by the KM for conversion into local harbor patrol vessels. They were armed with a single machine gun. There were 45 other assorted small vessels of diversified size, speed and armament. P 32–P 36 likely fall into this category as well. They operated in harbors for which larger ships could not be spared. Most were scuttled or destroyed when Java fell, although the Japanese salvaged many of them.

P 37–P 40 Builder Year Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Speed Armament Complement

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja (?) 1941–1942 72 × ? × ? ? 10 2 × 40mm; 2 × 7.7mm 10

P 37–P 40 were not laid down until late 1941-early 1942 and very little is known about them. It is possible that all four boats entered service and operated on the Moesi River in Southern Sumatra. P 38 was burned by her crew, while P 37, P 39 and P 40 were all scuttled to prevent capture.

Minecraft Through necessity, a large part of Dutch plans for defending the NEI fell to latent weapons such as the sea mine. These relatively cost-effective weapons could be deployed on a mass scale to guard harbor entrances and potential landing sites. Following the Great War, a plan calling for up to 4,000 mines in the East Indies had been advocated but never implemented. Upon taking command of the East Indies Squadron in 1939 Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered Commander J.H. van Rinkhuyzen to implement a comprehensive mining plan throughout the Netherlands East Indies.27 All of the large, seagoing minecraft were manned by regular members of the KM. Their crews were typically a mix of personnel from both Europe and the East Indies. These were filled out by reserves after the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. The small auxiliary minecraft—including the new Alor, Ardjoeno, Djember, Merapi and Merbaboe classes—were manned by militarized Indonesian civilians from the Gouvernmentsmarine.

Chart 9: Netherlands East Indies Minefields Location

Number / Type

Tandjoeng Priok 220 Contact; 85 Anti-Sweep Soerabaja 900 Contact; West Entrance 149 Anti-Sweep

Location

Number / Type

Soerabaja East Entrance Balikpapan

116 Contact; 17 Anti-Sweep 200 Contact; 90 Anti-Sweep

Tarakan

308 Contact; 140 Anti-Sweep

Tjilatjap

107 Contact; 41 Anti-Sweep 60 Remote Ground Fire TBA

B 1–B 16 Builder

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja (B 1–B 8) Soerabaja Drydock Company, Soerabaja (B 9–B 12) Palembang Indies Shipyard, Palembang (B 13– B 16) Year 1941–1942 Dimensions (feet) 149.3 × 16.4 × 4.6 Tonnage 130 Speed 19 Armament 1 × 75mm; 1 × 37mm; 2 × 12.7mm; 20 depth charges Complement 18

These 130 ton motor launches were ordered to patrol inland rivers and tributaries of the outer territories. They would have featured petrol engines generating between 1,200 BHP– 1,500 BHP with a top speed of 19 knots. Only B 1 was launched in early March 1942. She was almost immediately destroyed or scuttled to prevent capture. The others were destroyed on their stocks. At least half a dozen were completed by the Japanese and nearly all of those sunk in action.

Ambon Riouw Archipelago

1,060 (None Deployed)

Palembang

Contact mine

Type

Notes

Vickers Deployed after outMark H2 break of war. Vickers 300 Contact/63 AntiMark H2 Sweep mines laid prewar. Protected by Piring Fortress.

Type

Notes

Vickers Deployed after outMark H2 break of war. Vickers 182 Contact/90 AntiMark H2 Sweep mines deployed prewar. 18 Contact mines deployed after outbreak of war. Vickers 166 Contact/66 AntiMark H2 Sweep mines deployed prewar. Vickers Deployed immediately Mark H2 prior to outbreak of war. Australian Deployed prior to outMine break of war. Vickers Area off Tandjoeng Mark H2 Pinang mined December 8–19, 1941. Vickers Deployed prior to outMark T2 break of war.

Rinkhuyzen drew up a program that called for comprehensive mine barrages at Ambon, Balikpapan, Palembang, Soerabaja, Tandjoeng Priok, Tarakan and Tjilatjap. The program initially lagged due to a lack of ordnance and he had to secure mines from multiple sources. Britain was the main supplier, but

6. The East Indies Squadron large numbers were also ordered from Australia and the United States. By December 1941 Rinkhuyzen had deployed 2,471 mines throughout East Indies waters. The primary mines available to the KM in December 1941 were the Vickers H2 and its older counterpart, the Vickers T2. Similar in performance, both weapons had been in service since the early 1920s. There were only limited stocks of the T2 mines available. Most of these were deployed to cover the channel of Tjilatjap in the months prior to Pearl Harbor. The KM received 560 Vickers H2 mines and 500 A Mark XIV mines from the British in early 1941.28 All were intended for use in the Riouw Archipelago, just south of Singapore. Although Dutch territory the British were eager to reinforce these islands in order to further safeguard Singapore. The British approached the Dutch in June 1940 about the possibility of mining the archipelago.29 They were aware of Dutch mine shortages and proactively offered to provide the weapons.30 The mines arrived from Singapore in early 1941.31 They were deployed in the Riouw Archipelago by Willem van der Zaan between December 8 and 19.32 The KM also received 96 magnetic mines originally bound for Singapore; these were likely A Mark VI air-dropped mines. As defenses in Malaysia collapsed they were rerouted to Java where a limited number were deployed in the Moesi River and Banka Strait. The Dutch finalized a deal with Australia for 2,000 mines on October 21, 1941,33 although they would commit to the delivery of only 700 in 1942 due to their own defense needs.34 Those delivered prior to the outbreak of war were deployed at the island of Ambon.35 But in late December 1941 production was greater than originally anticipated; thus on January 2, 1942, the Australian Government approved the immediate transfer of an additional 300 mines to the KM.36 They left Melbourne for Java aboard the passenger ship Boissevain later that month.37 It is doubtful that they were received in time to be deployed. In addition, 1,000 Mark 6 Antenna Mines were ordered in the United States in early 1941. This type of mine had first been developed by the United States for use in the North Sea during World War I and proved very effective.38 It does not appear that any were delivered prior to the surrender of Java. The KM simultaneously initiated a crash program to build 3,000 mines in their own factories on Java. The construction of new mines and development of controlled ground mines received high priority under this program. Production was scheduled to start in August 1941 with delivery of 100 units per month. The KM planned to deploy 135 of their new controlled ground mines at Tjilatjap, but it does not appear that they were completed prior to the surrender of Java.

Chart 10: Dutch Mines in NEI39 Model

Type

Explosive Charge Year

Vickers H2 Vickers T2

Contact Contact

441 lbs 441 lbs

World War I ?

Country of Manufacture Great Britain Netherlands (License Built?)

59

Model

Type

Explosive Charge Year

Country of Manufacture

Vickers(?) Mark XIV Mark 6 Antenna Mine Australian Mine Type A Mark V (Probable) Controlled Ground Mine

Contact

320 lbs

1920s

Great Britain

Antenna

300 lbs

World War I

United States

?

?

1941

Australia40

Magnetic 700 lbs Ground 1,005 lbs Fired

1940 Great Britain 1940s; still Netherlands under development

Major minefields were laid prewar. Smaller barrages were delayed until the start of war due to a shortage of magnetic mines and security reasons. Prior to the war harbors were left clear to minimize the danger to civilian shipping. There were always mines stored locally or at the Madoera Ordnance Depot that would be laid to quickly close them. Some ports had minelayers stationed there permanently to immediately deploy them.

Chart 11: KM Minelayer Activities41 Ship

Location

Date

Eland Dubois Gouden Leeuw

Balikpapan Ambon, Balikpapan, Rembang, Soerabaja, Tarakan, Toeban Bay Eastwater Channel, Madoera Strait, North coast of Madoera, Sapoedi Strait, Westwater Channel Tarakan Air Salang, Avi Lalang, Banjoe-Asin, Eastwater Channel, Moesi River, Palembang Unspecified minefields throughout NEI Balikpapan Singapore Approaches (Riouw Archipelago)

June–July 1940 September 1939– February 1942

Krakatau

Prins van Oranje Pro Patria

Rigel Soemenep Willem van der Zaan

December–January

December December

December–March December December42

As it turned out, the mines had little impact on the East Indies campaign. The Japanese—often warned by spies or prewar reconnaissance—were able to avoid or sweep the area. They also anchored their convoys 5 to 10 miles offshore to avoid mines. In the end they still achieved their purpose, which was to defend key areas at minimal cost. And in the process they sank a handful of Japanese ships.

Minelayers The Dutch had approximately 40 minecraft—ranging from 80–1,600 tons—in service in the East Indies. A number of vessels were under construction on Java in December 1941 but few were completed before the fall of Java. The KM mobi-

60

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

lized a number of auxiliary minecraft; most were small coastal types designed to work close to shore. All were employed as harbor defense vessels and convoy escorts.

invasion fleet blocked her escape to Java, Pro Patria was scuttled that afternoon.

Prins van Oranje Class (Gouden Leeuw, Prins van Oranje)

Krakatau Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Naval Shipyard, Soerabaja 213.3 × 34.4 × 10.5 982 tons 1 × Shaft; 1 × Triple Expansion Engine 15.5 knots 2 × 75mm (1 × 1); 4 × 12.7mm; 150 mines 91

When launched in December 1924 Krakatau was one of the biggest ships built in the East Indies. At the time, larger ships designed by the ME suffered from instability as did Krakatau. In October 1933 the minelayer capsized in calm water in the Eastwater Channel. She was refloated and towed into the ME where repairs were made and her design flaws addressed. Soon after the outbreak of war Krakatau was reconfigured for use as a tender for motor torpedo boat flotilla.

Ram Class (Ram, Regulus) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Tandjoeng Drydock Company 288.7 × 41.7 × 13.8 2,400 tons 2-Shaft Enterprise Diesel Engines; 4,800 BHP 15 knots 2 × 75mm; 2 × 40mm; 25 × depth charges; 80 mines 120

The Ram class consisted of two 2,400 ton ocean-going minelayers authorized in February 1940 for the East Indies Squadron. Ram was laid down before the war and launched in December 1941. She was never completed and was towed to Tjilatjap and scuttled on March 3. Regulus was blown up before being launched.

Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

International Ship Construction Yard, De Mass 216.5 × 36.1 × 11.6 1,291 tons 2 × Shafts, 2 × Triple Expansion Engines; 1,750 IHP 15 knots 2 × 75mm; 2 × 40mm; 2 × 12.7mm; 150 mines 67

Gouden Leeuw laid mine barrages off Balikpapan, Tarakan and in Ambon Bay in December January. The latter claimed a Japanese minesweeper during the invasion of Ambon. From January–February she remained in the ME where her guns formed part of the harbor defenses and she claimed two Japanese planes shot down. Prins van Oranje was laying a minefield at Tarakan when Pearl Harbor was attacked. On December 15 she transported Japanese internees from Tawao in British North Borneo to Tarakan. She then returned to Tarakan and was the target of an air attack on January 9. This raid focused on Prins van Oranje as her gunfire had helped break up a previous attack. An invasion fleet appeared the next day and Prins van Oranje was sunk as she attempted to escape.

Willem van der Zaan Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Netherlands Drydock Company, Amsterdam 246.9 × 36.8 × 11.2 1,407 tons 2 × Shafts, 2 × Triple Expansion Engines, 2 × Yarrow Boilers; 2,300 IHP 15 knots 2 × 120mm; 4 × 40mm (2 × 2); 4 × 12.7mm (2 × 2); 120 mines 90 + 40 cadets (prewar design)

Pro Patria Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Soerabaja Naval Yard 154.2 × 28.2 × 9.2 537 tons 1 × Single Shaft, Triple Expansion Engine; 650 IHP 10 knots 1 × 75mm; 2 × 12.7mm; 80 mines 62

Pro Patria was a converted coastal vessel that entered service in August 1923. After the outbreak of war she moved to Palembang where she mined the Moesi, Air Salang and Benjoe Asin rivers. She then laid booms in the Avi Lalang River for MLD planes. On February 15 she engaged Japanese aircraft dropping parachutists on the nearby oil refineries. Since a Japanese

Willem van der Zaan (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

6. The East Indies Squadron Willem van der Zaan entered service in 1939 and was the last and largest minelayer built by the KM. She was in Holland during the German invasion but escaped to England. She reached Tandjoeng Priok in January 1941. She was the first KM warship equipped with SONAR, having received it in England prior to her departure. Because Willem van der Zaan doubled as an officer cadet training ship, her equipment and armament were sophisticated and heavy. Her mine deck was fully enclosed. A single-engine floatplane could be carried and launched from amidships by crane, but was never shipped during the East Indies campaign.

Bangkalan (Auxiliary Minelayer) Builder

Netherlands Indies Shipyard & Coastal Navigation Company, Lasem ( Java) Dimensions (feet) 140.9 × 24.6 × 9.7 Tonnage 397 tons Machinery 1 × Triple Expansion Engines Speed 10 knots Armament 2 × 12.7mm; 30 mines Complement 17

The Netherlands Indies Shipyard & Coastal Travel Company originally built Bangkalan in 1926 as the civilian tug Willem van Braam. Taken over by the KM in 1936, she served as the auxiliary training vessel Hydrograaf with the East Indies Hydrographic Service for several years. In early 1942 she was converted into an auxiliary minelayer and re-commissioned as Bangkalan. Shortly after reentering service in February 1942 she was heavily damaged in a Japanese air raid on the ME and scuttled by her crew.

Rigel (Auxiliary Minelayer) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Netherlands Drydock, Amsterdam 221.5 × 36.2 × 10 1,631 tons 2 × Shafts, 2 × Triple Expansion Engines; 1,400 IHP 12.5 knots 1 × 75mm; 2 × 12.7mm; 150 mines 67

Launched on March 7, 1931, Rigel was a dual-purpose ship. In peacetime she was the official yacht for the Governor General. In September 1939 she was requisitioned by the KM and converted into a minelayer. Rigel carried out mining and patrol duties until Java fell, when she was scuttled as a blockship at Tandjoeng Priok on March 2.

Soemenep (Auxiliary Minelayer) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Soerabaja Drydock Company, Soerabaja 117.7 × 26.6 × 9.3 227 tons 1 × Triple Expansion Engine; 395 IHP 10 knots 2 × 12.7mm; 26 mines 26

Launched in 1931, the auxiliary minelayer Soemenep was originally built for the East Indies Government. In 1940 she

61

was taken over by the KM and converted into an auxiliary minelayer. After extensive overhaul and reconstruction she reentered service on June 17, 1941. Soemenep laid a number of minefields off the east coast of Borneo.

Minesweepers Jan van Amstel Class (Abraham Crijnssen, Eland Dubois, Jan van Amstel, Pieter de Bitter) Builder

P. Smit Jr., Rotterdam and Gusto v/h Smulders, Schiedam Dimensions (feet) 183.1 × 25.9 × 7.2 Tonnage 460 tons Machinery 2 × Shafts, 2 × Triple Expansion Engines, 2 × Yarrow Boilers; 1,690 IHP Speed 15 knots Armament 1 × 75mm; 4 × 12.7mm (2 × 2) Complement 90 + 40 cadets (prewar design)

Japanese destroyers sank Jan Van Amstel—the class name ship—in the Madoera Strait as she attempted an escape to Australia on March 8. Her sister ship, Eland Dubois, was scuttled that same day. On March 6 Pieter De Bitter was also scuttled. Heavily camouflaged with branches and palm leaves, Abraham Crijnssen slipped out of Soerabaja on March 7 and escaped to Australia. She still survives today as a floating exhibit at the Naval Museum in Den Helder, the Netherlands. The remaining minesweepers were a mixed lot ranging in size and armament. All but the oldest four had been built on Java for use in the East Indies. Though their primary role was mine warfare they performed a number of secondary duties, including harbor patrol and light escort.

A Class Minesweepers (A, B, C, D) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Royal Shipyard, Willemsoord 140.4 × 19.7 × 4.9 179 tons 2 × Shafts, 2 × Triple Expansion Engines, 690 IHP 14 knots 2 × 12.7mm 38

These were the oldest minesweepers on the East Indies station. All served as light escorts and harbor patrol boats until being scuttled at the campaign’s end. A, B and C were salvaged by the Japanese and commissioned as submarine chasers until 1945, when they were sunk by U.S. forces.

Alor Class (Alor, Aroe, Bantam, Boeroe, Bogor, Ceram, Cheribon) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company 103.7 × 17.7 × 6 145 tons 296 HP 12 knots 2 × 37mm; 2 × 7.7mm 17

The Alor class was also built at Tandjoeng Priok and entered service in 1938. All were scuttled at Tandjoeng Priok and

62

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942 fitting out at Tandjoeng Priok. Djember, Djombangh, Djambea and Engano were scuttled on March 2. Endeh was sunk trying to escape from Tandjoeng Priok in early March. The remainder were destroyed incomplete at Tandjoeng Priok.

Merbaboe Class (Merbaboe, Rindjani, Smeroe) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Alor (left), Bogor (center) and Ceram (right). Three white rings on the funnel identify them as the 3rd Minesweeper Division (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

completely wrecked except for Bantam, which the Japanese raised and commissioned as submarine chaser Cha 117. She was sunk by the American submarine Hardhead north of Bali in 1945.

Ardjoeno Class (Ardjoeno, Gedeh, Kawi, Lawoe, Salak) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Soerabaja Drydock Company 65.6 × 13.8 × 4.8 51 tons 133 HP 10 knots 2 × 7.7mm 14

Soerabaja Drydock Company 74.5 × 14.3 × 5 60 tons 133 HP 10 knots 2 × 7.7mm 14

Merbaboe, Rindjani and Smeroe were the first diesel- powered mine sweepers built in the Far East. All escaped to Australia on March 3, 1942. In 1945 they returned to Java and were transferred to the Indonesian Navy in 1951.

Merapi Class (Merapi, Slamat, Tjerimei) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Prauwenveer Shipyard, Batavia 74.5 × 14.3 × 5 60 tons 133 HP 10 knots 2 × 7.7mm 14

The entire Ardjoeno class was scuttled at the ME on March 2. Ardjoerno, Kawi and Salak were raised by the Japanese. All were sunk by Allied forces.

Djember Class (Djampea, Djember, Djombangh, Endeh, Enggano, Fak-Fak, Flores, Garoet, Grissee) Builder

Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company Dimensions (feet) 113.6 × 18.7 × 6.2 Tonnage 175 tons Machinery 355 HP Speed 10 knots Armament 1 × 12.7mm Complement 17

All of these small coastal minesweepers had been launched but several were still

The diesel powered minesweeper Djombangh was scuttled at Tandjoeng Priok in March 1942 (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

6. The East Indies Squadron These auxiliary minesweepers were captured by the Japanese still on the stocks at Tandjoeng Priok. Although heavily damaged the Japanese used parts from the other two boats to complete Tjerimei. She entered service as an auxiliary submarine chaser and was sunk by American aircraft on April 8, 1945.

Ciska (Auxiliary Minesweeper) Builder

Jonker & Stans Shipyard, Hendrik Ido Ambact (the Netherlands) Dimensions (feet) ? Tonnage 133 tons Machinery 456 HP Speed 9 knots Armament 2 × 12.7mm Complement 17

Ciska was launched in 1930 as a civilian tug. In 1939 she was to be converted into a buoy ship. Later that year the KM ordered her rebuilt as an auxiliary minesweeper. She was damaged and then scuttled at Soerabaja in March 1942.

Holland (Auxiliary Minesweeper) Builder

Jonker & Stans Shipyard, Hendrik Ido Ambact (the Netherlands) Dimensions (feet) ? Tonnage 120 tons Machinery 456 HP Speed 9 knots Armament 2 × 12.7mm Complement 17

Holland was originally launched as a civilian tug in 1928. On September 30, 1939, she was requisitioned by the KM and rebuilt into an auxiliary minesweeper. She was scuttled at Soerabaja in March 1942.

“B Class” (Auxiliary Minesweeper) Builder Dimensions (feet) Tonnage Machinery Speed Armament Complement

Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company 173.1 × 21 × 6.7 310 tons 2,269 HP 18 knots ? ?

Construction of these auxiliary minesweepers started just prior to the outbreak of war. Their intended role is unclear as various sources also have them classified as patrol boats. Few details are known and none were completed. All were destroyed to prevent capture. Due to their embryonic state of construction none were completed by the Japanese.

Gouvernmentsmarine The Department of Shipping was a bureaucratic agency that operated exclusively in the East Indies. It consisted of the Buoy and Lighthouse Service, Gouvernmentsmarine (GM) and Regional Patrol Service.43 Although technically separate branches, all were interlinked and operated a range of patrol boats, survey ships, light ships, tugs, etc.44 Larger Buoy and Lighthouse Service and GM ships typically displaced 800 to 1,000 tons. Regional patrol vessels usually displaced 150 to 200 tons. They

63

performed many duties performed by today’s United States Coast Guard, Customs Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Law enforcement included drug, piracy and smuggling interdiction. They also enforced territorial integrity and catch limits for foreign fishing and pearl boats. Routine maritime duties included charting seaways and ports and maintenance of buoys and lighthouses. Periodically vessels were assigned to support scientific missions to Borneo and New Guinea. They also transported small amounts of cargo and personnel over short distances within the archipelago.45 From 1936 the GM and KM cooperated to patrol NEI waters. They initiated a crackdown on Japanese intelligencegathering inside the three-mile limit disguised as fishing activity. The GM patrol boat Arend and gunboat Flores operated in the Eastern half of the archipelago, each with the support of three MLD seaplanes. They were joined by the auxiliary ship Zuiderkruis off the north coast of New Guinea where the KM held large-scale naval exercises.46 The Department of Shipping cooperated closely with the KM but was still a peacetime civilian agency. That changed with the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. A number of Gouvernmentsmarine “White Ships” were militarized; they were painted warship grey and their crews taken into KM service. Ships of the Regional Patrol Service were also militarized and came under KM operational control as of October 11, 1939.47 Militarized officers received naval ranks that equated to those of their civilian service. Indonesian crewmen, who comprised the majority of the GM’s deckhands, retained their civilian rank and duties. GM sailors continued to wear their civilian uniform. From September 1939 they sewed an orange cotton band around the upper left sleeve to denote their new military status. Officers and men of the Regional Patrol Service maintained their civilian status.48

Chart 12: Gouvernmentsmarine Ships49 Name

Displacement (Tons)

Year Launched

Hoofdinspecteur Zeeman Albatros II Orion Aldebaran Canopus Bellatrix Deneb Castor Tydeman Eridanus Gemma Pollux Wega Sirius

803 807 1052 892 773 773 773 670 1160 996 845 1012 1014 1018

1909 1912 1912 1913 1914 1915 1915 1915 1916 1918 1918 1922 1922 1922

Fomalhaut Zuiderkruis

1001 2661

1923 1924

Armament — 2 × 37 mm — — 2 × 37 mm 1 × 75 mm 2 × 37 mm — 2 × 37 mm 2 × 37 mm 1 × 75 mm 1 × 75 mm 1 × 75 mm 1 × 75 mm 1 × .30 2 × 37 mm 2 × 75 mm 2 × 20 mm 4 × .30

64

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

boats then under construction. All were ordered converted to auxiliary minesweepers prior to completion. The GM patrol boats were assigned to local defense, patrols in the Soenda Strait and convoy escort. They also searched for German and Italian merchant cruisers rumored to be operating in NEI waters. The patrol boats were armed with 37mm or 75mm deck guns. These weapons had been built or salvaged from decommissioned armored cruisers or battleships around the turn of the century. They had short range and slow rate of fire.53 The condition of their AA Lawoe was a former customs service police boat impressed by the KM in September 1939 as Auxiliary defenses was even more dismal and in many cases bordered on Minesweeper 7 (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). criminal neglect. Only five miliDisplacement Year tarized GM ships received any kind of AA weapons consisting Name (Tons) Launched Armament of 7.7mm or 12.7mm machine guns. Most had no defense against Willibrord air attack other than carbines and pistols. Rigel received a single Snellius 930 1928 1 × 75 mm 12.7mm machine gun in mid–1941. She was the only GM ship Merel 600 1928 1 × 75 mm to draw blood when her gunners claimed an unconfirmed JapaValk 748/1011 1929 2 × 75 mm nese fighter shot down at Soerabaja on February 3, 1942. 1 × .30 As a result of this deficiency GM ships were heavily 1 floatplane Arend II 748/1011 1929 2 × 75 mm bombed with near impunity through the campaign and several 1 × .30 were lost as a result. In one instance a GM ship—the survey 1 floatplane vessel Willebrord Snellius—was escorting a convoy that came Reiger 600 1930 1 × 75 mm under air attack from Japanese bombers. Armed only with an Fazant II 623 1931 1 × 75 mm Rigel

1631

1931

Poolster

1565

1939

1 × .30 2 × 75 mm 2 × .50 150 mines Asdic 1 × 75 mm 2 × .50

The GM patrol boat Rigel was converted into an auxiliary minelayer. At the same time, the GM patrol boats Arend, Fazant, Reiger, Sirius and Valk were converted into aircraft tenders. Arend and Valk were so-called “Opium Jagers” with a top speed of 17 knots and were also assigned to convoy duty.50 The GM patrol boats Ram and Regulus were converted to minelayers while still under construction. The tugboat Bangkalan was also converted. The Buoy and Lighthouse Service ships Castor and Poolster were converted into a repair ship and motor torpedo boat tender, respectively. The GM cableship Zuiderkruis had already been converted into a submarine tender before the war.51 The militarization of the Regional Patrol Service brought all remaining civilian craft under KM control.52 These included the small Alor, Ardjoeno, Djember and Smeroe class patrol

Korporaal Torpedomaker Maarten Klootwijk supervises Indonesian sailors during a changing of the guard at the Oedjoeng mine depot (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

6. The East Indies Squadron obsolete 75mm surface mount and two 7.7mm machine guns, the “warship” promptly had to be protected by the superior AA fire of the Norwegian tanker that she was supposedly protecting! Prewar service in all the armed forces was considered prestigious by many Indonesians.54 Yet, social and political missteps by the Dutch, a growing Nationalist movement, Japanese propaganda and military setbacks badly impacted morale amongst Indonesian crews. By the end of the East Indies campaign there were many desertions. On March 1, 1942, the head of the Department of Shipping, Superintendent J. Kuiper, requested that Vice-Admiral Helfrich officially demobilize his civilian forces. Kuiper hoped that this would allow his personnel to avoid Japanese captivity. Helfrich agreed and issued the order, which only applied to the Buoy and Lighthouse Service, Regional Patrol Service and cer-

65

tain elements of the Gouvernmentsmarine. Those GM personnel who had been formally conscripted into the KM were to remain at their posts. But as word of the order spread, many Indonesians promptly deserted. Even the conscripts aboard KM warships abandoned their posts. As result, dozens of GM and KM ships could not sail from Java and were destroyed or scuttled. Their European officers were either interned in civilian camps or put into prisoner of war camps. For their part, the Indonesians simply went home. Many were quickly re-hired by the Japanese to raise, repair and crew the scuttled Dutch vessels. Of the 58 ships belonging to the Buoy and Lighthouse Service, Gouvernmentsmarine and Regional Patrol Service, 54 were lost.55 Only Zuiderkruis was able to escape to Colombo. In addition, three Smeroe class auxiliary minesweepers—Merbaboe, Smeroe and Rinjani—sailed to Australia.

Chapter 7

The MLD The Marine Luchtvaart Dienst (MLD)—or Dutch Naval Air Force—was formed in 1916 with interned German aircraft and officer volunteers from the surface fleet. It has since operated as a separate entity within the KM. In December 1941 Dutch naval doctrine called for the MLD to work closely with the fleet by relaying the position, course and speed of enemy warships. It also provided key support in the areas of long-range reconnaissance, convoy escort, Air/Sea Rescue and A/S duties. The MLD was in the midst of a rapid expansion program when Germany invaded Holland. Funds had been authorized for increased personnel and new planes using a combination of Dutch and German built aircraft. Most of this growth was to be based in the East Indies to counter growing Japanese influence in Asia. However, events of May 1940 totally disrupted these plans. This left Dutch forces in the East Indies on their own. The Dornier aircraft factory in Germany had long been a preferred provider of long-range flying boats. They were supplemented by a multitude of indigenous short and medium range floatplanes built by the Fokker and Van Berkel aircraft factories in Holland itself. Hitler’s invasion cut off supplies of aircraft from both sources, forcing the MLD to turn to other nations, particularly the United States, for aircraft and equipment.1 The occupation of Holland also shut off access to spare engines, propellers, parts and related material necessary to keep these aircraft flying. The Dutch operated a myriad of machine shops and other manufacturing facilities in the East Indies, but as a colony, they did not have a strong industrial base. As a result, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the existing fleet of Dornier and Fokker aircraft as they became older. As the only neutral nation with an established aircraft manufacturing base, the United States was the MLD’s first and only stop for new equipment. Prior to December 1941 the United States Navy did not place a particularly high priority on reconnaissance aircraft,

which greatly reduced the stress on aviation manufacturers. Still, the MLD did have to compete, often quite fiercely, against the British Royal Air Force for newer aircraft like the Consolidated PBY Catalina which was also in service with the USN. Companies, such as Vought/Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, did not have contracts with the U.S. military, which gave them ample production capacity to meet Dutch needs.

Fokker T.IVa (T Boats) The most numerous Fokker seaplane were 11 twin-engine T.IVa floatplanes. Featuring all-metal construction and two large floats under the fuselage, the T.IV had been designed as a torpedo/level bomber and reconnaissance plane in the mid– 1920s. It was awkward-looking and resembled a pregnant cow. Nonetheless, the T.IV was reliable and seaworthy. It was the MLD’s first long-range seaplane which allowed for effective patrolling of the outer territories for the first time.2 Twelve originally reached Java in 1927 where they were designated as “T” class flying boats. In operational service they were typically called “T-Boats.” The original T.IV version fea-

T-IVa (courtesy of Jan Klootwijk).

66

7. The MLD tured open cockpits and gun positions. Twelve modified T.IVa aircraft reached Java in 1935 and incorporated more powerful engines, heavier armament, enclosed cockpits and gun positions and a strengthened airframe to accommodate the design upgrades. The original T.IVs were upgraded to T.IVa version by MLD workshops on Java shortly afterwards. Eleven aircraft remained in service by December 1941. They operated as Groep Vliegtuigen (Squadrons) GVT.11 and GVT.12. During the East Indies campaign, these planes were used for bombardier training, reconnaissance and A/S patrols along the north coast of Java and over the Java Sea. None were lost in combat, but it appears that several may have been lost on the water during Japanese air raids. The surviving T-Boats were destroyed to prevent their capture.

Fokker C.XI-W (W Planes) The Fokker C.XI-W was a two-man, bi-wing floatplane specifically designed for shipboard service. It had stressed wings for catapult launches and a range of 453 miles. The C.XI-W entered service in 1938 and was utilized primarily for observation and reconnaissance. KM naval doctrine did not call for the use of shipboard aircraft to spot shell fire during daylight naval battles. Rather, it used them primarily for observation and reconnaissance duties. Nor did these planes operate at night or carry flares for the illumination of enemy forces. Five aircraft—W-1, W-8, W-11, W-12 and W-13—were operational in December 1941. They primarily flew off the light cruisers De Ruyter and Java and were used extensively through-

67

out the East Indies campaign. MLD personnel destroyed all of the remaining C.XI-Ws when Java was overrun.

Chart 13: MLD Auxiliary Seaplanes3 Fokker T.IVa Squadron Aircraft December 7, 1941 Remarks T-1

—

T-2

—

T-3 T-4 T-5 T-6 T-7 T-8 T-9 T-10 T-11 T-12 T-13

— — — — — — — — — — —

T-14

—

T-15

GVT.11

T-16 T-17 T-18 T-19 T-20

GVT.11 GVT.11 GVT.11 GVT.11 GVT.12

Damaged and written off October 16, 1937, following accident. Written off and taken out of service 1939–40. " " " " " " " " " " Damaged and written off October 12, 1937, following accident. Damaged and written off May 26, 1941, following accident. Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941. " " " " Destroyed at Morokrembangan by Japanese fighters February 3, 1942.

C-XI-W being hoisted aboard an unidentified light cruiser (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

68

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Aircraft

Squadron December 7, 1941 Remarks

T-21

GVT.12

T-22

GVT.12

T-23

GVT.12

T-24

GVT.12

Fokker C.XI-W December Aircraft 7, 1941 W-1

GVT.13 or GVT.14

W-2

—

W-4 W-5

GVT.13 or GVT.14 —

W-6

—

W-7

—

W-8 W-10

GVT.13 or GVT.14 "

W-11

"

W-12

" De Ruyter

W-13 W-14

" "

W-15

"

Fokker C.XIV-W December Aircraft 7, 1941 F-1

F-5 F-6 F-13 F-15 F-16 F-17 F-18 F-22 F-23

Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941. Destroyed at Morokrembangan by Japanese fighters February 3, 1942. Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941. "

Remarks Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941. Damaged and written off January 1939 following accident. Destroyed at Morokrembangan by Japanese fighters February 3, 1942. Damaged and written off May 1939 following accident. Damaged and written off August 7, 1940, following accident. Damaged and written off September 26, 1939, following landing accident at Blinjoe, Banka; attached to De Ruyter. Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941. Destroyed at Morokrembangan by Japanese fighters February 3, 1942. Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941. Shot down by Japanese fighter near Tjepoe, Java February 18, 1942. Lost in accident June 17, 1941. Destroyed at Morokrembangan by Japanese fighters February 3, 1942. Destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong Lake to prevent capture March 2, 1941.

Remarks

MLD Flight Date of loss unknown, but likely destroyed in Japanese air attack on Morokrembangan February 1942. Or destroyed by MLD personnel March 1942 to prevent capture. " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "

C-XIV-W in flight over Java (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

Fokker C.XIV-W (F Planes) The Fokker C.XIV-W was a twin-float, single-engine biplane designed for training and light reconnaissance. The crew consisted of a pilot and observer who also manned a flexible 7.7mm machine gun in the rear cockpit. A total of 24 aircraft were built and all were initially based in Europe. As with all MLD aircraft they were numbered sequentially and identified by the letter “F.” Eleven C.XIV-Ws survived the German invasion and were flown to France where they operated briefly. When the French surrendered they crossed the English Channel to Britain. In late 1941 they were crated and shipped to Java. It is possible that several were lost in Japanese air raids, but this is uncertain. All remaining aircraft were destroyed to prevent capture when Java surrendered to the Japanese.

Fokker C.VII-W (V Planes) This was another twin-float biplane designed for light reconnaissance and advanced trainer duties. The C.VII-W featured a two-man crew and first entered service in the mid–1920s. The MLD obtained 18 aircraft for service in the East Indies; of these a handful (the exact number is unknown) were still operational in 1941.4 They were primarily utilized for airborne torpedo launch and bad weather flight training. Their operational history and any subsequent losses are unknown. Any aircraft that survived the campaign were destroyed to prevent capture.

Dornier Do. 15 “Whale” (D Boats) The MLD and Dornier aircraft factory had a business relationship going back to the mid–1920s. The Dutch bought 46 Dornier Do. 15 “Whales” that were initially intended to replace

7. The MLD

69 The C-VII-W was employed primarily in a light reconnaissance and advanced trainer role (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

Below: A serene peacetime snapshot of two Do. 15 “Whales” taking off with the light cruiser Java in the background (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

their Fokker T.IVs. However, the Fokkers had a longer operational life than expected and the “Whales” eventually only supplemented them. The first six “D Boats” arrived on Java in 1926. They were highly valued for their ability to land and take off from short waterways. Six of the 10 remaining “Whales” were still operational in December 1941, although newer Dornier Do. 24K flying boats had phased them out of front-line service.5 They were used as advanced trainers by the MLD flight training school.

Dornier Do. 24K-1 (X Boats) The Do. 24s were large, sturdy planes designed for longrange reconnaissance and Air/Sea rescue in the expanses of the East Indies. The MLD initially approached Dornier with the request for an entirely new design of flying boat to replace their aging Do. 15s. It was from this request that the Do. 24K took flight. It was a large, tri-engine flying boat with a heavy hull, good defensive armament and a maximum range just under 3,000 miles. The K-1 prototype was delivered in 1937 and extensively

tested in the North Sea. It was followed by 11 German-built production models in 1937–38. The Aviolanda aircraft factory at Papendrecht, Holland, then took over production and license-built 25 more K-1 models. The MLD ordered 60 Do. 24Ks for service in the East Indies. However, the order was reduced to 48 in 1939 to free up additional funding for the M-KNIL. Of these, only 36 Dutchbuilt 24K-1 models arrived before the German invasion of Holland in May 1940. Once in service they rapidly began replacing the Fokker T.IVs and Do. 15s in frontline service. One of these flying boats, the X-4, was lost in an accident with her entire crew in April 1940. Initial production on the Do. 24K-2 series began in 1940. Its biggest upgrade was the addition of more powerful engines that would help the big seaplane more effectively operate from short jungle waterways. The first aircraft, designated X-37, reached Java later that year. Unfortunately, both its engines proved defective; because they were a completely new type existing spares could not be used. The plane then sat unused until new powerplants arrived from Holland. Unfortunately the German invasion prevented this and X-37 never saw service.6

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

A total of 35 PBYs reached Java by the end of January 1942.8 The first three PBY to arrive were attached to the MLD Flight Training School at Soerabaja to begin familiarizing trainees and veterans alike with the new planes. The MLD did not have trained aircrews immediately available to man the rest of the PBY. They initially went into reserve and did not start replacing the Dorniers until losses among frontline units began to mount. The first PBY equipped squadrons went into service at Tjilatjap in mid–January. Although the PBY had greater range it had lighter armament and only two engines. As a result, many Dutch flight crews preferred the heavier Dorniers with their 9 X-19 in formation with a second, unidentified Do. 24. Her lack of armament and dorsal 20mm cannon and third engine. MLD turret (to save on fuel consumption) indicate that this is a prewar flight (courtesy Jan losses were extremely heavy with 27 PBYs Klootwijk). lost in the East Indies. These figures include a Dutch PBY lost in the attack on Pearl Dornier losses were heavy. No less than 29 of the original Harbor, but not the loss of three additional Catalinas loaned 35 Do.24K-1s were lost in action or through accidents. Only to the British at Singapore shortly after the outbreak of war. six escaped to fight another day. As their losses mounted and The remaining 12 Catalinas on order were delivered sevthe new Consolidated PBY 5 Catalinas became available, the eral months later to those MLD forces in Ceylon that had esDo.24K gradually was phased out of service. caped from Java.10 They equipped 321 Squadron which was attached to the Royal Air Force. They flew A/S and Search/ 7 Rescue missions for the remainder of the Pacific war.

Consolidated PBY Catalina (Y Boats)

As part of an emergency plan to build up the MLD following the occupation of Holland, the MLD ordered 48 Consolidated PBY-5 Catalinas in 1940. The first PBYs arrived at Morokrembangan in September 1941; they were flown from San Diego across the Pacific to Manila by American civilians. There MLD flight crews took over and ferried the planes down to Soerabaja.

Subsidized Flight Training 11

To address the shortage of pilots both the Army and Navy faced, the East Indies Government supported several initiatives designed to promote general interest in aviation throughout the NEI. The private Nederlands Indisch Luchtvaart Fonds (NILF or Netherlands Indies Aviation Fund) was raised in 1938 to fund recreational flight training. In March 1941 the East Indies Government launched the Vrijwilleger Vlieger Corps (Volunteer Flying Corps or VVC). The two programs were unrelated but their goal was the same. Young men, age 17 to 20 could learn to fly at heavily subsidized rates of roughly ƒ2 per hour.12 This would provide the MLD and ML-KNIL with a trained reserve of pilots in the event of war. They became part of the Reserves and were called up for operational training. Both branches provided instructors for the program. NILF flying clubs were established at Bandoeng, Batavia, Semaran, A MLD PBY somewhere over the Pacific, circa 1944 (author’s collection). Soerabaja and South Sumatra. They

7. The MLD trained on five German-built Bücker Jungmann primary trainers bought in 1940. The first VVC flying club was established at Bandoeng in March 1941 in Bandoeng. Additional clubs were formed later in the year at Balikpapan, Djokja,13 Malang, Medan, Semarang and Soerabaja.14 The VVC clubs flew Tiger Moth trainers. Between May 1940 and December 1941 the East Indies Government purchased 48 Tiger Moth primary trainers from Australia. Of these 15 were assigned to the MLD and 11 to VVC flying clubs. In addition there were two Piper Cub light aircraft. Many of the reserve pilots called up by the MLD received their primary flight training via these clubs.

Ryan STM Trainers (S Planes) The Dutch also ordered 48 Ryan trainer floatplanes for pilot training by the MLD. Half of these planes were the STM 2 model with ordinary land configuration, while the remainder were the STM S2 model equipped with floats. All arrived between 1940–41 with 12 American military instructors to help the MLD speed up the training process. These planes and their American instructors were attached to the MLD Flight School at the main seaplane base at Morokrembangan on Java. Thirtyfour STMs were evacuated to Australia in March 1942, where they were bought by the Australian government and transferred to the RAAF.

Douglas DB-7 (D Planes) The MLD still had a large number of planes on order when the Japanese attacked. The largest order included 80 Douglas DB-7C light bombers that the MLD intended to use as torpedo bombers. They were to be assigned “D Series” identification numbers from the retired Do. 18 seaplanes. Fortyeight were bought by the Dutch and constructed by Douglas; the MLD received only six planes before Java fell. Only one got into the air to bomb the Japanese on the beaches. The remaining five were destroyed by the Dutch or captured by the Japanese.

Vought/Sikorsky VS-310 (V Planes) This was the export version of the U.S. Navy’s OS2U Kingfisher; it was a modern single engine floatplane designed to operate either from land or sea. It first flew in 1938 and a Dutch order for 24 planes, including spare engines, propellers and parts, followed in 1940. Designated V-1 through V-24 they were intended to replace the MLD’s aging Fokker C.VII-W, C.XI-W and C.XIV-W floatplanes. Java fell before they were delivered; 18 were transferred to the Royal Australian Air Force with the remainder being transferred to Mexico.

Beechcraft C-45 Expediter Twenty-four of these planes were ordered by the MLD for use as advanced trainers. After the fall of Java they were instead

71

delivered to the MLD Flight Training School that was set up at Jackson, Mississippi. There, training of Dutch pilots and flight crews continued until 1944.

Vought/Sikorsky VS-43 The MLD also ordered 48 Sikorsky VS-43 flying boats. This popular twin-engine flying boat was in widespread service with many civilian airlines around the world. One of the biggest operators was KNILM (Koninklijke Nederlandse Indische Lucht Maatschappij or Royal Netherlands Indies Air Company), the East Indies Government subsidized civilian passenger line. Like so many other aircraft and weapons ordered by the Dutch, they too did not arrive in time. KNILM airline operated a diverse mixture of land, sea and amphibious aircraft along an extensive network of air routes connecting the East Indies to Europe, Australia, New Guinea, Asia and Japan. Shortly after the start of the Pacific War, many of the airline’s pilots, aircrews and ground personnel were absorbed by the MLD and hastily retrained on the seaplanes in use with the Naval Air Service. Drafted land pilots were forced to learn the intricacies of seaplane operations. In addition to seaplane flight instruction, their training included the basic regulations and rules of seamanship regarding harbor navigation, water currents, jetties, buoys and anchorages. They also had to learn advanced theories governing how and where to land depending on wind direction and force, wave motion, swell and water depth. In addition, flight crews and ground personnel accustomed to land operations learned how to service seaplanes on the water, fuel planes from barges and carry out maintenance without the benefit of a dock. Along with its land-based fleet of Douglas, Fokker, Ford and Lockheed aircraft, KNILM operated one four-engine Vought/Sikorsky VS-42 flying boat and several twin-engine Vought/Sikorsky VS-43 and Grumman G-21 seaplanes. Despite the fighting these aircraft maintained passenger, mail and resupply flights between Java, outlying territories of the East Indies, Malaya and Australia. They also flew a number of longrange missions to resupply isolated KNIL outposts in Dutch New Guinea. The unarmed civilian airliners’ best defense was to avoid combat. Even so, by the time KNILM received permission to evacuate its planes to Australia on February 19, 1942, heavy losses had already been suffered. Of the 30 aircraft operated by the airline on December 7, 1941, no less than 18 were lost. Among the flying boats lost was the airline’s lone VS-42, two VS-43s and three of its four Grumman G-21 “Goose” flying boats.

Training and Organization The basic MLD formation was the three-plane GVT (Groep Vliegtuig or Aircraft Group). In December 1941 eight GVTs totaling 24 planes (all Do. 24Ks) formed the backbone

72

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

of the MLD’s frontline reconnaissance strength. These units were spread throughout the East Indies to cover strategic locations. Eleven Dornier formed a small reserve that was supplemented by the new PBYs. The MLD was a well trained organization, with its primary function being to support the fleet with air reconnaissance, photography, gunnery spotting and general assistance as needed. As would be expected, the level of cooperation between the air and surface arms was extremely high. After two decades of close cooperation, the KM and MLD had developed a very efficient system with extensive radio contact exchanged directly and efficiently between aircraft and ships. All prewar exercises carried out by the Dutch revolved around this organization. The system was sound and worked to a very high degree of precision.

Chart 14: MLD Squadrons in the Netherlands East Indies15 M.L.D. Commander(s): Captain K.W.F.M. Doorman Captain G.G. Bozuwa Captain P.J. Hendrikse

August 17, 1938–May 5, 1940 May 5, 1940–January 16, 1942 January 16, 1942–March 3, 1942 (KIA at Broome, Australia March 3)

GVT.1 X-15, X-35, X-36 Lieutenant-Commander December 7, 1941–December 29, 1941 J.H.J. Nepveu (KIA aboard X-15 December 29) Based Sambas, Borneo, with support points at Kuching and the Natoena Islands. Seaplane tender at Sambas was the Gouvernmentsmarine ship Poolster. Squadron transferred to Morokrembangan December 29, 1941, and disbanded January 2, 1942, due to losses. • X-15 lost December 29, 1941—Not replaced. • X-35 and X-36 overhauled and put into reserve. GVT.2 X-11, X-12, X-25 Lieutenant-Commander W.J. Reijnierse June 17, 1941–March 3, 1942 Based Sorong, New Guinea, with support points at Morotai and Ambon. Mothership at Sorong was Gouvernmentsmarine ship Rigel. • All destroyed December 26, 1941, at Kalkas seaplane base on Lake Tondano. • Squadron reformed as GVT.2 (NEW) at Soerabaja with PBY-5 Catalinas.

GVT.3 (NEW) Y-46, Y-49, Y-61 Lieutenant-Commander January 16, 1942 G.F. Slottje March 1, 1942 Activated at Morokrembangan in January 16 and operated from that base until March 1. • Y-46 lost at Morokrembangan March 1, 1942—Not replaced. • Y-61 lost at Morokrembangan March 1, 1942—Not replaced. • Y-49 evacuated to Australia with MLD flight training school February 19, 1942. GVT.4 X-13, X-14, X-21 Lieutenant-Commander December 6, 1941 S.H. Rosier January 27, 1942 Based at Sambas, Borneo, on December 6, 1941, for reconnaissance flights over South China Sea. Group transferred to Morokrembangan and disbanded January 27, 1942. • X-14 lost January 23, 1942—Replaced by X-19 from reserve pool. • X-19 lost January 25, 1942—Not replaced. GVT.5 X-26, X-27, X-30 Lieutenant-Commander December 8, 1941–March 5, 1942 H.V.B. Burgerhout, KMR Based at Ternate, Anambas Islands, on December 7, 1941, for reconnaissance flights over South China Sea and area south of the Philippines. • X-13 lost February 7, 1942—Not replaced. • X-21 lost February 25, 1942—Not replaced. • X-27 lost December 23, 1941—Not replaced. • X-26 lost December 26, 1941—Not replaced. • X-30 returned to Morokrembangan December 26, 1941, and put into reserve pool. GVT.5 (NEW) Y-65, Y-66, Y-67 Lieutenant-Commander December 8, 1941–March 5, 1942 H.V.B. Burgerhout, KMR Reformed at Morokrembangan. December 28, 1941–January 12, 1942 Group reforms and reorganizes at Morokrembangan and becomes operational at Tjilatjap as of January 12. • Y-67 badly damaged February 7, 1942, in ground collision with Y-65—replaced by Y-71 and flown to Morokrembangan for repairs. • Y-65 irreparably damaged and written off February 27, 1942—Not replaced. • Y-66 destroyed March 4, 1942—Not replaced. • Y-71 evacuated to Australia from Tjilatjap March 5, 1942.

GVT.2 (NEW) Y-62, Y-63, Y-64 Lieutenant-Commander June 17, 1941–March 3, 1942 W.J. Reijnierse Activated January 19 at Emmahaven harbor at Padang (west coast of Sumatra). • Y-63 lost February 28, 1942—Not replaced. • Y-62 evacuated to Australia from Tjilatjap March 6, 1942. • Y-64 evacuated to Ceylon from Tjilatjap March 6, 1942.

GVT.6 X-28, X-29, X-31 Lieutenant-Commander December 10, 1941–March 3, 1942 J.G. Stegeman Activated at Morokrembangan on December 10, 1941, for reconnaissance patrols over Java Sea and along the south and east coasts of Java. • X-31 lost February 13—Replaced by X-3 and X-23. • X-29 lost February 11, 1942—Replaced by X-21. • X-21 lost February 25, 1942. • X-3, X-23 and X-28 evacuated from Lengkong, Java, to Broome, Australia, March 3, 1942.

GVT.3 X-19, X-20, X-22 Lieutenant-Commander December 1941 G.F. Slottje, KMR Replaced GVT.8 at NAS Sambo at Singapore from December 10 to fly reconnaissance missions over South China Sea, Anambas Islands and Natoena Islands. • Transferred Morokrembangan and disbanded December 31; reformed with PBYs. • All three X-boats put into the reserve pool.

GVT.7 X-32, X-33, X-34 Lieutenant-Commander B. August 1941–March 3, 1942 Sjerp, KMR Transferred to Tarakan on December 6, 1941, for reconnaissance flights over Celebes Sea and Makassar Strait. • X-34 lost December 17, 1942—Replaced by X-35. • X-33 damaged in landing accident February 7, 1942—Replaced by X-13 and flown to Morokrembangan for repairs. • X-13, X-32 and X-35 lost at Roti Island February 7, 1942.

7. The MLD GVT.7 (NEW) X-1, X-20, X-24, X-36 All reserve planes formed from the remnants of disbanded squadrons. Lieutenant-Commander B. Sjerp August 1941–March 3, 1942 Reformed at Morokrembangan on February 1942. Based on Grati Lake near Modjokerto, Java. • X-1 lost March 3, 1942. • X-20 lost March 3, 1942. • X-36 lost March 5, 1942. • X-24 evacuated to Australia on March 1942 and given over to RAAF April 19, 1942. GVT.8 X-16, X-17, X-18 Lieutenant-Commander December 3, 1941–December 20, 1941 W. van Prooijen, KMR Lieutenant 1st Class December 20, 1941–March 1, 1942 W.O.P.R. Aernout Based at NAS Seletar/Singapore December 3–10, 1941. Replaced by GVT.3 on December 10, 1941, and sent to Morokrembangan for overhaul. • X-17 lost February 24, 1942. • X-18 lost February 24, 1942. • X-16 lost March 1, 1942. GVT.11 T-15, T-16, T-17 Lieutenant-Commander J. December 7, 1941–March 2, 1942 Craamer, KMR Based Morokrembangan December 7, 1941–March 2, 1942. Modified to carry depth charges; carried out reconnaissance and A/S patrols over Java Sea and Soerabaja. • T-15, T-16 and T-17 destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong, Java, March 2 to prevent capture. GVT.12 T-18, T-19, T-21 Lieutenant-Commander December 7, 1941–March 2, 1942 B.J.W.M. van Voorthuisen, KMR Or Lieutenant 1st Class W. Bierenbroodspot, KMR Based Morokrembangan December 7, 1941–March 2, 1942. Modified to carry depth charges; carried out reconnaissance and A/S patrols over Java Sea and Soerabaja. • T-20 lost February 3, 1942. • T-22 lost February 3, 1942. • T-18, T-19 and T-21 destroyed by MLD personnel at Lengkong, Java, March 2 to prevent capture. GVT.13/GVT.14

4 X Fokker C.XI W floatplanes attached to each squadron, including : W-1, W-4, W-8, W-10, W-11, W-12, W-13, W-14 Of these aircraft, five (possibly W-1, W-8, W-11, W-12, W-13) were based aboard Tromp, Java and De Ruyter, but the surviving seaplanes aboard the latter two ships were put ashore prior to the Battle of the Java Sea. • W-4, W-10 and W-14 destroyed on February 3, 1942. • W-12 from De Ruyter shot down over Tjepoe, Java, February 18, 1942. • Remaining aircraft flown to Lengkong, Java, March 2, 1942; destroyed by MLD personnel to prevent capture.

GVT.16 Lieutenant-Commander W. van Prooijen, KMR; Former commander of GVT.8. Lieutenant-Commander A. van der Hoeden, KMR

Y-51, Y-56, Y-57 December 20, 1941–March 2, 1942

January 19, 1942–January 21, 1942

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Activated December 20, 1941. Based Tandjoeng Priok for patrols over Indian Ocean, Java Sea, Karimata Strait and Gaspar Strait. Y-51 lost January 21 and replaced by Y-55. Group evacuated Vice-Admiral Helfrich and his staff from Java to Ceylon on March 2. • Y-51 lost to Japanese fighters January 21, 1942—Replaced by Y-55. • Y-55 evacuated from Toeloeng Agoeng to Colombo March 1, 1942. • Y-56 evacuated from Bagendit Lake to Colombo March 1, 1942. • Y-57 evacuated from Toeloeng Agoeng to Colombo March 1, 1942. GVT.17 Y-58, Y-59, Y-60 Lieutenant-Commander December 8, 1941–March 3, 1942 F.J. Wissel, KMR Based NAS Halong December 7, 1941, with seaplane tender Arend. Y-58 lost January 11 and replaced by Y-67. • Y-58 lost January 11, 1942—Replaced by Y-67. • Y-59 evacuated from Toeloeng Agoeng, Java to Broome, Australia, March 2, 1942. Destroyed March 3, 1942, at Broome. • Y-60 evacuated from Toeloeng Agoeng, Java to Broome, Australia, March 2, 1942. Destroyed March 3, 1942, at Broome. • Y-67 evacuated from Toeloeng Agoeng, Java to Broome, Australia, March 2, 1942. Destroyed March 3, 1942, at Broome. GVT.18 Y-45, Y-47, Y-48 Lieutenant-Commander January 16, 1942–March 8, 1942 A.W. Witholt, KMR Activated January 16, 1942, at Tandjoeng Priok to fly reconnaissance and A/S patrols over Sumatra, Borneo, and Java Sea. • Y-47 lost February 24, 1942. • Y-48 destroyed March 3, 1942. • Y-45 evacuated from Tjileuntja, Java, to Australia, March 8, 1942. Was last MLD aircraft to leave Java.

Prior to May 1940, most MLD pilots, aircrews, officers and enlisted men were trained either at the De Mok and De Kooy seaplane bases or Willemsoord Naval Base in Holland. Pilot trainees first learned to fly in standard land configuration planes before making the transition to seaplanes. Primary, intermediate, advanced and formation flight training took place in Holland. As most of the seaplane pilots were to serve in the East Indies, a majority of the cadets were then transferred to Morokrembangan for operational training. After the fall of Holland, the MLD initiated an extensive network of training programs at Morokrembangan, including primary, intermediate and advanced seaplane flight training. In addition to courses for regular and reserve officers, training centers for air gunners, radio operators and mechanics existed. A MLD mechanics and workshop training college for Indonesian recruits at Makassar was also expanded. A number of these men were evacuated before Java fell and formed the bulk of Dutch ground crews throughout the war. One of the largest training programs was for radio operators. Although all its planes were in direct contact with shipboard and shore-based radio stations, one of the most severe shortages faced by the MLD was a lack of trained operators. As radio equipment became standard on MLD planes in the 1930s, the first operators were trained in Holland and shipped to Java to form the core of a specialized training program for subsequent classes of aircraft and shore radio operators. With the expansion of the MLD and occupation of Hol-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

land, this program was expanded and a number of militia recruits were trained. Still, the shortage remained so severe throughout the fleet that Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered in early 1941 that a separate communications branch of the MLD be formed to meet the East Indies Squadron’s needs. As the MLD had a surplus of junior officer pilots, a number of these men were trained as radio operators. To fill another void, radio operators were also cross-trained as air gunners and flight medics. Although men and material remained in short supply escapees from occupied Holland and civilian volunteers from South Africa provided some reinforcements. A contingent of MLD pilot trainees had been evacuated from Holland in May 1940. After a brief period in England they reached Batavia on November 21, 1940. They underwent advanced flight training at Morokrembangan before returning to England to form the nucleus of the RN’s 320 Squadron. In contrast to their American and British counterparts, many MLD pilots in the East Indies were older than average. Reasons for this can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the MLD was a small, highly skilled peacetime force. Turnover in these types of specialized organizations are usually not high in any country’s military. In addition, funding throughout the 1930s strictly limited the growth of the MLD, dictating that it remain a small force dominated by career men. The total number of Europeans in the East Indies, women and children included, numbered less than 300,000. This forced the MLD to compete with the KM and KNIL for qualified recruits in a very small candidate pool. Although Eurasians and Indonesians were eligible to join the military in every branch few met the educational requirements to become pilots. As a result, the MLD was left with a substantially older, albeit extremely well-trained, core of seaplane pilots.

Seaplane Bases The primary MLD base in the East Indies was MVK (Marine Vliegtuig Kamp or Naval Air Station) Morokrembangan at the ME. The largest seaplane base in the world, it had been purpose-built for amphibious operations. Before the base opened on July 30, 1925, all naval air operations had been carried out from the ML-KNIL air base at Tandjoeng Priok. The new location was much more convenient, as the MLD’s primary role was to support the fleet, which also operated from Soerabaja. Although the KM had undertaken to dredge it, the harbor at Soerabaja was very shallow. While they lay bare and exposed at low tide, a series of mudflats dotted the harbor and were deceptively concealed just beneath the water’s surface at high tide. A deep channel leading to the seaplane base was usable at all times and clearly marked. However, without charts or local knowledge of the channel, it was impossible to know which side of the buoys to stay on. If one strayed off the step, the penalty usually resulted in having to be pulled off the flats by a small boat.

In 1939–40, MVK Morokrembangan received a series of substantial modifications and renovations as a result of the Dutch government’s efforts to strengthen the country’s armed forces. These efforts yielded a number of new hangars, ramps, workshops and barracks. By the outbreak of the Pacific War, Morokrembangan had 24 hangars, concrete ramps, expansive workshops, transport cranes, underground fuel tanks and powerful radio facilities. In addition to its comprehensive training facilities and workshops, all supplies, spare parts, engines and reserve aircraft were housed at Morokrembangan. There were also a number of older planes in reserve. These included the older “D” and “T” planes, many of which were reactivated for duty in late 1941. Throughout the campaign, damaged planes of all nationalities also came into Morokrembangan for repairs and overhaul, while new PBYs from the United States arrived to be made operational. Large numbers of American seaplanes permanently moved onto the base as the campaign progressed. There were four main support bases, including MVK Priok at Tandjoeng Priok outside Batavia on western Java, MVK Ambon, MVK Tarakan and MVK Prapat on Lake Toba in Central Sumatra. These naval air stations were all major hubs. MVK Priok had two hangars and a number of workshops. Located at Halong on the island of Ambon, MVK Ambon consisted of three hangars, workshops and a number of barracks that were still under construction when the island fell to the Japanese in January 1942. An air station for the MLD since the 1920s, MVK Tarakan was modernized in 1940. In late 1941, it received a small floating aircraft dock and expanded facilities that let it carry out major aircraft repairs. MVK Prapat was completed just before the outbreak of war and had only a concrete ramp and barracks for aircrews. In addition, there were three permanent MVKs at Kalkas on Lake Tondano in northern Celebes, Balikpapan and Pontianak in southern Borneo. The MLD also operated approximately 50 remote bases scattered throughout the East Indies. Although not as large or well-equipped as Morokrembangan and the hub facilities, they provided adequate stopover points for refueling, repairs and rest for the crews. Many were equipped with skeleton ground crews and all had radio facilities that let them maintain contact with Morokrembangan. Developed secondary bases included the Riouw Archipelago, the Talaud Islands, Ternate and Morotai in the Moluccas Islands and Sorong on the northwest cape of New Guinea. Located 300 miles south of Java, in the Indian Ocean, the MLD also reached an agreement with the British to establish a seaplane base on Christmas Island. There were also some 50 undeveloped bases scattered throughout the East Indies. Most consisted of little more than remote supply depots of camouflaged fuel drums and crates of oil at a suitable site on a jungle lake or river. All of these bases were serviced in one way or another by a wide variety of small boats. These included fast motorboats for personnel transport, boats for refueling seaplanes in the harbor, specialized ordnance boats for “bombing up” planes

7. The MLD

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and “crash boats” to rescue survivors or to take off wounded. The MLD also operated small harbor boats, which resembled miniature tug boats. These highly maneuverable boats had a cockpit forward with a towing bit placed amidships. This design allowed the coxswain to put the seaplane in tow wherever he wanted. Although few of these boats were standardized, no base could effectively function without them and their destruction could seriously limit the effectiveness of an MLD base. The lifeline provided by these forward bases was due to large supplies of fuel, oil and ordnance stocked before the war and supporting aircraft tenders of the GM. After being militarized by Vice-Admiral Helfrich, six patrol boats— Arend, Fazant, Merel, Poolster, Reiger and Valk—were put at the disposal of the MLD for use as aircraft tenders. Seaplane tenders like Merel let the MLD dramatically increase its operational capabilities in Carrying fuel, oil, supplies and ammu- undeveloped regions of the East Indies (courtesy Maarten Noot, Historic Society of Den nition, they provided an invaluable net- Helder). work of mobile support bases that could Japanese strategy centered on neutralizing these bases and simply pick up and move to a new location when threatened. it proved very effective. Throughout the campaign, the GVTs This broad network of seaplane bases and tenders allowed lived a nomadic existence, being harried from base to base. One the MLD to maintain a high degree of operational efficiency squadron operated from five different bases in 15 days. Adding throughout the East Indies campaign. At the same time, it alto the strain was the fact that Dutch aircrews often flew 16–18 lowed the Dutch to keep a wide eye on what the Japanese were hour missions for days. Although the MLD tried to rotate doing as they moved south towards Java. What areas the MLD squadrons out of the line, this was not always possible. And, as could not cover, was patrolled by the seaplanes of KNILM, the war converged on Java and Morokrembangan, there soon which utilized its prewar civilian stopover points in addition was no safe place left for the squadrons. to the MLD’s bases.

Chapter 8

Command and Control Personnel Shortages

Vice-Admiral C.E.L. Commander-in-Chief Helfrich East Indies Naval Squadron

As war with Japan loomed the KM struggled with a severe lack of manpower. Even before the outbreak of war in Europe two decades of defense cuts by the Dutch Government meant that personnel shortages both at home and abroad were common. The German occupation of Holland further amplified this deficiency in the Netherlands East Indies. With so many new ships and aircraft under construction or on order, there was now a very valid question of who exactly would crew them. Unlike the KNIL, which was a self-contained colonial army, the East Indies Squadron was an extension of the Royal Netherlands Navy.1 Although a ship might spend its entire service life on the NEI station, officers and crew were largely drawn from Europe. Europeans and Eurasians in the East Indies could join the KM without restriction but all training prior to May 1940 was conducted in Europe.2 This included officer training at the Royal Naval Institute3 at Den Helder Naval Base, flight training and technical training for European personnel. This network was completely ripped away by the German invasion. Vice-Admiral Helfrich moved quickly to address this loss. On May 25, just 10 days after the surrender of Holland, he ordered Captain Pieter Koenraad—commander of Soerabaja Naval Base—to form a committee tasked with establishing a new Royal Navy Institute. On August 1 Rear-Admiral G.W. Stöve was appointed head of the new Academy. Housed at Soerabaja’s Oedjong Naval Barracks, the school offered a two-year curriculum for aspiring naval officers.4 KM leadership in England also took steps to help alleviate the KM’s personnel shortage. After the occupation of Holland, the KM high command reestablished its headquarters on the fourth floor of C&A, a large Dutch-owned department store on Oxford Street, in one of London’s toniest retail districts. It then formed two Naval Colleges; the first was at Enys House in Cornwall and a second in London. These colleges remained in operation until 1946. Between May 1940 and December 1941 they graduated a number of KM midshipmen who were assigned to the East Indies, although others remained in England. Vice Admiral J.T. Furstner

Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Netherlands Navy

Rear-Admiral K.D.F.W. Doorman

Commander, East Indies Naval Squadron

Rear-Admiral G.W. Stöve

Commander of Dutch Naval Academy at Soerabaja Chief-of-Staff to Vice Temporary promotion Admiral Helfrich to Rear-Admiral January 1, 1942 Naval Commander Temporary promotion Soerabaja to Rear-Admiral January 1, 1942 Naval Commander Ambon Naval Commander Balikpapan Naval Commander Palembang

Captain J.J.A. van Staveren Captain Pieter Koenraad Captain A.M. Hekking Commander F.H. Vermeulen Commander Sir J.F.W. de Jong van Beek en Donk Commander Sir G.A. Berg Commander P.F.M. van de Lint Commander H.C. Nieuwenhuisen Commander (KMR) B.J.G. Schokking Lt.-Commander (KMR) A.S. de Bats C.W. Herringa

G.H.C.A. de Laive

Chart 15: Key KM Commanders in NEI Escaped to London May 1940; Assumed control of all Dutch naval forces in World War II.

Replaced Vice Admiral H. Ferwerda as Commandant der Zeemacht (CZM) of East Indies Squadron December 18, 1939 Appointed commander of Allied Combined Strike Force February 1942

Naval Commander Riouw Archipelago Naval Commander Tandjoeng Priok Naval Commander Tarakan Naval Commander Schokking had been the Tjilatjap port’s civilian harbormaster prior to being called into service. Naval Commander Makassar Civilian Director of Managed civilian Operations technical and Soerabaja Naval repair services Yard Civilian Director of Operations Madoera Ordnance Depot

To increase manpower throughout the fleet greater numbers of reserves were mobilized and more conscripts drafted.

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8. Command and Control Total population of the East Indies in 1940 was 70,476,000.5 But the number of Europeans totaled less than 250,000 6; this included men, women and children of all ages, further reducing the number of military candidates. Since the KM did not conscript Indonesians it was forced to compete with the KNIL and civilian occupations for qualified individuals in a very limited pool of European males.7 The Netherlands Government in Exile also approved the conscription of all Dutch males of fighting age living outside occupied territory. Not only did it require a massive effort to locate and test them physically, but negotiations with Allied governments were required so these activities could take place on their territory.8 The Dutch Government also moved to seize the finances of Dutch residents living abroad to finance the war effort.9 None of these activities proved popular with immigrants living in Canada, South Africa and the United States, among others. Many now had very loose, if not distant, ties with their mother country and the Dutch Government’s sudden appearance proved unwelcome. Recruitment speeches were sometimes greeted with disinterest, rude comments and catcalls. With so few Europeans available, the East Indies Government had to carefully balance the mobilization of reserves and conscripts despite the approach of war. Many KM reservists were employed by civilian shipping lines such as Holland America Line, KPM and Rotterdam Lloyd, among others. They carried passengers, freight and trade goods that were the lifeblood of the colony. A wide call-up of skilled personnel could have crippled the ability of those ships to operate, effectively stalling the economy.10 Although Indonesians were able to join the KM, widespread illiteracy relegated most to largely unskilled positions. Nonetheless, recruitment of Indonesian personnel was stepped up after May 1940. To make naval service more attractive, native pay scales were enhanced, which successfully generated an influx of new recruits.11 They trained at technical schools in the East Indies and were generally limited to duty in colonial waters. Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s position in the East Indies was not helped by his immediate superior—Vice-Admiral J.T. Furstner—making repeated requests for manpower in the European theater of war.12 In October 1940 he asked Helfrich to send a full crew to Great Britain to man the destroyer Isaac Sweers.13 He later asked for approximately 20 ordinary seamen and submarine personnel. In November Furstner requested seven torpedo mechanics; in December, one administrative officer and seven administrative personnel. These men were needed to staff a new torpedo workshop and fill out a new naval headquarters staff in London.14 Helfrich met these requests as best he could, but notified London that his own command was short of minimum staffing requirements by at least 1,400 regular personnel.15 Thus, he could no longer significantly contribute to Dutch forces in Europe without dangerously weakening his own position in Asia. To reinforce Helfrich’s point, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer notified Vice Admiral Furstner not

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to request the transfer of any additional KM to Great Britain without his direct approval.16 Even so, the number of available men continued to fritter away. Six reserve officers were mobilized to take command of new auxiliary minesweepers entering service at Tandjoeng Priok. Soon afterwards, 100 militia sailors and firemen were mobilized to provide an armed security detachment at various naval bases and barracks.17 Several civilians were also conscripted; after a brief training period they were commissioned as reserve officers and nearly all served with the Signals branch. In a reverse transfer, three KNIL reserve officers were transferred to the Royal Marines as second lieutenants.18 The Department of Shipping was considered a reserve force for the KM.19 But few of its personnel could be transferred to the fleet without downgrading the operational efficiency of those ships. Vice Admiral Helfrich did receive a boost when the light cruiser Sumatra reached Java in October 1940. She required extensive overhaul and was decommissioned on October 31, 1940.20 As a result, her crew of some 500 men was broken up and transferred to other duties throughout the fleet. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939 total KM strength in the NEI was between 4,000 and 5,000 men.21 As a result of the crisis the KM announced that no Indonesian personnel would be released from service, nor would Europeans be returned to Europe at the end of their service term. 22 By January 1941 personnel strength increased to 8,855 men, including 2,825 reservists and conscripts. Six months later, on June 6, personnel numbered 8,565 men including 1,935 reservists and conscripts.23 Of these 1,879 (22 percent) were Indonesian,24 which likely does not include the militarized GM ships almost entirely crewed by Indonesians. Owing to the educational challenges detailed earlier many of the latter were assigned to shore duty. Those aboard ships typically operated small equipment.25 These men were part of a well-trained, spit and polish force with a strong esprit de corps. After the occupation of Holland there was a strong desire, particularly amongst Europeans in the East Indies Squadron, to fight the Germans. During the so-called “Status Quo Period” between May 1940 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, morale did suffer to a small degree due to inaction. Officers and men alike wanted to fight while their loved ones in Europe languished under the heel of German occupation. Despite the growing Japanese threat, many felt the East Indies were a sideshow to the real war. An increasing number felt that they were simply preserving the Dutch Government’s financial empire. Several officers went so far as to pen a letter to a member of the Royal Family protesting their prolonged inaction.26

Command and Control Largely as a result of insufficient manpower, most KM commands across all departments were overwhelmed by the

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

volume of work which swamped them like a tidal wave beginning in December 1941. As the volume increased, communications in particular slowed considerably. After January, when the additional requirements of supporting an ad-hoc multinational command were thrown into the mix, communications across the various Allied commands soon became almost paralyzed by the gridlock. The situation within the KM itself was somewhat erratic due to an insufficiently developed command and control structure.27 Its main naval communications hubs on Java were at Batavia and Soerabaja. There were also naval radio installations at support bases on Ambon, Balikpapan and Tarakan. Of these, Balikpapan and Tarakan were the most important although Ambon was in the process of being expanded when Japan attacked.28 As the East Indies’ primary naval base, Soerabaja featured a well-developed command structure. Prior to the outbreak of war KM headquarters functioned like a typical peacetime office with a relaxed environment. Incoming telegrams were treated like regular mail and were not processed with any sense of great urgency. Nor was there much distinction between administrative and operational functions. In peacetime this worked well enough, but with the start of war a much finer distinction was required. Although attempts were made to remedy the situation it was not uncommon for operational needs to suffer at the hands of administrative functions.29 Naval forces at Soerabaja under the command of Captain Koenraad included MVK Morokrembangan, old submarines, the motor torpedo boat squadron, harbor patrol service, mine service, guard boats (i.e., gunboats) and various Department of Shipping vessels.30 Other land-based functions included the Coastwatch Service, Naval Security Section, Coastal Fortifications and the new Naval Academy.31 The Naval Shipping Department coordinated the routing of merchant ships. This system was primitive at best as few of the civilian vessels had radios and could not be contacted after leaving port. If a submarine sighting was reported by a coastwatcher or Allied aircraft it was all but impossible to route ships at sea away from the area. There was also a shortage of escort vessels so many vessels traveled unescorted. Certain key ships had to be escorted by aircraft, putting further strain on military resources. Few of the small inter-island steamers traveled in convoy anyway, leading to heavy losses amongst Dutch cargo vessels. The Coastwatch Service largely consisted of KNIL and civilian personnel, although the KM manned a number of observation posts on Java and in the Lesser Soenda Islands. They provided valuable information on enemy aircraft and submarine movements. KM coastwatchers had their training facility and barracks at Soerabaja, although the program was new and still growing. Most positions were connected to Soerabaja via Java’s civilian telephone system, which was not secure. However, several had no communications capability which diminished their effectiveness. A large number of short-range radio transmitters and receivers had been ordered in Australia, but few arrived before the war.32

Chart 16: Coastwatch Positions Manned April 1940 Position

Location

Anjer Island Edam Island Noesa Kambangan Saresh Pasoeroean Bawean Island Tandjoeng Oeban Tandjoeng Sambo Boeloe Tandjoeng Kelian South Broeder Island

Soenda Strait Bay of Batavia Tjilatjap on south coast of Java South coast of Madoera North coast of Java Java Sea, 90 miles north of Soerabaja Riouw Archipelago Riouw Archipelago Boelan Strait Banka Island Doerian Strait

The Naval Security Section consisted of about 100 (mostly older) militia personnel, but may have grown larger over time. Its primary role was to provide base security for various naval installations at Soerabaja. The Section worked closely with the KNIL’s 3rd Infantry Division which had the task of defending Soerabaja from land assault. The Naval Security Section evolved into a motorized formation and was considered by the 3rd Infantry Division commander to be one of the best trained units under his command.33 The KNIL had control of most coastal fortresses at Soerabaja and Madoera, which fell under the command of Soerabaja’s artillery officer. The forts covered minefields and prevented access to strategic shore installations. They were strategically placed on the edge of minefields and waterways, such as the roadstead of Soerabaja and the Eastwater and Westwater channels. Within these barriers the forts fell under KNIL control; outside, the KM was in command.34 They were supported by an integrated network of patrol boats, submarines, minesweepers and motor torpedo boats. Soerabaja also had its own anti-aircraft command, which cooperated with civilian air defense forces, but reported directly to Captain Koenraad.35 The exact role of this command is unclear, as AA defenses throughout the East Indies were the responsibility of the KNIL. One can speculate that it was responsible for coordinating the movement and placement of the KNIL guns around the city and harbor. Although Perak Airfield at Soerabaja was a navy installation, the KM had no fighters based there. The ML-KNIL had a squadron of pursuit planes there but these were quickly reduced by the Japanese. The only scheduled interaction between KM headquarters at Soerabaja and ML headquarters at Malang was a daily written communiqué from Captain Koenraad’s staff. In it they detailed the KM’s expected ship movements in the Soerabaja area. It was delivered to Malang by motorcycle courier each night around 2000.36 The KM attempted to ensure unified control over air and naval operations command from their newly created “Area Command Headquarters” at Soerabaja. It was the only fully equipped “Operations Room” in the East Indies. The concept of a “Combat Information Center” was still in its infancy in the early days of the Second World War and was

8. Command and Control

Although Perak was officially an MLD airfield it was defended by ML-KNIL fighters (author’s collection).

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largely unknown in the NEI prior to December 1941.37 Dutch forces in Europe first saw the British version of a “Combat Information Center” following their evacuation from Holland. However, the East Indies Squadron was not introduced to the concept until the following year. Between May 15 and 20, 1941 three MLD Do. 24Ks and three ML-KNIL Martin 139 bombers visited Darwin, Australia. It was the first official military exchange mission between the Dutch and Australians. Lieutenant-Commander C.J.W. van Waning, a KM staff officer from Soerabaja, was given a tour of Darwin’s Area Combined Headquarters which was jointly operated by the RAAF and RAN.38 Van Waning came away very impressed; upon his return to Java he immediately worked to create a similar system at Soerabaja. The KM’s first “War Room” was built in a reinforced bunker adjacent to Captain Koenraad’s headquarters. Although largely modeled on the Australian and British versions, van Waning’s first attempt at creating an “Area Command Headquarters” was not completely successfully and quickly proved too small in practice to effectively handle the workload. Nor did it offer the ability to support any kind of joint Allied operations and the Dutch moved quickly to find a larger space. The new

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command center was located in a civilian office building in the Soerabaja suburb of Embong Woengoe and become operational at 0900 JST on the morning of January 26, 1942.39 It measured approximately 260 × 110 feet and allowed ample room to house the naval headquarters component of the new joint AmericanBritish-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command. Nonetheless, signals from Soerabaja on the KM naval frequency were largely reliable, though delays related to staffing did occur.40 Large ships communicated on the KM’s fleet wavelength. Individual branches of the KM, such as the MLD, MTB/Anti-Submarine and Anti-Aircraft defenses, utilized dedicated frequencies. Local harbor defense and fortress commands also used separate communications grids that were not tied into the main KM network.41 Communications technology of the 1930s meant that signal delays related to atmospheric conditions were also common at certain parts of the day. Although Soerabaja was the KM’s primary naval base, its headquarters was at Batavia, 400 miles away. Primary communication between these bases were conducted via telex. Various administrative departments—Communications, Intelligence, Jurisprudence, Logistics and Operations, among others—were based here. Vice-Admiral Helfrich and his Chief-of-Staff, Captain J.J.A. van Staveren, also made strategic and tactical decisions regarding conduct of the war. As CZM of the East Indies Squadron, and senior naval commander on Java, Helfrich also had political obligations to fulfill. Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was Commander-in-Chief of all Dutch military forces in the Netherlands East Indies. In this capacity he and Helfrich routinely discussed strategy and other military topics. Batavia’s proximity to the capital city of Bandoeng let Helfrich easily

meet with the Governor General and other high-level civilian officials whom he was required to brief. Political convenience aside, Batavia was poorly equipped to provide the East Indies Squadron with any meaningful leadership. Its most glaring drawback was the lack of a dedicated “War Room” as at Soerabaja. It possessed few charts, large maps, tables or the communications network to track operations throughout all corners of the NEI. Nor was a Chief of Operations, senior flag officer or large staff present to coordinate operations. It did not operate 24/7 and the officers manning it were cobbled together from other departments and frequently rotated in and out of the position.42 As a result, Batavia was incapable of making a quick or particularly informed decision.43 It was more of a tactical office with little practical use than a strategic command post. Yet, it was amidst this setup that Vice-Admiral Helfrich routinely micromanaged his fleet commander, Rear-Admiral K.D.F.W. Doorman. So limited were its capabilities, that just prior to the final naval battle in the Java Sea in February 1942, Helfrich had no idea where Doorman’s force was located in relation to the approaching Japanese invasion force.44

The Lack of Radar

At the start of the Pacific War Dutch forces in the East Indies were completely devoid of radar. The technology was still in its infancy in 1941. Despite its spectacular—albeit highly classified—success in the Battle of Britain the year before, little thought was apparently given to its application within the KM’s overall command and control structure on Java. Nonetheless, the positive attributes of radar were well-known to the Dutch military long before the outbreak of war in Europe. Although the British were the first to implement radar operationally, Dutch research on this technology went back to the early 1920s. In 1924 the Dutch Parliament founded the Committee for the Applications of Physics in Weaponry which had the task of researching and incorporating physics into military equipment in order to improve military performance.45 The committee’s first efforts on advance warning technology focused on air acoustics and a number of listening devices were developed. Under the direction of Professor J.L.W.C. von Wieler, development of a radio transmitter/receiver for artillery use and electronic listening equipment for detecting the approach of aircraft began in 1934. This was two years earlier than the first British radar sets The MLD radio station at Morokrembangan (author’s collection). eventually developed at Portsmouth.

8. Command and Control The latter system—the earliest form of radar used by the Dutch military—was ready by 1938.46 It utilized a single antenna and integrated processing unit that was married to a stabilized Bofors 40mm mount.47 Four radar sets had been built by May 10, 1940. Of these, two were operational; one near the Hague with the other scheduled for installation aboard the light cruiser Sumatra. That project had been scheduled to begin on May 10. Both units were destroyed by Dutch engineers on May 14 to prevent capture. With Holland’s surrender Professional von Wieler fled to England and continued his research there until 1946.48 The two remaining radar sets were also shipped to England in their original crates. Upon arrival, one was cannibalized so that the other could be installed aboard the recently

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completed destroyer Isaac Sweers.49 These were later supplemented by British Type 289 systems as they become available in greater quantities. Although none of this indigenous technology made its way to the East Indies, radar did eventually make its way to Java as detailed later in this text. In the meantime, plans were made to outfit the larger Dutch ships of the East Indies Squadron with British designed fire control radar. However, it appears that the KM’s top leadership procrastinated and the opportunity to do so before the Japanese invasion was lost.50 Several fire control systems were shipped from England to Java aboard Hr.Ms. Columbia but the Dutch surrendered before their arrival.

Chapter 9

The Deployment of Force Z By December 4 the Japanese were on the move across the Pacific. Off Hawaii, Admiral Nagumo’s carrier force was turning southward so he could be in position to launch air attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7. This attack would signal the start of a massive thrust against the Western powers in the Far East. Simultaneously, a troop convoy began moving south for the invasion of Malaya. Twenty-eight transports left Hainan carrying 26,640 troops of the 5th Infantry Division and 56th Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division. All were bound for landing points at Kota Bharoe, Patani and Singora. For close escort they had the heavy cruiser Chokai, one light cruiser and 13 destroyers. Trailing behind in close support were four additional light cruisers and three destroyers. The Japanese knew the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse had arrived Singapore on December 2 and took steps to provide the convoy with additional protection. This consisted of the battleships Kongo and Haruna, two heavy cruisers and a screen of 10 destroyers. Even so, they still considered Kongo and Haruna substantially inferior to the British ships and deployed large numbers of bombers to southern Indochina to provide assistance.1 And finally, they deployed large numbers of submarines along the most likely routes Prince of Wales and Repulse would take to intercept the convoy. On December 2, American reconnaissance planes sighted 12 Japanese submarines on the surface off Indochina moving south at full speed. It was correctly assumed that they would assume picket stations around Singapore. Once there, they mined passages between Singapore and important areas along the coast of Malaya. Additional reports put 21 transports loading at Cam Ranh Bay. Japanese air strength in Southern Indochina was now estimated at 180 planes, including 90 bombers. More ominously, there was not a single Japanese merchant ship or tanker to be found at sea in the Pacific, Indian or Atlantic Oceans.2 On December 4, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips flew to Manila with two staff members for a secret meeting with Admiral Thomas C. Hart and General Douglas MacArthur. It was the first in a series of meetings intended to coordinate long-term American-British-Dutch defense plans. Although Vice Admiral Helfrich had been invited he was unable to attend. Admiral Phillips arrived in Manila on December 5 aboard a Royal Navy PBY Catalina. In his first meeting with Admiral

Hart and General MacArthur, they discussed how the British Far Eastern Fleet might join the United States Asiatic Fleet at Manila. Because of their northern position, the Philippines were considered ideal for forward operations against the Japanese. However, no ships could leave Singapore until there were enough planes to protect Malaya in the air. In the end, their only useful exchange was Hart’s promise to dispatch the 57th Destroyer Division to Singapore to help screen Prince of Wales and Repulse. But he would only do so if the isolated RN destroyers Scout, Thanet and Thracian were transferred from local defense at Hong Kong back to the main fleet at Singapore.3 Phillips agreed and the orders were issued on both sides. The pace of Japanese movements meant that it would be the only concrete agreement reached during these meetings. As the meetings proceeded, the Japanese invasion force moved south under the cover of gale weather. It was a blessing to the Japanese, who banked on the element of surprise. However, 75 miles south of Saigon, they sighted the 1,515 ton Norwegian freighter Halldor on December 5. She was bound for Hong Kong from Bangkok when the destroyer Uranami ordered her to heave to and prepare for boarding. Once aboard, Japanese sailors hurriedly destroyed the freighter’s radio equipment and allowed her to continue on her way. She arrived at Hong Kong and was eventually captured by the Japanese in late December. Despite the bad weather, Japanese luck broke on December 6 when a RAAF Hudson sighted the convoy; but after the initial report, it was lost again in the storm. It was sighted again at noon on the following day by a PBY from 205 Squadron out of Singapore. This time the Japanese CAP was ready and the PBY only managed a quick report before five Ki-27 “Nates” from the 1st Sentai shot it down. It was the first act of the Pacific War. A USN officer brought Hart and Phillips the initial contact report which broke up their conference. It confirmed that the convoy previously reported in Cam Ranh Bay was now moving south. It was first reported as three ships; then as 27 transports, escorted by a battleship (actually Chokai), five cruisers and seven destroyers. Its position was well south of Saigon with a course to the west. The destination could only be neutral Siam or Malaya.

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9. The Deployment of Force Z Phillips made plans to leave immediately. As he boarded his plane, Hart’s last words were, “I have just ordered the destroyers at Balikpapan to proceed to Batavia on the pretext of rest and leave. Actually, they will join your force.” With that, Phillips was airborne within the hour. His plane left so quickly that a crewman was left behind and had to follow later. He received additional signals in the air. They reported three more convoys, totaling 29 transports and large numbers of escorts. Although Phillips was desperate for more information, bad weather over the South China Sea kept additional patrols from Singapore and Malaya from obtaining any more information for the time being. Just before noon on December 6 the convoy was sighted again, this time south of Cape Cambodia. Although it held a course for Bangkok, Admiral Layton, Chief-of-Staff China Station at Singapore, correctly plotted its real destination as Malaya. To get in the first strike, he stationed a submarine line along the most likely course the convoy would have to follow. Nonetheless, there was still no declaration of war and the British and Dutch were unwilling to initiate hostilities without overt provocation. In conversations with Admiral Layton and Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, ViceAdmiral Helfrich raised concerns about the deployment of submarines. After several earlier false convoy scares during the Dutch-Japanese Cold War, he did not want to unnecessarily provoke the Japanese with offensive action, or provide them with additional political ammunition.4 Britain was still fighting for its life with Nazi Germany. With Commonwealth forces stretched to the limit she could not afford to initiate a war with Japan—no matter how strongly the evidence pointed to an imminent attack. At the same time, the Dutch were still too weak to defend themselves without American or British support, and were unwilling to initiate a fight they could not win alone. All three men highly valued the submarines as first-strike weapons and early detection would severely hamper future operations. Thus, they were redeployed off Siam and Malaya. The most likely invasion points were considered to be Singapore, Patani and Kota Bharoe. K-XII and O-16 lay off eastern Malaya, while K-XI, K-XIII and O-19 patrolled the Karimata Strait. To interdict landings on Western Borneo, K-XIV, K-XV and K-XVII lay off Kuching.

“Get Off My Bloody Ship.” The Japanese opened hostilities in the Far East at Shanghai early on the morning of December 8. The American gunboat Wake lay moored to the dock. Her crew had already been evacuated to the Philippines; all that remained aboard were a small number of reservists who manned the radio equipment. They were asleep and did not know war had started when Japanese naval infantry boarded the ship two hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Outnumbered and unarmed, they had no choice but to surrender without a fight. Wake was later entered into Japanese service as IJNS Tatara.

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The elderly armored cruiser Izumo entered the harbor about the same time. A detachment of Japanese naval infantry boarded the British gunboat Peterel. They were met by her captain, Lieutenant Stephen Polkinghorn.5 Polkinghorn had already been informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor and had his crew at action stations. A Japanese officer informed him that Britain and Japan were at war and that he must surrender Peterel. Polkinghorn had no intention of surrendering, but needed to arm the ship’s demolition charges and burn the codebooks. To buy time he invited the Japanese officer below deck to discuss his demands. When he refused, Polkinghorn drew his sidearm and curtly told him to “Get off my bloody ship.”6 As the boarding party rowed away the officer fired a flare into the morning mist. Izumo immediately opened searchlights and began firing at pointblank range. She was joined by the gunboats Seta and Atami, a destroyer and IJA shore batteries from the French Settlement. Peterel was quickly battered into a burning wreck and sank with heavy loss of life.7 Meanwhile, as the Japanese neared the coast of Malaya, they sighted a second Norwegian merchant ship 120 miles north of Khota Bharu. Uranami stopped and boarded the ship, which was the 1,350 ton Hafthor. This time, the Japanese thought the ship was too close to Allied territory to let her go, so her crew of four Norwegian officers and 47 Chinese crewmen were put into the lifeboats and left to fend for themselves. A skeleton prize crew brought Hafthor into Hainan several days later. Two other Norwegian freighters encountered the Japanese off Khota Bharu that day. Hai Tung is believed to have been sunk with all hands by a submarine while en route to Singapore from Bangkok with a cargo of rice.8 Ngow Hock was intercepted at sea and taken as a prize. Her crew was later released. At Singapore, Admiral Phillips ordered Prince of Wales and Repulse to be ready to put to sea at short notice. If the American destroyers did not arrive in time he would sortie without them. At this time, virtually all units of the Asiatic Fleet were already moving south into the Dutch East Indies. The light cruiser Marblehead and 58th Destroyer Division were fueling at Tarakan. They sailed for Balikpapan on December 9 where all but two destroyers put into port. Also taking on fuel at Balikpapan was the destroyer tender Blackhawk and 57th Destroyer Division. Blackhawk left for Soerabaja alone on December 7. The destroyers sortied a short time later for Singapore. However, they arrived after Admiral Phillips had already sailed without them.

Force Z Sorties A rather surprising lack of prewar planning left the Royal Navy in a pinch when it came time for Force Z, as the strike force was designated, to sortie. Although the heavy cruiser Exeter was ordered to Singapore from the Bay of Bengal, she would not arrive for 36 hours at top speed. The light cruisers Durban, Danae and Dragon were already at Singapore. Al-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

though each had the speed to keep up with Force Z, they were old and built for scouting, not fleet action. Of the three, only Durban was ready to sail immediately, and Phillips left her behind due to age. A fourth cruiser was more modern, but the Mauritius was refitting and her engines were torn down and required reassembly. Per prewar agreements, Java was coming north to join the RN at Singapore from patrol duty in the Indian Ocean; but her arrival would also take time. The outlook on destroyers was little better. Encounter suffered minor problems and would be ready for sea in three days, while Jupiter required three weeks of repairs. This left Phillips with only two modern destroyers, Electra and Express. He also had the old destroyers Tenedos, Stronghold and HMAS Vampire, although they were incapable of sustained fleet or combat operations. In two days he would have the 57th Destroyer Division and two of three destroyers at Hong Kong. Scout and Thanet were en route, but Thracian remained in Hong Kong with engine problems and would follow later. A full 70 minutes before Admiral Nagumo’s air strike on Pearl Harbor, Japanese troops began landing in force at five locations throughout Malaya and neutral Siam. In Siam, one transport landed troops at Prachaub while two more landed troops at Jumbhorn. Three more lay off Nakhorn and Kota Bharoe respectively; 18 transports landed the main body at Singora and Patani. At Khota Bharoe, rough seas hampered the landings, as did stiff resistance from Indian troops of the 8th Brigade, who were well-supported by artillery. Offshore, the light cruiser Sendai, screened by the 19th Destroyer Division and the minesweepers Sokaitei, W.2 and W.3 with several submarine chasers provided cover. Off Singora, the destroyer Sagiri (headquarters ship for all invasion points) and 20th Destroyer Division covered the landing operations there. The first wave of Japanese troops moved ashore at 2400, meeting only weak resistance from Thai civilian and military police units. As troops moved inland, the transports withdrew north and the destroyers moved to join the escort off Khota Bharoe. Sixty-five miles to the south, at Patani and Tepoh, the 12th Destroyer Division covered the landings. At Patani the 42nd Infantry Regiment met heavy resistance on the beach from troops of the Royal Thai Army. This was soon overcome and the destroyers withdrew to Khota Bharoe once the landings were complete. Off Nakhorn, three transports landed troops with the patrol boat Shimushu as escort and the light cruiser Kashii provided cover for another off Bandon. One transport landed troops at Prachuab and two more at Jumbhorn without escort. None encountered any resistance and the transports withdrew north and the warships to Khota Bharoe upon completion of the landings. As the Japanese pushed into Thailand, nine Ki-30 “Ann” light bombers of the 31st Sentai escorted by 11 Ki-27s of the

77th Sentai made a demonstration flight over Bangkok. As the formation neared the city, three Curtis Hawk III biplanes from the Royal Thai Air Force’s Fighter Squadron 43 scrambled from Watana Nakorn Airfield. Unfortunately, the Thais were not up to the task and their better trained and equipped enemy downed all three Hawks in minutes.9 With the Japanese ashore in force, Admiral Phillips could now no longer wait for reinforcements—even if he wanted to. He was forced into action not only by his enemy, but also by tradition. To let the Japanese land uncontested while the Royal Navy sat complacently in port with two powerful capital ships was unacceptable. In the end, he sailed with Prince of Wales, Repulse, Express, Electra, Tenedos and Vampire. His plan was for Force Z to enter the Gulf of Siam on the afternoon of December 10 and clear it of Japanese ships. The Japanese could not allow Force Z to interfere with their operations and made provisions to deal with it. At the last moment, they made three amendments to their plans. The first was to mine the narrow strait separating Tioman Island and the Anambas Islands as it was the most direct route from Singapore to the landing areas. Forty-eight hours before war started, the minelayers Tatsumiya Maru and Nagasa laid 1,000 mines on the night of December 6–7. The second alteration was the submarines sighted by American reconnaissance planes off Indochina. Every available submarine was ordered south from Japan. In late November 10 boats sailed from Hiroshima and Sasebo. By December 2 they were hastily organized into three patrol lines north of the minefield laid by Tatsumiya Maru and Nagasa. Two more were deployed near the approaches to Singapore and four more boats arrived on December 8. As the IJN had little confidence in the IJA’s ability to provide air cover for the convoy it moved Rear-Admiral Sadaichi Matsunaga’s 22nd Air Flotilla from Formosa to southern Indochina. The Genzan Air Corps flew into Saigon with 36 Type 96 “Nell” bombers while the Mihoro Air Corps operated 36 “Nells” from Tu Duam Airfield north of Saigon. At Soc Trang, south of Saigon, the Navy deployed an additional 36 fighters and six reconnaissance planes. The arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse on December 2 posed a severe threat to the invasion of Malaya. In response, the Japanese decided to reinforce the Indochina air units. They quickly moved the Kanoya Air Corps of the 21st Air Flotilla to Saigon from Formosa. The 27 G4M1 “Betty” bombers were the most modern in the IJN’s arsenal and their arrival gave Admiral Matsunaga a formidable force of 99 bombers and 36 fighters. With their convoy safe, the landings proceeded. Their first objective was the airfield at Kota Bharoe on December 8. It was home of 36 Squadron (RAF) with 12 obsolete Vildebeeste torpedo bombers and 1 Squadron (RAAF) with 13 Hudson bombers. Both responded with heavy attacks at first light. They made repeated attacks throughout the day, hitting all three transports and sinking several landing craft. Unfortunately, the raw Indian Dogras could not keep the Japanese on the beach and they captured Kota Bharoe in just 24 hours.

9. The Deployment of Force Z With the Japanese ashore, Admiral Phillips and Force Z sortied. Correctly fearful of mines, he chose a course around the Japanese minefield between Tioman Island and the Andamans. He then made a sudden change of course to the north to avoid detection by Japanese aircraft flying from captured airfields on Malaya. Unknown to him, this course change also took him over the still incomplete Japanese submarine patrol lines. I-65 of the 30th Submarine Flotilla was the first to make contact. Her captain sighted the force and made a report, but could not close the range to attack. Lieutenant-Commander Hakue Harada struggled to maintain visual contact, but Force Z entered a squall and disappeared. I-65 sighted it again in the distance an hour later, but was forced to submerge by an approaching plane which proved friendly. When she surfaced, the British ships were gone. Japanese reaction was swift. Chokai, the heavy cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron and light cruiser Kinu launched floatplanes to find Force Z. All warships in the area were notified and ordered to intercept, but Kongo and Haruna would not arrive until the following morning. The transports were ordered to stop unloading and scatter north. In an unrewarded effort to draw the British force into battle, the Japanese made extensive use of their radios in the clear. By this time the fuel situation for the destroyers of Force Z was pressing. Phillips would have to spend three vital hours fueling them at sea, or release them to return to Singapore. He chose the latter, and after sunset on December 9, Tenedos turned for home. Her captain carried orders for all possible destroyers, including the 57th Destroyer Division, to come out and meet him north of Anambas Island at dawn of December 11. All through the rest of the night both sides groped for each other in the darkness. The Japanese blindly based on an hours old sighting from a cruiser floatplane; Force Z with the questionable aid of radar. It was almost disastrous for the Japanese, who threw 53 torpedo bombers into the search. In the dark, they found a large ship and dropped a flare while setting up an attack. Below, on the bridge of Chokai, the flare burned brightly as her radio operator sent a frantic signal to Saigon: “There are three attacking planes over Chokai. It is Chokai under the flare.”10 Rear-Admiral Matsunaga read the message and prudently recalled his bombers until daylight. Five miles south, Electra sighted the flare and notified Prince of Wales. Phillips thought long and hard before ordering his force to turn away. Although both his capital ships had radar, neither was picking up the enemy force of six cruisers and their escorting destroyers. Since he did not know the strength of his opponent, he was unwilling to risk battle for several reasons. Phillips’ objective was to win a strategic victory; he knew the landings were complete and that Force Z was too late to affect the issue. He also realized there was little chance of finding transports in the area, since he believed his presence was already known. While a victory over warships would achieve a tactical

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advantage, strategic victory could only be won by destroying loaded transports. And this he could no longer do. Thus, Admiral Phillips turned away with the thought of saving his ships for another chance on another day. To the north, the Japanese were badly shaken by their near attack on Chokai. They decided to withdraw north until dawn. This would give Kongo and Haruna time to join up and allow the destroyers time to refuel for a prolonged day action. With both sides withdrawing, the opportunity for a surface action was lost. Had they encountered each other that night, the battle would have been interesting. With 14-inch and 15-inch guns, Force Z possessed a preponderance of firepower over the Japanese with their five 8-inch heavy cruisers and one 6-inch gun light cruiser. More important, the British possessed radar on a dark night hampered by rain squalls and low clouds.11 However, one can question its effectiveness after failing to detect the Japanese force at a range of only five miles. Although early models, the sets had a range of 25 miles; the next morning they worked perfectly. The IJN was also the best in the world when it came to night actions. Superior weaponry and training let it remain competitive at night long after radar was commonplace. With their 24-inch “Long Lance” torpedo, the larger numbers of Japanese destroyers had great potential to cause serious damage to the British force. Also, the British destroyers had never worked together before. Even so, the RN was a capable, welltrained force with excellent officers and crewmen who had more than two years of combat experience to draw upon. In the end, none of these factors came into play as both sides turned away. Admiral Phillips sought to cover as much ground as possible during the night so he would be out of range of air attack at dawn. The Japanese were equally determined to strike by air if they were denied a surface engagement. But they still had to find Force Z. I-58 was next to make contact when she was nearly run down on the surface just before midnight on December 9. Force Z never saw the submarine dive 1,800 yards away. Once again radar failed the British, as did ASDIC aboard the three destroyers. They also missed the five torpedoes I-58 fired at Repulse. All just missed her stern and I-58 was left behind as Force Z plowed into the night, completely oblivious to its narrow escape.12 All Lieutenant-Commander Sohichi Kitamura could do was make another sighting report. Admiral Phillips should have been out of range of Japanese bombers by dawn. However, he received word of a landing at Kuantan and sent a floatplane to investigate, which reported only a Japanese trawler towing four small boats. So instead of distancing himself from prowling Japanese bombers, Force Z was still off Kuantan when a Japanese reconnaissance plane found it again at 1015. At about the same time a jolting report came in from Tenedos, well to the south, that she was under air attack. Not wanting to let the British slip away, the Japanese launched their initial air strikes quickly. It was only hours before

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

the first wave appeared over Force Z, which steamed southward without air cover. Eight high-level “Nells” of the Mihoro Air Corps closed formation at 1113 and turned on Repulse, which they knew to have thinner armor protection. It was a clear day and the radar sets aboard Prince of Wales and Repulse were functioning perfectly and had been tracking the Japanese for some time. Initial AA salvos were ragged until controlled fire took over. Prince of Wales’ modern 5.25-inch AA guns opened long-range fire at 1100, and were joined by Repulse’s older 4-inch AA guns as the range closed. Admiral Phillips was in combat for the first time since 1915. The bombers closed with no apparent regard. They ignored Prince of Wales and swept low over her deck with a thundering roar. Repulse could not avoid this quick attack and left her fate to the skill of the lead bombardier. One bomb fell to starboard and six more to port, throwing up huge splashes. Only one hit, penetrating the unprotected aircraft hangar and Marine mess deck before exploding on the armored deck above the boiler room. Had it been armor-piercing the bomb probably would have penetrated to cause extensive damage. Each plane carried two 500-pound bombs and planned to make two separate attacks. Defensive fire from Force Z was intense and damaged five of the eight planes in their first pass. Two were hit so hard that they barely staggered home. The remaining six circled away to await more “Nells” of the Genzan Air Corps that were coming up fast. At 1140 two additional formations joined the fight. Each carried torpedoes and maneuvered to attack from different directions and split the AA fire. The first section formed an extended arc and bore in on Prince of Wales, dropping their torpedoes from about 100 feet. At 1144 a heavy explosion thumped aft of the bridge on the port side and a 200 foot column of water drenched gun crews. Speed quickly fell from 25 to 15 knots and Prince of Wales began vibrating due to propeller shaft damage. She took an immediate 11½ degree list and the stern was only two feet above water instead of the normal 24 feet.13 Power and lights to the aft 5.25-inch AA guns also failed. In seconds, a single torpedo had crippled the most modern ship in the world. The blast and water column actually did little damage when it struck the armored belt. In reality, it concealed a second hit that caused serious damage. Not until after the war did divers discover a 12-foot hole in her stern, caused by a torpedo which hit simultaneously and produced little shock and no water column. In return, the battleship shot down a paltry one bomber and lightly damaged three others. The second wave of seven torpedo bombers attacked late. They were confused by the configuration of Repulse and thought they might actually be attacking their own battleship Kongo instead. The section commander was well aware of the Chokai incident the previous night and retired into the clouds for 12 minutes to make sure. Only when he was sure about the identity of the ships did the formation attack. Repulse was their target this time. She turned hard to starboard to comb the torpedoes as the “Nells” bore in, but her AA

armament was outdated and weak in numbers. Some guns could not elevate high enough, while others could not depress low enough to reach the bombers during their final torpedo run. As the range closed, the battlecruiser’s two pompom mounts opened fire. But as on Prince of Wales, one mount immediately suffered jams in six of eight barrels due to ammunition separating in the belts as it entered the guns.14 The second mount’s electric motor had been damaged by the bomb hit and was still trying to go to local control. Repulse was now all but defenseless at close range, as her 20mm Oerlikons were too small to seriously damage the bombers. As they closed in, eight torpedo-armed “Nells,” which Repulse never noticed in the confusion joined them. Captain W.G. Tennant was brilliant in his maneuvers, as he combed up to 12 torpedo tracks. He also evaded six bombs from the remaining bombers of the first wave, which coordinated their attack with the torpedo bombers. This ended the first wave of attacks on Force Z. In exchange for a minor bomb hit on Repulse and the two strikes on Prince of Wales, the Japanese lost one bomber, two heavily damaged and 10 more lightly damaged out of 25 torpedo bombers and eight high-level bombers. They claimed seven torpedo hits on Repulse. A lull followed as the Japanese raiders retired to the north.

A Japanese photograph showing Prince of Repulse and Repulse under heavy air attack (U.S. Naval History & Heritage Command).

9. The Deployment of Force Z The two capital ships were now about three miles apart. And while Repulse was almost undamaged, Prince of Wales was in serious trouble as she wallowed along at 15 knots. In the first four minutes following the torpedo hit(s), she took on 2,400 tons of water and more entered the punctured hull every minute. With half her dynamos flooded the pumps also failed, leaving no way to save the ship if they could not be restarted. Her B Engine Room flooded immediately as did the port Dynamo Diesel Room and the aft turret’s Action Machinery Room. The aft 5.25-inch magazine was flooding, as was Y Boiler Room, which in turn, caused its engine room to also lose power. In the Harbor Machinery Room, only one dynamo still worked amid an electrical fire; the other had flooded and failed. The blast also bent a propeller shaft, causing severe vibrations as the 240-foot shaft turned, causing its propeller to work loose and eventually drop off. Although the rudder remained undamaged, both electric steering engines lost power and were useless. Emergency efforts were immediately made to connect auxiliary steam engines, but they were not successful before more attacks came. Captain J.C. Leach now counter-flooded Prince of Wales so her 5.25" guns could train. He managed to bring the list down to 10 degrees, but that was all. All four aft mounts were without power, while two of the forward mounts suffered intermittent power failures, as did some of the pom-poms. The latter still had barrels jammed from the separated ammunition and the gun crews could not remedy the problem in the time at hand. All the while, communications with the aft section of the ship were out and the captain was having great difficulty getting damage reports. Ventilation in her engine rooms then failed and black gang crews began passing out from the extreme heat. By 1210, Captain Leach was forced to raise two black balls, signaling that Prince of Wales was “Not Under Control.” All of this had been caused by the single torpedo no one had noticed. The torpedo causing the huge explosion and water column had only buckled a few plates and allowed minor flooding into the port bulge. Aboard Repulse, Captain Tennant was astonished to learn that Admiral Phillips had not sent any messages to Singapore requesting air cover. Now at 1158, he took the liberty of transmitting, “From Repulse to any British man of war, enemy aircraft bombing. My position 134NYTW22X09.”15 It was the first radio message Force Z had sent since leaving Singapore two days earlier. It was also the first indication naval headquarters there had that Force Z was in trouble.16 Within 26 minutes air cover was on the way as 453 Squadron (RAAF) at Sembawang Airfield scrambled.17 The squadron had been assigned to fly air cover for Force Z from the time it left Singapore.18 However, during his days at sea, Phillips never once called upon the Buffalo fighters. Now, despite being an hour’s flying time away from the two ships, the pilots of 453 Squadron could do nothing to help. The lull lasted 20 minutes before the next wave found Force Z. At 1220 the Kanoya Air Corps with 26 “Betty” bombers

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dropped out of the clouds. They carried 450-pound torpedoes, but were low on fuel after a prolonged search and could not spend much time developing an attack. They split into two groups and immediately pressed the attack. Seventeen bore in on Prince of Wales, which could not defend herself and no bombers were shot down during this attack. The only two 5.25-inch mounts with power could not depress low enough to interdict the low-flying bombers. Pompoms opened fire as the range closed, but began jamming again almost immediately, leaving only the 20mm Oerlikons. Against this weak show of AA fire, the first six bombers closed to 550 yards before releasing their torpedoes in a crushing attack. Four ran true and exploded against the crippled battleship’s starboard hull. The first blew a huge hole through the stern allowing more flooding and the second struck just forward of the bridge and ruptured a fuel tank. The last two were the most damaging, as they hit where the damage was already worst. The third exploded alongside Y Turret. The fourth crumpled the remaining propeller shaft, stopping the turbines in A Engine Room. By now she had taken on approximately 18,000 tons of water. On the plus side, the hits remedied her list to port, but further reduced speed to 8 knots.

“Abandon ship” Prince of Wales was all but finished, so the remaining 20 “Bettys” turned their attention toward Repulse. Their attack was loose and ragged due to the fuel situation. Two miles away, the battlecruiser still remained untouched except for the lone bomb hit. As the bombers closed Captain Tennant worked Repulse up to 27½ knots and began turning to starboard to comb the attack. Seventeen planes started the initial attack from varying angles attempting to box in Repulse. They did not press home the attack and dropped their torpedoes from 2,500 yards out, mostly to starboard. As Repulse committed to avoiding these torpedoes, three planes feinting toward Prince of Wales suddenly made a hard turn and bore in close on the port side. There was nothing Repulse could do to avoid all the torpedoes. Captain Tennant’s maneuvers caused the first eight to miss, but the feint worked to perfection. Crewmen watched a torpedo intersect for 90 seconds before it struck her port bulge. A second struck at an odd angle but did not explode. Repulse absorbed her initial torpedo hit very well and suffered little damage and no reduction in speed. Nine torpedo planes now closed in the most skillful attack of the day. Six planes circled in from starboard, while the remaining three came in on the port side. Once again Repulse was in danger of being boxed in. The first six did not close and dropped their torpedoes at fairly long range. The three bombers of the second section closed to 600 yards before dropping their weapons. Two could not turn away fast enough and had to fly directly over Repulse at low altitude. The combined weight of her AA fire was extremely vicious at such close range and both were shot down.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Despite effective AA fire, all three torpedoes struck home. The first exploded near the Aft Engine Room and the second abreast Y Turret. The third struck the stern and sounded Repulse’s death knell. It jammed her rudder hard to starboard so that she could only steer in a wide circle. One of the remaining torpedoes also hit starboard in E Engine Room. The attack lasted just four minutes but was enough to kill Repulse. Captain Tennant knew her compartmentation was old and not designed to withstand multiple torpedo hits. The list quickly increased from seven to nine degrees; when it reached 12 points, he gave the order: “Abandon ship.” As the crew went over the side, Vampire and Express came up to assist. At 1235, 11 minutes after the first torpedo hit, Repulse’s red-colored hull turned up and she disappeared from sight. There were still two more Japanese squadrons left to attack. The first started its run at 1233 in pattern formation, but the lead bombardier accidentally dropped his 1,000-pound bomb far from the ships, and the other eight planes followed suit. The bombs fell on the horizon and the British crews thought a damaged bomber was jettisoning its bomb load. At 1220 Admiral Phillips finally broke radio silence—22 minutes after Captain Tennant had first notified Singapore. It was now a full 80 minutes after the first attack began. He signaled: “Emergency … have been struck by a torpedo on port side. NYTW022R06. 4 Torpedoes. Repulse hit by 1 torpedo. Send destroyers.”19 Amazingly, Phillips still did not ask for air cover, although Sembawang Airfield was only 75 miles away. At 1241 the last eight Japanese bombers arrived over Prince of Wales at 9,000 feet. By now, only three 5.25-inch turrets could fire and one was soon forced to stop due to a hydraulic leak. The other two were severely hampered by a damaged rangefinder. Though out of range and still prone to jamming, the pompoms and other short-range weapons also joined in. One bomber’s release mechanism failed, so only seven 1,000-pound bombs fell in the final attack. One penetrated the catapult deck and exploded near X Boiler Room. It contained the last boiler that was still operable, and the bomb put it out of action. Prince of Wales now had no power of any kind. Two more near-misses caused extensive hull damage and additional flooding aft. The battleship’s engines stopped as the bombers flew away. Despite their weak fire, the AA guns had damaged five of the planes. They signaled Saigon that both capital ships were sinking so no more attacks would be dispatched. It was fortunate as the attacks had used every last aerial torpedo in southern Indochina.20 As Prince of Wales settled deeper, the admiral signaled Singapore several times. One transmission asked that all available tugs be dispatched and another was so badly garbled that Singapore could not understand it. None of his messages revealed that Repulse had already sunk. Even more revealing was the fact that not one of his nine messages sent that day ever mentioned a request for air cover. Captain Leach still refused to give up on Prince of Wales and officers went through the crew asking for volunteers to stay

aboard and try to save her.21 Crewmen were going over the side when Lieutenant-Commander F.J. Cartwright neatly brought Express alongside to take them off. As he did though, a rather tart signal flashed down from the battleship’s bridge: “What have you come alongside for?” Cartwright answered, “It looks as though you require assistance.” He managed to take off much of her crew before being forced to back off by the capsizing battleship’s keel.

“Look after yourselves” Despite dramatic last minute efforts to save her, Prince of Wales took a turn for the worse at 1315. Her list sharply increased and the doomed battleship clearly began going down. Just 90 minutes after her initial torpedo hit, Captain Leach gave the final order to abandon ship. On the bridge, Admiral Phillips assembled his staff and ordered them to “Look after yourselves.”22 Most of the bridge staff was rescued. However, both Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach remained on the bridge despite pleas from crewmen to leave the ship. Approximately 10 minutes later Prince of Wales took her final plunge. By 1323 the Royal Navy’s newest battleship had completely disappeared from sight, leaving more than 1,000 British seamen struggling in the water. Electra had been broadcasting signals for the flagship after her transmitter faded at 1300. At 1318 Commander C.W. May sent a message that shook Singapore and 10 Downing Street down to the foundation: “Most immediate…. HMS Prince of Wales sunk.” Exactly two minutes later the fighters of 453 Squadron (RAAF) belatedly arrived in response to the signal sent by Captain Tennant an hour earlier. All they could do was watch Prince of Wales sink and chase off several Japanese reconnaissance planes monitoring the situation from a distance. Compared to Repulse’s swift demise, Prince of Wales sank slowly, although loss of life was still high. Of 1,612 crewmen aboard Prince of Wales, 327 were lost; the number was even higher aboard Repulse, where 513 of 1,309 aboard perished. Both Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach were lost, but Vampire rescued Captain Tennant. There is debate as to whether the first two chose to go down with Prince of Wales or tried to get off at the last minute. Japanese losses were negligible. Of 51 torpedo-bombers and 34 level bombers deployed, they scored 11 torpedo and two bomb hits while losing only three torpedo bombers. They suffered light damage to 17 torpedo- bombers and 11 level bombers. One plane crashed on return to base, bringing total Japanese losses to four aircraft; all but three of the damaged planes were repaired locally. Personnel losses totaled 18 crewmen aboard the aircraft lost. All that remained now was to return the survivors to Singapore. As Electra, Express and Vampire retired, they met the destroyer reinforcements Admiral Phillips had requested. They included the 57th Destroyer Division, which had reached Singapore after Force Z sailed, and Stronghold.

9. The Deployment of Force Z Stronghold joined the retiring destroyers while the Americans continued on. They swept the scene of action that afternoon to ensure no survivors remained, but found only oil slicks, debris and dead bodies. As they retired, Edsall boarded the Japanese fishing trawler Shofu Fu Maru as she towed her four small boats off Kuantan and took them into Singapore. Three days later Admiral Hart recalled the 57th Destroyer Division, ending the first attempt at a combined Anglo-American naval operation of the war. The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse was a crushing blow. The most powerful remaining allied ships were now the heavy cruisers Exeter and Houston. Although supported by a host of light cruisers and destroyers, they were no match for the powerful Japanese units facing them. The situation worsened on December 12 when the British Admiralty all but ruled out any future offensive action. The remaining RN ships would be used primarily for convoy duties between Singapore and the Indian Ocean.

Chart 17: Royal Navy Ships at Singapore, December 11, 1941 Cruisers

Notes

Danae Dragon Durban Exeter Mauritius

Arrived December 10 from Colombo. Undergoing comprehensive overhaul.

Destroyers Electra Encounter Express Isis

Attached to Mediterranean Fleet; Undergoing comprehensive overhaul.

Jupiter Scout Stronghold Tendeos Thanet

Corvettes Bendigo Burnie Goulburn Maryborough

Sloops Vendetta

Undergoing comprehensive overhaul.

Armed Merchant Cruisers Kanimbla Manoora

En route to Singapore from Penang.

On December 23, the RN announced its permanent plans following the loss of Force Z. The battleships Revenge and Royal Sovereign, together with Dragon, Durban, Danae, Jupiter, Encounter, Electra, Express and Vampire would form part of the Eastern Fleet surface forces at Singapore. The very cruisers Admiral Phillips had declined to take to sea because of advanced age would now replace Prince of Wales and Repulse! Despite their

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attachment, Revenge and Royal Sovereign never moved to Singapore and remained with the main fleet at Ceylon. It was clear, for the time being at least, that no reinforcements were coming from Europe or elsewhere, which created rifts in the Australian-British-New Zealand alliance. In the 1930s, the Admiralty promised to replace any Dominion ships sent to reinforce Singapore with those from the Royal Navy. Now, despite these assurances, New Zealand and Australia refused to surrender strategic control of their ships to the British. This was because since 1939, the RN had suffered grievous losses. War losses included no less than three battleships, three aircraft carriers, nine cruisers, 56 destroyers, 31 submarines, 23 small warships and 14 auxiliaries.23 The total was even higher when one counted the hundreds of small auxiliaries that had also been lost. Saddled with these huge losses, the RN could barely meet its own needs; much less fend for the Dominions. Amid this strained naval situation and the crushing loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Australians correctly doubted the British ability to replace ships sent to reinforce Singapore. Reluctant to leave its mainland unprotected to guard distant Singapore, the Australian Government elected to hold its ships in territorial waters. The Admiralty made similar promises to New Zealand. Its government also had reservations, but as a show of support, they did order the light cruiser HMNZS Achilles from Northern New Zealand to Singapore. Not until mid February, when the USN agreed to form a joint task force to replace Dominion ships, did the Australians release any major surface units to reinforce Singapore. With the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Royal Navy had a surplus of several thousand trained and experienced seamen at Singapore with little to do. When he learned of this, Vice-Admiral Helfrich approached Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, commander-in-chief of the Royal Navy’s China Fleet, about the possibility of using some of them to man the light cruiser Sumatra for convoy duty.24 They would also operate several motor torpedo boats for which the Dutch had no trained crews. Although the cruiser was still several months away from completing her overhaul at the ME, Helfrich already knew he would have trouble pulling together a crew to operate the ship.25 Thus, he proposed Sumatra be partially manned by a Dutch crew with British seaman filling out her ranks where necessary. She would sail under the Dutch flag with a Dutch captain.26 RN personnel would also man several small craft due to launch in the coming months. Admiral Layton was initially receptive to the idea and Helfrich dispatched Hr.Ms. Janssens27 to Singapore in late December.28 She took aboard a contingent of RN sailors and transported them to Soerabaja. However, Layton’s enthusiasm waned when a British survey team inspected Sumatra. It deemed her condition too deteriorated and he withdrew his support.29 The men of Prince of Wales and Repulse were distributed amongst other RN ships or assigned to duty ashore. It does not appear that any of them were assigned to man the uncompleted motor torpedo boats.30

Chapter 10

The Japanese Land The most effective naval weapons left to the Dutch and Americans were now their powerful submarine fleet. Dutch boats numbered 15, to which the United States Asiatic Fleet added 23 modern “Fleet Boats” and six obsolete S-Class submarines (referred to as “Pig Boats” because their cramped conditions and lack of air conditioning made life aboard them almost unbearable). Nevertheless, the Americans suffered a crushing blow almost immediately. American submarines operated out of Cavite Naval Yard at Manila when the Pacific War started. On December 10, the Japanese launched a massive air strike against the base and literally leveled it. Lost were the submarine Sealion, the low frequency radio tower used to transmit to submerged submarines (meaning they now had to surface to receive messages) and all repair facilities and parts. Even worse, was the loss of 233 Mark 14 torpedoes. Yard personnel salvaged 150 torpedoes and a few spares, which they transferred to underground tunnels on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. These losses—combined with an acute shortage of torpedoes in the USN—badly hampered American submarine operations for months. Almost immediately, the American boats moved south to the ME to remain free of air attack and resume operations. They also needed a base as Cavite was little more than a twisted pile of scorched metal. The minesweepers Lark and Whippoorwill joined them. The latter eventually moved to Tjilatjap and operated as patrol boats under Dutch operational command when heavy air raids began on Soerabaja in early February, but the submarines remained at the ME.

reported, “One Bristol-Class seaplane tender and one destroyer anchored in Davao Harbor at 1800 hours 6 December.” In response, IJN Headquarters ordered Rear-Admiral Kyuji Kubo’s 4th Surprise Attack Force to launch an attack with the light carrier Ryujo. By the morning of December 8 Kubo was 100 miles off Davao and launched 13 Aichi D3A “Val” dive bombers and nine A5M “Claude” fighters between 0400 and 0445. Simultaneously, the destroyers Hayashio, Kuroshio, Natsushio and Oshio broke formation. At 30 knots they made a high-speed run toward the port to intercept any ships attempting to escape the raid. The only naval vessel present was the seaplane tender William B. Preston with three PBY Catalinas. The Japanese initially ignored the tender. They burned two PBYs on the water almost before their crews knew what had hit them. The third PBY survived because it was on patrol. William B. Preston was attacked by dive bombers for over half an hour; although near-missed several times she suffered no major damage.1 When her remaining PBY returned it reported the approach of Japanese destroyers. They were 15 miles south on a course straight for Davao. In response, the tender carried out a hurried search and rescue effort and sailed to avoid being caught in the harbor. There was no resistance from the ground or in the air, although a bomber suffered engine trouble and was forced to ditch in the ocean on the return flight; Kuroshio rescued its crew. The destroyers also found nothing and rendezvoused with Jintsu, Hatsukaze and Amatsukaze at 1400. Immediately after the attack, William B. Preston sailed south to the East Indies to continue reconnaissance operations. Davao was considered too exposed for continued use as a port and it was abandoned. On December 16 5,000 troops of the 56th Independent Mixed Brigade left Palau aboard 14 transports bound for Davao. In close escort were the minelayer Shirataka and 2nd Destroyer Flotilla under Rear- Admiral Raizo Tanaka. Rear- Admiral Takeo Takagi with the 5th Cruiser Squadron, Ryujo, seaplane tender Chitose and the destroyer Shiokaze provided distant cover. The landings started on the night of December 19–20 and encountered mild resistance. The garrison numbered approximately 2,000 troops of the Philippine Army’s 101st Regiment, who withdrew into the interior. The Japanese did not aggres-

The Japanese Take Davao To guard the flank of their “Western Invasion Force” in Malaysia and Borneo, the Japanese launched a series of operations designed to support their invasion of the NEI. These required capturing several islands in the southern Philippines which were needed as bases for their entry into the northern fringes of the East Indies. These would serve as the springboard for their “Eastern Invasion Force.” Davao on southern Mindanao was their first objective and the Japanese began softening it up on the first day of the war. On December 6 a reconnaissance plane flew over the port and

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10. The Japanese Land sively pursue and remained content to take possession of the port and airfield. By the afternoon of December 20 they had established a seaplane base in the harbor and were flying patrols. By January 1 the 21st Air Flotilla was on the airfield flying missions against Dutch targets in the East Indies. With the loss of Force Z, the Dutch submarines operating from Singapore under British operational control were now Malaya’s first line of defense. The Royal Navy put out a call for additional Dutch help (while still refusing to commit their own warships from Colombo) and Helfrich responded by ordering the 4th Submarine Division from the Karimata Strait into the South China Sea. They came under British operational control on December 11. Vice-Admiral Helfrich anticipated early Japanese movement against Dutch territory. He ordered the 3rd Submarine Division to take up position off Tarakan. He initially separated one boat from the division and ordered it to Menado. But upon receiving word of the Malaya landings, he ordered the entire division into the South China Sea via the ME for refueling. His plan was to hold the 3rd Submarine Division in the South China Sea, just north of Billiton Island. From this position it could guard the entrance of the Java Sea while simultaneously providing a strategic reserve for those divisions operating to the north. Helfrich worried about leaving Tarakan exposed, but with the action currently off Malaya, he had little choice. Helfrich had other problems as well. Due to a shortage of reconnaissance planes, he posted isolated surface ships throughout the archipelago to warn of surprise attacks on key outposts. The plan was a poor one and threatened disaster if an invasion force did appear, for the scattered ships could not be quickly reassembled to contest it. It also created the possibility of lone units being easily picked off one at a time. With the start of war Helfrich quickly realized his tactical error and pulled the ships back. He deployed his surface ships mainly on patrol duties to prevent a surprise attack on Java. The cruiser Java was already operating with the British at Singapore, while De Ruyter was alone in the Alice Strait off the Paternoster Islands. Tromp was in the Karimata Strait without destroyer escort. Although Helfrich needed a patrol there, he could not afford to lose an irreplaceable cruiser to a submarine, so he ordered her to join De Ruyter in the Alice Strait. Meanwhile, Banckert patrolled the south entrance of the Sape Strait while Piet Hein patrolled south of Alor and Paternoster Island. The 3rd Destroyer Division with Van Nes and Evertsen was on patrol in the Soenda Strait. They were under British operational control on December 8 but remained in the strait to escort expected reinforcements for Singapore. Witte de With and Kortenaer were based at Tarakan and patrolled the Celebes Sea. Between December 12 and 15 Java escorted the first Allied convoy through the Soenda Strait. She was the convoy command ship and other escorts included Evertsen, Van Nes, Stronghold, Encounter, Tenedos and the Australian armed mer-

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chant cruiser Kanimbla. They took four British and three American merchant ships from Singapore into the Indian Ocean via the Soenda Strait. Japanese air attacks on allied shipping from captured airfields on Malaya were frequent. The gunboat Soemba was the first target when she came under attack while on patrol in the Riouw Archipelago hours after the start of war. Despite having no air cover, she drove them off and claimed one shot down. The GM patrol boat Arend was attacked on December 16 off the northwest coast of Netherlands New Guinea. The ship’s anti-aircraft defenses consisted of six carbines fired by her officers. However, fake wooden gun positions persuaded the Japanese from attacking too closely and Arend suffered no damage.2 Kortenaer was another target while escorting convoys between Tandjoeng Priok and Palembang during December. All were sporadic and ineffective initially, but grew more intense and effective as the campaign wore on. By mid February, virtually every convoy moving through the Soenda Strait was subjected to some form of air attack. Attacks also hampered Dutch submarines off Malaya by keeping them submerged and limiting their mobility. Although they missed the initial landings, the submarines were able to interdict future landing and supply operations. On December 10 K-XI and K-XIII intercepted a convoy off northeast Malaya and made the first attacks of the war. The common belief among the Americans and British was that the IJN was second-class and not equipped with ASDIC. However, the Dutch boats quickly found otherwise as the escorts detected their presence and drove both off without loss to the convoy. Once alerted, they did not allow either submarine to close again.

“If you manage to survive, say goodbye to my wife and children” Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A.J. Bussemaker, O-16 departed Singapore on Saturday, December 6 with orders to investigate two Japanese destroyers operating off the coast of Malaya. Although she sighted both ships, there had been no declaration of war so Bussemaker could take no offensive action and they eventually disappeared. Following the declaration of war on December 8, he fired three torpedoes against a Japanese troopship in the early morning of December 9. A driving rainstorm allowed poor visibility and all missed and the submarine was unable to close again. However, the Japanese master had carelessly neglected to extinguish his ship’s stern lamp, allowing Bussemaker to easily trail her on the surface. At dawn, O-16 submerged and continued to follow its course until dusk. At nightfall, Bussemaker surfaced and ordered full speed, eventually sighting the transport again as it entered the Bay of Patani on the night of December 11. Bussemaker slipped through a destroyer screen unobserved and followed the transport into the bay. Inside, he found

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four transports anchored in a semi-circular formation. To avoid detection he brought O-16 close into shore despite little moonlight and no navigation aids. The depth gauge soon indicated less than 30 feet of water, making a fully submerged attack impossible. Bussemaker pressed on and watched as the troopship dropped anchor with the three other transports. As it did, O-16 closed quietly on the surface until well within torpedo range. Bussemaker fired six torpedoes and saw them hit all four ships as he retired. They sank two cargo ships; the 8,666 ton Tozan Maru and 8,811 ton Asosan Maru, along with the 9,306 ton transport Kinka Maru. The 7,170 ton Sakura Maru was heavily damaged. As the depth of the water was only 30 feet it appears the Japanese were able to quickly salvage and repair the sunken ships. With only one torpedo left, Bussemaker moved approximately four miles offshore and set course for Singapore. At 0200 on the morning of December 14 one of his lookouts reported a searchlight on the horizon and Bussemaker changed course to investigate. At approximately 0230, a huge blast rocked O-16, spraying seawater and fuel oil across the bridge. The boat went down in less than a minute, trapping all hands except Bussemaker and five other bridge crew. Unaware that O-16 had suffered catastrophic damage, Bussemaker and Lieutenant 2nd Class C.A. Jeekel tried to close the conning tower hatch to maintain watertight integrity as the sinking boat washed them into the sea. Although all six men on the bridge survived the initial sinking, Bussemaker was apparently wounded and drowned almost immediately. The others heard him call out but could not find him in the darkness.3 With his death, the remaining survivors included Leading Seaman Cornelius de Wolf, Lieutenant Jeekel, Seaman 1st Class F.X. van Tol, Seaman 2nd Class F. Kruijdenhof and Machinist A.F. Bos. They swam on, trying to reach an island in the distance. Without life jackets, the exhausted men slipped under the water one by one until only Bos and de Wolf remained. Bos was so tired that he could barely tread water and struggled to remain afloat. De Wolf suggested that they sing a short psalm, which initially appeared to bolster the machinist’s resolve. But after only a few more strokes, he called out to de Wolf: “I can’t go on; swim on and don’t worry about me. If you manage to survive, say goodbye to my wife and children.”4 Bos then disappeared and de Wolf did not see him again. Hallucinating badly, de Wolf swam alone for another 36 hours before reaching land where a Malaysian guided him to an Australian army camp. There, a sentry nearly bayoneted him in the dark. Then, because he spoke poor English and the Australians did not understand Dutch, de Wolf had trouble convincing them that his story was true. They thought he was a German spy dropped by submarine. They eventually took him to Singapore and he returned to Java on December 17 aboard the submarine depot ship Janssens. Upon his arrival on Java, Leading Seaman de Wolf made a personal report to Vice-Admiral Helfrich, who immediately promoted him to the rank of petty officer and awarded him

two of Holland’s highest medals for valor, the Bronze Lion and the Distinguished Service Medal. At the same time, LieutenantCommander Bussemaker was decorated posthumously. De Wolf was the only survivor of the sinking; in addition to Bussemaker and those who drowned after abandoning ship, one officer and 34 crewmen went down aboard the O-16. Based on Quartermaster de Wolf ’s initial debriefing by two Dutch naval officers in Singapore, O-16’s loss was attributed to a British mine. It was believed that Bussemaker had not been informed of a new British minefield off Tioman Island, or that his navigation was off and O-16 inadvertently ran onto the barrage. Other possibilities included that the position of the minefield may not have been precise; or, a stray mine could have broken loose and drifted across O-16’s path as she skirted the spread. In the end, none of these hypotheses proved correct.5 K-XII made contact with a supply convoy off Kuantan on December 12. Lieutenant-Commander H.C.J. Coumou, KMR skillfully penetrated the escort screen and sank what he claimed to be a 9,000 ton transport. Postwar records confirmed it as the 1,932-ton cargo ship Toro Maru. He remained in the area and on December 13 torpedoed what he thought was a 3,500 ton tanker. Postwar records confirmed it as the 3,525-ton cargo ship Taizan Maru, but credited K-XIII. However, this boat never made any attacks in the Gulf of Siam. Taizan Maru went down in shallow water and was probably salvaged later. As O-16 and K-XII ravaged shipping off Malaya, the Japanese moved on Borneo. Measuring 260,000 square miles it was the third largest island in the world. Although rich in oil and raw materials communications were primitive and the interior was virtually undeveloped. The Japanese wanted it to protect their sea route to Java and Malaya, while simultaneously providing a barrier against counterattack by the Allies.

The Loss of Shinonome At 0530 on December 13, 10 transports left Cam Ranh Bay with the light cruiser Yura, 12th Destroyer Division, 1st Minesweeper Division and submarine chaser Cha 7 in close support. The aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru provided air cover. Trailing behind was Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita with the heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya with the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri. From December 12 to 17 Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo with the battleships Kongo and Haruna, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao and a heavy destroyer screen provided distant cover while remaining out of range of air attack. Submarines I-62, I-64, I-65 and I-66 also patrolled the passage between Natoma Island and Northwest Borneo to prevent interference from Allied ships. Their goal was to capture the oilfields at Miri and Seria and the airfield at Miri. The convoy arrived off Lutong, Miri and Seria near midnight on December 15 and began landing troops in heavy seas at 0100. Resistance from the Indian 2/15th Punjabis was weak and both operations were completed by 0610. The oil facilities and airfield had been demolished on De-

10. The Japanese Land cember 9 when the garrison withdrew into Dutch Borneo. Beginning at dawn on December 16 they were further damaged by MLD and ML-KNIL bombers operating from Tarakan and airfields in the interior of Dutch Borneo. Most attacks on December 16 were directed against the oil facilities and airfield. However, at 0650 on December 17 X-32 and X-33 from Tarakan sighted a “cruiser” nine miles off Lutong. In the face of light AA fire, the X-boats hit her twice and left the ship listing dead in the water on fire. It was not a cruiser, but rather the Japanese destroyer Shinonome of the 12th Destroyer Division. Both hits proved fatal, causing her to blow up and sink with the loss of her entire 228-man crew.6 Despite this success, the Japanese easily established a foothold on Borneo. Their engineers had the airfield at Miri operational by the 21st. The next day, nine bombers and six fighters of the IJN’s 22nd Air Flotilla flew in to begin operations.

The Invasion of Kuching The Japanese wanted to move south immediately and take Kuching but bad weather delayed their operation for three days. The 2nd Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force and assorted army units left Miri on December 22 aboard six transports. Their escort was again Yura and her 12th Destroyer Division, the submarine chaser Ch 7 and 1st Minesweeper Division. Kamikawa Maru provided air cover and A/S support. The convoy barely left Miri when MLD planes sighted it. The first report put three cruisers and one destroyer 90 miles off Kuching and a second later reported 18 ships 60 miles out. Reconnaissance planes from Singapore then reported three Mogami class heavy cruisers heading north about 100 miles from Kuching. While the convoy moved on Kuching, other forces took Pontianak on December 18. Vice-Admiral Helfrich anticipated this and deployed the 3rd Submarine Division off the west coast of Borneo. It was in the Karimata and Gaspar Straits acting as a reserve for the boats operating in the Gulf of Siam and South China Sea; it also guarded against a surprise Japanese air strike on Tandjoeng Priok. (After Pearl Harbor Helfrich was taking no chances). On December 19 all three submarines bombarded Japanese installations at Pontianak with their 88mm deck guns.

“What an easy target” On the night of December 11 O-19 sighted what LieutenantCommander F.J.A. Knoops reported as a Japanese carrier escorted by two destroyers at 03–30 S / 109–25 E.7 He thought it was preparing to launch an air strike on Tandjoeng Priok. As they slowly moved through the Gaspar Strait, Knoops thought “what an easy target” as he launched a single torpedo at the larger ship.8 Fortunately his aim was bad, for the “carrier” was the 6,369 ton American cargo ship Lillian Luckenbach; she was being escorted to Soerabaja from Singapore by two Dutch tugs.9 In the

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dark night apparently none of them realized that they had even been attacked. Knoops also failed in three subsequent attacks on December 16, 18 and 23; the latter was against a small convoy. O-19 was unable to regain contact with the “Japanese” and sent a position report. In response K-X was ordered out of Soerabaja with orders to intercept. It later transpired that Tromp and the 2nd Submarine Squadron had been notified of Lillian Luckenbach’s departure from Singapore on December 6. For some reason the signal was not sent to the rest of the fleet. When someone in the understaffed KM headquarters finally connected the dots, K-X was recalled.10 As the Japanese invasion convoy neared Kuching on the morning of December 23 X-35 of GVT.1 sighted it and signaled K-XIV by light: “Eight enemy ships about 50 nautical miles north of you, Course 210, Speed about 10 knots.”11 The seaplane then flew off for another look, which the pilot relayed to Lieutenant-Commander C.A.J. van Well Groenveld. Following a third pass, it reported that both Yura and Kamikawa Maru had launched a floatplane and that the destroyer escort had now deployed in an A/S formation. X-35 then deliberately engaged the floatplanes and led them away from the submarine, allowing K-XIV to close in unmolested from the air. The pilot from Kamikawa Maru and Japanese monographs claim to have shot down the Dutch seaplane. The X-boat made it back to base in damaged condition. With the escort now alerted van Well Groenveld elected to trail behind and attack after dark. The convoy entered Kuching Harbor at 2230 that night and K-XIV followed it in despite shallow water depth. Van Well Groenveld fired two torpedoes at an unidentified transport from his bridge tubes at a range of 1,500 yards, but both missed. He then took the boat close to shore and fired two torpedoes from his revolving deck mount; soon afterwards an explosion roared and the 9,849 transport Katori Maru began sinking at coordinates 02–30 N / 110–00 E.12 Just 50 yards from the sinking transport, van Well Groenveld fired at another transport from 800 yards. Assault troops were assembling on her deck preparing to enter their landing craft when the torpedo struck. The 4,943 ton Hiyoshi Maru immediately began listing, causing men and equipment to slide overboard. She too then sank. Destroyers flashed back and forth dropping depth charges but could not find the submarine. The night was pierced by hundreds of small flashlights from Japanese soldiers struggling in the water as K-XIV silently found another target. Depth was now less than 30 feet and van Well Groenveld had to partially surface as he fired at the 8,416 ton transport Hokkai Maru. Again, the torpedoes ran true and van Well Groenveld claimed to have seen the Japanese ship break in two and settle to the bottom. As K-XIV turned to escape, van Well Groenveld fired torpedoes at the 6,503 ton tanker Nichinan Maru. There was a huge explosion and flash as the submarine moved through hundreds of men struggling in the water. As he retired to deeper water, van Well Groenveld came across the most beautiful sight in his naval career: A full broadside shot on Yura at a range of only 200 yards—but he was out of torpedoes!13

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Postwar records confirmed hits on all four ships. Katori Maru and Hiyoshi Maru both sank.14 Hokkai Maru and Nichinan Maru were only damaged despite van Well Groenveld’s claims to the contrary. Hokkai Maru remained afloat but listing; she remained in the harbor until being towed by Heito Maru to Singapore for repairs in September 1942.15

The Loss of K-XVI As K-XIV retired to the ME, K-XVI under LieutenantCommander L.J. Jarman closed in. On Christmas Eve night, he caught the destroyer Sagiri on patrol off Kuching and fatally struck her with two solid torpedo hits. They set the ship ablaze and the pure oxygen from her own torpedoes fueled the flames until their warheads exploded.16 The blast ripped Sagiri apart, killing 121 crewmen. As she sank, the destroyer Shirakumo and minesweeper W-3 closed in and took off 120 survivors. He later attacked the destroyer Murakumo, but the Japanese ship detected her in the shallow water and evaded the torpedoes. She then drove off K-XVI with two depth charge counter-attacks. Aggressive defense on the part of Murakumo prevented Jarman from approaching again. He then retired to charge his batteries. Despite the failed attack on Murakumo, Jarman and his crew were jubilant as they searched for additional targets. It was a short-lived celebration. The Japanese submarine I-66 had departed Samah on the southern end of Hunan Island on December 5. On December 16, her captain, Commander Yoshitomi Zenji, conducted a periscope reconnaissance of Kuching in preparation for the landing operations there. Aware that there were Dutch submarines in the area Zenji then took a patrol station north of the landing site.17 Approximately 60 miles north of Kuching a soundman detected the sound of propellers. At 1145 on Christmas morning Commander Zenji raised his periscope and saw a “quite large” submarine running on the surface less than 150 feet off his starboard bow.18 The range was too close to fire torpedoes. Zenji ordered a sharp circular turn that gave I-66 a favorable firing solution 13 minutes later. He then fired a single torpedo which sank K-XVI with no survivors. Beginning at dawn the next day, the Royal Netherlands Army Air Force (Militaire Luchtvaart or ML) made a series of heavy air strikes. Throughout the afternoon of December 26 Dutch Martin 139W medium bombers (from Sinkawang I Airfield in the interior of Dutch Borneo) attacked the invasion fleet off Kuching. They succeeded in sinking the minesweeper W-6 (615 tons) and the 2,827 ton converted salvage vessel Unyo Maru No. 2. Shortly after returning to Singapore from her patrol off Malaya K-XIII suffered a battery explosion on December 21. Caused by a build-up of chlorine gas from the boat’s exposed batteries19 the blast killed three crewmen and wounded three others.20 As the shipyard at Singapore had no spares for Dutch submarines, Helfrich ordered her back to the ME. Without electric power K-XIII had to make the entire voyage to Soer-

abaja on the surface using her diesels with Van Ghent in escort. They left Singapore on Christmas Day and arrived without incident on January 6. Upon arrival in the submarine base, K-XIII immediately underwent extensive repairs and overhaul. Most of her crew was transferred to K-VIII, which was just completing a hurried overhaul after nearly a year in material reserve. After a brief working-up period, she re-entered service on January 6, 1942, as an ASDIC training boat. A number of KM ships in the East Indies were just now beginning to receive ASDIC equipment from the Royal Navy at Singapore and the submarine was detailed to help properly train the Dutch operators. Despite his dwindling number of submarines, Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered K-X to attack Japanese shipping off the port of Davao on December 25. Air reconnaissance reported the port was rapidly becoming a major base for invasion operations into the East Indies after its capture on December 20. Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander P.G. de Back, K-X was 20 years old and just out of material reserve. ME personnel had been under great pressure to get her ready for sea and did not have time for a complete overhaul. Halfway to Davao, an engine blew out on December 30 and she limped into Tarakan on one engine a week later. An American submarine took over her mission. On December 26 Admiral Layton notified Vice-Admiral Helfrich that K-XVII was five days overdue and officially considered lost. Her last known contact had been with K-XII off Tingan Island on December 14. She had failed in an attack on a Japanese submarine several days earlier and warned K-XII to be on the lookout for others in the area. When she failed to return to Singapore, she was presumed lost in a news release issued by Layton on January 7, 1942: The Commander of the Naval Forces regrets to announce that a submarine of the Dutch Navy which had been placed at the disposal of the Commander of the British Fleet in Eastern Asia has not returned to her base. For a long time there has been no news of this submarine, which since the beginning of the war has been operating in a position where strong enemy forces are maneuvering and it must be concluded that she has been lost in the fighting. It is not known whether the submarine scored success in her final battle.

At the time, it was believed that K-XVII had been lost to Japanese destroyers while attacking a convoy near her last reported position. Divers discovered her wreck in 1978 off Tioman Island, although she was not positively identified until May 1982. Shortly afterwards, it was determined that she had run onto a Japanese barrage of 456 mines that had been laid by the auxiliary minelayer Tatsumiya Maru just prior to the invasion of Malaya. Thirteen years later another expedition discovered the wreck of O-16 just seven nautical miles away. Both submarines had been lost to the same minefield.

The Loss of O-20 On December 29 O-20 was officially declared missing and considered lost. She was five days overdue and had made no

10. The Japanese Land contact with KM Headquarters since the middle of the month. She disappeared without a trace and Vice-Admiral Helfrich did not learn her fate until several months later. Two of her officers eventually escaped Japanese captivity at Hong Kong and traveled overland through occupied China to personally report her loss to Helfrich at Ceylon. The submarine had operated from Singapore in the Gulf of Siam under British operational command since the start of the war. On December 17 Lieutenant-Commander P.G.J. Snippe sighted a Japanese merchant ship off Songei Patani but could not close. At 1000 the next morning he sighted a Japanese destroyer in the distance and spent a good part of the day pursuing it but again could not close. By now it was nearly dark and Snippe had to submerge. Just before O-20 left Singapore a seam in her starboard exhaust pipe had separated and required emergency repairs. They were not carried out properly; as the submarine nosed through the water a huge shower of sparks periodically flew from the exhaust pipe and the crew was unable to fix it. Although able to remain surfaced during daylight, O-20 had to dive after dark as the shower of sparks revealed her position for miles. At sunrise Snippe raised the periscope and sighted two transports escorted by three destroyers approximately eight miles away. The destroyers were the Urunami, Ayanami and Yugiri of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 29th Destroyer Division, which were on convoy duty between Southern Indo-China and Malaya. As he closed on the convoy a Japanese escort plane sighted the submarine’s silhouette in the clear, shallow water at about 1000 and dropped two depth charges.21 Although the first depth charge missed, the second rocked the boat, shattering glass gauges and knocking equipment off line. Snippe made emergency repairs within 30 minutes and went to periscope depth. He immediately signaled the alarm and took O-20 down again. The plane had notified the convoy and Ayanami and Yugiri were now only about 400 yards off the submarine’s stern; meanwhile, Uranami shepherded the convoy to safety. As they closed, Snippe took O-20 to the seaboard’s maximum depth at 142 feet and went silent. The destroyers were tenacious and made good use of their ASDIC as they boxed in O-20, eventually driving her into even shallower water. As their ASDIC loudly pinged on the submarine’s hull, her crewmen donned life jackets and drew numbers to determine who would leave the boat first if it came to that. Meanwhile, Snippe patiently lay quietly on the bottom until approaching depth charges forced him to move at 1330. However, O-20 was stuck in the mud and her engines could not pull her loose, forcing Snippe to blow air from one of the saddle tanks. This gave the destroyers (now joined by Uranami) a solid sound contact and they dropped nine close depth charges. O-20 maneuvered silently as they exploded around her, but Snippe could not shake the destroyers. After another close attack, he ordered fuel oil pumped from an outside tank. The resulting slick on the surface either convinced the Japanese that O-20 was dead or misled their search and the attacks ceased, although the pinging did not.

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How well the submarine held together buoyed the crew. Other than shattered gauges, the only serious damage was a leak where the conning tower joined the hull. Blasts forced the tower down several inches, opening a seam that allowed water to flow in which the crew was unable to seal completely. The light damage was due primarily to the fact that none of the depth charges were set deeper than 100 feet—30 feet above O-20. As afternoon wore on, the boat became a steam bath. At supper, Snippe issued the crew a shot of gin, but would not yet allow them to break open the boat’s limited supply of fresh water. As evening came, the pinging gradually died out and Snippe made plans to escape on the surface after dark. His batteries were low and the air was becoming stale, so he decided to surface and fight it out with torpedoes and his 88mm deck gun if necessary. At 2045 he ordered, “Blow Tank 3,” but water from the leaking seam had made O-20 heavy and she barely moved. Snippe then also blew Tank 2 and O-20 slowly came loose from the mud. Stability was poor and she went to the surface with a 30° list to starboard and a 20° down angle on the stern. On the surface, hull pressure inside the submarines was so great that an officer had trouble opening the main hatch. When he finally did, his binoculars were sucked from his neck through the hatch and thrown onto the deck. With deck guns manned O-20 plowed through the dark night on her diesels at 19¼ knots. After approximately 15 minutes Snippe and his crew began to relax. Then her starboard exhaust began to shower sparks again, revealing her presence for miles. Unfortunately, the Japanese had not left after all and still loitered in the area. Lookouts on O-20 did not spot them until a single searchlight suddenly shot through the night and locked on the conning tower. A shell followed as Uranami charged in. Because of the sparks, a surface escape was impossible and the batteries were still too low for another prolonged dive, so Snippe resolved to fight it out on the surface. He came hard about and fired two torpedoes from his deck tubes, but the destroyer evaded them. The deck gun was unable to fire because the boat’s conning tower blocked its field of fire. Snippe knew escape was impossible and that a surface fight was useless, so he gave the order to scuttle O-20. In the engine room, machinists opened the main vents and pushed the throttles to full speed before abandoning ship. O-20 ploughed into the water at full speed and quickly sank amid a rain of cannon and machine gun fire as the crew went into the water. As the submarine disappeared beneath the surface, Uranami dropped a string of depth charges to ensure that she was truly being scuttled. As they floundered in fuel oil floating on the water, the destroyer veered towards them and swept the area with a searchlight. In a relatively amazing show of compassion from the IJN, it remained in the area throughout the night rescuing survivors. By 0830 she had rescued 32 of O-20’s crew who were well taken care of; another rarity considering the Japanese tendency to habitually mistreat and periodically massacre prisoners. Eight oth-

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ers, including Lieutenant-Commander Snippe, were killed by the final depth charge attack.

“Ship a Day Helfrich” Despite a promising start, Dutch submarines ended their first month of combat on a decidedly sour note. In just three weeks they lost four boats sunk while two more (K-X and K-XIII) suffered heavy damage that required extensive overhaul. With only 15 submarines, this represented 40 percent of their total strength. The figure was actually higher, since several older boats were still in material reserve and were not yet operational. K-VII was so old that she continued to defy all attempts to get her operational, effectively leaving the East Indies Squadron with only 14 submarines. Unlike their American counterparts, the KM achieved good results because their torpedoes were reliable and their commanders tended to be more aggressive.22 In December they sank eight ships totaling 49,122 tons. At the same time, American boats operating in the Philippines sank six ships for 29,500 tons. Dutch claims were so frequent that the press nicknamed Helfrich “Ship a Day Helfrich.” Then, as their losses mounted, the Dutch submarine squadron quickly ceased to be a dominant weapon. As Dutch efforts waned, Japanese submarines of the 6th Submarine Flotilla now became active. I-21 and I-22 laid mine barrages off Singapore and I-24 laid a spread off Manila. I-23 laid fields off Balabac and Soerabaja on December 18–19. Mines from the latter broke loose and washed ashore; this alerted the Dutch, who quickly swept the remainder. Only one merchant ship was lost on I-24’s barrage. As the campaign progressed, the flotilla and others became increasingly active throughout the East Indies and inflicted a heavy toll on Allied shipping.

The Occupation of Portuguese Timor Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan pressured Portugal to accept their “protection” which included the stationing of troops in Portuguese Timor. Unwilling to become what amounted to a colony of Japan, Lisbon did not respond to these offers or refused. Regardless, the threat of Japan occupying any part of Timor was simply too great for the Allies. It would force them to route supplies for Java and Singapore an additional 2,500 miles around the southern tip of Australia.23 It would also threaten Darwin and give Japan a base of operations deep in the Dutch rear area.24 To help prop up Portuguese resolve, Britain offered military assistance in the event of a Japanese attack on Timor. The Allied forces would be immediately withdrawn when additional Portuguese reinforcements arrived. Less intimidated by the presence of Allied troops than those of Japan, Lisbon responded favorably to this offer on December 12, 1941. As part of the agreement it was decided that there would be a series of staff conversations in Singapore to work out the details.25 Portugal pulled together a battalion-size expeditionary

force from their colonial garrison in Portuguese East Africa, some 6,000 miles away.26 It consisted of two infantry companies, one engineer company and a battery of light artillery. Under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Raul Lima Ferreira de Carvalho the force numbered some 800 men. On January 26, 1942, they sailed from Lorenco Marques, Mozambique aboard the merchant ship João Belo with the sloop Goncalves Zarco in escort.27 However, the Japanese would force the issue on Timor long before their arrival and the operation was an exercise in futility.28 Still, the Japanese offer resulted in an emergency meeting between senior Australian and Dutch officials. They discussed the possibility of a joint Australian-Dutch occupation of Portuguese Timor.29 Despite the guarantee of British intervention, they correctly feared that Japan would seize it with little or no warning. Once entrenched, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge them. Thus, the Australians and Dutch resolved to act proactively if the situation warranted. With the Japanese on the move in mid–December they decided that the time was right to act. On December 13 the Netherlands Government in Exile signaled Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer that it “disliked” the idea of a proactively occupying Dili.30 Portugal and Great Britain were historic allies and the Dutch were well aware of the sharp protests such an action would elicit.31 Yet, the same cable closed by directing him to take no action in Portuguese Timor until circumstances made it absolutely unavoidable. From this somewhat nebulous directive Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer determined that those conditions existed and ordered the operation to proceed. On the evening of December 16 two Dutch representatives left Koepang for Dili aboard the GM patrol boat Canopus. They were go to ashore in advance and notify the Portuguese governor that his colony was about to be occupied.32 Soon afterwards the merchant ship Pijnacker Hordijk sailed carrying a joint landing force of 600 KNIL troops and 250 Australian commandoes with weapons and equipment.33 She was escorted by Soerabaja which took up position outside Portuguese territorial waters, although her 11-inch guns could still bombard the city if necessary.34 Just hours after the representatives arrived, the Allied troops landed west of Dili on the morning of December 17. Portuguese troops stayed in their barracks and there was no resistance. As expected, the governor and Lisbon government protested vigorously to the British and Dutch governments at this violation of their neutrality. Although Portugal had agreed to the presence of Allied troops, it was only to take place after a structured agreement had been negotiated. There were, of course, negotiations with the Australians and Dutch. The Allies flatly told the Portuguese that they would only withdraw when Portugal could adequately defend her half of the island against invasion. So until the 800 man expeditionary force aboard João Belo and Goncalves Zarco arrived, Portuguese Timor would remain under Allied military occupation.

10. The Japanese Land Just 10 days later, on December 27 the Japanese occupied the Tambelan Islands. Located south of the Riouw Archipelago, halfway between Singapore and Singkawang, Borneo, they were the first Dutch territory seized by Japan. This signaled the start of a new phase in the East Indies campaign and reinforced the Allied belief that Japan also intended to seize neutral Portuguese Timor.35

The Davao Raid The first air resistance to the invasion came two days later from nine American B-17s stationed at Batchelor Field in Australia. Flying nonstop, they bombed Davao late on the afternoon of December 22. They hit the port’s dock area heavily and claimed to have sunk a 10,000 ton tanker (unconfirmed) and turned for Northern Mindanao. The following day the B-17s refueled and flew another mission against Japanese shipping off the island of Luzon. Soon afterwards they returned to Batchelor Field. The MLD also launched a strike against the invasion force on December 24. It originated from Kalkas seaplane base on Lake Tondano, Celebes and included the six Dornier Do. 24 seaplanes of GVT.2 and GVT.5. GVT.5 attacked shore installations while GVT.2 attacked shipping in the harbor. They initially encountered light resistance from cruiser floatplanes. This let X-27 and X-30 take their time and heavily damage a large warehouse complex. They hit it with six 500-pound bombs and left it burning as they turned for home. X-26 near-missed a cruiser in the harbor. Following them was GVT.2, which attacked shipping in the harbor. All three Dorniers’ bombs missed, but for a lone hit claimed on the 19,262 ton tanker Tonan Maru. Dutch crewmen reported her stern heavily afire as the planes turned for Lake Tondano. However, postwar records do not confirm it. On the way out, Japanese fighters intercepted GVT.2. In a running fight, they shot up X-27 so badly that she was forced down 20 miles north of Taroena Island. A few minutes before landing, the seaplane passed over a small Japanese convoy at low altitude, which the pilot successfully steered away from before the engines gave out. The crew was able to radio their position before the X-boat sank and left them in the water. X-30 landed shortly afterwards and returned them to Lake Tondano. Two more B-17s from Batchelor Field followed the Dutch seaplanes the next morning. Three had originally flown up from Batchelor Field in Australia; one blew out a tire en route and was left behind. At dawn they each laid seven 300-pound bombs across the runway and turned for home. They encountered heavy AA fire and determined resistance from 10 Japanese fighters that shot out an engine on the lead bomber on the first pass and slowed the flight. Despite a climb to 28,000 feet the fighters kept up and badly damaged both B-17s before breaking off. With tremendous effort both just barely staggered the 1,100 miles back to Australia.

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Retribution In retaliation for the raid on Davao the Japanese struck back on the morning of December 26. At 0710, six Zeros from Davao swept in low out of the morning mist, taking the base by surprise. Initially, three of the fighters stayed at high altitude to provide top cover, while the remainder strafed the flying boats. When no Allied air resistance materialized, they too joined the attack. The remaining Dorniers were fueled and armed for a strike against the convoy X-27 reported just before crash-landing. Despite machine gun and cannon fire from the seaplanes, the Japanese fighters quickly burned X-11, X-12 and X-25 on the water. X-26 and a Sikorsky flying boat belonging to KNILM followed. X-30 survived the raid only because she was on a reconnaissance patrol to locate the convoy’s precise position before the remaining MLD planes were launched. The raid was a complete surprise to the Dutch who thought Lake Tondano out of range of land-based fighters. With the occupation of Davao they considered Kalkas exposed and too far north. Air reconnaissance had revealed no carriers in the area, nor any at Jolo, which would have caused the planned attack to be abandoned. Secure in this knowledge, the Dutch felt safe enough to remain here for another mission. Later investigation revealed the fighters had carried auxiliary drop tanks that gave them enough range to reach Celebes from Davao. With Kalkas neutralized, the Japanese landed at Jolo. This would give them a harbor and airfield from which to cover their landings on Western Borneo. The invasion force left Davao on December 23 and landed at 0120 on December 25. The garrison numbered less than 200 poorly trained Philippine Army reservists, many with rifles that did not work. Although the Filipinos attempted to stop the Japanese, resistance broke almost immediately. The Japanese controlled the airfield and harbor by late morning. Within three days all remaining resistance ended. Although ground resistance on Jolo was weak American and Dutch planes again struck back as best they could. At 2300 on December 26 six USN PBYs left Halong Naval Air Station on Ambon bound for Jolo in two flights of three planes each. The first flight arrived at dawn, 10 minutes ahead of the second flight. Although he had achieved surprise this group’s commander made the mistake of circling the harbor until the second could join up. The delay gave the Japanese time to put up fighters and man AA guns on shore and the ships in the harbor. Heavy flak and savage fighter resistance tore the first formation apart; three PBYs went down almost immediately before dropping their bombs. The second formation realized the mission was futile and dropped its bombs and turned back for Ambon. As fighters nipped around them, the PBYs shot one down and fled into a rain squall. Two emerged 10 minutes later and returned to Halong; they were the only survivors of the six PBYs. The convoy suffered no damage. Two Dutch Dorniers from Tarakan followed the Ameri-

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can PBYs. There was no fighter resistance but the air was thick with heavy bursts of flak. They concentrated on shipping in the harbor but scored no hits. In return they suffered heavy damage to one plane and light damage to the other. Upon landing at Tarakan, they were given the distressing news that the PBYs had drawn off the fighters. With the capture of Davao and Jolo the Japanese accomplished two strategic goals. The first completed the isolation of the Philippines so that no reinforcements or supplies could reach the main island of Luzon. At the same time, they protected their flank against counterattack, which allowed them to attack the western East Indies at will. With these goals achieved the Japanese were now ready to begin their invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.

The Loss of Ruth Alexander As they prepared to move south the Japanese continued to send out armed reconnaissance missions. On December 31 the unarmed American merchant ship Ruth Alexander had slipped out of the Philippines and was making way for Balikpapan. At 0930 a Japanese Kawanishi H6K “Mavis” flying boat sighted her off Cape Mangkaliat, Borneo. After making an initial pass it turned to attack Ruth Alexander whose Master ordered his helmsman to begin zig-zagging.36

The “Mavis” dropped two small bombs from 2,000 feet on its first attack. Both missed by only 20 feet and the concussion damaged Ruth Alexander’s engines although she was able to maintain power. Apparently realizing that the merchant ship was unarmed, the seaplane came in at just 300 feet on its next pass. This time it dropped two larger bombs which missed. On its third pass, the “Mavis” dropped two more bombs which both struck home. They passed through the main deck and exploded three decks below. The first bomb blew a 10-foot hole in her port side that was “big enough to drive a team of horses through” as one of her crewmen later described it.37 The second wrecked the steering gear so the ship could only steam in circles. The ship’s Chilean cook was killed in the attack and three others badly burned.38 Just 15 minutes after the initial attack Captain F.P. Willarts sent out an SOS signal and gave the order to abandon Ruth Alexander. Her crew went over the side in five lifeboats. Fortunately, the Japanese did not attack them and soon retired after the ship was abandoned. X-32 was routed to her position and rescued 47 survivors at 1530.39 It was a heavy load for the Dornier and she had to dump her entire bomb load and taxi for some distance to get off the water. She flew them to Balikpapan; from there, 20 of her crewmen made their way to New York City 50 days later. KM authorities reported that Ruth Alexander sank on January 2.40

Chapter 11

The Formation of ABDA “He should have come on board a battleship”

sion, many Dutch expected no less than a fleet of carriers, battleships and cruisers. One later commented, “He should have come in an airplane or on board a battleship with all his flags flying.”1 At his new command post in Soerabaja Hart read a series of out-of-date messages which had come in while he was en route. One was from his immediate superior, Admiral Harold R. Stark, which referenced a series of cables sent by General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines. In them, MacArthur strongly criticized the U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s poor performance in the first month of fighting. By extension, they also tacitly questioned Hart’s leadership. Stark implied that the memos were affecting Hart’s image professionally.2 A second message informed Hart that a new unified Allied command was in the process of being formed. It would include American, British, Dutch and Australian ships that would likely be under his command. Hart, who had already delayed retirement in June 1941 to oversee the build-up of the Asiatic Fleet, did not feel up to the job and cabled Washington back, stating, “In view of my doubtful endurance, advise you choose another for command.” 3 In his response Hart specifically cited his health. In his memoirs his biographer states that Hart probably did not want the job due to a lack of uniform Allied strategy and the infighting that would almost certainly follow.4 In any event, Hart apparently felt that he had effectively removed himself from consideration.

As the Japanese secured the southern Philippines, Admiral Hart boarded the submarine Shark at Corregidor on December 25; he arrived Soerabaja January 2. Vice-Admiral W.A. Glassford and Rear-Admiral W.R. Purnell arrived several days before him to set up an advance headquarters for American warships operating in the East Indies. Hart had planned to travel by PBY, but Japanese fighters destroyed the plane just before his departure. Since the enemy blockade prevented surface ships from leaving Luzon or Corrigedor, Hart was forced to raise his pennant aboard Shark. Little did Hart know, but he was walking into a firestorm of controversy and deceit, at which he would be the epicenter. It started with his rather unceremonious arrival by submarine. Regardless of the circumstances that dictated his method of travel, for an Admiral of the United States Navy to make his grand appearance on Dutch territory by submarine was considered less than impressive. Facing the threat of Japanese inva-

The “Set Up”

Admiral Hart reached Soerabaja aboard USS Shark on January 2 (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

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On January 3 Admiral Hart took the overnight express from Soerabaja to Batavia. Vice-Admiral Helfrich met him at the station, and together they met with Governor-General Tjarda van Starken-

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borgh Stachouwer and Lieutenant-Governor H.J. van Mook on the morning of January 4. Upon walking into the meeting Hart later recorded in his personal diary that he had a feeling of being “set up.”5 The meeting opened with Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer informing Hart of a Japanese proposal that called for the Netherlands East Indies to withdraw from the war and resume commercial relations with Japan.6 It appears the Japanese Government had been quite surprised when the Dutch unexpectedly declared war on December 8 following the attack on Pearl Harbor.7 Japan’s motivation for attacking Pearl Harbor had been to secure Dutch oil and Malaysian raw materials. Despite full-scale attacks against the United States, Britain and Thailand, Japan hoped to take control of the East Indies with minimal force. Their biggest fear was that the Dutch would destroy the oil fields to prevent capture. Already on March 29, 1941, Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka told German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop “If at all possible, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in the event of a Japanese attack on the area the oil fields would be set on fire. They could be brought into operation again only after one or two years.”8 To this end, Japan still had not formally declared war against the Dutch in early January. Nor had they launched anything more than relatively minor air attacks on outer provinces. Nonetheless, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer stated that the Japanese peace proposal would be denied. Initial word of the Japanese proposal was funneled to London through Duff Cooper, Resident Cabinet Minister in Singapore. Cooper discussed the matter with the Dutch Consul General in Singapore who had not heard of the proposal. However, the Dutch diplomat did express surprise that Dutch territory had not yet been attacked by the Japanese. The initial British signal read: 914. MOST SECRET Reported from secret source that the Japanese are now making a lastminute attempt to persuade the Netherlands East Indies Government to accept immediate stoppage of hostilities and aid to Japan’s enemies. If accepted the Japanese will protect the Netherlands East Indies leaving the administration untouched. Should the Dutch refuse immediate action against Dutch Borneo and possibly others may be expected. A telegram is being addressed by the War Office to the Commanderin-Chief Far East 60557 and repeated to the Commander-in-Chief India.9

In London on January 9, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden met with Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens to discuss a reported Japanese peace overture to the East Indies Government. Some 10 days earlier a member of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs approached the Dutch ambassador in Tokyo. Although under house arrest, J.C. Pabst was asked to broadcast a series of proposals “in the name of humanity” aimed at ending hostilities between the NEI and Japan.10 Pabst flatly refused and demanded that any such proposals

be sent through proper diplomatic channels. The Dutch government fully agreed with his response and van Kleffens reported that no subsequent notes were received from the Japanese Government in either Europe or the East Indies. He also stated that any such proposal would hold absolutely no interest for the Dutch government. Because the proposal was not formally presented to the Netherlands Government in Exile the Dutch did not make any counter-proposals or related conditions. However, van Kleffens did state that the Dutch would be willing to delay their answer in order to buy time if and when a formal request was made. Thus, the matter was left as a “bring forward” at a future meeting. With that matter addressed, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer then read aloud from a news release. It announced the formation of a unified Allied Command to be known as ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) whose naval commander would be Admiral Hart. Hart immediately got the distinct impression that the Dutch were less than happy with his appointment, rather than Helfrich, who was much more familiar with the territory being defended.11 Already on the defensive, Hart was further annoyed when they asked for a detailed operational plan of the new joint naval command. Hart responded that he had not yet been officially informed of his new position. He also pointed out that he had cabled Washington stating that he felt “too old” for the job.12 On the question of strategy, Hart demurred and stated that any discussion of that nature should wait until ABDA’s new Supreme Commander, British General Sir Archibald Wavell, reached Java. The Dutch were clearly not impressed with Admiral Hart. The American Admiral’s reference to his age greatly annoyed the Governor General who would reference it repeatedly in the coming weeks. For his part, Helfrich believed Hart was too cautious; he would later write: “The charming 65-year-old admiral was not optimistic and seemed somewhat downcast by Pearl Harbor and his rapid departure from the Philippines…. What disturbed me more was his opinion that the defense of the Dutch East Indies was a lost cause and that retreat to Australia was the next step to be taken.”13 On January 10 General Wavell reached Batavia from India. Upon his arrival—33 days after outbreak of the Pacific War— the Allies formally activated the ABDA Command to coordinate the defense of the Malay Barrier. In addition to the Netherlands East Indies, its operational area encompassed Malaysia, Burma, Andaman and Nicobaren Islands, the Philippines, Christmas and Cocos Islands. Australia, China, French Indochina and Siam lay outside the boundaries of the command. ABDA objectives were to hold as many key areas as possible and then counterattack to retake lost positions. Malaysia, Sumatra, Java and Northern Australia would be the primary ABDA defensive positions. Sea, land and air forces would operate as far forward as possible from these bases to prevent a southward Japanese advance. When the situation stabilized, it would be followed by an all-out offensive against Japan.

11. The Formation of ABDA

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ABDA headquarters was established in the relatively isowealth ships operated from Tandjoeng Priok. The RN did not lated town of Lembang, which had been a popular resort town establish land-based communications facilities on Java; instead, before the war. Situated at an altitude of 5,000 feet in the mounthe depot ship Anking served as hub station for all Commontains overlooking the Preanger Plateau, Lembang’s cool climate wealth naval communications in the East Indies. offered a welcome respite from the sweltering tropical heat Operational control of the East Indies squadron was at found elsewhere on Java. It was approximately eight miles above Soerabaja under the command of Captain (later Rear-Admiral) Bandoeng which was the Dutch seat of power for the entire Pieter Koenraad and his chief of staff Captain F.S.W. de Ronde. East Indies. However, Batavia was a four hour drive. Most USN ships operated from the ME. Admiral Hart and Supreme Allied Headquarters was the Grand Hotel, an Rear-Admiral Glassford set up their command center in the opulent colonial era resort built in 1926. Despite its grandeur headquarters building of the General Netherlands East Indies the hotel was overwhelmed by the crush of Allied command Electric Company (Algemeen Nederlandsch-Indische Elecstaff, enlisted men and guards who took up residency almost triciteits Maatschappij or ANIEM) in Soerabaja’s residential overnight. In addition, the British brought some 40 to 50 Embong Woengoe neighborhood. women from Singapore to whom they assigned coding and secDue to congestion at the Grand Hotel ABDA-AIR reloretarial duties. Staff had trouble feeding and housing them all cated from Lembang to Bandoeng by February 1. Even then, and the hotel soon resembled a refugee camp more than a headthe MLD staff remained in a separate building without a direct quarters.14 line of communication. There was little effort to formulate joint The hotel grounds were completely enclosed by a barbed operations with ABDA-FLOAT. ABDA-AIR was simply asked wire perimeter; for security there was only a single point of “to assist as practical.” Although both commands nominally inentry and exit. The surrounding trees and vegetation had been formed the other of their plans there was little cooperation for cleared to create a field of fire in case of attack. The swimming a number of reasons, the most common being poor communipool, once the heart of the hotel, had been drained and all the cations and the overall speed at which the campaign moved.19 buildings camouflaged. Slit trenches and sentry points with machine guns dotted the area.15 Den of Deceit ABDA headquarters was a chaotic beehive from the start. Communications amongst the myriad of Allied commands General Wavell had been nominated for supreme comwere laborious and creaky. It was not uncommon to send a sinmander of ABDA largely because he was available. He was also gle dispatch to 10–20 different addresses. The Dutch provided the only senior military officer commonly recognized by all dispatch riders, regular phone lines, scrambler phones and a those Allied governments and military officials involved. A cateletype system that directly connected Bandoeng and Batavia.16 reer soldier who had seen service in the First World War, However, security by outside standards was considered exWavell’s reputation as a military leader had been largely built tremely lax and open to Japanese counterintelligence efforts. The British and Dutch relayed contact reports and urgent messages via unsecured phone lines as military channels became clogged. They also sent classified information “in the clear” via teletype operated by Indonesian civilians.17 Although the Americans protested, the Dutch continued to broadcast ship and submarine positions using codes which they felt were insecure. The Americans found the setup too insecure and the USN soon set up its own communications system at the Grand Hotel.18 The respective Allied naval commands were spread across Java. KM administrative offices remained in Batavia so Vice-Admiral Helfrich and his chiefof-staff Captain J.J.A. van Staveren could maintain regular contact with the East Indies government in the capital city of Bandoeng. The RN also set up its head- The first meeting of the ABDA Command senior leadership in January 1942 (courtesy Dutch quarters in Batavia as most Common- Navy Museum).

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on the destruction of vastly superior Italian forces in North Africa in 1940–41. In spite of that success he was soundly beaten in Greece. Nor could he contain German General Erwin Rommel and was replaced by Winston Churchill as commander in North Africa in 1941. The rest of ABDA’s leadership was a mixed bag of American, British and Dutch officers who were virtually unknown outside their own national armed forces. Admiral Hart commanded ABDA naval forces (ABDA-FLOAT) with RearAdmiral A.F.E. Palliser, RN as his chief of staff and head of Royal Navy forces in the Malay Barrier. Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten, KNIL had command of all ABDA ground troops (ABDA-ARM) with Major-General I.S.O. Playfair as his chief of staff and deputy.20 Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse had command of the air units (ABDA-AIR) with Group Captain L. Darvell, RAF as deputy chief. On the surface the Dutch appeared to have some merit to their grievance of Helfrich being left out of ABDA-FLOAT. Mostly Dutch territory was being defended and it made sense to include someone from the KM in the ABDA-FLOAT command structure. And with the exception of a few distant bases in Australia, all facilities used by the Allies in the East Indies campaign were on Dutch territory. Nor did it sit well with the Dutch, whose ships made up a large portion of ABDA-FLOAT, to have their forces led by a foreigner in defense of Dutch territory. ABDA was a multinational command, and for such an organization to work, all parties must be represented on some level. While the Dutch may not have been consulted during its formation, they certainly were not unrepresented or even underrepresented. Lieutenant-General ter Poorten received com-

mand of all ABDA-ARM forces; likewise, Captain G.G. Bozuwa, KM received command of ABDA reconnaissance operations. And of course, Allied naval forces would be led into battle by a Dutch admiral. So any assertion that the Dutch were “left out” cannot be realistically supported. Vice-Admiral Helfrich did not want to just be included in the leadership of ABDA-FLOAT. He had no interest in being co-commander or Admiral Hart’s chief of staff; nor did he request permission to approve or veto operational plans or to be part of any strategic planning. In short, Helfrich wanted to run the show lock, stock and barrel and would accept no less. No other Dutch military officer made a similar power play. MajorGeneral Ludolph van Oyen, head of the ML-KNIL, was also left out but he did not protest. That they were not actively consulted by the Americans or British prior to the formation of ABDA is the strongest point in favor of the Dutch. The simple fact is that they had very little clout before Pearl Harbor; and with Holland occupied Dutch influence was further eroded. As discussed earlier, Dutch defensive strategy in the NEI was to hold out until the arrival of American or British reinforcements; even then, they were very cool toward their future allies until the outbreak of war became obvious. Given this detached attitude toward their own prewar defense, it is hardly surprising that their allies were indisposed to grant the Dutch a larger role within ABDA. Almost immediately the Dutch lobbied hard for Hart’s removal. Even before his meeting with Helfrich, van Mook and Tjarda van Starkenborgh he was considered difficult to work with.21 On December 18 Helfrich had asked for plans regarding what USN forces would operate in the NEI. Neither Hart nor his subordinates could provide any details as their orders came from Washington. Helfrich, who apparently could, or would, not comprehend the state of mass confusion gripping the USN just 10 days after Pearl Harbor, labeled Hart a non-team player.22 From the British point of view, Hart quickly became regarded as overly pessimistic and slow to act.23 All found him extremely likeable and capable in terms of naval matters. Even so, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall spoke for many British officers when he wrote in his diary on January 24, “Poor old Hart is quite unfitted for his job, he has no kick in him at all.”24 Four days later, Pownall reinforced this line of thinking when he further described Hart in his diary as “a nice man but with very little guts who always finds good reason for not doing things.”25 In contrast to Pownall and Wavell, many of Hart’s officers throughout the ABDA-FLOAT’s senior leadership, from left: Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, RN; Vice- United States Asiatic Fleet hated him perAdmiral C.E.L. Helfrich, KM; unknown; and Admiral Thomas Hart, USN (Netherlands sonally; yet most had tremendous respect Institute of Military History). for his rank, professional qualities and

11. The Formation of ABDA ability to lead. Captain L.G.L. van der Kun, who had been appointed to serve as liaison officer between Hart and Helfrich also thought well of him. The Dutch officer would later describe him as a “tough and good leader.”26 Unfortunately for Hart his supporters were largely subordinates, while his detractors were of high rank with easy access to a great many key influencers. In what no doubt had to be a miserable working environment for Admiral Hart, the Dutch openly advocated for Admiral Helfrich to replace him. That said, Tommy Hart was certainly not helping himself much. His own negative comments regarding his age and lack of vigor for the task at hand—combined with Dutch dissatisfaction regarding his appointment— made for the perfect firestorm. The acidic cables from General MacArthur did not help Hart’s case either. On January 14 Lieutenant-Governor van Mook began a visit to the United States to lobby for more and faster military aid to the East Indies. At every stop along the way and all throughout his visit to Washington, D.C., van Mook loudly called for Helfrich to replace Hart.27 As early as January 12 Admiral Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief of the United States Navy, got involved when he sent a note directly to Hart asking for an evaluation of Helfrich’s qualifications to lead ABDA naval forces. Even President Roosevelt was alarmed to hear of the Dutch disappointment. Unpopular as he was, Admiral Hart clearly recognized the unpleasant situation developing around him. With that in mind he sat down with Wavell to discuss the issue before the ABDA command structure was finalized. However, Wavell had only known Hart for a few days and was thus disinclined to take any action toward removing him. Although Wavell liked Hart personally, he wrote Churchill: “Hart is quite attractive character and seems shrewd. But he is old and openly says so and gives me the impression of looking over his shoulder rather too much. His experiences at Manila seem to have given him exaggerated ideas of Japanese efficiency.28 Palliser will help to keep his eyes to the front. Hart should be easy to work with but may be over depressed if things go wrong.”29 It was amidst this less than encouraging air of drama, controversy and inter–Allied conniving that ABDA started its short, disappointing existence.

“I’m planning to get the hell out of here!” As a result of their difficult trade negotiations with the Japanese the East Indies Government became much more receptive to establishing closer ties with the American, Australian and British militaries. In the latter half of 1941 Allied military missions of all types visited Java. The messages they brought were mixed; some indicated robust military aid, while others told the Dutch to count on “going it alone.” Lacking a firm commitment of support from either the United States or Britain many Dutch officials assumed they would be fighting the Japanese alone.30 Thus, the Dutch viewed the formation of ABDA with relief and optimism. However, it was not long before they openly

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expressed disappointment at both the composition and attitude of the British officers attached to ABDA.31 As was the case with the U.S. Army in the Philippines, Singapore and Malaya for many years were used as a “dumping ground” for officers deemed too old, unfit or simply unqualified for duty in Europe. The abilities of these officers, whether real or perceived, generated little confidence. And just like their superior officers, many exhibited little enthusiasm for defending Dutch territory after the surrender of Malaya and Singapore: The British General Staff of high officers, the men from colonel on up, with some exceptions, appear always to be thinking where to retreat to next. They have a defensive complex, an invasion complex. They have had so many retreats that they think in terms of retreats … and here in Java they think of where they can retreat to when Java goes.32

For all their complaints about Admiral Hart, Dutch views about General Wavell were not much more positive. Overall, he was respected as a soldier. At the same time he was regarded by many Dutch officers and officials as a “kindly natured” but very tired and worn out old man who was handicapped by the loss of his left eye in the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915.33 Wavell “could not bring himself to be disingenuously optimistic.”34 To his credit, the British general was consistently straight-forward with his briefings at a time in the Pacific War when a certain amount of “spin”35 would have gone a long way.36 Although extremely intellectual and a published author who spoke six languages,37 Wavell was a shy public speaker who often did not articulate himself well.38 These traits could combine to discourage his listeners, as evidenced by Captain William Hipps, a USAAF staff officer with ABDA: We listened to Sir Archibald [Wavell] give this briefing on what was happening in the Far East with the war. After two days of listening to him, I thought to myself, “I know what I am going to plan…. I’m planning to get the hell out of here!”39

An accident and brief hospital visit soon after his appointment to ABDA apparently did not help his image. Wavell fell down a seawall during a trip to Singapore in January 1942.40 The accident broke two bones in his back and caused the general a great deal of pain. Although he briefly visited Tjikini Hospital in Batavia he steadfastly refused to check in. Although Public Affairs officials tried to keep the accident a secret, word was soon all over the streets of Batavia.41 According to Consul General Foote in Batavia, the disastrous defense of Singapore further undermined Wavell’s credibility.42 He wrote that few Dutch officials regarded the fortress as impregnable; thus there was little surprise when it fell to the Japanese. Even so, they were disappointed because it was hoped that Singapore would hold out long enough for the defenses of Java to be reinforced. The island’s surrender added to a lack of confidence in both Wavell and his staff and prompted many Dutch to believe that they would be entirely on their own in the defense of Java.43 Between Wavell’s arrival and the evacuation of Singapore in February 1942, Java was besieged with a tidal wave of British and Australia military personnel of all ranks, titles, occupations

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

and mannerisms. Doctor Foote described their seemingly overnight appearance on Java: At the very time when Netherlands Indies spirits were lowest, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and Manila—and we were in the war. Soon thereafter, the ABDA Command was formed and there arrived in Batavia one of the greatest aggregations of high Army and Navy officials that has ever assembled under one roof. Some of them were pessimistic, some optimistic, some were idealistic, and others were realistic. With the high officials of the ABDA Command arrived also veritable army of Liaison, Intelligence, Press Relations Officers, Censorship Officials and every other form of “Army hangerson.”44

Foote’s words were echoed near verbatim by the Sydney Morning Herald, which strongly condemned their presumptuousness. The Dutch were bewildered by the army of liaison and “intelligence” officers which descended upon them soon as things began to become “difficult” in Malaya. Press Relations officers, officers who liaisoned between every conceivable form of behind-the-lines organization, army censors, and others, all repeat with gold braid and the inevitable holstered revolver descended on them in droves. These ridiculous optimists believed for some inexplicable reason that they were to assume in Java the well-paid jobs they had done so badly in Malaya. With their previously well-controlled tempers rising rapidly, the Dutch reminded their visitors that Java was still Dutch territory.45

All were attached to Wavell’s ABDA staff. There was a stream of British Press Relations, Censorship and Intelligence officers to Foote’s office where they made clear their intent to take over all of these activities with little or no regard for any existing structure the Dutch already had in place. The fact that they now stood on Dutch territory seemed of little consequence. One of their goals was to block the access of American war correspondents to American officers in ABDA. They sought Foote’s help to minimize any complaints the reporters might raise.46

Rating the Dutch William A. Foote, Ph.D., the American consul general in Batavia, held various posts in the East Indies since the late 1920s. As the senior American diplomat on Java, he was instructed to provide as much information as possible on their new Dutch allies. In particular, State Department officials were eager to know their attitude toward the United States. Certain high-profile officials, such as Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh, were known on some level. Most of the others, primarily air force and naval officers, were completely unknown. A career diplomat, Jonkheer Alidius Warmoldus Lambertus Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was relatively unknown in Holland when appointed Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies in 1936.47 Although only 48 at the time of his appointment he was considered extremely bright, mature, impeccably honest and unflappable … a solid bureaucrat by all measures. Perhaps most important, Doctor Foote considered Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer solidly pro–American thanks to his wife. She was the daughter of a former United States ambassador to Belgium.

Tjarda was a member of the Liberal Remonstrant Church, and very attached to Groningen. He was reserved and unpretentious, dutiful and living almost frugally, with only a few good friends. He had a strong and critical mind, was exacting, but his appearance exuded integrity, self-confidence and dignity. He inspired confidence, and was a born leader. His speeches were clear, unambiguous and forceful.48

According to the Constitution of the Netherlands, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was supreme commander of the East Indies and all Dutch land, sea and air forces. In reality, the formation of ABDA effectively relieved him of these duties, although General Wavell met with him on a regular basis. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer had to authorize his orders to Dutch units, but had no authority to dictate strategy. He also kept in regular contact with the KM and KNIL and settled disputes that arose between the various Dutch military arms. Conrad Emil Lambert Helfrich was easily the most polarizing Dutch military figure of the entire Second World War. He had extensive experience in Indonesian waters, having served as chief of staff for the East Indies Squadron in 1931. Helfrich then commanded the East Indies Squadron itself from 1935 to 1937. In October 1939 he was named Commandant der Zeemacht (Commanding Officer Naval Forces) or CZM of Dutch naval forces in the Netherlands East Indies. 49 This wealth of experience was a primary reason why the Dutch were so offended at Helfrich being excluded from the command of ABDA-FLOAT. Helfrich was a born leader, and he was very much appreciated by his subordinates. He was a real “sailor’s admiral” who indeed cared for his men. He was a dynamic, aggressive personality, very communicative and with a good sense of public relations, but at times he could be ruthless. He was not an intellectual high-flyer, but compensated [for] this by getting things done. He remained to the end very much attached to his native land, the NEI, which he indeed defended almost to the last ship, sending Admiral Doorman to his doom at the Battle of the Java Sea, about which he had no regrets.50

Within his national sphere of influence Vice-Admiral Helfrich was well-respected by his peers, Dutch politicians and Queen Wilhelmina herself.51 This let him freely move between military and political circles. Helfrich could also be considered a “political operator” with an agenda towards furthering his postwar career. It has been suggested that he already had his eye on becoming postwar Minister of the Navy.52 “He made the impression of a raw seaman, but his conduct was very different. He was a fighter, a good leader and the opposite of a bureaucrat. He was prepared to sacrifice everything in the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, which he saw as an inseparable part of the Kingdom, not just as a colony.”53 Outside the cozy parameters of his naval peers Helfrich was considered vain and arrogant. He exhibited a certain air of class mentality, particularly in his dealings with KNIL Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten. As he was Royal Navy and ter Poorten only Colonial Army, Helfrich was technically his superior according to the Constitution of the Netherlands, which ranked the Royal military above the Colonial forces. But

11. The Formation of ABDA since ter Poorten was part of ABDA’s command structure, he was by virtue of position, the admiral’s superior. Lieutenant H. Creutzberg was the adjutant for Major General L.H. van Oyen, commanding officer of Dutch air units on Java. He commented that admiral Helfrich was “vain and not communicative unless it was to his own advantage.”54 Nor would Helfrich return calls from van Oyen because he outranked the general; he told van Oyen this to his face. Helfrich also repeatedly by-passed ter Poorten and went to Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer for certain approvals.55 This breach of the chain of command created a stink at the time and resulted in a sharp reprimand of Vice-Admiral Helfrich by Lieutenant-General ter Poorten.56 Part of the friction between Vice-Admiral Helfrich and his army counterparts was the inherent nature of his position. In addition to his title of CZM, Helfrich was also Head of the Department of the Navy. Vice-Admiral Furstner in London was Minister of the Navy, and thus, his direct superior. Yet, Helfrich’s isolated position essentially made him de facto Minister of the Navy in the Netherlands East Indies, although formal use of that term was completely unacceptable. As the senior naval officer in the East Indies, Helfrich long had direct access to the Governor General even prior to the outbreak of war. Except for ter Poorten, no KNIL officer had similar access. This made it easy for Helfrich to skirt the ABDA command structure when it suited him. It also let him minimize, or ignore completely, the concerns of his army counterparts. His pompous attitude and inability to be a “team player” with the KNIL simply poured gas on the fire. Vice-Admiral Helfrich had mixed relations with his Allied counterparts. He had an excellent relationship with Admiral Layton; their shared goal of preserving a colonial legacy for their respective nations almost certainly contributed to this. Helfrich was in near complete lock-step with British plans to hold Singapore and was prepared to contribute a sizeable portion of his fleet in this cause. Both men were annoyed by the lack of cohesion and strategic policy which dictated movements of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet in the early weeks of the war.57 To those Americans who dealt with him throughout the war Admiral Helfrich was consistently regarded as loud, abrasive and obnoxious to the point of arrogance: “His cocky attitude toward the plans or strategy of other commanding officers … won him few friends….”58 Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s relations with Admiral Hart were cordial yet cool. Due to his close ties to Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Hart at times had difficulty determining if Helfrich was speaking to him on a military or political level. Both claim individual credit for assembling a combined striking force to aggressively attack the Japanese at sea: The idea of a cruiser-destroyer Striking Force was American … throughout January, convoy and escort duty remained the insistent “call” for destroyers, and only by refusing repeated requests for escorts was it possible to maintain any semblance of a striking force.59

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For his part, Helfrich was frequently quoted in contemporary media to this effect. Hart, on the other hand, felt that Helfrich withheld information regarding the availability of Dutch warships which delayed the formation of this force.60 He also stated the Helfrich could create the impression of trying to get someone else’s combat forces to do the job. While USN submarines had little to show after six weeks of combat, Dutch boats had been quite successful, which Helfrich repeatedly threw in Hart’s face.61 General Wavell was in a tight spot that required a fair amount of diplomacy to avoid offending either the Americans or Dutch, or both. There was talk of perhaps replacing Admiral Hart with another American naval officer. Among other reasons, Wavell himself expressed doubt to Prime Minister Churchill as to whether another American naval officer would agree to work with Helfrich. The Dutch Admiral tended to “express himself caustically” when referring to the USN.62 In that regard, one might wonder if Helfrich was passed over for command of ABDA-FLOAT for that very reason. Even before the outbreak of war with Japan, he became well-known to American and British officers during strategic planning talks at Singapore in 1941. The Dutch admiral was not necessarily the most polished individual and could be extremely blunt on occasion. He rubbed their British hosts the wrong way and was not necessarily well-liked.

“A real Netherlander, and a fighting man” Captain Pieter Koenraad was in command of the naval base at Soerabaja throughout the East Indies campaign. Prior to the Pacific War he saw sea duty in the East Indies as both a destroyer captain and commander of the East Indies Destroyer Squadron. He also served as commander of Oedjoeng Marine Barracks outside Soerabaja. Captain Koenraad was promoted to (Temporary) Rear-Admiral on February 2, 1942. Koenraad was considered intelligent and a good thinker by his peers.63 Doctor Foote knew little about him and could only describe him in general terms, including the above description. His report read as follows: Nothing is known about Koenraad’s abilities or his attitudes toward the United States or any other countries. He appears to be a man of action who, if he has any opinions, seldom or never expresses them. Koenraad is cheerful, cordial and a hard worker. He is not a social man, although he enjoys the company of his friends. I regard Admiral Koenraad as a solid, hard fighter. He had never expressed any special attitude toward the United States or towards any other country.64

Although a relatively minor player in the East Indies campaign, perhaps his greatest contribution was his daily logbook for the Marine Establishment. It was evacuated from Java in March 1942 and survived the war. It provides valuable insight and details regarding events during the Japanese invasion.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s Concerns Although relieved that there was now a single command coordinating the defense of Southeast Asia, several issues irritated Admiral Helfrich. Other than ter Poorten, the Dutch were locked out of ABDA’s upper command. Paragraph 7 of the ABDA directive specifically ordered that Allied commanders be appointed to commands regardless of rank, seniority or nationality if and when needed. According to Helfrich, there were several instances where Dutch commanders were passed over in favor of British and American commanders. Although he retained command of all Dutch naval forces, Helfrich was “disappointed” at not being appointed to the upper ranks of ABDA, especially since the strategic East Indies formed a majority of its territory. He felt the Dutch had much to offer in the way of good information and advice. American and British flag officers of ABDA-FLOAT had no local knowledge of the East Indies, while their Dutch counterparts knew it well. Helfrich assigned Captain L.G.L. van der Kun to Admiral Layton’s staff as liaison officer and he soon became Helfrich’s only steady source of information as to what went on in ABDA-FLOAT. Perhaps Helfrich’s most nagging concern was the MLD’s new role within ABDA. Its aircraft now operated under British command that placed them under control of the Royal Air Force. The RAF had no history of working with the RN and showed no inclination to do so with the formation of ABDA. The new setup did not bode well for the MLD, which constantly trained to be the “eyes of the fleet” and was considered an organic part of the KM. Prewar reports quickly reached the fleet at sea, but with ABDA’s complex and disorganized structure, they now went to ABDA-AIR and then to ABDA-FLOAT before going to the fleet. To his credit, Helfrich refused to be shut out of the command process and was able to make his views known despite having little or no say in the strategic guidance of ABDA. In contrast to the uninspired and cautious attitudes other ABDA commanders often displayed, Helfrich consistently stressed the offensive and pressed for the formation of a naval combined striking force to attack the Japanese to the north. However, ABDA was slow to form one due to other nations (primarily the British) putting national goals ahead of a joint war effort. The Dutch admiral correctly anticipated the buildup of Davao and Jolo into bases for the invasion of the East Indies and wanted to blockade them and the Siberoe Passage with submarines. He also knew Palau was a major Japanese base and wanted to blockade it too, but did not have enough boats. Besides ordering increased MLD patrols in the area, he was willing to send K-X, K-XIV, K-XV and K-XVIII to Davao and Jolo unless the USN wanted the job as it was officially in the American sphere of operations. Although his submarines were either on patrol or still in the Philippines, Hart agreed to move them into the East Indies as soon as possible to bolster the Dutch boats.65 However, he expressed a desire to station them in the Molucca and Djailolo

Passages. He also suggested concentrating the fighting ships of the Asiatic Fleet and all available Dutch surface forces in the Banda Sea with Ambon as their base. Helfrich argued that at least for the time being, surface activity had to be limited to areas where there was no strong air activity due to the lack of Allied air cover. He considered Ambon a poor forward base because it would soon be in range of air attack and the ML-KNIL could only provide three Brewster B-339D Buffalo fighters for air defense. Twelve P-40 fighters and 12 PBYs were scheduled to arrive on January 10 to make the island tenable, but they never materialized. Until air cover could be provided, Hart and Helfrich decided to utilize Ambon only as a base for submarines and reconnaissance aircraft. Helfrich also wanted to avoid a direct clash with heavy Japanese ships until the Dutch and Asiatic Fleet received reinforcements. Hart provided him with a full report of the losses at Pearl Harbor and would make no commitment to USN deployments or reinforcements. Still, Helfrich knew substantial USN units were at sea and wanted some of them at least, diverted to reinforce the Malay Barrier. Hart acknowledged there were at least two heavy fleet carriers at sea, but stated that he was not privy to their operational orders. These included Rear-Admiral J.H. Newton with the carrier Lexington, heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and Astoria and a screen of five destroyers. Vice-Admiral W.F. Halsey, Jr., was also at sea with the carrier Enterprise, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. Also at sea were Vice-Admiral William Brown with the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Northampton with a small destroyer screen and Rear-Admiral Jack Fletcher aboard the heavy cruiser Minneapolis. Rear-Admiral M.F. Draemel had the light cruisers Detroit, St. Louis and Phoenix screened by destroyers and oceangoing minesweepers; all three forces had orders to join Halsey and form a task force around Enterprise. At the same time, the heavy cruiser Louisville escorted two transports between Santa Cruz and Ellis Island. On the west coast or en route, was the battleship Colorado (refitting at Mare Island), the fleet carrier Saratoga (torpedoed January 11), the light cruisers Trenton and Richmond with six destroyers and five submarines. Another seven submarines and a destroyer were at sea. This totaled two carriers, 12 cruisers, at least 15 destroyers, seven submarines and several smaller ships; but as hard as Helfrich lobbied, none were earmarked to reinforce the Philippines or East Indies.66 Following Pearl Harbor, the USN was withholding a large part of its remaining strength back to defend against a feared invasion of the West Coast. Hart considered the ME a usable base—albeit somewhat far south—but Washington did not agree. In late December, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered all fleet service units to Darwin, Australia—1,200 miles southeast of Java. This caused Hart great problems as he tried to keep Task Force 5 supplied, but Washington was unwilling to accept the time it would take to bring them back to Java even though they quickly realized their error in judgment. Thus, any ships needing refit or overhaul had to travel all the way to Darwin.

11. The Formation of ABDA Hart then divided the Asiatic Fleet units in the East Indies into four task forces. Task Force 5 included his surface warships based at the ME. Submarines formed the second and operated primarily from Soerabaja, although a few briefly operated from Tjilatjap. The PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 formed the third force and operated from the Dutch seaplane bases at Morokrembangan and Halong on Java and Ambon respectively. The displaced fleet auxiliaries formed the fourth task force. While Hart considered the use of major warships for convoy escort a waste of resources, the Dutch and British used them extensively to escort convoys from the Indian Ocean through the Soenda Strait to Singapore. On December 23, the British Admiralty reported that nine convoys would reach Singapore between January 3 and 29 and requested additional Dutch escorts. Convoy DM.1 arrived January 8 carrying the 54th Infantry Brigade with approximately 9,000 troops. It also delivered an anti-tank gun regiment (50 × 2-pounder AT guns), one light antiaircraft regiment (50 × 40mm AA guns) and a heavy antiaircraft regiment (50 × 3.7-inch AA guns). More important, were 51 Hurricanes with which the British hoped to wrestle back air superiority from the Japanese. These convoys tied up much of the Dutch surface fighting power in early January 1942. For most of the month De Ruyter, Tromp, Java, Van Nes, Evertsen, Banckert and Piet Hein escorted British reinforcements to Singapore, even though the threat of surface attack so deep in Dutch territory was virtually nonexistent at such an early stage of the East Indies campaign. Escort operations tied up valuable resources and ensured that the Dutch could not quickly assemble a strike force in the event of a surprise attack in the eastern part of the archipelago. De Ruyter and Tromp were later released, but Java and two destroyers remained in the Western Java Sea. The destroyers patrolled south of Java and escorted convoys through the Soenda Strait into the Java Sea, where Java and RN escorts took them to Singapore. Owing to the importance of the convoys, and Japanese attacks on Singapore, British Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Layton transferred his naval forces to Tandjoeng Priok. The elderly light cruisers Dragon and Durban were the first to arrive; they were followed by a variety of British and Australian auxiliaries. Both the Dutch and British could have made better use of their limited resources by exclusively using small ships to escort the Singapore convoys. Dutch auxiliaries such as the minelayer Willem van der Zaan and various Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boats were already being used for convoy escort to Borneo, New Guinea and Timor. The destroyer Evertsen had also entered service in early December with a brand new crew, most of whom were straight from technical schools. She was not considered operational and was used for convoy escort south of Java. The shortage of escort ships was not helped when Witte de With suffered condenser problems and returned to the ME for overhaul. Her crew transferred to Van Ghent, which was just coming out of overhaul and immediately went back to sea. K-XV also returned to the ME overhaul and no replacement

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was immediately available. About the same time, K-XIII limped into harbor after her battery explosion at Singapore; the crew went over to K-VIII, which was barely able to function after a prolonged period in material reserve. Her condition was so poor, that she was used only as an ASDIC training boat for other Dutch ships in the harbor. Two striking forces were eventually formed on February 3, a full month after the creation of ABDA. The first was at Tandjoeng Priok with Dutch and British ships and a second with USN ships at the ME. Although they had orders to operate as far north as possible, Japanese air superiority severely undercut their ability to do so. The Dutch had expected airfields on Borneo, Kendari and Ambon to provide air cover for Allied warships operating in the Makassar Strait. But by the time ABDA formed the CSF, the Japanese held Balikpapan, Kendari and Ambon and were launching air strikes against Java and its naval bases. ABDA airpower, weak to begin with, was shattered by these attacks, forcing the CSF to sortie without air cover. The other problem hampering the CSF was the priority Wavell placed on Singapore; even after it became clear Malaya was lost. Convoy escort for Singapore originally consisted of the three light cruisers allocated to replace Prince of Wales and Repulse. However, escort for these convoys eventually included virtually every Commonwealth ship in the area and the Dutch ships already named. The RN ships were not released from convoy duty until late February. Finally, although ABDA-FLOAT exercised supreme command over all ships, each national commander retained operational control over his ships and commanders, which allowed them to carry out individual war goals. Individual ships were often detached on special duty and unavailable for CSF operations. USN ships only entered the east zone once during a sortie into the Banka Strait and RN ships only entered the east zone during the Battle of the Java Sea. Dutch ships shuttled between both regularly since the KM’s area included the Java Sea. Admiral Layton arrived in Batavia from Singapore (the RN headquarters there was being evacuated to Java due to heavy air attacks) on January 5 to meet with Governor-General van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Vice-Admiral Helfrich and Commodore J.A. Collins. Layton set up ABDA-FLOAT headquarters at the Indies Hotel in Batavia, but due to communications difficulties, it did not become operational until January 15. It quickly became apparent that the hotel was too small and a secondary headquarters was established at the Grand Hotel in Lembang. Collins had the title Commodore Commanding China Force or Flag Officer Java, with the heavy responsibility of routing and protecting all equipment, supplies and personnel detailed for Malaya and the East Indies. To carry out this role, the Admiralty formed China Force from Danae, Dragon, Durban, Jupiter, Encounter, Express, Electra, Stronghold, Vampire, Yarra and the Royal Indian Navy sloop HMINS Jumna on January 20. Its mission was to provide escort for convoys between the Indian Ocean, Soenda Strait, Java and Singapore. They were reinforced as needed by Dutch ships.

Chapter 12

Japan Declares War At the end of January 1942 Netherlands East Indies Government gold reserves totaled ƒ216,000,000.1 Despite any optimism fostered by their alliance with America and Britain, the Dutch began sending these reserves from the Bank of Java abroad for safe-keeping. From January through the end of February a number of so-called “Gold Ships”2 sailed for American or Australian ports. By the time Java fell they had carried away some ƒ150,000,000.3 This wealth was used to fund remaining Dutch forces and purchase new warships throughout the war.4 On the way, the transports had to negotiate a treacherous swarm of Japanese submarines that became extremely active and effective at the first of the year. On January 3 the 4th Submarine Flotilla entered the Java Sea and began operations against Dutch and Allied shipping. With the exception of I-55 and the two RO boats off the Anambas, all quickly scored almost immediately. I-58 scored first on January 3 when she caught the 7,395 ton Dutch steamship Langkoeas northwest of Bawean Island.5 She crippled the steamer with a torpedo in her engine room at 0145, killing 12 men.6 The steamer almost immediately began to sink by her stern as the remaining crew abandoned ship. A massacre followed when the I-Boat surfaced and opened fire on the lifeboats and survivors in the water. Her captain pulled three survivors from the water for interrogation. When the lone European—4th Engineer Jan de Mul—could not answer his questions about secret codes and signals he was slashed with a sword, kicked, beaten and thrown back into the water.7 The other two crewmen soon followed as I-58 disappeared into the night leaving all three to their fate in the open ocean. Shortly after dawn de Mul found a boat from Langkoeas and rescued the other two crewmen later that day. The boat drifted with the tide for four days until eventually coming ashore on Bawean Island on January 7. A local fisherman summoned help and the men were flown to Batavia. From the steamer’s crew of 94 officers and men, they were the only survivors. Jan de Mul later signed on with the KPM steamer Boero, although he fell ill and missed her departure.8 She was sunk in the Soenda Strait on February 25; I-58 was again the culprit, although there was no massacre this time. Five days later on January 8, I-58 struck again. She sank the 2,380 ton KPM steamer Camphuijs 60 miles off the south coast of Borneo. But her captain did not, or was unable to, re-

peat the Langkoeas affair and MLD planes rescued her survivors a day later. I-56 sank the British steamer Kwantung of 2,626 tons south of Java at 0500 on January 5. Then 24 hours later she attacked the 8,169 ton Dutch motorship Tanimbar with gunfire 40 miles south of Tjilatjap. Although claimed sunk, the badly damaged merchant ship limped into harbor. Two days later, she scored twice 80 miles south of Tjilatjap. At 0716 I-56 torpedoed the 3,000 ton KPM steamer Van Rees, followed by the 2,263 ton steamer Van Riesbeeck at 2100 with her deck gun. At 1800 on January 7 I-57 attacked the 3,077 ton Dutch navy tanker Djirak (TAN-3) with gunfire and claimed her sunk.9 Despite heavy damage the tanker did not immediately sink and MLD planes from Morokrembangan rescued her surviving crew the following day. A patrolling plane last saw Djirak’s shattered hulk as it drifted in the vicinity of Kangean Island with many fuel drums in the water.10 I-65 made two more attacks in the Java Sea on January 9. At 0957 she fired two torpedoes and battle-surfaced on an unidentified Dutch tanker with her deck gun. Despite being hit by no less than 28 rounds, which set her afire, the tanker managed to escape. I-65 had better luck at 1513 when she crippled the 1,003 ton steamer Bengkoelen with a torpedo. Her commander then battle-surfaced and finished off Bengkoelen with the submarine’s deck gun. As Japanese submarine activity intensified similar ABDA efforts fell short as the American boats suffered crippling torpedo failures and Dutch numbers dwindled through attrition and a lack of manpower. Of the 15 KM boats that started the war in December, four had been lost and K-XIII was under repair at the ME, as was K-X at Tarakan. This left only K-XI, K-XII and O-19 in the Gulf of Siam with K-XIV in the South China Sea and K-XVIII off Balikpapan. K-XV lay in overhaul and the elderly K-VII was still being readied for sea. K-IX was in material reserve while K-VIII was just entering service with the crew of K-XIII. With only five operational submarines at sea in January, Dutch response was weak. On January 10 O-19 made two of only four attacks claimed by Dutch boats that month. Both came when Lieutenant-Commander (Temp) H.F. Bach Kolling, a naval reservist in temporary command, contacted a small supply convoy of five ships in the Gulf of Siam.

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12. Japan Declares War The convoy consisted of the 3,187 ton passenger cargo ship Akita Maru and the 4,944 ton cargo ship Tairyu Maru. Although escorted by the destroyers Fubuki, Asakaze and Hatakaze. Bach Kolling skillfully slipped through their screen and put three torpedoes into both merchant ships in a single attack. Akita Maru broke apart and the destroyers took off her crew. Tairyu Maru also sank, but was later salvaged and brought back into service. O-19 continued her patrol before returning to the ME on February 3 without making another attack. About this time the Japanese 5th Submarine Flotilla moved south to support the invasion forces pushing into the northern East Indies. They included I-59, I-60, I-62, I-64, I-65 and I-66, which began operating in the Java Sea and Soenda Strait. They were later joined by I-21, I-22, I-23 and I-24 of the 6th (Minelaying) Submarine Flotilla, which had been previously deployed in Philippine waters. At 0415 on February 11 I-66 claimed a 15,000 ton ship 10 miles off Lombok. She was actually the 4,979 ton USAT Liberty Glo. Although badly damaged, Liberty Glo was still afloat when Van Ghent arrived to tow her into Soerabaja with the USN destroyer Paul Jones as escort. En route Liberty Glo took on more water and Lieutenant-Commander P. Schotel had to beach her in Tulaben Bay on the north side of Bali. She remained there until 1963. That year a severe earthquake pushed the hulk into deep water some 40 yards offshore and broke her back in the process.11 Despite mounting losses and weak armament some merchant ships fought back, as did the KPM ship Kampar on January 13. When a Japanese submarine battle-surfaced to man her deck gun, Kampar put her rudder hard over and attempted to ram the I-Boat, which crash-dived as she ploughed over the spot. Her master claimed a sinking, but no Japanese submarines were lost on January 13. Later that day, a submarine surfaced and damaged the Dutch steamship Patras with her deck gun southwest of Bali. Although her captain made no report of the attack at the time, this was probably the I-56 as she was the only Japanese boat of the 4th Submarine Flotilla operating in the area that day.

Chart 18: Japanese Submarine Operations January–March 194212 Submarine

Patrol Station

Activity

I-53

East of Singapore; Lombok Strait along East Java Indian Ocean south of Soenda Strait and West Java Java Sea north of Soenda Strait, South of Lombok Strait Indian Ocean south of Java; Lombok Strait Lombok Strait

Three merchant ships sunk

I-54 I-55

I-56 I-57

One merchant ship sunk Two merchant ships sunk

Four merchant ships sunk; two merchant ships damaged One merchant ship sunk

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Submarine

Patrol Station

Activity

I-58

Four merchant ships sunk; one merchant ship damaged

I-62

Java Sea north of Lombok Strait; Indian Ocean south of Soenda Strait Indian Ocean south of Java Patrolled off Timor; laid mines off Darwin Patrolled and mined Torres Strait between Cape York, Queensland and New Guinea Mined sea lanes off Darwin Java Sea north of Soenda Strait; Bay of Bengal Indian Ocean south of Soenda Strait Bay of Bengal

I-64

Indian Ocean

I-65 I-66

Indian Ocean Indian Ocean off Ceylon Northwestern Australia West Coast of Australia West Coast of Australia

RO-33 / RO-34 I-21 I-22

I-23 / I-24 I-59 I-60

I-1 I-2 I-3 I-4 I-5

I-6 I-7

Indian Ocean south of Java Attacked by Japanese aircraft en route; forced to return to Japan Indian Ocean south of Java Indian Ocean south of Java

N/A One merchant ship sunk N/A

N/A Two merchant ships sunk One tanker sunk Two merchant ships sunk; three merchant ships damaged Five merchant ships sunk; one merchant ship damaged Five merchant ships sunk Four merchant ships sunk One merchant ship sunk One merchant ship sunk One merchant ship sunk; one merchant ship damaged One merchant ship sunk13 N/A

Two merchant ships sunk One merchant ship sunk14

Payback in the Soenda Strait 15 The British destroyer Jupiter managed a measure of revenge on January 17. While escorting the troop transport USAT Mount Vernon in the Soenda Strait, she picked up a distress call from a nearby merchant ship under submarine attack. LieutenantCommander N.V.J.T. Thew responded immediately and Jupiter initiated an ASDIC sweep of the area 25 miles NNW of Krakatau Island. After a two-hour ASDIC search Jupiter made contact with I-60. The destroyer delivered two crushing depth charge attacks that crippled the I-Boat and forced it to surface just off her stern. The range was too close for I-60 to fire torpedoes;

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nor could Jupiter depress her main armament low enough to engage. Lieutenant-Commander Shun Hasegawa now decided to fight it out on the surface with his 100mm deck gun and the engagement quickly turned into a full-scale brawl. Jupiter opened fire with her 20mm Oerlikons as Japanese crewmen poured from the conning tower. The British gunners repeatedly raked I-60 and mowed down multiple Japanese crewmen. But as one fell another rushed from the conning tower and took his place on the deck gun. Despite taking heavy casualties the submarine continued to fire between seven and eight rounds a minute. A 7.7mm machine on the submarine’s bridge also returned fire. Japanese gunners scored a direct hit on Jupiter’s A Mount and knocked it out of action. Three men were killed and nine more wounded. In return, the destroyer launched two torpedoes but Lieutenant-Commander Hasegawa evaded them. Thew now opened the range and brought his main battery into the fight. This sealed the fate of I-60. Jupiter’s remaining 4.7-inch guns hit the submarine repeatedly and knocked out her deck gun. The submarine’s 7.7mm machine gun continued to fire until 20mm shells silenced it as well. Another shell hit I-60 and there was a heavy explosion; smoke and flames erupted from the conning tower. Jupiter moved to finished off the crippled submarine. At a distance of just 15 feet she dropped a single depth charge set to detonate at shallow depth. There was a blast of water and flame; a crewman was blown off the bridge. I-60 then quickly sank by the stern at 06–19 S / 104–49 E. She was the first Japanese submarine sank by the Royal Navy. From a crew of 84 officers and men, just three survivors were pulled from the water. Of these, one later died. It was a much tougher fight than Thew or anyone else aboard Jupiter expected. A British postwar report later stated, “The enemy submarine was fought with great determination, her gun’s crews being continually reinforced from inside the submarine until put out of action.”16 For his bravery, Lieutenant-Commander Hasegawa was posthumously promoted to Commander. One of Jupiter’s officers was more critical of his performance, whom he felt lacked experience: One can say in retrospect about the action that the [ Japanese] Submarine Commander was inexperienced, as we should not have brought him to the surface so easily, when he had plenty of depth [500 fathoms] and sea room.17

Japanese Minelaying Operations The 6th Submarine Flotilla now began a series of minelaying operations in Dutch waters and off the coast of Australia. Between January 12–16, I-21, I-22 and I-23 laid mine barrages in the Clarence and Bundas Straits and 30 mines just outside Soerabaja’s Westwater entrance. However, the latter were laid too deep to be effective and eventually began washing ashore without causing any damage. Mines also washed ashore on Bangka Island from minefields laid along the main convoy route from the Indian Ocean to Singapore. Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Koichi

Kishigami, I-24 had orders to lay a minefield off Darwin, but was lost on February 20 when she ventured too close to shore. Kishigami had likely done so under the orders of Captain Keiyu Endo, the 6th Flotilla’s commander, who was also aboard.18 The USN destroyer Edsall detected I-24 at 0630, while 60 miles north of Darwin as she and the USN destroyer Alden escorted the tanker Trinity into port. Alden remained with the Trinity while Edsall began a search pattern and notified Darwin. In response, port authorities dispatched the corvettes Deloraine, Katoomba and Lithgow of the RAN’s 24th Minesweeper Flotilla. Deloraine was the first to join Edsall at 1335 and was promptly forced to evade a torpedo from I-24.19 In coordination with the American destroyer, Deloraine then got a solid ASDIC contact and launched a series of attacks that produced a large oil slick and bubbles. At 1500 her supply of 20 depth charges ran out, but she and Edsall maintained contact until joined by Lithgow at 1620 and Katoomba at 1800. Deloraine returned to Darwin for more depth charges while the others continued the attack. Deloraine returned at 0350 and immediately reestablished contact. Katoomba came up at 0356 and provided ASDIC direction until all depth charges were expended. The 24th Minesweeper Division and Edsall left believing they had sunk three submarines—two by Deloraine and one by Katoomba. Divers from Darwin confirmed only I-24 when they literally stood on her deck at 24 fathoms. She was the first Japanese submarine lost to the RAN.

The Loss of Eidsvold On January 18 I-21 torpedoed and sank an unidentified transport of 3,322 tons. Two days later I-59 attacked the 4,184 ton motorship Eidsvold off Flying Fish Cove, Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean. The Norwegian freighter had been attempting to load a cargo of phosphate since January 12, but bad weather relayed the operations.20 Eidsvold lay offshore when Lieutenant-Commander Yoshimatsu Tamori sighted her on the afternoon of January 20. At 1430 her 2nd Mate saw what looked like a torpedo wake passing parallel to the ship.21 It was initially thought to be a whale but the ship’s Master moved closer to shore where Eidsvold could be protected by the island’s single shore battery. She could also be easily beached if necessary. In reality, LieutenantCommander Tamori had fired no less than five torpedoes; for some reason, all missed the stationary merchant ship.22 But he scored a direct hit with the sixth torpedo. Eidsvold was about ½-mile offshore when her Master sighted a periscope to starboard at 1815. He called for full speed and hard port rudder, but almost immediately a torpedo ploughed into the ship. It struck forward of #4 Hatch, nearly breaking the ship in half. The crew abandoned ship with no casualties; I-59 surfaced to finish off Eidsvold but was driven off by the island’s shore battery. Her wreck soon broke apart and both halves of the ship

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drifted ashore and settled in shallow water at 2026. They were about 40 feet part but remained upright; this allowed her crew to return and salvage supplies, food, clothes and the wireless set, which was given to the local authorities. Two weeks later the crew of Eidsvold was picked up by the British cruiser Durban and taken to Batavia; from there they went to Sydney. The wreck of Eidsvold remained visible into the 1950s.23

land merchant ships traveled in convoy. Their regular supply runs to distant ports rarely required more than a small steamer, making convoys uneconomical. The KM could not escort every ship which often made them easy targets. In contrast, there were few successful submarine attacks in the Soenda Strait as it was a tight waterway and most ships in the area typically traveled in convoy under escort.

“Shelled by submarine”

The Invasion of Tarakan

On January 22 I-64 claimed another KPM ship. Van Overstraten was bound for Oosthaven when the 3rd Mate sighted two torpedo tracks at 1730; the first just missed the bow, while the second was set too deep and missed the steamer amidships.24 Van Overstraten immediately changed course and tried to escape, but the submarine battle-surfaced at 1740 and opened fire with her deck gun. Van Overstraten’s radio operator frantically signaled: “Shelled by submarine.”25 Unable to outrun the submarine on the surface the unarmed merchant was slowed by gunfire 550 miles west of Sibolga. Her Master finally signaled full stop and ordered his crew over the side. As they abandoned ship I-64 dispatched the 4,482-ton steamer with a torpedo. There was a huge plume of smoke and van Overstraten heeled over to port and sank by the bow. Four crewmen died in the attack, but 113 survivors made it into six lifeboats which the submarine ignored. They quickly became separated and lost sight of each other on the open ocean. After drifting in the Indian Ocean for nearly two weeks, 10 crewmen aboard two sloops reached the port of Sinabang. About the same time three sloops were located by the flying boat X-17, which had flown anti-submarine patrols from Lake Toba in central Sumatra since January 25. Two days later the Dornier found the remaining lifeboat and also rescued its occupants. The lack of naval resistance only served to embolden the Japanese submarines. One of these was Lieutenant-Commander Yoshimatsu Tamori aboard I-59.26 On the night of January 25 he sailed into Sabang Roads in search of targets.27 His audacity paid off when I-59 torpedoed and sank an unidentified British tanker in the roadstead at 1816.28 She then captured part of the British crew as they abandoned ship and escaped back out to sea without ever being detected.29 Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Ogawa Tsunayoshi, I-64 also conducted an aggressive patrol, sinking three ships in three days. The first was on January 29 when she torpedoed and sank the 5,049 ton steamer Florence Luckenbach. At 2233 on January 30, she stopped the 2,498 ton Indian steamer Jalatarang with a torpedo and finished her off with her deck gun. At 0626 I-164 claimed yet another Indian steamer. After stopping the 4,125 ton Jalapalaka with torpedoes, LieutenantCommander Tsunayoshi also finished her off with his deck gun. This brought January to a close as Japanese submarines ran rampant throughout the East Indies and Indian Ocean. In barely a month, they sank 17 ships totaling 63,540 tons for the loss of two I-Boats. The Dutch were hit hardest as few of their small interis-

As their submarines continued to savage Allied shipping the Japanese began moving into the East Indies. Their first objective was the island of Tarakan. Although at the far reaches of the Netherlands East Indies and only 25 square miles in diameter, Tarakan was of critical importance to the Japanese. Their primary target was the island’s 700 oil wells, refineries and airstrip. The wells could pump 5,000 barrels of crude oil a day, the quality of which was so pure that it could be pumped directly into ships without refining. The Japanese needed the airstrip to provide air cover for the upcoming invasion of Balikpapan 200 miles south. The runway itself was often closed by bad weather and very swampy due to poor drainage facilities. Nonetheless, Japan needed it and the Sakaguchi Detachment and 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force were put on alert. The landing force left Jolo and Davao on the night of January 7–8 aboard 16 transports under the command of ViceAdmiral Sueto Hirose. Close escort consisted of the 2nd Base Force with the minelayers Imizu Maru, Itsukushima and Wakataka, 11th Minesweeper Division, 30th Minesweeper Division, 31st Submarine Chaser Division and patrol boats P-36, P-37 and P-38. Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s 4th Destroyer Flotilla provided additional escorts with the 2nd, 9th and 24th Destroyer Divisions. The 23rd Air Flotilla at Jolo and floatplanes from the seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and Sanuki Maru provided air cover and A/S protection. As this force moved toward Tarakan, six transports and the 1st Base Force under Rear Admiral Kyuji Kubo left Davao January 9. His convoy carried naval infantry of the 1st Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, which was to take Menado, Kema and Bankga Roads on the island of Celebes. Their objectives were the airfield near Menado and seaplane base on Lake Tondano. They would be supported by 334 paratroopers of the Yokosuka Naval Air Landing Force. Rear- Admiral Raizo Tanaka’s 2nd Destroyer Flotilla with the 15th, 16th and 1/8th Destroyer Divisions provided escort for the convoy. The 21st Air Flotilla provided air cover from Jolo. These operations were their first foray into Dutch territory and the Japanese expected fierce resistance on the ground, in the air and at sea. To guard against anticipated Dutch interference, several forces were deployed to cover both operations simultaneously. The 5th Cruiser Squadron with Nachi, Haguro and the destroyers Ikazuchi and Inazuma patrolled north of Menado.30 The 5th Submarine Flotilla was deployed against Allied forces

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coming up from the Java Sea. The 11th Seaplane Tender Division with P-39 as escort was given the task of providing A/S protection for both operations. It left Davao January 9 and entered Banka Harbor two days later. As the convoys moved south, the Japanese launched a series of air raids to soften up Tarakan. Six B-339D fighters formed the island’s only fighter defense and the Japanese destroyed most of these on the ground as the Dutch had no radar.31 Prins van Oranje was still deploying a minefield in the harbor when bombers appeared overhead on January 9. Maneuvering room was limited due to the minefield, but the minelayer’s gunners claimed one plane shot down and kept the remainder high enough that they only managed near-misses.32 In retaliation, the Japanese returned again the next day and concentrated solely on the minelayer. They dropped 30 bombs, but accurate AA fire, heavy maneuvering and good luck again helped the ship avoid any direct hits. Near misses caused minor damage and killed one crewman. To suppress Dutch air power, they also bombed Manggar Airfield several miles north of Balikpapan, but the raid was a failure, as the Dutch had no planes present. On the night of January 9–10 GVT.4 flew its last mission from the seaplane base on Tarakan. Aware that the Japanese were using Jolo as a staging base for the invasion of the East Indies, the MLD sent the Dornier flying boat X-13 to bomb the airfield and harbor. On the return flight to Tarakan early that

morning X-13 received orders to divert to Balikpapan as the Japanese were about to land. The other aircraft from her squadron, X-14 and X-21, had already preceded her. As X-13 landed, X-14 and X-21 shadowed the invasion convoy. For five hours they maintained contact, ducking in and out of clouds to evade fighter interception and AA fire. At first word of the pending invasion, 50 KNIL troops from the Samarinda II airfield on Borneo were put aboard the motorship van Mastdijn and sent to reinforce Tarakan.33 However, reports from the MLD planes put the convoy much closer to the island than the transport and X-13 was sent out to warn her off. Unfortunately, Japanese planes found van Mastdijn first and X-13 arrived to find her aground on Bilang-Bajor Island under heavy air attack. After giving what assistance she could in the air, the X-boat landed on the water to rescue survivors. She took aboard the seriously wounded and those who could not swim and flew them to Balikpapan. The remaining 45 survivors clustered together until X-14 and X-21 landed after midnight of January 11 to rescue them.34 As the Japanese invasion force neared Tarakan various ships attempted to escape. Baynain was a 659-ton inter-island merchant ship under charter to the North Borneo Chartered Company. She arrived with a handful of evacuees from Sandakan just after Christmas.35 Baynain sailed again for Soerabaja on the morning of January 10 with a cargo of steel pipes and military stores.

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Soon after sailing the small freighter was attacked by JapaSesajap River and withdrew upstream and attempted to reach nese fighters. At 1000 she was stopped and captured by the subthe sea through another entrance. On January 10 Lieutenantmarine chaser Ch 11. The only two Europeans aboard—her capCommander A.C. van Versendaal received permission from tain and chief engineer—were interned on Tarakan.36 Baynain KM headquarters to attempt a breakout. He delayed until the was later put into Japanese service as the Heinan Maru.37 night of January 11 to take advantage of poor visibility brought Approximately one hour later Ch 11 and Ch 12 captured about by rain showers and heavy clouds. a second vessel trying to flee the island. This time it was an At approximately 2000 Prins van Oranje went to General unidentified 60-ton tug which was escorted back to Tarakan.38 Quarters and sailed on the evening of January 11. Shortly after K-X limped into harbor just ahead of the Japanese on January she sortied the weather cleared and the Japanese destroyer Ya10 after suffering damage to one of her diesel engines en route to makaze quickly sighted Prins van Oranje as she circled around Davao. There was no time for repairs and the submarine lay in the north coast of Tarakan. The faster Japanese destroyer harbor when the first Japanese ships began encircling the island. quickly ran down the minelayer and hit her repeatedly with 5The situation rapidly deteriorated; if Lieutenant-Commander inch shells. Her fate was sealed when the patrol boat P-38 came P.G. de Back waited any longer, he would be trapped and have to up and joined the already unequal fight. scuttle K-X. Orders from Soerabaja were clear and to the point— Lieutenant-Commander van Versendaal returned fire with attempt a breakout and be quick about it. his 75mm deck gun but Prins van Oranje was soon overThe task of escaping on only one diesel was made even whelmed by their combined gunfire. The minelayer began to more difficult by shallow water that precluded a submerged esburn heavily and sank at 2332. Of her 118 crewmen aboard, cape. Waiting until nightfall would be too late, so de Back was 102—including van Versendaal and three other officers—were forced to begin his escape in broad daylight. A Japanese seaplane lost. The 16 survivors were rescued by Yamakaze and put ashore sighted K-X almost immediately as she traversed the minefield on Tarakan. Lieutenant-Commander Van Versendaal was postjust laid by Prins van Oranje and moved to attack. As the subhumously decorated with the Bronze Lion, Holland’s second marine cautiously maneuvered among the mines, her crew ashighest military decoration. sembled on deck with their life jackets on. Fortunately, the Also at Tarakan were several small KM craft, including bombs missed K-X and she missed the mines. The plane then the patrol boat P 1 and converted A/S vessel Beatrix. They were dove to strafe, but the submarine’s 12.7mm machine gun kept joined by the motor schooners Aida and Parsifal, which beit from getting too bold. longed to the BPM oil company.40 Under the command of Leading Seaman A. van Sluys, P 1 slipped past the blockade under As the seaplane retired nine bombers appeared, forcing de cover of night. Disguising his ship with palm branches, he Back to submerge and crawl along the bottom in only 33 feet of reached the Borneo shore and successfully navigated a series of water.39 He stayed down until dark when K-X surfaced in order to clear the sandbar outside the harbor. Barely a mile away de unfamiliar waterways upriver to the port of Samarinda. There Back could see a horde of Japanese ships. Searchlights played he joined the local KNIL garrison and continued the war. over the water and destroyers crisscrossed the night as the submarine inched into deep water. As a destroyer neared, de Back took K-X deep and steered for Soerabaja. He surfaced later that night to recharge the batteries but maintained radio silence per Dutch naval policy for submarines at sea. K-X sat on the bottom all day and traveled on the surface at night. With only one diesel, the trip to Soerabaja took nine days; when the submarine arrived at the ME on January 19 she was treated like a ghost ship. Due to the Japanese blockade and her radio silence, the KM leadership had thought her lost at Tarakan. It was a miraculous escape that Prins van Oranje attempted to duplicate. As the Japanese neared Prins van Oranje sails for Java from Den Helder March 9, 1932. Her skipper is Lieutenant-Commander the island she laid a boom in the K.D.F.W. Doorman, future commander of ABDA naval forces (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

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Ashore, the KNIL’s 7th Infantry Battalion resisted until superior numbers and a surprise night attack broke organized resistance early on January 12. At dawn on the following morning Tarakan’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel S. de Waal, surrendered unconditionally. However, communications to four 120mm guns of the island’s Karoengan artillery fort had been broken since the first day of battle and their crews were unaware of the surrender. The IJA suspected this, as multiple assaults had failed to take the fort. It attempted to notify the IJN on January 12 with the following message: Although the enemy has offered to surrender, it is feared that the battery at the south end of the island is not aware of this and it would be dangerous to proceed to the Tarakan Pier, therefore, hold up your sailing.41

The IJN chose to ignore the warning and ordered the 11th Minesweeper Division and 30th Minesweeper Division to sweep the harbor. W-13, W-14, W-17, W-18, W-16 and W-15 entered the harbor in column at 1200. The Dutch guns opened fire immediately and sank W-13 at 1205; W-14 followed 10 minutes later as the others retired out of range. Lieutenant Colonel de Waal had to personally secure the surrender of the guns, whose crews the Japanese promptly massacred. In reprisal they let survivors of the sunken minesweepers behead the crewmen or tie their hands and feet and throw them into the swamps to drown or be eaten alive by crocodiles. As de Waal surrendered, engineers blew up the airfield and naval base to prevent their capture. Dutch planes from Borneo also bombed the airfield repeatedly on January 13–14. However, efficient work by 2nd Base Force engineers brought the airfield back into operation by January 16 when planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla and Tinian Air Wing flew in from Jolo. The Japanese now had the airbase they needed in order to cover the invasion of Balikpapan.

Japan Declares War on the NEI 42 In conjunction with their landings on Tarakan, the Japanese officially declared war on the Netherlands East Indies on January 11. Their reason was the need to protect Japanese citizens in Dutch territory. They had previously treated the war as a state of hostilities. Despite launching full scale war on the Americans and British, Japan launched relatively light attacks on Dutch territory. They still hoped to avoid the destruction of the oil wells and refineries on Balikpapan, Sumatra and Tarakan. The Dutch suffered no illusions as to Japanese plans and had no intention of withdrawing from the war or negotiating a separate peace agreement. On January 12 the Japanese government issued a statement saying that it regretted being compelled to fight a war caused by the aggression of the Dutch. Ten days later, Foreign Minister Tojo spoke at the opening of the 79th Imperial Diet and again expressed regret at being “forced into war by the Netherlands.”43

The Invasion of Celebes That same morning, the 1st Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force began landing at Kema and Banka Roads. The transports arrived off their landings points at 0000 hours and began predawn landings at 0300. At dawn, MLD, USN and RAAF seaplanes and bombers from Halong Naval Air Station on Ambon made a series of attacks. Y-58, Y-59 and Y-60 of GVT.17 made the first attack; without fighter cover they hit nothing in the face of heavy fighter interception and wicked AA fire. Y-58 went missing and Y-60 suffered heavy damage and barely limped back to Halong. Four USN PBYs of PatWing 10 followed, but they also scored no hits and lost one of their number. Eleven RAAF Hudson bombers came last and claimed four hits and four fighters shot down without loss.44 Unfortunately, postwar records do not substantiate any of their claims. The paratroopers staged through airfields on Brunei and dropped over the Langoan airfield at dawn. They were to seize it and hold until relieved by the ground troops. It was Japan’s first use of airborne troops in combat and their inexperience showed. The paratroopers dropped from too high an altitude and strong winds scattered men and equipment. This left them disorganized, which gave the KNIL time to blow the airfield and complete demolitions of the facilities. Although there were 1,500 Dutch troops present, fewer than 25 percent were KNIL regulars. The remainder were militia and Home Guard units without the training or equipment for prolonged combat. Still, it took several hours of extremely bitter fighting before the paratroopers secured the airstrip. The Dutch forces counterattacked but could make no headway; they then withdrew into the interior. Soon afterwards, ground troops relieved the paratroopers and proceeded to take Kalkas seaplane base, whose naval ground crews retired to Makassar by truck. Despite methodical demolitions to the airfield, Japanese engineers had the runway back in partial operation by the evening of January 11. As night fell nine fighters of the 3rd Air Unit flew in to establish initial flight operations. The airfield did not become fully operational until January 24, when the 21st Air Flotilla Headquarters, 35 fighters of the 3rd Air Unit and 20 bombers of the Kanoya Air Unit flew in. The Toko Air Unit also flew into Kalkas with 20 flying boats. Organized resistance quickly collapsed after the fall of Menado and the remaining KNIL forces—fearing execution— retired into the interior and began to wage guerrilla warfare. Their fears were realized in March when the Japanese executed seven officers who had surrendered with their men after the official surrender of KNIL forces in the East Indies. The remaining troops surrendered on April 14, followed by their officers several days later. Two of the latter were also executed for their role in wrecking Langoan airfield.

Chapter 13

Balikpapan and Sinkawang II In just three days of fighting on Tarakan the Japanese cracked the outer perimeter of the Netherlands East Indies. In the process they snatched away one of the top oil-producing centers in the Southwest Pacific. Tarakan also gave them a springboard from which to jump-start the next phase of their invasion operation. From the perspective of the Japanese High Command, this all came with relative ease and the cost of less than 300 lives and very little material loss.1 With their timetable well ahead of schedule, the Japanese now moved up their date to occupy Balikpapan. From a strategic viewpoint, its oil refinery was needed for the production of vitally needed petroleum; its capture would also give direct access to the huge oil fields located in the interior of Borneo. From a tactical standpoint, Balikpapan offered a harbor and airfield needed to secure Southern Borneo and eventually the capture of Java itself. Orders for its capture were concise…

On the morning of January 20 they were put aboard the captured BPM motor schooner Parsifal with a native captain and three Japanese interpreters and sent south to Balikpapan.2 At 1630 two Dornier seaplanes from Balikpapan sighted the launch, which flew a Japanese flag. Fearing that the planes were about to attack, Colijn and Reinderhoff ran onto the deck; Reinderhoff waved a Dutch flag wildly as Colijn took down the Japanese ensign. This turn of events discouraged the Dutch planes from attacking. However, rough water prevented them from landing and the Dorniers eventually retired. One of the planes promptly returned at first light the following morning. The water was now calm and the seaplane set down and slowly taxied toward Parsifal. Colijn and Reinderhoff then went aboard and explained their mission. From there they were immediately flown back to Balikpapan where they made a personal report to the KNIL commander, Lieutenant-Colonel C. van den Hoogenband.3 The Dutch commander immediately put both men aboard a plane to Java and ordered the wells, refineries and port facilities blown up. In an effort to avoid the threatened reprisals, he arranged for the evacuation of those BPM and KNIL engineers who carried out the demolitions.

1. “The enemy will be contacted and destroyed while very possible effort will be exerted to prevent destruction of the oil refinery installations. The airfield, after its capture, will be used for the invasion of Java. The assault unit will cooperate in the maintenance of the airfield. 2. “The main force immediately upon landing in the vicinity of the airfield will capture it. Simultaneously, a part of the group will secretly go up the river below the port and make a surprise attack at the enemy’s rear in order to break the organized resistance of the enemy garrison. As far as possible, they will prevent the destruction of the oil refinery installations. 3. “After the capture of the Balikpapan, the Sangasanga Oilfield region will be mopped up and secured. 4. “Preparations will be made to make Balikpapan the center of military administration in South Borneo.”

The Evacuation of Balikpapan The evacuation took place at the last minute on the night of January 20. On average, MLD flight crews were spending 15–18 hours a day in the air so they had little opportunity for rest. The four Dorniers of GVT.4 were ordered to take the men out, but for an unknown reason, only three took off from Morokrembangan at 1800 that evening. To increase their range and personnel capacity, all were completely unarmed.4 In his haste to take off the navigator aboard the lead plane forgot his charts, forcing the pilot to fly by dead-reckoning.5 The formation also encountered rain and heavy cloud over the Makassar Strait and the planes became separated. By that point they needed no charts to find Balikpapan. Flames and plumes of black smoke were visible a full hour’s flight time from the port. As the formation neared Balikpapan the town and port were a thick mass of flames. The Dorniers had orders to land on the Songei River and

Dutch engineers at Tarakan demolished every oil well on the island. The furious Japanese were never able to get them fully operational again before the war ended. Anxious to avoid a repeat of this destruction at Balikpapan, the local IJA commander sent his Dutch counterpart a message threatening reprisals against the garrison and civilians if demolitions were carried out. To carry the message he detailed Captain G.L. Reinderhoff, who had been chief of staff to Lieutenant-Colonel de Waal and Captain A.H. Colijn, a KNIL reservist who had been the manager of BPM, the Dutch oil company on Tarakan. Colijn was likely considered to carry a bit more weight, as his father was a well-connected politician who had previously served as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1933 to 1939.

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rendezvous with the evacuees on shore. As the first descended it took light AA fire from Japanese troops on the ground but suffered no damage.6 The pilot had no idea where to find the evacuees. He slowly cruised down the length of the landing point signaling with flashlights. It was a tense time for the crew, for they had no idea if the Japanese were lying in ambush. Their only armament was the service revolvers they carried. After a short time they found a party of 31 evacuees gathered on the bank. The pilot initially planned to load only 20 of them; however, the other Dorniers had failed to appear and their status was unknown. So he made a split-second decision to take all the evacuees aboard.7 They were crammed into every possible foot of the plane and it was nearly dawn by the time the Dornier lifted off the river. Due to the time required to load the extra personnel, the unarmed plane now had to traverse the Makassar Strait and Java Sea in broad daylight.8 In addition, there was real concern that the badly overloaded seaplane might not have enough fuel to reach Morokrembangan. Fortunately, bad weather covered the return flight. However, it did nothing to alleviate their concerns about fuel. It was a tremendous relief to all when the Dornier broke free of the clouds to find Soerabaja under them. The remaining two Dorniers reached Balikpapan a short

time later. Due to the poor weather one of the planes ran low on fuel and returned home. X-14 of GVT.4 attempted to land, but struck a floating log or obstacle in the river. The X-boat exploded in a ball of flame, killing four of her six crew.

“Much smoke”—The Invasion of Balikpapan As the Dutch destroyed Balikpapan, a Japanese invasion force departed Tarakan the night of January 20–21. They originally planned to sail January 16, but the Celebes operation delayed the invasion for a week by tying up air units that were to cover the convoy. Even then, air cover was spotty; according to the Japanese ace Saburo Sakai, the Tinian Air Wing unable to put more than three Zeros over the convoy at one time due to bad weather, maintenance problems and aircraft shortages. 9 Because the airstrip at Tarakan proved unsuitable for mass operations, aircraft covering the invasion had to remain at Jolo and fly long-range missions against Southern Borneo. Nonetheless, Japanese fighters caught the PBY Catalina Y-51 on the Barito River near Bandjermasin and burned the flying boat. Her crew escaped but the plane was completely destroyed. Close escort for the convoy’s 16 transports consisted of

13. Balikpapan and Sinkawang II the converted patrol boats P-36, P-37 and P-38; remnants of the 11th Minesweeper Division, 30th Minesweeper Division and the 31st Submarine Chaser Division. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla again provided a distant covering force with the light cruiser Naka, 2nd Destroyer Division, 1/9th Destroyer Division and 1/24th Destroyer Division. The 21st Air Flotilla seaplane tenders trailed the convoy and provided A/S protection. Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura was in overall command of the convoy and escort forces. ABDA reconnaissance planes quickly discovered the convoy as it moved down the Makassar Strait. On January 19 the American submarine Pickerel reported a Japanese destroyer moving down the Makassar Strait at high speed in the direction of Balikpapan. Four days later, Dutch reconnaissance planes reported three groups of Japanese ships headed for Balikpapan. In addition to Pickerel, the USN submarines S-40, Porpoise, Saury, Spearfish and Sturgeon were ordered to intercept. In addition, they were joined by K-XIV and K-XVIII. The latter Dutch boat reported “Much Smoke” as she closed. Based on these reports KM Headquarters took steps to either stop or reroute shipping to Borneo ports. Van Ghent was en route to Bandjarmasin and Balikpapan with a small merchant ship loaded with rice and other stores when the Japanese landed at Balikpapan. They proceeded to Bandjarmasin but were forced to return to Soerabaja on January 22 without reaching Balikpapan. That same day K-XIV received orders to scuttle the port’s lightship Orion with her 88mm deck gun.10 Sturgeon made initial contact with the invasion convoy on January 22 and made three attacks. In the first, LieutenantCommander W.L. Wright sat on the bottom and let the destroyer screen pass over as he set up a sonar attack. At 1,400 yards, Sturgeon fired four torpedoes and the sonar operator reported multiple hits; Wright claimed to have sunk a large ship. In a second attack, he fired on a destroyer and claimed another sinking. In the third, he fired three torpedoes against a tanker and claimed it sunk also. However, all his torpedoes either exploded prematurely or missed, as postwar records failed to confirm any damage to the convoy. K-XIV had patrolled off East Borneo since January 6 and was the next ABDA submarine to attack on January 22. She had a good angle and closed the range; but just as Lieutenant T. Brunsting was about to fire a heavy rain squall obscured his view and the attack failed. Once alerted, the 4th Destroyer Flotilla drove off K-XIV with depth charges and did not allow her to close again. Porpoise also made contact off Balikpapan. Lieutenant-Commander Joseph Callahan was com-

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pletely exhausted after being at sea since December 22 and it clearly impacted him. He missed his first opportunity to attack when Naka passed at a range of 4,000 yards. On another contact later that night, he could not regain his senses in time only managed a quick stern shot that missed badly. Another torpedo was then fired by mistake which also missed. He later wrote that he never would have given orders to fire had he been in “full possession of his mental faculties.”11 Upon his return to Soerabaja, Callahan was relieved of command. Saury and Spearfish were the only other boats in the immediate area of Balikpapan. Unfortunately, due to inaccurate USN charts and bad weather, neither had been unable to get an accurate navigational fix for several days and were badly out of position. Saury missed the convoy by at least 65 miles and Spearfish estimated to have missed it by 17 miles.12 They were never able to correct and the convoy passed them by unmolested. Beginning at dawn on January 23 Dutch Martin bombers from Borneo and American B-17s from Java repeatedly attacked the convoy until nightfall. Not only did the Dutch lose three planes over Balikpapan, but the intense air activity betrayed the location of Sinkawang II airfield, which had been previously unknown to the Japanese. Their bombers and fighters hit the field early on January 24. They destroyed no planes on the ground, but severely damaged the runway and facilities. As a result of their attacks on Sinkawang II the Japanese could not provide the convoy with adequate air cover, so ABDA planes met little or no resistance in the air. Their attacks came every 10–15 minutes and Dutch and American airmen claimed one cruiser and a large transport sunk with a second cruiser damaged. However, their claims were out of line and it was not until late in the evening that Dutch bombers hit the 6,764 ton freighter Nana Maru and left her a burning derelict. They also damaged the 7,064 ton ammunition ship Tatsugami Maru.13

K-XVIII (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

The Miracle of K-XVIII Despite these attacks the convoy dropped anchor three miles off Balikpapan at 1945. Just after 0030 on the morning of January 24 Japanese lookouts aboard the light cruiser Naka reported what appeared to be, “a vessel which looked like an enemy patrol boat” southwest of the anchorage.14 The submarine chaser Ch 12 was ordered to investigate. The “patrol boat” was actually K-XVIII which had left the ME on January 16 and arrived off Balikpapan the following day.15 She had only recently been put back into service; together with K-XIV and K-XV she was part of the newly formed 5th Submarine Division.16 Their orders were to patrol the Makassar Strait in anticipation of Japanese landings on Borneo. It was her first war patrol under the command of LieutenantCommander van Well Groenveld. K-XVIII made contact with Balikpapan invasion convoy off Samarinda on the night of January 22–23. In poor visibility lookouts sighted 11 anchored transports escorted by two warships. Due to the bad weather she was operating partially submerged with only the conning tower above water.17 At 0035 van Well Groenveld fired three torpedoes from the bow tubes on what he reported to be a “1,400 ton destroyer.”18 In fact, his target was Naka whose profile throughout the war was often mistaken for a large destroyer. All three torpedoes missed with two passing under Naka.19 He then put a single torpedo into the 6,987 ton passenger-cargo ship Tsuruga Maru at 0140.20 The torpedo struck the ship’s Hold #4 on the port side, instantly flooding the engine room. Tsuruga Maru first listed to port, but then gradually stabilized and began sinking by the stern.21 Thirty-eight army troops and one crewman were killed in the initial blast.22 Her remaining army troops were transferred to the transport Liverpool Maru along with those crewmen not otherwise engaged in damage control activities. Captain Kato Shizuo and 10 remaining crewmen abandoned ship early that morning and watched Tsuruga Maru sink from their lifeboat.23 She disappeared under the waves at approximately 0600 at coordinates 00–10 N / 118–00 E. After second attack Lieutenant-Commander van Well Groenveld cleared the immediate area to reload his forward tubes. In response to what he correctly believed was a submarine attack, Rear-Admiral Nishimura moved the bulk of his close escort farther into the Makassar Strait to conduct a comprehensive A/S sweep. This decision would later have profound repercussions for the Japanese convoy. Just after dawn Lieutenant-Commander van Well Groenveld returned to the area near where Tsuruga Maru went down. There he sighted Ch 12 and attacked. He planned to fire one torpedo from the bow, followed by a second from the deck tubes. The first malfunctioned, alerting the Japanese ship which was only 125 yards away.24 At 0652 Ch 12 reported that a torpedo passed under her keel without exploding.25 As van Well Groenveld fired his second torpedo Ch 12 caught K-XVIII at periscope depth and punished the submarine with a string of depth charges.

Ch 12 claimed the submarine as being sunk, which was not far from the truth. The depth charge blasts threw the wireless set from its rack as the submarine heeled over. In the deck torpedo room, explosions warped the loading hatches and water poured in. The torpedoman on duty quickly eyeballed the damage and determined it to be irreparable.26 After firing the second torpedo as ordered, he evacuated the compartment and sealed the hatch, leaving it to flood. Some eight seconds after firing the torpedo the crew heard an explosion in the distance. It sounded different from that of a depth charge, and Groenveld assumed he had scored a hit on Ch 12.27 As K-XVIII went down by the stern, an officer lost his balance and fell on the fire control board, accidentally firing a third torpedo, although no one realized it. As the submarine settled into the mud 150 feet down, flooding shorted out the main electric engines, leaving the boat on auxiliary power. Diesel fuel also poured into the bridge, completely covering the deck. The situation was extremely critical. There were approximately 25 tons of water in the flooded torpedo room and K-XVIII had no hope of surfacing until it was pumped out. Every available electric motor on the boat—in addition to the rudder engine, dive motor and main ballast pump—was immediately put into use to clear the compartment. However, floating oil frequently clogged them and water steadily rose in the engine room until it contaminated the fuel lines and forced the diesels offline. Temperature inside the hull quickly shot up to more than 93° Fahrenheit (34° Celsius). While there was air circulation, a lack of coolant made conditions miserable. At the same time, the hot engines caused relative humidity to exceed 100 percent.28 Nor was there any way to measure air content and purity as that gauge had been smashed. Ch 12 and several destroyers continue to ping with their SONAR overhead but no more depth charges followed as the crew quietly worked throughout the night and into the next day. Conditions inside the boat worsened again when the air circulation system eventually had to be shut off due to the noise it generated. As a result, many crewmen began showing the initial symptoms of carbonic acid poisoning by late that afternoon. Time was running out for K-XVIII. By nightfall on January 25 the deck torpedo compartment had been pumped out enough to be entered. Inside, van Well Groenveld found that the loading hatches had not been damaged after all. Rather, two exhaust vents had been blown open which the chief torpedoman was able to lock down and stop the flooding. He then discovered the torpedo accidentally fired during the descent had stuck halfway out of the starboard deck tube where it made a hot run. There was no telling if the warhead had armed so he tried to fire the torpedo again. However, there was not enough pressure left in the firing system. With no way to pull it back in van Well Groenveld had to leave the torpedo hanging in the tube and pray that it had not armed. Just before 2100 van Well Groenveld got word that the

13. Balikpapan and Sinkawang II diesels were back on line—K-XVIII could now try to surface. When the ballast tanks were blown the bow easily rose but the stern remained mired in the thick mud, holding the boat at an extreme angle. Then #3 Main Tank was blown and the stern gradually broke loose. Near death after almost 24 hours on the bottom of the Makassar Strait K-XVIII broke the surface to the joy of her crew. Lookouts immediately sighted a Japanese destroyer 2,200 yards to port and another 3,300 yards to starboard.29 LieutenantCommander van Well Groenveld steered away from them and was not sighted as he headed for Soerabaja at full speed. He remained on the surface all night although unidentified ships were sighted in the distance several times. With her electric engines out of commission and irreparable K-XVIII could not make a powered dive or operate submerged. Her luck ran out the next day when a Japanese four-engine seaplane sighted the submarine. Unable to dive, van Well Groenveld resolved to fight it out on the surface with his two 12.7mm machine guns. As the plane crossed port to starboard at approximately 650 feet, he gave the order to fire. Both weapons failed; although thoroughly cleaned and dried both guns and their ammunition were completely inoperable. As the plane lined up on the bow for another low pass van Well Groenveld decided he had to dive with or without power. As the submarine disappeared under the surface bombs exploded all around but caused no damage. Without power, K-XVIII went into a steep, uncontrolled dive before hitting bottom at 280 feet—16 feet over her designed limit. Due to the crew’s exhausted condition van Well Groenveld sat on the bottom until well after nightfall before surfacing. It was only with great effort that the crew of K-XVIII was able to get their boat off the bottom. When she came back to the surface the horizon was clear and K-XVIII steered for the ME at 12 knots. In response to van Well Groenveld’s call for help, the submarine received air escort in the form of MLD planes. Later they were relieved by American B-17s. K-XVIII arrived Soerabaja on January 26 and went into immediate overhaul. Her first and only war patrol in the East Indies campaign had lasted just 10 days. Two days later yard personnel and technicians from the torpedo workshop removed the torpedo from K-XVIII’s deck tube. Further inspection revealed that its warhead needed only eight more revolutions before arming!30

A Misplaced Corner of Hell: The Battle of Balikpapan Although K-XVIII succeeded in sinking only the Tsuruga Maru, her efforts were not wasted. As Naka and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla left the convoy to hunt for her they opened the way for the American 59th Destroyer Division to attack the convoy, which was left relatively unguarded. Their attack originated from Koepang Bay, Timor, where the destroyers had assembled with the light cruisers Boise and Marblehead. The cruisers were escorted by the destroyers Bul-

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mer and Pillsbury. Houston and remaining nine destroyers of the Asiatic Fleet were on escort duty or in overhaul at Darwin. No Dutch ships were available either. De Ruyter was just entering drydock at the ME, while Tromp, Java and four destroyers were on convoy duty in the Soenda Strait and Singapore area. Even so, ABDA-FLOAT felt Rear-Admiral Glassford still had enough strength to intervene at Balikpapan and on January 20 ordered his ships to make for Balikpapan as soon as the destroyers refueled from Marblehead. However, Marblehead only had one working turbine, which limited her speed to 15 knots. Boise then touched ground on an uncharted reef in the Sape Strait between Komoto and Soembawa Islands.31 The collision tore a 120-foot gash in her hull. With a huge, jagged hole below the waterline there was no chance she could continue so Glassford ordered both cruisers to Warorada Bay on the south coast of Soembawa. The destroyers Bulmer and Pillsbury were detached to escort them.32 There, he transferred his flag to Marblehead and refueled from Boise. Boise then proceeded to Tjilatjap to have her hull examined; from there she later sailed to the United States for repairs. It was a huge loss because as Boise was the only ABDA-FLOAT ship equipped with radar.33 With no way to catch the destroyers, Rear-Admiral Glassford set course for a rendezvous with the destroyers 90 miles south of Balikpapan to cover for their withdraw if needed. Even though the scales had tipped dramatically in favor of the Japanese, Glassford ordered Pope, Parrott, John D. Ford and Paul Jones to “go in there and fight!” The 59th Destroyer Division commander, Commander Paul H. Talbot, first set a course for Mandar Bay, Celebes, to mislead any Japanese reconnaissance planes they might encounter, but the sky remained clear. One hour after sunset, at 1930, Talbot changed course for Balikpapan and increased speed from 25 to 27 knots. Heavy swells out of the north broke over their bows and smashed the bridge, breaking windows, buckling spray shields and soaking lookouts. Aboard Pope, Lieutenant-Commander W.C. Blinn signaled he was having trouble keeping up; there was no mention of reducing speed or changing course and she just barely managed to hold her station.34 As they neared Balikpapan Commander Talbot issued his final orders over TBS and left no doubt as to what he expected: Initial weapons will be torpedoes. Transports chief objective. Cruisers as required to accomplish mission. Launch torpedoes at close range if unsighted by enemy. Each tube set for normal spread torpedoes. Fire single shots if size of target warrants … will try to avoid action en route … attack independently when targets located if necessary. When all torpedoes fired. Close with all guns. Use initiative and determination.

Just after 2200 lookouts sighted what appeared to be searchlights far in the distance and Talbot altered course to reach Balikpapan at 0300 on January 24. At 2357 lookouts again saw lights; they appeared to be in the water some distance offshore and would flicker briefly before flaring up again.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

At 0047 a searchlight suddenly appeared on John D. Ford’s starboard bow and a blue blinker light issued a coded challenge that the American signalmen could not understand. Commander Talbot swung away and made several course changes for the next two hours to avoid detection. The ship was likely a Japanese destroyer on picket duty in the Makassar Strait. As the 59th Destroyer Division neared Balikpapan at 0230 the lights observed during the approach proved to be the Nana Maru, now abandoned and burning out of control. The port itself was a mass of fire and the smell of burning oil lingered. In addition to dark thunderclouds, a thick cloud of black smoke from ruptured oil wells and storage tanks rolled 20 miles out to sea, hampering visibility and covering the destroyers’ approach. Ahead of us the air became increasingly hazy, and the sky overhead grew darker. When we saw flames in the distance we realized that the oil installations and wells at Balikpapan had been set afire. The haze had been caused by the smoke from the fires. A tremendous amount of oil must have been burning, for the clouds of smoke filled the sky for miles around. As we advanced toward Balikpapan the visibility improved, but the canopy of smoke hung over us, lending a sinister touch to the proceedings. We seemed cut off from the rest of the world as we approached a misplaced corner of Hell.35

At 0245, Naka suddenly appeared out of the swirling smoke and headed for the Americans. As they briefly passed at high speed, Japanese lookouts failed to recognize the American destroyers and Naka disappeared into the night. Minutes later, four destroyers crossed ahead from port to starboard and flashed another challenge. Talbot again changed course without replying and hid in the darkness. Apparently, they also thought he was friendly and raised no alarm. A course change brought Talbot back around and almost immediately his destroyers found themselves on the eastern edge of a completely unprotected convoy of merchant ships. The murk and swirling smoke frequently obscured their view, so it was difficult to distinguish targets as the four destroyers moved down the second row of transports and into torpedo range. There was still no indication they had been sighted. As they turned for a run down the outer line of merchant ships, Parrott fired three torpedoes into a large transport at close range. As seconds turned into minutes, her captain, Lieutenant-Commander E.N. Parker realized they had missed the mark. Two minutes later, he shifted slightly to port and fired five more at an anchored transport 1,000 yards to starboard; these also missed. At the same time, John D. Ford fired a torpedo astern, as did Paul Jones to starboard at 0257. Both were tracking the same target and identified it as either a destroyer or a cruiser. It was the 800ton minesweeper W-15 on her way to A/S duty in the Makassar Strait. She avoided their torpedoes and fled into the night. Talbot now reached the north end of the transport anchorage and his ships had still hit nothing. As they turned south for another run at 0300, Parrott again fired three torpedoes at a target to port. As she completed her turn two minutes later, there was a huge explosion and the 3,519 ton passenger-cargo ship Sumanoura Maru sank. Between 0306 and 0310, Pope, Parrott and Paul Jones fired nearly 10 torpedoes in succession

at a large target to starboard. At least one hit and another blast roared as the 7,064 ton passenger-cargo ship Tatsukami Maru went down. The remaining nine torpedoes missed. Three hours after our torpedo hit, the enemy began full-scale attacks. On the dark waters we saw columns of flame shoot up here and there. The most dreadful scene I had ever seen was the explosion of a ship fully loaded with ammunition; the length of the ship, as well as the base, and to the height of the masts was filled with fire and incendiary arrows like fireworks. When they all subsided into darkness, the ship was nowhere to be found.36

At 0314, Talbot made a 90-degree turn at the south end of the anchorage in order to close the range. The new course took them into the middle of the anchorage. Five minutes later, they sighted a destroyer to port and Pope fired two torpedoes and Parrott three more. In reality their target was the 750-ton patrol boat P 37, which took three hits and sank instantly. A moving transport then appeared to port. By now, John D. Ford and Paul Jones were the only ones with torpedoes; each fired one, but the Japanese master turned away and avoided both. Paul Jones then fired a third torpedo and obtained a solid hit amidship on the 5,175 ton cargo ship Kuretake Maru, which began sinking. In the belief that K-XVIII or another ABDA submarine had returned, Admiral Nishimura had been searching away from the anchorage in the Makassar Strait until now. As his ships returned to the engagement, Commander Talbot turned wide to port and doubled back on their track at 0335. Pope, Parrott and Paul Jones now reported, “All torpedoes expended” and opened gunplay. Shooting on both sides became extremely heated. As the American destroyers weaved and darted through the transports they also took fire from the Japanese troops aboard the transports.37 John D. Ford then launched torpedoes at three transports that missed. As Talbot turned northwest, the destroyers became separated. Parrott and Paul Jones withdrew independently after losing John D. Ford, as did Pope. Under orders from Commander Talbot, Lieutenant-Commander E.J. Cooper turned John D. Ford toward shore and continued to attack alone. At 0346, another transport appeared to port and Talbot launched his last torpedo as the destroyer’s guns hit it repeatedly. The torpedo hit, leaving transport Asami Maru damaged, as John D. Ford turned hard to avoid running aground. As she withdrew, John D. Ford received the only damage suffered by the 59th Destroyer Division during the battle. A Japanese shell wrecked the after deckhouse, wounding four sailors and setting some ready ammunition afire. A quickthinking sailor threw the burning ammunition over the side before it could explode and others extinguished the flames in less than a minute before major damage was caused. As the battle progressed, a call went to Rear-Admiral Nishimura, whose main force was still on A/S duty east of the main convoy in the Makassar Strait. Naka and the 4th Destroyer Division immediately turned back toward Balikpapan. Too late to influence the final outcome of the battle, they attempted to cut off the escape route of the American destroyers in order to

13. Balikpapan and Sinkawang II engage them.38 Unfortunately for the Japanese they were unable to make contact and the 59th Destroyer Division slipped away. Dawn broke shortly before the 59th Destroyer Division rendezvoused with Marblehead and Bulmer. There was no Japanese pursuit as they retired to Soerabaja. There, both RearAdmiral Karel Doorman, operational commander of Dutch forces at sea, and Admiral Hart visited each ship. The mood was relaxed and everyone involved felt extremely optimistic about the battle for good reason. Particularly Admiral Hart, who had conceived the raid and pushed for its execution. Just underneath the jocularity, several key points remained unaddressed. Although ABDA believed the battle to be a huge victory, the USN’s first naval engagement since 1898 proved only marginally successful. The battle could, and probably should, have been much more successful. Of 12 merchant ships in the virtually unprotected anchorage, Talbot’s force managed to sink only four transports and a single patrol boat that was later salvaged. Several others, including Asami Maru, received light to moderate damage, but survived. In retrospect, it was a poor score for four destroyers with a total of 48 torpedoes. There were no more than seven confirmed hits—a paltry 15 percent success rate. Undoubtedly, many others were duds or ran erratically, as the surface version of the Mark 13 torpedo was just as unreliable as those aboard USN submarines. Commander Talbot might also be faulted for not reducing speed among the transports; the high speed and close range dictated that many torpedo hits would be a matter of luck. These factors did not help the inexperienced torpedo men. Although the final tally could have been much higher, it should not diminish the success of the Balikpapan engagement. It was the first surface battle for the United States Navy since 1898. In the face of tremendous adversity and overwhelming enemy strength the USN conducted an extremely difficult mission and substantially hurt the enemy for the first time in the East Indies campaign. It was a huge morale boost to the American people, who were still reeling after the news of Pearl Harbor. The Dutch, more than ever, felt they had an ally on whom they could count. Although the ABDA command celebrated otherwise, the engagement had absolutely no effect on the invasion of Balikpapan. Most of the Japanese troops had already transferred to landing barges before the battle and postwar records put their losses at only 29 men. Their only naval loss was that of P 37. To add salt to the wound, the Dutch KNIL garrison ashore had already evacuated the port and town long before the 59th Destroyer Division arrived. Once again, Japanese personnel losses were minuscule in relation to the value of what they seized. As the Japanese moved ashore, the USAAF took over the task of stopping them. On January 24 eight B-17s from Malang bombed the anchorage and claimed two transports sunk with the loss of three planes to fighters and AA fire. The two ships were unconfirmed and the Japanese advance continued unabated. By nightfall of January 24 the Japanese had secured the

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center of Balikpapan and were pursuing the Dutch force into the interior. The majority of this force surrendered in March with the fall of Java. The Japanese then massacred 78 KNIL troops and civilians in retaliation for demolishing the port and facilities; most were bound together and pushed into the sea to drown. Two small guerrilla bands held out until June 1942 before they were hunted down. The next day, the depot ships of the 21st Air Flotilla arrived at Balikpapan and set up seaplane operations over the Makassar Strait. They had been providing A/S support from a temporary seaplane base at Sangkoelirang Bay (halfway between Tarakan and Balikpapan) since January 23. On January 26 the minelayers Imizu Maru, Itsukishima, Wakataka and a number of transports arrived with the 2nd Base Force to repair Balikpapan’s airfield. They needed it to cover the invasion of Bandjermasin and so they could begin air sweeps over Java in preparation for its invasion. American B-17s also returned on January 26 and sank Sanuki Maru. Fortunately for the Japanese, their engineers got the airfield back into operation by January 28 when the 23rd Air Flotilla flew in. Fighters of the Tinian Air Wing arrived to begin operations over Java on February 4. With their air strength now firmly established at Tarakan and Balikpapan, the Japanese resolved to eliminate the previously secret air base at Sinkawang II. All throughout January 25 their bombers filled the sky and fighters shot up anything that moved or looked like it might be a target. Despite this massive show of airpower they failed to destroy any of the seven remaining Martin bombers, but the runway was heavily cratered and Sinkawang II became useless as a base. The ML-KNIL now evacuated the bombers back to Java via a brief stop at Bandjermasin to refuel. Disaster struck only minutes out of Bandjermasin as the fully loaded Martins staggered off the runway and assumed formation. Without fighter escort their only protection was flying at low altitude which failed to help when a Japanese fighter patrol found them. Heavily loaded with fuel, the obsolete bombers had no chance amid the ensuing slaughter. The fighters sliced through the lumbering formation and shot down all seven in minutes without loss. Their evacuation and loss effectively signaled the end of Sinkawang II as an ABDA-AIR base. It was a critical loss for it was the only airfield capable of providing air cover for northern ABDA-FLOAT operations after the fall of Tarakan and Balikpapan. Indeed, on January 4 Vice-Admiral Helfrich and Admiral Hart had decided that Sinkawang II would have to provide air cover for Allied warships operating in the northern Banda Sea. After its loss Helfrich correctly guessed that the Japanese would now attempt to establish air superiority over the remainder of the Malay Barrier. Without air cover from Balikpapan, Tarakan or Sinkawang II, the offensive power of ABDAFLOAT was rendered largely impotent. This point was driven home by the simple fact that virtually every subsequent ABDA naval sortie in the East Indies campaign was turned back by Japanese air power.

Chapter 14

The Japanese Move South The Invasion of Kendari

fighters (the only fighters on the island), two USN PBYs and a RAAF Hudson. As the attacks intensified the PatWing 10 seaplanes and RAAF bombers quickly withdrew.

As the Japanese Central Invasion Force took Balikpapan, their Eastern Invasion Force simultaneously moved against Kendari in Southern Celebes. On January 21 the 1st Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force left Banka aboard six transports. It was to make the initial landings to secure the city and airfield. Engineers with the 1st Base Force would then repair the airfield and installations, which the Japanese correctly assumed had been had rigged for demolition. The 1st Base Force left Menado on January 21 with the light cruiser Nagara; minelayer Aotaka; transport Tsukuishi Maru, fast transports P 1, P 2 and P 34; 21st Minesweeper Division and 1st Submarine Chaser Division. Close escort for the invasion convoy was provided by the light cruiser Jintsu and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla’s 16th Destroyer Division; 15th Destroyer Division and 1/18th Destroyer Division. Rear-Admiral Fujita’s 11th Seaplane Tender Division provided direct air cover and A/S protection for the convoy.1 The Japanese knew ABDA-FLOAT still had several powerful surface units at sea and they took steps to minimize naval interference to the invasion. This included deploying I-59, I-62, I-64, I-65 and I-66 of the 5th Submarine Flotilla in a picket line across the Ambon Sea to warn of ABDA ships. The 5th Cruiser Squadron provided distant cover from the Celebes Sea.2 Ikazuchi and Inazami of the 2/6th Destroyer Squadron were attached to provide A/S support.3 The battleship Haruna (2/3rd Battleship Division), heavy cruiser Maya (2/4th Cruiser Squadron) and Akatsuki and Hibiki of the 1/6th Destroyer Squadron patrolled east of Mindanao. In addition, the battleship Kongo (2/3rd Battleship Squadron) patrolled with the 2/4th Cruiser Squadron and 4th Destroyer Squadron south of Palau. To suppress air resistance the 23rd Air Flotilla heavily bombed Ambon on January 24–25. It was supported by the 2nd Carrier Division, which operated in the Banda Sea with the heavy cruiser Tone (1/8th Cruiser Division) and destroyers Tanikaze and Urakaze (1/17th Destroyer Division). Their air attacks heavily damaged both Ambon’s Laha Airstrip and Halong Naval Air Station; 60,000 gallons of aviation fuel were destroyed. They also destroyed two Dutch B-339D

“A8Y … A8Y … A8Y” 4 The invasion convoy passed through Peleng Strait on January 22 and arrived off Kendari at 0200 on the morning of January 24. Its progress was monitored by ABDA reconnaissance planes the entire way. By the time the Japanese approached Kendari, Staring Bay was clear of Allied shipping, except for the USN seaplane tender Childs, which arrived the night of January 22–23. As other ships fled her crew offloaded 30,000 gallons of aviation fuel for Kendari II Airfield. They were particularly motivated after a Japanese observation plane flew over the harbor. Childs got underway at 0525; but by then it seemed too late. As the tender entered the port’s South Channel, her lookouts sighted four Japanese destroyers eight miles out heading on an intercept course. As they approached, one challenged Childs with the signal “A8Y … A8Y … A8Y.” Signalman Rod Nordfelt had no idea what it meant. For lack of a better response he returned the signal, which appeared to confuse the Japanese. Several minutes later she again challenged Childs. About then, a rain squall blew over Childs and hid her from the approaching destroyers. Lieutenant-Commander J.L. Pratt took advantage of the brief cover by changing course and running down the narrow channel at full speed in near zero visibility. So extreme was the need for speed that boiler room engineers locked down the safety valves in order to get more steam. As she cleared the channel lookouts reported landing craft entering the North Channel. Their attention was quickly diverted by the four destroyers that were now in pursuit. Fortunately, they apparently thought Childs to be a harmless merchant for they quickly turned back to the anchorage. A half-hour later three fighters came in low for a better look. As they did, they quickly discovered Childs was not defenseless when heavy machine gun fire drove them off. Five minutes later they returned, but AA fire drove them off for good with the leader trailing smoke. A single engine cruiser floatplane appeared at 1415 and

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14. The Japanese Move South again challenged the seaplane tender with the signal “A8Y.” Childs’ signalman again responded with an identical signal. However, the pilot refused to be hoodwinked and immediately dropped two bombs. Both missed and AA fire quickly drove off the plane. Pratt was now certain a cruiser was near and immediately turned southeast at full speed and made Soerabaja two days later without problems. As Childs fled south the American submarine Swordfish sank the 4,124 ton auxiliary gunboat Myoken Maru with two torpedoes at 1200. An hour later she fired two more at an 8,035 ton transport, which may have been damaged. About the same time, nine Dutch Martin bombers attacked and claimed a transport sunk with another and a destroyer damaged in exchange for two planes. In retaliation aircraft from the 11th Seaplane Tender Division sank a small merchant ship south of Boetoeng Island.5 The 1st Sasebo SNLF went ashore at dawn in the face of weak Dutch resistance and secured Kendari II airfield by 1200 with only two wounded. KNIL troops under Colonel M. Vooren withdrew east of Kendari to eight miles of prepared positions along a mountain pass known as the Tjamba Line. They had no automatic weapons and a Japanese attack on February 26 forced them back to Rala where Colonel Vooren surrendered on March 7. Soon after, most of his European troops were massacred. Ten days later, the remaining KNIL troops under LieutenantColonel L. Gortmans surrendered at Enrekan, ending organized resistance on Celebes. Two guerrilla groups resupplied from Australia held out in the interior into 1944 before being hunted down and eliminated by the Japanese. The airfield itself was taken almost intact. Constructed in 1940, its two main runways were regarded as not only the best in the East Indies, but possibly in all of Southeast Asia. The 21st Air Flotilla flew in on January 25 and relieved the 11th Seaplane Tender Division which then retired to Banka Roads. With the fall of Kendari the Japanese had now taken all ABDA airfields within striking distance of the ME in just 13 days. In addition, they could interdict the Australia-TimorBali-Java air route. Not only could they bomb the naval base and airfields on east Java, but they could also disrupt air reinforcements to Java upon which ABDA relied upon. They also covered sea routes to Ambon in the east and Makassar in the west that were next on the list for invasion. Staring Bay itself was to be quickly developed into a primary naval base and the first IJN reinforcements arrived January 25. These were the 25th Destroyer Squadron from Hong Kong. The destroyer Hatsuharu was almost immediately involved in a collision with the light cruiser Nagara near Kendari. The destroyer was forced to put into Davao for repairs on January 29, where she remained until February 11.

The Invasion of Ambon With their timetable ahead of schedule the Japanese now decided to also move up the invasion of Ambon. The immediate

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purpose of this operation was to apply pressure on—and if possible—cut outright the lines of communication between Australia and Java. The island’s airfield would further consolidate the defensive line protecting against Allied counterattack from Darwin. Ground troops were drawn from Major-General Takeo Ito’s 38th “Nagoya” Infantry Division. The core unit was the 228th Infantry Regiment, fresh from its victory at Hong Kong. Artillery, engineer, transport and miscellaneous support units brought the total force to approximately 5,300 troops.

Chart 19: Ambon Invasion Force Ship

Cargo

Miike Maru

228th Infantry Regiment • Headquarters staff • Supporting units Zenyo Maru 1st Battalion, 228th Infantry Regiment Yamamura Maru 2nd Battalion, 228th Infantry Regiment Africa Maru 3rd Battalion, 228th Infantry Regiment Ryoyo Maru 1st Mountain Artillery Battalion • Additional combat troops

The IJA forces convoy left Hong Kong on January 12. They reached Davao on January 18 where various ship loading changes were made. The Army and Navy leadership also met to coordinate and finalize the invasion plan. The convoy left Davao for Menado on the 27th with the 2/8th Destroyer Squadron and 1st Submarine Chaser Division in close escort. The convoy put into Menado on January 28. There, RearAdmiral Tanaka joined them with Jintsu; 2/15th Destroyer Division and 16th Destroyer Division. The following day, the 1/15th Destroyer Division and 21st Minesweeper Division escorted the fast transports P 34 and P 39 into harbor. They carried 579 officers and men of the Kure 1st Special Naval Landing Force which was to reinforce the Army forces. Rear-Admiral Fujita also came up from Kendari with his 11th Seaplane Tender Division to provide direct air cover and A/S support. As the convoy got under way Vice-Admiral Takagi provided distant cover from a position in the Celebes Sea with the 5th Cruiser Squadron and destroyers Akebono and Ikazuchi. Rear-Admiral Tanaka covered to the southwest with Jintsu, Tokitsukaze and Yukikaze while the 15th Destroyer Division covered the operation to the west. Africa Maru, Miike Maru, Yamura Maru and Zenyo Maru arrived off Ambon at 0100 on January 31. Ryoyo Maru experienced engine problems and was delayed at Menado for an extra day as a result. In the meantime, elements of the 228th Infantry Regiment began going ashore near Hoetoemoeri and Hoekoerila at 0120. The landings were complete by 0250. Multiple columns then pushed inland and north toward the town of Paso and the main Dutch and Australian positions. Simultaneously, the Kure 1st SNLF landed on the north coast near Hitoelama. Dutch infantry reinforced with mortars and machine guns initially resisted fiercely and pinned them on the beach for several hours. Once ashore in strength, the naval troops overran the KNIL positions and support weapons. They then pressed southward to Paso and west toward Laha

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Airfield. The goal of both columns was to drive a wedge between the Dutch and Australian forces and break them individually. Defenses facing them were substantial and numbered more than 3,700 Australian and Dutch troops. Dutch forces numbered approximately 2,600 men in four regular KNIL infantry companies with a machine gun company and four companies of conscripts, militia and retired troops. The 4th Coast & Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company with 150mm and 40mm guns supported them. An engineer detachment brought the garrison to approximately 2,600 troops. All the KNIL units were severely understrength in both the noncommissioned officer and officer ranks. In addition, ammunition stocks were sufficient for only five days of heavy fighting. In accordance with prewar agreements between the East Indies government and Australia, 1,131 troops of the Australian 2/21st Regiment arrived to reinforce Ambon in December 1941. Although at full strength the battalion was critically short of artillery, antitank guns and heavy weapons. Its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel L.N. Roach, M.C., pressed so vigorously for reinforcements that he was relieved of command by Lieutenant-Colonel W.J. Scott, D.S.O. Roach returned to Australia where he was retired from military service within a week of his arrival. The Australians assumed concentrated positions inland and around Laha, so they were able to resist more effectively. The Dutch were forced to dilute much of their strength by placing detachments near possible landing sites on the coast. Not even a late consolidation of KNIL forces several hours before the landings could do more than prolong their resistance by several hours. At 1700 on January 31 forward elements of the 228th Regiment penetrated the outskirts of Ambon City. The Japanese were in control of the city by 0900 on February 1. Their mountain guns now threatened the flank of Benteng Artillery Fort. This powerful, modern battery was built out of reinforced cement with underground accommodations and communications. It housed two 150mm guns manned by regular naval crews. The position effectively controlled Ambon Bay, Laha Airfield and hindered operations against Allied positions on the southern Laitimor Peninsula. The Japanese quickly isolated the fort by cutting its lines of communication and pounding it nonstop with artillery for hours. The position surrendered by 1000 when the garrison realized that their position was hopeless. This effectively divided the Australian and Dutch forces and allowed minesweepers to begin sweeping Ambon Bay. By 1630 on February 2 those remaining Allied positions on the south part of the peninsula had been reduced. Other units of the 228th Infantry Regiment moved north and attacked Paso. This area was the heart of the Dutch defenses and the Japanese initially experienced rough going amid hardened positions. With the assistance of naval ground units from the north they took several key positions and secured Halong naval base at 0500 on February 1. The main force then joined the Kure 1st SNLF in taking Laha Airfield.

The Australians at Laha were well dug in and put up heavy resistance. Superior Japanese numbers broke their resistance in extremely heavy fighting and secured the airstrip. This ended organized resistance on Ambon, although guerrilla bands operated for another week and several small groups of Dutch and Australian soldiers escaped from the island back to Australia over a period of time. Japanese monographs list IJA losses as 55 killed (including five officers) and 135 wounded.6 The destroyer Amatsukaze alone retrieved 30 dead and 90 of the wounded from a beach where the Japanese troops were initially pinned down for several hours.7 Naval infantry losses are unknown, but they are probably in line with Army figures. If Japanese figures can be trusted total ABDA losses totaled 340 dead and 2,182 taken prisoner.8 Australian losses numbered 309, which includes a very large number of Army and RAAF personnel massacred at Laha several days after surrendering.9 Dutch losses are difficult to assess. Of the KNIL garrison of 2,600 only 1,400 were captured. A small number were executed with the Australians. Most of the missing were Ambonese conscripts who deserted en masse once the fighting started.10 Japanese naval casualties aboard ship were virtually nonexistent except for the minesweeper W-9, which hit a mine and sank with most of her crew while sweeping Ambon Bay. W-11 and W-12 were also damaged trying to clear the 70-mine barrage that Gouden Leeuw had laid in December. Despite demolitions by Dutch “Genie,” the Japanese had Laha Airfield back in operation within days.11 On February 5, advance flights of fighters, medium bombers and flying boats flew into Ambon to begin operations. Five days later, the remainder of the 21st Air Flotilla flew into Laha to begin operations against Java and cover the invasion of Makassar on southern Celebes.

Inter-Allied Discord There was no Allied naval resistance to the invasion of Ambon. ABDA-FLOAT had yet to form its Combined Striking Force, so the fragmented Allies had no warships immediately available. Commonwealth ships were on convoy duty between the Indian Ocean and Singapore and could not reach the area in time, even had the Royal Navy agreed to release them. Likewise, the USN ships were either on escort duty between Java and Australia or refitting. This left only the Dutch ships, most of which were also on convoy duty. On January 26 a militarized civilian coastwatcher at Tandjoeng Datoe on the northwest coast of Borneo reported “16 ships” from the east moving southward down the coast.12 With the loss of Sarawak and Kuching, Vice-Admiral Helfrich feared the Japanese would use them as springboards to seize airfields in southern Borneo, putting their planes in easy striking distance of Java. After the initial report no more followed and Helfrich was left unsure about what the “16 ships” were or what their desti-

14. The Japanese Move South nation was. He ordered reconnaissance flights over Pamangkat and Sinkawang, which he suspected were their target due to the presence of airfields at both. But it would be some time before they reported back and there were no new reports from other coastwatchers. Helfrich also decided to concentrate all his available surface ships off southern Borneo. He hoped to engage the Japanese convoy before it reached its destination. There were only four ships available, but he ordered them rendezvous 60 miles northwest of the Karimata Strait. On the night of January 26 Tromp, Piet Hein and Banckert received orders to leave Oosthaven. They were to rendezvous with Java, which left a convoy she was escorting to Singapore. Even with the strike force en route, no one knew exactly where the convoy was, or could even confirm its existence. Helfrich also faced being unable to communicate freely with his ships without compromising their location through enemy monitoring and radio direction finders. To maintain secrecy of movement, KM ships operated throughout the East Indies campaign under strict orders not to transmit unless they had joined battle or were on the verge of doing so.13 Vice-Admiral Helfrich was thus unable to mount a coordinated search with Captain P.B.M van Straelen aboard Java and MLD reconnaissance aircraft. There were no MLD sightings so the ships sat on their original orders to rendezvous northwest of the Karimata Strait. Java and Tromp normally carried three seaplanes between them but neither was equipped with a catapult and relied on the Hein Matt System to conduct air operations.14 Just before dawn on January 27 MLD reconnaissance reports began filtering into KM headquarters in Batavia. They confirmed a small transport with many small motorboats unloading troops and supplies at Pamangkat.15 Meanwhile, there was still no sign of a convoy in the true sense of the word. Helfrich ordered Java to intercept the landing force at Pamangkat. Still unsure if the lone transport was the vanguard of a larger force, he held Tromp, Piet Hein and Banckert back to engage the main body of the convoy if and when it was found. Captain van Straelen piled on the steam and reached Pamangkat by dawn of January 27. Unfortunately the landings there were already complete and the one transport eluded Java, leaving van Straelen holding an empty bag. With bombers at Kuching just hours away, Helfrich ordered Java back to Tandjoeng Priok and the others to Palembang for refueling. The operation was a complete bust. After the war, the USN’s official historian, Samuel Elliot Morison, called it a “wild goose chase” and chastised Helfrich for delaying formation of the CSF by wasting resources on “rumors” which Admiral Hart knew to be false.16 Morison does not explain how Hart came to know they were false, nor does he mention the Dutch coastwatcher’s report or MLD’s confirmation of the landings. Morison went on to write: Even in these most difficult days the Dutchman was not entirely frank with his American superior in command; but Admiral Hart appreciating the ambiguous nature on Helfrich’s position, bore

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him no grudge. Helfrich was not only local naval commander but minister of Marine of the Netherlands East Indies, which involved civil duties as well. The governor insisted on receiving a day-by-day report every morning and, as this information was soon circulating in the town, where there were numerous enemy spies, Admiral Hart had to be reticent, too.17

Helfrich pointedly disputed these charges in his postwar memoirs. He pointedly wrote that the operation was not planned and those ships involved were already in the area when he made use of them. At the same time, he notified ABDAFLOAT of his intentions and received no counter-orders.18 It seems plausible at this stage, that as head of ABDA-FLOAT, if Hart had any information on the convoy, he would have passed it along to Helfrich or called off the operation at some point. While Helfrich was disappointed at being excluded from a top ABDA command, he strongly denied ever withholding information from Admiral Hart. Hart always knew what Helfrich thought thanks to a frequent paper trail between them. According to Helfrich, Hart never indicated or gave the impression that he was withholding information. Nor did Hart ever tell Helfrich to withhold sensitive information from the governor-general.19 Contrary to Morison’s statements, the only breach of Dutch security occurred in Bangkok before the war. In February 1941 a civilian employee gained access to all the embassy safes and was able to copy and sell several sensitive government documents to the Japanese before being discovered.20 There appears to have been no major breach in the Dutch intelligence system throughout the East Indies campaign. Last, Helfrich pointed out that his official title was not Minister of Marine, which would have made him head of all Dutch naval forces worldwide. As detailed earlier, his formal title was Commander-in-Chief, Netherlands East Indies Squadron. In addition, he simultaneously served as head of the Navy Department, a role that limited his authority to Dutch naval affairs in the Far East. In the latter, Helfrich’s role was primarily military with limited civilian duties. These consisted of limited interaction with the civilian government. Per the Netherlands Constitution, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was Supreme Commander of all Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies. Helfrich and all Dutch military branch heads in the Far East reported directly to him.21

Withdrawal from Singapore By mid–January, the British situation in Malaya was rapidly deteriorating. The Japanese advance down the peninsula was barely checked, and their capture of key airfields let them keep planes over Singapore at will. Singapore’s now crowded airfields were kept under constant attack and losses on the ground mounted, as the few remaining Buffalo and Hurricane fighters were insufficient to defend the island. Of the 51 crated Hurricanes that had reached Singapore on January 8 no less than 17 aircraft had already been destroyed (most on the ground) by January 28. Of the remaining 13 were

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

under repair, leaving just 21 planes operational after only three weeks of action. At the same time, the remaining six Buffalo fighters of 21 and 453 (RAAF) Squadrons were combined into one unit. Unable to break Japanese air superiority over Singapore, the RAF began a general withdrawal to southern Sumatra on January 14. All remaining fighters and bombers with any new reinforcements were assembled at P.1, the civilian airfield outside Palembang. The only planes left at Singapore were eight Hurricanes and the six Buffalos of 21 Squadron and 453 Squadron; they soon found themselves operating from an airfield frequently shelled by Japanese artillery. The withdrawal took 14 days and proved to be chaotic and poorly planned from the start. Few transport ships were available due to constant bombing and it was extremely difficult to load the few available. As a result, units were mixed up and badly needed supplies were haphazardly loaded or left behind. The most serious oversight included more than 200 motor vehicles, which were sorely missed on Sumatra as the Dutch had none to spare. On January 19 all remaining Dutch fighters sent to Singapore in December were withdrawn to Sumatra, where they provided air cover for the final convoys reaching Singapore. Two squadrons of Martin bombers withdrew to Java three days later. Transport planes continued to fly supplies into Singapore’s garrison from Sumatra and Java. The fighters were withdrawn to Java when the RAF completed its evacuation to P.1 on January 28. By the end of January 151 Maintenance Squadron had established itself at Batavia. On Southern Sumatra fighters of 226 Group and bombers of 225 Group operated from P.1, the pri-

mary airfield near Palembang. They provided air reconnaissance and convoy protection north of the Soenda Strait. Japanese submarines and aircraft left P.1 critically exposed by sinking two important transports carrying badly needed ammunition for 3.7" AA guns and ground radar equipment. As the RAF abandoned Singapore Japanese air pressure on Sumatra increased and Dutch merchant shipping was again the primary victim. On January 16 bombers and fighters attacked Medan airfield in North Sumatra and destroyed a Dutch transport. The next day, they caused heavy damage to Pakanbaroe Airfield and killed many civilians.

The van Imhoff Scandal

Perhaps at no point in history did Dutch bitterness run deeper than after the German invasion of Holland in May 1940.22 They immediately interned all Germans in the East Indies over the age of 19, totaling some 2,800 people.23 Some were openly Fascist; many were life-long residents of the East Indies caught in the dragnet. Ironically, others were Austrian and German Jews who had fled Europe in the 1930s to escape persecution. Nonetheless, all were rounded up and held as enemy aliens. The largest group consisted of about 900 German seamen from 19 merchant ships seized in NEI waters on May 10, 1940.24 Of the civilians, there were approximately 500 “Fierce Nazis” who openly supported Germany. Others included 100 missionaries, priests and nuns; 200 retired government workers; numerous doctors and a number of civilian policemen. Even current and former officers in the KM, Royal Marines and KNIL were arrested. The remainder were a mixed bag of prominent planters, small business owners, artists, scholars and intellectuals. Approximately 150 women and children were interned on Java. The remainder were initially held on Onrust Island in the Bay of Batavia before being transferred to Northern Sumatra.25 There several internees were released, including the elderly, sick and those who were obviously “non–German.” 26 The others were sent to prison camps in the Alas Valley.27 After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Dutch began moving them to a more secure environment in India. This transfer began on December 28, 1941, and was well underway by early January. A total of 975 internees went aboard the merchant ship Ophir and another 938 followed aboard the Plancius.28 The final group was slated for evacuation in mid–January. On January 16 the merchant ship van Imhoff put into the port of SiThe freighter van Imhoff (courtesy Marien Lindenborn).

14. The Japanese Move South bolga on Sumatra’s west coast.29 In addition to her 84-man crew she took aboard 362 internees and 62 KNIL soldiers.30 She sailed on the afternoon of January 16 but was almost immediately recalled. At Sibolga 100 tons of barbed wire were taken aboard and several wire cages were built on deck. Then an additional 111 internees came aboard and were housed in the cages in groups of 30. Van Imhoff sailed again on the evening of January 18 with 473 internees.31 Although smaller and slower than Ophir and Plancius, she sailed alone for Ceylon. She carried six lifeboats with a capacity of 50 people each, a workboat with a capacity of 14, six bamboo floats and 650 life jackets.32 This amounted to lifeboat space for just over half of her 619 crew, KNIL detachment and internees. On the morning of January 19 van Imhoff was 110 miles southwest of Nias Island off the western shore of Sumatra.33 She was then sighted by a single G4M “Betty” on patrol out of Patani Airfield in Malaya. The Japanese plane immediately attacked and dropped a stick of bombs. Although van Imhoff was unarmed, the KNIL detachment returned fire from their carbines and several machine guns. There were no direct hits, but one bomb near-missed the ship. It caused so much hull damage that Captain H.J. Hoeksema determined that van Imhoff could not be saved. The ship was taking on water and her pumps could not keep up. Her crew and KNIL detachment then abandoned ship in five of the six lifeboats; the sixth boat was left behind when it stuck in its davit and could not be freed. They reached shore on January 20. It was a disgraceful act that underscored Dutch resentment toward their former friends and colleagues. Only as the final crewmen left the ship were the internees released by the guards.34 They were left with only one sloop, a workboat and the six bamboo floats, which were nowhere near enough to hold those remaining aboard. The ship sank slowly during the day; as she sank deeper the boats and rafts cast off carrying just a handful of van Imhoff ’s internees. The lifeboat carried 53 passengers and the workboat 14 while 134 went aboard the bamboo floats.35 The remainder remained behind and subsequently drowned when the ship slipped under the waves that evening.36 Prior to abandoning ship, Captain Hoeksema had ordered a SOS sent at around 1200. This signal was picked up by the Dutch airfield at Medan, Sumatra. At 1400 on the afternoon of January 19 Admiral Helfrich signaled several Dutch ships and the PBYs of GVT.2 to mount a Search and Rescue operation from Padang. However, his orders were to focus on the rescue of Dutch crewmen and the KNIL detachment: “At 00.10 S / 97.10 E SS van Imhoff in sinking condition. Initiate search and assist if possible. Preferably rescue Dutch crew and escort. Van Imhoff carried interned Germans.”37 A shortage of fuel prevented the squadron from launching a full-scale operation and only Y-63 spent the entire afternoon searching.38 That same day, the militarized harbormaster at Padang, Lieutenant-Commander (KMR) J.K.G. Möller dispatched the tug Pief on a rescue mission. She carried food, clothes and life vests. To maintain security she carried nine KNIL soldiers

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equipped with carbines, machine guns and hand grenades.39 Captain C. Ammeraal was to make for van Imhoff ’s position, but his orders from the Department of the Navy in Batavia (i.e., Vice-Admiral Helfrich) were equally clear: “Primarily rescue Netherlands and Netherlands-Indies citizens and then, if there is no great risk, the foreign passengers.”40 The KPM merchant ship Boelongan was also ordered to make for van Imhoff ’s position. Y-63 had orders to work in tandem with the freighter. Her captain also intercepted coded signals with instructions to put primary emphasis on rescuing Dutch and Indonesian survivors: “First rescue crew of van Imhoff (i.e., Europeans, Indonesian crew, members of military detachment on board). Then, as directed by military commander, take on-board trustworthy elements of German internees. Prevent other Germans from boarding.”41 Boelongan had no radio operator aboard; she could receive but not transmit messages.42 Her captain could not confirm the orders even had he wanted to. In the end his interpretation of Helfrich’s signal led to tragedy. Within minutes of linking up with Boelongan Y-63 found the lifeboat filled with internees. She notified the merchant ship which came alongside; strangely the pilot noticed that Boelongan took no one aboard. Within minutes the PBY sighted the workboat and two rafts, all loaded with German internees. However, Boelongan refused to take any of them aboard. Nor would her captain provide provisions or assistance of any kind. He had interpreted the orders to mean that he was not to take any German internees aboard.43 His stance apparently greatly angered the rest of his crew.4 4 These survivors would later reach Nias Island on their own. On January 24 Van Nes was ordered to leave a convoy she was escorting in the Indian Ocean. There were few internees to take back into custody. Likewise, Pief and Boelongan returned to port and GVT.2 stood down. Although van Imhoff ’s entire crew and KNIL detachment survived, only those internees in the lifeboat and workboat survived. One man from a raft tried to board Boelongan via a rope ladder hanging down her side and was shot in the wrist for his efforts. He ended up aboard the lifeboat; none of the bamboo floats were seen again and all aboard were lost.45 Only 67 internees reached shore three days later; several died soon afterwards. There was little mention of the event in the Dutch press other than to report that van Imhoff had been lost. However, after the surrender of Java, word of the disaster with feedback from the surviving internees eventually filtered back to Europe. The German government was outraged; they arrested KPM staff in Holland and sent them to labor camps. The company was also forced to pay in the amount of ƒ4,000,000 to the families of those lost.46 The scandal would also be investigated in postwar Holland, though little came of it.

Initial Japanese Air Raids The Japanese raided Sabang and Belawan on January 22 and sank a merchant ship. On January 27 they heavily bombed

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Wega next received orders to destroy or extinguish all coastal navigation lights and other aids in the region. She then conducted patrols in the waters around Sabang and down into the Malacca Strait. On the latter she often encountered small British gunboats and MLD Catalinas operating from Lake Toba to prevent Japanese infiltrators from slipping into Sumatra from Northern Malaya. On January 26 Wega lay at anchor in the roadstead of Olehleh preparing for a voyage to Colombo when four Japanese bombers appeared. Captain A.E. van Berkum got under way as they approached. Although armed with a single 75mm deck gun, the patrol boat had no AA defenses of any kind. CapPoelau Tello burns alongside the dock at Emmahaven before being towed into the harbor and tain van Berkum ordered his helmsman to zigzag but the ship could only make allowed to burn herself out (Netherlands Institute of Military History). 12 knots and stood no chance. Emmahaven and sank the steamer Buyskes and damaged de Wega was quickly hit by three bombs; the first destroyed Meyer and Elout and Poelau Tello. 47 Moored alongside the the map room and a second set the ship ablaze.50 With her fires port’s main pier, Poelau Tello caught fire and became a total out of control, Captain van Berkum steered close to shore. He loss. The tug Pief later towed her out into the roadstead where then dropped anchor, opened Wega’s seacocks and ordered his the merchant ship eventually sank. In addition, the Japanese crew over the side. There were no casualties and all quickly burned harbor warehouses and a large amount of material. made it ashore at the small village of Kota Radja.51 Wega quickly Emmahaven was hit again the next day and the previously damaged merchant ship Elout was lost with heavy casualties. Bombers also sank Boelongan and damaged van de Capellen 20 miles to the south at Taroesan Bay. Then, with complete impunity, they also struck the undefended islands of Banka and Billiton. Tandjoeng Priok received its first air raid on January 28.

The Loss of Wega 48 Japanese air raids also sank the GM patrol boat Wega at the small coastal port of Olehleh on the northern tip of Sumatra. She had been stationed at the port since the start of war in May 1940. Her first action was to seize the German merchant ships Lindenfels, Werdenfels, Wasgenwald, Moni Rickmers and Sophie Rickmers, which were hiding from the Royal Navy in Sabang Bay. Her boarding parties successfully boarded the first four ships, but the Master of Sophie Rickmers scuttled his vessel as a whaleboat from Wega approached.49

The Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boat Wega (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

14. The Japanese Move South burnt herself out and sank later that night. She was the first GM ship lost in the East Indies campaign.

Courage Under Fire 52 A second loss soon followed in the Riouw Archipelago as the Japanese intensified their anti-shipping missions in the South China Sea. On February 4 they found the Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boat Deneb and small auxiliary vessel Martha anchored 500 yards west of South Brother Island. Deneb, which was flagship for the archipelago’s naval commander, was engaged in the routine transfer of coastwatch personnel when seven Japanese twin-engine bombers appeared.53 There had been much enemy air activity in the area and no one paid much attention to them. This time, however, the Japanese approached at low altitude. Then their bomb bay doors swung open. Launched in 1915, Deneb was armed with two 37mm deck guns dating from 1890. Like Wega she carried no AA defenses; this time the Japanese were much more vindictive. Deneb was first heavily shaken by seven near misses and three direct hits. As the bombers passed overhead their gunners heavily strafed her deck. Deneb’s gunners returned fire from her 37mm guns, but they were obsolete surface mounts and all but useless in an AA capacity. In a slow, graceful arc the bombers turned back for a second bomb run. As they did, several crewmen jumped overboard to escape the impending hell. The bombers dropped another 10 bombs, one of which hit Deneb.54 Her stern instantly became a mass of flame and Captain G.P. Berlijn gave the order to abandon ship. Nonetheless, the gun crew of her forward mount continued to fire without success in an effort to force the Japanese to attack from a higher altitude. From Deneb’s crew of 45 officers and men, four were killed and 20 badly injured. Barely had the second attack ended when two crewman from Martha—Ordinary Seaman-Signalman T.J. Zitter and Seaman-Signalman W.C.C. van Casand—leapt into a motorboat

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and sped toward the burning ship. En route they rescued several men in danger of being swept out to sea by the current. As they boarded Deneb the bombers made a third pass and heavily strafed both the ship and those men in the water. In spite of several additional attacks that targeted their boat, van Casand and Zitter made multiple trips that day between Deneb and Martha. Neither man was injured that day but both were captured when Java surrendered a month later. Van Casand died on June 13, 1943, as a prisoner of war in Thailand. Zitter survived the camps and returned home. After the war, details of their actions became known. As a result, in 1948 both were awarded the Bronze Lion, Holland’s equivalent of the Navy Cross, for courage under fire. These attacks effectively closed Sabang and Belawan as ports. Padang remained open but proved increasingly difficult to operate from. It was critical that Padang remain open as Java’s railroads depended almost entirely on Sumatran coal that reached Java via inter-island steamer. And with ports of all sizes under attack, the resupply of Sumatra was extremely difficult. Ship traffic through the Malacca Strait was also halted, forcing shipping to the United States to be re-routed along longer routes through the Indian Ocean. As the number of open ports fell, the KM took steps to reduce the excess number of merchant ships in the East Indies. Between January 25 and February 20, 30 KPM merchant ships were evacuated from the NEI. Half went to Australia and the others to India—all carrying cargo, but no passengers or evacuees. The East Indies government had banned any evacuation of civilians (with their savings and other capital) from the NEI to protect morale and preserve the war effort.

British Air Reinforcements

After the fall of Tarakan and Balikpapan, Palembang was the only major oilfield and refinery left to ABDA. As British resistance in Malaya crumbled, Vice-Admiral Helfrich feared that Southern Sumatra would soon follow. In an effort to build up reserves, on January 24 he ordered the oil tanks at Lampong Bay (Oosthaven) to be enlarged as the road from Palembang was being improved. Tanker traffic between Oosthaven and Java also increased; although Japanese submarines and aircraft hampered their efforts, losses remained acceptable. Helfrich’s concern increased on January 23 when 27 bombers hit P.1 for the first time. Dutch B-339s intercepted, but could not penetrate the fighter escort. Although there was little damage, subsequent The Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boat Deneb (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). attacks painfully demonstrated

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ABDA-AIR’s inability to stop Japanese air power from operating at will. Always preceded by reconnaissance flights, their bombers attacked P.1 on a daily basis. On February 7 a particularly heavy raid destroyed 17 Hurricanes and seven Blenheims on the ground, forcing the remainder to abandon P.1. They withdrew to P.2, a secret airfield south of Palembang, which the Japanese did not discover until their occupation of Southern Sumatra. On January 26 Japanese fighters appeared over Timor’s Penfoi and Atamboea Airfields for the first time. Bombers soon followed them on a regular basis. Timor was the first staging point along the Darwin-Timor-Bali-Java air route; without it, fighters from Darwin did not have sufficient range to reach eastern Java. The Japanese hoped their bomber attacks and fighter sweeps would both disrupt air reinforcements to Java and soften up Timor for invasion, which was soon to come. Air reinforcements, particularly fighters, were the key to holding Malaya and the East Indies. On January 26 General Wavell announced that 320 fighters were en route to the East Indies. Another 320 fighters would reach Java no later than April 15 in addition to other reinforcements. But with the alarming rate of the Japanese advance thus far, many Allied leaders almost certainly questioned whether they would arrive in time. If they arrived at all. On December 31, the British fleet carrier Indomitable— screened by the 7th Destroyer Flotilla 55—received orders to leave Durban and make for Port Sudan. She arrived on January 14 and embarked 48 Hurricanes and pilots for delivery to Sumatra. They sailed the following day and reached Addu Atoll on January 21. They reached the Cocos Islands four days later where Indomitable refueled her destroyers. She was 300 miles south of Java’s western tip the night of January 27 and launched the Hurricanes at first light. All four ships then withdrew to Tricomalee where they arrived February 2. The fighters flew to Sumatra via Batavia; 16 were ordered to Singapore while the remainder were held at P.1. Three planes in the Singapore flight suffered brake failure and were badly damaged when they overshot Batavia’s Kemajoran Airfield. Two more were lost at P.2 when they hit ruts left by American B-17s that had recently refueled there. The remaining 11 fighters reached Singapore on January 29, but saw no action for two days.56 The 11,000 ton British aircraft transport Athene embarked 40 partially assembled Hurricanes at Tokoradi, Africa. She traveled around the Cape of Good Hope and delivered them to Batavia on February 6. Along with the remaining Hurricanes from Indomitable, these fighters were sent piecemeal to reinforce Singapore via Sumatra. In addition to suffering heavy losses in action (both in the air and on the ground), many were also lost or damaged on P.2’s soft, unpaved runway. At the same time, the United States was establishing a series of island airstrips across the South Pacific. With these in place, it could provide Australia and the East Indies with a steady stream of aircraft. After the heavy losses at Pearl Harbor less than a month earlier, the USN was hard-pressed to provide

protection for two large U.S.-Hawaii-Pacific-Australia convoys that came through the Panama Canal in early January. The first comprised six ships carrying 4,500 troops and engineers with equipment and orders to construct a new naval fuel station at Bora Bora. Its escort consisted of Rear-Admiral Jack Shafroth’s Southeastern Pacific Force with the light cruisers Trenton, Concord and two destroyers. The second was much larger, with 20,000 troops aboard eight transports. Two were to garrison Christmas Island and two were to garrison Canton Island. The remaining four were to reinforce Free French forces at Noumea, New Caledonia. Admiral Wilson Brown’s force, which included the heavy carrier Lexington and heavy cruisers Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Pensacola and San Francisco with a screen of 10 destroyers covered it. These islands were important staging points for aircraft en route to Australia from the United States. The route to the East Indies stretched from the Unites States-Hawaii-Christmas Island-Canton Island-Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia-AustraliaTimor-Bali-Java. Although already in use by some planes, it suffered from hasty organization, a shortage of trained ground crews and the complete lack of spare parts. Reinforcements sought by the British and Dutch were diverted to build up this route, which was used long after the fall of Malaya and the East Indies.

Engagement Off Endau As January closed the end was near for British forces in Malaya, although they failed to realize it. Although Japanese troops easily pushed the British back they had also outrun their supply lines. Without resupply, there was concern as to whether the advance could continue and the planned invasion of Singapore undertaken. To maintain their initiative the Japanese leapfrogged down the coast and landed at Endau—a mere 80 miles from Singapore. The invasion force consisted of the 96th Airfield Battalion with enough stores, equipment, ammunition, fuel and ordnance to equip Kahang and Kluang Airfields which were slated for capture. Their transport consisted of two transports escorted by the light cruiser Sendai, 11th Destroyer Squadron, 20th Destroyer Squadron together with the 1st Minesweeping Squadron and six smaller craft. The 7th Cruiser Squadron and 4th Carrier Division provided distant cover. Allied reconnaissance planes found the convoy 20 miles north of Endau at 0745 on January 26. They correctly reported its strength as two transports, four cruisers, one carrier, six destroyers and 13 smaller craft. Throughout the day, 68 fighters and bombers from Singapore and Sumatra flew missions against the convoy as the Japanese moved ashore. In exchange for 13 planes lost and several others heavily damaged, the RAF damaged both transports and Sendai, but could not prevent the Japanese from establishing a beachhead by nightfall. It now fell to the Royal Navy, which was again caught out of position. The only warships immediately available were the elderly destroyers HMS Thanet and HMAS Vampire, which

14. The Japanese Move South had reached Singapore on convoy duty on January 24. Both were small, weakly armed and completely outclassed by the Japanese ships they were about to meet. Although Thanet had only four torpedoes, and Vampire three, both ships raised steam and cleared the harbor at 1630 under the command of Commander W.T.A. Moran, RAN aboard Vampire. Hiding against Tioman Island the two destroyers arrived off Endau just before 0200 on January 27. At 0237 Vampire sighted a blacked-out destroyer; she was not seen and pressed on at 15 knots hoping to find a larger concentration of ships. Three minutes later she sighted another ship believed to be a destroyer. Moran altered course to port and fired two of his three torpedoes at a range of 600 yards. His target was the 600ton minesweeper W-4; she evaded the torpedoes and signaled the convoy. Vampire and Thanet left the two Japanese ships behind as they continued toward Endau for another six or seven miles. Sighting nothing, they changed course to southeast by east at 0313 and went to full speed. At 0318 the destroyers Shirayuki

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and Yugiri appeared out of the night. Moran ordered Thanet to engage Shirayuki and launched his remaining torpedo at Yugiri. A lopsided firefight then erupted when Sendai, Fubuki, Asagai and W-1 also came up and entered the fight.57 The fight quickly turned sour for the two destroyers as they traded shots with the Japanese and fled southeast by east at full speed. Vampire claimed two hits on a destroyer. Virtually all the Japanese ships concentrated their fire on Thanet. She was quickly hit in her engine and boiler rooms and came to a stop at 0400. Vampire tried to cover her with smoke but the crippled British destroyer was last seen emitting huge clouds of black smoke with her guns silent and a heavy list to starboard.58 At 0420 Shirayuki illuminated her with searchlights while Amagiri and Hatsuyuki administered the coup de grace. Shirayuki pulled 31 officers and men from the water and later turned them over to IJA forces.59 Between 40 and 60 crewmen swam ashore; as many as 65 may have reached Singapore.60 In the confusion Vampire slipped away into the night and put back into Singapore at 1000 that morning without damage or casualties.

Chapter 15

The Formation of the Combined Striking Force On February 1 American and Dutch reconnaissance planes reported a large convoy leaving Balikpapan with three cruisers, 10 destroyers and many transports. ABDA correctly identified it as an invasion forced headed for either Bandjermasin or Makassar and took steps to intercept it. On February 2 ABDAFLOAT held a staff meeting at Lembang. There the Allies finally formed a Combined Striking Force (CSF) under the command of Dutch Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman who flew his flag aboard De Ruyter.

dies Squadron, Sumatra sailed for Ceylon on February 2. Sailing unescorted along normal trade routes, she briefly stopped at Oosthaven before passing through the Soenda Strait into the Indian Ocean. En route her boiler feedwater system became contaminated and the cruiser drifted dead in the water for several hours until the problem was fixed. On February 15 Sumatra put into Tricomolee.4 She had spent 15 months in the NEI, virtually all of it in drydock.

The Combined Striking Force

Sumatra Leaves the East Indies

The CSF initially included the cruisers Tromp, Houston The CSF was to consist of all available American, British and Marblehead. Banckert, Van Ghent, Kortenaer, Piet Hein and Dutch warships that could be spared from convoy duty. and the American destroyers Barker, Bulmer, John D. Edwards, Even as the CSF assembled, Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered the Stewart, Paul Jones, Pillsbury and Whipple joined them. Doorlight cruiser Sumatra to leave the East Indies. man officially took command when De She was still undergoing overhaul and modRuyter met the force on February 3 at ernization at the ME and it would be several Bounder Roads.5 Prior to sailing the American cruismonths before she could put to sea. After the ers received a number of high-frequency attempt to man her with British sailors fell radios set to Dutch naval frequencies. through Helfrich did not have the personnel These had been requisitioned from available to crew the ship. Her immobilized civilian companies on Java to facilitate presence at Soerabaja represented a prime tarinter-Allied communications. At the get for Japanese bombers and took up dock same time, Lieutenant Jacob van Leur space needed by operational ships. and Conscript Sailor Signalman P.J.A. After Admiral Layton withdrew his supStoopman reported aboard Houston port for the joint crew venture, Vice-Admiral to serve as liaison officers. Helfrich gave orders to make Sumatra ready Although assigned to the CSF for sea as soon as possible. She re-entered servJava did not join until February 14. On ice on January 27 but was not fully seaworthy February 4 she escorted the transport and certainly in no condition for a fight.1 Critical systems had been restored but the engines Bontekoe from Tandjoeng Priok to were still partially torn down and Sumatra Banka Island with a battalion of KNIL could only make 15 knots. Due to the shortage troops. The following day, she escorted of personnel, she had a skeleton crew that two transports with KNIL reinforcemanned only the engine room and part of the ments to Billiton Island. main battery.2 Several were young midshipAlthough Billiton contained immen from the KM’s officer cadet school.3 Rear-Admiral Karel Willem Frederik Marie portant tin mines, Vice-Admiral HelUnder the command of Commander J.J.L. Doorman, April 23, 1889–February 27, frich thought the operation to be a Willinge, former chief of staff for the East In- 1942 (courtesy Dutch Navy Museum). waste of resources on an indefensible

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15. The Formation of the Combined Striking Force island.6 He was also unhappy at having to expend valuable shipping transporting the troops there and felt sure he would have to waste more when they would undoubtedly require evacuation. To cover the operation ABDA-FLOAT deployed a screening force of Exeter, Hobart, Encounter and Jupiter. They sortied from Singapore through the Banka Strait into the Soenda Strait. They had orders to intercept any Japanese surface units attempting to interfere with the operation. No resistance was encountered and the covering force turned for home when the troops reached their destination. Northwest of the Soenda Strait the British force was attacked by the submarine RO-34 whose captain mistook it for a merchant convoy. After a clumsy, submerged approach Lieutenant-Commander Ota Takeshi launched four torpedoes at Encounter. As RO-34 went deep her Sonar operator reported four hits, likely confusing them with depth charges. Takeshi claimed a destroyer sunk. Encounter was not hit and RO-34 escaped several hours later without damage.7

“No sir, they are Japs” Meanwhile, the Japanese invasion force sighted on February 1 had set a course for Celebes. Alarmed, the East Indies government now attempted a last-minute evacuation of about 1,000 European civilians from Makassar before they landed. Helfrich ordered the KPM steamer van Lansberge to take them off. She was escorted by the minesweepers Jan van Amstel and Pieter de Bitter. The Dutch ships sailed from Soerabaja at 0000 on the morning of February 3 with van Lansberge carrying 38 Badjo fishermen who were being returned to Celebes.8 By dawn of the following morning the convoy was near DeBril Bank, 80 miles southwest of Makassar when signalman Able Seaman Adriaan Kannegieter sighted a formation of aircraft high overhead, moving south. He reported it to Lieutenant-Commander J.A.L. Lebeau, commander of the 2nd Minesweeper Squadron. Lebeau initially suggested that they might be American reinforcements, but Kannegieter insisted otherwise, “No sir, they are Japs.” To which Lebeau replied, “If the signalman says they are Japs, then they are Japs” and ordered Pieter de Bitter’s radio operator to notify KM headquarters, “Soerabaja air attack expected from the north.”9 The formation was indeed comprised of Japanese bombers and fighters en route to bomb Soerabaja for the first time.10 As a result of Kannegieter’s warning the city had ample time to man its AA defenses and scramble fighters. Even so, there was still extensive damage with heavy casualties. The bombers had also reported the position of Jan van Amstel, Pieter de Bitter and van Lansberge. Around midday seven Japanese dive bombers from Kendari appeared and launched a series of attacks over a 2½ hour period.11 Unarmed and able to only make 11 knots, van Lansberge was hit in the first attack. She took a bomb hit in Hold #3 which knocked out her engines and started a large fire.12 A signal was sent to

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Rear-Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja reporting that the convoy was under attack and that van Lansberge had been hit. As the Japanese planes began their attack, lookouts on Pieter de Bitter shouted, “Here they come again!” LieutenantCommander Peter Willigen ordered full speed and changed course to disrupt their aim. As they closed, he shouted, “Cover!” and all on the bridge ducked, with the helmsman keeping his hand on the rudder.13 Bullets thudded against the bridge as the Japanese plane shot by. The explosion of bombs and columns of water followed. The ship’s four light machine guns returned fire and Kannegieter saw one of the dive bombers smoking as it flew away.14 One of the bombs exploded very close and lifted Pieter de Bitter’s stern out of the water. Her radio operator immediately signaled, “BTR15 hit by bombs.”16 The blast was so close that it knocked the ship’s mainmast loose and took down the antenna. As a result, the message was cut short after the text, “BTR hit” had been sent. Nevertheless it was enough to get the point across. During a break in the action Kannegieter and another crewman worked to repair the ship’s antenna. In the process they noticed that bullets had penetrated one of the fuel tanks and that Pieter de Bitter was trailing fuel oil. In the distance they saw heavy black smoke pouring from Jan van Amstel; she was believed to have been hit, but it was only smoke from her funnel. Soon afterward, the dive bombers retired, leaving Jan van Amstel and Pieter de Bitter to assist van Lansberge. She was now completely afire amidships. As frequently occurred the Japanese over-reported their results as one merchant ship and two light cruisers sunk.17 Aboard Pieter de Bitter, three crewmen were lightly wounded. The antenna had been repaired but the topmast and depth charge controls were still damaged. The ship’s wooden deck was heavily pitted with machine gun rounds, as were the bridge, chart cabinets and engine room. A leaking oil pump was fixed and the fuel transferred from the damaged bunker. By that afternoon her crew had stopped the fuel leak and restored radio communications. Both minesweepers lowered lifeboats and began picking up survivors from van Lansberge, which burned out of control. The water was littered with men floating in lifejackets, on life rafts and clinging to all kinds of flotsam. They had been strafed in the water and there were many dead and wounded.18 Kannegieter was ordered to assist in the infirmary; his first sight was of a wounded Indonesian with a horrible stomach wound that allowed his intestines to hang outside his body. As gently as possible Kannegieter placed them back inside and bandaged the wound.19 As van Lansberge was not sinking fast enough, Pieter de Bitter closed in and opened fire with her 75mm deck gun. The shelling stopped when a lone survivor was seen to still be onboard frantically waving a Dutch flag. As he was taken off, the merchant ship began to sink. The minesweepers then recalled their boats and turned for Soerabaja. The following day, five of

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the survivors aboard Pieter de Bitter died of their wounds and were buried at sea.20 Losses aboard van Lansberge were heavy; from her crew of 78 there were 12 dead and 10 wounded. Of the 38 Badjos, eight died with 19 wounded.21 The civilians at Makassar were left to their fate.

The First Bombs Fall on Soerabaja Soon after passing over van Lansberge and her escorts, the Japanese bombers hit Soerabaja for the first time. It was part of Japanese efforts to reduce ABDA air power and soften up Java in preparation for invasion. In a series of sledgehammer strikes across Eastern Java from Kendari, 26 bombers and 50 fighters hit Soerabaja and the ME, while 15 bombers and 10 fighters struck the air base at Malang. A further 28 bombers and nine fighters were deployed against the airfield at Madioen. To intercept the bombers at Soerabaja, eight Curtis Hawks of the ML’s 1st Fighter Squadron scrambled from Maospoti airfield.22 One suffered engine trouble and aborted its take off. A second blew a cylinder shortly after take-off, leaving six planes to intercept the Japanese over Madioen. There, they found the Japanese had already dropped their bombs and were headed home. The flight commander detailed two planes to pursue and headed to Soerabaja with his remaining four Hawks. They joined the 2nd Fighter Squadron with its 12 Curtis Interceptors from Perak Airfield.23 A freewheeling dogfight ensued over Madoera with disastrous results for the Dutch, who were outnumbered 3:1. The Japanese quickly shot down eight Demons and damaged two of the others so badly that they never flew again. Three Hawks were also shot down. The two Hawks at Madioen engaged the Japanese bombers who were without the benefit of their fighter escort as it beat up the airfield. They made repeated passes through the bomber formation until their ammunition ran out, leaving several with smoking engines. In return, the massed firepower of the bomber formation left both fighters riddled nose to tail. However, both planes made it back to Maospati to join their lone remaining mate. The American 17th Pursuit Squadron, based at Ngoro, had 20 minutes’ warning before the Japanese arrived over Soerabaja at 1007. The raiders were at 18,000 feet and the fighters could not reach them before they dropped their bombs and turned for home. Four P-40Es pursued the formation 85 miles out to sea. Two ran low on fuel and had to turn back without engaging. The remaining pair caught up to the formation over Bawean Island and shot one bomber down. In another action over Malang three P-40Es were lost in exchange for one Zero. On the ground, the raids caused massive damage. At Morokrembangan Naval Air station, fighters caused heavy damage to seaplanes moored in the harbor. Ignoring AA fire from her .30 caliber machine guns, they roared over the American gunboat Isabelle to strafe at masthead height. Twelve MLD planes were burned or shot down. ABDA-AIR also suffered heavily. Four B-17s were burned at Singosari and an American B-18 bomber was shot down 30

miles west of Soerabaja. This brought ABDA losses in the February 3 attack to 31 planes. No less than 13 of these were lost on the ground. Lacking radar and adequate AA defenses, the Japanese would repeatedly inflict heavy losses on Allied air power. The Japanese also targeted several hotels in the city center. They had intelligence that high-ranking Allied officers were quartered in them.24 Although none of the Allied High Command were injured, a number of private homes were destroyed and 31 civilians were killed.25 Afterwards, many hotels and other public administration buildings were quickly camouflaged and painted green in order to blend them into the surrounding countryside as much as possible. The USN submarine Sculpin torpedoed the destroyer Suzukaze near Kendari on February 4. Sighting a destroyer patrolling off Staring Bay, the submarine fired three torpedoes and obtained two hits. Sculpin claimed her sunk but Suzukaze was able to beach herself with flooded crew compartments and the loss of nine men. The destroyer Yamakaze and the tankers San Clemente Maru and Itsukushima Maru later assisted her into Kendari for emergency repairs. She sailed for Sasebo Naval Base in Japan on March 28. About this time, the Netherlands Government in Exile told Helfrich that he could expect reinforcements, his first since the start of the Pacific War. The new destroyer Isaac Sweers had orders to leave the Royal Navy squadron at Aden and head for Java via Ceylon. At the same time, the anti-aircraft cruiser Jacob van Heemskerck was en route from England. Both were under construction in Holland when the Germans invaded in 1940, but had been towed to England where they were completed. Helfrich was told to expect them by the end of February. The Dutch submarine depot ship Columbia was also preparing to leave England with 130 troops of the Princess Irene Brigade. This was a formation of Dutch soldiers who had escaped from Holland in May 1940. They had been reformed, rearmed and retrained by the British. Upon their arrival on Java in mid–March, Columbia would remain to service the Dutch submarines. Columbia also carried a number of British-made fire control radar sets for warships in the East Indies. Heartened by this information, Helfrich signaled ABDAFLOAT that Admiral Doorman’s Combined Striking Force was ready for action. He also requested that ANZAC Force, then forming at Suva, Fiji, immediately join the CSF, as Java, Southern Sumatra and Makassar were the first line of defense and should have priority. He was especially concerned when reconnaissance planes found the Japanese convoy in the southern Makassar Strait.

“Let the Japanese come, we’re ready for a fight” 26 The CSF assembled at Bounder Roads at 0000 on the morning of February 3. Rear-Admiral Doorman’s order to his force was brief and to the point: “Enemy Transports Will Be Attacked and Destroyed in Night Attack.”

15. The Formation of the Combined Striking Force

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Prior to sailing the CSF fueled from the USN tanker Pecos Houston quickly launched one of her floatplanes and was still and the operation continued past daybreak. Around 1130 klaxtrying to launch a second when the 5-inch guns fired their first ons aboard De Ruyter sounded as seven Japanese bombers flew salvo. The concussion tore the fabric off the framework, leaving low overhead.27 Fueling stopped as the Allied ships raised anthe aircraft useless. Unable to winch it off the catapult in comchor and moved into open water in order to have room to mabat, the pilot and his observer stripped the plane and it was catneuver. apulted into the sea. The bombers circled Doorman’s force several times but Concussion from the 5-inch guns also knocked the main did not attack. In typical Japanese military fashion, the bombers AA fire control director off its roller pad. Although the Housdid not deviate from their assigned mission and continued on ton’s secondary director immediately took over, it suffered from to Soerabaja. There they attacked the minelayer Krakatau a limited train and its observers were frequently blinded by hot which was laying a minefield in the Madoera Strait. For the next smoke and gas from the aft smoke stack. As a result, most of 30 minutes they bombed and strafed Krakatau before turning her AA batteries were forced into local fire control throughout for home. In the meantime, the CSF put back into Bounder the battle. Roads and continued fueling.28 At 0954 the first flight of nine Nells descended to 13,000 Clearly any chance of surprise had now been lost even befeet at approximately 150 knots in the first attack of the day. Igfore the Makassar Strait mission had started. Without fighter noring Tromp and the screening destroyers, they picked out the cover, Doorman was no longer optimistic about his chances of Marblehead and Houston, which turned individually into sharp success. However, under pressure from ABDA-FLOAT and turns to evade. Their initial tactics were successful as the bombs Helfrich to stop the Japanese he continued in hopes of covering missed, although several near misses shook Houston. A second enough ground throughout the night to make the bombers’ poflight quickly followed, this time targeting Marblehead. sition report outdated. On De Ruyter’s AA deck a sailor was Captain A.G. Robinson ordered full left rudder and inheard to comment, “Let the Japanese come, we’re ready for a creased speed to maximum revolutions, hoping to throw off the fight.” bombardier in the lead plane. But the Japanese airman noted The CSF sailed from Bounder Roads at 0000 on the mornthe course change and led his formation around without ating of February 4.29 Doorman first sailed east from Bounder tacking. The game continued through a second pass; at 1019 Roads to the south of Kangean Island (200 miles east of Soerthe formation dropped its bombs. Seven fell in the water 50 to abaja) before turning north into the Makassar Strait. This 100 yards off Marblehead’s port bow. A rain of shrapnel rattled course put the CSF directly on the air route between Kendari the ship but caused little damage. and Soerabaja, which Japanese bombers had followed the preAs the formation passed overhead the USN cruisers opened vious day. At 0935, as his force gently zigzagged off Kangean Island, Doorman received word from KM Headquarters at Soerabaja to expect an air attack shortly. Captain E.E.B. Lacomblé informed De Ruyter’s crew over the ship’s intercom system that a formation of Japanese bombers was headed their way.30 Dutch guerrillas on Makassar had reported the departure of a large strike force from Kendari II Airfield. The weather was clear with a light wind and scattered clouds. Lookouts could see Kangean Island 20 miles to the north and Bali and Lombok to the south, when at 0949 they sighted the first wave consisting of four formations with nine bombers each.31 Doorman’s calculated risk to evade Japanese air attack had failed and the CSF was about to pay a heavy price. The value of massed AA fire had not yet been realized and the ABDA warships scattered to maneuver inde- Japanese bombs exploding near Tromp in the Kangean Sea, February 4, 1942 (courtesy Gerard pendently. To reduce the risk of fire Horneman).

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fire. Marblehead’s gun crews quickly realized that their obsolete 3-inch guns could not reach the Japanese but continued to fire. Aboard Houston, Captain Albert H. Rooks knew that at least some of his 5-inch AA shells were defective. In 1940, the USN Cruiser Anti-Aircraft Gunnery School had discovered that many detonators in its 5-inch AA shells were defective. Not even Rooks was prepared for what followed. From Houston’s initial four-gun salvo one shell exploded. As the battle continued, 75 percent of the ship’s 5-inch rounds proved defective. Houston still managed to destroy one plane with a direct hit. She also hit a second bomber and it spiraled into the sea. In an apparent suicide effort, the Japanese pilot turned his plane toward the Marblehead and appeared to try and ram the ship. As the bomber closed, it ran into a rain of .50-caliber machine gun fire. This apparently killed the pilot, causing the plane to crash into the sea. At 1027, seven more bombers appeared off Marblehead’s port quarter and straddled her with six high explosive bombs. One near miss exploded just off her bow, sending shock waves rattling through the hull. These opened several bow plates and severe flooding quickly developed as the ship ploughed through the water. A direct hit then demolished the starboard motor launch and penetrated the deck before exploding. The resulting blast destroyed the sick bay, wardroom and several officers’ cabins, in addition to leaving a six-foot hole in the deck. A third bomb struck the fantail and pierced the main deck, gutting the hand steering compartment and a number of living quarters. The blast tore a huge ripple in the deck, which jammed the after turret in place; additional hull plates were also jarred loose, allowing more flooding. Leaking chlorine from smashed batteries and thick black smoke from large fires poured through the ripped deck, confirming to the Japanese that they had seriously hurt Marblehead. With the aft fire mains ruptured Marblehead’s crew and damage control parties formed bucket brigades to fight the fires. The steering room blast jammed the rudder hard to port, causing Marblehead to circle tightly at 25 knots. Heavy flooding throughout the ship caused a 10 degree list to starboard. Marblehead was soon noticeably down by the bow. With tons of water entering her forward and aft compartments she was in serious danger of breaking in half.

It’s nothing, just a little water!” At 1111 another group of bombers appeared over the CSF but did not attack. Two more sections soon followed, one of which, concentrated on De Ruyter. Lieutenant-Commander J. Bennink (KMR), the ship’s anti-aircraft officer, manned the fire control director in the middle of her AA deck with three crewmen. Taking continuous altitude measurements he passed them to the gun crews who adjusted their guns accordingly. Around them, the deck was cluttered with cases containing some 3,000 40mm shells which had been brought from below deck by lift.32 De Ruyter’s AA guns scored hits on one of the Japanese planes; white smoke trailed from the starboard

engine and it rapidly lost speed and altitude before crashing into the sea near Marblehead.33 From his position, Lieutenant Bennink heard one his gunners snarl, “There goes son of a bitch number one!”34 As a result of the cruiser’s AA fire the bombers increased their altitude to 21,000 feet, which was outside the range of her 40mm guns. In return, a string of four bombs straddled De Ruyter. None hit but they were so close that water columns drenched the gun crews. “It’s nothing, just a little water!” Bennink yelled to his men. Fragments then knocked the fire control director offline. It was quickly repaired within one minute and Bennink resumed his work. At about the same time the ship’s 5.9-inch main battery fired off several salvoes in an AA role without any noticeable effect.35 The second formation turned on Houston. Captain Rooks’ evasive maneuvers caused the bombs from eight of the planes to miss. However, the ninth plane in the formation lagged slightly behind the main group. Its bombs pursued the cruiser across the water—each exploding harmlessly—except the final one which very nearly destroyed Houston. With thick, heavy crunches, the delayed fuse bomb smashed through the top mainmast, searchlight and machine gun platforms without exploding. The latter deflected it through the leg of the tripod mast, leaving a 10-foot hole. It then sliced diagonally through the roof of the after radio room to the main deck halfway between the crew’s head and Turret Number 3, which was traversed to port. There the bomb exploded three feet off the main deck. In an instant, Houston suffered 48 killed and 20 wounded. White-hot fragments penetrated the side armor of Turret #3 and ignited powder bags in the hoist. The blast killed most of the men in the turret and handling room. Fire and fragments also damaged the turret’s roller track, putting it out of action permanently. Many crewmen in the ship’s forward compartments failed to realize that Houston had been hit until the PA system crackled with a message, “Fire in Turret #3.” If it touched off the turret’s remaining shells and powder bags or reached the aft magazine, Houston’s stern would be blown off, sinking the ship instantly. Inside Turret #3 Gunner’s Mate 1st Class Roger P. Poirer attempted to activate the turret’s main sprinkler system. Unfortunately it had been damaged by the blast and he was unable to do anything more. Severely wounded and nearly overcome by smoke, he evacuated the turret. In the powder magazine, two other crewmen had better luck. After recovering from the initial blast and turning on the emergency lighting, Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class C.J. Kunke activated the magazine’s sprinkler system. At the same time Seaman 2nd Class J.D. Smith secured the flash door and flooded the ammunition hoist. Their actions eliminated the threat of fire reaching Houston’s after magazine. On deck, damage control parties worked to extinguish a fire threatening to detonate the shells and powder bags in the aft turret. They quickly brought up fire hoses and brought the fires under control in a matter of minutes. While spraying the

15. The Formation of the Combined Striking Force fire, one of Houston’s officers accidentally shorted out the turret’s main firing circuit with his hose, causing the center 8-inch gun to fire. More than one crewman thought the turret had exploded.

“We are standing by to take off your crew” Confident they had inflicted major damage, the Japanese planes withdrew. Upon landing their crews claimed to have sunk one Augusta class heavy cruiser, one Java class light cruiser, and one Tromp class light cruiser. With two seriously damaged ships and no air support, Rear-Admiral Doorman also chose to withdraw rather than face additional air attacks. The decision weighed heavily on him and he was sure history would condemn him, although in reality, he had little choice. Houston’s fires were now out and her damage under control, but Marblehead was critically damaged and appeared in immediate danger of capsizing. Tromp and two Dutch destroyers approached with the intention of taking off her crew.36 Her commander, Captain J.B. de Meester, signaled Marblehead by light, “We are standing by to take off your crew.” 37 Captain Robinson was not ready to give up and waved Tromp off. But Marblehead was rudderless and could only steer with her engines. Captain Rooks also considered abandoning Marblehead but decided against it. At 1225 the ships of the Combined Striking Force formed a protective screen around Marblehead and began a long voyage south. With her rudder still jammed hard over, the damaged light cruiser had extreme difficulty steering. The journey south was marked by hard labor and frustration as the crew continued to save their ship. The CSF cleared the Lombok Strait without incident and was well into the Indian Ocean by midnight of February 4–5. Satisfied that Marblehead was out of danger Doorman now left the American destroyers behind to screen her. He took De Ruyter and the Dutch destroyers along the south coast of Java and through the Soenda Strait to Tandjoeng Priok. He ordered Houston and Tromp into Tjilatjap which they reached February 5. Shortly after dawn, a Japanese reconnaissance plane sighted Marblehead southwest of Bali and shadowed her all day. Fortunately she was out of range of bombers and Marblehead safely entered Tjilatjap on February 6. Perhaps the only positive result from the Makassar Strait was a noticeable improvement in relations between American and Dutch enlisted men. Although relations between their officers had always been cordial, those between American “Blue Jackets” and Dutch “Jannen” were sketchy. As the Australians and British soon would, Soerabaja experienced a “mini invasion” of brash, well-paid American servicemen. Many American sailors carelessly declared that the United States would “protect” the Dutch and the Netherlands East Indies.38 For the Dutch, who were unimpressed with the combat record of the USN in the Philippines, these were fighting words and several brawls took place between American and Dutch

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seamen.39 The atmosphere was described by Ensign John J.A. Michel aboard the destroyer Pope: “I returned to the ship that night with a feeling that the U.S. Navy was not particularly welcome in Java. Incidents related to me by enlisted men the following morning strengthened my belief. Several men had been asked why they had come to Java, the inference being that the war was going on in the Philippines and the U.S. Navy should have remained there. When some Dutchmen went so far as to suggest that our ships had withdrawn out of cowardice, our men answered with swinging fists.”40

When De Ruyter put into Tjilatjap soon afterward, the crews of both Houston and Marblehead spontaneously lined the decks of their respective ships. As the Dutch cruiser passed she received a thunderous cheer from the American sailors. The men of De Ruyter were somewhat embarrassed to receive such a reception from their allies who had suffered so many dead and wounded. Ashore, it was not uncommon to see American and Dutch sailors arm-in-arm drinking beer and singing. 41 While good for morale it did not go far toward stopping the Japanese.

Assessing the Makassar Strait Operation Despite facts that clearly made continuation of the mission impossible Hart was furious with Doorman for withdrawing and strongly considered relieving him.42 But political considerations and the fact that mostly Dutch territory was being defended swayed him. 43 Instead, Hart and Helfrich met with Doorman in Tjilatjap on February 8. Both got the impression that he had been badly shaken by the operation. But Doorman was still well regarded within the KM and Helfrich publicly professed full confidence in his abilities, as did other Dutch naval officers. Even so, Helfrich did not exactly give his subordinate a ringing endorsement in a letter he wrote to Hart shortly afterwards. In it, Helfrich stressed the continued need for offensive action by the CSF: the striking force must be reinforced by British, and if possible, American seapower: and that is to be done only if we take more risks by weakening convoy escorts. Against air attacks, convoys cannot be defended by warships only…. I am afraid that the first air attack [Doorman] got during the first operation of the Combined Fleet has upset him a little and I hope he will recover soon, especially after your meating [sic] at Tjilatjap. As you know, I am entirely at your disposal and if you think that I should take command at sea of the Combined Forces myself, I will only be too glad to do so.

The operation’s postmortem analysis was filled with a great deal of muted finger-pointing and rancor between the Allies. Admiral Hart clearly felt the mission should have continued despite the overwhelming presence of Japanese airpower. Historian Samuel Elliot Morison is quick to lay blame for the Makassar Strait operation entirely on the shoulders of RearAdmiral Doorman. In the process he appears willing to absolve Admiral Hart of any related blame.44 As seen above, Vice-Admiral Helfrich all but threw RearAdmiral Doorman under the proverbial bus when he volunteered to take personal command of the Combined Striking

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Force. For his part, Doorman told Helfrich that “he didn’t unDuring the meeting between Doorman, Hart and Helderstand why he got orders to proceed for an attack on Balikfrich, a PBY reported that the Japanese invasion force was now papan—a long way—without air protection and after being rounding the southern tip of Celebes. Despite events in the sighted the last day before.”45 Kangean Sea just four days previously, Hart ordered Doorman In their meeting, Doorman told Hart and Helfrich that to formulate a battle plan and intercept the convoy in a night the Soerabaja-Makassar air route was the same as the Kendariaction. Again, Doorman was assigned no air cover and the only Makassar and Kangean-Soerabaja sea routes. He feared that folpractical route required that he follow a course that he considlowing them on future missions without air support would proered seriously exposed to air attack. voke additional attacks with more dire results. Helfrich could Hart then inspected Marblehead and Houston. Due to not understand why Doorman took the route he did: “In my flooding Marblehead’s draft had been down to 32 feet at the opinion he should have gone through Sapuldi Strait [along the bow when she reached Tjilatjap.49 This was too deep to enter the channel; but by dumping fuel from the forward bunkers east cost of Madoera Island] up north immediately.”46 Doorman further reinforced his perception as a cautious and continuous pumping of flooded spaces, Captain Robinson naval commander when he sought to send his warships 300 was able to reduce her draft to 21 feet. This let the cruiser miles south of Java to refuel. He no longer considered the ME squeeze past the sandbar and enter the harbor. suitable for refueling as it now lay within range of Japanese Marblehead had suffered 15 dead and 84 wounded. She bombers operating from Kendari. He suggested that tankers be moored alongside the pier where the most seriously wounded loaded and sent into the Indian Ocean where the CSF could were offloaded and taken inland to a Dutch hospital. With her refuel at sea. Helfrich initially overruled him on this point, saydamaged hull and jammed rudder there was considerable doubt ing that ABDA-FLOAT had to maintain an offensive spirit. as to whether Marblehead could reach a safe port. Complicating Helfrich eventually relented when Doorman argued that matters was the fact that Tjilatjap’s 8,000 ton commercial floathe had no intention of remaining in the Indian Ocean, and that ing drydock (owned by Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company) his plan of action was consistent with prewar KM plans to was too small to accommodate the cruiser. mount a hit-and-run campaign against the Japanese until Allied Luckily, the Dutch naval engineer in charge of the drydock reinforcements arrived.47 With Helfrich’s approval, Doorman was very skilled at his job. In a complex balancing act he was ordered the KM tanker Djirak (TAN-3) from Soerabaja to Prigi able to partially position the forward half of the ship inside the Bay on the south coast of Java to be in position to initiate the drydock. It was then raised, lowered and tilted at various angles. operation. The drydock could not handle the cruiser’s heavy stern, so there Hart vetoed the operation because he considered its location too distant from the enemy and in a spot too rough for fueling at sea. Although Hart had little experience in those waters he ordered Doorman to fuel the CSF at another location. Samuel Elliot Morison later blasted Doorman and Helfrich for the plan and suggested that Doorman was being overly cautious after the Makassar Strait.48 Prigi Bay now became the primary refueling point for Allied warships operating south of Java during the latter half of February. It was here, on the night of February 12, that De Ruyter and Whipple collided with one another in a dense fog. Although only a glancing blow, the bow of Whipple was caved in. She entered drydock at Tjilatjap on February 13. Temporary repairs were made but the destroyer was considered unfit for fleet service; she was subsequently assigned to convoy and patrol duty. Damage to De Marblehead ’s bomb-damaged deck at Tjilatjap before entering dry dock (U.S. National Archives, #80-G-254938). Ruyter was insignificant.

15. The Formation of the Combined Striking Force was no chance to repair Marblehead’s rudder but the process did allow emergency repairs to the most badly damaged parts of the hull.50 The process was extremely tricky as it proved difficult to maintain a perfect state of equilibrium. On several occasions it was necessary to re-flood the dock and put Marblehead back in the water to keep the ship from re-launching itself by sliding out of the drydock stern-first. Nonetheless, Marblehead entered drydock on February 7 and undocked three days later. On February 13 Marblehead sailed for Tricomalee in company of the submarine tender Otus. Steering on her engines the entire voyage she reached Ceylon on February 21. However, there was no drydock space available so Marblehead soon continued onto South Africa. After additional preliminary repairs she sailed for the United States and put into the Brooklyn Navy Yard on May 4, 1942.51 Although Houston’s after turret was out of action and the Dutch had no facilities to repair her, she still had firepower equivalent to the British heavy cruiser Exeter. For this reason, Hart kept Houston in the NEI, but promised Captain Rooks that he would send her to a repair yard as soon as a replacement arrived. In the meantime, Hart placed Houston on convoy duty between Darwin and the island of Timor. He then wrote General Wavell, trying to impress upon him that operations involving USN ships could not continue as they did in the Kangean Sea. This came just hours after Hart chastised Doorman for withdrawing in the face of overwhelming Japanese air power and then ordering him back into action along the exact same route. But if Hart thought Doorman needed encouragement, Wavell apparently thought Hart needed some also, when he replied: I’m sure you realize that I absolutely and entirely appreciate the feelings of your Navy and the ships that suffered such damage and casualties the other day. But a man with any sense of grievance against his own side won’t help win a war … any fellow can fight when things are going well, it’s the fellows who can keep on fighting without loss of spirit when things are going all wrong that win a war. That’s how you beat us a good many years ago and the way we’ve beaten other people, and the way we’ll surely win through together this time. I’m sure that’s the way you’re putting it to your sailors, it’s the way I’m trying to get over to our troops. We must hold the NEI and it’s going to take some hard fighting and heavy losses.

Perhaps embarrassed by Wavell’s reply and clearly on the defensive, Hart quickly took steps to clarify his position on February 11: Your note of 9 February was written after I had told you of certain feelings among American naval personnel which resulted from their experience in Luzon: The cruisers which were damaged east of Java did not have these experiences—they were not in the area. As I thought I had made clear to you, I had just visited these cruisers and found the spirit of the people very good indeed. Well, it seems that I again failed to make you understand, looking back over these four weeks during which I have been under your command I must realize that it is largely my fault, and since I served under British command during the other war, it should not have happened. My own “war psychology” and, I think, that of the rest of the American fleet is not different than is expressed in your note.”

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The Invasion of Makassar The Japanese convoy Rear-Admiral Doorman failed to intercept in the Makassar Strait dropped anchor off Makassar just before midnight on February 8. The convoy consisted of the 1st Base Force with the 1st Submarine Chaser Squadron providing A/S support. In close escort were the 8th Destroyer Squadron, 15th Destroyer Squadron and 21st Minesweeper Squadron. The 5th Cruiser Squadron with destroyers Inazuchi and Akebono provided a covering force to prevent interference by Admiral Doorman. The 11th Seaplane Tender Division provided air support with the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho and depot ship Sanyo Maru. Rear-Admiral Hirose arrived from Balikpapan on February 8 with the 1/24th Destroyer Squadron, 9th Destroyer Squadron and remnants of the 17th Minesweeper Squadron and 30th Minesweeper Squadron to provide additional support. As the 15th Destroyer Squadron screened the landings on February 8 the USN submarine S-37 surprised Natsushio and put a torpedo into her forward engine room at 2115, killing eight and wounding two. Although heavily damaged, Natsushio remained afloat; but with her boilers off-line, she was dead in the water. Kuroshio attempted to tow her into Makassar, but Natsushio’s damage control parties could not contain the flooding and Kuroshio was forced to take off her crew at 0245. Gale weather further hampered tow efforts, until at 0743 Natsushio went down approximately 20 miles off Makassar. In accordance with Admiral Hart’s orders, Doorman raised steam and departed Tjilatjap on February 8 with De Ruyter, Tromp, Piet Hein and Van Ghent. He was still in the Indian Ocean when KNIL headquarters at Makassar reported that the landings were already underway. Realizing that he was too late and too weak to influence the landings, ABDA-FLOAT ordered Doorman to stand down and remain south of Soembawa Island until receiving further orders. At Makassar, troops of the Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force landed early on the morning of February 9. By late morning they controlled the city and Maro Airfield, which Japanese aircraft began using on February 15. The KNIL garrison under Colonel M. Vooren withdrew to prepared positions east of the city, where they resisted until February 26. Voorten then retired to the village of Enrekan and finally to Rala, where he surrendered his remaining forces on March 7. The Japanese almost immediately massacred most of his European and Christian Indonesian troops. Meanwhile, the Japanese continued to hammer Soerabaja and the ME, to reduce ABDA sea power. At the same time, strong fighter sweeps across Java sought to reduce ABDA air power and strip allied shipping of needed air cover. Outnumbered and outclassed, the rapidly dwindling numbers of ABDA fighters could do little to prevent the Japanese incursions. On the night of February 8 the Japanese began landing at Singapore as part of their final push to eliminate British resist-

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ance in Malaya. By 2000 troops from the IJA’s 5th Division and Imperial Guards Division crossed the Johore Strait and drove back the exhausted Commonwealth troops. By the morning of February 10 they were securely entrenched on the island and Allied troops were unable to drive them back. On February 12 Japanese troops captured Singapore’s MacRitchie Water Reservoir, cutting off water to the entire island. Exhausted, disoriented and low on ammunition, Commonwealth troops were unable to stem their advance or mount an effective counterattack. Although his own forces were critically low on ammunition, Japanese General Tomoyuki Ya-

mashita gambled that the Allied position was worse and pushed on. Many top-level civilian and military leaders now realized that the fight for Malaya was over. They began to abandon Singapore in a stream of small boats and merchant ships. Although ordered to resist to the end, British LieutenantGeneral A.E. Percival determined that his defenses verged on complete collapse. With his most of his food and ammunition depots in Japanese hands Percival could not hope to continue the battle. On the afternoon of February 15, he ordered that all ciphers and remaining weapons be destroyed and sent an emissary to seek surrender terms from General Yamashita.

Chapter 16

The Battle of Banka Strait The Fall of Palembang

Palembang produced almost all the high octane aviation fuel used by Allied planes in the East Indies, so it had to be defended. The invasion of Sumatra was supposed to have begun on February 10 but Ledo Airfield on Borneo, the airborne regiment’s jump-off point, could not be readied in time. Its jumpoff point was then moved to the airfields at Kuching, Borneo and Kuantuan, Malaya. Kuantuan was also in poor shape so the operation was delayed five days. The Japanese used the additional time to further reduce ABDA air power in Southern Sumatra and Western Java. To further screen the convoys the Japanese also deployed the 4th Submarine Flotilla to the southern Java Sea and Soenda Strait area. Its orders were to support the invasion of Southern Sumatra and harass or prevent evacuation of Allied troops from Singapore. They would score heavily in the days to come. As the Japanese moved south they encountered a mass of Allied ships, including many vessels carrying military and civilian escapees from Singapore bound for Sumatra and Java. In addition to countless native craft there were numerous merchant ships of all sizes. Some were fleeing Singapore; others were merchant ships plying normal trade routes between Java, Sumatra and the Indian Ocean. Among the Commonwealth ships were the transports Empire Star and Gorgon, auxiliary patrol boat Kedah, cruiser Durban and destroyers Jupiter and Stronghold. Also in transit was the RAN’s 21st Auxiliary Minesweeping Group.1 The latter had just finished sweeping the Banka, Berhala and Durian Straits so as to keep these convoy routes open. They were then ordered to provide escort for ships evacuating Sumatra. These included two auxiliary ships, 12 steamers and a convoy of six tankers, which carried the last oil the Allies would receive from Palembang. The Japanese deployed planes from Ryujo and airfields on Malaya. In a series of strong air attacks on February 13 they sank the tankers Manvantara, Merula and Sudabar and many other smaller ships. The transports Anglo-Indian, Empire Star and the tanker Seirstad were severely damaged. Aircraft from Malaya had already inflicted severe damage earlier in the month. The merchant ship Loch Ranza was bombed and run aground on Abang Island on February 3. She carried badly needed radar equipment, wireless transmitters/receivers and ten 3.7-inch and eight 40mm AA guns destined for the defense of Palembang and Pakanbaroe.2

As the British struck the Union Jack at Singapore the Japanese began moving on Southern Sumatra. Escorted by powerful surface forces two invasion convoys left Cam Ranh Bay, bound for the mouth of the Moesi River. Here, elements of the 38th Division would offload into barges for a trip upriver to the oil fields and refineries located in and around the city of Palembang. Advance elements of the 38th Division left aboard 8 transports on February 9. The convoy had a close escort of the light cruiser Sendai, 20th Destroyer Squadron and Fubuki of the 11th Destroyer Squadron. The 1st Minesweeper Squadron and 11th Submarine Chaser Squadron provided additional escort. The convoy and its close escort were under the command of RearAdmiral Shintaro Hashimoto aboard Sendai. Overall command of the operation rested with ViceAdmiral Jisaburo Ozawa, who sailed from Cam Ranh Bay with a distant covering force on February 10. This force consisted of his flagship Chokai, the 7th Cruiser Squadron, light cruiser Yura and 19th Destroyer Squadron. Escorted by the destroyer Shikinami, the light carrier Ryujo of the 4th Carrier Squadron provided air support for both convoys. The second convoy left Cam Ranh Bay the following day carrying the bulk of the 229th Infantry Regiment and one battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment aboard 13 transports. In direct support were the light cruiser Kashii, escort vessel Shimushu, remnants of the 11th Destroyer Division and part of the 12th Destroyer Division. Ch 9 of the 11th Submarine Division provided A/S escort for the convoy. Preceding the main invasion force were 360 paratroopers of the IJA’s Airborne Raiding Regiment. Their orders were to make a surprise drop on P.1 Airfield and nearby Palembang to prevent the KNIL garrison from destroying the oil wells, pumps and refineries. They were to hold out until the main invasion force arrived. The Dutch knew an invasion force was en route and had already made plans. The huge oil fields at Pangkalan, Soesoe and Pangkalan Brandon in South-Central Sumatra were too close to Malaya to be defended. They were blown up and their garrisons withdrawn to Palembang. The KNIL concentrated its defense of Southern Sumatra around the oil fields and refineries at Langkat, Djambi and Palembang. The refinery at

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Toowoomba rescued her survivors and took off some small equipment on February 6. The next day, Wollongong and Bendigo were ordered to the wreck. They were to ensure that the radar and wireless sets had been destroyed and that the Japanese could salvage nothing of value. Arriving at dawn on February 7 they found Loch Ranza hard aground on the reef. She was submerged up to her mainmast and completely burnt out. Satisfied that nothing of value remained salvageable the Australian ships left the area.3 The loss of Loch Ranza was severe. Without her radar sets to provide warning the Japanese were able to conduct daily air sweeps over Palembang. These strikes soon reduced British fighter defenses to critical levels. The loss of her 40mm and 3.7inch AA guns also severely weakened the defenses at P.1 and P.2. Guns that did arrive were hampered by the severe shortage of ammunition. This shortage was due primarily to the 4th Submarine Flotilla. At 1225 on February 13 I-55 sank the merchant ship Derrymore; she carried ordnance for the 40mm guns already at Sumatra. She also carried Spitfire fighters, radar equipment and 2,000 tons of explosives. Derrymore had carried this cargo since leaving England five months earlier. Also on board were 200 RAAF personnel, including a number of wounded pilots.4 From her passengers and crew, 21 men were lost. HMAS Ballarat took off 213 survivors. The next evening, I-56 sank the 4,681-ton Johanne Justesen at 1850. Although she was part of a convoy escorted by Exeter, Hobart, Java, Electra and the Indian sloop HMIS Jumna, I-56 escaped undetected. In contrast to the Japanese submarines, ABDA boats were caught out of position and remained quiet during the invasion of Sumatra. K-XIV and K-XV were stationed on the Anambas Islands-Banka line and the southern entrance to the Karimata Strait respectively. Both boats were out of position to intercept the convoys, allowing them to approach the Moesi River unhindered. The first invasion convoy entered the Banka Strait on the night of February 13–14. There, it became intertwined and disorganized amid a steady stream of small boats fleeing Singapore. A slaughter followed as the Japanese escort cleared a path through the Allied ships, ensuring that nothing threatened the convoy. One of the first Allied warships encountered was the British gunboat Scorpion. Japanese destroyers caught her in the Banka Strait on February 13 and overwhelmed the gunboat with gunfire. Scorpion sank with the loss of 115 of 135 crewmen. The next day, Japanese aircraft sank the gunboat Grasshopper off the southern tip of Sumatra in 10 minutes. In the same attack Japanese bombers severely damaged the gunboat Dragonfly; she was abandoned and later sank at anchor.

“Stand by to ram!” The convoy then encountered the 1,000 ton naval auxiliary Li Wo. Bombed twice since leaving Singapore on February 14 her captain, Lieutenant T. Wilkinson, Royal Naval Reserve,

wanted to traverse the strait with all speed. When lookouts sighted 30 unidentified ships at 16,000 yards Wilkinson immediately suspected an invasion force headed for Sumatra or Java. Although Li Wo was armed only with a single 4-inch gun and 13 practice shells, Wilkinson raised his battle ensign and turned to attack.5 Believing Li Wo to be an unarmed merchant ship, the Japanese let her close to within 2,000 yards of the convoy. Targeting the nearest transport, Wilkinson gave the order to open fire. The first shot was long and the second fell short, but the third round hit just below the bridge. While the rest of the convoy turned away from Li Wo, the damaged transport turned toward the gunboat, firing rapidly with a small deck gun. As it approached, Wilkinson ordered, “Stand by to ram!” Hitting the Japanese ship directly amidships, the two vessels became locked. A vicious machine gun duel raged at close range for several minutes before Li Wo could back away from the burning transport. An unidentified cruiser now opened fire at 18,000 yards, although its gunners possessed little accuracy. Their initial salvo fell 300 yards wide, as did seven subsequent salvos. The ninth salvo inflicted serious damage and a number of casualties. Critically damaged and heavily afire amidships, Wilkinson now gave the order to abandon ship. Within minutes, Li Wo slipped under the water … still underway with her battle ensign proudly waving. Lieutenant Wilkinson did not attempt to abandon ship; he instead remained on the bridge as Li Wo sank beneath him.6 For his actions that day he would posthumously receive the Victoria Cross when details of the battle came to light after the war. Despite the valiant action of Li Wo, Japanese aircraft and ships combined to sink or capture more than 70 Allied warships, merchantmen, launches, tugs, auxiliaries, tankers and other types between February 13 and 17.7 Exact figures are unknown but casualties numbered between 2,000 and 5,000, at a minimum.8 Nor do they include countless small native craft which may have been sunk, captured or driven ashore.9 The invasion itself started early on the morning of February 14 as the paratroopers attempted to capture their objectives in the face of fierce resistance. KNIL troops, Dutch Marechaussee and isolated groups of Commonwealth airmen, ground personnel and AA crews all resisted fiercely and prevented the Japanese from obtaining many of their initial objectives. Still, the paratroopers were able to gain a foothold amid the burning oil facilities. Although the KNIL launched a series of strong counterattacks, it was unable to dislodge the Japanese.

The Evacuation of Palembang The minelayer Pro Patria was based at Palembang with the patrol boats P 37, P 38, P 39 and P 40. The minelayer had orders to close the entrance to the port’s minefield and block the river when the Japanese appeared. That time came at 0830 on the morning of February 15 when Admiral Ozawa’s advance force anchored off the mouth of the Moesi River. As the Japa-

16. The Battle of Banka Strait nese prepared to push upriver Lieutenant-Commander L.F. Guiot received instructions to deploy his mines. Beginning at 0400 on the morning of February 15 Pro Patria laid 24 mines in the Moesi River seven miles south of Pladjoe.10 She then laid additional barrages in the Banjoe Asin and Aer Lalang rivers. At the same time the tankers Iris and Semiramis and a very small KPM merchant ship were scuttled to prevent capture. At the last minute, as the Japanese invasion force appeared, the Palembang lightship was scuttled.11 Also scuttled were four small British auxiliary minesweepers that had escaped from Singapore. These ships are unknown, but they almost certainly were former civilian steamers requisitioned shortly before or after the outbreak of war. All were manned entirely by Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers and untrained volunteers; with only a top speed of five or six knots they had no chance of breaking through the Japanese blockade of the Moesi River and reaching Java.12 Ashore, the oil installations at Songei Gerong and Pladjoe burned heavily. Warehouses filled with rubber and other materials were also set ablaze, filling the sky with thick, dark smoke. The port naval commander made a quick, last-minute inspection aboard one of the patrol boats. Between 0730 and 0745 on the morning of February 15 he signaled Vice-Admiral Helfrich: “Task of Naval Station Palembang complete. Station has been destroyed. I shall attempt to reach Java with personnel.”13 Thus ended the KM presence at Palembang. The radio was blow up and remaining naval personnel put aboard a long evacuation train to Oosthaven.

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Betrayal at Benkoelen

Unable to make a run for the open sea or even return to Palembang, Lieutenant-Commander Guiot took Pro Patria farther upriver. His orders were to report to the local KNIL commander at the town of Lahat. Guiot planned to steam upriver to the confluence of the Lematang and Moesi rivers. There he would scuttle Pro Patria and make for Lahat in her lifeboats. Before they could reach the Lematang, Pro Patria was attacked by three Japanese bombers near the village of Kerpati. Although she suffered no damage, Guiot assumed that it was a matter of time before more planes arrived. Thus, he ordered the crew to abandon ship and scuttled Pro Patria. The crew was ordered to make for the small port town of Benkoelen via ferry, native prauw, lifeboat or bus. According to LieutenantCommander Guiot’s postwar report, part of his crew safely reached Benkoelen where he states that he purchased a native prauw and sailed for Java. Lieutenant-Commander Guiot’s postwar report omits details that do not reflect well on the KM’s inter–Allied relations. Namely that upon arrival in Benkoelen, Guiot and his men found a party of approximately 35 British merchant seamen already in town. They were from the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company tanker Pinna that had been lost at Singapore. Her civilian crew reached Palembang by boat and then took a bus across the width of Sumatra to the tiny port of Benkoelen.14 With the Japanese on their heels, the Pinna crewmen were desperate to find a way off Sumatra. The local Dutch Resident recommended that they go to the port of Padang, some 400 miles north. He felt it highly unlikely that an evacuation ship would visit a port so small as Benkoelen. Nonetheless, they instead elected to try and repair a local native prauw which had been badly damaged and scuttled by local demolition crews. With the permission of the prauw’s owner, they started the backbreaking task of unloading its cargo and patching her many holes.15 Approximately 24 hours later the crew of Pro Patria arrived. Unlike the civilian crewmen of Pinna, they were heavily armed with pistols, rifles, automatic weapons and several machine guns.16 The salvage operation was well underway by the time Guiot and two of his officers reached the harbor. The leader of the British party informed them of their plan to salvage the prauw and sail her to Java. Guiot cordially requested perThe minelayer Pro Patria (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). mission to join them, to which the

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

British consented. They then backtracked upon learning that his party consisted of 25 men. The prauw was too small for both parties. Guiot then asked if just he and his officers could join the escape party; this was agreed to.17 The Dutch officers then left, but left a squad of men armed with automatic weapons and a machine gun to monitor the project. The British felt they were to ensure that the prauw did not sail prematurely. The detachment of Dutch sailors soon disappeared. The Resident recommended to Lieutenant-Commander Guiot that he too go to Padang. Given that the British already had possession of the only sizeable vessel left in harbor the Dutch took his advice. They did not get far before blown bridges and other obstacles forced a return to Benkoelen. At that point Guiot became considerably less cordial. Some two days later the prauw had been repaired, refloated and fully provisioned with food and water for the trip, which was anticipated to take a week. In the meantime, Pro Patria’s crew had returned to town and Guiot sent another detachment to monitor the repairs. As the British made final preparations to leave he reappeared with the Resident and coldly ordered the British party off the prauw: I want everyone off this vessel; it is now commandeered in the name of the Dutch Navy. (He may have said Netherlands Navy. I can’t remember) If you are not prepared to accept the order it will be taken by force.18

Just like that, the incredulous British merchant seamen were evicted from the prauw they had invested nearly a week of back-breaking labor into salvaging. Guiot also ordered that all equipment and supplies be left onboard; they could only take their personal belongings. The Resident later explained that he had no authority to intercede in military affairs. So when Guiot said that he planned to commandeer the prauw the official was powerless to stop him.19 Guiot promptly loaded the prauw with 45 passengers, including Pro Patria’s crew, several members of the GM and a number of civilian women.20 Also aboard was the prauw’s original owner, from whom the British had received permission to salvage his boat. A day after sailing from Benkoelen the prauw was sighted by Siberg and her passengers picked up. The silver lining of the affair was that the British party was eventually rescued. Despite the Resident’s pessimistic prediction, two small cargo ships put into Benkoelen several days later. Not only were the merchant seamen taken off, but also much of the town’s population. However, conspicuously absent from the evacuees was the Resident and his secretary, who both remained at their post.21 Beginning at first light of February 15, 36 RAF and RAAF Hudson and Blenheim bombers of 225 Squadron fiercely attacked the Japanese convoy off the mouth of the Moesi River. Reports now put its strength at 20 transports and escorting warships. Although the Japanese initially had substantial air cover from Malaya, this gradually melted away as the day progressed. Allied air attacks lasted from 0630 to 1530 and were hampered only by the speed of rearming and refueling the planes.

Japanese fighters attempted to interdict Allied air operations but 22 Hurricanes from P.1 and P.2 kept them at bay. This let the bombers score a number of hits and sink the transport Inabasan Maru. As Japanese fighters disappeared from the scene, the Hurricanes joined in strafing the convoy of troop barges as they pushed up the Moesi towards Palembang. As the air attacks continued, AA and small arms fire from the barges also slacked off. This allowed the planes to inflict heavy damage on the Japanese force. By noon all movement on the river had ceased as the barges sought cover under thick foliage on the banks of the river. Paratroopers then overran P.1, forcing its evacuation and a withdrawal to P.2. Coupled with strong Japanese air attacks the Allied air effort was blunted, which allowed the barges to resume moving upriver.

The Battle of the Banka Strait Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Doorman had reassembled his strike force and was moving to intercept the Japanese. Assembling 14 miles east of Etna Shoal in the Western Java Sea, he weighed anchor at 1600 on February 14 with De Ruyter, Java, Tromp, Exeter and Hobart. In escort were the destroyers Banckert, Kortenaer, Piet Hein, Van Ghent, Barker, Bulmer, John D. Edwards, Parrott, Pillsbury and Stewart. At sea, the Allied force formed two columns with De Ruyter and Java to starboard and the British and Australian cruisers to port. The American destroyers screened ahead while three of the Dutch destroyers trailed behind in A/S formation. With the Japanese already pushing up the Moesi, time was of the essence. For this reason Doorman and Helfrich decided on a route that would take the CSF on a direct course through the Gaspar Straits, sweep around Banka Island “destroying any enemy forces seen” and then back through the Banka Strait. On the first night Doorman planned to skirt the coast of Sumatra during the night to avoid detection. Darkness fell shortly after the formation sailed and heavy rain made for poor visibility. Rear- Admiral Doorman sent Banckert ahead to mark the channel off the Gebroeders Islands, two small islands collectively also known as Boompjes Reef or Gosong Barak.22 Located approximately 18 miles off the southeast coast of Sumatra, the passage would normally have been marked by a light. However, it had been extinguished when the Japanese landed on Sumatra. Once the squadron safely passed the reef, Banckert rejoined the formation. The CSF then turned north to pass through the Gaspar Straits. They were neither well-lit nor well-charted and most mariners familiar with the area considered it extremely dangerous. The Gaspar Straits are a series of smaller straits. They are littered with shallow reefs which are discolored and often covered by large patches of brown weeds or fish spawns. Although easily visible when exposed and dry, many are impossible to see in darkness or bad weather. Further compounding the danger are fickle tidal currents that provide no consistent vertical or horizontal movement of water. Only after the war was it learned that in certain parts of

16. The Battle of Banka Strait

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The destroyer Van Ghent in her “war colors” (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

the strait, the current follows the sun’s rotation in a complete the reef. Unable to stop, Admiral Doorman ordered Banckert 360-degree circle. Nonetheless, merchant ships often used the to remain behind and assist while he continued north with the Gaspar Straits as a more direct route between the Soenda Strait main body. Lieutenant-Commander Schotel later commented and Singapore. in his report that she had been off course by no more than 20 In its 1949 edition of Sailing Directions for the Soenda yards.27 By 0800 Schotel knew Van Ghent was lost and ordered Strait and Western Coast of Borneo and Off-Lying Islands, the her crew over to Banckert using the ship’s lifeboats. A small U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office strongly recommends that one force remained aboard to destroy her machinery and set explotraverse the Gaspar Straits only in good weather with clear vissive charges. They transferred her torpedoes, radio gear, gyro ibility. Doorman entered the strait at night in gale conditions compasses and ASDIC equipment to Banckert; what could not that severely hampered visibility. Worse, existing navigational be taken off was destroyed. The transfer was complete by 1700 beacons had been extinguished after the Japanese landed on and Schotel ordered the explosive charges detonated. This Sumatra. TBS communications between the Dutch ships also caused a massive fire on her stern; Banckert also fired four frequently failed that night, further amplifying their difficulties.23 At 0318 on the morning of February 15 the formation resalvoes from her main guns into Van Ghent’s bow. Banckert duced speed to 15 knots and entered the Stolze Strait, the widest then turned for Soerabaja at 28 knots where she arrived on Feband least dangerous of the Gaspar Straits. The Dutch destroyers ruary 15.28 screened ahead, line-abreast, of the cruisers with Van Ghent farthest to starboard. By now it was a pitch black night marked by periodic rain storms and fog; visibility was no more than 3,000 yards.24 At 0430 Van Ghent ran hard aground on the reef surrounding Bamidjo Island. 25 The impact badly damaged the destroyer’s hull and she began taking on water at multiple points. A fire—likely electrical—immediately broke out in her forward boiler room and heavy black smoke quickly poured from the stricken destroyer. Banckert (to port of Van Ghent) and the USN destroyers (trailing behind her) spotted the smoke and turned hard to port to avoid grounding themselves.26 Van Ghent struck the reef at high tide so initially only her bow was impaled. As the morning tide receded the destroyer was soon completely The wreck of Van Ghent after being abandoned and shelled by Banckert (courtesy aground with no way to back off or be pulled off Gerard Horneman).

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Meanwhile, Doorman had a clear idea of what to expect as he ploughed into the night. On February 13 air reconnaissance had reported four groups of Japanese ships: At 1000, two cruisers and two destroyers escorting a pair of transports on a southwesterly course 60 miles south of the Anambas. At 1030, eight more transports escorted by a cruiser and three destroyers 20 miles east of the first group. At 1530, a transport escorted by three cruisers and five destroyers steering west was sighted 60 miles north of Banka. What appeared to be the main force was sighted at 1630, consisting of two destroyers escorting 14 transports on a south-southwest course 100 miles north of Billiton. The CSF cleared the north entrance of the Stolze Strait by 0800 on February 15; at 0845 Doorman turned west to close on the Japanese invasion convoy. De Ruyter launched a floatplane at 0837; it reported seven cruisers and three destroyers approximately 45 miles north of Banka. However, they were steering northwest at high speed and Doorman was unable to intercept. In any event, he should not have attempted to engage a covering force. His primary mission was to prevent the invasion of southern Sumatra through the destruction of the enemy transports before they could land their troops, not engage enemy warships. Doorman now continued through the Gaspar Straits and circled Banka in a northwesterly curve that put the CSF some 60 miles offshore. Japanese floatplanes were also active; they discovered the Allied force before it had even cleared the Gaspar Straits. At 0923 a floatplane from the heavy cruiser Chokai sighted Doorman’s strike force and radioed the Japanese fleet: “Three enemy cruisers and five destroyers are sailing northward through the Gaspar Strait, 0939 hours.” Almost immediately the Japanese plane sent a second signal erroneously reporting the presence of an Allied battleship with Doorman’s formation.29 From that point, the CSF was kept under constant surveillance by Japanese planes. At the same time, Admiral Doorman signaled Admiral Helfrich: “Have been sighted by enemy aircraft 02–00 S / 106–13 E at 0920 JT.”30 With only cruisers and destroyers at his disposal Admiral Ozawa ordered Ryujo to mount an air attack. He ordered the transports to turn north while their escort prepared for a night action with Doorman’s force. Within 30 minutes seven B5N “Kate” bombers were in the air. Although torpedoes were the preferred weapon against warships, Ryujo was a second-line carrier and both her flight and deck crews left much to be desired. The aircrews were untrained in torpedo warfare and the weapons themselves had been so poorly maintained that they could not be readied in time.31 As a result, the bombers left Ryujo carrying bombs.32

“Jôh, it looks like a movie!” After a flight of nearly 2½ hours, the “Kates” arrived over Admiral Doorman’s force at 1150 and focused their initial attack on Exeter. The Japanese pressed home their attack in the face of AA fire that was both heavy and accurate. Captain O.L.

Gordon avoided a direct hit, although shrapnel from a near miss caused serious damage to her “Walrus” floatplane as it sat on its catapult. Although Japanese aircrews claimed heavy damage to Exeter, the cruiser suffered no serious damage. A second attack followed at 2217 by 23 G3M “Nell” bombers from Kuching. They and the G4M “Betty” bombers which soon followed also carried no torpedoes. The airfields they flew from on Borneo and Malaya were in such poor condition that the takeoff of aircraft loaded with torpedoes was impossible. This high-altitude attack caused no damage, although Allied fire damaged eight bombers. At 2229, six more “Kates” from Ryujo appeared overhead. Again, AA fire kept them at high altitude and there was no damage. As they retired, the CSF closed to within 80 miles of the nearest Japanese convoy. However, it was rapidly retiring and each mile he pursued, brought Doorman into the range of more Japanese bombers. Nine or 10 formations of bombers—totaling some 81 to 90 aircraft—attacked the CSF throughout the day. As in the Kangean Sea, the ABDA ships scattered to maneuver independently. The Japanese methodically attacked each cruiser, but their approach showed little ingenuity or detailed planning. There were no converging attacks on individual ships from multiple directions; most bomb runs were on the same course without any change in course or altitude.33 Aboard Java, LieutenantCommander J.A. Bientjes later wrote, “I only remember one attack on us by two aircraft that approached from behind.”34 Most bombs were dropped from an altitude of 19,800 to 23,000 feet.35 The attacks were so repetitious that Allied seamen used sextants to determine the point at which the Japanese would drop their bombs. Although many ships were nearmissed multiple times and occasionally obscured by bomb splashes, they avoided serious damage. In contrast, the Japanese airmen claimed additional damage with each attack. Aboard Java, Captain P.B.M van Straelen followed a simple formula for evading the bombs. Since the attacks were all from level bombers, two officers with sextants stood on the bridge measuring their altitude in relation to the horizon. When they reached a point overhead where it was predicted that the bombs would be dropped—typically 72 degrees—Captain van Straelen would throw the wheel over and change course 90 degrees for one minute before coming back to her original course.36 As the bombs fell, those crewmen on her exposed battle bridge would retreat into Java’s armored command tower. Her gunners would take cover behind their weapons; any crewmen on deck simply lay flat. Java constantly maneuvered at full speed throughout the day. In a testament to the skill of her black gang, the elderly cruiser maintained a pace of 31 knots … her top speed during trial runs when the ship was first launched in 1925.37 The Japanese only conducted level bombing. They dropped a pattern of 18 bombs, thus two per aircraft. Our anti-aircraft fire kept them at roughly 5,200 meters. The drop time of the bombs was 39 seconds. We avoided the bombs by throwing the rudder hard over, which disrupted the attack. The aircraft were then at about 52°

16. The Battle of Banka Strait above the horizon. During the first 30 seconds we steered to starboard or port and the last 9 seconds the rudder was put amidships in order to avoid being jammed hard over (like Marblehead off Kangean!) … the weather was so clear that crewmen with binoculars could see the bombs leave the planes and fall all the way to the end. Lieutenant-Commander J.A. Bientjes Hr.Ms. Java38

Although all the Allied cruisers were heavily bombed throughout the day, at times it frequently appeared to Java’s crew that she was the only ship being attacked. Bombs fell on all sides with some exploding just 30 to 50 yards from the ship. There were no direct hits but Java was pelted with shrapnel. The only damage was from a bomb fragment that penetrated a porthole, destroying its armored cover in the process. On the bridge there was relatively little effect from the bombs; but below deck, the concussion of bombs exploding in the water pounded the ship.39 At the height of one attack Java’s executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander J.B. Vinckers, climbed to the highest point aboard ship to observe. He was immediately blinded by the huge battle ensign that flew from her mast. Unable to see, he quickly ordered it replaced with a smaller flag. From that point on Java seemed to receive fewer attacks. He would later speculate that perhaps the Japanese bombardiers thought it was the pennant of an admiral.40 Aboard Hobart, Captain H. H. L. Howden violently maneuvered his light cruiser like a destroyer. On occasion this included reversing from 24 knots ahead to 24 knots astern on one engine, while simultaneously maintaining 24 knots ahead on the other engine. On Tromp, marine gunner Piet van Hest later wrote, At one stage, I could see the Hobart in the middle of the strait changing from full speed ahead to full speed astern—you could actually see the ship shudder—to avoid, luckily, a string of bombs.41

Three formations of nine, eight and seven aircraft, respectively, simultaneously attacked Hobart. Bombs landed so close that Howden felt the heat of their blast on his face.42 One pattern completely obscured the ship from view; but no sooner was her bridge visible than she defiantly signaled: “No direct hits.” In response she received a well-deserved round of congratulations from the other Allied ships.43 The intense bombing had different effects on crewmen throughout the squadron. Aboard De Ruyter, some crewmen prayed in small groups on her deck. While aboard Kortenaer, one seaman apparently got caught up in the moment and excitedly exclaimed to a shipmate, “Jôh, it looks like a movie!”44 By now the CSF had been under constant air attack for more than two hours. Ships were battered from near-misses, a large quantity of AA shells had been fired and the ADBA forces had burnt up a large quantity of fuel maneuvering at high speed. More importantly, the element of surprise had been lost. Intercepted Japanese radio messages indicated that their transports had turned to the north.45 The Japanese escort was now moving south to engage CSF, which was no longer in any condition for a surface fight. So just after 1300 Admiral Doorman gave the

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order to break off the action and move toward the Stolze Strait on a course of 117°.46 Even as the CSF retired, Japanese aircraft continued to hound it at various intervals. At 1400, a formation of 27 G3Ms of the Mihoro Air Wing out of Kuantan appeared overhead. AA fire thwarted this attack and damaged half of the attackers, although all of the bombers managed to land safely. At about the same time, Doorman signaled Helfrich, “Am retiring and still under air attack.”47 At 1420, seven B5Ns from Ryujo attacked Doorman without success. Attacks followed at 1441, 1450, 1454, 1459, 1517, 1530 and 1713. The Japanese claimed two near misses on a cruiser and suffered damage to two bombers; both De Ruyter and Hobart were near-missed.48 The final attack came at 1728 in the form of 17 G4Ms of the Kanoya Air Wing following a five hour flight from Thu Dau Moi Airfield outside Saigon. They scored no hits, but most suffered damage from AA fire. One crashed attempting an emergency landing at Ledo, Borneo, and a second suffered heavy damage while landing at Kahang, Malaya. The attacks did not cease until the CSF entered the Stolze Strait. The Japanese flew 93 sorties against Admiral Doorman’s force between 1150 and 1728. Although skillful seamanship and a great deal of luck prevented a disaster, many Allied ships were in poor condition from near misses. In particular, the American destroyers Barker and Bulmer were severely damaged; both suffered numerous leaks, split seams and huge dents in their hulls from the concussion of near misses. As the CSF retired through the Gaspar Straits the Allied ships passed the wrecked Van Ghent, which blazed fiercely in the falling darkness. Although demolished and abandoned by her crew earlier that morning, B5Ns from Ryujo had attacked the stranded hulk around 1700. Seeing Van Ghent was a grim reminder to Doorman’s force of the disaster they had narrowly averted. Even so, the admiral felt that history would condemn him for again failing to accomplish his mission.49 As Doorman cleared the Gaspar Straits, he was forced to split his force just to refuel. More than 30 Allied merchant ships clogged Tandjoeng Priok, which could not handle the heavy congestion. And although not yet acute, there was already a shortage of fuel after the loss of Palembang and Pladjoe. Doorman ordered Stewart, Parrott, John D. Edwards and Pillsbury into Ratai Bay on the southern tip of Sumatra to refuel from the KM tanker Paula (TAN 1). At the same time, Kortenaer and Piet Hein entered Oosthaven and refueled from oil lighters in the harbor. He took De Ruyter, Tromp, Exeter, Hobart, Barker and Bulmer into Tandjoeng Priok where they dropped anchor at 0952 on February 16. De Ruyter sailed for Tjilatjap on February 18 where she joined Java.

“I don’t have a parachute any more!” Prior to sailing for Tjilatjap, De Ruyter catapulted off W-12, one of her Fokker C.XI-W scout planes. Sergeant Pilot A.J. de Bij’s passenger and observer on the flight was none others than Rear- Admiral Doorman, whom he flew to Tandjoeng

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

De Ruyter catapulting off one of her floatplanes (courtesy Jan Klootwijk).

Priok for a meeting with Vice-Admiral Helfrich. They made the hop without incident, after which, W-12 remained in Tandjoeng Priok for several days. On February 18 Sergeant Pilot de Bij was ordered to fly to Surabaya where he would rejoin De Ruyter. His observer and rear gunner for the flight was Sub-Lieutenant G.J. van der Boom whom de Bij apparently did not know prior to the flight. W-12 departed Tandjoeng Priok early in the morning and reached the port of Semarang by mid-morning. There they landed to refuel. Van der Boom wanted to continue the flight immediately. However, de Bij demurred, saying, “let’s wait because it’s ‘Tojo Time,’ about 1000 hours when the Japanese Zeros and bombers always come over.50 He said to start anyway. I said, ‘let’s stay low,’ but he didn’t want to do that either and so we flew at about 150 feet.’”51 De Bij then climbed to 1,500 feet. Near the small oil refinery town of Tjepoe he suddenly heard the sound of cannon fire and turned his head to see a flight of three Zeros attacking the Fokker.52 The first, which had just fired, was already turning away as the second closed to attack. De Bij instinctively shoved the stick forward and threw the Fokker into a hard skidding starboard turn. He yelled at van der Boom, “SHOOT!!!” as he tried to avoid the third Zero.53 With seconds the attack was over and the Japanese disappeared. De Bij tried to hold W-12 level but the controls did not respond. As the Fokker fell into an uncontrolled spin to port the pilot told van der Boom to jump, but the officer yelled back, “I don’t have a parachute anymore!”54 Although de Bij had buckled and sat on his parachute, van der Boom carelessly set his atop the plane’s radio. So when de Bij unexpectedly threw the floatplane into its violent maneuver van der Boom’s parachute flew out of the cockpit. With no other choice, de Bij told van der Boom to grab onto him. The plane’s centrifugal force made it difficult to jump but then both men were thrown free. With van der Boom

still holding on de Bij counted to 20 and pulled the rip cord. The parachute deployed, but the resulting snap badly jarred de Bij and caused van der Boom to lose his grip. The last de Bij saw was him several feet away as he spiraled out of sight to his death in the jungle below. Crashing through the trees de Bij was stunned but unharmed. He looked for van der Boom and found his service revolver; a short time later he realized that the officer had fallen into the river right next to his parachute but the pilot had been too disoriented to recognize the partially submerged body. Soon after a Dutchman found de Bij; his family fed the pilot and put him on a train to Soerabaja.55

The Evacuation of Oosthaven While Doorman endured hours of bombing, the advance force pushed upriver to relieve the paratroopers who clung to their modest gains with fierce tenacity. Despite the strong initial showing by the RAF and RAAF the advance force pushed 40 miles upstream by 0000 on February 16. The arrival of the main force that evening sounded the death knell for ABDA’s defense of Southern Sumatra. As Japanese reinforcements neared Palembang, General Wavell ordered Southern Sumatra abandoned. By evening on February 15 the evacuation was in full swing and all remaining ABDA planes (primarily RAF and RAAF) and personnel reached Java the following day. At total of 54 planes had been lost, most on the ground due to the lack of radar and adequate AA defenses. Many more damaged planes had been destroyed during the evacuation when they could not be repaired. The aircraft flew directly to Java. Although many took out ground personnel, a majority of the maintenance crews left by ship from Oosthaven. All Allied shipping was ordered to clear the port by midnight of February 15. This meant that a great deal of motorized transport, heavy equipment and spares had to be abandoned along many maintenance tool kits. As a result, when the aircraft arrived on Java, they were barely able to function. On February 16 the gunboat Soemba put into Oosthaven; she had been operating in the Soenda Strait with Lampong Bay as her base of operations. She had barely moored when the port’s senior naval commander, harbor master and harbor commander came aboard. They reported that drunken mobs of Commonwealth troops from Palembang and Pladjoe were looting the town.56 The naval commander and his staff had already been accosted by armed men who demanded that more transports be provided in order to speed up their evacuation to Java. The British military commander in Oosthaven, Major A.T. Law, clearly was not in control of the situation.57

16. The Battle of Banka Strait Soemba’s captain, Commander P.J.G. Huijer, immediately halted all inbound ships, effectively stopping the evacuation of Oosthaven. This quickly brought Major Law on board within a half hour. There he was told to regain control of his men and ensure that Dutch personnel would not be threatened again. Only when that happened would the Dutch harbor personnel return to the shore and restart the evacuation. Once ashore, if they were not back aboard Soemba by 1930 Soemba would bombard the port with her 5.9-inch guns. This threat brought a certain amount of order back to the port and the evacuation continued the following day.58 So hurried was the evacuation, that ground personnel of 41 Air Stores Park and the salvage unit of 226 Squadron had to leave a number of badly needed Hurricane engines and other supplies on the docks at Oosthaven. A number of AA guns were also abandoned. Despite the rapid departure, the Japanese did not enter Oosthaven until February 20. On February 17, 50 volunteers from 605 Squadron returned aboard the corvette Ballarat. They spent 12 hours loading the ship with all the equipment that could be salvaged, including a number of spare aircraft engines. Oosthaven itself was a scene of mass chaos as a steady stream of Allied merchant vessels and warships entered and departed the port. Supplies that could not be easily transported were destroyed by demolition crews from Ballarat and Soemba. This included five large ammunition depots, four trains loaded with benzine and four truckloads of torpedoes for the Dutch submarine fleet; to destroy them, sulphuric acid was poured into their machinery and the torpedo blades hammered over.59 Ten aerial torpedoes were also burned inside of the warehouses.60 A prauw loaded with ammunition was destroyed. It blew up in the harbor with a huge blast, resulting in a smoke column more than 3,000 feet high. Five locomotives were burned and dozens of abandoned automobiles, trucks and armored vehicles were disabled with crowbars. Three depth charges from the corvette Burnie were placed under the KPM wharf. A fourth was placed amid its storage sheds. Finally, a 130-foot lighter was scuttled across the mouth of the harbor entrance.61 The KNIL rearguard departed at 1500 on February 18 aboard the last merchant ship in the harbor. Twenty minutes later, Burnie’s shore party fired the depth charges. She then raised anchor at 1620 and bombarded the port for an hour, destroying oil tanks, ammunition depots and the only bridge leading into Oosthaven. The corvette departed at 1730.62 Soemba put into Ratai Bay; she would return to Oosthaven on the night of February 24–25 to again bombard the port’s warehouses.

The Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol 63 As Oosthaven disappeared in the falling darkness ABDA was already taking steps to prevent Japanese infiltration of Java across the Soenda Strait. On February 17 Admiral Collins gave orders to form the Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol under the

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command of Lieutenant-Commander H.P. Brister. Brister was also in charge of the withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Oosthaven.64 The Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol initially consisted of the British auxiliaries Gemmas, Jeram, Ko Wang, Rahman and Sin Aik Lee. However, they were coal-fired and quickly proved difficult to maintain. Their fuel supply came from mines in Northern Sumatra, access to which, was all but cut after the loss of Palembang. They were replaced by minesweepers of the Royal Australian Navy’s 21st Minesweeping Flotilla (Ballarat, Bendigo, Burnie and Maryborough) on February 22. At about the same time, the KM ordered Soemba and the militarized GM patrol boats Bellatrix, Fazant, Merel, Rigel and Sirius to reinforce the Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol. The Dutch force was under the command of Commander Sir J.F.W. de Jong van Beek en Donk. They joined the 21st Minesweeper Flotilla on February 19 and the two forces worked in tandem. Working exclusively by night to avoid air attack, the patrol stopped and searched all small native craft in the Soenda Strait; their mission was to prevent the infiltration of Japanese troops and secret agents across the strait to Java. However, intercepting native boats in the dark could be deadly. As a result, a short burst of machine fire across the bow soon became a preferred way of encouraging native prauws which ignored commands to stop. Meanwhile, Japanese planes from P.1 and P.2 were hammering Western Java’s airfields at will and ABDA-AIR’s number of available aircraft was critically low. Barely 40 planes had come over from Sumatra to reinforce the surviving Dutch, American and Commonwealth aircraft still operating on Java. On February 15 Helfrich learned that there were only 94 bombers and 75 fighters left on Java. However, the actual number available was substantially lower as these figures also included inoperable aircraft. Even so, Helfrich could not understand why RearAdmiral Doorman’s Combined Striking Force never had any air cover.65 Although the number of available planes was small, ABDA expected 20 P-40s, 10 A-27 dive bombers, 8 B-17s and 50 Hurricanes within the coming week.66 Unfortunately, these planes never arrived. Washington stopped the B-17s in India, while the majority of the P-40s were lost either en route to Java or shortly after their arrival. Only a handful of dive bombers and Hurricanes arrived before Java fell.

The Loss of Sloet van de Beele and Van Nes Abandoning Southern Sumatra included the evacuation of Billiton Island, which had been reinforced just days earlier.67 Billiton was considered too exposed to resist invasion and the island’s garrison and remaining civilian population (mostly tin miners) were ordered back to Java. On February 16 the transport Sloet van de Beele sailed from Tandjoeng Priok for Billiton. A thoroughly irritated Admiral Helfrich was forced to send the destroyer Van Nes in escort.

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Getting outside I didn’t see the ship’s stern anymore. Much steam The ships reached Tandjoeng Pandan, the main port of and smoke. I couldn’t see if there was a fire. Later when other surBilliton, at 0800 on the morning of February 17 and loading vivors talked about a fire, I could not confirm that from my own obvia tugs, motorboats and prauws started.68 Within two hours servation. The forward part of the ship was already heavily listing to Sloet van de Beele took aboard 1,058 passengers, including 383 port. I remember being unsure whether to go to port or to starboard. KNIL troops.69 At about 1000 she and Van Nes raised anchor Did first go to starboard. List was so great that I could not jump overboard on that side. Somebody shouted: “Abandon ship!” Walked and sailed for Java.70 Just 30 minutes later a spotter plane from or slid to port. Forward part of the ship still underway (at the mothe Japanese heavy cruiser Mogami appeared and circled overment of the hit the ship was at full speed of about 30 knots). Several 71 head for 30 minutes. Although Van Nes engaged with her people already had jumped into the water. 72 75mm and 40mm AA guns, it remained out of range ; the pilot I didn’t care to just jump into the water and tried to get the balsa signaled, “Large merchant ship and destroyer sailing southward wood raft, which was fixed vertically on port side of the bridge, overboard. It was pretty easy, being helped by the ship’s list. At the moof the Gaspar Straits.”73 ment that I got the raft over the railing somebody from the upper The plane barely disappeared when the klaxons aboard bridge jumped on, or rather, into the net of the raft. It was Van Nes again sounded. Lookouts had sighted a destroyer or Lieutenant-Commander Lagaaij. I asked if he had hurt himself and cruiser in the distance. Van Nes opened fire with her main bathe said, “No.” Together shoved the raft overboard. Ship still making tery at 15,000 yards. She fired 16 salvoes with several direct hits some headway. Said to the commanding officer, pointing at the water: “Go ahead.” He answered, “You first.” I jumped overboard. as the range closed. At 4,000 yards Lieutenant-Commander When I surfaced from my dive, the forward part of the ship capsized C.A. Lagaaij ordered his gun crews to stand down. Their target and I found myself between the two funnels, which did not hit me. had been identified as the burning hulk of Van Ghent, which Loud hissing. Stern had disappeared. Ship ended right after the aft 74 had grounded early that morning. funnel. Much oil on the water, several centimeters thick. Was then In the meantime, 15 G3M “Nells” of the Genzan Bomber really afraid for fire, because in a flash surrounded by oil. Swam away. How I don’t know. Reached a raft. Don’t know if it Wing75 had been dispatched on a strike mission; they found was “my” raft. Could no longer see commanding officer. Was he, beVan Nes and Sloet van de Beele sailing alone at 1300.76 Soon cause he jumped after me, hit by steam and hot gas from the pipe?85 after, Tromp and the PBY Y-45 picked up a signal from Van Loss of life was extremely heavy. However, two days later Nes: “Convoy hit by bombers.”77 the flying boat X 18 of GVT.8 rescued 31 survivors of the deThe slow, unarmed transport was hit amidships in the first stroyer and flew them to Tandjoeng Priok.86 This was followed attack. A bomb exploded in her engine room and crippled the by the rescue of 87 more of the destroyer’s crew by Y 62. Anship; the huge blast created a mass of glass, metal and wood other group landed on a small island in the Java Sea and were splinters that killed and injured many passengers.78 Crewmen passed over many times by planes but could not attract their on Van Nes saw her passengers run for the lifeboats and Sloet attention. They starved to death. van de Beele sank within five minutes.79 LieutenantOn February 21 Y-45 sighted a sloop loaded to the gunCommander Lagaaij signaled that Sloet van de Beele had been wales with men and set down on the water. They proved to be lost and that Van Nes was under heavy air attack. survivors of Sloet van de Beele, and in all, 79 men were rescued Van Nes proved much more elusive. For more than two and flown to Tandjoeng Priok in a single, record-setting flight. hours he maneuvered his ship at 30 knots. Although closely nearAnother rescue followed the next day when X 17 rescued 30 missed several times there was no damage other than popped rivets in the hull.80 Lookouts then reported what they took to be British fighters and there was hope that Van Nes might survive. But hope faded when they were turned out to be 10 B5N “Kates” from Ryujo.81 At 1520 Lieutenant-Commander Lagaaij sent the destroyer’s last message, “Attack continues, am lightly damaged.”82 Amidst a rain of explosions and water columns from exploding bombs, Van Nes’ gunners maintained a furious barrage of AA fire. However, the Japanese remained out of range and they did no damage. Without air cover, the numbers were simply too great for the embattled destroyer. At 1530 Van Nes was hit aft and then amidships. A huge explosion roared and the ship broke in two just behind the aft funnel.83 Her communications officer, J. Dooren- This photograph reportedly shows B5N Kates from Ryujo over Van Nes, but it may also be the tanker Manvantara (Wikipedia Commons). bos, described the scene84:

16. The Battle of Banka Strait survivors of Sloet van de Beele. The Dornier was returning from a minelaying mission to the Moesi River and Banka Strait when she sighted the men. On February 23, she rescued 40 more while on another minelaying mission. But despite the efforts of the MLD, these 267 men were the only survivors rescued from more than 1000 KNIL troops and crew aboard Sloet van de Beele and the destroyer’s complement of 120.87 The MLD minelaying flights were part of a Dutch effort to interdict Japanese activities off Southern Sumatra. The KM had received 96 Vickers Mk H2 magnetic mines from the RN at Singapore before the war and Vice-Admiral Helfrich now ordered them deployed. In a series of night missions from Morokrembangan, the seaplanes of GVT.16, GVT.18 and GVT.8 began laying the mines on the night of February 22–23. Despite the loss of Y-47 on the evening of February 23 they were sent out to repeat the operation the following night. The planes were modified to carry two mines under each wing. However, each one measured 20-inches in diameter with a flat top and bottom, making the already cumbersome seaplanes extremely difficult to handle. To make matters worse, as far as the flight crews were concerned, was that the mines were armed by a simple piece of salt that dissolved in water. Flying through heavy monsoon rains, they feared being blown out of the air by the premature explosion of their own mines. Nonetheless, it appears that eight mines were laid at the mouth of the Moesi with 16 more dropped in the Banka Strait before the operation ended on February 24. With the loss of Palembang and Pladjoe, Tjepoe in Central Java was now the only oil drilling and refining center left to ABDA in the East Indies. Although Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer ordered its production increased to maximum capacity, the facilities at Tjepoe were much too small to meet Allied needs. So for the remainder of the campaign ABDA-FLOAT would suffer the irony of being short of fuel in one of the world’s most oil-rich regions. Meanwhile, the USN was rapidly losing faith in ABDA’s ability to stop the Japanese. The USN fleet tanker Pecos had been moored in Tjilatjap since February 6. There she received fuel oil from Dutch bulk tankers which braved treacherous convoy routes between Palembang and Java. Pecos then fueled Allied warships operating from the port. Her captain, Commander E.P. Abernathy, feared air attack on the exposed port88 and wanted authorization to put to sea and continue refueling operations south of Java. The plan he proposed was remarkably similar to that proposed by Rear-Admiral Doorman less than two weeks earlier. Although Rear-Admiral Glassford concurred with Abernathy, the Dutch still believed the Japanese could be stopped. The USN was less optimistic and Glassford hoped to save the 50,000 tons of fuel oil at the ME before Java fell. However, all attempts to persuade Helfrich to evacuate all or part of the fuel

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oil to Australia or Ceylon were met with immediate rejection. It was to be used for the defense of Java and the Netherlands East Indies until that option was no longer viable. In an effort to save at least part of the fuel, Glassford now decided to send a tanker into Soerabaja on February 20. She was to load to capacity and return to Tjilatjap, where refueling of American ships south of the Malay Barrier would proceed safely out of range of air attack. To execute the plan Glassford had Pecos and the civilian tanker British Judge. He chose to send the latter because of her larger capacity. He also considered her to be more expendable than Pecos, which was a modern fleet tanker equipped to carry out refueling operations at sea. British Judge safely entered Soerabaja and fueled to capacity. She returned to Tjilatjap on February 24 where her fuel oil was to be transferred to the waiting Pecos. Once loaded, Pecos had orders to proceed south of Java and refuel American ships at sea, just as Doorman had sought to do with the CSF. However, Glassford had failed to inform Helfrich. The latter apparently was unhappy about this covert attempt to siphon off KM fuel oil reserves. In also appears that the fuel oil was technically stolen, since it had been loaded under the guise of fueling all Allied ships. In reality, it was intended for the sole use of USN ships. Although this point is unclear, Helfrich appears to have ordered dock crews at Tjilatjap to ignore Glassford’s order to load Pecos. They instead discharged British Judge’s cargo into shore tanks. Meanwhile, the Japanese began a strong push to secure southern Borneo. Troops of the 56th Regimental Combat Group were shipped by barge to a point 50 miles south-southeast of the coastal city of Bandjermasin, where they were offloaded. The force then moved inland and assaulted the town from the south. At the same time the remainder of the regiment marched 160 miles from Balikpapan via a partially completed highway to form a two-pronged attack from the north. Lightly defended, Bandjermasin fell quickly on February 16. It was soon followed by most of the remaining towns on the south coast of Borneo. The primary reason for the operation was the Japanese desire to acquire an airfield closer to Java. Although Soerabaja and the ME were within range of their fighters based at Balikpapan, the long flight was extremely demanding and did not allow much time over the target. By February 23 the 23rd Air Flotilla and Tainan Air Wing were using Bandjarmasin’s airfield for sustained operations against Java. The capture of Bandjarmasin further extended the Japanese hold on Borneo and helped protect the sea lanes between Singapore, Sumatra and Western Java. The capture of Celebes and key outposts in the Flores Sea and Moluccas further secured these routes. These same routes would soon be used for the invasion of Java itself and the final conquest of the East Indies.

Chapter 17

The Inglorious End of ABDA As Singapore and southern Sumatra fell into Japanese hands, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder of the German Kriegsmarine appraised Adolf Hitler on the situation in the Far East. So extreme was the Allied position that the German admiral optimistically reported:

by no surface actions. On January 25 Admiral King cabled Admiral Hart and detailed Dutch concerns over Vice-Admiral Helfrich being left out of the ABDA command. Hart again met with Wavell on January 28 to discuss the situation. Wavell hinted that Hart himself had earlier mentioned that he might not be the right man for the job due to his age. Hart’s attitude now stiffened; he agreed that he often joked about his age. He also firmly stated that he had given Wavell full opportunity to replace him before ABDA became operational. Now that Hart was in the midst of a very tough job he did not feel it fair to be removed in a manner that reflected poorly on himself.4 The two officers ended the meeting without Wavell taking any action. The next day Hart submitted a note to Wavell stating that if the Dutch wanted Helfrich as ABDA-FLOAT commander, then Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer should formally make the request in writing. Wavell was embarrassed by the request and Hart believed the matter to be tabled for the time being. But in a secret memo to Prime Minister Churchill on January 29, Wavell wrote that Hart was wellqualified, but prone to taking a “pessimistic view” of the situation.5 Churchill forwarded the note to President Roosevelt that same day.

Rangoon, Singapore, and most likely, also Port Darwin, will be in Japanese hands within a few weeks. Only weak resistance is expected on Sumatra, while Java will be able to hold out longer. Japan plans to protect this front in the Indian Ocean by capturing the key position of Ceylon, and she also plans to gain control of the sea in that area by means of superior naval forces. Fifteen Japanese submarines are at the moment operating in the Bay of Bengal, in the waters off Ceylon, and in the straits on both sides of Sumatra and Java. With Rangoon, Sumatra and Java gone, the last oil wells between the Persian Gulf and the American continent will be lost. Oil supplies for Australia and New Zealand will have to come wither the Persian Gulf or from America. Once Japanese battleships, aircraft carriers, submarines and the Japanese naval air force are based on Ceylon, Britain will be forced to resort to heavily escorted convoys if she desires to maintain communications with India and the Near East. Only Alexandria, Durban and Simonstown will be available as repair bases for large British naval vessels in that part of the world.”1

“In charge at last” Even as Raeder delivered his report, ABDA already showed signs of unraveling. By mid–February pressure from the British and Dutch camps to remove Admiral Hart was acute. The Dutch continued to agitate behind closed doors for Helfrich to succeed him. Lieutenant Governor-General H.J. van Mook repeated this request all throughout the duration of his visit to Washington in January 1942.2

The cables were coming in at great length from the ABDA area and each one deepened the discouragement. Admiral Hart was making no secret to Wavell and the Dutch authorities of his conviction that he was not the man for the job.6

Amid this constant drumbeat of negativity President Roosevelt had real concerns about Admiral Hart’s ability to lead ABDA. For this reason he contacted Admiral King to discuss his removal. King was “deeply disturbed by the Dutch behavior” and did not want to replace Hart.7 But as Roosevelt, Churchill and Wavell all directly pushed for his removal King could not refuse. Roosevelt had already agreed to Hart’s removal so the change in command was a foregone conclusion. On February 5 Admiral King cabled Admiral Hart and suggested that it might be best if he requested that he be replaced on the grounds of ill health.8 Hart did not want to comply but could not refuse the request of his superior officer. In a final meeting with Wavell the British General admitted to sending the secret memo and finally flatly told Hart what he already knew … that the Dutch had no confidence in him and wanted

The cables were coming in at great length from the ABDA area and each one deepened the discouragement. Admiral Hart was making no secret to Wavell and the Dutch authorities of his conviction that he was not the man for the job.3

The British echoed Dutch sentiments, although their respective motives were quite different. The Dutch, quite understandably, wanted to lead the defense of their own territory; the British sought a competent and inspired leader. In that regard, neither camp was happy with Hart, whom they considered tired, over-age and unaggressive. Further undermining Hart’s credibility was the fact that his Asiatic Fleet had been booted out of the Philippines in less than a month of fighting marked

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17. The Inglorious End of ABDA him replaced by Helfrich. Accepting his fait accompli, Hart complied with King’s request and formally resigned the ABDAFLOAT command on February 14. Hart also transferred command of the Asiatic Fleet to Rear-Admiral Glassford and outlined his views on the situation in the East Indies in a letter. In it, he predicted that Helfrich would defend Java and the East Indies to the bitter end. Hart also believed the Dutch admiral would sacrifice all remaining Allied warships in a lost cause and stressed the need for a timely withdrawal. In Java’s defense, the expenditure of all U.S. Naval Forces in the ABDA area will be fully justified, providing such expenditure results in measurable contribution to the success of such defense. We must not, by confusing the necessity for holding Java without the ability to do so, fail in timely action toward the withdrawal of command, administrative, intelligence and other personnel on shore which is essential to further operation.9

American naval commanders and enlisted personnel throughout the Asiatic Fleet were shocked at the dismissal of Admiral Hart. While many hated his rigid sense of naval discipline, they respected his ability to lead men. In particular, they directly credited his aggressiveness for the only Allied victory of the campaign at Balikpapan.10 Many believed that politicians in Washington had sold them out in favor of smooth inter–Allied relations. By and large, USN personnel did not feel that the Dutch were qualified to take over command of ABDA-FLOAT. Specifically, they did not trust Vice-Admiral Helfrich.11 Nor did they much respect Rear-Admiral Doorman; after the actions in the Flores Sea and Bangka Strait they felt he lacked aggression and was prone to retreat. In anger that was entirely misplaced, they attributed the damage suffered by Houston and Marblehead to the failures of his command.12 Upon hearing the news that he had been named commander of ABDA-FLOAT, Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s first comment was, “In charge at last.”13 He immediately called a conference in Tandjoeng Priok of all Combined Strike Force ship captains.14 Returning from this meeting, Lieutenant-Commander D.A. Harris, captain of the destroyer USS Bulmer, later wrote, On returning from the conference I noted, as the only other individual in sight, an elderly man in civilian clothes. He was tall, erect, white-headed, and resembled Admiral Hart. But it could not be. You do not dump a four-star Admiral, particularly one who within the past few days had been Commander of ABDA-FLOAT, on the dock, in a strange country where little English is spoken, and leave him to fend for himself like the newest recruit. A closer look revealed that it was Admiral Hart, now reduced to the status of a seaman second—waiting on the dock. What to do? I was scared to death of the old devil. It was a well-known fact that he could shrivel an individual to a cinder with but a single glance of those gimlet like eyes. By leaving him to his own devices—who would expect him to be in civilian clothes?—I might well escape the dressing down of my life, for in that field, he also excelled. On the other hand, there was our Navy’s most senior officer for thousands of miles in any direction, one for whose military abilities, I had and still have, the utmost respect and admiration, and he was being treated like a leper and kicked when he was down. Letting my sympathy get the better of my good judgment, throw-

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ing caution to the winds, and with considerable trepidation, I went over to the old SOB and addressed him as follows… “Admiral, please excuse me for not saluting, but I see that you are in civilian clothes and might not want to be recognized. My gig is alongside the float. May I be of any service?” He replied in effect “that he wanted to go out to a ship in the harbor.” As he was boarding the gig, I gave the coxswain the following orders, “Take this gentleman wherever he wants to go. Return here and pick me up.” With that they shoved off and was soon [sic] lost to sight in the mass of shipping which crowded the roadstead.” The gig returned in somewhat less than an hour. I never asked the coxswain where he had been, nor did he ever mention it. Insofar as I know, there was no scuttlebutt circulated on Bulmer about that trip. I did not particularly like waiting on the dock, having spent many long hours engaged in that past-time in previous years. But I had much rather waited all day than to have been in that gig with Admiral Hart for two reasons: First, I did detest him as an individual, while respecting and admiring his military abilities. Second, I did not want to know anything at all about his destination—because what you do not know, you cannot tell, no matter what means of persuasion might be used.15

Admiral Hart felt railroaded, but in truth, multiple Allied camps had doubts about his leadership of ABDA-FLOAT. The Dutch—right or wrong—clearly had their own agenda. But in the end, his fate was sealed by the negative perception that he self-fostered among his other Allies. American historian John Toland wrote that Hart was “too tired and too unaggressive to command the ABDA Navy.”16 Australian naval historian G. Herman Gill wrote, “For Hart … the command was an unsought and heavy—perhaps too heavy—responsibility.”17Admiral Layton would later write in his war diary: Vice Admiral Helfrich relieved Admiral Hart of the command of the Allied Naval Forces in the ABDA area on 14th February. I welcome the change personally, as I thought Helfrich possessed qualities of decision and an offensive spirit which Hart did not; moreover, Helfrich had a much greater knowledge of the area of operations. He was, however, very unfortunate in taking over the command when it was already too late to do much to influence the course of events.18

These comments are not untrue. In many ways Admiral Hart just was not the right man for the job. But a most ingenuous comment was penned by Vice-Admiral Helfrich himself. In his postwar memoirs, he propagated a very whitewashed explanation of Hart’s situation that neatly sidestepped any mention of the strenuous backdoor politicking of van Mook and the Netherlands East Indies Government: “I believe that the advanced age of Admiral Hart was the direct cause of his replacement.”19

General Wavell Leaves Java General Wavell was also beginning to waver in his commitment to ABDA and the defense of the East Indies. On February 13 he initiated a lengthy series of secret dispatches between his headquarters on Java and Prime Minister Churchill in London. In the first, Wavell was strong in his commitment and stressed the importance holding southern Sumatra at all costs: The unexpectedly rapid advance of enemy on Singapore and approach of an escorted enemy convoy toward Southern Sumatra ne-

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cessitate review of our plans for the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, in which Southern Sumatra plays a most important part. With more time and the arrival of 7th Australian Division, earmarked for Southern Sumatra, strong defense could be built up. But ground not yet fully prepared. The leading infantry brigade of the 7th Australian Division will not be operative until about March 8, nor the whole division before March 21. If Southern Sumatra is lost prolonged defense of Java becomes unlikely. Garrison is weak for size of island. 6th Australian Division at present planned to reinforce Java, but not effective before end of March. 7th Australian Division, if diverted from Southern Sumatra, would be available for Java. From air aspect, defense of Java is a hard matter; without Southern Sumatra it is formidable. Even with air reinforcements in view it is likely that our air forces will waste more quickly than they can be replaced. Our limited air force is not engaged merely in a straight deal with enemy air force. It has also to attack enemy shipping, and is unable to protect our own. It is clear that retention of Southern Sumatra is essential for successful defense of Java. The situation does not at present demand change in plans, but it may be forced on us. If that were so, the destination of the Australian Corps would be first consideration, for it contains great majority of fully trained and equipped Australian troops. We must reinforce Sumatra until it is clearly useless to do so. Subsequent reinforcement of Java would probably be unprofitable.

After the evacuation of Palembang and southern Sumatra, Wavell’s convictions took an abrupt turn. On February 16, he sent a detailed message to London detailing the problems facing ABDA and why the command should have been terminated as soon as possible: As you will gather, recent events at Singapore and in Southern Sumatra have faced us with extremely grave and urgent problems of strategy and policy. 1. Geographical. Java is 500 miles [long]—i.e. approximately the distance from London to Inverness—and practically the whole northern coast affords easy landing facilities. 2. Enemy scale of attack and probable action. With shipping and escorts available, the enemy can probably engage four divisions against Java within the next 10–14 days, and reinforce with two or more divisions within a month. Maximum scale of air attack possibly 400–500 fighters (including carrier borne) and 300– 400 bombers. Our resources to meet an enemy attack on Java are as follows: 1. Naval. Maximum of three to four cruisers and about 10 destroyers as a striking force. If this is divided between two threatened ends of the island it is too weak at either. If kept concentrated it is difficult, owing to distance involved, to reach vital point in time. Wherever it is, it is liable to heavy air attack. 2. Land forces. At present, three weak Dutch divisions. British Imperial troops: One squadron 3rd Hussars, complete with light tanks, and approximately 3,000 Australians in various units. There are several thousand RAF ground personnel available, but proportion unarmed. American: One field artillery regiment, but without full equipment. 3. Air forces. At present, about 50 fighters, 65 medium or dive bombers, 20 heavy bombers. Landings on Java in the near future can only be prevented by local naval and air superiority. Facts given show that it is most unlikely that this superiority can be obtained. Once the enemy has effected landing, there is at present, little to prevent his rapidly occupying main naval and air bases on the island.

First flight of Australian Corps does not reach Java till about the end of the month. It cannot become operative till March 8, and whole division will not be unloaded and operative till March 21. The remaining division of corps could not be unloaded before the middle of April. To sum up. Burma and Australia are absolutely vital for war against Japan. Loss of Java, though a severe blow from every point of view, would not be fatal. Efforts should not therefore be made to reinforce Java, which might compromise defense of Burma or Australia. Immediate problem is destination of Australian Corps. If there seemed good chance of establishing corps on island and fighting Japanese on favorable terms, I should unhesitatingly recommend risks should be taken, as I did in matter of aid to Greece a year ago. I thought then of checking German invasion, and in spite of results still consider risk justifiable from tactical and strategical point of view. I fully recognize political considerations involved.

Wavell’s message had the desired effect on Churchill. On February 17 the PM inquired as to the status of two Australian Army divisions that were en route from North Africa to the Far East. With the fall of Singapore, they were earmarked for delivery to Java. But with Wavell’s less than optimistic assessment and the Japanese advance into Burma, talk turned to switching their destination: I am sure it would be impossible to act contrary to General Wavell’s main opinion. Personally, I agree with him. The best course would seem to be: a. To divert the leading Australian division to Burma, if the Australian Government will allow it. b. To send the 7th Division next, via Bombay, in the hitherto marked for the 2nd Australian, dropping one brigade at Ceylon. c. To send the remaining two Australian divisions as fast as possible to Australia as shipping becomes available. d. to make absolutely sure of Tricomalee by A.A. reinforcements from Convoy W.S. 17, and send the rest of this convoy to Rangoon. I am not clear as to how General Wavell proposes to use existing forces in Java. Are they to be used to fight it out with the Dutch, so as to delay the occupation, or is any attempt to be made to get them away? It seems this a more arguable question than the other.

However, the Australians proved glacial on the subject of diverting their troops to Burma. With the loss of some 20,000 Australian POWs at Singapore, their faith in British leadership had all but faded. They made it clear that if the troops were not going to aid the defense of Java, then they were going home to defend Australia. With the fall of Java imminent Australia feared that it would be next. With fewer than 25,000 trained troops available to meet a Japanese invasion, Parliament refused to send two fully trained and battle-hardened divisions to defend British territory while the mainland faced the most serious threat in its history. Thwarted in his efforts to reinforce Burma at Australia’s expense, Churchill informed President Roosevelt that the Australian troops would go to Australia, Java or Burma. At the same time, he decided the time had come to cut British losses in the East Indies and make a concentrated effort to hold Burma and India. With this in mind, he cabled Wavell on February 20: Obviously the whole plan for defense [of ] ABDA area is affected by the rapid progress of enemy in all directions. It has been decided to fight to the utmost for Java with existing forces and some that

17. The Inglorious End of ABDA were en route, and to divert main reinforcements to Burma and India. The President’s mind is turning to the United States looking after the Australian flank and we are concentrating everything on defending or regaining Burma and [the] Burma Road, of course after everything possible has been done to prolong the resistance in Java. He [Roosevelt] also realizes [the] vital importance of Ceylon, which is our only key of naval reentry. I surmise that it is not unlikely that General MacArthur, if extricated [from Corregidor], will look after the Australian side. I have not heard from you where you would move your headquarters if forced to leave Java. My own idea is that you should become again Commander-inChief in India, letting [General] Hartley go back to his Northern Command. From this centre you would be able to animate the whole war against Japan from our side.

By February 21, Wavell also appears to have given up all hope that Java or any part of the East Indies could be saved. In response to Churchill’s message on February 20 he cabled: I am afraid that the defence of ABDA area has broken down and that defence of Java cannot now last long. It always hinged on the air battle…. Anything put into Java now can do little to prolong the struggle; it is more [a] question of what you will choose to save…. I see little further usefulness for this HQ…. Last about myself. I am, as ever, entirely willing to do my best where you think best to send me. I have failed you and [the] president here, where a better man might perhaps have succeeded…. If you fancy I can best serve by returning to India I will of course do so, but you should first consult Viceroy both whether my prestige and influence, which count for much in East, will survive this failure, and also as to hardship to [General] Hartley and his successors in Northern Command. I hate the thought of leaving these stout-hearted Dutchmen, and will remain here and fight it out with them as long as possible if you consider this would help at all. Good wishes. I am afraid you are having [a] very difficult period, but I know your courage will shine through.

In response to this latest cable, Churchill responded to Wavell on February 22 with the following message: When you cease to command the ABDA area you should proceed yourself to India, where we require you to resume your position as Commander-in-Chief to carry on the war against Japan from this main base. It may be you will need a deputy Commander-in-Chief to take routine matters off your hands; but this can be settled when [you] get to Delhi. All other considerations are subsidiary. I hope you realise how highly I and all your friends here, as well as the President and the Combined Staff in Washington, rate your admirable conduct of ABDA operations in the teeth of adverse fortune and overwhelming odds.

General Wavell and Lieutenant-General George Brett met with Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer on February 22. What followed was a “dignified, frank and honest” discussion of the situation.20 They discussed the possibility of transferring ABDA headquarters to Ceylon or India although that almost certainly was never Wavell’s real intention. Wavell also told the Governor General that he would urge the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington to continue sending reinforcements to Java. Again, this was apparently an empty promise in light of the signals Wavell had received from London over the past 48 hours.21

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It was all a moot point anyway, as Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer felt that any kind of withdrawal would deal an unacceptable blow to morale. His administration had issued a series of strong public statements promoting Dutch-Indonesian solidarity to bolster their defense efforts. These statements revolved around a commitment that the Dutch would not abandon the Indonesians in their hour of need. In light of these statements and recent Allied setbacks he undoubtedly believed such a move would be viewed as a retreat by the general population. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer instead proposed that ABDA be dissolved completely and the Dutch assume command of the NEI’s defense.22 Wavell concurred and began shutting down ABDA. All senior military leadership positions passed to Dutch officers; by law, the Governor General again became Commander-in-Chief as they reported to him. All remaining Allied forces at sea and on land in the NEI—including those already present and en route—would come under Dutch operational control. It was agreed to end ABDA immediately so as to not damage morale following either a Japanese invasion or heavy air attack. The last ABDA command conference was held on February 23 where Wavell announced the decision to shut down the command. In a glaring omission, apparently he neglected to inform many of his subordinate Allied commanders beforehand. However, word quickly leaked out of ABDA Headquarters at Bandoeng, causing General ter Poorten much concern. The KNIL was fighting to the end, even if the British and Americans were not. However, he could not form a reliable defense plan without knowing the intentions of his allies. When ter Poorten asked Admiral Glassford of his intentions, the American replied that his orders from Washington were to defend the East Indies until further notice. For his part, Vice-Admiral Helfrich thought the British and Americans were entirely too pessimistic about the overall situation in the East Indies. On February 24 he signaled the Dutch Government in London: In my opinion, English and Americans much too gloomy; Soenda and Bali Straits still open; At [Tandjoeng] Priok and Soerabaja in spite of repeated bombardments only one merchant ship hit while Tjilatjap still has not been bombed. Delivery of fighters by ship is still possible. Expect Langley with 27, Athene now in Australia must come immediately. Also aircraft carrier Indomitable and B-25s from USA [purchased by the Netherlands Purchasing Commission in New York], for which there are 18 crews in Australia. I am convinced that when ANZAC Forces west of Torres Strait show their noses, Japanese will receive unpleasant surprise and Java Sea will quickly be relieved. It is still not too late, but the utmost speed, grim determination and all risks must be taken.23

In the meantime, Wavell signaled London: “We are planning to leave provisionally on February 25. I am most grateful for your very generous message and confidence in again entrusting me with command in India. If Hartley can remain as deputy it would be most helpful.” Then, on February 25 he again signaled Churchill: “I am leaving tonight with Pierse for Colombo. From there I am to fly [to] Rangoon or Delhi, according to answer to telegram I have sent Hartley.”

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

“Masters of our own house…” ABDA ceased to exist at 0900 JST on February 25. The first attempt at tactical inter–Allied cooperation in World War II lasted exactly 41 days and was a total failure. General Wavell and staff boarded the sloop HMS Kedah at Tandjoeng Priok on the night of February 25 and sailed for Ceylon. In his postwar memoirs Vice-Admiral Helfrich would write: We were again masters of our own house, but the situation was far from enviable.24 With Wavell’s departure, command of all Allied forces remaining in the East Indies shifted to Dutch control. Vice-Admiral Helfrich retained command of Allied naval forces but reverted back to his prewar position of CZM. Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten took over the land defenses. Major-General L.H. van Oyen assumed command of Java’s heavily reduced air defenses. Rear-Admiral Palliser remained as Senior British Naval Officer. Commodore Collins was in command of RN forces with Rear-Admiral Glassford in charge of USN forces. Both officers were under Helfrich’s direct command; but unbeknownst to Helfrich, Palliser secretly received authority from the British Admiralty to withdraw his ships if he felt further resistance had become futile. Although no more American, Australian or British reinforcements would reach the East Indies, air or land forces deemed essential to the defense of Java would be withdrawn. Still, several thousand extraneous British troops—including 2,110 RAF personnel and about 350 AA crew—were immediately moved to Tjilatjap for evacuation. 25 On February 25 Churchill signaled Air Vice-Marshal P.C. Maltby who commanded remaining British air units on Java: “I send you and all ranks of the British forces who have stayed behind in Java my best wishes for success and honour in the great fight that confronts you. Every day gained is precious, and I know that you will do everything humanly possible to prolong the battle.” Meanwhile, the Americans were also putting their initial evacuation plans for Java into effect. On February 19, General Brereton received permission from General Wavell to begin evacuating the USAAF to India. Brereton immediately cabled General Henry “Hap” Arnold26 in Washington of his intention and ordered all American planes to begin evacuating all remaining air and ground crews. On February 22 he received the following message from General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C.: I. Your own headquarters will be withdrawn in such a manner, at such a time, and to such a place within or without the ABDA area as you may decide, for its timely withdrawal is important. Dutch should be allowed to decide which of their representatives with your headquarters should leave or stay and also destination of any personnel withdrawn. II. Amplification of instructions contained in Paragraph I will follow. In meantime, Dutch shipping should be held and used. III. When you withdraw, report to whom you have transferred command of Java. IV. Future ABDA area now being considered by Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Later that same day Brereton received additional instructions regarding Paragraph 2 of his earlier message from Marshall:

1. Reference paragraph 2. All men of fighting units for whom there are arms must continue to fight without thought of evacuation, but air forces which can more usefully operate in battle from bases outside Java and all air personnel for whom there are no aircraft and such troops, particularly technicians, as cannot contribute to defense of Java should be withdrawn. With respect to personnel who cannot contribute to defense, general policy should be to withdraw U.S. and Australian personnel to Australia.

These instructions cleared the way for Brereton to begin the evacuation of Java. He left the exact date for the operation to begin up to his subordinate, Colonel Eugene L. Eubank. He was to keep American air units on Java as long as an effective operational force existed. At such time that one did not exist, Colonel Eubank was to notify the Dutch of his intentions and begin a general evacuation. He was only to evacuate personnel not necessary for the continued defense of Java. Aircraft were to remain until it was determined that they were no longer tactically useful or could no longer be maintained; they would then be withdrawn to Australia. Regardless of who was evacuated Eubank had orders to send out a proportionate number of combat-experienced men with each group. They were needed to form the nucleus of new units in Australia and the United States. Colonel Eubank barely received these directives before he ordered an immediate evacuation of virtually all USAAF personnel on Java. This included a general withdrawal of all heavy bombers and most air and ground personnel. So fast and disorganized was the evacuation, that a thoroughly disgusted General van Oyen bitterly labeled it little more than desertion.27 So severe was his criticism that General Marshall ordered an investigation into Eubank’s handling of the operation. Although the investigation cleared him it showed how quickly inter–Allied relations had deteriorated. Much of van Oyen’s anger can be attributed to a lack of contact between Eubank and the Dutch. Contrary to orders, Eubank apparently made little or no effort to notify his Dutch allies that the operation was set to begin. Thus, local ML commanders having heard nothing of a withdrawal were incensed to see American planes and personnel departing at a rapid pace beginning at 0200 on the morning of February 26. Although all the operational heavy bombers were withdrawn, the Dutch did inherit a number of American P-40s. The ML-KNIL applied national markings to those that could fly and transferred them to air units. They also began reconditioning the inoperative aircraft. These planes would fly many more missions before Java fell and the Japanese captured a number of Kittyhawks in Dutch markings.

Evacuation Aboard Abbekerk Many American airmen hated the idea of walking out and leaving the Dutch on their own, but there was nothing they could do.28 The evacuation was carried out by land, rail, air and sea. The aircrews were to fly out, while the ground personnel

17. The Inglorious End of ABDA went land and rail to Tjilatjap; from there they would be taken out by ship. As with the evacuation from Southern Sumatra, these men were only able to bring out a minimum of personal gear and maintenance equipment. At Tjilatjap they found mass confusion as soldiers streamed into the port hoping to find transport off the island. Some 30 merchant ships jammed the tiny harbor. One of these was the Abbekerk, a 12,000 ton KPM freighter reserved to take out American ground personnel. Because she had no side hatches all their transport—72 command cars, jeeps and trucks—was abandoned on the dock.29 Abbekerk also carried hundreds of oil company workers, Commonwealth air and ground personnel and 300 ML-KNIL flight cadets. There was no loading system and everyone crammed aboard as best they could, hoping to escape before the Japanese arrived. Periodic false air raid klaxons added to the confusion, but no attacks developed. Abbekerk pulled away from the wharf around 1700 on February 27 with more than 1,500 passengers aboard.30 Although she was supposed to travel in convoy Abbekerk could make 18 knots. As night fell, her captain turned away from the convoy and set course for Australia at full speed. Soon afterwards, discipline among the American enlisted men broke down in a disgraceful show. Their officers proved unable to con-

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trol them and the captain’s orders for a blackout and not to throw garbage overboard were widely ignored. The voyage itself went well until a single-engine Japanese reconnaissance plane sighted the freighter. Circling at 2,000 feet, its pilot obviously thought little of Abbekerk, whose main armament consisted only of a single 4-inch surface mount. Many evacuees brought aboard a large number of small arms and machine guns. These were mounted on the rails and the Japanese pilot received a surprise on his first pass. As the plane came around, its pilot encountered a hail of small arms fire that persuaded him to climb out of range. On a second pass, the plane dropped two small bombs that missed the stern by some distance. On his third and fourth passes, the pilot strafed Abbekerk but caused no damage or casualties. In return, gunners put a number of tracers into the fuselage but could not down the Japanese plane. As it disappeared in the distance, a mood of impending doom prevailed over the ship. With their position undoubtedly known, everyone aboard expected to be sunk at any time; two men tried to commit suicide. The voyage then became even more miserable as the weather turned cold and many evacuees were forced to sleep on deck with only a thin blanket. However, the Japanese did not reappear and Abbekerk reached Fremantle on March 5.

Chapter 18

The Destruction of Port Darwin Reinforcements for Timor

In coordination with their landings on Sumatra the Japanese simultaneously launched a series of strong air attacks throughout the eastern half of the Netherlands East Indies. The islands of Alor, Roti and Timor in the Lesser Soenda Islands were all hit in quick succession. Despite strongly worded Portuguese protests and their ongoing efforts to reinforce the garrison, Australian and Dutch forces had continued to occupy that end of Timor since mid–December.1 Timor, in particular, received a great deal of attention from the Japanese as it was a vital link in the air route between Australia and Java. The island was a primary target and its occupation was a key step in Japanese invasion plans for the East Indies. Once Timor was neutralized as a base ABDA would be unable to fly in fighter reinforcements from Australia.2 It would also give Japanese forces a base from which to operate in the eastern half of the archipelago. Air attacks could also be launched against the northern coast of Australia. Japanese air presence over Timor increased almost daily and cost the MLD a number of seaplanes in the first week of February. On February 3 X-33 of GVT.7 had been heavily damaged while landing at Dilly; as a result the crew was forced to beach the flying boat for repairs. Repairs were still underway on February 7 when a Japanese fighter patrol sighted the plane and burned it. X-13 replaced X-33 the following day at the squadron’s remote auxiliary base on Roti Island. Shortly after her arrival X-13 and the squadron’s remaining two Dorniers3 were discovered on the water by a patrolling reconnaissance plane. Alerted to the presence of the Dutch seaplanes, the Japanese immediately sent out a fighter patrol from Makassar. Completely devoid of radar or AA defenses, the Dutch were completely surprised. The fighters burned all three seaplanes at their moorings without loss. Two MLD radio operators were killed in the attack.4 The goal of these attacks was to reduce Allied air power prior to the upcoming invasion of Timor. Their plan was successful. After the attack on Roti ABDA-FLOAT operations in the Sawoe Sea ceased immediately. Unable to provide its seaplanes with fighter cover or adequate AA defenses, the MLD withdrew its units in the Flores Islands back to Java. On February 8 X-3 and X-23 of GVT.6 flew in to take out the survivors of GVT.7 and returned them to Morokrembangan.

As the air raids intensified, General Wavell correctly feared that they were a prelude to a Japanese invasion of Timor and decided to reinforce the island’s garrison. Fearing an invasion of Australia, the Australian Government was not keen on sending more troops abroad. Only after stiff negotiations did it agree to deploy the 2/4th Pioneers to Timor on February 7. Two days later Wavell also dispatched the British 79th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery (less one section) to the island. The 79th LAA left Batavia on February 9 aboard the 1,671 ton steamship Ban Hong Long. Escorted by the GM patrol boat Valk, Ban Hong Long safely reached Tjilatjap. From there, the American destroyers Alden and Edsall took over and escorted the cattle transport into Timor on February 16. As Japanese air attacks intensified General Wavell approached the United States about the possibility of also sending American troops. He again faced stiff resistance from the Australian Government, which lobbied hard to keep all available American troops on their continent. However, the importance of Timor to the defense of Java was considered vital and the United States agreed to commit both the 147th Field Artillery Regiment and 148th Field Artillery Regiment. Together with the 2/4th Pioneers, the two American artillery regiments sailed for Timor on the USAT Meigs and the civilian transports Mauna Loa, Portmar and Tulagi. They were escorted by Houston (her after turret still out of commission after the Kangean Sea) with the American destroyer Peary and Australian sloops Warrego and Swan. Leaving Darwin at 0200 on February 15, the convoy assumed a course that took it west and well south of Timor. It was hoped this route would avoid Japanese reconnaissance aircraft before the convoy turned north. However, a “Mavis” flying boat from the Toko Air Wing sighted the convoy just after 1100 that morning.5 As the “Mavis” slowly circled out of range for the next three hours Captain Rooks aboard the Houston signaled Darwin for air cover. Ninety miles west of Darwin the seaplane turned toward the convoy and made a bomb run. Heavy AA fire from the escorts kept the flying boat high and its bombs did no damage. As the “Mavis” turned for a second attack a lone P-40E from Darwin appeared as the Japanese plane hid in the clouds. Pi-

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18. The Destruction of Port Darwin loted by Lieutenant R.J. Buel of the USAAF’s 21st Pursuit Squadron, the Kittyhawk was one of only two operational fighters at the port’s aerodrome.6 Although Houston fired several 5-inch salvos in the vicinity of the Japanese plane Buel initially had trouble locating the “Mavis.” He then followed it into a cloud bank and both disappeared. The Japanese reported the P-40 as a Supermarine Spitfire. In his first pass, Buel killed the H6K’s radio operator and set the forward fuel tank afire. Crippled, the “Mavis” ditched in the sea as flames quickly spread throughout the fuselage. The surviving crewmen took to rafts and reached Melville Island on the north coast of Australia, where they were taken prisoner.7 In return, the Japanese gunners also crippled Buel’s P-40 and the burning Kittyhawk dove into the sea and exploded. Aboard the ships, no one saw the brief air fight. In the distance, crewmen saw a brilliant flash followed by a huge cloud of black smoke.8 Neither plane was seen again and all aboard hoped that it was the P-40 that had been successful. At the time neither side knew what had happened to their respective aircraft. Both planes went down without sending a final report. Back in Darwin, Houston’s crew was questioned about the disappearance of Buel and his P-40. Later, as POWs, the Houston crewmen would be questioned again; this time by the Japanese in regards to their missing flying boat.

“Exceedingly Well Done!” Although the night was uneventful, another “Mavis” promptly appeared at 0915 the next morning to shadow the convoy, which now lay 300 miles west and 40 miles south of Darwin. Circling lazily out of gun range for two hours, the flying boat guided in 35 G4M “Betty” bombers from the 1st Air Wing at Makassar. They were joined by nine more “Mavis” flying boats from the Toko Air Wing at 1100.9 As soon as the bombers appeared, Captain Rooks ordered his two SOC Seagull floatplanes catapulted off Houston. Lieutenant Jack Lamade and Ensign Walter Winslow were ordered to fly Broome and await further orders. Lamade made it off the ship and set a course for Broome without problem. As Winslow and his observer waited for the catapult to be reset, the ship’s 5-inch AA guns opened up. The concussion from their fire ripped the fabric covering off the plane’s tail and fuselage.10 Unable to fly, the Seagull was hoisted off the catapult and wheeled into its hangar. Meanwhile the Japanese bombers approached in waves at high altitude. Only Houston’s 5-inch guns could reach them, taking Peary, Warrego and Swan out of the fight. Only when a plane occasionally strayed into range could they fire effectively. It was left to Houston to bear the brunt of the convoy’s defense. After being damaged during the Balikpapan operation, Boise offloaded 500 rounds her new 5-inch AA ammunition at Tjilatjap which was taken aboard Houston. Unhindered by defective fuses, her gunners were able to mount an effective defense. The attack lasted for nearly an hour. Each time the bombers

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appeared Houston would change course to defend the ship in peril. To observers aboard the transports her decks appeared to be a sheet of flame as her gunners broke up each attack.11 Houston’s rate of fire was so intense that all but one gun crew’s first loader had to be relieved during the short fight. Many men in the ship’s 5-inch magazine would also be treated for heat exhaustion. A number of Japanese pilots pressed home their attacks and scored a number of near misses. All four transports sprung leaks but only Mauna Loa suffered casualties. One man was killed and two wounded. Twelve Japanese aircraft suffered damage but none were shot down. It was but a glimpse of what the Asiatic Fleet might have done with modern ships and proper equipment. As the bombers turned for home, the Army commander aboard Meigs signaled Houston: FROM: USAT Meigs TO: USS Houston Exceedingly Well Done!

Australia’s Pearl Harbor The Japanese had barely disappeared when ABDA headquarters ordered the convoy back to Darwin. With the invasion of Timor imminent, General Wavell feared a Japanese carrier force was in the area to cover the landings. With air cover unavailable from Darwin or Timor he was unwilling to expose the convoy to further attacks. Captain Rooks reversed course at 1515 on February 16 and the entire convoy reached Darwin early on the afternoon of February 18.12 A Japanese invasion force had been sighted in the Makassar Strait and it was assumed to be headed for either Bali or Timor. In a bid to intercept it Rear-Admiral Doorman ordered Houston and Peary to immediately join him at Tjilatjap. Thus, they left Darwin after a very short delay. They had barely cleared the harbor entrance when Peary’s ASDIC picked up what was believed to be a Japanese submarine. She launched a search lasting several hours while Houston continued on alone. Peary found nothing and returned to Darwin to refuel. This took longer than expected and LieutenantCommander H.H. Keith decided to remain overnight and sail for Tjilatjap the next morning. As night fell a powerful Japanese carrier task force made a high-speed run across the Banda Sea. This was Vice-Admiral Nagumo Choichi’s 1st Carrier Fleet with the 1st Carrier Squadron and 2nd Carrier Squadron. Although the 3rd Carrier Squadron had returned to Japan in late January, Nagumo’s force remained essentially the same that had attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7. The Japanese had departed Palau on February 15 with orders to attack Darwin. The raid would serve two functions. The first was to support the invasion of Timor that was scheduled to take place on February 20. The second was to interdict the flow of material and supplies to Java from Darwin, which had developed into the main ABDA supply base outside the East Indies.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Carriers Akagi and Kaga had just returned to Palau from Truk, while Hiryu and Soryu were fresh off supporting the invasion of Ambon. They were screened by the 1st/3rd Battleship Squadron and 8th Cruiser Squadron. In support was the 1st Destroyer Flotilla with Abukuma, 17th Destroyer Squadron, 18th Destroyer Squadron and the destroyer Akigumo. Nagumo put into Kendari on February 17 and traversed the Banda Sea the following night. By dawn of February 19 his strike force was in position in the Timor Sea to attack Darwin. The carriers launched 188 planes—36 fighters, 71 dive bombers and 81 level bombers. A total of 54 G4M “Betty” bombers from the 1st Air Wing at Ambon and Kanoya Air Wing at Kendari would join them.13 En route to Darwin, the formation encountered a PatWing 10 PBY flown by Lieutenant Thomas Moorer who was on patrol out of Darwin.14 One of Kaga’s Zeros, flown by Naval Air Pilot 1st Class Yoshikazu Nagahama, broke formation and bounced the Catalina before Moorer’s crew knew what hit them. In his first pass Nagahama shot out the PBY’s port engine and ruptured the port fuel tank, causing flames to engulf the plane. Killing power on both engines to counter the drag of the dead engine, Moorer put the PBY down on the water in an extremely hard landing. As the crew scrambled into rafts the PBY disappeared in a column of flame and smoke. Observing the action, a small Filipino merchant ship—the Florence D—altered course and rescued the crew a short time later. From her captain, Moorer learned that she was a blockade runner under contract to the USN to deliver supplies to American forces in the Philippines. The ship had already been unsuccessfully attacked several times and her captain was confident of their chances. The attack on Moorer’s PBY had been so fast, that his radio operator had been unable to notify Darwin of the approaching formation. As the Japanese passed over Melville Island an Australian coastwatcher radioed a warning. However, a formation of 10 P-40Es led by a LB-30 had just departed Darwin and it was assumed this was the same formation. The American planes were bound for Java via Timor. Had liaison between the Americans and Australians been better the Duty Officer might have realized that Melville Island was well north of their course. A second warning followed at 0937 as the Japanese passed over Bathurst Island. Father John McGrath of the island’s Catholic mission sighted it and radioed: “An unusually large air formation bearing down on us from the Northwest.” Again, the Duty Officer took no action. As at Pearl Harbor on December 7 Darwin’s final chance to make last-minute preparations for the impending raid was lost. Without radar the port was unaware of the Japanese and they were able to approach the port without being detected. Port Darwin had very few defenses of any kind and the recently departed P-40s had represented the only effective fighter cover. A cyclone closed the port from February 2 to 10, so the harbor was crammed with merchant ships waiting to unload. The port’s communist-led stevedore union then staged a strike, adding to the backlog. When unloading finally continued

(using American troops armed with rifles and bayonets), the port’s single wharf could only unload two ships at a time. The harbor contained nearly 30 ships. Australian ships included the examination steamer Southern Cross; the boom vessels Kookaburra, Koala, Kangaroo, Karangi; and the gate vessel Kara Kara. Also present were the RAN auxiliary minesweepers Tolga, Terka and Gunbar; patrol boat Coongoola; depot ship Platypus; sloops Swan and Warrego; and the 24th Minesweeping Flotilla with the corvettes Deloraine, Katoomba and Lithgow. The hospital ship Manunda also awaited orders after being held in port when Singapore fell. In addition to Peary, the transports Mauna Loa, Meigs and Portmar were also in port after their aborted venture to Timor just a few days earlier. With them was the transport Admiral Halstead. The seaplane tender William B. Preston was making preparations to head farther south down the coast. They joined the British tanker British Motorist, which carried a full load of high-octane aviation gasoline. Waiting to unload at Darwin’s small wharf were the Australian cargo ships Barossa, Tulagi, Zealandia and Neptuna. The latter carried 200 tons of depth charges amongst her cargo of explosives.15 On Darwin’s military airdrome were nine Hudson bombers of 2 Squadron (RAAF) and 13 Squadron (RAAF). Darwin’s civilian airport was home to five unserviceable Wirraway fighters of 12 Squadron (RAAF). Nine more of the squadron’s Wirraways were on Batchelor Field, just outside Darwin. Some distance away was Daly Waters, a primitive airstrip with eight Hudsons. A diverse assortment of civilian aircraft rounded out the military planes. There was very little AA at any of these bases. As the Japanese formation approached Darwin, it encountered the 10 P-40s of the 33rd Pursuit Group that had taken off for Timor at 0915. They had encountered violent weather just 20 minutes after takeoff and turned back to Darwin. Five planes landed to refuel, while the remainder patrolled over Darwin. These planes now encountered the Zero flown by NAP 1st Class Yoshikazu Nagahama. His attack on Moorer’s PBY had caused Nagahama to lose his formation, so he proceeded to Darwin alone. As a result, he was the first Japanese plane over the target. He sighted the five American Kittyhawks almost immediately and dove to attack. The first indication the Americans had of Nagahama’s presence was when Lieutenant Robert Ostreicher casually looked up and was shocked to see a Zero bearing down on them. Ostreicher immediately jettisoned his drop tank and dove away. The other P-40s attempted to follow, but Nagahama was too quick. In seconds, he shot down Lieutenant Jack Peres and Lieutenant Elton Perry before they could react. Both plunged to the ocean in flames. Nagahama then shot up Lieutenant Max Wiecks’ P-40 so badly that he was forced to bail out. As Wiecks floated to the water, Nagahama also seriously damaged the plane flown by Lieutenant William Walker. Just weeks out of flight school and unable to shake the Japanese pilot, Walker was badly wounded and barely managed to crash-land his mangled plane at Darwin. The first elements of the main Japanese formation now ar-

18. The Destruction of Port Darwin

161

rived over the port and almost immediately encountered Lieuparachute but he too was hit. With his plane barely controllable, tenant Ostreicher’s lone Kittyhawk. He made a number of atGlover headed back to the airfield. He crash landed and was tacks and claimed to have shot down one bomber and damaged dragged from the burning wreckage by ground personnel. another. Although his own aircraft was damaged by return fire, At 0957, the level bombers began their run over the harbor he was able to land safely at Darwin. and town at 14,000 feet. One minute later, Darwin’s air raid It is possible that Ostreicher attacked two different forklaxons belatedly sounded. Bombs struck the wharf, blowing mations belonging to Soryu. The first consisted of 18 B5N the pier’s train into the harbor. Explosions destroyed water “Kates” which reported being attacked by fighters and having mains, oil pipes and much of the pier. Strings of bombs moved four planes damaged, but none lost. A second formation of 18 across the hospital, post office, police barracks and through the D3A “Val” dive bombers also reported being attacked by fighttown’s government offices. Many workers were killed with ers. One was slightly damaged, while a second was lost. A Japadozens more wounded and trapped.18 With the water mains destroyed it proved impossible to extinguish the fires that soon nese destroyer later rescued its crew. engulfed the town. The main fighter force now arrived over Darwin and began Attacking singly, in pairs and in waves of three, 27 “Vals” strafing AA positions and other targets of opportunity. One of now concentrated on shipping in the harbor. Swan, Warrego, their first targets was the auxiliary minesweeper Gunbar as she Peary and William B. Preston managed to get underway. Peary passed through the boom. She suffered heavy damage and a was buried under a rain of bombs. Two bombs on the fantail number of dead and wounded before the Zeros moved on. demolished the depth charge racks, sheared off the propeller The five P-40s refueling on Darwin’s military airfield now guards and flooded her engine steering room. A third bomb extried to scramble. The 33rd Pursuit Squadron’s commanding ploded in the galley. It was followed by a fourth, which peneofficer, Major Floyd Pell, was first off the ground. He managed trated her main deck and exploded in her forward magazine. to reach approximately 100 feet before his plane was attacked A fifth bomb then gutted her engine room and the ship broke by a flock of Zeros from Hiryu. Pell bailed out of his burning apart.19 plane at about 70 feet and his parachute barely opened before he hit the ground. Although strafed in his parachute, Pell surAnother American destroyer [Peary] was on our port side, a solid vived the descent.16 He was alive and crawling on the ground mass of flame with burning oil all round her and what was left of the crew jumping into the burning oil. We manned our motor life-boat when a group of Zeros strafed him on the ground, killing him with four of a crew and went to their rescue and eventually picked up instantly.17 over thirty badly burnt and wounded men.20 Lieutenant Charles Hughes did not make it off the ground. Eighty officers and men perished in the hailstorm and the He was killed in the cockpit as his Kittyhawk rolled down the flaming oil that surrounded the Peary. Among the dead were runway. her commanding officer Lieutenant-Commander John BermingLieutenant Robert McMahon got into the air and encounham and all the ship’s officers. Only 40 enlisted men survived, tered three Zeros, which he managed to get behind. He claimed hits on one, but his landing gear then dropped, helping the Japanese gang up on him. The Zeros shot the P-40 full of holes and wounded McMahon in the leg, but were unable to complete the kill before AA fire from the harbor drove them off. As McMahon nursed his burning plane to the airstrip he encountered a “Val” which he hosed with gunfire. The rear gunner slumped over his weapon but McMahon was forced to bail out before he could observe more. This could also have been one of the planes attacked by Lieutenant Ost reicher. The attention paid to the three previous pilots undoubtedly helped Lieutenants Burt Rice and John Glover get airborne. Rice came under attack almost immediately and his plane crashed in flames. He bailed out and drifted to the ground in a semicon- Exploding oil tanks at Darwin with the corvette Deloraine in the foreground (Australian War scious state. Glover tried to cover Rice’s Memorial).

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

most of them wounded. The only officer to survive was Lieutenant W.J. Catlett; he was ashore in the hospital at the time of the attack. As Manunda sent out rescue boats, William B. Preston blew through the harbor. Steering on her engines, she missed the hospital ship’s bow by inches, cleared the harbor and set a course down the coast.21 Shortly afterwards, Manunda—although clearly marked as a hospital ship—was near-missed by a dive bomber. She suffered four dead, 76 shrapnel holes and more than 100 indentations in the hull with heavy damage to her upper works. A direct hit then smashed the aft end of the bridge, causing much internal damage and starting seven fires. Despite 12 killed and 47 wounded among the crew and medical staff, Manunda continued to function as a hospital ship.22 At the same time, Swan was badly damaged by a near-miss. The British Motorist was also badly hit and began sinking by the head. Mauna Loa had her back broken by a direct hit and began to settle at the stern. Platypus was also attacked, but managed to beat off her attackers although three near misses immobilized her engine room and sank the lighter Mavie, which was tied up alongside. Though Katoomba was confined to drydock, sharp AA fire from her gun crews caused a dive bomber to miss.23 About the same time, Zealandia took a bomb down her #3 hatch that exploded deep in the hold. She swung into the wind, causing the flames to fan up all along the ship. As the flames spread fore and aft, her master gave orders to abandon ship. As her crew went over the side, Terka, Tolga and several small harbor patrol boats moved in to take off her survivors and those of the British Motorist. Neptuna and Barossa were unloading at the pier when both were hit. With their boilers cold neither could move as burning oil from the wharf ’s ruptured oil pipes began to envelop them. Braving intense heat and flames, the naval tug Wato moved in and towed away the oil lighter moored to Barossa’s side. She then returned and towed Barossa to safety. Wato beached the burning merchant ship nearby and her cargo of wood and timber for the pier was allowed to burn itself out. Tulagi was also hit and beached to avoid sinking. She would later be pulled off and repaired with little trouble. Shortly after the raid ended, Neptuna’s cargo of depth charges and explosives exploded, destroying what was left of the pier and much of the town. Although her stern and engines disappeared immediately, the bow remained afloat for several moments. The carrier raid lasted less than an hour and these planes were gone before 1100. The bombers from Kendari appeared overhead at 1158. They ignored the town and harbor, instead concentrating on the military airfield. What little the Zeros had left untouched, the bombers finished off. This included both Ostreicher’s and Walker’s damaged P-40s. Although only six men were killed, highly accurate pattern bombing destroyed two hangars, four dormitories, the hospital, mess halls, equipment stores and a number of other buildings.

Aftermath Darwin was now a scene of complete devastation. Sinking ships and shattered hulks littered the harbor and small boats darted everywhere, fighting fires and gathering wounded. Black smoke choked out the sun. In addition to Peary, eight civilian ships—British Motorist, Mauna Loa, Mavie, Meigs, Neptuna, Zealandia and the coal hulk Kelat—had been sunk. Three more vessels—Barossa, Portmar and Tulagi—were saved only by beaching. The latter suffered little damage and was soon repaired. Ten other vessels were damaged in varying degrees. William B. Preston was heavily damaged by a single bomb hit aft, which wrecked her crew compartment. Her rudder jammed, she was forced to steer using her engines. William B. Preston successfully navigated the harbor boom and made it to the open sea. A short time later she was again bombed by a roving H6K “Mavis” but suffered no additional damage. She touched bottom several days later while putting into Derby and her speed was reduced to eight knot by a warped propeller shaft. Casualties numbered 11 dead, two missing and three wounded. On the ground, the Zeros and bombers had destroyed virtually every Allied plane they could find. In addition to the 33rd Pursuit Squadron’s 11 P-40s, one LB-30 and three USAAF Beechcraft biplanes used for liaison duties were also destroyed. Zeros from Hiryu burned three PatWing 10 PBYs in the harbor. The RAAF lost six Hudsons with another one and a Wirraway damaged. At Pearl Harbor Nagumo’s fliers failed to hit fuel stocks, repair facilities and other vital shore installations that would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet. At Darwin they were specifically instructed not to make the same mistake again. As a result, the port was completely annihilated as a supply base for several months. A total of 243 service personnel and civilians were killed with 330 wounded, 200 seriously.24 Nineteen of the most severely wounded later died, bringing the total dead to 262. Crewmen on Peary and Neptuna accounted for 172 of those killed. Damage from the raid could have been worse. AA fire from shore batteries and machine gun emplacements was extremely heavy, causing a number of attacks to fail. Despite the heavy fire, the Japanese lost only one “Zero” and two “Vals” over Darwin. A “Kate” was also forced to ditch in the ocean on the return flight, but its crew was rescued by one of the task force destroyers. Another 34 planes were damaged in varying degrees, although the number written off is unknown. As the Japanese retired to the north dive bombers from Kaga sighted what they reported to be a “camouflaged cruiser.” Based on this report, Soryu and Hiryu each launched nine “Vals” on an armed reconnaissance patrol. The planes from Soryu found the ship 1½ hours later. It was the 3,200 ton merchant vessel Don Isidore. Like Florence D, she was also under contract to the USN as a blockade runner to the Philippines. The nine dive bombers scored five direct hits, leaving the ship heavily damaged and afire. In exchange, return fire lightly damaged one of the “Vals.”

18. The Destruction of Port Darwin Just 30 miles to the south Florence D picked up her distress call. Don Isidore reported that she had been heavily attacked and was afire with many dead and wounded. Florence D’s captain immediately changed course to assist. He had barely done so when an Aichi E13A1 “Jake” floatplane appeared. It had likely been sent out to determine the results of the attack on Don Isidore. Unarmed and with a top speed of only 10 knots, the captain decided that it was useless to try and outmaneuver the floatplane. He dropped the anchor and ordered everyone to take cover. The “Jake” then came around and dropped two 100pound bombs. Fortunately the pilot was a poor bombardier and both missed the ship by several hundred feet. He then strafed Florence D several times before flying off to the west. As the “Jake” disappeared Florence D continued on course. Ninety minutes later lookouts sighted Don Isidore. Although the two ships exchanged recognition signals, Don Isidore did not slow down as she continued to the south. She later lost rudder control and was beached on the north coast of Australia to avoid sinking. The Australian corvette Warrnambool eventually rescued her crew on February 20. Florence D’s captain now decided that it was too dangerous to proceed and turned back for Darwin. Unfortunately, his decision came too late; Hiryu’s nine dive bombers found the freighter 30 minutes later and launched an immediate attack. Although only two bombs hit, the first exploded in the forward cargo hold, which contained 3-inch AA shells and a large quantity of .50-caliber ammunition. The second bomb exploded amidships, immediately ensuring the death of Florence D. Within minutes she went down by the bow. Moorer, his crew and the surviving crewmen quickly abandoned ship. With the Filipino captain badly injured, Moorer and his co-pilot took over command. They eventually landed on the northern coast of Australia. There, the PBY personnel and most of the Filipino crewmen were rescued by the Warrnambool on February 23. Early on the morning of February 20 a lone RAAF Hudson bomber took off from Darwin. Pilot Archie Dunn had orders to fly a reconnaissance mission over Timor and Penfoi Bay. By 0900 the Hudson was off Roti Island when he sighted Admiral Nagumo’s carrier force. Dunn made a single low-level pass over the Japanese formation and then quickly decided to turn for home.25 Nagumo was headed for Kendari where he arrived on February 21. Several days later he was joined by Vice- Admiral Kondo Nobutake with the 4th Cruiser Squadron and 2/3rd Battleship Squadron. They were screened by the 4th Destroyer Squadron and 1/6th Destroyer Squadron. All the ships refueled while Nagumo and Nobutake made preparations for their next. This would be a highly destructive sortie into the Indian Ocean south of Java.

Air Attacks on Soerabaja By now Japanese aircraft were hammering Eastern Java almost at will.26 With plans to invade the island well underway

163

they sought to reduce the remaining Allied air and sea power. Sizeable naval units still operated from Soerabaja and the IJN put a high priority on this threat to their troop convoys. ABDAAIR losses were heavy in the first two weeks of February and soon little strength remained to contest the Japanese air raids.27

Chart 20: Japanese Attacks on Soerabaja, February 194228 Attack Date

Bombers Fighters Notes

1st

February 3

26

2nd 3rd

February 529 0 February 7 0

38 9

4th31

February 8

18

0

5th

February 9

18

0

6th34 7th

February 9 ? February 10 ?

? ?

8th

February 11 ?

?

9th 10th

February 18 21 February 19 1838

8 23

11th

February 20 0

13

12th

February 21 21

12

13th

February 24 24 9 (2 × waves) February 25 22 9 February 26 26 8 February 28 ? 12

14th 15th 16th

27

Marine Establishment and Morokrembangan Morokrembangan Morokrembangan; minimal damage30 Minimal material damage; 51 × dead, 52 wounded32 Marine Establishment and Perak Harbor(?); Minimal damage33 "35 Marine Establishment; Minimal damage36 Marine Establishment; Minimal damage37 Marine Establishment No ground targets attacked; air engagement only Marine Establishment and Perak Harbor39 Marine Establishment and Perak Harbor Marine Establishment and Perak Harbor Marine Establishment Marine Establishment Perak Harbor

Japanese bombers and fighters struck Soerabaja more than a dozen times in February. Unlike the attacks that obliterated Cavite Naval Yard in the Philippines40 and Darwin, their attacks on the ME had comparatively little effect on operations from a material standpoint.41 By the end of the East Indies campaign the naval base was still capable of operating at 90 percent capacity.42 Neither Cavite nor Darwin had effective AA or fighter defenses, which let the Japanese rain destruction virtually unmolested. In contrast, Soerabaja had an extensive, well-prepared defensive network. Though Dutch AA defenses were largely inadequate, flak over Soerabaja destroyed or damaged multiple Japanese aircraft. It also helped break up the bomber formations and disrupt their aim.43 Despite being greatly weakened as the campaign progressed, Allied fighters also played a role in limiting damage on the ground. And finally, the Japanese had a limited number of bombers available to deploy across a wide geographic area. As a result they were unable to shut down either the civilian or naval port at Soerabaja. Nonetheless, the attacks brought operations at the ME to

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Soerabaja was moored near the entrance of the ME when air raid klaxons sounded at 1120 on the morning of February 18. Probably because she was the largest ship in port the Japanese targeted Soerabaja. A bomb landed directly on an unsecured armored hatch and penetrated into her engine room.48 The blast gutted her engine room and knocked out all power. Twenty-two crewmen were killed with multiple wounded; seven of the latter would later die in the hospital.49 Tugs pulled the disabled ship into the ME and she tied up at one of the piers. In addition to destroying Soerabaja’s power plant the blast opened up a number of seams in her hull. Launched in 1910, Soerabaja did not have the compartmentation of a modern warship to minimize the flooding. Japanese photograph of Oedjoeng naval base (left) and Tandjoeng Perak (right) being bombed Her pumps were unable to keep up and soon she sank at a 15 degree angle. on February 18, 1942 (Netherlands Institute of Military History). As the ship had settled on a relatively a near standstill. In early February the base employed 18,000 even keel it was decided to leave her place as an AA battery. workers, the vast majority Indonesian. At the first sign of JapaDue to the list her large guns were unusable and two 75mm nese bombs they fled en masse. After the first attack 70 percent mounts were removed for shore use. Yard personnel were able to 80 percent of the “toekangs” (Indonesian foremen) and 90 to restore partial power from shore, which let her AA weapons percent of the unskilled “coolie” labor disappeared.44 By Febremain in use.50 ruary 23 only 3,000 Indonesian workers remained at work, leadDuring air raids on Soerabaja it was standard practice for ing to a crippling labor shortage for the remainder of the East Allied submarines to clear the submarine base and submerge in Indies campaign.45 Much maintenance and repair work was the outer harbor.51 The American S-39 would typically remain done at night to avoid the bombs. This put a huge strain on the at periscope depth and observe the attack. If forced to remain crews of Allied warships needing to refuel and refit. on the surface she and the Dutch boats would man machine While damage ashore may have been slight, losses for the guns on the bridge and engage any Japanese aircraft that came KM began to climb. As Allied fighter strength ebbed the Japainto range.52 nese launched a series of damaging attacks on military and civilK-VII was in material reserve to start the war. On February ian shipping. Although many ships were only damaged they 18 she lay in the submarine base as a yard crew worked to bring were put out of action and could not be repaired in time. Others her back into operational service. K-VII was unable to move so were hit multiple times while awaiting repairs and further inher captain pulled the plug to wait it out on the bottom. A capacitated. bomb exploded directly above the boat and K-VII was lost with On February 14 Japanese reconnaissance planes reported her entire crew of 13 men.53 There was no time to raise her bea strong Allied fleet anchored at Soerabaja. They launched fore the end of the campaign. a series of air raids on the port on February 15, 16 and 18.46 Also hit that day was the auxiliary minelayer Bangkalan. The attack on February 18 consisted of 23 Betty bombers esShe had originally been launched as a tug, but was taken over corted by 15 Zeros47; they raided the ME and caused heavy by the Gouvernmentsmarine for use as an auxiliary survey ship. damage. In early 1942 she was again taken over, this time by the KM, The gunnery training ship Soerabaja, reserve submarine for conversion into an auxiliary minelayer. The newly commisK-VII and auxiliary minelayer Bangkalan were all hit. After sioned ship had only been put into service two days earlier when taking part in the Australian-Dutch operation to occupy Porshe was hit by a Japanese bomb. Bangkalan went back into the tuguese Timor in December, Soerabaja had returned to the ME. ME and never re-entered Dutch service. There she resumed her prewar role as a gunnery training ship. On February 21 Japanese bombers again hit Soerabaja, When the attacks on Oedjong and Perak started in early Febclaiming hits on a cruiser and a merchant ship. However, the ruary she was used as a mobile AA battery and moved to various only casualty that day was the hospital ship Op ten Noort; she spots in the roadstead. had taken over by the KM for conversion into a hospital ship

18. The Destruction of Port Darwin

165

torpedoes available.60 When fired, it either exploded on the reef or did little damage to Kota Radja and she remained firmly lodged on Queen Olga Rock. Klijn then returned to the ME for further orders. TM 11 now loaded an “ancient” torpedo which had been scrounged up in the torpedo workshop.61 Also aboard was Commander J.J. van der Have, chief torpedo officer for the East Indies Squadron. He made no detailed calculations and simply stood behind the torpedo tube and “eye-balled” the range. This time the torpedo scored a direct hit but was still unable to dislodge Kota Radja. At that point Kota Radja was abandoned in place and left to burn herself out. Banckert was hit in the same air raid and left with a gaping hole in her bow. This put her out of action. Also hit and damaged were the GM patrol boat Fomalhaut and the auxiliary minelayers Ciska and Holland.62 Although not sunk, none of the damaged ships would be repaired or put back into service before the Japanese invaded Java in early March. Four days later, on February 28, Banckert was damaged again which sealed her fate. Although not hit directly she received a series of very close near misses which lifted the destroyer out of the water and violently dumped her back down. The explosions and subsequent drop broke or severely damaged Banckert’s keel and permanently put the destroyer out of action.63 Heavily damaged at the same time were the KM minesweepers A and B; neither returned to service. Until now, Soerabaja’s civilian port of Tandjoeng Perak had largely been spared as the Japanese focused on the ME and Morokrembangan. Then on March 1, a heavy air attack struck Tandjoeng Perak. There was heavy damage to shore installations and the KPM merchant vessel Batak was lost. Undergoing repairs from a prior attack, she lay in one of the small civilian drydocks; the dock received a direct bomb hit that capsized both it and Batak.64 The KNIL was responsible for providing AA defense throughout the East Indies. The preferred supplier of heavy weapons for all branches of the KNIL and KM was the Swedish Bofors factory. There were plans to upgrade the KNIL’s air defense arsenal but the outbreak of war in September 1939 dramatically impacted the availability and delivery of additional equipment. There were only four heavy AA batteries (1 × 105mm and 3 × 80mm) with a total of 40 guns for the entire archipelago in December 1941. These Kota Radja burning after being grounded on Queen Olga Rock. In the foreground is the Gouvern- were a mixture of mobile and fixed mentsmarine survey ship Willebrord Snellius (Netherlands Institute of Military History). weapons.

in December 1941 and had just entered service on February 14. Although clearly marked with white paint and large red crosses, two Japanese bombers each made a separate attack on the ship in the Westwater Channel that killed a doctor, nurse and medical technician54; 11 others were wounded.55 The resulting damage to her bow forced Op ten Noort back into the ME for repairs. February 24 was the largest raid to date with bombers attacking both the ME and Tandjoeng Perak in the morning and late afternoon. Although the Japanese claimed one merchant ship sunk and three others damaged, the only merchant ship hit was 7,177 ton Rotterdam Lloyd freighter Kota Radja.56 She had been loading a cargo of rubber that caught fire and burned heavily. Her crew was unable to extinguish the flames and eventually abandoned ship.57 Completely burnt out, Kota Radja was towed out of Tandjoeng Perak by the GM survey vessel Willebrord Snellius and grounded on Queen Olga Rock.58 Her cargo of rubber continued to burn and she emitted a huge column of black smoke visible for miles. Not only did it give Japanese bombers an excellent navigation aid, it also provided a clear indicator of wind direction. The minelayer Krakatau received orders to sink Kota Radja that evening. Despite pumping multiple 75mm rounds into her hulk the merchant ship stubbornly refused to sink. The motor torpedo boat TM 11 was then ordered to sink her.59 The KM was unwilling to waste a modern torpedo so her skipper, Sub-Lieutenant K. Klijn, was given one of the oldest

166

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Chart 21: Planned AA Defenses for NEI Ports65 Machine Guns Djamoeang Reef 66 ? ? Lake Tondano 67 Madoera Multiple 7.7mm and 12.7mm Soerabaja " Tandjoeng Priok

"

Tjilatjap

3 × 12.7mm "

40mm

80mm

? ? —

? ? 1 × battery (4 × guns) 60–80 × guns 7 × batteries (28 × guns) 15–20 × guns 3 × batteries (12 × guns) 20–30 × guns 4 × batteries (16 × guns) 95–130 × guns 60 × guns

These were supplemented by Bofors 40mm AA guns bought from Sweden prior to September 1939. The KNIL ordered a large number of Rheinmetal 20mm cannon from Germany, but only 30 reached Java before Germany occupied Holland.68 The Dutch attempted to acquire modern 75mm AA guns from Bofors, but their efforts were completely disrupted by the war in Europe. Soerabaja’s air defenses comprised just eight 80mm guns, which included four guns emplaced on the south coast of Madoera adjacent to the ME.69 The defenses at Tandjoeng Priok were equally weak with a total of four 80mm and six 40mm guns. Morokrembangan was even weaker with just two 20mm cannon. As the primary airfield for the defense of Soerabaja, the naval airdrome at Perak received four 105mm and four 40mm guns. There were also multiple 7.7mm and 12.7mm machine gun emplacements. These were supplemented by weapons salvaged from damaged and destroyed flying boats, but they were ineffective against anything other than low-flying fighters.70 In early February Soerabaja’s air defenses were reinforced by the British 21st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment with nine 40mm guns, and the 77th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment with nine 3.7-inch weapons. Both units had been evacuated from Singapore when its loss became imminent. Even with these additional weapons the port’s defenses were still considered inadequate. In particular, the 77th HAAR was hampered by a shortage of ammunition after the merchant ship Derrymore was lost with her cargo of 3.7-inch shells during the evacuation of Singapore. Many of the British guns would be evacuated to Tjilatjap in early March.

“They aren’t going to fight” It could be logically assumed that the port’s air defenses would be supplemented by the AA weapons of those ships anchored in the naval basin and outer harbor. This was the case when Houston experienced two air raids on February 25 while moored next to De Ruyter in the ME. The Americans were shocked and angry to see the entire crew of De Ruyter leave their guns completely unmanned and file off the ship and into bomb shelters ashore during the attacks.71 By gosh that was something we didn’t understand. Why in the Sam Hill would they [the Dutch] do that? They’d head for those air raid shelters like a bunch of rats.72

The feeling aboard ship was, “Well, you can’t trust them. They aren’t going to fight.”73

Unbeknownst to the Americans, this was standard practice for KM and GM ships when moored in port. With no AA guns larger than 40mm, the Dutch cruiser could not reach the Japanese bombers which flew high and out of range. It was felt that putting the crew ashore was a safer alternative. Unfortunately, it did nothing to alleviate tension which continued to exist between Dutch and American sailors.

Allied Radar Units on Java It has long been put forth that Allied forces in the East Indies lacked radar. This was accurate for the majority of the East Indies campaign. As a result, ABDA-AIR and ABDAFLOAT both suffered heavy aircraft losses on the ground. But it remains largely unknown that American and British forces on Java received no less than 17 operational radar sets of various types. That said, none of the equipment reached Java until late January/early February. As a result it was extremely delayed in coming online and was able to offer only limited benefit. Prior to the arrival of American and British radar, the primary Dutch air warning system utilized a series of observation points which conveyed reports of Japanese aircraft via radio and telephone. It was a process that did not always work correctly, accurately or fast enough. The head of ABDA-AIR, General Brereton, quickly recognized its inherent weakness. In January he dispatched a team under the command of Colonel William H. Murphy to review the situation and prepare for the arrival of American radar units that were en route to the East Indies. A member of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, Colonel Murphy was a highly regarded prewar radar specialist who flew in from Hawaii at the request of General Brereton. Accompanying him were Major Joseph A. Burch (a former civilian radio installation expert),74 1st Lieutenant Glenn H. Boes (Operations Officer, 19th Bombardment Group, who had recently been evacuated from the Philippines; Boes also graduated from Kansas State University in 1939 with a degree in civil engineering, which made him useful for assisting with the placement and construction of radar facilities) and 2nd Lieutenant Irvin R. Kriel of the 32nd Fighter Squadron.75 Murphy’s orders were to inspect “radio equipment” which had recently arrived on Java.76 In reality, this equipment comprised eight SCR268 Gun Laying Radar77 sets that reached Soerabaja on the merchant ship S.S. President Polk on January 28.78 President Polk originally departed San Francisco on December 7 carrying nine P-40 and 14 P-39 fighters. She was to arrive in Manila on January 15 but was recalled when Pearl Harbor was attacked.79 President Polk was unloaded and reloaded with new cargo; she sailed on December 19 for Brisbane and arrived January 12. The heavily laden cargo ship carried 55 P-40E fighters (crated); four C-53 Skytroopers (crated); 20,000,000 .30-caliber rounds; 447,000 .50-caliber rounds; 30,000 3-inch AA

18. The Destruction of Port Darwin

167 onel Calvert H. Arnold, theater communications officer (based in Australia),86 then turned it over to Ensign John D. Salisbury, USNR, for the defense of Soerabaja.87 These eight Radar sets, consisting of 16 large trailers, arrived at Soerabaja on the U.S.S.S [sic] President Polk on January 28th last year.88

The radar units—all SCR268 models—were transported to the KNIL barracks at Darmo in Soerabaja. Darmo was the headquarters and primary depot for the KNIL Anti-Aircraft Corps; here they would be assembled and site placement determined. However, the equipment had been delivered without instruction manuals. Security required that they ship separately; as a result the manuals, not surprisingly, disappeared somewhere between San Francisco and Darmo.89 As apparently no one on Java had prior experience with SCR268 radar set in French North Africa (National Archives and Records Administration). radar, assembly was delayed by several weeks. rounds; 5,000 75mm rounds; 81 oxygen cylinders; five carloads British forces in Singapore operated multiple Mobile of Navy torpedoes; 615,495 pounds of rations and 233 officers Radar Units (MRUs)90 and Gun Laying (GL)91 units throughand men, including 55 pilots.80 out the Malaya campaign. With Singapore about to fall many The radar equipment was apparently not listed as such on were disassembled and put on merchant vessels for Java or President Polk’s cargo manifest. Given the highly secret nature Sumatra. Although more than 1,000 tons of radar equipment of the equipment it could have been classified. Early radar sets was lost on the merchant ships Derrymore and Loch Ranza, were often referred to as radio equipment and could simply six MRUs and three GL sets reached Batavia in mid–February.92 have been designated as such. On what ships they arrived is unknown. The equipment itself had initially belonged to the 557th A Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit (RIMU) just Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion. This unit was formed at San arrived from Singapore was immediately ordered to put two of Francisco in early December for transport to the Philippines them into operation as part of the air defense network at Tandwhere it would reinforce those radar units already in place. It joeng Priok. The Dutch built two 95-foot bamboo towers and consisted of a headquarters company, plotting battalion, two provided buildings and phone lines for a filter room. They becompanies of aircraft warning/reporting equipment and 10 discame operational 10 days later on February 26.93 They were tant reporting platoons. Its equipment was to include at least manned by RAF personnel evacuated from Singapore under six SCR268 and SCR27081 units.82 the leadership of Wing Commander Gerald Bell, who later It is unclear if the unit was already loaded on a merchant wrote: ship that was recalled or still ashore. Personnel of the 557th We managed to deploy such Radar equipment as we had been able to Signal Aircraft Warning Battalion were redeployed to Fort Lawbring away from Malaya and linked that into a makeshift Operations Room from which we controlled, as best we could, such fighter airton, Washington.83 Their equipment was put aboard President craft as had managed to reach the two airfields in the Batavia area.94 84 Polk for delivery to Java. In Brisbane she offloaded the aircraft, The RIMU team then moved across Java to assist Ensign passengers and some cargo. She took on additional cargo and Salisbury with his radar units. One was put into operation at ground personnel for USAAF bombers operating from Dutch Darmo.95 A second was erected just east of Soerabaja in the airfields and sailed for Java.85 Sitoebondo region.96 At the same time, another team took three En route to Java President Polk was part of a convoy that SCR268 units to Madoera.97 One was installed in the massive consisted of the freighter Hawaiian Planter and navy tanker coastal fortification at Modoeng where it operated February 18 USS Pecos. They were escorted by the Houston and two USN to March 9.98 destroyers. The convoy put into Soerabaja on January 28 and The second unit became operational at Parmakasan on the radar equipment was unloaded on or about February 1. Col-

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February 24.99 It does not appear that the unit at Tambaroe became operational. A unit at Pasion was also planned but does not appear to have been constructed before Java fell. The remaining three SCR268 remained at Darmo where their eventual fate would become a matter of concern to U.S. forces following the fall of Java. This equipment was never manned by American personnel.100 The Dutch were generally in charge and were given hand grenades and instructions as to how to destroy the equipment if and when such destruction became necessary. They were told to use the gasoline for the engine to set fire to the equipment with special emphasis on the complete destruction of the keyer, modulator and transmitter units.101

Soerabaja was not the only target. On West Java, Allied airfields received attention from Japanese Army Air Force bombers and fighters now based at Palembang. As in East Java, substantial numbers of ABDA-AIR fighters initially put up a vigorous fight. But as their losses mounted the Japanese were able to inflict an increasingly heavy amount of damage to both air and sea facilities. Even the small ships of the Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol received attention. They had continued to patrol the strait each night to prevent infiltration of Japanese troops and other subversive elements into Java from occupied Sumatra. By day, the RAN ship anchored off Merak or Labuhan; the KM ships always anchored at Merak.102 They were continuously passed over by formations of Japanese aircraft en route to Tandjoeng Priok or the various airfields that dotted Western Java.

The Japanese ignored them until the morning of February 27 when bombers attacked the 21st Minesweeping Flotilla, Soemba, Sirius and Fazant at Merak. They focused on Soemba, which was bracketed by 15 bombs; although not hit, she suffered extensive shrapnel damage. In return, Soemba’s gunners claim to have shot down one Japanese bomber.103 Two crewmen were hit. One of these, Ordinary Seaman W.G. van de Wel, was badly injured as he manned the ship’s 75mm AA gun. Although mortally wounded he remained at his post and helped fire off seven more rounds. He finally collapsed as the attack ended. Van de Wel104 died from internal bleeding at 1900 that evening and was buried at sea north of Krakatau an hour later.105 Patrols in the Soenda Strait continued that night. However, both Rieger and Sirius were bombed twice on February 28 in Bantam Bay off Merak.106 During one of these attacks three Japanese bombers dropped more than 80 bombs on Sirius.107 Despite this rain of explosives, the patrol boat suffered only one near miss, which left a gaping hole in her outer hull. Although the Allies did not realize it, Merak was the location of the planned Japanese invasion of Western Java. Their aircraft were softening up the area in advance of their landings. As a result, the area was considered too exposed for further operations. The 21st Minesweeper Flotilla was ordered to Tjilatjap while Lieutenant-Commander De Jong van Been en Donk was ordered back to Tanjoeng Priok.

Chapter 19

Fire in the Night: The Loss of Bali and Timor The Combined Striking Force Retreats

proceed and an invasion force left Makassar on the night of February 17–18. The convoy consisted of the auxiliary transports Sagami Maru and Sasago Maru with the destroyers Asashio, Oshio, Arashio and Michisio in close escort. The light cruiser Nagara and destroyers Hatsushimo, Nenohi and Wakaba followed behind and provided a distant covering force from a position in the Banda Sea. From Kubo’s course no one could positively identify his destination, although most Allied leaders on Java initially thought it to be Timor. The landing force consisted of the 3rd Battalion (minus one company), one mountain gun platoon, radio and field units, an engineer platoon and part of the anchorage headquarters of the 1st Formosa Infantry Regiment of the 48th Infantry Division. All had been withdrawn from combat duty in the Philippines when other units on Borneo could not find adequate sea transport in time to meet the scheduled departure date. Following the operation in the Bangka Strait Doorman’s strike force was widely scattered. De Ruyter and Java were with Piet Hein, Kortenaer, Pope and John D. Ford. Barker and Bulmer also lay in Tjilatjap, but due to the damage suffered in the Bangka Strait neither was capable of offensive action and the decision had been made to send them to Australia for repairs and refit. Tromp was at Soerabaja, while Stewart, John D. Edwards, Parrott and Pillsbury refueled at Ratai Bay on Southern Sumatra. Witte de With and Banckert were at the ME but could not join Doorman’s force. Witte de With lay in overhaul and could not be readied in time. Although operational, Banckert was badly damaged in an air raid on the morning of February 18. Evertsen was still working up; her crew was not sufficiently trained for the destroyer to be considered fully operational. With his scattered forces Doorman could do little to assemble when he received word that Kubo was on the move. Once air reconnaissance confirmed the convoy’s destination, Doorman ordered his ships to raise steam and make for Bali while he formulated a battle plan “on the fly.” The plan he came up with was not particularly desirable and was forced upon him out of necessity. As time was critical the CSF would not have a chance to concentrate. Rather, the Allied attack would consist of three waves that started from different points around Java and Southern Sumatra.

As ABDA unraveled Rear-Admiral Doorman and ViceAdmiral Helfrich again met on February 17. Doorman told his superior of the CSF’s inability to operate in the Western Java Sea without air cover. With the loss of P.1 and P.2 it was not possible to keep a large force of warships off Western Java. Doorman stated that until ABDA could provide adequate air cover, it was his intention to concentrate the CSF in the Eastern Java Sea.1 Knowing the depleted state of Allied air power on Java Helfrich could do little but concur. After the war he wrote, “After the occupation of South-Sumatra … I felt that a continued concentration [of warships] in the West was too risky. They had to vanish again (i.e., ‘run’).”2 Meanwhile, the Japanese were moving to consolidate their position in the eastern half of the East Indies as well. On February 14 MLD planes reported seven transports escorted by seven destroyers and three cruisers off Kendari. Three days later they sighted a smaller convoy of two cruisers and two destroyers escorting three transports 50 miles southwest of Ambon. At the same time, Allied intelligence reported that an invasion was preparing to depart Makassar for Bali.3 A landing at Bali was originally not part of the Japanese plan as they had the airfield at Kendari. Despite its well-lit, allweather runways, the Japanese quickly discovered that the fickle weather patterns over Kendari often kept flying time to a minimum. It was this inability to bomb Soerabaja on a regular basis that prompted them to move on Bali. As with Timor, closure of Bali’s Den Passar airfield would ensure that the air route between Australia and Java was closed for good. Capture of Den Passar would also give them a forward air base just two miles off the eastern shore of Java. It would also let the Japanese to strike Soerabaja and Eastern Java’s airfields at will. They were confident they could then deal Allied air power a sledgehammer blow. They could also interdict any sea force attempting to contest the invasion of Java. Due to its close proximity to Java, the Japanese considered the Bali operation extremely vulnerable to both air and sea counterattack. For his part, Rear-Admiral Kubo simply wanted to land the ground elements and clear his ships out of the area as soon as possible before ABDA could retaliate. Despite Kubo’s concerns and the obvious risks involved, the Japanese chose to

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The first wave, consisting of De Ruyter, Java and their destroyers, left Tjilatjap on the evening of February 18. Bad luck struck immediately when Kortenaer temporarily lost rudder control and ran aground while threading her way out of Tjilatjap’s treacherous narrow harbor channel. The destroyer could not be pulled off until the morning tide and was then forced into Soerabaja for repairs. Unable to wait, Doorman continued with only Piet Hein, Pope and John D. Ford to screen his cruisers. The second wave consisted of the 58th Destroyer Division under Commander T.H. Binford. Stewart, Parrott, John D. Edwards and Pillsbury had orders to leave Ratai Bay at full speed and join Tromp at Soerabaja. They rendezvoused with the Dutch cruiser on February 18 and the force sortied that afternoon. The third wave consisted of the Dutch motor torpedo boat squadron. They were included at the last minute on the suggestion of either Vice-Admiral Helfrich in Badoeng or RearAdmiral Koenraad at Soerabaja.4 TM 4, TM 5, TM 6, TM 8, TM 9, TM 10, TM 11, TM 13 and TM 15 sailed from Soerabaja at 2100 on February 18.5 They were to attack in two groups. Due to the torpedo boats’ vulnerability to damage TM 13 was to trail behind and serve a rescue boat if necessary. They left the harbor in complete darkness with each boat following only the small navigation light on the boat ahead. The skipper of TM 6 confused the light of a navigation buoy for that of the boat he was following. He tried to turn away at the last second but it was too late. The torpedo boat rammed into the buoy, forcing TM 6 back to base to have her hull inspected.6 The others continued to Pang Pang Bay, near the small coastal village of Banjoewangi on Java’s east coast where they were to refuel from the minelayer Krakatau. In the meantime, Rear- Admiral Koenraad dispatched three trucks with 120 drums of benzine. They were to transfer the drums to Krakatau which would refuel the MTBs prior to their attack. The torpedo boats would refuel from her again on their return trip to Soerabaja. However, the trucks become lost en route to the coast and were three hours late arriving at Banjoewangi. The torpedo boats moored next to Krakatau early on the morning of February 19.7 The operation was further delayed by Krakatau having only hand pumps, which slowed the pace of refueling. As they prepared to sortie, TM 5 suffered engine problems which reduced her to travel on just two propellers. However, instead of sending her back to base, she took the place of TM 13 as rescue boat. Making 17 knots, the remaining boats sailed for the Badoeng Strait at 2145 on the night of February 19.8 Doorman’s plan called for each of his three waves to attack independently. The first was to approach through the southern entrance of the Badoeng Strait from the Indian Ocean shortly after 0000 on February 19. Badoeng Strait is a 15-mile-wide channel that separates Bali from Noesa Besar, a small island in the Flores Archipelago. The nearest passable water channel to eastern Java, it represented a major thoroughfare for mer-

chant shipping in the eastern East Indies doing trade with Australia. By the time Doorman’s first wave appeared, Rear-Admiral Kubo had already landed his troops on a small beach near Den Passar and was ready to depart. He did not risk his entire force in the Badoeng Strait. Nagara and her destroyers remained in the Banda Sea, leaving Arashio, Asashio, Michisio and Oshio to cover the transports Sagami Maru and Sasago Maru during the actual landings.

“Take off, you’re on your own!” American planes from Java arrived over the strait at dawn on February 19. First word of the landings had reached Java at 0200 and the USAAF was ordered to prepare its 13 heavy bombers and seven A-24 dive bombers for action at dawn. The first planes arrived over Bali at 0700 and the Americans continued to pound away at the Japanese all day. Their attacks numbered 18 by dusk.9 Two of the A-24s were flown by Captain Harry Galusha and Lieutenant Julius Summers of the 27th Bombardment Group. The dive bombers were fueled and loaded with one 660-pound bomb and one 110-pound bomb each. They were awaiting orders at Malang Airfield when klaxons signaled the approach of Japanese aircraft at 1245.10 Galusha and Summers were ordered to take off immediately and fly around south of the airfield for one hour. The last instructions they received were simply, “Take off, you’re on your own!”11 Although they had no orders to do so, the two aircraft headed toward Bali. Breaking through the clouds at 11,000 feet, the dive bombers nosed over and targeted a transport and what they thought was a cruiser. They dropped their ordnance from 3,000 feet in the face of light AA fire. Summers missed the warship completely, while Galusha claimed a direct hit on the transport. Their attacks were the first dive bomber attacks ever carried out by the USAAF. Both pilots then returned to Malang where they were later decorated for their initiative and bravery. As at Palembang a few days earlier, Japanese air cover was initially strong but gradually died away. This was fortunate as strong air attacks on eastern Java tied up most of the ABDAAIR fighters, leaving very few to escort the bombers. They claimed four direct hits and 12 near misses.12 Although postwar historians would later dismiss many of these claims as being exaggerated, it now appears that the air attacks were more effective than once thought. Although no ships were lost to air attack off Bali on February 19, Sasago Maru received light damage from several near misses.13 Sagami Maru was heavily damaged by either a direct hit or near miss. A Japanese postwar report states, “One transport was hit by a bomb and her broadside became useless.”14 The damage knocked her boilers offline and the ship was only able to get under way with much difficulty.15 It would appear that this damage came from one of the B-17 attacks or Captain Galusha. Both transports were able to continue putting men and equipment ashore without delay.

19. Fire in the Night

Seawolf in the Badoeng Strait The only Allied vessel in the immediate vicinity of Bali was the American submarine Seawolf. Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander F.B. Warder, she had been positioned near the Lombok Strait in anticipation of an invasion and was thus the first to attack. As it turned out, hers would be the only naval resistance encountered by the Japanese throughout the initial landings. At 0715 on the morning of February 19 Seawolf was just outside the southern entrance of the Badoeng Strait. Her sound operator picked up two sets of propellers to the north but no ships could be seen. Warder then decided to move further into the Badoeng Strait to investigate. By 2115 that evening Seawolf had surfaced and was approaching Sanur Roads where the Japanese landings had taken place. In the distance, lookouts could see flames at the nearby coastal village of Benoa.16 At 0240 on the morning of February 20 her lookouts spotted a Japanese destroyer at a range of 1,000 yards and immediately dived. It was now raining heavily and visibility was so bad that Seawolf circled in the Badoeng Strait until he could fix his position. At 0604 he spotted another destroyer to the south and Warder realized that he had already penetrated the Japanese A/S screen.17 Seawolf was now very close to shore as Warder searched for the Japanese transports. At 0630 she ran aground but was able to back off almost immediately. At 0642 the submarine grounded very heavily. This time the situation was more serious. The submarine was unable to back off while submerged, creating a highly dangerous situation for Seawolf as the Japanese escorts were on alert for ABDA submarines. After several failed attempts while submerged, Warder finally gave orders to blow the main ballast tanks at 0643. From the bridge, Warder quickly discovered that his boat was in an enclosed lagoon ringed by coral reefs and patches of dark shoal water. It quickly became obvious that Seawolf would have to remain on the surface to have any hope of getting out. Again, the submarine was lucky. Seawolf surfaced in the middle of a heavy rainstorm that reduced visibility to 500 to 1,000 yards, so Warder was able to negotiate the coral and re-enter the Badoeng Strait by 0654. Warder now continued his slow crawl toward the convoy. En route he sighted a Japanese four-engine flying boat low over the water and was forced to dive again. In the distance, another destroyer patrolled the strait. At 1350 on the afternoon of February 19, lookouts spotted Sagami Maru and Sasago Maru being escorted by Arashio, Asashio, Michisio and Oshio. Running silent, Warder crept into torpedo range and fired two torpedoes at each transport. He spotted the first pair miss their target as the destroyers charged in. Warder took Seawolf down to 110 feet but the submarine still took a strong beating. Many depth charges exploded in close succession so the crew was unsure of how many were dropped. Warder estimated the number to be at least 43, possibly more. Because of flooding from several small leaks in her

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hull the submarine eventually ended up at 170 feet. A section of the hull was pushed in about six inches and several gauges were smashed. However, according to Warder’s post-patrol report, actual damage to Seawolf was minimal.18 At 1618 Seawolf came back up to periscope depth. Through the periscope Warder saw three of the destroyers escorting one of the transports northwards at 10 knots. The other trailed some distance behind with the fourth destroyer in escort.19 It was obvious that the latter transport had been damaged, as she was down by the bow and listing noticeably to starboard.20 As darkness fell Seawolf surfaced to charge her batteries. At 2300 her bridge crew heard gunfire and saw searchlights as the first wave of Rear-Admiral Doorman’s squadron engaged the Japanese. The submarine quickly dove when a searchlight swept the area. With that, her role in the Battle of the Badoeng Strait ended. Ashore, the poorly motivated garrison of 600 Balinese militia deserted almost immediately.21 Their Dutch commander, Lieutenant-Colonel W.P. Roodenburg, was further disgusted to learn that through a misunderstanding of his orders, Den Passar airfield had not been blown up. His order not to delay its demolition was misread by the engineers who thought he wanted the operation delayed. This let the Japanese take the air strip completely intact by 2230 on the night of February 19.

The Battle of the Badoeng Strait Rear-Admiral Kubo now turned his covering force away from Bali and set course for Makassar. With his mission completed, Kubo wanted to leave Bali’s exposed shores as soon as possible and get his ships home in one piece. By 2300 he was well north of the Badoeng Strait, effectively taking him out of the coming fight. He left Arashio, Michisio, Asashio and Oshio to escort the two transports to Makassar. Arashio and Michisio were detailed to look after the crippled Sagami Maru. With a top speed of just seven knots on one propeller, she got under way in the early evening after emergency repairs to her boiler room. 22 When the first ABDA ships arrived they were moving north toward the north entrance of the Badoeng Strait. This left only Asashio and Oshio to escort Sasago Maru out of the strait. The transport had remained behind to recover the last of her landing craft.23 They were ready to get under way by 2230.24 At 2300 Japanese lookouts sighted unknown ships; the Allies opened fire just as they were spotted. The first wave of Doorman’s three-stage attack arrived off the south tip of Bali at 2130 on February 19 in column formation. De Ruyter and Java led with the destroyers 5,500 yards behind. Piet Hein led John D. Ford and Pope, who trailed her by the same distance.25 Shortly after rounding the southern tip of Bali they passed the Dutch motor torpedo boats, which were close inshore and moving north.26 The general course was north. Battle speed was 27 knots. It was a dark night with little wind and a calm sea; visibility

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was approximately 8,700 yards.27 Aboard De Ruyter, crewmen on her port side saw only the dark cliffs of Bali’s shoreline. In the distance the village of Benoa continued to burn. In a striking contrast, those to starboard were treated to a beautiful view of the horizon.28 At 2230 a lookout on De Ruyter sighted a ship to starboard, but it disappeared behind Noesa Besar. No Japanese ships were in that part of the strait, so it was either a phantom or a native prauw. Thirty minutes later Java sighted three silhouettes to port against the dark Bali shore.29 The ship’s 2nd Gunnery Officer later wrote: Suddenly, I saw to port at two points, under the Bali shore, three silhouettes, one of an empty cargo ship, one of a destroyer and one of a surfaced submarine, as I then thought; after thinking about it later it might also have been a large landing craft.30 We notified the Squadron Commander [Doorman] via Ultra Short-Range Radio. We received no order to open fire on these ships … when the targets were almost completely broadside, the EC31 finally gave the long-awaited command.32

Rear-Admiral Doorman had established a fire control plan that called for Java to engage enemy targets to port; likewise, De Ruyter was to engage any Japanese ships to starboard. As not all of Java’s 5.9-inch guns were mounted centerline, this

meant that she could only bring a maximum of seven guns to bear on these targets. As she approached the Japanese ships, Java opened searchlights and fired three flares at 2225 to illuminate the area for John D. Ford, Pope and Piet Hein.33 Java’s main guns and 40mm AA battery simultaneously went into action at a range of 2,200 yards. Java’s targets were Asashio, Oshio and Sasago Maru.34 Her searchlights locked onto Asashio and the Japanese destroyer was completely surprised. Dutch lookouts could plainly see crewmen running across her deck as Lieutenant-Commander Yoshii Goro sounded General Quarters. Java fired three salvos before Asashio lit a searchlight of her own which was initially thought to be on shore. It swung around the bay in a wide circle before coming to rest on Java.35 The cruiser’s 40mm AA battery, under the command of Lieutenant R. Ritsema van Eck, immediately fired at the searchlight. It went out and was observed to fall into the sea. Asashio was hit several more times. A Japanese report states that she engaged a “cruiser of the Java class” and suffered multiple hits: “A searchlight was hit by shells of medium and light caliber, so it fell into the sea. The Radar36 and port machine guns were put out of action by shrapnel.”37 Java fired five more salvos from her main battery before the angle became too great for most guns to bear.38 She claimed multiple hits on Asashio. Sasago Maru was also hit by several 5.9-inch shells.39 The Japanese destroyer was slightly damaged with four crewmen killed and 11 wounded.40 In return, Asashio put a single 5-inch round into Java’s port side; there was no fire or loss of speed thanks to efficient damage control. This phase of the battle lasted less than 10 minutes. With her guns trained to starboard, De Ruyter did not fire during the engagement. Believing they had inflicted major damage Rear-Admiral Doorman continued north through the Sapoedi Strait and skirted the north coast of Madoera. They put into Soerabaja through the Westwater Channel. Behind them, flashes and gunfire could be seen as Piet Hein, John D. Ford and Pope engaged a fully alert Asashio and Oshio.41 The Japanese destroyers had aggressively turned into the attack to face the Dutch cruisers. Asashio continued east for

19. Fire in the Night several minutes after the withdrawal of De Ruyter and Java before turning southeast. Oshio followed a parallel course but went farther east. This course change brought Asashio into contact with Piet Hein, which was still sailing ahead of John D. Ford and Pope was on a course due north. Piet Hein launched three torpedoes against Sagami Maru.42 It is possible that one hit the merchant ship,43 but this remains unclear.44 John D. Ford and Pope then saw Piet Hein zigzag left to right and make a hard turn to starboard behind a screen of white and black smoke.45 The smoke hid the Japanese from view who concentrated their fire on Piet Hein. The Dutch destroyer returned fire from her main battery and 75mm gun; she also launched two more torpedoes which the Japanese evaded.46 Pope and John D. Ford increased speed to 28 knots and turned east in an attempt to close on Piet Hein. At 2237 Pope launched two torpedoes at a transport or “light cruiser” while John D. Ford fired three more at a range of only 3,000 yards.47 One of the torpedoes may have hit Sagami Maru, but the night action was becoming very confused and there is no way of telling. At this point, multiple Dutch sources are adamant that Piet Hein took friendly fire from John D. Ford, Pope or possibly both American destroyers. Surviving crewmen on her bridge later testified that Lieutenant-Commander J.M.L.I. Chömpf ordered the hard turn to starboard to set up his second torpedo attack. This maneuver put Piet Hein on a south course so that she was unexpectedly approaching the American destroyers. Her survivors indicate that the Americans at this point apparently mistook her for a Japanese vessel and opened fire.4849

“Continue firing until the last moment” At 2310 Piet Hein was struck by two 5-inch shells. The first struck amidships and destroyed the searchlight platform. It caused a fire so large that the bridge could only be evacuated by jumping down to Mount 2. The second exploded in the rear boiler room and severed the main steamline, causing the ship to go dead in the water. Asashio then passed by at close range and raked Piet Hein with her 25mm AA cannons.50 Three officers and several crewmen were lost in this attack. As Piet Hein drifted in the current one of her engineering officers, Major-Machinist N. Slot, approached LieutenantCommander Chömpf. He requested orders now that the destroyer was immobilized. Chömpf replied, “Continue firing until the last moment.”51 The Japanese were then distracted by the arrival of John D. Ford and Pope and broke off their action against Piet Hein to engage them. The brief reprieve gave Piet Hein time to launch a lifeboat containing several badly wounded men which it took ashore. Through “extreme effort” the black gang restored some power and Piet Hein was slowly able to get under way.52 Barely had she done so when Asashio and Oshio returned to finish her off at 2316.53 Together, they launched nine torpedoes at a range of 1,000 yards.54 Piet Hein sank with heavy loss of life at 2330.55

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As the ship sank an engineering officer, 2nd Lieutenant W.M. van Moppes, made repeated trips below deck to carry wounded and unconscious stokers from the aft boiler room to safety. He was last seen going back below deck and did not survive the sinking. In total 64 crewmen lost their lives.56 Lieutenant-Commander Chömpf and Piet Hein’s Mount 2 commander were both decorated posthumously for gallantry in action and their leadership when abandoning ship. After the loss of Piet Hein only the two American destroyers were left. Pope and John D. Ford were immediately put on the defensive as Asashio and Oshio aggressively defended their transport. The Americans had orders to continue north up the Badoeng Strait engaging whatever targets presented them. But when the Dutch destroyer went down, they veered away from the battle as John D. Ford engaged Asashio. Oshio was still hidden to the American destroyers by Piet Hein’s smoke. Swayed by Asashio’s gunfire at 2324, Pope and John D. Ford continued circling south as they tried to get back on a northern course in accordance with Admiral Doorman’s orders. Both laid smoke and traded gunfire with Asashio as Oshio came up and joined the battle. Pressure from the Japanese ships was so strong that the American destroyers never completed their loop to the north. The four ships paralleled each other, trading torpedoes and gunfire as Pope and John D. Ford continued their effort to the north.57 When the Japanese thwarted this latest maneuver they attempted to mask themselves against the shore of Noesa Besar Island. This involved a turn to port, taking Pope and John D. Ford across the bow of Asashio and Oshio, leading to another heated action. By now, the Americans had enough. Pope launched five torpedoes to starboard as John D. Ford laid smoke to cover her stern.58 This held off the Japanese destroyers long enough for the Americans to break off and retire south at full speed. They never realized their orders to proceed north through the strait. As Oshio swept north she sighted a darkened ship, which she assumed to be hostile, and opened fire. The “enemy” ship was Asashio who returned fire on her also misidentified colleague. Their artillery exchange lasted several minutes to the amazement of the Americans as they retired to Tjilatjap. Despite the heavy firing, neither Asashio nor Oshio was damaged before realizing their error. They then fell into line and returned to the Sagami Maru. At first report of ABDA ships in the strait, Rear-Admiral Kubo ordered Arashio and Michisio to leave Sagami Maru and return down the strait. They had just cleared the northern mouth of the Badoeng strait and the distance required that they miss the entire first phase of the battle and most of the second. At the same time, Kubo turned his covering force back toward Bali at full speed.

“Badly damaged, badly damaged” The second wave of ABDA ships rounded the southern tip of Bali at 0109 on February 20 after a trip through the Bali

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Strait. Observing flares and explosions, Commander Binford once again.61 The Japanese held a southeastern course, letting unsuccessfully tried to make radio contact with Pope and John them cross behind Stewart, John D. Edwards and Parrott to D. Ford. After midnight Tromp dropped back; her role was to isolate Pillsbury. follow behind and use her 5.9-inch guns to finish off any cripThis brought Asashio and Oshio into direct contact with ples from the destroyer’s torpedoes. In reality, she ended up Tromp, which was completely surprised. Still trailing the 58th playing rearguard against a pair of very aggressive Japanese deDestroyer Division at 31 knots, she had been waiting for an opstroyers. portunity to attack. At 0207 one of her lookouts spotted someAs the ABDA ships plowed up the strait at 20 knots they thing to port. Before de Meester could react the cruiser was hit were challenged by a flurry of unreadable green lights. Captain by a searchlight beam; almost immediately it was followed by J.B. de Meester aboard Tromp was in command, but he did not the crash of a shell. know if they were Allied or Japanese. This was one of the hazThe three ships paralleled each other from 0207 to 0216 ards facing a multinational strike force that had little prior opat a range of 4,500 to 5,500 yards. Tromp experienced an illuerational experience, so he hesitated. Captain de Meester was minating display of Japanese gunnery, beginning at with a rain unwilling to initiate a naval brawl without knowing friend from of shells from Asashio. The first struck near the torpedo tubes, foe. damaging their fire controls. The second shell destroyed the Binford, however, knew surprise was crucial and ordered main fire control director. This forced the cruiser’s 5.9-inch and his destroyers to launch torpedoes at targets to port.59 Stewart 40mm AA guns to go on local control for the rest of the batand Parrott each fired six torpedoes and Pillsbury three more, tle.62 Two shells penetrated the hull just above the waterline. A at Asashio and Oshio, who now circled Sasago Maru in Sanoer fire broke out in one of the mechanics workshops but was exRoads. Spotting their luminous wakes in the calm water, the tinguished by Seaman Pieter de Ru and another crewman.63 A Japanese easily evaded the American torpedoes. fifth shell also penetrated just above the water and exploded in Binford then lost contact with the blacked-out Japanese the engine room. Yet another passed through the XO’s cabin ships against the dark Bali shore. A deadly waiting game foland exploded in Captain de Meester’s cabin. lowed as both sides stalked the other in the warm night. Stewart More shells fell mostly about the navigation bridge and then sighted Asashio and Oshio off her port beam. She fired conning tower, causing serious damage. One exploded in the starshells and torpedoes at 0136 and opened fire seven minutes junior officers quarters, opening a massive 22-square foot gash later. John D. Edwards attempted a four torpedo spread at the in the ship’s hull. Another hit one wing of the bridge, killing same time, but only two fired, while the others hung in their everyone in that section. It left a large hole in the deck and tubes. heavily damaged the ship’s radio compartment. The ship’s comThe torpedoes were again evaded and the Japanese quickly pass was also put out of action.64 Tromp also took a critical hit gave the new arrivals a dose of what the first wave had received. below the waterline in a fuel oil tank; it is unclear if this shell Their initial salvo straddled Stewart, and at 0146 a ricocheting exploded. shell killed one seaman and wounded her executive officer. A direct hit then flooded the steering engine room, putting Stewart out of control. The result was pandemonium.60 Parrott nearly plowed into her control-less leader, while John D. Edwards avoided Parrott only by exercising a hard turn to starboard. Pillsbury veered off to starboard, causing her to lose formation for the remainder of the battle. By switching to auxiliary control, Stewart regained the lead with John D. Edwards following; Parrott took up a course on their port side. Pillsbury ended up on the other side of the strait and eventually teamed up with Tromp. Again, Asashio and Oshio had thwarted the main ABDA strategy—which called for the Allied destroyers to charge into the transport anchorage, sinking as many ships as possible. Instead, they were forced away and headed for the north entrance of the strait. Firing ceased momentarily and the Damage to Tromp’s fire control director following the Battle of the Badoeng Strait (Netherwarm night was suddenly quiet and still lands Institute of Military History).

19. Fire in the Night

Rare photograph of a damaged bulkhead in Tromp’s engine room following the Battle of the Badoeng Strait. The shell did not explode (Netherlands Institute of Military History).

Simultaneously, Captain de Meester avoided a torpedo spread from Oshio. The barrage killed Lieutenant Commander S.C. Ritsema van Eck, Sub-Lieutenant A.C.V. Kriesfeld and eight ratings. Multiple others were wounded, including Seaman de Rue. A number of these crewmen died afterward. After the loss of her director Tromp had difficulty ranging and did not return fire until 0210. From 0210 to 0216 her gunners fired 71 5.9-inch shells and 240 rounds of 40mm ammunition.65 It was a rather impressive display of firepower considering the short duration of the firefight. Amid this flurry of fire, Oshio took at least one hit forward of her bridge around 0210–0211, killing seven men.66 Oshio also avoided destruction only by extreme luck; an Allied shell penetrated her main magazine … but failed to explode.67 All three ships then lost contact and ceased fire. Asashio and Oshio circled back around to Sasago Maru while Tromp continued north and joined Pillsbury. At that point Captain de Meester knew his ship was in trouble; he broke radio silence and sent a signal to Soerabaja: “Badly damaged, badly damaged.”68 The Allies continued north with the intention of withdrawing from the strait. Captain de Meester figured his role in the battle was over and wanted to get his damaged ship home. They now contacted Arashio and Michisio who had left Sasago Maru an hour earlier. Their arrival was a complete surprise to the ABDA ships that were still badly scattered. However, this confusion actually helped the Allies. In the ensuing maneuvers, Parrott ran aground off Bali but was able to back off with minor damage. She continued north and did not return to the battle. At 0241, John D. Ed-

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wards and Stewart maintained column formation, as they steamed northeast. Tromp maintained an eastern course 8,000 yards off their starboard quarter. Pillsbury followed a northeastern course 3,000 yards off the cruiser’s starboard beam as she attempted to join Tromp. Heading west-southwest, Arashio and Michisio plowed into the middle of this haphazard formation and immediately found themselves in a tight spot. John D. Edwards and Stewart were to starboard with Tromp and Pillsbury to port. At 0247 Stewart opened her searchlights and launched torpedoes, followed by gunfire. Michisio was hit hard immediately. Taking fire at close range from both port and starboard, she veered hard to starboard to escape Stewart’s searchlight. Attempting to turn north, Michisio ran into a rain of shells from John D. Edwards which crippled her. With her engine room wrecked, Michisio went dead in the water with 13 dead and 83 wounded.69 She was then badly hammered again as the remaining ABDA ships passed. She would have to be towed to Makassar by Asashio. After this brief engagement both sides continued on their respective courses at high speed. The Allies were through and showed no inclination to finish off the crippled Michisio as they withdrew. For their part, the Japanese did not pursue and continued searching to the south for more enemy ships. By 0120 the motor torpedo boats were seven miles east of Bali’s Benoa Bay. They split into two groups. The West Group, with three boats, skirted the Bali shore; the East Group, with four boats, patrolled to the north end of Lemblongan Island. With their radios tuned to the Torpedo Boat Flotilla wavelength they did not hear any reports of the action on the KM naval frequency.70 It was only around 0200 that they knew for sure that a naval battle had taken place. En route they heard explosions, saw gunfire and many searchlights from the Bali shore.71 East Group closed in about seven minutes after the last shots were fired and the searchlights went out. At 1,500 yards a Japanese ship was sighted and all three torpedo boats went to full speed to get into a favorable attack position. Then after two minutes at 36 knots the target disappeared and nothing more was seen.72 This may have been John D. Ford, which sighted a “torpedo boat” as she retired to the south.73 Farther out in Badoeng Strait, West Group saw nothing.74 Their Allied counterparts had retired and the Japanese ships were completely blacked out. The two groups then formed up and returned to Pang Pang Bay without firing a shot.

“We had to cope as best we could” By dawn on February 20 Tromp and her destroyers were well north of the strait. Daylight brought renewed Japanese attention in the form of nine bombers from Makassar.75 At 0900 they attacked Tromp in the Madoera Strait. She went to 24 knots and maneuvered heavily. All their bombs missed and none of the Allied ships suffered any further damage. Captain de Meester repeatedly signaled for air cover. Despite being well

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OJR 7 and ORJ 8 were sister ships of OJR 2 and OJR 3 with the same performance, dimensions and armament (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

within range of ABDA-AIR fighters based on Eastern Java no help appeared. In the meantime, the motor torpedo boats returned to Pang Pang Bay. They had orders to refuel and make another sortie into the Badoeng Strait that night. It was believed that the prior night’s landings on Bali were just an advance force. The torpedo boats were to attack the main force that night. To ensure prompt refueling the tender Poolster joined Krakatau. She had electric pumps and the boats quickly refueled without delay. Then air reconnaissance revealed no additional Japanese forces were en route to Bali and the squadron was ordered back to Soerabaja. De Ruyter and Java put into Soerabaja on the morning of February 20. Soon after their arrival Lieutenant-Commander Bennink was startled by a large explosion in the roadstead. He turned his head in time to see a Higgins Boat being blown into the air. It was the submarine chaser OJR 3. Just like her sister ship OJR 2, which had been destroyed on February 2, she too was lost as a result of unvented fuel vapors that built up in her engine room and exploded. Java quickly dropped out of line and was the first ship in the harbor to provide assistance.76 Tromp limped into Soerabaja at 1300 on February 22 with the USN destroyers.77 She had received a total of 11 hits, mostly around her bridge and conning tower. Her fire control system was knocked out, while her searchlights and gyro compasses were destroyed. A bad hit below the starboard waterline had to be shored up internally to stop the flooding. Ambulances and medical personnel crowded the dock as the cruiser moored. She had suffered a total of 10 dead and 30 wounded.78 As they were removed from the ship, crewman P. van Hest recalled, Back in port we watched as the dead and wounded were taken away. Those were your friends and then it came, I was on board and had to sit down, I started to cry. I don’t know exactly how long, at that time we had to cope as best we could.79

By now the ME was critically understaffed and Tromp’s repairs were too extensive to be carried out locally. At 1700 on

February 23 she sailed for Fremantle to undergo repairs.80 At the time it was planned that she would return immediately and continue the fight. Although repaired and modernized she did not return to the East Indies before the surrender of Java. Tromp would not see Soerabaja again until after the surrender of Japan in September 1945. Stewart entered drydock, but the workmen failed to brace her properly and the destroyer rolled over as the dock drained. The additional damage was severe and ensured that Stewart would not see action in the near future. The torpedo boats put into Soerabaja at 1130 on the morning of February 21. There the crews were dismayed to learn of Piet Hein’s loss. Had their radios been tuned to the main naval frequency they would have been able to rescue her survivors.81 There was also talk that they might could have been dispatched to provide Tromp with additional assistance on her return to port.82 The Allies felt that the battle had been a huge success from a tactical standpoint. Although the Japanese had successfully put their troops ashore, it was believed that they had paid a heavy materiel price. On February 21 Vice-Admiral Helfrich reported to ABDA high command that probably one cruiser had been sunk, with least two more cruisers and two destroyers heavily damaged.83 In reality, the Badoeng Strait was a disaster for the Allies. Despite heavy air attacks, two submarines, three light cruisers, seven destroyers and seven motor torpedo boats, the Japanese suffered damage to two transports with one destroyer heavily damaged and moderate damage to two more. No ships had been sunk and Japanese troops were now two miles off Java’s eastern shore. Even more depressing was that this mass of Allied firepower never faced more than two destroyers at one time. Either of the first two waves should have been more than enough to defeat the Japanese. Instead, ABDA lost a much needed destroyer with a second destroyer damaged and later lost. A light

19. Fire in the Night cruiser was also so badly damaged that it had to leave Java for extensive repairs. For their part, the boldness of their plan paid great dividends for the Japanese. With Den Passar in their possession, the flow of fighter reinforcements from Australia by air was now cut off. At the same time, they quickly intensified air sweeps over Java and soon eliminated most remaining ABDA air power. As a result, Rear-Admiral Doorman found himself in the same position that the CSF had encountered in the Western Java Sea—an overpowering enemy air presence and no air cover. On the other end, Doorman’s battle plan was weak and perhaps even fatally flawed. He showed poor tactical judgment by placing too much reliance on gunfire. De Ruyter and Java came through the strait firing rapidly, ruining any chance of surprise. Their high speed, inexperienced gunners and the dark night all conspired to produce poor results. Torpedoes in a more controlled environment would likely have yielded better results. On February 20 seven A-24s and 16 P-40s attacked six cargo vessels in the Lombok Strait. They were intercepted by Zeros from the 3rd Air Wing but the P-40s kept them away from the dive bombers. Two Kittyhawks were shot down; a third made it back to base but was so badly shot up that it crashlanded. Two P-40s ran out of gas and had to crash-land on the Java coast. Two A-24s were shot down by AA. They claimed nine hits on Japanese ships and several Japanese fighters shot down.84 Although Seawolf remained in the strait for several more days, she encountered no more enemy ships. The submarine did witness Allied air attacks throughout the day on February 20, including at least one Allied plane being shot down and its pilot parachuting to safety. Lieutenant-Commander Warder also apparently witnessed Japanese fighters from the Tainan Air Wing landing at Den Passar Airfield.85

“Simple madness” The Japanese hardly completed their invasion of Bali before the KNIL began considering ways to retake the island, which lay just two miles off Java’s eastern shore. However, the KNIL troops were not trained for an offensive action of that nature.86 Nor were they organized or equipped to quickly undertake such an attack. In any event, Japanese plans for invading Java were moving into high gear and events would soon outstrip Dutch plans for a counterattack at Bali. Nonetheless, ABDA headquarters moved ahead with a plan to put Den Passar airfield out of action. A cruiser, supported by a destroyer, submarine and MLD flying boat, would conduct a night bombardment of the airfield. The destroyer would illuminate the area with flares and starshells while the cruiser carried out the attack as the seaplane spotted its shell fall. The seaplane would also coordinate with the submarine to provide reconnaissance throughout the operation.87 The operation was assigned to Java, as she was widely considered to have the best gunnery officer in the East Indies

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Squadron. Initially, Banckert was to provide the illumination and was loading the necessary ordnance when she was put out of action by an air raid on February 24. She was replaced by Witte de With. Seawolf, still patrolling north of Bali, was also assigned; however, she was replaced by K-X. The MLD made one of its PBYs available.88 On February 24 Rear-Admiral Doorman had a rather frank discussion with Vice-Admiral Helfrich. He bluntly stated that any bombardment of Bali without simultaneous action by the KNIL would be “simple madness.” Doorman further added that the operation would likely result in a “senseless sacrifice” of one of the two remaining Dutch cruisers in the NEI.89 After multiple delays the mission was set for the night of February 24–25 but was again pushed back.90 It was shelved for good early on the morning of February 25. This suited RearAdmiral Doorman; although responsible for planning and executing the raid, he had been critical of the operation from the beginning.

The Invasion of Timor With the loss of Bali, Java’s fate was effectively sealed. Still, the Japanese sought to ensure the air route’s closure and further secure their eastern flank with the invasion of Timor. The operation was planned to coincide with the invasion of Bali and the attack on Darwin, which would cover both operations. The operation got under way on February 17 with the departure of the seaplane carrier Mizuho and the patrol boat P 39 from Kendari. Her aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over the Flores Sea to ensure that the sea lanes were clear for the Timor invasion convoy and the Darwin strike force. She then provided air cover over the Banda Sea and provided A/S protection for the convoy from a position off the south tip of Lomblen Island. At 0800 that same day, nine transports carrying the 228th Infantry Regiment and 308 naval infantry of the 3rd Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Unit departed Ambon for Koepang, Dutch Timor. Although the latter unit consisted of the same naval paratroopers who had dropped on Menado, they undertook this operation in a seaborne role. In close escort were RearAdmiral Tanaka’s 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, including his flagship Jintsu, the 15th Destroyer Division, 16th Destroyer Division and Umikaze of the 24th Destroyer Division. A second convoy of five transports also left Ambon the following day for Dili, Portuguese Timor. In close escort were the 1/24th Destroyer Division, W 7 and W 8 of the 21st Minesweeper Division and a submarine chaser. In addition, the convoy included the fast transports P 1, P 2 and P 34. RearAdmiral Takagi’s 5th Cruiser Squadron with the destroyers Akebono and Ikazuchi trailed behind as distant covering force for both convoys to prevent interference from ABDA-FLOAT. Both convoys arrived off Timor on the night of February 19–20. With Admiral Doorman’s squadron engaged in the Badoeng Strait the only Allied warships in the area were the American submarines Pickerel, Pike and Tarpon. All three boats

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made contact, but only Pike was able to attack what her skipper thought were two light cruisers off Alor Island February 20. They were actually minesweepers of the 21st Minesweeper Division. Both her torpedoes missed ahead and the minesweepers moved out of range before she could set up another attack. Pickerel maneuvered for a shot on Jintsu when the cruiser stopped to recover one of her floatplanes. However, she was too slow in setting up her shot and Jintsu moved out of range while the submarine was 5,000 yards out. Pickerel was then detected and two destroyers moved in and drove her deep with a strong depth charge attack. Tarpon was not able to close on any of the ships she sighted. The first word Koepang had of the invasion convoy’s arrival came at 0000 on February 20 from a coastwatcher on Semau, a small island outside Koepang Bay. The Japanese landed before dawn and quickly put the paratroopers, 4,500 troops and a light tank detachment ashore. At dawn, bombers struck the fort at Klapalima and damaged two British AA guns and two Dutch 5.9-inch coastal batteries positioned there. Their crews later abandoned these weapons. At 1045 323 paratroopers of the IJA’s Air Raiding Regiment (the same unit dropped on Palembang a week earlier) arrived overhead from Kendari. Although dropped from too high an altitude and badly dispersed by high winds, they landed near the airfield and attempted to encircle the garrison. Small groups closed the only highway connecting both ends of the island and cut off the Allied force at Koepang from its ammunition dumps and supply depots. Despite their success, the paratroopers were badly decimated by Australian counterattacks and lost all but 78 of their number.91 The Dutch and Australians also lost a substantial number of troops in these counterattacks. Isolated and outnumbered, the remaining Allied forces attempted to break through the

Japanese line throughout February 21–22. By February 23 their position was hopeless and the KNIL forces began surrendering. They were followed soon afterwards by the Australian troops and British AA gun crews, who had been fighting as infantry after destroying their weapons. Approximately 400 Australian and Dutch troops had been stationed at Dili since the Allied occupation in December. When the Japanese invasion convoy arrived off Dili 800 Portuguese reinforcements from East Africa were expected at any time. Australian sentries temporarily thought the ships might belong to this convoy.92 The Australian officer in charge of defending Dili’s airfield correctly assumed that the troops were Japanese. However, the Dutch commander—Lieutenant-Colonel N.L.W. van Straten—believed that he had mistaken approaching KNIL troops sent earlier to reinforce the airstrip’s defenses. Eight large-caliber shells then struck the Dutch headquarters, conveniently missing the Japanese consulate located next door.93 This turn of events reinforced the Australian commander’s belief that Japanese landings were underway. However, van Straten naively believed they were from a Japanese submarine in the harbor. He hypothesized that it was trying to land a raiding party to blow up the runway. At this point, the Australian officer signaled that a transport escorted by a warship was landing large number of Japanese troops. The small Allied force was soon heavily engaged. Badly outnumbered and in danger of being flanked, the Australians fell back. Following the KNIL’s lead, they withdrew south to Dutch territory and disappeared into Timor’s rugged interior. Those men not lost at Dili or during the withdrawal joined the surviving troops from Koepang. This force—numbering 255 KNIL troops and 400 Australian commandos—initiated a guerrilla campaign that lasted until December 1942 when the surviving troops were evacuated.

Chapter 20

The Japanese Move Against Java Western Invasion Convoy

Although the initial timetable called for both convoys to simultaneously land their troops on the night of February 26, Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo (commander of the IJN’s 2nd Fleet) and Vice-Admiral Ibo Takahashi (commander of the IJN’s 3rd Fleet) were concerned about the remaining strength of ABDA’s air and sea forces. On February 22 air reconnaissance reported the presence of Allied warships in the Western Java Sea near the Anambas Islands. At the time, they believed all or most Allied warships had retired from the NEI to escape air raids on Soerabaja. Kondo and Takahashi did not attempt to seek out and destroy these ships as all their forces were needed for convoy escort.2 They did delay the landings by two days to February 28. This would give the Japanese Army and Navy air forces additional time to further reduce Allied airpower on Java while the Eastern Convoy’s naval escort was reinforced. The IJA high command opposed any delay as they felt it would give ABDA forces more time to prepare. The Army did agree to the revised landing date, but only if the Navy guaranteed that there would be no further delays. The Japanese now felt it necessary to reinforce the Eastern Convoy’s relatively weak escort. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla under Rear-Admiral Raizo Tanaka had recently supported the Japanese landings at Koepang. Tanaka was now ordered to join Nishimura at maximum speed. He raised anchor at Koepang on February 24 and refueled at Makassar before rendezvousing with the convoy 40 miles south of Tandjoeng Seletan, Borneo’s southernmost point. Also in the area of Timor was Rear-Admiral Takeo Takagi with the 5th Cruiser Squadron. They were screened by the 1/7th Destroyer Squadron and 1/24th Destroyer Squadron. This force was ordered to link up with the convoy, after which, Takagi would assume overall command of the operation. At the same time, Vice-Admiral Takahashi sailed from Kendari with the 16th Cruiser Squadron—screened by the destroyers Akebono and Inazuma. He did not join the convoy, instead providing distant cover from a position 200 miles to the rear. Although the Japanese convoys had not yet been discovered, Vice-Admiral Helfrich knew by February 20 that he would be unable to defend Java with the naval forces at hand. To alleviate the mounting threat he asked General Wavell to have the Royal Navy’s Eastern Fleet launch a diversionary attack

By mid–February Japanese plans for the invasion of Java on both its east and west ends were in full swing. A convoy carrying a landing force tasked with the invasion of Western Java sailed from Cam Ranh Bay on February 18. It consisted of 56 transports carrying the Imperial Japanese Army’s 16th Army Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Division and 38th Infantry Division’s 230th Infantry Regiment. In close escort were the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, 5th Destroyer Flotilla, 22nd Destroyer Squadron and 12th Destroyer Squadron. They were joined by the 9th Base Force which came up from the Anambas Islands. Rear-Admiral Kenzaburo Hara was in command of the close escort force. Providing distant cover was the 7th Cruiser Squadron, 19th Destroyer Squadron and heavy cruiser Chokai.1 The light carrier Ryujo and 22nd Seaplane Carrier Squadron—escorted by the 20th Destroyer Squadron—provided air cover and A/S support. Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita was in overall command of the Western Invasion Convoy and its naval escort.

Eastern Invasion Convoy An invasion convoy bound for Eastern Java was simultaneously moving south. By February 20 it was off the north entrance of the Makassar Strait. Consisting of 41 transports this convoy sailed from Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines on February 8 and put into Jolo on February 13. On February 14 it was joined by the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, 2nd Destroyer Squadron, destroyer Umikaze and 2nd Base Force. The 24th Seaplane Carrier Squadron provided air cover and A/S support. The 11th Air Flotilla at Balikpapan provided additional fighter cover and reconnaissance capabilities. This close escort force was under the command of Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura. The entire force sailed from Jolo on February 19 and put into Balikpapan three days later. There elements of the 56th Regimental Combat Group came aboard. Their orders were to go ashore at Kragan on the north coast of Java. From there, they would drive inland to capture and hold the expansive Allied airfield at Kalidjati. Once secured, the Japanese Army Air Force would bring in land-based fighters and bombers to support the remainder of the operation.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

into, or at least in the direction of, the NEI. Wavell refused, stating that his surface forces were weak and lacked air support. He only had the small carrier Hermes; Indomitable was still en route to Port Sudan after transporting her Hurricanes to Java. His heaviest ships were several old, and very slow, R-class battleships screened by cruisers and destroyers; most were covering troop convoys bringing Australian Diggers home from the Middle East.3 Although not specifically intended to support Helfrich, the USN did launch a series of attacks throughout the Pacific. Admiral Wilson Brown led Task Force 11—consisting of the fleet carrier Lexington screened by the heavy cruisers Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Pensacola, San Francisco and 10 destroyers—on a raid against the recently acquired Japanese base at Rabaul. Despite maintaining radio silence, a Japanese reconnaissance plane discovered the force on the morning of February 20. Lexington’s fighters then fended off two waves of nine bombers each, shooting down most of them. The raid was then called off as surprise had been lost. On February 24 Task Force 16 under the command of Admiral William “Bull” Halsey moved into position off Wake Island. Escorted by the heavy cruisers Northampton, Salt Lake City and six destroyers, the fleet carrier Enterprise launched 36 dive bombers and six fighters the following morning. The cruisers and two destroyers then bombarded the island.4 Other than setting a few fires and shooting down a four-engine seaplane, the attacks caused little damage while Enterprise lost one of her SBDs to AA fire. Unfortunately for ABDA, Rabaul is 2,700 miles and Wake 4,100 miles from Java, respectively. The distances involved were too great and the attacks too small in scale to be more than a minor nuisance at this stage of the war. The Japanese refused to be distracted and their invasion of Java moved ahead without delay. Although Allied leadership knew Java would be invaded within days, American, British, Dutch and Australian codebreakers all failed to detect the formation or departure of either convoy. As a result, the Western Convoy in its entirety eluded discovery for several days, although portions were sighted at various times. On February 21 Japanese cruisers and transports were reported at Terempa in the Anambas Islands. In response, Helfrich ordered K-XIV and K-XV into the area to investigate. The following day he ordered S-38 to reinforce them. The British submarine Trusty was ordered to investigate as well. Although S-41 was off Tarakan, she was close to shore and the Eastern Convoy passed without being seen. The Western Invasion Convoy was sighted by an Allied flying boat at Balikpapan on February 25. In response, Admiral Helfrich ordered all Allied submarines to concentrate in the Java Sea. Their orders were to take up position south of Makassar and along the north coast of Java. As many of the submarines were so displaced he ordered them to travel on the surface in daylight hours.5 This was extremely risky given that the Japanese had complete control of the air outside Java. But when Captain Wilkes protested, Helfrich was angry and dismissive: “He was

scornful of the results achieved by U.S. submarines, implying that that if the force took greater risks it might be more effective against the Japanese.”6 The Eastern Invasion Convoy was a ponderous, unwieldy force that invited submarine attack. It consisted of 41 transports in two columns with 650 yards between each ship. Columns were 2,000 yards apart. Four minesweepers abreast, each 3,300 yards apart, led the way. Behind them were three destroyers with similar spacing. Then came Naka with a small patrol boat on either side. The middle section of the convoy had but one destroyer on each side. Much farther to port was Jintsu and four destroyers. Trailing 200 miles astern, Haguro and Nachi piled on the steam in order to catch up.7 The convoy sprawled over 20 miles and its top speed was just 10 knots. Although zig- zagging to counter Allied submarines was in effect, it was a sloppy effort; many of the transports were requisitioned merchant ships whose masters had little or no experience in naval maneuvers.8 Likewise, many also were careless about discharging excessive smoke from their stacks, making the convoy visible to Allied aircraft and submarines for miles. Tameichi Hara, captain of the destroyer Amatsukaze, was dismayed. In his post-war memoirs, he wrote: The 41 transports were in two columns, 600 meters between ships, and 2,000 meters between columns. They zigzagged sluggishly at 10 knots. The formation was spearheaded by four minesweepers on a line of bearing with 3,000 meter intervals, followed at 3,000 meters by three destroyers, similarly spread. The 20-mile long convoy was quite a spectacle. An obvious laxity prevailed in the transports with their ill-trained crews. Many transports emitted huge clouds of black smoke from their funnels. Many used their radios in violation of “no-transmission” orders, or failed to observe blackout rules at night.9

His sentiments were echoed by British historian David Thomas, who would write: The convoy presented a tempting target for submarines who could have had a field day against such a poorly defended armada; twenty miles long with only one destroyer on each side. Japanese reported claimed sightings of at least five submarines during the passage of this convoy, but no attack developed at any stage, a remarkable failure for even the weather and sea conditions were favourable to submariners; by day the sun sparkled on a sea barely ruffled by the light breezes while at night the equally clear sky was bright with stars and a moon which silvered the sea with broad paths of shimmering light.10

Into the Fish Bowl In spite of what Hara and Thomas indicate, the Eastern Java Sea was a proverbial fishbowl of Allied submarines. As the Japanese moved south they made almost daily contact with them. So great was the concentration of submarines that they literally operated almost on top of one another. It is almost unbelievable that no instances of friendly fire took place. The Allied submarines operated under an advisory that warned of Allied surface ships in the area, but that did not apply to other submarines which had to be careful to stay within their assigned patrol zones. Even then, Allied submarines were not always 100 percent clear on the location of their counterparts.

20. The Japanese Move Against Java

Dutch Boats By now, the Dutch submarine fleet had been severely reduced and K-VII was the fifth boat lost since the outbreak of the Pacific War. Seven boats were under or just coming out of repair at the ME. Of these, K-VIII had re-entered service on January 8 after coming out of material reserve. Manned by the crew of K-XIII she worked up at an accelerated pace and put to sea on February 24. K-VIII patrolled between Bawean Island, the north coast of Java and the Madoera Strait until March 2, but made no attacks. K-IX was still working up with a partially trained crew of naval reservists scratched together from ME personnel. K-X put to sea on February 24 with orders to patrol the Soenda Strait; however, she returned to Soerabaja the same day with engine, pump and steering problems.11 Repairs took 48 hours and she sailed again on the night of February 27–28. K-X was north of Lasem, Java, by 0100 that same night. K-XI had been under repair in the submarine basin with engine damage since February 16. K-XII joined her on February 18 after throwing an engine cylinder while on patrol in the South China Sea. Also under extensive repair since January 6 was K- XIII following her battery explosion at Singapore. K-XVIII was in drydock to repair the depth charge damage she had suffered off Balikpapan on January 24. O-19 had just returned to the ME after a two-month patrol off the coast of Malaya. Although operational, she required routine overhaul and refit, while her crew looked forward to a rest. However, O-19 was rushed back out to sea on February 26 for a brief 24-hour patrol off Bawean. Only two of the KM’s 15 submarines—K-XIV and K-XV—were immediately available for action. Between February 14 and 25 K-XIV patrolled north of Klabat Bay on Bangka Island and into the South China Sea. On February 22 she attempted to attack a heavily escorted convoy. The attack failed due to rough weather conditions. K-XIV was then subjected to a heavy depth charge counterattack and held down for five hours until the convoy had moved out of range. There are conflicting reports as to whether or not the Dutch boat was damaged in this attack.12 K-XV was en route to the South China Sea to investigate a force of Japanese warships and transports reported by MLD aircraft. On February 20, outside Tarempah Bay,13 she fired two torpedoes at a Japanese cargo ship, both of which missed. The following day Lieutenant-Commander C.W.T. baron van Boetzelaer attempted to enter the bay, but K-XV was sighted by a patrolling plane in the harbor’s extremely clear water. It quickly called for reinforcements and the approaching destroyers forced him to make a quick withdrawal from the area.14 She was later redirected to the vicinity of Discovery Bank south of the Karimata Strait and Banka Strait where she and K-XIV could cover both seaways.15 The Japanese could have approached Western Java using that route, although the latter was narrow with little maneuvering room and could be easily mined.16 On February 25 K-XV was caught on the surface by a

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Japanese bomber that attacked as she made a crash dive. Fortunately the Dutch boat was not damaged.17 Vice-Admiral Helfrich hoped to have K-VIII, K-IX, K-X, K-XI and K-XVIII all back in service soon. However, the Japanese timetable for invading Java was about to surpass the available time his yard personnel had at hand. In addition to the remaining Dutch boats, there were still 25 American submarines in NEI waters as of late February. Their activities ranged from long-range patrol and attack to resupply and evacuation missions to the Philippines; others were en route to Australia for refit. As a result, nearly all were widely dispersed and their battle record in the final stage of the East Indies campaign was mixed at best.

American Boats Most of the American boats operated from Soerabaja, but as attacks on the naval base intensified they shifted to Tjilatjap.18 Not only did the attacks cause heavy material damage, but they incited overt panic and mass desertion amongst Indonesian workers at both civilian and military ports. As a result, shore operations by non-military personnel had ground to a virtual stop by the last week of February.19 Whereas large work crews originally met submarines returning to Soerabaja, they were now greeted by empty docks. The ME’s role as a primary USN submarine base in the NEI ended on February 26 when S-37 fitted out and departed on patrol. After the occupation of Bali everyone knew Java would be next. Soerabaja was under frequent air attack, making regular operations there extremely dangerous. At the same time, Tjilatjap was a poor port for naval operations and lacking air defenses. With the approach of Japanese invasion forces the commander of the USN submarine force, Captain John Wilkes, made the decision to withdraw the tender USS Holland from Tjilatjap to Exmouth Gulf on the west coast of Australia. A number of modern fleet boats in need of overhaul would also be withdrawn. Holland sailed from Tjilatjap on February 18 and put into Exmouth Gulf eight days later. There, she set up operations to support submarine operations in the Southwest Pacific when the last boats were withdrawn from the NEI. She was escorted by Stingray, Sculpin, Snapper, Sturgeon and Seadragon. All carried American submarine personnel being evacuated. In addition, Stingray carried 17 codebreakers recently evacuated from the Philippines. Sargo was at the ME, but required extensive overhaul and was also ordered to join Holland in Exmouth Gulf. Tarpon was also en route to Exmouth Gulf after suffering heavy damage when she ran hard aground in the Boling Strait (west of Flores Island) on the night of February 23. Swordfish was in the Sulu Sea, returning to Fremantle from a mission to the Philippines. She had run the Japanese blockade with orders to evacuate high-level civilian officials from Corregidor to Panay. The evacuees included Philippine President Emanuel Quezon and United States High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre. She would miss the remainder of the NEI campaign.

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Searaven was returning from a mission to the Indochina coast. She was in the Sibutu Passage en route to the Lombok Strait.20 Like Swordfish, she saw no more action in the NEI campaign. Seawolf was in the area of the Lombok Strait where she had remained following the Battle of the Badoeng Strait. Skipjack was in the Alor Strait. Her captain had initially been ordered to the Japanese naval base at Palau in mid–February. However, he was rerouted to the Molucca Passage where he failed in two attacks on a tanker and large seaplane tender, respectively. Skipjack was then ordered into the Java Sea where she was patrolling off the Zandbuis Banks at 2230 on the evening of February 25. Perch was in the western entrance of the Boeton Strait. She was en route to a position north of the Java coast and was east of Bawean by February 28. She would encounter Japanese ships as detailed below. Pickerel was north of Flores Island. She was routed into

the Java Sea when reports of the Japanese convoys began to filter in. However, she was still north of Bali and out of the primary battle zone when the Japanese reached Java on February 28. Sailfish, Salmon, Saury, Seal and Spearfish departed Tjilatjap on February 19. Within days they were in position north of Lombok and patrolled between southern Makassar and the Lombok Strait. By February 28 Salmon was north of Madoera but still had no luck against the Japanese. Permit put out from the ME on February 22 and was northeast of the Kangean Islands by February 25. That night she sighted two small ships and attempted to intercept but was unable to close. Based on their course and speed it was assumed that they were headed for southern Borneo.21 She then received orders to patrol in the Java Sea northeast of Madoera where Permit arrived on February 28. Porpoise was en route to the Western Java Sea. Although it is unclear, she probably sailed from Soerabaja where she had put in following patrol duty off Balikpapan earlier that month. Her captain suffered from severe exhaustion and had been relieved of command. There were also five USN “S-class” submarines— less than affectionately called “Pig Boats” by their crews—still operating in the NEI. These older submarines were primarily built in the mid/late 1920s for defensive purposes. As a result, they were small, slow and subject to frequent mechanical breakdown due to age and long-distance operations for which they were not designed. Their nickname stemmed from a lack of air conditioning and extremely cramped space, which made them particularly miserable in the sweltering Asiatic heat. S-39 was on patrol off the Badas Islands in the South China Sea. However, she made no contact with the Western Invasion Convoy as it moved south. This by itself must be regarded as little more than amazing as virtually all Japanese ship traffic in the South China Sea at the time was en route to Java via the Anambas Islands and Karimata Strait. S-37 was in the Lombok Strait on February 21. She was initially en route to the ME but was ordered to the area around Bawean on February 26–27. She saw many ships, but was unable to attack. However, S-37 will still play a vital role in the upcoming naval battle. Following a rest period for her crew, S-38 put out of the ME on February 22, bound for the Sapoedi Strait. On the 24th Helfrich ordered her into the Karimata Strait to reinforce K-XIV and K-XV. S-38 was south of Bawean when the first reports of Japanese ships came in and she would play a key role in the upcoming battle. S-40 patrolled south of Makassar without success from February 15 to 26. Her captain hoped to American submarines refitting at the Soerabaja naval base (courtesy Gerard bag any cargo ships resupplying the Japanese garrison Horneman). there. However, despite moving to several different

20. The Japanese Move Against Java locations, he experienced a dearth of enemy ships. He did not know that all available ships had likely been concentrated for the pending invasion of Java. On February 26, S-40 was ordered to join Holland in Exmouth Gulf and no more action in the NEI campaign. S-41 patrolled in the area of Tarakan and the Magkaliat Strait until being ordered to return to the ME on February 22. By February 25 she was off Cape William on the west coast of Celebes. She was in the northeast Java Sea on February 27 when ordered to Exmouth Gulf to meet Holland for overhaul.

British Boats The British submarines Trusty and Truant were also under Dutch operational command. Both had recently arrived with orders to operate under Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s command until otherwise directed.22 They had originally been detached from the Mediterranean Fleet with orders to operate against Japanese shipping from Singapore. They were to replace K-XI, K-XII and O-19, which had been returned to Dutch operational control in January.23 As the situation in Malaya deteriorated British boats were ordered to join ABDA-FLOAT. Trusty arrived at Colombo on January 9 and left for Singapore three days later. By now the entire north part of the Malay Peninsula had been occupied and there was real fear of Japanese troops infiltrating across the Malacca Strait to Sumatra. On January 15 Trusty received orders to alter course and sink any surface ship operating at night in the Malacca Strait above Longitude 2 E / 00 N.24 She conducted a sweep as ordered but did not sight any targets of value. Trusty put into Singapore on January 20. Ten days later she was near-missed and damaged by bomb splinters during a Japanese air raid on Keppel Harbor.25 On February 2 she was ordered out to patrol the southern Gulf of Siam and along the Indochina coast. Upon completion of this patrol, her skipper, Lieutenant-Commander W.D.A. King, DSO, DSC was to retire directly to Batavia. On February 8, Trusty battle-surfaced near Poulo Condore Island and attacked a small Japanese tanker with her 4-inch deck gun.26 To King’s surprise, the shallow-draft coaster proved more formidable than anticipated. Not only did it return fire, but her captain barely missed in his attempt to ram the submarine. King ended the action and submerged when one of his gun crew was wounded by splinters. 27 On February 11 he received orders to patrol off the Anambas Islands to investigate the suspected buildup of Japanese ships.28 This mission was later taken over by an American submarine. Soon after Lieutenant-Commander King was rerouted to Soerabaja where Trusty put into the submarine basin on February 19.29 However she saw no action in the East Indies. On February 23 Trusty was discovered to be leaking oil. It was believed to have been caused when she ran aground off Alexandria in December 1941. Near misses and splinter damage from Japanese air raids on Keppel Harbor likely exacerbated the problem. But

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since drydock space in Soerabaja was needed for more damaged ships no repairs were carried out. Under Lieutenant-Commander H.A.V. Haggard, DSC, Truant had also been detached from the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet in early January. She reached Colombo on January 25 and sailed for Batavia on February 1 carrying as many spare crewman as possible who would support the two boats’ operations at Singapore.30 Truant put into Tandjoeng Priok a week later; she continued on to Soerabaja and entered the submarine basin on February 11.31 Of 37 Allied submarines in NEI waters in mid/late February only 17 were immediately available for combat operations in the Java Sea. In an area the size of the Java Sea, such a small number of submarines did not cover much ground. To make matters worse, several of the older American and Dutch boats were in questionable mechanical condition or had only partially trained crews. Although Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s submarine force was severely depleted he still sought to intercept the Japanese invasion force at sea. He and Admiral Hart had long differed on their placement. Helfrich wanted to put ABDA’s remaining submarines off known Japanese bases, while Hart advocated their deployment along the sea lanes it was thought that they would take to reach Java. Helfrich was lukewarm to this strategy since no one could be sure what routes the Japanese would follow.32 Because he didn’t have enough boats to do either job effectively, Helfrich had to strike a balance between the two strategies. Reinforced by the American submarines, he split his remaining boats between observation and attack. Although Japanese convoys typically had strong A/S countermeasures, Helfrich believed the best chance for success would be to intercept the Japanese at or near their bases. He had advocated permanently stationing submarines off Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and Balikpapan, but had been overruled each time.33 It was now too late to do so.

Spearfish The first to make contact was Spearfish under LieutenantCommander Roland Pryce.34 She had orders to patrol a 40mile lane southwest of De Bril Bank.35 At 0322 on February 24 lookouts spotted two ships 4,000 yards off the starboard bow at coordinates 6–39 S / 118–38 E; her sound man simultaneously reported hearing the screws of a third ship off the starboard quarter. As Pryce dived a rain squall moved over and he lost sight the ships. At 0521 Spearfish was at periscope depth when Pryce observed two destroyers approaching at approximately 20 knots. Since there were no capital ships in sight he took Spearfish down to 260 feet to evade contact. They were joined by four more destroyers and all conducted an intense sweep of the area over the next three hours. During that time there were sounds of heavy screws moving overhead, but the destroyers kept Spearfish pinned down. Pryce was finally able to come up to

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periscope depth at 0800. All he saw were three destroyers some 6,000 yards away, moving off to the West with their ASDIC gear still pinging heavily. Spearfish remained on patrol within her assigned area. At 1303 on February 25 Pryce sighted two Japanese Atago class heavy cruisers escorted by two destroyers on a heading of 285° at 6–14 S / 118–03 E. These were Ashigara and Myoko of the 16th Cruiser Squadron—escorted by Akebono and Inazuma— as they moved south from Kendari at 15 knots to cover the Eastern Invasion Convoy. The cruisers were in column with a destroyer on each bow of the lead ship. The initial range was 1,500 to 2,000 yards; although the formation was zig-zagging Pryce had no trouble closing without detection. At 1321 he fired four torpedoes— all set to run at 10 feet—from 900 yards. Rather than wait for the lead cruiser to come into range on its own, he altered course to port just before firing to speed up the attack. As a result, the first two torpedoes missed ahead while the second pair passed well astern.36 Spearfish changed course and went deep. Akebono and Inazuma immediately counterattacked. Eight minutes later, at 1329, two depth charges exploded to port but caused no damage. Although a cruiser passed directly overhead, Spearfish was not able to attempt another attack. One of the destroyers remained overhead for nearly two hours while Ashigara and Myoko moved out of range. At 1530 the destroyer moved off and Spearfish came up to periscope depth; Pryce sighted her 6,000 yards to the west as she returned to the main body which had moved out of sight.37 By early morning of February 26 Spearfish was operating at coordinates 6–55.30 S / 117–08 E. At 1250 LieutenantCommander Pryce sighted two light cruisers and two destroyers moving at approximately 12½ knots.38 Spearfish was quickly sighted and the Japanese ships turned away on a course of 315 degrees and cleared the area. Due to the range and clear water, which would have made his torpedo wakes easily visible in the dark night, Pryce did not attempt to fire on them. Soon afterwards Spearfish was ordered back to Tjilatjap where she arrived on March 2.

Salmon On the night of February 24 Salmon, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander E.B. McKinney, operated in the Bali Sea and Flores Sea north of Sanggar Bay (north coast of Soembawa Island) and south of Sepanjang Island (southernmost island in the Kangean Group). While operating on the surface at 1934 lookouts sighted a large ship escorted by two or three smaller vessels at a range of approximately four miles; they were moving west at 16 knots at coordinates 7–40 S / 118–00 E.39 Almost immediately the larger ship made smoke and put a searchlight directly on Salmon; they simultaneously turned toward Salmon. McKinney executed a crash dive and took Salmon down to 170 feet. Beginning at 1944 she was vigorously hunted by

Japanese destroyers which employed typical IJN A/S tactics where one ship would stop, listen and echo range the target; a second would then charge in and attack.40 Using this method the Japanese ships dropped 14 depth charges over the next hour. Once the attacks ceased, Salmon surfaced and McKinney reported seeing gunfire between several ships and what appeared to be a shore battery near the port of Kawienda on the northern shore of Soembawa. It ceased as the submarine steered toward it.41 At 2250 on the night of February 25 McKinney came across a single large ship at coordinates 7–50 S / 118–15 E. It dropped two depth charges some distance away as he closed the range and computed an attack solution using the submarine’s sound gear. At 2,000 yards he fired two torpedoes from the bow tubes which missed; he then turned and launched two more torpedoes from the stern tubes before going deep; these also missed. Salmon was at 120 feet and still going down when two depth charges rattled the boat and knocked out several lights. There was no serious damage and the Japanese ship moved off at approximately 20 knots.42

Seal On the early morning of February 24 Seal, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander K.C. Hurd, patrolled between Dewakang Island (near the entrance of the Makassar Strait off the southwest tip of Celebes) and the Lombok Strait between latitude 7–00 S and 7–30 S. Her assigned patrol area was essentially right at the front door of the new Japanese base at Makassar. Beginning at 0450 she sighted three large ships to starboard in quick succession. Although specific details could not be ascertained in the dark Seal was deep in enemy waters and they could only be Japanese. Hurd plotted a firing solution for the closest ship and launched two torpedoes at 0459. Some 30–40 seconds later two heavy explosions rumbled confirming hits on what was apparently a 5,000 ton transport. 43 Although Hurd took Seal down to 200 feet to evade counterattack, there were no depth charges as the remaining two ships withdrew.44 Approximately three hours later at 0806, Seal heard the pinging of ASDIC gear and sighted smoke at coordinates 06–35 S / 117–15 E. By 0838 Hurd could make out a small convoy of four merchant vessels escorted by three destroyers. They were moving south on a course of 250° at 13 knots.45 Despite the heavy escort, Lieutenant-Commander Hurd was able to close undetected and launch two torpedoes at a 5,000 ton freighter with twin derrick posts at 0943.46 Exactly 61 seconds later two explosions roared.47 The escorts kept Seal on the bottom until 1047 but she suffered no damage. By that time the convoy was hull down on the horizon and Seal had no chance of catching up. The following day, February 25, Hurd made multiple contacts. First he sighted two Japanese destroyers at long distance; he immediately lost sight of one and the other was barely visible. They appeared to be patrolling, as if waiting for a convoy, so Hurd did not attack in hope of making contact with additional

20. The Japanese Move Against Java merchant ships. The time and position of this contact is not given in Seal’s patrol report. At 1335 that afternoon Seal sighted still more Japanese ships. This time her log reports contact with a single “Natori Class” light cruiser screened by two destroyers at coordinates 6–42.5 S / 117–20.5 E. It is possible that this was Jintsu and destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla en route to Makassar where they would join the Eastern Invasion Convoy. However, all three ships were out of range and Seal had no chance of closing, so Hurd made no attempt to attack.48 One hour later he was redirected to patrol a corridor 40 miles wide, the center of which was 60 miles off the east end of Madoera.49 He was also advised to limit any attacks that night to auxiliary vessels as Admiral Doorman was at sea. En route to the new picket station lookouts sighted a Japanese destroyer at 6–18.5 S / 114–25 E at 2133 on the night of February 27. Although he gave orders to submerge to avoid being seen, Hurd declined to attack. Earlier that day he had received a report of two enemy heavy cruisers and a destroyer in the same area (undoubtedly Haguro and Nachi as they moved to join the Eastern Invasion Convoy off Bawean). In spite of Rear-Admiral Koenraad’s orders, he still hoped to attack the cruisers and did not want to prematurely alert them to his presence.50

Saury Saury, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander John Burnside, was ordered to patrol a line on longitude 246° between Sepanjang Island and DeBril Bank.51 On the evening of February 24 she was on the surface approximately 15 miles south of Sepanjang. At 1750 lookouts spotted smoke to the south at a range of 8,000 yards and Burnside turned to investigate. At 2025 her lookout spotted what appeared to be another submarine which quickly disappeared.52 It was a clear night with the moon overhead and a calm sea. By 2033 Saury’s lookouts could distinguish at least six large ships escorted by six destroyers. They moved east at slow speed; the destroyers milled around and the convoy appeared to be in the process of forming. At 3,000 yards Burnside was within seconds of firing a spread of four torpedoes into the convoy.53 Unfortunately, the clear night gave the Japanese excellent visibility as well. A torpedo boat or small patrol boat sighted the submarine and put a searchlight directly on Saury, forcing Burnside to dive at 2044. By the time he brought Saury to periscope depth at 2050 nothing could be seen. However, the sound operator picked up the screws of two destroyers, one of which passed directly overhead. Saury went deep; at 2058 the destroyers dropped six depth charges, three of which exploded under the boat without major damage. Additional destroyers now joined the search and from 2058 to 2245 Saury evaded the Japanese ship until they finally cleared the area.54 On the morning of February 25 Saury sighted more ships. At 0723 Burnside raised periscope and saw one light cruiser

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and two destroyers at a range of 10,000 yards. They were moving east at an estimated speed of 15 knots. They then entered a rain squall and Burnside lost sight and was not able to regain contact.55 Later that night, Saury was ordered to a new patrol zone near Tandjoeng Serdang off the Java shore. At 0536 Burnside reported seeing a Japanese destroyer to port at 10,000 yards but lost contact when Saury submerged.

“Why did you come back?” Despite her very poor mechanical condition, S-37 was ordered out of Soerabaja on February 26. Lieutenant-Commander J.R. Reynolds spoke with Commander E.H. Bryant—Commander of the USN’s Submarine Squadron 203—via phone at around 1500.56 Bryant gave him somewhat ambiguous orders to leave the ME and proceed to just outside “dangerous ground” and await orders.57 Bryant did not give a specific location and Reynolds assumed that it would be obvious by looking at a current nautical chart. It was not and a follow-up call to Bryant’s staff was of no help. Dutch charts showed only one spot marked “dangerous ground” just outside the Eastwater Channel. There was no information regarding the area north of Java. With this as his only direction, Reynolds decided to take S-37 out the east entrance and await further direction.58 Given the poor mechanical condition of S-37, just getting out of Soerabaja turned into an ordeal. She first recovered a large amount of equipment that had been sent ashore for repair at the ME. As a result, her starboard engine was torn down and had to be reassembled; the engine order telegraph and two trim pumps had also been put ashore for repair.59 Reynolds discovered that much of this equipment had not been touched due to the extreme shortage of civilian workers who abandoned their jobs by the thousands once Japanese air raids on the port started in early February. S-37 got under way at 1815 and moved toward the Eastwater Channel on her lone operable diesel engine. But just as Reynolds reached the lightship he received a signal at 2130 directing S-37 to take up station between Bawean Island and the northern entrance of the Westwater Channel. There he was to patrol a 25-mile square grid centered on coordinates 6–17 S / 112–10 E. This required a half-hour wait for a new pilot, followed by a 180° course change that took S-37 back through Bounder Roads and Soerabaja’s Outer Harbor to the Westwater Channel. En route the boat’s starboard engine was re-assembled using engine cooler parts that had been sent ashore for repair. However, it almost immediately overheated and shut down, causing S-37 to temporarily stop. At 0024 the electric steering failed, which led to more loss of time and battery power as Reynolds maneuvered to avoid running aground. In the meantime, it was discovered that yard workers had incorrectly assembled the starboard engine cooler; it had to be taken apart and reassembled, which would not be complete until 0900. A launch then came alongside and Reynolds was directed

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

to moor in the naval yard and report to Commander Bryant. He called USN headquarters and was promptly asked, “Why did you come back?”60 Upon giving his explanation, Reynolds was told that a Dutch minesweeper would escort S-37 through the Westwater Channel. S-37 got again under way at 0139 and joined their escort at 0230. The boat’s electric steering remained problematic and failed three more times before 0430. As dawn approached it was clear that S-37’s batteries and air banks would not be fully charged due to the frequent delays. At 0524 Reynolds signaled the minesweeper that he had to finish charging both before putting out to sea. S-37 anchored near the pilot ship at 0700; at 930 the starboard engine was brought back online. At 1305—some 24 hours after first being ordered out by Commander Bryant—S-37 navigated the Westwater Channel minefield and entered the Java Sea.

S-38 Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander H.G. Munson, S-38 put out of Soerabaja on February 22. She was initially ordered to take position north of the Bali Strait and to operate inside the Lombok Strait down to latitude 8° 50 S. This was slightly south of the British submarine Truant which had been operating in the area of latitude 8° 20 S since February 18. S-38 had barely left Soerabaja when Lieutenant-Commander Munson was redirected to patrol off Meinderts Reef.61 Other than two small Dutch minesweepers anchored close to shore off Tandjoeng Pachinan, S-38 saw nothing. The Japanese were still well to the north at this point. On the evening of February 23 Munson was again ordered to a new position. This time he was to take S-38 all the way across the Java Sea to patrol south of Karimata Island. This was in the Karimata Strait, which was the gateway into the Western Java Sea from the Southern South China Sea. By February 25 S-38 was south of Bawean Island. LieutenantCommander Munson was ordered to again change course and assume a patrol line between Bawean and the mouth of the Westwater Channel. There had been reports of Japanese movement in the area and S-38 was to check them out.

S-4162 Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander G.M. Holley, S-41 had departed Soerabaja on February 4. His orders were to patrol the Makassar Strait and S-41 operated as far north as Tarakan for the remainder of the month. Although several ships were sighted they were all too far out of range for an attack. In the early morning hours of February 26 S-41 was operating in the center of the Southern Makassar Strait directly between Celebes and Borneo. At 0050 lookouts sighted what appeared to be two heavy or two light cruisers, escorted by four destroyers, at a range of 10,000 yards. Holley submerged but the range was too great for him to set up an attack as the Japanese were moving away from S-41. Shortly afterward his soundman picked up high-

speed propellers approaching his position from starboard and another ship approaching dead ahead. At that point Holley took S-41 deep. There was no attack but he lost contact with the Japanese. Soon after Holley got orders directing him to retire to Exmouth Gulf.

K-VIII Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander M.A.J. Derksema, K-VIII was ordered to patrol along the north coast of Madoera Island throughout the last week of February. But as detailed earlier, the boat was old and had only recently been put back into service after a long period in material reserve. As a result, K-VIII suffered multiple engine problems and other mechanical breakdowns that repeatedly forced Derksema back into the ME for emergency repairs. Due to her poor mechanical condition she was slated for local defense in the immediate area of Soerabaja. On February 23 K-VIII was ordered back into Soerabaja, but Derksema had orders “to be ready to sail at a moment’s notice.”63 On the 26th Rear-Admiral Koenraad signaled him to put out of Soerabaja with K-X and O-19; he was to take up station in the Java Sea some 30 miles southeast of Bawean at coordinates 6–14 S / 113–00 E.64 There K-VIII was to patrol an East-West line in the Java Sea between Bawean and the Madoera Strait. She encountered no enemy ships as the Japanese invasion convoy was still well north of Java at that time. At 1248 on February 27 she received a signal from Soerabaja: “According to message from attacking U.S. Army plane, position large Japanese convoy, 43 transports, 3 cruisers, 18 destroyers at 1700 local time 20 miles west of Bawean, course west/1800.” Some eight hours later, at 1842, Rear-Admiral Koenraad sent an additional sighting report to all KM ships operating in the East Indies: Convoy concentrated to 39 transports in two column, 1500 yards between columns, course north, speed ten. 3 destroyers in column right flank, 1000 yards.1 cruiser, 2 destroyers in column left flank 1000 yards. 2 cruisers and six destroyers concentrating on convoy at high speed positions probably, Lat 05–36S, Long 112–46E/0227 1842.

K-IX 65 As with her sister boat K-VIII, K-IX was an elderly submarine that had only recently come out of material reserve. Her scratch crew of reserve personnel from the ME spent most of January and February working up the boat. K-IX re-entered operational service the last week of February under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Th. Brunstig. As the Japanese closed in on Java Brunstig was ordered to take his boat into the Gulf of Siam. K-IX was then obliged to return to Soerabaja almost immediately with engine problems to undergo additional repairs.

K-X By late February K-X was again ready for action following her incredible escape from Tarakan. On February 24 Lieutenant-

20. The Japanese Move Against Java Commander P.G. de Back received orders to depart Soerabaja and make for the Soenda Strait. However, K-X had to return to the ME that same day with engine, pump and steering gear problems. Repairs would take 48 hours.66 In the meantime, she was put under the command of Rear-Admiral Koenraad for local defense in the immediate area of Soerabaja. On the 26th de Back was ordered to accompany K-VIII and O-19 out of harbor to form a picket line in the Java Sea north of Lasem, Rembang, Madoera and south of Bawean.67 Repairs to her engine would not be complete for another 24 hours so K-X remained in the ME as the other two boats put out. She followed as soon as repairs were completed on the night of February 27.68

O-19 O-19 was ordered out of the ME on February 26 with K-VIII, K-X and Trusty. They were to form a picket line between Bawean and the Java shore.69 O-19 was to patrol off Rembang at coordinates 6–20 S / 112–00 E.70 LieutenantCommander H.F. Bach Kolling, a naval reservist who had been recalled to active duty, was told to find out “what was going on there.”71 O-19 departed the ME at 1400 and made for the Westwater Channel entrance.72 There, Bach Kolling found Trusty idling just outside the minefield. Lacking charts to navigate it Lieutenant-Commander King had requested a Dutch patrol boat to guide Trusty into the Java Sea, but it had not yet arrived. With the appearance of O-19 King followed his Dutch counterpart out to sea. Both then set course for their respective patrol stations. By the following afternoon O-19 was approximately 25 miles north of Tanjoeng Awar Awar at coordinates 6–09 S / 111–54 E. 73

Truant and Trusty Truant sailed from Soerabaja on February 18 with orders to patrol in the Banda Sea. A Japanese air raid hit the port during her exit, but Truant was not damaged.74 LieutenantCommander Haggard apparently received no briefing and was unaware that Seawolf still loitered off Bali following the Badoeng Strait scrap. Lieutenant-Commander Warder was likewise uninformed of the British boat’s presence and it was fortunate that neither ran on top of the other. Following the invasion of Bali Admiral Kubo’s covering force had remained in the area. It appears likely that they were engaged in the escort of supply convoys from Makassar. On February 24, northeast of Bali, Truant sighted smoke at 2045.75 Range was 22 miles and Haggard turned to close on the surface to investigate. By 2100 he could distinguish six ships moving north at 12 knots. Three were believed to be transports, the re-

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mainder cruisers or destroyers. Truant submerged at 2105; shortly thereafter Haggard identified Nagara and focused his attack on her. Truant had little trouble penetrating Kubo’s destroyer screen to set up an attack on Nagara. At 2148 Haggard fired six torpedoes at 1,200 yards and went deep. As he dove the sound operator heard two dull thuds; two torpedo hits on Nagara but neither exploded. Destroyers immediately charged in, their ASDIC gear pinging. They held Truant down for two hours; although two close depth charges heavily shook the submarine she suffered no major damage. As the pinging gradually faded Haggard ventured up to periscope depth at 2348. He saw nothing other than two destroyers moving off. Truant then returned to Soerabaja and put into port on February 27.76 In the meantime, British fears about Japanese infiltration from occupied Malaya to Northern Sumatra continued to manifest themselves. Although Truant and Trusty had barely arrived in Dutch waters, Admiral James Somerville Commander-inChief of the British Far Eastern Fleet, on February 21 contacted Vice-Admiral Helfrich to ask when they might be available for patrol duty in the Malacca Strait.77 Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Dudley Pound, simultaneously applied pressure in London.78 In his post-war memoirs Helfrich claims that Somerville’s telegram requested that Truant and Trusty, or two Dutch submarines, be assigned to patrol in the Malacca Strait. Helfrich wrote that Somerville also asked that the modern British destroyers in NEI waters be released for fleet escort duties in the Indian Ocean. Helfrich denied both requests out of hand, stating that all warships were needed for the defense of Java. Shortly afterward, Trusty and Truant were abruptly removed from Helfrich’s command and recalled to Colombo.79 In his post-war memoirs, Helfrich surmises that this was in retaliation for his refusing to release the RN submarines and destroyers.80 On some level he may well have been correct. After all, the British had to know full well that the Dutch would refuse their request—particularly for Dutch warships—at such a critical juncture in the NEI campaign. That said, the author has not seen any communiqués related to a request for RN destroyers or Dutch submarines.81 The process by which Truant and Trusty were withdrawn from Java was somewhat Machiavellian. Shortly after Helfrich refused Somerville’s request, a similar request made its way to the Far Eastern Council.82 On February 23, General Wavell, head of ABDACOM forces in the East Indies, received a signal (1945/23) from Washington directing him to return Truant and Trusty to British control for operations in the Malacca Strait.83 Wavell issued this order on February 25; it was one of his last orders as ABDACOM was formally disbanded that same day.

Chapter 21

“In the afterlife, Sonny” By now, the Dutch anticipated that Java would be invaded on both ends. Acting on this assumption Helfrich broke his remaining naval forces into two formations. An Eastern Strike Force was based at Soerabaja. It initially comprised the De Ruyter, Java, John D. Edwards and Pillsbury, just returned from their abortive night action off Bali. They were joined by Kortenaer and Witte de With which arrived from Tjilatjap. This force would soon sortie against the Japanese invasion coming down the Makassar Strait. A Western Strike Force was based at Tandjoeng Priok. It included Exeter, Hobart, Dragon, Danae, Electra, Encounter, Express, Jupiter, Scout, Stronghold and Tenedos, which had been escorting convoys and individual ships through the Soenda Strait into the Indian Ocean. Helfrich intended for this force to meet any Japanese forces moving on Java from Sumatra or the South China Sea. However, subsequent events would soon change these plans. Helfrich’s decision was also based on his available fuel supply.1 Despite boosting production to maximum capacity, the Tjepoe oil field and refinery on Java was incapable of providing fuel oil in sufficient quantities. Although the Dutch had some 50,000 tons of reserve fuel stored inland the transportation and logistics network on Java was by now severely clogged and in danger of being overwhelmed.2 As a result, it proved easier to disperse small amounts of fuel oil to multiple ports rather than a single large shipment. Although tight, Dutch sources hint that quantities may not have been so tight as to seriously impede critical naval operations.3 Still, to conserve fuel oil for larger warships, many smaller KM vessels—patrol boats, launches, tugs—often used a lower grade synthetic fuel known as solar oil.4 The American fleet tanker USS Pecos had been based at Tjilatjap since February 6 where she refueled American, British and Dutch warships. In turn, she was periodically resupplied by smaller Dutch tankers. The port had not yet been attacked but Rear-Admiral Glassford and other American naval officers were beginning to feel exposed as the Japanese continued to move south. They did not like refueling in the tiny, cramped harbor and sought to reposition Pecos south of Java where she could refuel the USN ships at sea. However, Helfrich refused to approve this plan and she stayed put.5 Although there is no indication that American ships were

ever forced to go without fuel to this point in the NEI campaign, Glassford felt it necessary to develop alternative sources. On February 17 he dispatched the fleet tanker USS Trinity to the Persian Gulf; two days later he sent a chartered civilian tanker to Ceylon on a similar mission.6 On February 20 he sent the civilian tanker British Judge into Soerabaja to load fuel and return to Tjilatjap. In what appeared to be a direct contradiction of Helfrich’s orders, she was to transfer her cargo to Pecos, which would then proceed south of Java and begin refueling USN ships at sea. She returned four days later where Dutch port officials promptly ignored Glassford’s order and instead pumped her cargo into shore tanks.7 On February 24 Houston put into Soerabaja with Alden and Paul Jones following their recalled escort mission to Timor. They were soon joined by John D. Ford and Pope. Following their action in the Badoeng Strait the latter two destroyers returned to Tjilatjap on February 21 and refueled. They then sailed immediately for Christmas Island, 190 miles south of Tjilatjap. There, John D. Ford and Pope took aboard the last 17 torpedoes carried by the destroyer tender Black Hawk, which were equally distributed between the two destroyers. Then they steamed to Soerabaja, arriving on February 24. The Australian light cruiser Perth also put into Tandjoeng Priok on February 24.8 She berthed alongside Wollongong, a minesweeper attached to the 21st Minesweeping Flotilla. That unit had recently been withdrawn from service with the Soenda Auxiliary. A Japanese air raid struck the port shortly afterward, but Perth was undamaged. On February 25 the light cruiser Hobart and sloop Yarra put into port. Another air raid hit Tandjoeng Priok the same day. None of the Australian ships were hit, but the lone Walrus seaplane aboard Perth was put out of action by concussion from her 4-inch AA guns.9 In the meantime, the British destroyer Express had been ordered back to Ceylon to rejoin the main body of the British Eastern Fleet. At the same time, the elderly 900-ton destroyers Scout and Tenedos were designated only for convoy escort. Both ships were more than 20 years old and completely unsuited for fleet duty. By now, a substantial number of Allied surface ships had been damaged or put out of action. In the space of just over one week, no less than four Dutch destroyers had been lost or put out of action.10 Of seven Dutch destroyers in the East Indies

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21. “In the afterlife, Sonny” to start the war, only Kortenaer and Witte de With remained operational. Evertsen was still not considered sufficiently operational for fleet duty. As a result, the destroyer had previously been assigned only to convoy duty as her crew worked up. “The beginning of the war was a quiet time for Evertsen,” said former crewman Jan Roelse who was transferred to the surface fleet from submarine duty prior to the outbreak of hostilities and trained as a gunner in just three months.11 “You really noticed very little of the war. From February 1942 you had air raids when you refueled [in port], but at sea we experienced nothing.”12

Of the American destroyers, Stewart lay immobilized in drydock at the ME. Whipple was still under repair in the drydock at Tjilatjap following her collision with De Ruyter on February 12. Edsall also lay in Tjilatjap effecting repairs to her stern following a premature depth charge explosion on January 20. Parrottt and Pillsbury had no torpedoes; as they required extensive overhaul both had been withdrawn from the strike force at Soerabaja and ordered back to Australia via Tjilatjap. Although Pope had just put into Soerabaja her hotwell leaked badly and she required immediate repairs.13 This left only Alden, John D. Edwards, John D. Ford and Paul Jones operational on the eve of the Japanese invasion of Java. Allied cruiser strength had also been dramatically reduced. Following her grounding in the Sape Strait, Boise sailed for Colombo on January 30. Sumatra and Marblehead followed her on February 4 and February 13, respectively. And most recently, Tromp had sailed for Sydney on February 23 to undergo extensive repairs following her heavy damage in the Badoeng Strait. Houston was still in the fight, but her aft turret remained out of action following the action in the Makassar Strait. This left De Ruyter, Exeter, Hobart and Java as the main Allied surface force. The “D Class” light cruisers Danae and Dragon also still remained in NEI waters, but both were elderly and unsuited for fleet action.14

Dutch Reinforcements for the East Indies By late February the British were unwilling to put any additional naval resources toward the defense of the East Indies, which they viewed as a lost cause. They had long regarded the NEI as little more than a stepping stone in the defense of Malaya. With the fall of Singapore their resolve to defend Java bordered on non-existent. In response, Helfrich signaled the Netherlands Government in Exile on February 24: In my opinion English and Americans much too gloomy; Soenda and Bali Straits still open; at Priok and Soerabaja in spite of repeated air attacks only one merchant ship hit while Tjilatjap still not bombed. Delivery of fighters by ship is still possible. Expect Langley with 27, Athene now in Australia must come immediately. Also aircraft carrier Indomitable and B-25s from USA, for which, there are presently 18 crews in Australia. I am convinced that when ANZAC Force west of Torres Strait and available Eastern Fleet Colombo nose shows [itself ] Japanese will receive unpleasant surprise and Java Sea shall be quickly relieved. It is still not too late but the utmost speed, grim determination and all risks must be taken.15

With the British and Americans unwilling to commit sizeable naval reinforcements to the defense of the East Indies, the

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Dutch took matters into their own hands as best they could. In January their government in London persuaded the British to release several of their own ships, then attached to the Royal Navy, for duty in the East Indies. With some reluctance the British acquiesced and Dutch reinforcements—albeit small ones—began flowing toward Java. They were led by the 14,600 ton submarine tender Hr.Ms. Columbia, which departed Dundee, Scotland, on January 5. In addition to spare parts and equipment for the East Indies submarine force, she carried a 130 man detachment from the Princess Irene Brigade which was to reinforce Java.16 Columbia put into Colombo on March 4. The light cruiser Jacob van Heemskerck sailed from Belfast, Northern Ireland, on January 12 and arrived in Colombo on February 21. En route, she had been forced into dry dock at Simonstown, South Africa, for five days to repair storm damage. Although unrealized at the time, this delay would later prove providential for Jacob van Heemskerck and her crew. She sailed for Java four days later loaded with 4.7-inch shells for those British destroyers still operating in Dutch waters. At the same time the destroyer Isaac Sweers was also en route from the Mediterranean Sea where her veteran crew had already seen heavy action against German and Italian air and naval forces.17 She sailed from Malta on January 23 and arrived in Colombo on February 8. There, she too immediately put into dry dock for minor repairs and maintenance before sailing to join Helfrich’s forces on February 28.18

Phoenix, Langley and Sea Witch Vice-Admiral Helfrich also expected additional naval reinforcements in the form of the light cruiser USS Phoenix. She left Fremantle on February 22 escorting Convoy MS.5, which consisted of the seaplane tender USS Langley, cargo ships MS Duntroon, SS Katoomba, MS Sea Witch and the USAT SS Willard A. Holbrook. They carried 65 P-40s, pilots, ground crew, tools, spares, ammunition and vehicles for the 13th, 33rd, 35th and 51st Pursuit Squadrons.19 Twenty-seven crated P-40s were loaded on Sea Witch with 32 more put aboard Langley fully assembled. Sea Witch also carried all the vehicles and some 750,000 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition belonging to the 51st Pursuit Squadron. Six crated planes went aboard Holbrook.20 All 65 fighters were originally allocated to the defense of Java. However, on February 17, General George Brett, deputy ABDA commander to General Wavell, decided that sending any additional air reinforcements to the NEI was a lost cause. Thus, he instead ordered them diverted to India.21 Not surprisingly, the Dutch were less than happy. They protested strongly to General G. Marshall, in Washington, D.C. In response, Marshall sent a sharply worded note to Brett on February 26 informing his subordinate of the War Department’s firm intention to stand with the Dutch in defending the East Indies. That commitment was to be honored regardless of the current combat situation. That particular situation in-

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cluded delivery of the P-40s aboard Langley and Sea Witch to Java.22 Rear-Admiral Glassford now met with Vice-Admiral Helfrich to determine a location to which the fighters would be delivered. It was impossible to fly the fighters off Langley’s deck so they would have to be off-loaded to the shore. Given the lack of a suitable port not already under air attack they chose Tjilatjap, despite it having no runway. The planes aboard Langley would be put ashore and towed to an open field on the outskirts of town; from there they would be flown to Allied air bases. As their wings were too wide for the narrow streets, residents along the selected route were hastily evicted and their homes torn down. Those crated fighters aboard Sea Witch would be offloaded and transported for assembly. To assemble them a composite group of MLD mechanics and ground crew were ordered to Tjilatjap from Soerabaja. While this exchange was developing MS.5 sailed for India. En route new orders arrived. Phoenix was to escort her charges to the vicinity of Cocos Island (600 miles south of Java) where she would turn over Duntroon, Katoomba and Willard A. Holbrook to the British light cruiser HMS Enterprise.23 Phoenix would then escort Langley and Sea Witch into Tjilatjap where she would join Helfrich’s forces. Their arrival was scheduled for the early morning of February 28. This let the final—and most dangerous—leg of their approach to Java be made under the cover of darkness.24 It would protect them against air attack from Japanese bombers now operating from Bali. However, the need for fighters on Java was acute and Helfrich quickly changed their orders again. He now ordered Langley and Sea Witch to leave the convoy on the night of February 22 and proceed independently to Java at their best speed. Because of her superior speed (18 knots) Sea Witch adhered to the original timetable. Langley could only make 13 knots so her arrival time in Tjilatjap was pushed back to 0930 on February 28. The revised timetable still allowed her to cover the final 120 miles under the cover of darkness. Phoenix was to follow them into Tjilatjap after her rendezvous with Enterprise 300 miles west of Cocos Island. However, this did not take place until February 28. By then it was too late to join Langley and Sea Witch, so Phoenix returned to Fremantle where she dropped anchor on March 5.25 As Helfrich and Glassford moved to buttress Java’s air defenses the Japanese were taking counter-measures. Undetected by ABDA the 1st Carrier Air Fleet under Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo left Staring Bay on February 25.26 Its core units—the 1st Carrier Squadron and 2nd Carrier Squadron—were the same ones that had pounded Pearl Harbor and Ambon. They were screened by the 1/3rd Battleship Squadron, 1/8th Cruiser Squadron, 1st Destroyer Flotilla, 17th Destroyer Squadron and 18th Destroyer Squadron. They had orders to operate south of Java to prevent reinforcements and any evacuation of personnel or equipment.27 The task force was accompanied by six tankers.28 They were followed out of Staring Bay that same day by a main battle force under the command of Vice-Admiral Nobu-

take Kondo. His force included the 2/3rd Battleship Squadron and 4th Cruiser Squadron with the 4th Destroyer Division providing A/S support.29 They too slipped through the Ombai Strait30 into the Indian Ocean. These two forces would inflict considerable havoc on Allied civilian and naval forces in the first week of March. Although the Japanese firmly controlled Bali and the airfield at Den Passar, they took additional steps to prevent the reinforcement or evacuation of Java via the Bali Strait. The exact date is unknown, but at some point in late February the 21st Destroyer Division moved into the Bali Strait.31 They had participated in the invasion of Bali and were likely assigned to escort supply convoys to that island. It appears they were the same destroyers encountered by USN submarines in the Eastern Java Sea and Banda Sea. At about the same time, Arashio from the 8th Destroyer Division moved into the Madoera Strait.32 Although it remains unclear, Asashio likely operated with her. Michisio and Oshio were still undergoing repairs to their damage suffered in the Badoeng Strait. They too likely escorted supply convoys between Makassar and Bali. In contrast to the powerful Japanese forces bearing down on Java from virtually every direction, Admiral Helfrich’s naval forces were weak and dispersed. By February 25 the main body of his Eastern Strike Force at Soerabaja consisted of just De Ruyter, Java and Houston. They were screened by Kortenaer, Witte de With, Alden, John D. Edwards, John D. Ford and Paul Jones. At the ME Pope’s crew worked frenetically to repair the ship’s hotwell, but she would not be ready for sea for another 48–72 hours. Even with the arrival of Perth, the Western Strike Force at Tandjoeng Priok was equally weak and absolutely no match for the Japanese naval forces massing in the South China Sea. Its main body also consisted of only cruisers with Exeter, Hobart, Perth, Danae and Dragon. They were screened by Electra, Encounter, Jupiter, Scout and Tenedos. Although she still could not be considered battle-ready, Evertsen was also ordered to join Admiral Collins at Tandjoeng Priok as soon as she could be released from convoy duty. On February 25 an Allied flying boat sighted the Eastern Invasion Convoy in Balikpapan Harbor as it prepared to move south. At this stage of the campaign there was no doubt of its destination. Although the Allies fully expected a landing on both ends of Java, the Western Invasion Convoy still had not been sighted. Thus, Helfrich elected to combine his forces against the single known threat. At 1125 that same morning he issued orders for Exeter, Hobart, Perth, Electra, Encounter and Jupiter to leave Tandjoeng Priok and join Doorman’s force at Soerabaja. In response, Commodore Collins ordered them to sail at 1500. Danae, Dragon, Scout and Tenedos remained behind due to their age and lack of speed.33 Before departing Tandjoeng Priok, Hobart went alongside the British fleet tanker RFA War Sirdar to refuel. Barely had the operation commenced when klaxons sounded and 27 Japanese bombers appeared overhead. Some 40 to 60 bombs fell

21. “In the afterlife, Sonny” around both ships in a cascade of explosions, mud and geysers. Though heavily pounded by the concussion of near misses, Hobart suffered only minor hull and splinter damage with several wounded. War Sirdar suffered a direct hit forward. The damage allowed salt water to partially contaminate her cargo of fuel oil. The tanker also assumed a list to port. Although she later transferred her remaining cargo to the tanker RFA Francol the attack completely disrupted Hobart’s ability to fuel. As a result, she was unable to join Doorman and instead remained with the Western Strike Force.34

“Commander, I’m wounded.” 35 The Japanese did not just pick on large warships. Their fighters and observation planes frequently strafed anchored seaplanes, small boats and other targets of opportunity. At 1030 on the morning of February 25, 27 G4M “Betty” bombers attacked Tandjoeng Priok. Their attack unsuccessfully focused on Exeter, which lay anchored in the harbor. As the bombers departed a flight of three Zeros came down in a “V formation” and proceeded to strafe the patrol boat P 16 as she moved into the outer harbor. To avoid being raked down the length of his ship, Leading Seaman 1st Class N. Heynemann ordered his coxswain, Reserve Seaman P. Dorif, to turn hard to starboard. Nonetheless, the wooden boat was hammered by hundreds of cannon and machine gun rounds. Ignoring the hail of gunfire, Reserve Seaman F.L.J. van Aken emptied a full belt of ammunition from his 12.7mm machine gun into one of the fighters. The Zero staggered in mid-air and plunged into the harbor from an altitude of about 200 feet.36 The fighters had done damage as well. P 16 carried four 300-liter drums of fuel oil in case a surprise parachute drop prevented the boat from refueling. Several drums were holed in the first attack and fuel flowed onto the deck; if ignited, the boat would instantly turn into a massive fireball. Instead of withdrawing, the remaining fighters turned for another attack. Reacting to the danger, Reserve Seaman van Aken left his weapon and quickly cut the ropes securing the drums; he then manhandled them over the side. He had barely finished when one of the fighters again roared overhead, spraying gunfire. Two crewmen, coxswain Dorif and Reserve Seaman H.W. Hengst (loader for the patrol boat’s two heavy machine guns), were hit in this attack. Hengst was hit in the groin, while Dorif ’s right arm was immobilized and he was knocked to the deck. He cried out, “Commander, I’m wounded!” Unable to do anything for either crewman, Heynemann simply ordered his coxswain to “Continue!” Sitting on his knees in a pool of blood, Dorif continued to steer P 16 with his left hand. In an instant, one-third of the patrol boat’s six-man crew had been immobilized and the third fighter was beginning its attack. As the Zero bore in, van Aken and Reserve Seaman van der Broek sighted and readied their weapons. Before it could come into range of their machine guns, Exeter opened fire with her 2-pounder pom-pom guns from across the harbor. The Japa-

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nese pilot flew so low that Exeter’s AA guns were forced to fire through the mast of P 16, bringing down her Dutch flag.37 This encouraged the Japanese to pull out and they flew away. The condition of Hengst was critical and Heynemann headed for a nearby British hospital ship. However, she would not bring Hengst aboard during an air raid, leaving the patrol boat to race against time to bring him to a hospital on shore. En route, P 16 notified the shore station that she was bringing ashore two casualties. An ambulance met them at the wharf and the wounded men were taken to the military hospital where they underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the wounded Hengst could not be saved and he died soon after. The following day he was buried in Batavia with full military honors.38 In the meantime, P 16 returned to the naval base where her crew counted a total of 362 bullet holes in the patrol boat’s hull and deck. As a final insult, they were then forced to fix the damage themselves. As they did at Soerabaja, the Indonesian workforce had fled the harbor after the first Japanese air raid. Heynemann later wrote, “We had to repair them ourselves. Because out of fear of the air raids the native workers had already fled.”

Air Cover for the CSF Although virtually all English-language accounts of the East Indies campaign written since March 1942 claim that Doorman’s force suffered from a complete dearth of air cover this is not accurate.39 As Vice-Admiral Helfrich moved to intercept the Eastern Invasion Convoy he requested air cover from Java Air Command.40 In response to this request, Lieutenant-General van Oyen ordered the transfer of as many fighters as possible to Ngoro Airfield on Eastern Java to cover Doorman’s force. In total, six ML-KNIL Buffalos and seven Hurricanes were made available to fly CAP over the CSF.41 The latter aircraft had been handed over to the Dutch by the RAF only a few days before when their pilots were evacuated from Java. The re-allocation of these resources came at a time when the number of fighters on Java was in critically short supply. Their transfer to Ngoro resulted in weakened counter-strikes against Japanese air units operating from Bali, Balikpapan, Makassar and Palembang. Everyone knew that a naval fight was brewing off Java. The only question was when and where it would take place. Ashore, there seemed little confidence that the KNIL could hold out for long once the Japanese came ashore. All hope for holding Java, it seemed, lay on the shoulders of the remaining Allied naval forces. Indeed, Helfrich had already issued the following communiqué to all ships under his command: I inform all officers and ships’ companies that the situation is critical. I wish to impress upon all of you the necessity for every effort against the enemy to prevent his landing on Java. Every opportunity for offensive action must be seized and all sacrifices must be made to this end.42

Although the Japanese were on the move there remained considerable doubt as to exactly where on East Java they would land. The north coast of Madoera was considered one of the more favorable locations. For years the Dutch military had been fixated with the possibility of Japanese landings or a similar

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type attack at Soerabaja. But the north coast of Java was long and much of it weakly defended.43 The Eastern Invasion Convoy had last been reported in the southern Makassar Strait. At a speed of 10–15 knots it could reach Madoera by the morning of February 26. Faced with the real possibility of an unopposed Japanese landing on Java while he waited for reinforcements, Rear-Admiral Doorman elected to sortie from Soerabaja without waiting for Exeter and her accompanying warships to arrive. Prior to sailing, Rear-Admiral Doorman made a momentous decision that would dramatically influence his actions over the next 48 hours. Since he planned to only engage the Japanese in a night action he put all his ship-board floatplanes ashore at Morokrembangan. This included three Fokker C.XI-W floatplanes from De Ruyter and Java along with Houston’s lone remaining Curtis SOC Seagull floatplane.44 Although Houston was equipped with a hangar, the Dutch planes sat exposed and unprotected, presenting a severe risk of fire. With that in mind, he elected to leave all his aircraft behind.45 New reconnaissance reports put the Japanese convoy north of Bawean Island. If it maintained its course and speed it could land on Java within hours. In a bid to intercept it, the CSF cast off mooring lines at dusk on February 25. A rainy, overcast day added to their sense of foreboding.46 For this sortie Doorman had only De Ruyter, Java and Houston in his main force. They were screened by Kortenaer, Witte de With, Alden, John D. Edwards, John D. Ford and Paul Jones. At a speed of 10 to 15 knots Doorman first swept to the east along the north coast of Madoera in hope of intercepting the Japanese convoy. He then reversed course and swept westward to the area north of Rembang without making contact. Doorman was already thinking ahead to his next attempt to intercept the Japanese. In the midst of this sortie, at 0148, Captain O.L. Gordon aboard Exeter received a signal from Doorman ordering him to rendezvous with his force in the ME by noon. At dawn Doorman led the CSF back into the ME. But the assembled fleet was a tempting target and he dared not linger in port for fear of air attack. Lieutenant-Commander Antonie Kroese, captain of the Kortenaer, later recalled, At dawn the cruisers and destroyers returned to Soerabaja to refuel. As soon as their tanks were full, the destroyers left the harbor and cruised in the roadstead to avoid enemy aerial attacks.47

Although disrupted by a Japanese air raid at 0930 the Allied ships—with the exception of Houston which had topped off the previous day—continued to fuel throughout the day.48 They all had to alternate between the shore and tankers in the harbors as fueling stations on the quays had been damaged or destroyed by prior air raids.

S-38 Bombards Bawean Ashore, ominous reports were filtering into KM headquarters indicating that the Japanese had landed on Bawean earlier that night. Located just 90 miles north of Soerabaja, the Dutch had no military presence on the island, but maintained a me-

teorological station to relay weather reports to Java. MajorGeneral G.A. Ilgen, commander of the KNIL 3rd Infantry Division, had reports that contact with the island had been lost, but restored later that morning. It was then lost again permanently. One of the officers aboard the cruiser Java had a friend in the Meteorological Office who told him that the weather station on Bawean had stopped responding. It was assumed that the Japanese were already on the island.49 Given the rather small size of the island, detailed information on the actual occupation of Bawean is sketchy. It is known that Asagumo, Minegumo and Natsugumo of the 9th Destroyer Squadron broke off from the main body of the Eastern Invasion Convoy on the night of February 25.50 They carried a force of approximately 20 soldiers tasked with capturing Bawean and setting up a weather station of their own.51 It appears that the destroyers either carried or towed one or two motorized schooners to ferry the troops ashore. S-38 was in the vicinity of Bawean when LieutenantCommander Munson received orders to investigate. She had been en route to reinforce K-XIV and K-XV off Discovery Bank. If the island was indeed in Japanese hands Munson was to bombard and disable its radio station to prevent its use by the Japanese. By 0600 on February 26 she was off the village of Sangapura, which housed the island’s radio station. S-38 initially approached on the surface, but submerged as she got closer. As it became lighter Munson surveyed the harbor by periscope. The Japanese destroyers had returned to the convoy, but inside the reef were two motor schooners with a number of prauws scattered about.52 With no enemy ships in sight he gave orders to battle-surface and man the submarine’s 4-inch deck gun. Slowly cruising offshore at ranges between 4,300 and 5,100 yards his lookouts were unable to locate the transmitter. They then fired on the European houses and buildings in the hope of scoring a lucky hit. The Japanese returned fire from a small cannon on the beach, but S-38 silenced it with just two shots. The gun crew had fired 42 rounds when lookouts signaled the approach of a destroyer, forcing Munson to pull the plug. When the “destroyer” was identified as a native prauw, S-38 again surfaced and resumed her bombardment. She fired another 30 rounds into Sangapura with 10 more at a nearby native village. There was no indication of Japanese casualties, but her bombardment started several fires and ignited what appeared to be a small ammunition dump. Munson ceased fire when all 4-inch rounds were expended; S-38 then submerged and set course for Soerabaja.53 By sunrise on February 26 the Eastern Invasion Convoy was 40 miles off Tandjoeng Selatan, a peninsula just south of Banjarmasin. It was moving south with only the 4th Destroyer Flotilla in close escort. At 0630 the 5th Cruiser Squadron came into view and the convoy turned west.54 Jintsu and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla were some miles to the northwest and would join up later that evening. Although the weather up to now had been perfect, the morning of February 26 was cloudy and overcast. As a result, the IJN’s Tainan Air Wing, operating out of Balikpapan, had trouble consistently maintaining a CAP over the convoy.

21. “In the afterlife, Sonny” This was demonstrated some 90 minutes later when the Dutch flying boat Y-67 sighted the escort. Taking advantage of the overcast sky, her pilot completely surprised the Japanese when he dove through the clouds and dropped a single 500pound bomb. The destroyer Amatsukaze was his target; her captain later recalled in his postwar memoirs: At 0800 a PBY float plane suddenly slipped out of the clouds to the southeast and headed toward my ship. “Enemy plane dead ahead! Open fire!” I yelled. An antiaircraft machine gun fired one burst as the PBY dropped a bomb—a bit too early—which raised a large water pillar about 500 meters ahead. The plane swerved, gained speed and disappeared into the overcast. The whole action was so brief we didn’t even have time to get excited.55

Hara surmised that the Allies were deliberately targeting warships over transports in preparation for a naval battle off Java. However, it appears Y-67 attacked Amatsukaze simply because her pilot failed to spot the convoy. Dutch reports indicate that an unidentified MLD flying boat sighted ship movements in the Karimata Strait that same morning. However, it could not provide any detailed information due to the bad weather.56 There still had been no reports of an invasion force headed toward Western Java—only the small concentration of ships previously sighted in Muntok Harbor and they made no movement. That changed on February 26; at 1030 a RAF Blenheim bomber returning from a raid on Muntok reported a convoy of 20 ships 100 miles northeast of the Soenda Strait. They were moving north, away from Java, on a course of 345 degrees. Although they remained under observation, neither Helfrich nor Doorman saw need to revise their plans; the biggest threat was still in the Eastern Java Sea. Once that force had been repulsed Doorman would move to Tandjoeng Priok and engage any Japanese forces operating off Western Java.57 By now reports of the approaching Japanese convoy were starting to come in with increasingly regularity. At 1150 on February 26, 30 transports were reported northwest of the Arends Islands at 4-50 S / 114-20 E. Course 245 degrees, speed 10 knots. In escort were two cruisers and four destroyers. If accurately reported, this could very well have been the convoy’s distant covering force trailing behind with heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi with Kawakaze, Sazanami, Ushio and Yamakaze. Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were also busy scouting the location and composition of Allied shipping still in the Eastern Java Sea. Prior to the arrival of the RN ships from Tandjoeng Priok a “Betty” attached to the 11th Air Flotilla at Balikpapan reconnoitered Soerabaja. It reported one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers—Houston, De Ruyter and Java—and several destroyers in the ME. A short time later floatplanes from Haguro and Nachi also scouted the harbor. They reported the presence of Houston and several destroyers; they failed to sight De Ruyter and Java and reported them missing. It was on one of these reconnaissance flights that Haguro suffered damage to her lone Aichi E13A “Jake” floatplane. It encountered an “enemy double-wing flying boat”—almost certainly a Do. 24 that had been misidentified due to its stummels—that dropped several bombs and flew away.58 The “Jake”

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then landed and was hoisted aboard. Before the operation was complete Haguro prematurely got under way, causing the plane to hit the water, damaging a wing. The pilot, Joushio Kameda, fell into the water and injured his head.59 Admiral Doorman planned another night sweep that evening after the Commonwealth ships arrived. He requested that MLD units at Morokrembangan immediately reconnoiter the Java Sea north of Soerabaja and Madoera.60 Although the mission was approved by the Dutch high command in Bandoeng, the MLD was unable to comply; it was severely weakened and had to conserve its few remaining planes for missions later that evening.61 The ML-KNIL would instead carry out the mission later that afternoon.62 Doorman and Rear-Admiral Koenraad also requested that USAAF B-17s on Java conduct reconnaissance sweeps over the Java Sea. They were told that none were available. Doorman then urgently requested that at the radio station at Morokrembangan immediately forward to him directly any and all air reconnaissance reports.63 Typically they first went to the Reconnaissance Group headquarters at Bandoeng where they were evaluated, prioritized and re-transmitted to the fleet on either ABDA or KM naval frequencies. However, the understaffed KM communications net was overwhelmed by war-time demands; a single message, no matter how vital, could take hours to transit the clogged communications system. 6 4 Doorman needed fresh information and he had no qualms about going outside the normal chain of command to get it. At 1300 Y-67 reported a convoy of 30 transports northeast of Bawean. It moved south at a speed of 10 knots. The PBY’s first report was so garbled that Rear-Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja did not know which plane had sent it.65 The report was passed along at 1340 but Doorman did not receive it until after 1400.66 At 1500 Y-67 sent a second signal reporting two cruisers and two destroyers between the Paternoster Islands and Shoulder Bank. At 1440 their position was 6–25 S / 117–13 E. This was likely Ashigara, Myoko, Akebono and Inazuma moving into position to provide the Eastern Convoy with distant cover. In preparation for his second sweep on the night of February 26 Doorman called a meeting of all ship captains. It took place at 1500 at the newly opened KM headquarters in the ANIEM Building in the suburb of Embong Woengoe. Commander T.H. Binford—from the 58th Destroyer Division— and Commander E.N. Parker—of the 59th Destroyer Division—represented the American destroyer force so that their skippers could refuel and rest.67 As they left John D. Ford they sighted the Royal Navy ships preparing to tie up. Exeter, Perth, Electra, Encounter and Jupiter entered the Westwater Channel at 1230. The channel was some distance from the port; navigating the minefield and subsequent final leg to the port often took two to three hours. The destroyers were sent ahead to relay the force’s need to fuel. According to the deck log of John D. Ford, they reached the outer bay at 1430; Exeter and Perth followed 30 minutes later.68 All dropped anchor by ±1600. They had orders to be ready to sail by 1800. This pre-

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cluded the new arrivals from completely refueling as there were no oilers available. Nor was there time to go alongside one of the few operational fuel bunkers inside the naval basin. Although all got some fuel, none were able to top off.69 In the meantime, their respective commanders made a harrowing dash by car through the streets of Soerabaja in order to join Doorman’s meeting, which was pushed back two hours pending their arrival. Captain Gordon later recalled, “Rear-Admiral Doorman had called a meeting of Commanding Officers for 1700 but no information of this was received until nearly that time when the British Liaison Officer attached to De Ruyter arrived aboard Exeter.70 As a result the Commanding Officer of Perth and myself were very late in joining this meeting, and only arrived at the risk of our lives in the fastest and most dangerous motor car rides through traffic that we had ever experienced.”71

“In the afterlife, Sonny” Although Rear-Admiral Doorman was a loyal, dedicated officer who was well-respected within the Royal Netherlands Navy, he had severe reservations about the pending naval battle to try and save Java. Shortly before the meeting of ships captains took place, Doorman and Helfrich had a private phone conversation. As he had done multiple times since his initial foray into the Makassar Strait two weeks earlier, Doorman again pointed out the lack of air reconnaissance and the importance of adequate fighter protection.72 In 1962 Helfrich recalled the conversation for Dutch historian Loe de Jong: Doorman said to me, “We have little chance.” To which I replied, “There is no reconnaissance report of a Japanese aircraft carrier or battleship.” He stated again: “Do we have a chance? I believe very little. Is it not better to leave while there is time and join the Allies outside Java?” I made three counterpoints against it [withdrawal]: • First, we would fight in the Java Sea; any withdrawal was unacceptable, as was any suggestion that we would not fight. • Second, it was not necessary to reinforce the Allied fleets with the remainder of our squadron. • The third echoed the orders from Washington: hold … and that includes the fleet. I said: “So you stay and you fight it out. The chance of success is slim, but it is there.”

In response to a question about his health Doorman replied: “It is okay.” His last words were to the CZM: “Well then, I go.”73

Doorman almost certainly suffered from exhaustion and perhaps even Acute Stress Disorder or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (i.e., shell shock). He told Helfrich that his men were exhausted and that he himself could barely cope with the situation. Helfrich later mentioned to his aide that Doorman looked exhausted. He was pale and walked with a stooped posture. He suffered from dysentery, which affected his overall health.74 Dutch historian Dr. Ph.M. Bosscher believes that this, at least partially, accounts for the gloomy outlook Doorman sometimes projected privately. His gloomy behavior and pessimistic outlook regarding his fleet’s chances of saving Java also manifested themselves to others. On February 17 he visited Lembang, his childhood home, and met his former chief of staff, Captain L.G.L. van der Kun. As their visit wrapped up van der Kun responded to Doorman’s “tot ziens” (“until we meet again”) with the question, “And where shall that be?” Doorman answered “In the afterlife, Sonny.” To which Van der Kun replied, “Don’t be in such a hurry to get there, Tank.”75 Nonetheless, Doorman was completely serious and shook Van der Kun’s hand firmly, “No, in the afterlife and that I’m sure of.”76 Despite Doorman’s physical ailments perhaps one should not make too much of his “gloom and doom” mannerisms. According to Bosscher, although he was by no means a master tactician, Doorman was well-educated with a good mind and considered to have above-average skills compared to his contemporaries. That said, he believed in a “class society” and could be impatient and dismissive toward ordinary sailors. His overall personality was generally cynical and negative.77 These traits manifested themselves long before the outbreak of the Pacific War. The drawback now was that they were amplified by the fact that many of his American allies, and even his own commander to a certain extent, felt that he was much too cautious.78 A cautious commander with a pessimistic attitude certainly did not boost morale on the eve of the naval battle that would decide Java’s fate.

Chapter 22

“We spanked the Japs … and we’ll do it again!” “My hope is on you”

Although the staff meeting was originally called for 1500, Rear-Admiral Doorman pushed it back to 1700 to facilitate the late-arriving British officers.1 He spent the delay in the Operations Room of Rear-Admiral Pieter Koenraad2; at 1615 Doorman received a signal from Vice-Admiral Helfrich:

In the meantime, the meeting of Allied ship commanders started at 1700. In attendance were Rear-Admiral Doorman, his chief of staff, his adjutant, Rear-Admiral Koenraad and his senior staff officer, captains of the Allied cruisers, Division Commander of the Dutch destroyers,9 commanders of the 58th and 59th Destroyer Divisions, skippers of the British and Dutch destroyers, Exeter’s navigation officer and one or two other officers.10 Lieutenant-Commander Antoine Kroese of the Kortenaer, remembered:

CZM to EC,3 (R) CCCF, Comsowespac: Most Immediate At 1155 Java Time, 26th February, 20 transports in position lat. 04° 50' south, long. 114° 20' east [i.e., about 25 miles northwest of the Arends Islands, and 180 miles northeast of Soerabaja]. Course 245°, speed 10 knots. Two cruisers and four destroyers in company with transports. Striking force is to proceed to sea in order to attack enemy after dark. After attack, striking force is to proceed towards Tandjoeng Priok. Acknowledge.4

The Commanders appeared at this last conference correctly attired in white starched uniforms with shining epaulettes. They might have been going to a tea-party. Old friends and comrades from former actions greeted each other warmly. Outside the sirens howled another alert, but nobody paid any attention to it. Anyway, the alert was hardly audible amid the babble of voices. As Rear-Admiral Doorman and his Chief-of-Staff, Commander J.A. de Gelder, entered the room, a sudden silence descended. Everyone stood to attention. Rear-Admiral Doorman smiled to his Commanders. The newly arrived Commanders of the British destroyers were presented to him, and he gave them all a cordial handshake. The Chief-of-Staff then asked them all to be seated at the long conference table.11

Doorman now had clear orders and an initial position report to work against after leaving harbor that night. On a completely different level, it was the first in a drumbeat series of piercing signals from Helfrich to his subordinate before and throughout the pending battle. It remains unclear if Doorman truly needed encouragement, but Helfrich browbeat him with a series of strongly worded signals exhorting action and sacrifice. True to his rank and duty, Doorman would follow every one of them to the best of his ability. In response to Doorman’s earlier request for air reconnaissance, two Dutch Buffalos flown by 1st Lieutenant G.J. de Haas and Sergeant G.M. Bruggink took off from Ngoro air field at 1645. In preparation for Doorman’s sortie later that night they made a 90 minute sweep into the Java Sea north of Soerabaja. They sighted nothing and returned to base at 1815. Four additional Dutch Buffalos sat in readiness during their flight in case the mission needed to be expanded, but were not needed.5 At 1700 the Buffalos were followed by two B-17s from the 19th Bomb Group at Madioen airfield.6 Just 90 minutes later the bomber Monkey Bizz-Ness attacked a convoy of 18 ships in the South Makassar Strait. Bombing from 21,000 feet, all of its bombs missed by at least 100 feet despite light AA fire.7 Six aircraft—which were assumed to be Japanese fighters—were seen in the distance but did not approach.8 The convoy’s position was reported upon landing at 2230. The second B-17 failed to sight the Japanese convoy altogether and proceeded to bomb Den Passar Airfield on Bali.

Although Doorman spoke English well enough to conduct meetings with his American and Commonwealth allies, Commander de Gelder moderated.12 Doorman spoke about the military situation in the NEI and the importance of the CSF to the defense of Java; he also reviewed those airfields currently in Japanese hands. Java could expect simultaneous landings on both its Eastern and Western ends within 24 to 48 hours.13 Night landings on Eastern Java were expected on the north coast of Madoera or on Java proper near Rembang. Both were ideal landing sites; the night of March 1 was a full moon and would offer ideal conditions. The former would let them isolate Soerabaja and the Allied fleet from the rest of Java. The latter would allow them to quickly move inland and seize Tjepoe, the last remaining oil field and refinery in Dutch hands. Doorman then used a chart to show where minefields had already been laid along the north coast of Java. He also pointed out that additional mines were to be laid that night off Toeban.14 The CSF was to sortie as soon as all captains returned to their respective ships. They were to cast off at 1900. Upon clearing the Westwater Channel minefield at 2100 the force would

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turn east and sweep along the north coast of Madoera, staying five miles offshore. Speed would be 25 knots, which would put the CSF off the east end of Madoera by midnight of February 28. The CSF would then reverse course and patrol westward to Rembang.15 Once the Japanese landings on East Java had been repelled the CSF would set course for Tandjoeng Priok to link up with the remainder of the Western Strike Force and combat the anticipated landing forces there as well. After the CSF successfully repulsed the Japanese off East Java, they would move to the Western Java Sea to take on the Japanese there.16 It was an exact repeat of the course Doorman had followed the previous night. Lieutenant-Commander Kroese of the Kortenaer remembered Doorman’s briefing clearly.17 The admiral stated that the CCSF would risk everything in its attempt to prevent a Japanese landing on Java or Madoera. The Japanese transports would be attacked by night. According to gossip aboard the American ships, Doorman was considered a “night prowler” who preferred to operate after nightfall because he feared Japanese airpower.18 This was closer to the truth than many realized. Doorman recognized his own deficiency in airpower and chose to operate after dark to minimize the threat of air attack. The KM also trained extensively for night combat to help offset their smaller numbers. Unfortunately, as experience had shown in the Badoeng Strait, the Japanese were much better trained and equipped. There were two options available to Doorman as he sought out the approaching Japanese convoy: 1. Based on his last signal from Helfrich, push northwest of Bawean; then northeast toward the Arends Islands. However, this position report was some eight hours old and nothing new had come in since. Due to insufficient air reconnaissance Doorman risked missing the Japanese transports altogether and their reaching Java or Madoera undisturbed. 2. Stay close to the Java shore. Patrol along the north coast of Madoera to its easternmost tip, followed by a sweep westward as far as Toeban. The benefit of this was that it would keep his ships close to shore with decreased risk of missing the Japanese.

Admiral Helfrich originally considered going out and meeting the Japanese in the Makassar Strait. He then decided against it due to the weakness of ABDA air reconnaissance. His fear of missing the convoys and allowing an uncontested landing on Java was too great.19 Given the lack of fighter cover the result of this kind of sortie would almost certainly have been the same as, if not worse than, those into the Makassar Sea and Karimata Strait. In the end, Doorman elected to stay close to shore where he had a greater chance of intercepting the convoy and where he would be in range of the fighter cover at Ngoro. Upon exiting the Westwater Channel the CSF would assume a night formation with the British and Dutch destroyers screening forward. The cruisers followed in column. Except for their heavy torpedo armament, Doorman considered the American destroyers to be an offensive liability in a surface action and kept them to the rear. The British and Dutch destroyers would launch torpedo attacks as soon as enemy forces were sighted. They would then crash into the convoy and inflict as much damage as possible. The cruisers would stand off and shell the transports and any escorting warships.

With their short torpedo range and weak surface armament, the elderly American destroyers were too frail to withstand the beating of a prolonged surface engagement. Thus, they would carry out their own torpedo attacks under the cruisers’ covering fire. All the Allied destroyers would display colored lights after their respective torpedo attacks to avoid being shelled by their own cruisers. Doorman anticipated that the formation would then break up and no definite plans were possible. The captains were instructed to utilize flares, searchlights and smoke as circumstances dictated. There were special precautions if there was contact near the coast. The KM had laid mines off Madoera’s north coast (inside the 20 meter line) and within the Bay of Toeban (inside the 10 meter line).20 To avoid them, the Allied ships would turn north after their attack. If the CSF was moving east when it encountered the Japanese there would be no danger as they would be on the starboard bow. If Japanese transports were sighted to port the Allied cruisers had orders to proceed at least five miles farther east after passing the enemy line of ships, to avoid any torpedoes fired by the American destroyers. Because a leaking boiler pipe forced Kroese to shut down her #3 boiler Kortenaer was limited to 25 knots. So that she could keep up, Doorman limited the CSF to her top speed. The only reason she was brought along was to serve as an escort for any damaged Allied cruiser that might require an escort back to the ME.21 This would later prove to be prophetic forethought on the part of Admiral Doorman. Lieutenant-Commander Binford joked that she could play the role of SMS Blücher at the Battle of Dogger Bank to general laughter of the other naval men in the room.22 Although an obscure footnote in today’s military annals, the story of Blücher was well- known at the time.23 Whether intentional or not, Doorman then put Binford on the spot by pointing out that Pope was also supposed to join the CSF, but was still completing repairs to her hotwell. She would catch up to the formation as soon as possible. Doorman then continued: “But fortunately I have more cheerful news than these tales of damaged ships and losses. There is a possibility that in this action we may have some fighter protection.” His statement was politely met with general laughter amongst the officers present. They had heard this promise before and it had never materialized.24 One of the American officers went so far as to shake his head and murmur, “Too little and too late.”25 Unknown to them, the promise would actually come true this time; but although Allied airpower appeared overhead at least twice, many of them would not even realize it. The attendees were then given the opportunity to ask questions. A schedule of sailing and formations was handed out and meeting broke up.26 With little or no air support, Doorman knew that he would be sailing blind. After putting his spotter planes ashore he would have to rely almost exclusively on position reports compiled and reported by Rear-Admiral Koenraad’s “War Room” at Soerabaja. Thus, his final words to his counterpart were, “Koenraad, my hope is on you.”27

22. “We spanked the Japs … and we’ll do it again!”

The CSF Sorties As the commanders made their way to the harbor Dutch and Indonesian crewman also began filtering back to their ships. They had been given shore leave that morning following their return from the previous night’s foray. Although no thought was given to the resolve of the European personnel, numerous former crewmen and historians consider it significant that virtually every Indonesian crew member returned to his ship in spite of what lay ahead.28 At a time when Indonesian loyalty to the Dutch cause could be soundly debated, every KM ship had a full crew when the Squadron sailed. Lieutenant Abraham van der Moer aboard Witte de With wrote: The Combined Striking Force left Soerabaja for the last time late on the afternoon of February 26. Although no special restriction had been in place concerning shore leave during the previous few weeks, our crew and the crews of the other ships were complete. During those hectic days it would have been easy for the native enlisted men to go absent without leave, but they did not. One sailor ordered ashore by the medical officer for health reasons joined his ship on the sly.29

Lieutenant-Commander Kroese aboard the Kortenaer also noted: The native crews of the Dutch warships also remained true to the honor of their cause. Not one of them failed to answer at the last roll-call, though it would have been easy for them to exchange their uniform for civilian clothes and not return from shore leave.30

The harbor to which they returned was an orgy of destruction. After being bombed regularly for the past month the damage was clearly visible: Many times a day the sirens howled alerts. In the roadstead a large motor cargo-boat of the Rotterdam Lloyd line lay burning [on Queen Olga Rock]. Smoking ruins mirrored themselves in the water of the harbours. In the 3,000 ton dock of the naval base, the destroyer Banckert was being repaired. It had a huge hole blown in the stern by a near miss while it was refueling. The Dutch hospital ship Op ten Noort had been severely damaged by bombs as it was on its way through the Western Channel to Soerabaja. The ship was undergoing repairs in the Perak Harbor. The 15,000 ton dock in the Merchant Navy harbor was blocked by the American destroyer Stewart, which was lying pitifully on its side. The huge Naval Air Station, Morokrembangan, was a spectacle of destruction. It was no longer used by the seaplanes since a dozen Catalinas and Dorniers had been destroyed by machine-gun bullets from enemy aircraft while they were riding at anchor. The seaplanes now were hiding as well as they could on Java’s lakes during their short breaks for refueling and rest. Soerabaja’s seafront, which had once been so gay and lively, now presented a picture of destruction and desolation.31

De Ruyter was moored alongside the Cruiser Quay in the ME. Admiral Doorman came aboard just before 1800. Sick with dysentery, exhausted by the burden of leading a multinational command under impossible circumstances and perhaps a bit jittery from the heavy air attacks on his force, Doorman was keenly aware of the challenges facing him in the Java Sea and appeared aged beyond his years. He looked like a broken man. He was exhausted and all stooped over. He had his orders, but seemed like he already knew the outcome. De Ruyter’s crew applauded him as he boarded; they had respect for him.32

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The ship’s whistle then signaled “All Aboard” and the gangplanks were pulled up and the CSF made final preparations to sail. In addition to military personnel and civilian volunteers, there were hundreds of family members—including men, women and children—who had come to see off family, significant others, officers and shipmates.33 Many for the last time. With the ME now all but devoid of civilian yard workers, many well-wishers were informally drafted into service at the last minute to help the Allied ships get away from Soerabaja. The mooring lines of Kortenaer were cast off by none other than T. Kroese-Rutgers, the wife of her commanding officer.34 Her husband later wrote: “As Kortenaer passed by the flagship both crews raised a deafening cheer from high to low. One felt that the end had finally come to a long wait and that now ‘anything can happen.’”35 While the mood ashore was gloomy and desperate, it was the exact opposite aboard Java. She was the oldest ship in the CSF and following her extensive convoy duty, the air action in the Gaspar Straits and naval fight off Bali, she would have normally undergone extensive overhaul. But there was no time and her engine room crew worked day and night when Java was in harbor to make repairs. Although their work was occasionally interrupted by air raids, morale remained high. Statements like, “We spanked the Japs off Badoeng and we’ll do it again”36 and “We are the best gunnery ship in the navy and Lieutenant van Geen is the best gunnery officer” were heard throughout the ship as Java moved into the outer bay.37 Morale was “really very high … we knew there was a great power against us, yes, we even knew that the outcome would be unfavorable,” a Petty Officer aboard Java wrote after the war. “However, we had so many difficulties to overcome that this was just one more obstacle to confront.”38 Jupiter had already thrown off her mooring lines and was slowly inching off the pier unassisted. Two tugs from one corner of the naval yard passed her as they approached De Ruyter. Captain Lacomblé gave the order to cast off front and rear hawsers and the tugs moved the light cruiser into the harbor at 1830. Shortly afterward, he ordered the engines to “Slow” and then “Half Speed Ahead” as the tugs threw off their lines and signaled their final farewell in the failing light. As she pulled away the sound of the bustling civilian crowd on the Cruiser Pier slowly died out and a calm quiet fell over De Ruyter.39 To port, the Allied crews could see the smaller warships and merchants still in harbor putting out their blue anchor chain lights. Farther in the distance, flames from the still burning MS Kota Radja flickered in the dark like a tantalizing beacon to any Japanese aircraft that dared risk the night sky. Admiral Doorman signaled the strike force, “Assume formation and increase speed to 9 knots.”40 Shortly after giving that order, a tug pulling a water barge was sighted crossing over the path of the formation on its port side, almost dead ahead. The two sides approached each other in slow motion. In a flurry of commands and ringing telegraphs, De Ruyter changed course slightly and gave three short blasts

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on her steam whistle to signal the rest of the Squadron, “I am full speed astern.” Although all the Allied warships repeated her maneuver, it was obvious that the tug was too slow and a collision was unavoidable. A violent crash—followed by creaking and groaning— permeated De Ruyter as her bow plowed into the tug directly amidships. The barge separated and drifted away, but the tug heeled over and immediately began to sink. A Dutch sailor threw a rope ladder over the side as De Ruyter and the entire squadron slowly drifted to a full stop. Seven Indonesian crewmen from the tug—including her captain—quickly climbed aboard. As they did the tug sank with a huge blast of steam as seawater extinguished its boiler. There were still two crewmen missing and De Ruyter quickly launched her whaleboat to search for them as a searchlight swept the water. One was found in the water near a light buoy, but the last could not be found. After 15 minutes the whaleboat was taken aboard again and the fleet continued onward into the darkness. It was assumed that the missing man was a fireman tending the boiler at the time of the collision.41 At 1900 on February 26 the CSF exited A Gate of the Westwater Channel minefield. Outside the minefield Doorman continued eight miles north and then ordered a course due east at 21 knots. The cruisers—De Ruyter, Java, Houston, Perth and Exeter—formed a main column. Kortenaer and Witte de With formed an A/S screen ahead of the formation. The American destroyers were positioned two each on the port and starboard sides, respectively. The British destroyers sailed in column astern of the cruisers.42 Although there was a bright moon that night visibility was hindered by occasional showers. Exeter was the only Allied ship equipped with radar, which she operated throughout the night, but only periodically during the rain storms.43 In the meantime, Helfrich continued to hound Doorman. At 2055 he signaled his strike force commander, “You must continue attacks until the enemy is destroyed.” In his postwar memoirs Helfrich would rationalize this order by stating: “In retrospect this sounds a bit ‘in the clouds.’ However, I wanted to impress upon him the need to attack whatever the cost, as reconnaissance reports still indicated the absence of an overpowering enemy force. To the contrary. But this had to be done quickly before the Japanese admiral brought up reinforcements, which were present in the East and West [ Java Sea].”44 The Allied crews were tight; no one knew exactly where the Japanese were and everyone expected action at any time. Exeter ratcheted up the tension when she went to action stations at 2100. The rest of the Allied ships would follow and their crews spent an exhausting night at full alert. In an interesting side note, Exeter’s Dutch liaison officer was quite surprised to discover that, “Despite the tension, or perhaps because of it, the commander of her marine detachment appeared to have had too much to drink.”45 By 0100 on the morning of February 27 the CSF was off the Sapoedi Strait on the east coast of Madoera. At 0108 Doorman turned and swept north to the Masalembo Islands, some

100 miles north of Madoera. Sighting nothing, Doorman reversed course and backtracked along his previous route which now took him along the north coast of Java.

Operations Ashore While Doorman was prowling the Java Sea in search of the Japanese, the KM was equally busy ashore. At 2200 RearAdmiral Koenraad ordered six Dutch motor torpedo boats into the Java Sea from their base at Soerabaja. TM 7, TM 8 and TM 15 were deployed into the vicinity of the minefield at Tandjoeng Awar-Awar, a peninsula north of Rembang. Three more MTBs (boat numbers unknown) were deployed to patrol around those minefields laid along the north coast of Madoera. They were to intercept any Japanese ships that got past Doorman’s force and contest any landing operations. At 2317 Koenraad signaled their respective positions to Doorman, K-VIII, O-19 and S-38.46 That same night, O-19 encountered a force of Japanese warships as she patrolled between the shore of Java and Bawean Island. Neither the Japanese transports nor the 5th Cruiser Squadron were yet so close to Java. Thus, these forces were either elements of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla or 4th Destroyer Flotilla.47 Lieutenant-Commander H.F. Bach Kolling approached but was detected and subjected to a heavy depth charge attack. She was unable to approach again and continued to patrol her assigned area.48 At 0035 a LB-30 from the 7th Bomber Group took off from Jogjakarta. This flight was in response to the request made by Doorman and Koenraad earlier that afternoon. It conducted an intense reconnaissance sweep along north coast of Java. It sighted nothing and returned to base at 0625.49 At 0047 Koenraad alerted K-VIII and O-19 to the position of a new minefield that he had just ordered Gouden Leeuw to lay off Toeban (inside the 10-meter line) that night. Doorman was not informed since he had already briefed his ship commanders of the planned location during their final meeting the prior afternoon. The minelayer was ordered to lay her mines under the cover of darkness on the night of February 27–28. However, delays in loading the mines meant she would still be en route to lay her barrage at Toeban after dawn. At 2220 Koenraad provided Doorman with the following position report: “One convoy, course unknown, lat. S. 05–30 long. E. 113–00. T. 1110 Z” [1840 JST]. This was the convoy attacked by the B-17 Monkey Bizz-Ness earlier that evening. Koenraad had only learned of the attack during an unrelated phone conversation with Major- General G.A. Ilgen, commander of the KNIL 3rd Infantry Division, which was responsible for the ground defense of Soerabaja. By now Doorman returned to a westerly course. At 0220 he signaled the formation of a pending course change: “Am increasing speed to 24 knots, course 270 at 0300 0226–1850Z.” This course would eventually put the CSF off Rembang, approximately 125 miles west of Soerabaja. He then turned back toward Soerabaja. By 0500 on the morning of February 27 the

22. “We spanked the Japs … and we’ll do it again!” CSF was off the Westwater Channel entrance; the Allied crews had been at action stations all night in anticipation of enemy contact and were exhausted. But unlike the previous morning, the CSF did not put back into port. Aboard Kortenaer, 2nd Gunnery Officer 2nd Lieutenant J.A.N. Heurn recounted: At dawn, we did not as usual re-enter the western fairway to refuel at Soerabaja, but instead, cruised further out into the Java Sea in a westerly direction. At first a short air-attack kept us keyed up. The hostile reconnaissance planes never let us out of their sight, so that we had something to look out for. Exertion and lack of sleep began to weigh more heavily upon us.50

With the CSF at sea searching for the Japanese convoy KNIL headquarters in Bandoeng ordered Java Air Command to commit all available fighters in East Java to support its operations. In compliance with this order, 24 fighters (16 Dutch Buffalos and eight American P-40s) at Ngoro and eight Dutch Buffalos at Andir were made available for permanent air cover over the CSF as of 0500 on February 27. The Buffalos were the primary aircraft used throughout this operation as they had greater range than the P-40s.51 At 0515 two Buffalos (1st Lieutenant H.H.J. Simons and Sgt. G. van Haarlem) took off from Ngoro with orders to provide a CAP over the CSF as it sailed west along the coast of Java. They kept the Allied ships in sight and maintained an altitude of 7,500 meters (about 25,000 feet) until relieved at 0700 by two Buffalos (1st Lieutenant G.J. de Haas and Vandaarig G. Win), which flew CAP at altitudes of 7,500–8,000 meters.52 At 0730 they sighted a “Betty”53 bomber from the 22nd Air Flotilla at Balikpapan above them at 9,000 meters (about 30,000 feet). Unable to intercept or radio base, they immediately turned for home to make a report.54 They would not have been able to remain with the CSF much longer anyway as Doorman had again turned north and the Buffalos did not have sufficient range to escort his squadron farther out into the Java Sea. Both fighters landed at 0745 and reported that the CSF had been discovered by the Japanese.55 At 0700 Exeter secured continuous radar contact on what she reported to be Japanese aircraft to the southwest. At 0735 Houston notified the USN destroyers that aircraft had been detected at a range of 25 miles. Reports continued to come in, but no planes were sighted until 0947.56 Since no Japanese planes would appear overhead for another half hour it appears that these were the Dutch Buffalos. Doorman signaled that they might be the friendly fighters to which he had referred the prior afternoon. Either way, it is unclear if Doorman was aware that they had air cover of their own, underscoring the inability of the Allied naval and air force units to communicate amongst themselves.57 Although the Dutch fighters remained over Doorman’s ships continuously for two hours on the morning of February 27 they were not identified as friendly aircraft. In a telling lack of early war air recognition skills, it appears that not a single Allied naval observer recognized them as such. Indeed, it remains unclear if Doorman himself realized that they were friendly. For their part, it does not appear that the fighters

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themselves did much to help eliminate any of the confusion. Close coordination between the KM and ML-KNIL was all but non-existent. The fighters and ships could not communicate via radio and the Dutch fighters flew at such high altitude that they could have easily been missed. In the meantime, the 19th Bomb Group at Malang sortied four B-17s at 0630 to strike a force of Japanese ships reported by a Dutch coastwatch position. They were followed an hour later by two B-17s from the 7th Bomber Group at Madioen. Three bombers from Malang aborted almost immediately due to engine trouble, but the fourth, piloted by Lieutenant P.L. Matthewson, continued alone. At 0735, Java Air Command ( JAC) notified 5th Bomber Command at Jogjakarta Airfield that the ships were probably Admiral Doorman’s force.58 Unfortunately, the radio aboard Matthewson’s plane was either not working, or interference prevented contact with him. He sighted five large warships and several smaller ones just before 0900 and attacked. Exeter tracked the B-17’s approach, although it was assumed he was a Japanese plane. Fortunately, the bombardier was hampered by heavy clouds that made for zero visibility. Matthewson made two bomb runs but dropped below the cloud cover only long enough to drop a total of seven bombs before scooting away without observing the results.59 Both Exeter and Houston fired into the clouds without result. Corporal-Telegraphist F.I. van Esveld aboard De Ruyter wrote of the attack: Around 1000 Exeter, which is equipped with radar, detects aircraft 40 miles to the north.60 The sky is overcast with near zero visibility overhead. Exeter, however, opens fire with her AA battery. Then suddenly, several bombs fall in the water around her stern. This alert lasts about 20 minutes and the bombs do no damage. 15 minutes later, another alert sounds and there is more AA fire, again without result as the sky becomes cloudy. This second air raid is brief.61

In reality, both attacks concentrated on Jupiter.62 In the first attack, Jupiter was near-missed by three 100-pound bombs which caused no damage thanks to the CSF taking evasive action. A short time later four more 100-pound bombs fell some 550 yards off her starboard side without causing any damage.63 Matthewson then turned for home. Upon his return 5th Bomber Command later sent an apology to Doorman through JAC and Allied naval headquarters, but it is doubtful that he ever received it.64 Matthewson had located and attacked the CSF about 55 miles north of Rembang. At 0900, K-15 intercepted a signal from Doorman to Koenraad: “Air attacked 0855 06–20S, 111– 30E. Send fighter protection.”65 This signal further strengthens the contention that he had been unaware of the Allied fighter cover above his formation earlier that morning. At 1000 Helfrich signaled Doorman directly: “Notwithstanding air attack you are to proceed eastwards to search and attack enemy.” Despite very heavy cloud cover and poor visibility, the B17s from Madioen found Jintsu, Yukikaze, Amatsukaze, Tokitsukaze and Hatsukaze and attacked at approximately 1020. AA fire was heavy but it fell below them. Dropping through the clouds to 13,000 feet, they dropped eight 300-kilogram bombs

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and claimed a near miss off Jintsu’s bow.66 She was reported dead in the water with two destroyers going to her aid. In reality there were no hits; four bombs exploded 1,500 yards from Amatsukaze and two more 500 yards from Hatsukaze. One exploded just 200 yards from Yukikaze.67 By now the Japanese had air cover in the form of nine Zeros. One managed to intercept but could only make a single pass before the bombers disappeared into the murk. As they turned for home the Americans sighted 35 transports in the distance on a heading of 170 degrees. Neither plane had a working radio, so no position report was made until they returned to Madioen at 1230. Even then, the B-17 crews could not state with certainty if they had attacked Allied or Japanese ships. As a result, it took several more hours for news of the attack to reach Vice-Admiral Helfrich; presumably 5th Bomber Command waited to confirm that Doorman’s force had not been attacked again. In the meantime, due to the lack of information regarding his position additional air strikes against warships in the Java Sea were halted.68

Eastern Invasion Force Nears Java By sunrise of February 27 the Eastern Invasion Convoy was 50 miles northwest of Bawean. The transports were in two columns, each some 27,000 yards—15½ miles—from tip to tail, moving at 7–8 knots. Course was 190 degrees which put it on course for Kragan where the invasion force was to land that night.69

By 0900 the convoy escort had deployed to pre-assigned positions as they neared Java. Jintsu and her destroyers, just arrived from Timor, screened to the east between Bawean and the Westwater Channel. Two unidentified destroyers—possibly Natsugumo and Umikaze—were between Tandjoeng Djati (north coast of Java) and the Karimoendjowo Islands. The 5th Cruiser Squadron, now escorted by only two destroyers, was 160 miles north of Soerabaja between the Karimoendjowo Islands and Bawean.70 The 11th Air Flotilla Betty bomber encountered by the Dutch Buffalos quickly radioed the position of Doorman’s squadron back Balikpapan. Admiral Nishimura later wrote in his after action report: On the morning of the 27th, we received a signal reporting the enemy fleet in the Surabaya Sea from a scout plane of the 11th Air Flotilla. At 12:05 [1035 JST] we sent scout planes from Naka, the 5th Cruiser Squadron and Jintsu to contact the enemy fleet.71

This report stemmed from a morning reconnaissance flight over Soerabaja that reported, “0830, no main fleet inside the [Soerabaja] bay.”72 At 1230 [1100 JST] another report from the 11th Air Flotilla came in: “1230, five enemy cruisers, six destroyers at 310 degrees, 63 miles, 80-degree course, 12-knot speed.”73 This report came as a rude shock to the Japanese as it was the first indication they had that the CSF was at sea.74 Doorman was only 63 nautical miles (73 statute miles) from the leading edge of the convoy and moving north, which caused alarm amongst the Japanese naval command.75

22. “We spanked the Japs … and we’ll do it again!” When the Japanese fleet neared Java we expected no battle in the Java Sea, as we thought most of the Allied fleet had been damaged by air attacks on February 4. Although ships were reported in Soerabaja we thought they were too damaged to be battle ready. We were sorely surprised when the Allied fleet was discovered. We thought the enemy outnumbered us in cruisers.76

In response, Nachi catapulted her first reconnaissance plane at 1137 [ JST]; it had orders to fly to Doorman’s last reported position and take his force under observation.77 Simultaneously, Nishimura turned the 4th Destroyer Flotilla to a course of 150 degrees to intercept the Allied force; he also ordered the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to close with Naka. As a precaution the convoy was ordered to turn northward; to bolster the light units of the 2nd Base Force, Natsugumo and Umikaze were detached to provide escort. At 0930 on the morning of February 27 the CSF was 14 miles off Tandjoeng Bendoh, 90 miles west of Soerabaja.78 Doorman now turned southeast on a heading of 115°, which took him away from the invasion convoy. At that point he completely failed to realize how close he was to engaging the Japanese on the most favorable terms possible. At no other time would the Allies have such tactical superiority. The convoy was still weakly defended by Naka and her 4th Destroyer Flotilla. Although the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and 5th Cruiser Squadron were coming up hard, Nishimura would have been hard-pressed to defend the convoy without their support. Even if they arrived after the battle had been joined, all the Allies needed do was inflict enough damage to force the

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Japanese to pull back and reorganize before making another effort.79 Had Doorman not put his own reconnaissance planes ashore he could have easily located the convoy and attacked, at least initially, with a clear superiority in numbers. It was a crucial missed opportunity for the Allies to stave off the invasion of Eastern Java. Japanese intelligence had initially estimated Allied strength at one battleship, four heavy cruisers and multiple smaller ships.80 At 1020 Nachi’s floatplane found the CSF and signaled its position to the covering force.81 It found Doorman at 1235 JST and floatplanes from all four Japanese cruisers kept his ships under watchful eye for the rest of the afternoon while sending continuous and accurate position reports. Although the Allied gun crews remained at General Quarters throughout the day the Japanese planes were careful to remain well out of range. Now under constant observation from enemy aircraft, Doorman again urgently requested air cover at 1040. He almost certainly expected air attack at any time. The commander of air defenses at Soerabaja, Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Ente van Gils, replied that the JAC could no longer provide air cover for the CSF. The Squadron had moved too far west for the fighters at Ngoro; P-40s were out of range and the longer-legged Buffalos would have been able to remain overhead for just 10 minutes. Although four fighters were on alert they lacked oxygen and could not fly above 13,000 feet until additional supplies arrived that afternoon. Doorman relayed the news to his force via ultra-shortwave radio.82

Chapter 23

“We will lead you to the enemy” Y-45 loitered above the convoy while her crew took notes. However, one of the Japanese cruisers launched a floatplane which rapidly gained altitude. The PBY hid in the clouds and sent an uncoded message in the clear on CZM Frequency, reporting two cruisers, six destroyers and 25 transports 20 miles west of Bawean with a due south course.7 Although Y-45 had sighted the enemy it would be several hours before the report reached Doorman. In the meantime, he signaled Helfrich at 1200:

At 930 we changed course to the East again. Unknown to us, several tardy messages about sightings of Japanese forces in the Java Sea had reached Admiral Doorman, but he had little information about the enemy’s whereabouts and certainly no recent intelligence.1

By the morning of February 27 reconnaissance reports reaching Doorman were five to six hours old. In the time it took for them to reach the CSF the convoy—even moving at just 10 knots—could have changed course in any direction and moved 50 to 75 miles from its last reported position. As a result, Doorman never had current information on the location of the Japanese convoy.2 Without reliable air reconnaissance and precise coordinates he was unwilling to leave the Java shore and risk letting the Japanese land unopposed. REC-Group was struggling to launch reconnaissance missions over the Java Sea. The previous night (February 26–27) it had been ordered to fly a series of reconnaissance flights over the Java Sea, which it managed to do only by holding back planes from day missions. On East Java PatWing-10 was down to just three PBYs, of which two were serviceable. The MLD had 10 planes but only four were operational. Although GVT.6 had three Do. 24Ks none were operational and their crews were on leave.3 GVT.7 had four Dorniers in overhaul and none were fully operational; their crews were assigned to temporary duty elsewhere. GVT.17 had three PBYs, of which two were operational. The situation in West Java was slightly better where GVT.2 and GVT.8 had a total of seven PBYs and Do. 24Ks available. At least five of these planes were allocated to maintain a presence over the Western Invasion Convoy.4 Two Dorniers had been lost just two days earlier and a PBY would also soon go missing. GVT.5 and the Royal Air Force’s 205 Squadron were at Tjilatjap where they were responsible for reconnaissance and A/S patrol south of Java and into the Indian Ocean. At 0930 Y-45 from GVT.18 departed MVK Priok for a reconnaissance mission over the Eastern Java Sea. Flowing low under heavy clouds she scoured the Java coast for the invasion convoy; the PBY sighted Doorman’s force east of Toeban at 1100 and then turned north.5 By 1340 Y-45 was 65 miles NNW of Bawean; her pilot broke out of a heavy cloud bank and found 20 Japanese ships, escorted by an unknown number of destroyers, at 4-45 S / 112-15 E on a course of 180 degrees. Five minutes later the PBY reported a single cruiser 135 miles at 4-40 S / 111-07 N on a course of 220°.6

Was proceeding eastwards after search Sapoedi to Rembang. Success of action depends absolutely on receiving good reconnaissance information in time, which last night failed me. Destroyers will have to refuel tomorrow.

Helfrich was puzzled. Rear-Admiral Koenraad had twice sent Doorman position reports on the KM frequency; the first at 1820 on February 26 and a second at 0255 on February 27. Helfrich thought Doorman might have had radio difficulties and been unable to receive messages. But even if that were the case, Helfrich surmised that Java or one of the Dutch destroyers would also have received the signal and relayed it to the flagship. Helfrich later wrote that he assumed Doorman had accepted that Japanese would land in the morning of February 27–28. This would have let him intercept the Japanese and carry out a night attack. It would also allow him to return to ME and refuel prior to the fight.8 By late February communication—both civilian and military—all across on Java was tenuous at best. Allied communications relied heavily on the civilian phone grid, which was unsecure and subject to disruption. As volume increased it inevitably became badly overloaded. Delays were so frequent that individuals would sometimes fly from Soerabaja to Bandoeng or Batavia for meetings that could otherwise have been handled by phone. Erratic atmospheric conditions across the NEI further disrupted radio communications. It was not uncommon for KM signals to delayed for several hours as a result. Only high priority messages got through with any sense of regularity. As a result, senders simply classified their signal as a priority message, which further clogged the system. Helfrich was headquartered at Bandoeng, 430 miles west of Soerabaja. This gave him easy access to the Dutch High Command and NEI government officials, but it also isolated

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23. “We will lead you to the enemy” him from his tactical commanders at the ME. As the pending battle unfolded Helfrich did not have a clear grasp of the tactical situation.9 He received incoming reports of Japanese convoy positions but it would appear that communications difficulties limited his knowledge of Doorman’s movements. Helfrich later wrote that he was unclear as to his subordinate’s intentions during his sweeps on the nights of February 25–26 and 26–27.10 By midday of February 27 the Allies were mentally and physically exhausted. Houston’s crew had spent 12 straight hours at General Quarters for each of the previous two nights. Nor had they been able to rest in port due to air raids on the ME.11 The crew of Witte de With came aboard from the grounded Van Ghent just two weeks earlier. Not only did they have to get the ship, which had been in material reserve, ready for duty at an accelerated pace, but they had also been out of port almost continuously since December with virtually no rest. As a result, several crewmen were now near collapse.12 At 1240 Rear-Admiral Koenraad intercepted a signal from Rear-Admiral Doorman to Vice-Admiral Helfrich: “This day the personnel have reached limit of endurance, tomorrow endurance will be exceeded.”13 The Allied ships were also low on fuel and Doorman turned toward Soerabaja with the intention of refueling. Two Japanese floatplanes from Nachi continued to circle overhead, careful to stay well out of AA range. They signaled Rear-Admiral Takagi aboard Nachi: “The enemy fleet is two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and nine destroyers. Its location is 190 degrees, 45 miles, an 80-degree course, a 24-knot speed.”14 Only when the CSF neared the Westwater Channel did they withdraw. The Japanese were unsure as to whether or not Doorman intended to intercept the convoy or if he was simply avoiding air attacks on the ME. For the time being their plan was to proceed to the Bay of Toeban and put the invasion force ashore. The escort would maintain a covering position north of Soerabaja, thus confirming Helfrich’s fears of the CSF being bottled up in port. If Doorman attempted to sortie he would be engaged and destroyed in a night battle.15 At approximately 1330 the Allied force was just outside the Westwater Channel minefield when it was approached by an aircraft resembling a Lockheed Hudson.16 Houston immediately opened fire and the plane abruptly turned away after only a dozen rounds had been fired. Although the plane may have been a misidentified Betty bomber from Balikpapan, it may also have been a Lockheed L-212 Electra Junior which the ML-KNIL operated in a reconnaissance role. Allied reconnaissance aircraft from all service branches were active up and down the Java coast that day and one could have easily wandered too close to the CSF with unintended consequences. About that time, Takagi received another reconnaissance report that the Allied formation was now “sailing toward Soerabaja.” Thus, by 1340 he was convinced that Doorman was indeed retiring back to Soerabaja and wanted to avoid a surface action.17 Takagi ordered the 5th Cruiser Squadron to reduce speed and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to rejoin the convoy, which turned south once again.18

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At 1350 the CSF was sighted at long range by S-37 which had just put out to sea from Soerabaja.19 Lieutenant James Reynolds initially took Doorman’s force for the Japanese and went to General Quarters as he initiated an attack vector. Eight minutes later he realized his error as the range closed and secured from action stations. At 1410 S-37 fired a yellow flare to alert nearby Allied destroyers of his presence. As the range came down to five miles Reynolds turned to parallel Doorman’s force with the intention of surfacing and following it into battle. 20 However, as the Allied formation began to circle outside the mouth of Westwater Channel Reynolds realized that they intended to put back into Soerabaja. S-37 then fired a second smoke rocket to confirm his identity and surfaced at 1425. Reynolds then engaged his diesels and turned away toward his assigned patrol area.21 At 1444 he submerged again. Behind him, the CSF prepared to enter the Westwater Channel minefield through its “B Gate” in column formation. The Dutch, British and American destroyers led the way, respectively. The cruisers brought up the rear. They had not yet entered the minefield, when at 1427, Doorman intercepted an unfiltered position report originating from Y-45 on the KM frequency22: a. At 1340, GH 20 ships, with unknown number destroyers were in position 04° 45S, 112° 15E (approximately 65 miles NW of Bawean), course 180°. b. At 1345 GH, one cruiser was in position 04° 40S, 111° 07E (approximately 135 miles NW of Bawean), course 220°. c. At 1350 GH, two cruisers, six destroyers, 25 transports, were 20 miles West of Bawean, course south. Of this force, one cruiser and four destroyers proceeded south at full speed, the transports staying behind.23

Doorman immediately signaled his force, “I am going to intercept an enemy unit. More information later.”24 At about the same time De Ruyter heeled over and executed a 180 degree turn just before entering the Westwater Channel minefield.25 Twenty minutes later, at approximately 1445, he received a formal signal from Helfrich: From CZM to CCSF: Air reconnaissance reports 0610 Z [1340 JST] 20 ships unknown number destroyers bearing 90 degrees distance 6miles, course 180 degrees S 04–45 / E. 112–15; 0615 Z [1345 JST] 1 cruiser bearing 40 degrees distance 30 miles, course 220 degrees, S. 04–04 / E. 111–07. Great fleet consisting 2 cruisers 6 destroyers and 25 transports position 20 miles west of Bawean, course South. 1 cruiser 4 destroyers South full speed, transports stay behind. 0712Z [1502 JST].

Although Helfrich was well aware of the formation’s physical limitations and the need to refuel, he still pushed Doorman to attack immediately. He later stated that the reason for his order was to ensure that under no circumstances would the CSF be bottled up in Soerabaja before it could engage the convoy. Outside the Westwater Channel the RN destroyers were ordered to make full speed and form a screen ahead of the cruisers. Jupiter took station five miles ahead of De Ruyter off her port bow at 270 degrees; Electra was dead ahead with Encounter to starboard. The Dutch destroyers were also ordered to the van; although first to enter the channel, they were now last in the

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formation. They endeavored to do so all afternoon, but proved unable to comply due to Kortenaer’s third boiler being offline. As Witte de With could not leave her squadron mate behind they remained abreast of the formation to port.26 The cruisers were in column formation with the USN destroyers trailing behind with no specific assigned position. By 1500 all Allied ships were on a course of 320 degrees at 15 knots. Doorman increased speed to 18 knots at 1524 and eventually 25 knots, which was the maximum for Kortenaer.27 Her Assistant Gunnery Officer, 2nd Lieutenant J.A.N. Heurn, later wrote: “Course 33, Speed 25” was the order. It was fortunate that the speed ordered did not exceed 25 [knots] since only two of the Kortenaer’s three boilers were in use. This was enough for fighting, but definitely not enough for running away, which actually did not come into our plans anyway.28

A short time later a fast moving rain squall drenched Perth’s entire bridge crew. In a rather humorous contrast to the seriousness of the situation, Captain Waller sent his steward below to bring him a dry pair of shorts, shirt and towel. Setting them on the chart table he proceeded to strip naked in full view of the crew and dried himself before dressing without regard to their thoughts.29 Aboard De Ruyter, Rear-Admiral Doorman huddled in the conning tower with his staff and several ship’s officers. They included his chief of staff (Commander J.A. de Gelder) and adjutant (Lieutenant A.F. Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken), De Ruyter’s Executive Officer (Commander F.H. Vermeulen) and Chief Gunnery Officer (Commander I.A.P.L de Gelder). They were surrounded by the Officer of the Deck and crewmen manning communications gear, range finders and machine guns, among others. Supporting them were Lieutenant W.A. Jackson, RNVR and Lieutenant Otto Kolb, USN the Allied liaison officers who oversaw communications from Doorman to Exeter and Houston, respectively.30 At this point communications between the Allied ships, although a patchwork system, were still reasonably effective. Except for Perth, all the cruisers had liaison personnel aboard to facilitate communications to and from Admiral Doorman.31 There had been no time to develop common signals so an Anglo-French codebook was issued, although it is unclear if it was ever used. In the pre–NATO period all three Allied navies used different flag systems, although this form of communication was rarely utilized by the KM.32 To facilitate communications, Dutch signalmen underwent crash courses in semaphore and English in order to communicate with their American and Commonwealth allies.33 Primary means of communication between De Ruyter, Exeter and Houston took place via high frequency radios aboard the latter two ships; the equipment was supplied by the KNIL which had confiscated it from civilian businesses. The liaison teams commanded by Jackson and Kolb transmitted orders to Exeter and Houston in plain English. Houston then relayed them to the USN destroyers by TBS34 on ship/shore frequency of 4235 kcs series. The Dutch navy utilized its own TBS system on a 60

megacycle bandwidth, for tactical movements35 to which they referred as UKG.36 An emergency tactical contact frequency at 5634 kcs allowed communication between all American and Dutch ships. The British and Australian ships did not make use of short-range ship-to-ship radio; instead they relied solely on visual communications.

“Planning a battle to the West” A floatplane from Nachi almost immediately picked up on Doorman’s course change and signaled Admiral Takagi at 1445 that the CSF had “Reversed course, 205°, 18-knot speed.” At 1508 he was informed that “The enemy’s course is 315° at a 22-knot speed. Quickly approaching our fleet.”37 By 1550 the Allied formation was estimated to be 60 nautical miles distant.38 It was obvious that the Allies intended to engage the Japanese; at 1555 Takagi signaled the entire invasion force, “Planning a battle to the West.”39 Orders were given for the convoy to once again reverse course. Manned by requisitioned civilian crews with little or no experience in formation maneuver, the transports were in considerable disarray after a series of turns and counter-turns. Only weakly defended by a small number of light escorts over a 15 mile stretch, the results could have been catastrophic had Allied submarines been in position to attack. But this was not the case and the escorting minesweepers and sub chasers managed to shepherd them back into formation with a northward course within 30 minutes.40 Aboard Nachi, Admiral Takagi ordered the battle flag raised. There was a flurry of activity as the other Japanese warships followed suit and pennants fluttered from their masts as they quickly moved into position. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla again left the convoy and moved south to link up with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and the 5th Cruiser Squadron, which was moving south at 24 knots.41 The destroyers Kawakaze and Yamakaze were detached from the cruisers to operate with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla throughout the battle. At the same time, Natsugumo and Umikaze were detached from the 4th Destroyer Flotilla to provide the convoy with additional protection. In addition to Doorman’s surface fleet, the Japanese had also been warned to expect up to five Allied submarines in the area north of Soerabaja.42 Whether this information was gleaned from air reconnaissance, codebreaking or radio intercepts is unknown. Although the Allies were closing the range quickly the Japanese still could not determine if Admiral Doorman meant to initiate a head-on surface engagement or attempt an end-run for the convoy in order to inflict as much damage as possible. It was also conceivable that he might split his formation and engage the escort while a secondary force attempted to get in among the transports. In the end, the Dutch admiral proved extremely conventional, if not somewhat timid in his conduct of the battle. As the range closed Haguro and Nachi made wide turns into the wind in order to launch additional scout planes; between 1545 and 1559 both cruisers launched a single “Dave.”43

23. “We will lead you to the enemy” Each plane circled his home ship and signaled, “We will lead you to the enemy.”44 They then dipped their wings and set course for Admiral Doorman’s position. Flight conditions were perfect, although the pilots were warned to be on the lookout for Allied fighters from Java. Lieutenant Michio later recalled: We flew comfortably at high altitude to the south. We were at 2,000 meters. I saw the shape of a fleet. Five large warship-like heavy cruisers were rapidly sailing west with destroyers both at its front and back. I searched for enemy planes from Soerabaja, but couldn’t see any. I thought even though they were coming, we would have some time. Considering the sunset, we positioned ourselves in the best location to observe shell fire [from Haguro]. The second plane followed us tightly. I saw other reconnaissance planes from Nachi. We were ready.45

Although he did not realize it, Michio’s warning about Allied fighters was prophetic. At about the same time, radar aboard Exeter detected a formation of aircraft at a range of 48 miles on a northward course of 342 degrees. It held course and a short time later 15 aircraft slowly passed over the CSF at about 16,000 feet. They were observed to circle the Japanese convoy, the masts of which Allied lookouts could now discern 20 miles in the distance.46 The aircraft could not be identified but they were assumed to be Japanese.47 In reality, this was an Allied airstrike en route to attack the invasion convoy. However, its presence further underscored the confusion and lack of communication which had permeated the KM and ML-KNIL commands. At 1500 that afternoon, Lieutenant-Colonel van Gils, head of Soerabaja’s air defenses, requested information from Admiral Koenraaad as to when and where the CSF would engage the Japanese convoy. A bomber strike was being launched and he sought to coordinate it with Doorman’s attack.48 Fifteen minutes later 10 American P-40s and five Dutch Buffalos took off from Ngoro. Four A-24 dive bombers also took off from Singosari, but one pilot aborted the takeoff when his hydraulic system failed.49 The two flights rendezvoused over Soerabaja and turned north toward the convoy’s last reported position off Bawean Island. The fighters had orders to escort the bombers; once they were safely away the fighters were to remain overhead and clear the skies of Japanese aircraft.50 Although the USAAF was in the process of evacuating Java, the A-24 crews had volunteered to fly the mission to show support for their Dutch allies.51 The American and Dutch fighter commanders were told that Rear-Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja had been briefed of their mission. The mission had been planned and coordinated by JAC and the KM in Bandoeng. Although Koenraad knew, it is unclear if Doorman himself had been informed. Just minutes before opening fire he made a final appeal for air cover at 1600. However, van Gils told him it was not available as all available fighters had been detailed to escort three A-24s on a strike mission against the convoy. Apparently neither officer was aware that the strike was planned to support Doorman and that the fighters had orders to remain behind and maintain a standing CAP over the CSF.

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Koenraad would have immediately passed along such vital information, but there is no record in the CMR logbook of his doing so. Thus, it appears Doorman was not notified that he would have air cover.52 Radio communications on Java were erratic throughout the day on February 27 due to monsoon weather and strong electromagnetic interference. The Japanese were also heavily jamming Allied radio frequencies.53 Although they had not broken Dutch naval codes, they still seriously hindered communications. De Ruyter sent several lengthy messages in standard KM code that day, but everything after the letter “P” (Priority) proved indecipherable due to enemy jamming.54 “Aboard De Ruyter, our communications on the CZM and CSF frequencies were continuously disrupted by the enemy throughout the entire day.”55 At this point the CSF was moving to intercept the Japanese at 25 knots. Commander Lacomblé announced to the crew of De Ruyter that the enemy would be in sight at approximately 1530. Doorman then ordered the formation to increase speed to 28 knots and Kortenaer was slowly left behind as the rest of the formation pulled away.56 As De Ruyter pulled ahead the rescued tugboat crew was seen sitting on deck smoking cigarettes.57 They appeared to have little idea of what was about to transpire. At 1555 Helfrich signaled Doorman, “3 cruisers, 5 transports, course 190, 06–50 S / 112–10 E, time 0825 Z.” Approximately five minutes later, De Ruyter signaled the CSF via TBS and high-frequency radio, “Many ships 2 points on the starboard bow.” Assistant Gunnery Officer Lieutenant J.A.N. Heurn recalled the signal aboard Kortenaer: “It sounded just as business-like as ever, and yet I shall never forget the deep voice which yelled those words down from the bridge of the Kortenaer. You could hear it right down in the mess since the loudspeaker was switched onto maximum volume.”58 By now, forward elements of the opposing fleets could easily see each other. Although exhausted, Allied crewmen instantly became alert with anticipation. The transports were tantalizingly close; the British destroyers and the cruisers could see their masts in the distance. However, they were moving north away from the action. The Dutch destroyers to port, and the American destroyers trailing behind, were still unable to make out the Japanese, although their smoke was clearly visible. Commander Kroese wrote: When battle began, our ship was a long way behind the Allied cruisers to the lee of the firing, for our ship had been unable to keep up with the high speed at which Rear-Admiral Doorman moved against the enemy because of the leak in one of our boilers. All we saw of the Japanese at that time were heavy columns of smoke, which seemed to rise from three separate groups of ships. The lookout in the crow’snest reported that he could count about two dozen [ Japanese] ships.59

Aboard Amatsukaze, Lieutenant-Commander Hara received the message, “De Ruyter is distant 28,000 meters [about 17 miles]. It is closing rapidly.”60 He anxiously glanced to the north but saw only transports. Although Haguro and Nachi were coming on hard from the north they had not yet joined the covering force. With only Jintsu and Naka to face five Allied cruisers Hara feared the out-

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gunned covering force would be forced into battle before they arrived. To make matters worse, if Doorman maintained his current course he threatened to cross the Japanese “T.” The Allies could potentially inflict substantial damage on the Japanese and even the odds before their heavy cruisers arrived. Unfortunately, Doorman immediately surrendered his initial advantage. Along with it was any chance to reach the convoy. Instead of charging ahead he ordered a course change at 1600 to parallel the outgunned Japanese destroyer flotillas. Aboard Nachi, Admiral Takagi was ecstatic; “Now I have time to catch up with our fleet!” he shouted.61 At 1616 he ordered the Japanese covering force to form three columns—consisting of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, 4th Destroyer Flotilla and 5th Cruiser Squadron, respectively— and turn to course 170 degrees to close the range. Takagi soon realized that this course would again give Doorman the opportunity to cross his “T” and ordered his force to parallel the Allied formation.62 De Ruyter’s AA officer Lieutenant-Commander J. Bennink could see the Japanese from his position on the air defense deck. On the horizon were the masts of many transports, cruisers, destroyers and at least one four-funnel cruiser. If he could see the Japanese, De Ruyter’s lookouts could also have easily sighted them from elevated positions on the conning tower. This meant that Doorman knew the location of the convoy, at least initially, and made no aggressive effort to close on it. He instead engaged in a long-range gun duel with the covering force while the convoy slipped away. In the meantime, Nachi’s Jake remained overhead, keeping

Takagi fully aware of every move Doorman made.63 Although visibility was perfect at sea level, heavy cloud cover allowed it to remain largely out of sight. By 1530 the Jake ran low on fuel and was forced to retire; as the floatplane turned away its pilot randomly dropped two small bombs through the clouds.64 AA batteries aboard Exeter and Houston immediately opened fire as the CSF scattered.65 The ships maneuvered independently and there was no damage, although the formation was completely disrupted. The bombs fell 5,000 yards astern and the Jake disappeared without being hit. By 1545 the CSF had reformed on a course of 320° at 18 knots.66 Three “Daves” from Haguro and Nachi arrived at approximately 1530 to provide relief and spot shell fall during the upcoming battle. They carefully circled out of range to avoid AA fire from Exeter and Houston. Multiple Allied ships reported their presence between 1530 and 1615; it also appears that they were tracked by Exeter’s radar.67 At 1602 Jupiter reported the appearance of three Japanese floatplanes north of the CSF.68 Kortenaer also reported seeing and hearing several enemy aircraft.69 Although De Ruyter, Java and Houston had left their spotter planes ashore, Exeter and Perth still carried their Walrus seaplanes. Unfortunately, the planes aboard both Commonwealth ships were still out of action. Exeter’s plane was inoperative as a result of the action in the Banka Strait two weeks earlier. Perth’s Walrus had not yet been repaired after suffering damage from the concussion of her own AA guns on February 25. At no time does it appear that Rear-Admiral Doorman made any attempt to recall his observation planes from shore.

Chapter 24

The Battle Begins “Kid, that’s the main battery firing”

Two minutes later Electra signaled, “1 cruiser, large destroyers, number unknown, bearing 330, speed 18, course, 220. 1612.” By now the 5th Cruiser Squadron was on the scene and maneuvering to join the battle. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was north of Takagi’s cruisers and had not yet been sighted. At long distance the massive superstructures of Haguro and Nachi momentarily confused the lookouts aboard Electra as they came into view. At 1615 she sent shockwaves through the fleet when she again signaled, “2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers. 1615.” The American destroyers also reported the Japanese cruisers as battleships of the Kongo or Ise class on a course of 342 degrees at a

Four miles ahead of the cruiser formation, Jupiter and Electra were the first to make contact with the Japanese. Electra initially reported a single Sendai Class light cruiser; this was Naka and her 4th Destroyer Flotilla, which opened fire on Electra at 1610. Though the range was 15,300 yards Naka’s first and second salvos straddled her; subsequent salvos fell short or long before the light cruiser turned her attention to Jupiter. Electra and Jupiter came about to course 280 degrees to parallel the Japanese line. Trailing behind, Encounter moved to join them.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

range of 20 miles.1 Despite the initial confusion they would soon be correctly identified. At 1617 Haguro and Nachi opened fire at a range of 29,500 yards with De Ruyter as their target. Japanese gunnery was extremely accurate from the onset with both De Ruyter and Exeter consistently straddled after the third salvo. The first fell about 1,000 yards over De Ruyter, near the British destroyers, which had taken up position 1½ miles off Exeter’s port side. They zigzagged heavily but suffered no damage.2 A second salvo landed so close that crewmen aboard Exeter thought she had been hit. Realizing their error in targeting a light cruiser that could not respond, the Japanese turned their attention to Exeter. The third salvo barely missed her conning tower and fell just 10 feet off the disengaged side of the ship.3 Due to the extreme range and elevation shell trajectory was steep. Allied observers also noted that the pattern of Japanese salvos was very tight, with a length of ±400 feet and a width of ±215 feet. So accurate was their gunfire that the Allied ships escaped serious damage only due to the extreme range, which caused their shells to land almost perpendicular.4 Throughout this opening phase Japanese spotter planes flew up and down the length of the Allied column on its unengaged side. They remained well out of AA range and never ventured any closer than 16,000 yards. At this point only the 8-inch guns of Exeter and Houston were able to reach the Japanese. Aboard Exeter, Captain Gordon realized De Ruyter was still out of range and that Admiral Doorman was apparently not going to issue an order to open fire until the CSF had moved in closer. At 1617 he took the initiative and ordered Exeter to open fire at a range of 26,000 yards; Gordon wrote after the war, Had we been in company with a Senior British Officer, I could and probably would, have hoisted a very brief flag signal—if I had received no order—asking permission to open fire but in this case I knew the limitations of inter-ship communications.5

Exeter fired rapidly but her spotters underestimated the speed of the Japanese due to the extreme distance. In contrast to the pinpoint Japanese accuracy, it took her gunners several volleys to find the range. They claimed to straddle Haguro or Nachi on the tenth or twelfth salvo.6 In the meantime, Houston followed suit and also opened fire at 1618. Aboard Houston, 19-year-old Pharmacist Mate Griff Douglas had never experienced her main battery being fired. There was a large bang as the cruiser shook and heeled over some four degrees. To Douglas, it felt and sounded just like when Houston’s #3 turret had been hit by a bomb in the Flores Sea earlier that month. He thought the ship had been hit again before a Chief laughed and told him, “Kid, that’s the main battery firing.”7

Opportunity Lost On her sixth salvo, Houston’s six-gun salvos straddled her target. On the tenth salvo Turret #1 officer, Lieutenant ( JG)

H.S. Hamlin, reported a direct hit amidships on either Haguro or Nachi.8 However, neither Japanese cruiser was hit at that stage of the battle. Up to that point apparently very few crewmen aboard Houston knew that her 8-inch shells contained red dye to help spot her shell fall. At a maximum range of 15 miles Hamlin could possibly have confused the red dye of a near-miss with the explosion of a direct hit. There was initially no zig-zagging by the CSF as Doorman sought to close the range as quickly as possible. He needed to bring his light cruisers into the fight in order to exploit their superior firepower. But this straight-ahead course quickly put the Japanese in position to cross Doorman’s T, so he altered course 20° to port in order to parallel the Japanese while still closing the range. In the meantime, the British destroyers remained out of range of Takagi’s heavy cruisers, but continued to receive harassing fire from the Japanese light cruisers. Aboard the American destroyers there was some consternation among the officers as to how Rear-Admiral Doorman was conducting the battle. There was a feeling that he was being too cautious when the situation called for bold, aggressive action. Lieutenant-Commander J.E. Coley, captain of the Alden, noted, Our cruisers seemed to be conforming to the type of battle the enemy would desire with his inferior forces, and with his convoy to protect. If he could stay at long range, with air spots, he might gain advantage through attrition.9

Masts of the convoy could now be clearly seen moving north. Commander Parker on John D. Ford was frustrated that Doorman made no attempt to get in amongst the transports. Although losses would have been taken he believed them to be acceptable in order to engage the transports before they escaped. Instead, Doorman remained locked in a pitched battle with the Japanese covering force, which easily held off the CSF.10 Indeed, this would be the Allies’ only chance to intercept the Eastern Invasion Convoy for the remainder of the battle. Aboard Nachi, the Japanese believed De Ruyter had been fatally damaged by their initial volley and would soon sink. Observers reported, “The first salvo, a hit!” which was seemingly confirmed by their floatplane.11 This report was quickly dispelled and the Japanese gunners found it extremely difficult to target the Allied ships. Not only did they “chase shell splashes” but the Japanese ships’ own maneuvering to avoid being hit themselves made their own gunnery abysmal.12 Nachi’s Gunnery Officer pleaded with Captain Kiyota Takahiko to stop frequently changing course. In response to his repeated requests, Takahiko maintained a steady course for a short time and accuracy improved accordingly. When Allied shells began hitting too close for comfort the captain ordered the ship to zig-zag once again.13 Perth entered the fight at 1625 when her main battery engaged the 4th Destroyer Flotilla as “the destroyers appeared to be moving prepatory to attack.”14 These were initial movements for the first in a series of torpedo attacks that would eventually leave Rear-Admiral Doorman and his formation constantly offbalance and reeling to recover. Led by Naka, the flotilla in-

24. The Battle Begins creased speed to 35 knots to cross ahead of the 5th Cruiser Squadron and astern of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. It then assumed a WSW course roughly parallel to that of the CSF.15 As this movement was taking place, Jupiter signaled: “1 cruiser, 6 destroyers [4th Destroyer Flotilla] bearing 320, distance 8 miles. 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers [2nd Destroyer Flotilla] bearing 320, distance 7 miles. 1 cruiser bearing 358, distance 10 miles. 1 cruiser bearing 010, distance 10 miles.” At 1629 Rear-Admiral Doorman changed course to 248 degrees and increased speed. However, he was careful not to exceed 25 knots so that Kortenaer could keep up. One minute later De Ruyter opened fire for the first time. With just her second salvo, De Ruyter claimed hits on a four-funnel cruiser that allegedly caused a fire. This report generated much enthusiasm among De Ruyter’s bridge and gun crews, who held up their steel helmets and cheered. In reality, no Japanese light cruisers were hit and the enemy ship continued to return fire as it retired under cover of smoke. De Ruyter then engaged several Japanese destroyers without result.16 At the same time, Java fired an initial ranging salvo but immediately realized that her older 6-inch guns were out of range and ceased fire. De Ruyter was the first Allied ship hit. At 1631 an 8-inch shell struck starboard under the bridge and penetrated into the ship’s bakery. An iron stove deflected it diagonally into the Diesel Power Plant, then the Central Forward Pump Room and Forward Pump Room, respectively. It came to rest in the ship’s double bottom where, with a sound of a sledgehammer on metal, it exploded under a battery. This detonated an oxygen canister, separated a steam pipe and caused a gas fire.17 StokerOilman R. Hassing was the first Allied sailor killed in the Battle of the Java Sea. Six more crewmen were wounded by fragments.18 Doorman now attempted to again close the range to more effectively bring his light cruisers into the fight. As he turned starboard to 267 degrees several Allied spotters reported seeing a Japanese cruiser hit at 1635. The explosion was clearly visible from the bridge of Alden and a column of smoke belched up some 300 feet high.19 By 1654 the ship was reportedly heavily aflame although it continued to fire. However, no Japanese ships were hit at this time and the claim is again unsubstantiated. On Kortenaer’s upper bridge, Lieutenant van der Moer could clearly see the maelstrom of gunfire between the two fleets. It was apparent that the Japanese were focusing on De Ruyter and Houston; roughly every fourth salvo was a straddle, but only De Ruyter was hit. 20 Both Allied ships returned fire in very rapid salvos. After about 30 minutes of firing he saw a heavy column of smoke rise over the Japanese squadron. Commander Kroese assumed one of their cruisers had blown up. He ordered van der Moer to alert the ship’s fire control team who cheered loudly at the news. At that point morale was still high; indeed, after the war van der Moer would write, “We had the feeling that, on the whole, we were doing rather well.”21

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At 1632 a crewman on the starboard side of De Ruyter’s bridge heard Doorman order a signal sent to Helfrich informing him that the CSF was in action: “Engaged in battle with Japanese cruisers 35 miles SSW of Bawean.” It is unclear if Helfrich received the message due to Japanese jamming. In the meantime, despite the range and their lack of spotter aircraft, Allied gunners consistently near-missed Haguro and Nachi. The heavy thunder of gunfire filled the air and huge red, white and blue water columns dotted the sea. They were from the dye in ammunition designed to help Allied gunners spot their shell fall. Red from Houston … white from Exeter … and blue from De Ruyter.22

“Shoot it, shoot it, Lacomblé” By now, the 4th Destroyer Flotilla was in position and turned toward the CSF. Naka fired first; at 1633 she launched four torpedoes from long range and turned away under cover of a heavy smoke screen. Between 1640 and 1642 Asagumo and Minegumo launched three and four torpedoes, respectively, and retired behind smoke. Harusame, Murasame, Samidare and Yudachi followed at 1645; each launched four torpedoes and turned away, also under cover of smoke. The range of each attack varied between 13,000 and 15,000 yards.23 As the range closed to around 16,000 yards, Doorman calmly told the captain of De Ruyter, “Shoot it, shoot it, Lacomblé.”24 At the same time the 4th Destroyer Flotilla engaged in a firefight with the outranged Electra, Jupiter and Encounter but neither side took damage. No one on the Allied ships realized that torpedoes had been launched, so no evasive action was taken.25 All 27 torpedoes from this attack missed and Perth claimed credit for driving off the Japanese.26 Heavy smoke now choked the battlefield and visibility was extremely poor. Japanese fire continued to be both continuous and extremely accurate thanks to the continued presence of their spotter planes.27 One of the Japanese floatplanes wandered into range and Houston’s port AA battery drove it back. Allied fire also continued to be brisk although visibility was severely impaired. Nonetheless, observers aboard Exeter, Houston and Perth erroneously reported hits on several Japanese ships.28 At 1645, Allied naval observers, still unaware of the planned air strike against the convoy, reported bomb splashes near the Japanese ships, but sighted no aircraft. These were the A-24s and P-40s from Java that had passed over the CSF just 15 minutes earlier. The bombers were each armed with one 300 kilogram and two 50 kilogram bombs, respectively. They had actually arrived over the battlefield some time earlier. Although their orders were to attack the transports, Captain Galusha initially elected to search for a “big-money” target in the form of an aircraft carrier thought to be supporting the convoy. Locked in battle below, the Allied planes initially had trouble differentiating the CSF from the Japanese. At 1630 they sighted a single line of warships reported as six cruisers and five destroyers with no transports; this force was correctly reported

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

back to the ME as being the CSF. They then passed over a second formation believed to be three battleships, six cruisers and three destroyers; this was correctly reported as being Japanese. However, they sighted no carrier and Galusha turned his attention back to the transports. Sixty miles northeast of Bawean they sighted 43 transports in two lines escorted by a ring of “15 destroyers.”29 Although just 10 minutes north of the battle Doorman had already missed his chance to reach them. Weather conditions were Level 5 on the Beaufort Scale with a gentle wind out of the northeast and few clouds in the sky30; visibility to the northwest was extremely sharp.31 However, the Japanese still had no air cover due to bad weather over Bali, Balikpapan and Makassar, which made it difficult to maintain a CAP over the convoy with regularity. The Japanese had already lost three Tainan Air Wing Zeros from Balikpapan; all ran out of fuel and crash-landed, but the pilots were rescued.32 Faced with no resistance, the Buffalos and P-40s circled protectively while the A-24s went to work. A cloud bank obscured the convoy but the Banshees still made two attacks on the convoy.33 At 1647 they nosed over at 9,500 feet and dove through the heavy cloud cover; they released their bombs between 3,000 and 4,000 feet.34,35 Despite “very heavy AA fire”36 the bombers claimed six direct hits, three near misses and three ships sunk.37 The P-40 pilots claimed to see one ship of about 14,000 tons sink.38 At approximately 1645, Lieutenant Vermeyden reported seeing a number of 2,000 pound bombs explode alongside the leading Japanese heavy cruiser.39 Within a minute the ship was reported to be on fire. He was unsure if it was hit by a bomb or naval shell, but its fire become very ragged and intermittent. The second heavy cruiser continued to fire.40 Given that the dive bombers were in the process of expending their ordnance on the transports it is unlikely that these were the result of Allied air attacks. Despite the extravagant claims, no Japanese transports or cruisers were hit during this mission. In return, one A-24 was heavily damaged and barely managed to stagger back to Java where it made a forced landing at Singosari airfield. The plane was immediately abandoned and its crew drove 200 miles back to Jogjakarta.41 The USAAF evacuation of Java was now in full swing and no one wanted to be left behind. The Buffalos and P-40s remained behind with orders to provide the CSF with air cover. It soon became apparent that the Allied ships had no knowledge of their mission. As to be expected, every time they approached the Japanese formation they were met with a torrent of accurate AA fire. Equally annoying, they also took fire from the CSF.42 Unable to directly communicate with the CSF by radio, the fighters radioed Interceptor Command at Soerabaja to request that Doorman be informed of their presence through naval channels. Unfortunately, nothing came of this effort. Periodically taking fire from both sides, the fighters orbited the battle in a rectangular pattern at 25,000 feet.43 The precise location of the Japanese spotter planes at this time re-

mains unclear. The Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo states that five of their cruiser spotter planes were in the air.44 The Institute implies that they withdrew, but came back when the Allied fighters departed. However, there was literally no place for them to go as they were not recovered by their parent ships during the sea battle. Likely aided by smoke and poor visibility, it would appear that they continued to linger near the Allied battle line, as detailed by British history David Thomas45: “Meanwhile, left alone, unmolested by the 10 American fighters, flew three Japanese floatplanes spotting for the Japanese cruisers.”46 At this point the Japanese assert that none of their ships had yet been hit. This claim is contested somewhat by Lieutenant Lester J. Johnsen who at the time was overhead in one of the P-40s. Using a small hand-held camera he photographed what he believed to be a Japanese heavy cruiser that had been hit and was now afire.47 Although repeated by several different authors over the years, his photo remains unconfirmed by Japanese records. The photo itself, taken from high altitude, shows little more than an unidentified ship with a smoke plume. The smoke could just as easily be a deliberate smoke screen. On one of these passes it appears the American and Dutch fighters again wandered too near the Japanese squadron, as lookouts aboard John D. Ford reported bursts of AA fire above them.48 At 1700 Lieutenant G. E. Kiser reported to Interceptor Command that the transports were moving west, away from the battle. He also advised that fuel was low and he would be forced to return to base shortly.49 By this point their presence had been a complete bust. The battlefield was almost completely covered with smoke and it was extremely difficult to distinguish the Allied and Japanese ships from 25,000 feet. And of course, the persistent Japanese spotter planes remained overhead unhampered, seemingly unhindered. At 1730 the fighters turned for home in order land back at Ngoro before dark.

Too Close for Comfort Both sides maintained a torrid rate of fire. As a result, the cloth sail covering Haguro’s main guns caught fire from the heat, while the paint blistered and peeled off the steel barrel.50 Admiral Takagi glowered toward the Allied fleet and conferred with his senior officers between glances through his binoculars. All of them had been soaked by the blue (De Ruyter), red (Houston) and white (Exeter) dye shell-splashes from the Allied cruisers’ near-misses. The wind howling through the bridge, combined with the roar of gunfire and exploding shells, made it difficult to communicate.51 Below deck, the crew of Haguro was punished by the nonstop roar of the main guns and the gut-wrenching concussion that reverberated throughout the ship. A number of men become twitchy and nervous. In particular, the sick bay crew, located directly beneath one of the main turrets, was affected. Eventually the ship’s doctor became disoriented and began babbling to himself incoherently.52

24. The Battle Begins Aboard Nachi, Lieutenant-Commander Tanaka pleaded to close the range to improve accuracy. In response, Takagi’s chief of staff, Captain Ko Nagasawa, ordered the 13,300 ton cruiser to turn into the Allied line with Haguro following. “‘Chief Navigator … to port, to port!’ the Chief of Staff shouted, waving his hand to the left.” As a result, the range dropped steadily from 27,000 yards down to 19,700 yards, bringing the guns of the Allied light cruisers into range. Although Japanese accuracy increased, so did that of RearAdmiral Doorman’s ships. In particular, Houston’s gunfire was too close for comfort. Allied gunfire concentrated on Nachi. Red colored water from Houston’s shells crashed over the deck, staining the uniforms of the Japanese crewmen. Although none of the Japanese ships were hit, it was a tense situation. Concerned by this increased accuracy, Captain Nagasawa soon waved his right hand and ordered, “Chief Navigator! Starboard!” to again open the range. Nachi heeled over as she turned away with Haguro in tow. As 5th Cruiser Squadron increased the range Allied gunfire dropped off as only Exeter and Houston remained in range. At 28,400 yard they too ceased fire.53 The Japanese were consistently the more aggressive combatant throughout the battle. Nonetheless, both sides would later be heavily criticized for continuing the engagement at such long range. Although both forces featured two heavy cruisers— Exeter and Houston versus Haguro and Nachi—the Japanese were heavily outgunned by the Allied light cruisers. Closing the range would have let this superiority manifest itself. At the same time, damage to Haguro or Nachi might have altered the battle in favor of the Allies. In short, all the Japanese needed, and wanted, to do was keep Doorman away from the convoy. Nachi’s gunnery officer, Tanaka Tsuneji, later wrote: When we traded fire at more than 20,000 meters it was very difficult to hit targets. As a matter of fact, Nachi had received intense firing from five cruisers, but no shells hit her. It was not as easy as we might think to get hit by shells from a distance. It sounds good that we utilized the out-of-range tactic, but the reality was that we didn’t know exactly at what we were firing.

Although Allied lookouts had spotted the convoy early on, Doorman had no idea of its position some 40 minutes later. Still, the battle had slowly drifted west and Jintsu—on the north edge of the fight—could now see the transports to the northwest. In order to turn the Allied column away and head off any potential thrust toward them, Admiral Takagi ordered the 5th Cruiser Squadron to launch a torpedo attack.54 Aboard Haguro, tube doors in her upper hull slid open and the 24-inch torpedo mounts were targeted on Doorman’s force with clockwork precision. It was just like prewar drills that had been run hundreds, if not thousands, of times in countless exercises.55 The more superstitious among Haguro’s torpedo crews gently patted their massive weapons and spoke words of encouragement, as if talking to a child. The cruiser’s chief torpedo officer then announced, “Starboard torpedo ready!”56 Preparations aboard Nachi was not quite as polished and

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led to a humiliating loss of face for her chief torpedo officer, Captain Horie. Shortly after receiving Rear-Admiral Takagi’s order, a crewmen reported that the compressed air valves of their torpedo mounts were frozen and would not open. Unless these valves could be opened and compressed air fed to the mount, Nachi would be unable to fire her torpedoes. Allied fire was very heavy and the two Japanese cruisers maintained a steady course amid a torrent of shell splashes from near-misses. Haguro was holding up her launch for Nachi. Everyone felt pressured to launch so that the cruisers could again begin maneuvering. Captain Nagasawa, repeatedly pressed Captain Horie, “Not yet Chief Torpedo Officer?” Clearly unhappy with the answer he snapped, “Open them! Hurry up!” Again the crewman reported that the valves refused to budge. At 1652, Captain Nasagawa finally lost patience with Nachi and Horie and ordered Haguro to launch on her own. Her target was the Houston at range of some 22,000 yards. As soon as the torpedoes went into the water, several exploded almost immediately. So did most of the others after a short run, creating monstrous columns of water in the open ocean. The Japanese were initially mystified. The 5th Cruiser Squadron action report credited the explosions to timercontrolled Allied torpedoes, large-caliber super cannons or a controlled mine field controlled from Bawean.57 Not until later was it determined that Haguro had fired her torpedoes with little regard to angle, target speed or other key variables inherent to a successful torpedo attack.58 In the end, Nachi was unable to launch any torpedoes and Captain Horie was thoroughly humiliated, both personally and professionally. After the battle the “locked” valves were found to have a deceptively simple fix. As it turned out, they had already been fully opened and no one noticed in the heat of the battle. Her crew had cause to laugh about it after the battle ended, but only because Horie would later that night have the very rare opportunity to redeem himself in the same engagement. Haguro and Nachi continued to fire while making preparations to launch torpedoes. Amid this flurry of fire Java was hit at 1655, although her fighting efficiency was not impaired. Her XO, Lieutenant-Commander J.B. Vinckers, was below deck in Central Damage Control when the shell struck. There was apparently minimal damage, for he recalled there being nothing out of the ordinary about the hit.59 It remains unclear if Java was actually hit. While Vinckers suggests in one report that she was, yet another report by Vinckers himself and Lieutenant J.A. Bientjes suggests that no damage was suffered. Further muddying the issue is a statement by the captain of John D. Ford, Lieutenant J.E. Cooper: “At 1655 the Java appeared to be hit. Just after the Java was hit torpedoes were fired on the starboard [side] of the main body, all ships turned left to avoid being hit.”60 As the CSF turned to avoid Haguro’s torpedoes at 1700, Doorman signaled Helfrich: “Position 1700 S 06–24 E 112– 12; main course West. Enemy turns away.” Two minutes later Perth claimed to hit a Japanese cruiser. Aboard Kortenaer, Lieu-

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tenant Heurn reported what he thought to be a hit as well: “Suddenly, in the enemy lines, a thick black pillar of smoke rose straight up into the air; a Japanese cruiser had met its doom.” 61 Despite the reports of both Kortenaer and Perth, it does not appear that any Japanese ship was hit or damaged in this exchange.

“Prepare for all-out attack!” Aboard the Japanese ships frustration was building amongst their senior officers. After an hour of heavy firing, the Allies showed no sign of giving up or having suffered major damage. Doorman’s tenacity was particularly worrisome as Rear-Admiral Takagi still believed the Allied ships were too damaged to fight a major surface battle due to earlier air raids on Soerabaja. He had started the day thinking that the Allies wanted no part of a naval battle with his covering force. Yet, they were now engaged in pitched battle with a numerically strong Allied fleet that showed no signs of quitting. Coordinated fire control had also broken down with each Japanese ship picking its own targets. Some fired on Allied destroyers while others engaged an unidentified target, only the mast of which was visible above the thick black smoke. Haguro and Nachi confused the Allied cruisers amid the gunfire, smoke and colorful prisms of long-range shell splashes. Houston and De Ruyter were still the only ships that had been positively identified.62 As a result, De Ruyter received much attention despite being forced to return fire at extreme range. Although the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was much closer to the CSF and could recognize individual Allied ships, they failed to return fire with any cohesion. Rear-Admiral Takagi had to make a choice. The sun was due to set in just over an hour at 1820. He felt that the CSF was still too close to the convoy and clearly did not want to risk Doorman slipping by his forces after nightfall. As had the Allies, the Japanese had burned through a large portion of their ammunition. Their cruisers had already expended 1,271 8-inch and 171 5.5-inch rounds and several dozen torpedoes, so ammunition was becoming a concern.63 And finally, operating deep inside enemy territory and unable to oil his ships with the Allied squadron still at sea, fuel consumption was also a consideration, although not yet critical. To force the situation he issued the order “Prepare for allout attack” to the entire fleet just after 1700. Shortly afterward, the Japanese ships went to full speed and executed a hard turn to port in order to close the range. They also took steps to coordinate their fire and changed tactics in the belief that if they sank the strongest Allied ships the remainder would retire. Thus, Haguro and Nachi shifted fire to Exeter and Houston.

“Check fire… Exeter has been hit.” At approximately 1705 Exeter was straddled very closely by an 8-inch salvo. She may also have received an underwater

hit, for the explosions lifted the ship out of the water and dropped her back down. Her hull was ruptured and several compartments flooded; repair crews later determined that Exeter took on 66 tons of seawater as a result.64 Just minutes later Exeter suffered an 8-inch shell hit from Haguro.65 It punched through the shield of Mount S.2, a dual 4-inch AA battery, before penetrating a boiler room ventilator and armored hatch cover.66 It sprayed fragments throughout A Boiler Room and continued into B Boiler Room, causing further casualties and damage. Although there was no explosion, the result to Exeter was catastrophic.67 The main boiler line forward was destroyed, putting both forward starboard boilers out of action. None of the four aft boilers were hit, but damage to the superheater knocked them offline.68 With a deafening roar, superheated steam from a ruptured pipe filled the aft boiler room, instantly killing the entire crew except for a single petty officer.69 This put B Boiler Room completely out of action and brought the ship’s total number of killed to 14, including casualties among the AA mount crew. With six of eight boilers offline, Exeter’s speed instantaneously dropped to just six knots. The reduced power output caused the dynamos to jump; although electricity was not completely lost, oil pumps to the main engines failed, lights dimmed and her main armament temporarily put out of action.70 Until this point Exeter was firing rapidly and had expended 166 rounds per gun, which was nearly half her supply of 8-inch ammunition. To preserve the steam pressure that remained in the two operational boilers the main throttles were closed and two auxiliary engines were started to increase speed. As Exeter’s speed fell off, Captain Gordon threw the wheel over and she staggered out of line to port. The result was pandemonium. Unaware of Exeter’s condition, Houston, Perth and Java interpreted the move as an effort to comb incoming torpedoes and followed suit. Trailing by just 600 yards, Houston maneuvered hard to avoid ramming the British cruiser. As Houston heeled to port, mount commanders received the order from chief gunnery officer Commander A.L. Maher: “Check fire… Exeter has been hit.”71 De Ruyter continued ahead on a WNW course for another 90 seconds before Rear-Admiral Doorman realized that his column was in disarray.72 He then swung southward in wide arc roughly abreast of the British destroyers.73 Flying overhead in his “Dave,” Lieutenant Utsunomiya Michio noted, “After two hours of cross-firing, I didn’t see any hits. Only one shell hit the second ship. The warship suddenly reduced its speed in black smoke. It was the British Exeter. Due to the Exeter’s damage, the enemy fleet formation collapsed.”74

At the same time, Lieutenant J.E. Cooper aboard John D. Ford noted Exeter’s condition and would write afterward, “At 1708 heavy smoke was seen coming from the stacks of Exeter and she was noticed to slow down, the three cruisers astern overtaking and passing her. An additional enemy force of three cruisers and several destroyers were noted on our starboard bow well over the horizon at this time. The main body

24. The Battle Begins started falling off to the left, the De Ruyter lagging behind making an attempt to close the enemy. Simultaneously with this maneuver enemy destroyers launched torpedoes on the starboard bow.”75 Captain Gordon signaled Captain Waller on Perth of his condition at 1714.76 Given the laborious Allied communications it is unclear if he signaled the flagship or had Perth do so. As Doorman struggled to reform his line Perth closed and circled Exeter laying smoke. In turn, the American destroyers and Witte de With laid additional smoke to mask the cruisers. Visibility was already poor due to the heavy gunfire and Japanese smokescreens; it now become non-existent and both sides were effectively concealed from each other. Aboard Exeter damage control teams worked frantically to increase her speed which was still just six knots. As steam pressure was restored Exeter worked up to 11 knots and then 15 knots very soon after. It also allowed the engine room to restore main power, which allowed the main battery to come back online. This was fortunate, as the Japanese were now massing for another attack in an attempt to finish off Exeter.77

“It was a sight I shall never forget” In the midst of this chaos, the first torpedoes launched some 20 minutes earlier by Haguro and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla now reached the Allied squadron. At 1715 Kortenaer was 1,000 yards off Alden’s starboard beam when a “Long Lance” torpedo slammed into her engine room on the starboard side.78 Its massive 1,080-pound warhead lifted the destroyer out of the water and slammed it down.79 Hit directly amidships, her keel snapped and Kortenaer immediately broke in two, rolled to starboard and buckled like an accordion within 90 seconds.80 Her Executive Officer, Lieutenant-Commander R.M. Crommelin, later described how the two severed sections—fore and aft—came to a stop less than 10 feet apart; completely vertical, they began to slowly sink81: The Dutch destroyers continued on a westerly course and came into the vicinity of the Java. When we turned to port, the Kortenaer, astern of us took a hit from a torpedo and broke in two. We saw both parts of the ship, covered with survivors, sink slowly. After her loss, our ship increased speed and began to zigzag.82 A great explosion lifted the ship out of the water and then slammed it back again. The destroyer broke in half. Bow and stern, before sinking, both stood straight up in the water where they were no more than 2–3 meters apart.83 At about 1708 the Exeter was observed to have been heavily hit near the base of her forward stack. At about this time our cruiser formation turned left by ship’s movement to the southwest. The Dutch and and U.S. destroyers had been working their way up along the port side and turned with them. At 1714 the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer, then about 800 yards on the starboard side of the Ford, was hit by a torpedo about amidships on the starboard side, and then rolled over. The ship broke in two, turned on its side and then rolled over. The time to do the above was not over thirty (30) seconds. Men were observed to be jumping overboard as the ship rolled.84

When the torpedo hit Lieutenant-Commander Kroese was on the main bridge of Kortenaer with his gunnery officer,

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assistant gunnery officer, torpedo officer, signal officers and several crewmen. All wore steel helmets and lifejackets. They were observing the plight of Exeter when the torpedo ripped into the ship without warning.85 Assistant Gunnery Officer Lieutenant J.A.N. Heurn instinctively grabbed the wire caging surrounding the bridge and felt the steel of the ship crack and break apart throughout his entire body.86 The stern section rolled back over and sank almost immediately but remained just under the surface. The still vertical bow section remained afloat for approximately five minutes. While Kortenaer’s European crewmen scrambled over the side, many of her Indonesian crew refused to abandon ship.87 Other crewmen were lost when they fell into the sea between the separated halves of the ship. Likewise, several members of the black gang were killed when they either fell or were thrown into the destroyer’s funnels.88 Kortenaer’s shattered hulk sank at coordinates 06–25 S / 112–08 E.89 Miraculously, 115 of her 153 man crew, including the captain and executive officer, survived, although several were injured.90 Three large rafts, all damaged, almost immediately popped to the surface. Lieutenant-Commander Kroese ordered them tied together. One raft contained a single Dutch officer, two Eurasians and a number of Indonesian seamen. The Indonesians were in a surly mood and began to accuse the Dutch of colonial exploitation. Disorder continued to fester until the Dutch officer beat several of them with a paddle to restore order.91 In the water, Kroese glanced at his wristwatch; it had frozen at exactly 1715 when the torpedo slammed into Kortenaer. Looking up, he saw her shattered bow—dotted with crewmen crawling about or falling into the sea—towering over him. “It was a sight I shall never forget,” he wrote in his after-action report of the battle.92 Within a seven minute span Rear-Admiral Doorman had lost two of his ships. Even had they been so inclined, the other Allied ships could not stop for survivors. Although against orders, one of De Ruyter’s crewmen, Sergeant-Constable B. Gierman, dropped a light buoy over the side.93 The water was covered with a thick layer of fuel oil from Kortenaer’s shattered bunkers, but it fortunately did not catch fire. Within two minutes of Kortenaer being hit, the sea was full of Japanese torpedoes. The USN’s first “up-close and personal” look at the Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedo occurred when John D. Ford sighted one 75 yards off the port quarter. The ABDA formation was on course 180 degrees and it rapidly overtook the destroyer from a 20 degree angle. LieutenantCommander Cooper immediately ordered evasive action hard to starboard that caused the torpedo to miss by 25 yards to port. It initially ran at a depth of about six feet, but then porpoised, giving her a crew a good look. Although no one was taking notes, they were surprised see that it had no wake thanks to its pure oxygen propulsion system.94 A third torpedo crossed Jupiter’s bow and a fourth approached Exeter which still wallowed along at a near stop. Houston’s 1.1-inch AA mount fired in the direction of the tor-

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pedo to alert her to the danger, but she took no notice. It passed astern with no indication that Exeter had seen it. A torpedo ran directly under Witte de With’s #2 Mount without detonating.95 It was set too deep and did not have a magnetic exploder or she may well have suffered the same fate as Kortenaer. Her crew had no time for evasive action. From his raft after abandoning Kortenaer, Lieutenant Heurn observed, “a torpedo wake was seen to pass under amidships [of Witte de With], which meant that the torpedo had just missed the bow by a hair’s breadth.”96

Yet another exploded off the Dutch destroyer’s starboard side. The ocean was quickly filled with additional water columns. Japanese torpedoes that had not found a target were now exploding at the end of their run. It appears that several either surfaced or sank vertically and were mistaken for submarine periscopes by several Allied lookouts in the confusion. They were still unaware of the tremendous range of the Type 93; as no enemy destroyers were thought to be in range, it was assumed that the CSF had run across a line of Japanese submarines.97 As a result, Witt de With dropped several depth charges at random.

Chapter 25

The Withdrawal of Exeter “What is the matter with you?”

At 1736 Rear-Admiral Doorman signaled Exeter, “What is the matter with you?” At 1748 he ordered her to “Proceed to Soerabaja.” Witte de With received orders via UKG to escort her while Java covered them with smoke.2 Java’s smoke generator was out of commission so she circled them and laid funnel smoke, which hung low and oppressive over the water.3 Aboard Perth, Captain Waller received Doorman’s order, “but I continued to smokescreen Exeter and reported her damage to the Admiral who told me by visual signal to follow him, which I proceeded to do so.”4 By 1740 the main body of the CSF, minus Exeter, Witte de With and the RN destroyers, had reformed. Doorman led his ships to the south and then made a wide looping turn to the northeast. In the process Perth, Houston and Java fell back into a single column.5 By 1750 they were on a course of 270 degrees. 6 This positioned them between Exeter and the Japanese to cover her withdrawal.7 The Allied destroyers were ordered to lay more smoke. The USN destroyers then formed a screen to port of the main column. At 1752 he came to course 240 degrees and signaled Vice-Admiral Helfrich: “Kortenaer sunk. Exeter damaged. The fight goes on. Position 06-15 S / 112–17 E.”8 Together with gunfire and ongoing dusk, visibility was now less than one mile.9 Radio communications had long since broken down and only occasional visual signals from De Ruyter could be seen.10 The CSF still received heavy Japanese fire; it was so accurate and continuous that Captain Waller aboard Perth thought it to be radar controlled.11 In reality, Japanese spotter planes were simply helping their gunners easily find the range.12 The Allied cruisers emerged from the smoke to find Haguro and Nachi on an opposite course some 19,500 yards distant. Closer on a somewhat parallel course was

At 1720 Rear-Admiral Doorman signaled the CSF, “All ships follow me.” Although often interpreted as a signal of his intention to attack the Japanese fleet, in reality, it was to ensure that his ships formed on De Ruyter instead of Exeter. From 1728 to 1745 the USN destroyers laid smoke around Exeter and then retired behind it.1

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the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. All three formations again traded heavy gunfire. During this exchange Perth claimed to hit Haguro, causing “a very big explosion aft in the target with volumes of bright lava-like emissions and a pink smoke.”13 Exeter was screened on her starboard side by Electra, Encounter, Jupiter and Witte de With. The destroyers had orders to escort her from the immediate battle. They moved to the southeast on a course of 130 degrees that later changed to 90 degrees.14 Exeter still heavily vented smoke and steam. Captain Gordon took her into the smoke as Witt de With endeavored to join up. When she emerged at 1745 a Japanese floatplane almost immediately appeared 5,500 yards to port. AA fire quickly drove it off to the north.15 As it did, Japanese ships closed in—the 5th Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Destroyer Flotilla from the northeast and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla from the northwest. Seeing Exeter lagging behind the main formation, and well-informed of her condition by their spotter planes, the Japanese attempted to finish her off. With Doorman’s formation in complete disarray, RearAdmiral Takagi felt in a position of strength from which he could deliver the knockout blow. As his forces maneuvered for a mass torpedo attack, he ordered the convoy to again turn south, toward Java, in anticipation of routing the Allied force. Some 12,000 yards northwest of Exeter, Jintsu and her destroyers came about on a south-southeast course in preparation for a torpedo attack against Exeter.16 To the southwest, Naka was rapidly forming her charges into two columns (four and two destroyers, respectively) on her starboard quarter. Their target was also Exeter. The 5th Cruiser Squadron was the first to make its move.

After a brief lull in the action Haguro and Nachi resumed long-distance shell fire at 1745 while closing the range. At a range of 19,000 yards Haguro launched eight torpedoes at 1748; Nachi launched eight more at 1754.17 At 1756 they turned away to starboard and paralleled Doorman’s main column. The CSF did not return fire; although their primary target was Exeter, Doorman executed a hard turn to course 190 degrees to evade and all missed. Next was the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, which closely coordinated its attack with that of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. As they closed the range at 30 knots both formations took heavy fire. Although completely enveloped in smoke LieutenantCommander Bennink aboard De Ruyter could clearly see the masts of the Japanese destroyers above the swirling smoke and remembered them making excellent targets. De Ruyter claimed hits on a destroyer he believed was so damaged that it sank, although this was not the case.18 John D. Ford’s logbook also reports that De Ruyter “probably hit” and sank a Japanese destroyer which was not the case. Perth fired sporadically through gaps in the smoke. Exeter targeted Jintsu with several salvos, but was forced to cease fire when Electra moved across her bow and fouled her line of sight.19 During this attack the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla reported receiving heavy fire from multiple Allied cruisers. It consisted of three salvos, one of which hit very close20 and 31 other types of fire.21 The water was a churning mass of red, blue and white columns. Several shells exploded so close that Allied and Japanese observers were certain heavy damage had been inflicted. But each time the ship emerged from under the water and continued. 22 Aboard Amatsukaze, Commander Hara describes Tokitsukaze receiving a shell hit in his post-war memoirs23: “At 7,000 meters from the enemy fleet, destroyer Tokitsukaze, a little ahead of Amatsukaze, took a shell hit. Amatsukaze was enveloped by thick white smoke bursting from Tokitsukaze, which blinded us.”24 Although heavily outgunned by the CSF, Jintsu engaged in a brisk, long-range fight with the British destroyers. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla battle report states that she fired 137 rounds of 5.5-inch ammunition. Jintsu claimed to have inflicted heavy damage on the Allies, but no ships were hit by her fire. In return, she received a single 4.7-inch shell from Electra that killed one crewman and wounded four more.25 Closing to 15,000 yards, Jintsu launched four torpedoes

25. The Withdrawal of Exeter at 1754 and reversed course. From 1757 to 1758 the ships of the 16th Destroyer Squadron each launched eight torpedoes and turned away to the northwest. The 24th Destroyer Division followed close behind and from 1800 to 1802 they too launched eight torpedoes apiece and turned away to the northwest. In total, they launched a total of 52 torpedoes, all of which missed.26 Still circling overhead in his scout plane, Lieutenant Michio was somewhat less impressed with the torpedo attack than Rear-Admiral Tanaka: “Our destroyers charged toward the enemy fleet. They turned around after firing torpedoes from a very far distance. I was disappointed, if, as they were proudly saying, that this was our brave torpedo attack.”27 At 1747 RearAdmiral Doorman signaled the CSF, “1 cruiser and 4 destroyers. Bearing 285. Distance 10 miles.” This was the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, which also received heavy fire. Naka closed to 18,500 yards and fired four torpedoes at 1750.28 She then reversed course to the West, dropping smoke to cover the approach of the 2nd Destroyer Squadron and 9th Destroyer Squadron.29 Their targets were the undamaged Allied cruisers. Houston was able to bring her forward turrets to bear and fired on Naka without result. At 1750 Exeter also fired a single salvo from 18,000 yards at Naka that missed.30 Perth fired periodically as visibility allowed through gaps in the smoke and shell splashes. Murasume, Harusame, Samidare and Yudachi closed to under 10,000 yards. At 1804 each launched four torpedoes and reversed course on Naka. Doorman altered course southwest to heading 190° to evade and all missed.31 Immediately behind came the 9th Destroyer Squadron. Natsugumo was still shepherding the convoy so only Asagumo and Minegumo attacked under the leadership of Captain Sato Yasuo. Although the rest of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla had already turned away, they made a solo yet very determined charge. For some 10 minutes they withstood withering Allied fire and closed the range to just 6,500 yards.32 Even the Japanese themselves were surprised by Yasuo’s audacity.33 The result was a sharp series of running firefights with the RN destroyers and Witte de With.

“We are going through the smoke to Counterattack.” As the Japanese massed to attack and their destroyers moved forward Rear-Admiral Doorman ordered the British destroyers to meet them head-on. At 1725 he signaled, “British destroyers counterattack.” Aboard Electra, Commander C.W. May calmly addressed his crew over the ship’s intercom: “The Japanese are mounting a strong torpedo attack against the Exeter. So we are going through the smoke to counterattack.”34 May ordered Encounter and Jupiter to follow. However, they were widely dispersed and not able to attack in formation. Unwilling to wait for them to form on Electra he rang up full speed and turned into the smoke alone.35 It was the last time any Allied ship saw her afloat.36 Encounter also attacked independ-

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ently into the smoke. Visibility was only ½-mile; unable to see any suitable torpedo targets Jupiter remained near Exeter in case anything broke through her companion’s defensive screen.37 At the same time, two enemy destroyers charged us contrary to the other enemy ships. They were ready to battle despite the danger. Laying a smoke screen to protect damaged Exeter, they started a full-out engagement, firing cannons and machine guns at Asagumo and Minegumo.38 At that time, separating from the group, two of our destroyers charged at the enemy fleet. They were Asagumo and Minegumo. They charged right into the middle of the enemy fleet. Fierce fighting started between the two and the enemy destroyers. I cheered on our destroyers from above. One of our destroyers, Asagumo, stopped after being hit on the stern. Minegumo kept fighting, protecting Asagumo. The enemy fleet, having lost one destroyer, also had received heavy damage.39

Electra emerged alone from the oily haze of the smoke screen to find herself facing both Asagumo and Minegumo. Initially only Asagumo and Electra engaged in a heavy firefight at ranges of 3,300 to 5,500 yards.40 At a range of 5,000 yards Electra immediately hit Asagumo four times aft.41 As a result of damage to her engine room she lost main power, which froze her main batteries and caused the ship to go dead in the water for 40 minutes.42 Asagumo launched no torpedoes during this phase of the battle. She suffered four killed and 19 wounded in this exchange.43 In return, Asagumo simultaneously hit Electra twice. 4 4 The heaviest damage was in her #2 Boiler Room on the port side. It knocked Boiler #2 offline, which in turn, supplied Boiler #3. As water ran out of the damaged pipes, Electra lost propulsion. The explosion also destroyed the pipes connecting her telemotors, leaving Electra adrift.45 She drifted some distance before coming to a full stop with a list to port.46 As detailed above, it appears that she drifted across Exeter’s bow, forcing her to cease fire against Jintsu.47 While Asagumo and Electra engaged each other, Minegumo continued on a NNE course and pushed into the smoke. Within minutes she made contact with Encounter, which also emerged from the smoke alone. From 1730 to 1740 the two destroyers paralleled each other at a range of 3,300 yards. However, in this exchange it appears that neither side suffered damage nor casualties.48 Witte de With witnessed their fight as she formed up with Exeter. Next, we received orders from the Admiral to escort the Exeter to Soerabaja, because the ship had been hit and her speed was low. When we found her, she was smoking heavily. To our west, Japanese and British destroyers were doing battle. One of the enemy ships apparently succeeded in breaking through and approached us, probably intent on torpedoing the Exeter.49

Witte de With was closing on Exeter when at approximately 1730 she sighted Minegumo coming through the smoke screen 300° astern at a range of just under 16,000 yards. The Japanese destroyer was still engaged with Encounter as she attempted to close on Exeter. Witte de With opened fire at 9,400 yards; Minegumo immediately switched her fire to the Dutch destroyer, which allowed Encounter to slip back into the smoke undamaged.50

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

In a short fight marked by accurate gunplay, Witte de With and Minegumo traded eight or nine salvos. Witte de With scored a hit with her first shot. Minegumo replied immediately with a volley of highly accurate fire of her own. Although not hit directly, Witte de With lost her aerial mast. She fired eight additional salvos, hitting Minegumo at least once more.51 Lieutenant van der Moer wrote after the war: Through my binoculars I saw our first salvo score a hit. The enemy returned fire immediately with great accuracy. We heard and saw some shells passing and exploding in the water, but we did not sustain any more damage than a shot-down antenna. The Exeter did not fire.52

At that point the Japanese destroyer turned away hard to starboard which took her back into the smoke; she suffered light damage and four wounded during the fighting with Encounter and Witte de With.53 Whether Minegumo launched any torpedoes during this action remains unclear. Witte de With maneuvered heavily throughout the fight and two depth charges rolled over the side; although they should have been set on safe, one exploded near her stern. The blast knocked both of the ship’s generators offline. One was able to be immediately reset, but the other could not and a backup diesel generator was started in its place. Witte de With also suffered substantial collateral damage from the concussion of her own main guns. Most of her fire had been directed almost full astern and slightly to starboard.54 This severely warped the starboard propeller shaft which began to vibrate heavily and badly shook the 1,316 ton destroyer.55 It was so sudden and unexpected that several crewmen were thrown to the deck. On the far starboard side of the uncovered battle bridge, Lieutenant van der Moer “had some difficulty” staying on board the ship.56 On the main bridge, the gyro compass and several smaller ones were wildly off-target; another had jumped out of its socket completely. The starboard bridge wing was damaged; the sail had been blown away and its rods bent.57 The ready room door was completely off its tracks. The radio was offline due to the concussion and loss of her aerial. There was additional damage aft. The smoke generator was inoperative; the small metal hut just behind the bridge, which housed the SONAR gear, loosely hung together at the seams58; shattered glass was everywhere. Despite the damage, only one crewman, a wireless operator, was injured when a piece of radio equipment struck his head.59 Minegumo circled back to Electra, still without propulsion and dead in the water. She proceeded to hammer her at point-blank range, scoring hits beginning with her second salvo.60 Electra returned fire, but her gun crews were forced onto local control as the ship’s communications system was out. Without power or central fire control it was a hopeless fight. Minegumo methodically silenced her guns in minutes. Although the conditions were right no order was ever given to fire torpedoes.61 With only her Y Mount left in action LieutenantCommander May gave the order to abandon ship. As her guns ceased fire Minegumo came in close and

sprayed the ship with machine gun fire before returning to aid Asagumo.62 Approximately 25 wounded were put into the only undamaged whaler and launched along with #4 and #5 Carly rafts. Two more wounded were put into the water. Electra listed heavily to port and went down by the bow. LieutenantCommander May appeared on the bridge and waved to his men in the water who cheered. He then disappeared to port and appeared to leave the ship, although he was not among the survivors. Electra settled slowly until only her screws and six feet of quarterdeck showed; the destroyer remained in this position for some time before sinking. Apparently all survivors were in the water, on floats and wreckage, when Electra “sighed, listed heavily to port and down by the bows …” she then “settled more sleepily” and finally out of sight about 6 pm.63

Five Minus Two Equals Five Aboard the Haguro and Nachi the Japanese were elated. Reports of heavy damage to the CSF by their gun and torpedo attacks were pouring in. Two Allied cruisers and at least three destroyers were now being reported as sunk. Exeter was limping away to the southeast, still escorted by Encounter, Jupiter and Witte de With. Doorman, with De Ruyter, Houston, Perth and Java were moving off the battlefield to the southwest. Together with their heavily inflated claims, Rear-Admiral Nishimura took that as a sign that the Allies had finally been broken and that they were withdrawing. At this point Chief Gunnery Officer Tanaka was apparently the only Japanese officer still paying attention to the number of Allied ships: After a while, Jintsu from the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla sent a message, “We sank two enemy cruisers from our torpedo attacks.” That message created further excitement. For me, however, there was little, if any, chance of succeeding in a torpedo attack from that far a distance. To make sure of my belief, I checked the enemy fleet through my binoculars. I saw that five cruisers were still sailing, except Exeter from which there trailed light smoke. I guessed that she had been hit by one of our shells. There was no calculation of five-minus-twoequals-five. I counted the destroyers. I noticed that one of them was missing. I thought the damaged destroyer finally sank.64

Although the USN destroyers had remained unengaged other than to lay smoke, they were not completely ignored. As the Japanese moved to launch torpedoes their spotter aircraft ran low on fuel and were recalled. Rather than taking their ordnance home, or dropping it in the ocean, several Japanese floatplanes made a series of attacks on the USN destroyers before turning for their respective cruisers. They each dropped two light bombs on the destroyers, which escaped without damage.65

“Cover my retirement” At 1806 torpedoes were sighted and Admiral Doorman executed a turn to 190 degrees to evade and all missed. As the cruisers turned away De Ruyter ordered the USN destroyers to “Counterattack.” Before this order could be executed Doorman signaled the 58th Destroyer Division to cover his withdrawal if

25. The Withdrawal of Exeter ordered. By 1812 it was growing dark and visibility had decreased to about 15 miles. Unable to overcome the Japanese escort despite a prolonged gunfight, Doorman now attempted to disengage in order to try and reach the convoy under cover of darkness. Destroyer Division 58 was directed to make a counterattack, but immediately the signal was canceled and Destroyer Division 58 told to cover De Ruyter with smoke if ordered. Before the cancellation could be gotten out the attack was made and Commander Destroyer Division 58 reported all torpedoes expended. Communication was very difficult as concussion from own gunfire had broken both 12-inch signal lights, leaving two hand lamps for flashing light signals.66

Despite Sholar’s official recollection, there is confusion as to what orders the destroyers received.67 In his after action report Lieutenant-Commander Coley aboard Alden would write: DesDiv 58 was ordered at this time to make a counter-attack. Division commander signaled by flag… “Prepare to attack with torpedoes, broadside fire to starboard.” Then he signaled… “Cancel attack.” At 1820 again signaled to attack. Alden fired SB tubes at 1822 on order of DesDiv 58 commander. Target angle estimated by navigator to be 60 degrees, enemy speed 20 knots. Estimate range 22,000 yards.68

Aboard John D. Ford, Lieutenant-Commander J.E. Cooper later wrote: 1807—USN DDs on course 190° when ordered to attack with torpedoes, which was cancelled almost immediately. At 1815 they turned to port on East course and again received orders to fire torpedoes. The Japanese main body was on their SB bow some 20,000 yards distant with target angle of about 075°. Closed to about 14,000 yards and fired starboard tubes. Reversed course and fired torpedoes from port battery. Last torpedo expended 1827. Individual firing plan used. Then passed under stern of main column and took up position on disengaged quarter with ENE course.69

There was also initial confusion as to which Japanese formation they were to attack. Aboard John D. Edwards, Commander Binford thought it was to the northeast, while LieutenantCommander Coley thought they were to the northwest.70 It can be reasonably assumed that Binford made the final decision to attack the Japanese heavy cruisers. Breaking out of the smoke they had just laid the American destroyers saw the Japanese battle line some 22,000 yards off the starboard bow and turned to close the range. As the 58th Destroyer Division pushed forward, Doorman’s cruisers continued to engage the Japanese at approximately 19,000 yards.71 Many salvos from Haguro and Nachi were over. Jintsu apparently also fired, but was hampered by the range. De Ruyter returned fire at extreme range, but her guns proved ineffective. Houston’s 8-inch cannons pounded out salvos at a rapid pace. So fast was her rate of fire throughout the battle that Captain Rooks was forced to notify Rear-Admiral Doorman (via Perth) that he was low on ammunition. Doorman responded with an order to conserve ammunition.72 At approximately 1815 Haguro was hit by either Houston or Perth.73 A heavy explosion was observed and the Japanese

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cruiser was obscured by smoke.74 One of her floatplanes was hit and burned fiercely for several minutes until extinguished. Binford’s destroyers pushed within 14,000 yards, the maximum range of their torpedoes. Although Japanese fire was heavy their shells consistently fell some 800 yards short.75 They launched starboard torpedoes starting at 1822. They then turned in column and fired their port tubes at 1827. All fired their entire complement of torpedoes except for John Paul Jones, which had one stick in its tube. Alden fired 12 torpedoes, which all made normal runs; four were set at a depth of just four feet and porpoised for some time in the choppy sea. The remaining eight were set at eight feet and assumed the proper depth almost immediately.76 Sunset was at 1821, making the torpedoes’ luminous wakes easy to spot in the darkness. Although fired at extreme range, Binford’s torpedoes successfully encouraged the 5th Cruiser Squadron to turn away to the north. Lieutenant-Commander Coley would later assert that this attack “definitely saved Exeter,” a questionable claim at best.77 The 58th Destroyer Division then turned to course 30 degrees and trailed the main column.78 Multiple USN destroyer logs report hits on Japanese ships, including at least one torpedo hit. Aboard Alden, LieutenantCommander Coley reported that a ship in the rear of the Japanese column was hit aft, causing a large fire. One of her forward turrets or superstructure was also on fire. At the same time, Commander E.N. Parker aboard John D. Ford, observed, While firing the first torpedo broadside two large fires were observed on the Japanese ships; one was quite large. At about 1830, or about 10 minutes after firing the first broadside, a very large explosion was observed by an officer and several men to take place on a ship of the Japanese main body.79

No Japanese ships were damaged by torpedoes during the Battle of the Java Sea. At that time it was almost dark and one can assume that the fires reported by Coley and Parker were actually flashes from Japanese guns or Haguro being hit by Houston or Perth. But given that the Japanese ships used flashless powder (adopted in 1938) one can easily question the legitimacy of the former explanation.

“Follow me” With their light surface armament and inability to absorb heavy damage, Doorman had little use for the American destroyers at this point. Unless he could work past the escort and bring their small 4-inch deck guns into action against the unarmed transports they were virtually useless. For their part, the destroyers had no idea of Doorman’s plans or course and simply followed along.80 After 24 hours of high speed operations they had trouble keeping up with the cruisers, which began to pull away. Fuel was also a concern as none were able to fuel completely prior to sailing on February 26.81 At 1831 Doorman signaled the main column and his remaining destroyer escort by Aldis lamp82: “Follow me.” This was to make sure Allied ships formed on De Ruyter rather than Exeter, which was now moving south. Three minutes later the

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

final shots of the daylight phase of battle were fired according to Commander Binford. Doorman then turned away to the east and appeared to be making a run back to Soerabaja. At this point Encounter and Jupiter were in column formation behind and starboard of Java. After helping Witte de With escort Exeter out of immediate danger they turned back to rejoin the main column. However, they proved unable to do so and remained several thousand yards behind the cruisers for the remainder of the battle. In the meantime, night fell and both the CSF and the Japanese were lost from sight. As the British destroyers turned away Witte de With attempted to escort Exeter into Soerabaja. Captain Gordon signaled Royal Navy command at Tandjoeng Priok: “Reduced to … [transmission garbled?], my position 06-39 S / 112-13 E, Course 150 degrees, returning.” Several minutes later, at 1822, Exeter signaled again: “My position 06-43 S / 112-16 E, Course 130 degrees. Speed 16 knots. Remainder of force in company. Enemy to the NW. I am withdrawing under smoke. Maximum speed available 16 knots.” Lieutenant-Commander Schotel signaled the cruiser to follow his course, but Exeter either did not understand or ignored his signals. She did not react and held a course to the south. Witte de With did finally make contact and Exeter fell in behind the destroyer at approximately 1830 and both ships set course for Soerabaja. Because the Allies were unaware of the Long Lance’s extreme range, it was incorrectly assumed that Japanese submarines were in the area. While maneuvering at high speed during the fighting Witte de With had been unable to operate her Sonar. With Exeter only able to make 15 knots, Lieutenant van der Moer was now able to turn the equipment on. Although there was no immediate threat, he obtained permission from Lieutenant-Commander Schotel to randomly drop several depth charges, which of course, damaged nothing.83 Sometime later, in the darkness, they saw flashes of gunfire in the distance. This told them that the fight was continuing. They were also disturbed by the continued presence of one or more unseen Japanese spotter planes, which tracked their movement with several green and white flares.84 These were the ubiquitous floatplanes from Jintsu and Naka which continued to wander over the battle completely unopposed. They initially had trouble locating the entrance to the Westwater Channel as the Dutch destroyer’s compass was out of order. But at approximately 2100 Exeter followed Witte de With into the minefield. They entered the ME by 0000, passing Pope as she put out to sea after completing emergency repairs. Lieutenant-Commander Blinn had orders to patrol near the mouth of the Westwater Channel and assist any damaged Allied ships returning to Soerabaja. Morale aboard Witte de With remained quite strong: “Although utterly exhausted, our crew had performed admirably. The loss of Kortenaer did, of course, have an effect, but that did not last. A missing Javanese steward, thought to have been washed overboard, was found sleeping tranquilly in his bunk. In Soerabaja we topped up again and underwent some minor repairs.”85

The Japanese Withdraw Although the Japanese did turn away following Binford’s attack, it was not due entirely to his torpedoes. The battle had raged for more than two hours without either side gaining a noticeable advantage. With the sun down, visibility was virtually non-existent. It was made worse by smoke from gunfire and smoke screens laid by both sides. The Japanese felt they had inflicted heavy damage on the Allies, which was reinforced by the loss of Electra and Kortenaer and withdrawal of Exeter and Witte de With. Aboard Nachi, Lieutenant-Commander Tanaka felt the pause was a mistake. He believed Doorman was beaten and retiring east, back into Soerabaja; the Japanese only needed to strike a final, decisive blow in order to sweep the CSF from the Java Sea. Tanaka was convinced that to stop now would cost them their best chance of victory. He felt that Rear-Admiral Takagi should have pressed the fight regardless and finished off the Allies.86 Takagi had his reasons for being cautious. At 1700 he had ordered the convoy to again turn west and stay clear of the battle.87 At 1740 he then ordered the convoy to turn south again.88 However, both Japanese heavy cruisers were low on ammunition and all his ships were running thin on their primary offensive weapon, the highly effective “Long Lance” torpedo.89 All the destroyers were low on fuel after hours of high-speed maneuvering. He was also acutely aware that only the light cruiser Kinu and destroyer Umikaze with a few gunboats and minesweepers guarded the convoy. Although Doorman was moving away, Takagi could not risk the Allies changing course and slipping past him in the dark. In addition, the battle had moved south and was now quite close to the Java shore. The Soerabaja lighthouse was visible in the distance and Takagi felt increasingly exposed. Japanese reconnaissance planes had accurately reported the presence of at least five Allied submarines in the Java Sea earlier in the day.90 He also feared running onto Dutch mines, which the Japanese correctly assumed were present. Takagi’s apprehension was further heightened by the premature explosion of his own longrange torpedoes; they had been mistaken for remote controlled mines fired by observers on Bawean Island.91 The battle area had moved too far south. The location of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was too close to the island [Bawean]. We witnessed many explosions from controlled mines at the spot close to the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. In addition, considering the possibility of five enemy submarines joining the battle, we decided that sailing toward the enemy port further would be risky. To avoid the foreseeable, unfavorable situation, we halted the attack. After we assembled, we sailed to a position midway between our convoy and the enemy fleet. During that time, we spotted the enemy again and decided to attack.92

Thus, Rear-Admiral Takagi ordered his ships to cease fire and turn away to the north. This ended the daylight segment of the battle. They reassembled and took up position halfway between the convoy and Doorman’s last known position.

25. The Withdrawal of Exeter Although unsure of Doorman’s movements Takagi had to assume that he planned to continue the battle. He ordered Naka and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla93 to protect the south flank of convoy. He ordered Jintsu and the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to close on the 5th Cruiser Squadron and both assumed a position 20 miles southeast of convoy.94 In the now still darkness they left Asagumo—dead in the water—to whatever fate awaited her. A precarious decision indeed. But deep in enemy waters with Allied warships and sub-

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marines on the prowl, it was the only option. Only Minegumo stood by her and passed a tow line. Asagumo eventually got partial power back on one propeller and Minegumo escorted her to Balikpapan where they arrived the following day.95 Although sunset was officially at 1821 there was still limited visibility in the twilight for another 40–50 minutes.96 As the light failed the Allies and Japanese lost sight of each other. Just before 1900, Doorman signaled Helfrich, “Enemy retreating West, where is convoy?”97

Chapter 26

“Bravely but not very skillfully” ahead of the main column.5 Speed was 28 knots, which was the best the USN destroyers could make as they attempted to rejoin the main column following their torpedo attack.6 The invasion convoy—last reported 20 miles west of Bawean—was now some 50 miles southwest of the island.7 The Allied cruisers were just 20 miles away … roughly one hour sailing time.8 Moreover, Doorman was steering almost directly toward the weakly defended transports. If he had air reconnaissance, and had been willing to use it at night, he could have easily located the convoy.9 Even so, with the Japanese covering force still posi-

Despite Rear-Admiral Doorman’s lack of aircraft support, ABDA-Float had not been idle and RecGroup reconnaissance planes continued to crisscross the Java Sea throughout the battle. At 1757 a Dutch PBY had reported a convoy of 35 ships 70 miles northwest of Bawean. It later reported four destroyers 60 miles west of the island. Rear-Admiral Koenraad ordered that these reports be confirmed to see if any fresher information was available. There were not so the earlier position reports from Lieutenant Kiser at 1700 and the PBY position report time stamped at 1757 were re-broadcast to Rear-Admiral Doorman at 1930.1 In response to this signal Rear-Admiral Koenraad also contacted Soerabaja’s Air Defense Commander who provided the B-17 attack report time stamped 1700.2 According to the naval base logbook, receipt of this information was logged at 2125.3 However, the information itself was relayed to Doorman more than an hour earlier. It remains unclear as to whether or not De Ruyter actually received either signal due to atmospheric interference and Japanese jamming. However, radio logs of both John D. Ford and the gunboat Soemba show receipt of the following position report at 2018: According to message from attacking U.S. Army plane, position large Japanese convoy, 45 transports, 3 cruisers, 12 destroyers at 1700 local time [ JST] 20 miles West of Bawean, course West.4

“How about going to Soerabaja?” Per the pre-battle briefing Doorman initially headed toward Batavia in column formation, but gradually changed course to 290 degrees. De Ruyter led, followed by Perth, Houston, Java and the USN destroyers. Jupiter was about one mile off the port bow of De Ruyter with Encounter about the same distance to starboard; they screened

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26. “Bravely but not very skillfully” tioned between the CSF and the transports, reaching them would have been problematic at best. Just nine miles distant was the 5th Cruiser Squadron; two miles and five miles farther west, respectively, were the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and 4th Destroyer Flotilla. By now the five Japanese spotter planes (three from Haguro and two from Nachi) had been in the air for several hours. Due to the highly fluid nature of the battle below they had no chance to land and were running low on fuel. Although Doorman’s formation was no longer in sight the Japanese continued to maneuver for some time while their floatplanes circled overhead. At 1857 Haguro and Nachi secured from General Quarters and came to a full stop in order to hoist them aboard.10 Lieutenant Michio later recalled: After a while the sun set and it became dark. Both fleets sailed off to the north and south. We flew around the fleet, receiving instruction that we should wait above the mother ship for landing. Our ship continued to maneuver quickly and no order to land was given. Finally I checked our fuel gauge. Until then, I hadn’t thought about the fuel consumption because I was so preoccupied with the sea battle. I wasn’t concerned about landing on the water because the waves weren’t rough. But I wondered whether our ship would hoist us up if we weren’t sure where the enemy was. I asked the crewman in the back seat, “What do you want to do if we aren’t able to be hoisted aboard?” He jokingly answered, “How about going to Soerabaja?” Soon after we received orders to land. Our ship stopped after a large right turn in order to face the wind. Our first and second planes were lifted up on the first try without any problems. Haguro immediately sailed off after taking us aboard. At that time, I didn’t know that our ship was still receiving fire from the enemy.11

Japanese timing was unfortunate and nearly resulted in disaster. Just six minutes later, at 1903, Allied spotters sighted Haguro and Nachi to port at 240 degrees. Both were at or near full stop with their guns unmanned as they hoisted their aircraft aboard. Rear-Admiral Doorman immediately signaled his forces, “Target to port.”12 Perth reported four Japanese ships at approximately 8,700 yards; Jupiter saw three ships bearing 300° at a distance of five miles. Both of these formations were actually Jintsu and her destroyers. Perth fired star shells but they fell short; Houston also fired without result. The Japanese responded with two green starshells.13 In the twilight Japanese lookouts initially confused the unique pagoda superstructure of De Ruyter with those of a Japanese battleship and reported that the 3rd Battleship Division had arrived to reinforce the convoy escort. This belief quickly fell by the wayside when Allied shells began to fall around Haguro and Nachi at just over 13,000 yards—point-blank range that day for the heavy ships on both sides.14 The firing lasted approximately 10 minutes as Nachi’s aviation crew frantically hoisted the last plane aboard.15 As soon as they hooked Lieutenant Michio’s plane Captain Kiyota Takahiko ordered full speed and the ship quickly worked up to 28 knots with the floatplane still hanging over the side. Michio later wrote, “As I walked to the bridge to report, more than 10 star shells exploded above us. A large water column shot up near the bow. It was much more dangerous on board than in the air. Now I understood how the flight crew on board had felt during the day’s fighting.”16

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The 5th Cruiser Squadron turned away to the west under cover of smoke and disappeared from view.17 At the same time the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla moved up and Jintsu launched four torpedoes at De Ruyter at a range of 10,500 yards.18 Lookouts on Perth reported splashes in the water at 1936 and Captain Waller correctly assumed torpedoes had been fired. He ordered a hard turn to starboard; De Ruyter and the other Allied ships immediately followed. Encounter lost visual contact with the main column as result of this maneuver.19 All the torpedoes missed, but Jintsu accomplished her task, which was to blunt the Allied charge. Although the Japanese were rattled by the near disaster, neither side suffered any damage during the unexpected encounter. Within 10 minutes the 5th Cruiser Squadron secured its aircraft and worked back up to cruising speed. Together with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla and 4th Destroyer Flotilla, the Japanese then began searching for the CSF. To aid them Jintsu launched a Kawanishi E7K2 “Alf ” spotter plane.20 Despite losing one of Haguro’s floatplanes earlier in the battle, the Japanese heavy cruisers still had five aircraft available. In addition, Jintsu and Naka each carried a single observation plane. Only the latter two aircraft were equipped for night operations and the Japanese showed no hesitation in using them.21 Crewmen aboard Houston first heard Jintsu’s “Alf ” overhead at 1950. Seaman 2nd Class Bill Weissinger later recalled, “We felt fairly safe after the sun went down. Until we heard those planes. We just couldn’t believe they were flying over the water at night. Then they started dropping flares.”22 There was a near full moon that night. With no heavy cloud cover or rain showers to conceal the CSF, the clear night sky made the Japanese pilot’s job easy.23 The “Alf ” initially dropped 8 flares … one at a time. Each burst and hung in the air, suspended from a tiny parachute, before settling slowly into the water. After the last one, a quiet darkness enveloped the formation.24 For the rest of the night every course change made by the CSF was marked by a parachute flare or floating magnesium light. In the meantime, the Japanese warships silently and methodically stalked their prey in the warm night. By now S-37 had reached her assigned patrol area.25 At 1908 she surfaced to charge batteries. Twenty minutes later lookouts sighted a series of lantern flares between 280° and 290°; they hung stationary at a constant height as if attached to a helium balloon; it was correctly assumed that they had been dropped by aircraft. These were followed by flashes and the rumble of gunfire at 1933 at a range of approximately 15 miles. Lieutenant Reynolds again correctly assumed that Doorman was engaging the Japanese. He turned toward the flares but held position to get a better fix on the location of the transports before approaching. As the gunfire and flares died out, silence returned and S-37 resumed charging batteries. The Allied column reformed by 1938 and assumed a heading of 60° at 28 knots. Over the next 20 minutes Doorman ordered a series of consecutive starboard turns, ending with a course to the northeast. He then turned to port with a course to the northwest. He finally assumed a course of due north. Al-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

though Doorman’s intentions are unclear, Captain Waller believed that he was attempting to circle around the convoy escort.26 Once Jintsu’s spotter plane appeared no movement went unreported. At approximately 1945 De Ruyter led the CSF into a wide turn to the south and assumed a course of 170 degrees. At 1958 Doorman turned to 160 degrees and then 175 degrees at 2014.27 Jupiter maintained a northwest heading until it became obvious that the main column was going to hold this course. LieutenantCommander J.T. Thew then increased speed to 30 knots in order to regain his assigned position at the head of the column. Doorman would later be criticized for not making a determined effort to reach the convoy. But without a fresh position report he was clearly fearful of missing the convoy in the open sea and instead attempted to intercept the convoy closer to shore before it could land any troops. Aboard De Ruyter, Captain Lacomblé took the opportunity to mess his crew and make temporary repairs. Two 12-inch searchlights had been knocked out by the concussion of the ship’s own guns. This left her with only two small, hand-held Aldis lamps, which further limited communications with other ships of the CSF. Unlike the Japanese who quickly secured from General Quarters to let their crews rest, Rear-Admiral Doorman kept his exhausted men at their posts. This decision would undoubtedly have disastrous consequences for the exhausted crewmen later that night. One man from each station was released in shifts to go below and eat. Even then, only bread and butter was served; nor were tea, coffee or jelly available due to the mess crews being at action stations.28 In the officers’ longroom bread, butter and soft drinks were set out by the officers.29 They served themselves as the mess attendants were busy transferring ammunition from the magazines to the guns. A buffet of sandwiches and beer was laid out on the bridge. In Cabin 16 an impromptu Bible reading was well-attended. Despite their extreme exhaustion and losses earlier in the day, Chief of Staff de Gelder reported to Doorman that the morale of De Ruyter’s crew remained high.30 As Jintsu’s floatplane circled the CSF the Allies were putting reconnaissance aircraft of their own into the air. Shortly before 1900 Rear-Admiral Koenraad requested that RecGroup send out a plane to follow up on earlier Japanese position reports. No additional planes were available. Instead, a USN PBY scheduled to fly a reconnaissance mission later that night was ordered to take off several hours earlier than planned. Although there was still insufficient moonlight for an effective night search the P-5, flown by Ensign Duncan “Duke” Campbell, departed Morokrembangan at 1850 with the following orders31: “Find convoy and keep shadowing. Signal position. If convoy splits follow main part.”32 Shortly after his departure from Soerabaja Ensign Campbell witnessed the engagement between Doorman and the Japanese as they recovered their aircraft. Due to the long range and darkness he was unaware of what he was seeing. At 1955 RearAdmiral Koenraad received a signal from P-5 that made no

mention of the Japanese: “Starshells, also 3 cruisers and approximately 8 destroyers about 30 miles SW of Bawean, course north.”33 Unable to see much more, Campbell assumed that the ships were Allied and continued his patrol. He stayed west of Bawean and continued to South 05–15, then 20 miles to the East, back to South 06–10 and then 30 miles to the west. In the meantime, the MLD was in the process of dispatching a reconnaissance mission of its own. Lieutenant G.F. Rijnders, pilot of the reserve PBY Y-67 at Morokrembangan, was abruptly summoned to naval headquarters. He received the following briefing: 1. Information a. CSF probably attacks with 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers* b. A U.S. Y-boat has almost same instruction c. At 1535/27, 3 cruisers, 5 transports, position 06-01 S / 112-10 E, course 190 d. At 1700/27, convoy of 45 ships, 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers, 20 miles west of Bawean e. At 1800/27, 35 ships position 05-10 S / 111-35 E, course 170 and 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers , position 05-40 S / 111-35 E f. At 2100/27, 9 destroyers (probably Allies) position 06-20 S / 111-50 E* 2. Instruction a. Find convoy in area 05-30 S to Java coast and Bawean 111 and 113 degrees East b. Shadow convoy and report at least each hour and when is altered. If convoy splits up follow main part. At dawn return to secret landing place c. Pass all information in plain language Note: CMR has been informed that Kortenaer is sunk and Exeter and Witte de With are returning to Soerabaja. U.S. destroyer Pope finished her repairs and has left Soerabaja in the afternoon of 27th” * In mentioning 8 destroyers it was still unknown that Electra had been lost and Pope was being included as part of the CSF although she had not yet left Soerabaja.

The American Destroyers Withdrawal Shortly after turning south Rear-Admiral Doorman took stock of his remaining forces. At 2000 he signaled the British destroyers to report their position, course and speed.34 This indicates that he was unclear as to the exact location of his dispersed ships. He was apparently unaware that Electra had already been sunk earlier that afternoon; that said, neither were many of the other Allied captains. Others only knew that a “Dutch” or “English” destroyer had been lost. Such was the poor state of communications within the Combined Striking Force during the Battle of the Java Sea. At the same time Encounter was now several miles behind the cruiser column after becoming separated. The USN destroyers were also out of position. Since their torpedo attack earlier that afternoon they had endeavored to rejoin the cruisers. Although the formation slowed to match their top speed of 28 knots this only allowed the outdated flushdeckers to just barely keep up; there was no talk of overtaking the main column. After 24 hours of sustained high-speed operations the USN destroyers were struggling to maintain even

26. “Bravely but not very skillfully” that performance. As a result, they trailed some distance behind Java. Although still unknown, Dutch codebreakers accurately predicted that the Japanese would land at or near the Bay of Toeban. Rear-Admiral Doorman’s goal was to intercept the transports before they offloaded their troops. That said, he was aware that a number of minefields had been laid near potential landing sites of strategic importance. This included a new barrage being laid off Rembang that night on the 20-meter line. Vice-Admiral Helfrich had signaled the position of this minefield to all KM ships at 2057 and the position was reported throughout the night. Jintsu’s floatplane continued to track the CSF and dropped a single flare at 2009 to signal its position.35 In response, Houston fired a starshell but nothing was seen. At 2023 the USN destroyers erroneously reported four Japanese destroyers launching a torpedo attack to port.36 In response Doorman altered course to port but no torpedoes were seen. Twenty minutes later the USN destroyers again reported Japanese destroyers, this time to starboard. Doorman again altered course to port. The nearest Japanese ships were 25 miles to the northeast at that point so the targets were either native prauws or simply wishful thinking. At 2100, as the CSF approached the shore of Java, Doorman turned to course 280 degrees in order to sweep westward along the 20-meter line.37 Perhaps wanting to clear the area due to the perceived danger of torpedo attack, the cruisers and Jupiter increased speed at the same time. Jupiter now took up station astern of Java which was the last cruiser in line. The USN destroyers were approximately one mile behind Jupiter in line.38 They could not match this pace and quickly fell even farther behind. Their last sighting of the CSF was smoke from Java at approximately 2105.39 Just before 2125 Doorman’s force reached the Bay of Toeban, which was deserted. Although he had unknowingly found the spot of the Japanese landing, Doorman was hours early and continued on to the west. The CSF was now dangerously close to shore off Kodok Point just west of the Soerabaja Strait (approximately 50 miles northwest of Soerabaja). 40 A crewman aboard Houston was among the first to notice. Pharmacist Mate G.L. Douglas remarked that the water looked “funny”; a Chief Petty Officer replied that they were in “shallow water.” At the same time, her senior AA gunnery officer, Lieutenant-Commander W.J. Galbraith, saw a 6 to 8 foot wave on either side of the fantail; Houston then began to vibrate heavily and lose speed; he reported that she was probably in shoal water.41 With his ship in immediate danger of grounding, Captain Rooks threw the wheel hard to starboard and swung out of line without waiting for orders. Seconds later Captain Lacomblé also turned De Ruyter and led the CSF back out to sea on a course of 000 degrees. Houston rejoined the formation in deeper water about four miles offshore.42 They then continued to the west while zig-zagging to avoid possible Japanese torpedoes. By now the USN destroyers had completely lost sight of the main body with little hope of rejoining it. At 2115 Com-

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mander Binford reduced speed in order to obtain a navigational fix from shore.43 Alone, outgunned and devoid of torpedoes, which were his only effective weapon in a surface fight, Binford had no contact with De Ruyter for several hours.4 4 His last transmission to Doorman (that all torpedoes had been expended) at 2043 apparently went unacknowledged. His ships were also low on fuel as they had been unable to top off in Soerabaja the previous day. Although Doorman’s pre-battle instructions were to make for Batavia, Commander Binford knew that a powerful Japanese convoy lay between him and Tandjoeng Priok and was unwilling to risk encountering its escort again. Thus, he decided to withdraw back to Soerabaja. He later wrote: Realizing that I had no more torpedoes and that further contact with the enemy would be useless, since my speed and gunpower were less than anything I would encounter … I retired to Soerabaja, which was about 50 miles away.45

As Binford turned toward Soerabaja he signaled RearAdmiral Doorman of his intentions. The Admiral immediately responded at 2135: D.D. 58, CZM, ComSoWesPac, Edwards, Alden, Whipple [should have said Paul Jones], Ford—proceed to Batavia and replenish with fuel and orders as to obtaining new torpedoes.

The logbook of John D. Ford shows this signal was received at 2152. By then the 58th Destroyer Division was well on course for Soerabaja with Jintsu’s tenacious spotter plane patiently droning overhead. Upon receipt of Doorman’s signal Commander Binford and Lieutenant-Commander Parker conferred to discuss their ability to comply. At approximately 2230 they reached the mouth of the Westwater Channel and entered the minefield via Channel C. As they did, Jintsu’s plane dropped a final flare and withdrew.46 At 2350 (likely about the time he cleared the minefield) Binford signaled Doorman, With reference to your message 1403 followed by aircraft and enemy forces. With disposition of enemy forces as they are I have considered the impossibility of reaching Batavia tonight. Now in channels off Soerabaja. Will fuel immediately. Will proceed as directed. Entirely communications between EC [CCSF] and Houston lost after dark. All torpedoes fired.47

About the time the USN destroyers exited the minefield they passed seven Dutch motor torpedo boats en route to take up position off Rembang and Toeban. Shortly afterward lookouts sighted another ship coming up in the dark. Making contact via TBS, it was learned that it was Pope, which had completed repairs earlier that afternoon. She had been ordered to patrol outside the channel. Binford ordered Pope to join his formation and all returned to the ME. From her skipper, Lieutenant-Commander W.C. Blinn, Commander Binford learned that Exeter and Witte de With had entered the ME several hours earlier. His destroyers tied up to the pier at 0153 and proceeded to refuel between 0300 and 0500.48

“Jupiter torpedoed” By 2125 the main body of the CSF was about 8½ miles NNE of Toeban at coordinates 6.45 S / 112.6 E. Off

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Toeban, the Dutch naval coastwatch station there signaled Rear-Admiral Koenraad to report six warships and one aircraft.49 No doubt briefed to be on the lookout for Doorman’s force, the coastwatch commander ended his signal with “Probably own forces.”50 The CSF was now skirting the edge of a new minefield laid by the Dutch minelayer Gouden Leeuw. The coordinates of this barrage had been regularly broadcast to KM ships and Doorman was certainly aware of it. Weather conditions were excellent with little cloud cover, nearly calm seas and a light breeze out of the East; visibility was seven miles.51 Jupiter still trailed one mile behind Java at the rear of the main column. She was suddenly ripped by a violent explosion on the starboard side at the forward bulkhead of her #2 Engine Room. The engine room and boilers immediately flooded, which completely disabled Jupiter and brought her to a dead stop. The initial blast killed 12 men and wounded seven more; two of the wounded would die later that night.52 LieutenantCommander Thew signaled Java, “Jupiter torpedoed,” although later investigation revealed that she had run onto a drifting Dutch mine which had likely broken loose from its tether. Aboard De Ruyter at the lead of the column several miles distant, the blast was heard but not seen. Petty Officer Sholar later wrote that an explosion was heard astern, which he believed to be a British or Dutch destroyer being torpedoed.53 As Jupiter was the formation’s last remaining destroyer, and a Japanese submarine was suspected to be in the area, none of the cruisers could afford to render assistance. Thus, the CSF ploughed into the night, leaving Jupiter to fend for herself. Aboard Jupiter there were no fires or secondary explosions, but flooding of the engine room and boilers meant that all power had been lost. The eerie calm was shattered only by the sound of the ship’s anchor being dropped.54 A survivor later said, “We had not blown up. We had not sunk. We had, in fact, just stopped, and the same oppressive silence of a ship in dock during the night watches descended on us.”55 Despite the efforts of her crew, damage control proved ineffective. The ship continued to take on water and Jupiter slowly began to sink. Convinced that she could not be saved, Lieutenant-Commander Thew gave the order to abandon ship. The evacuation was structured and orderly as the ship continued to settle. The wounded and as many able-bodied crewmen as possible were loaded into a whale boat and motorized sloop that towed it to shore. They would then return for another load. Five officers and 78 ratings reached shore on this first trip; there, a KNIL unit provided medical care and assistance. The round trip took nearly two hours; before they returned Jupiter rolled to port and sank at 0130, just over four hours after being mined.56 She sank before the whaleboat and sloop arrived. This forced the remaining six officers and 161 ratings into the water aboard a lifeboat, motorized raft and various floats. The whaleboat and sloop conducted a 25-minute search of the area, but found few survivors.57 Some—including 10 men on a raft and several others—reached Java several days later and joined the

first party to reach shore. The remainder were carried out to sea by a strong current. Of these, the Japanese rescued 90; four officers and 66 ratings were never seen again.58 Those who reached shore were transported to Soerabaja and evacuated to Australia.

“I hope they smash the ribs of the Japs” At 2150 Jintsu’s floatplane dropped another flare to mark Doorman’s position. A line of calcium flares or light floats then appeared in the water. They straddled the cruisers at right angles and appeared every time Rear-Admiral Doorman changed course.59 Petty Officer Sholar recalled, “Flares were dropped by enemy planes before and during the night engagement, which were followed by a string of three or four light floats in a line and parallel to our course. After a course change, a new strong would be dropped, sometimes two or three strings in quick succession.”60 At 2200 the CSF again turned north, still hoping to intercept the invasion convoy before it made landfall.61 About the same time Doorman learned that Jupiter had fallen out of formation. Meanwhile, Naka’s “Alf,” which had relieved that of Jintsu at 2120, lost contact with the Allied formation; it appears that both planes had retired to refuel. This left both sides groping blindly in the dark, although the Japanese had a much clearer idea of Doorman’s location due to a steady stream of earlier position reports. Doorman’s northward turn now took him back through the same waters in which the main battle had taken place earlier that afternoon. At 2217 lookouts sighted men and rafts in the water almost directly ahead. They were initially thought to be Japanese because there were many small lights; K-14 had seen the same thing when she sank her troop transports off Sarawak back on December 23.62 Captain Lacomblé changed course slightly to avoid running them down and the cruisers sped by at high speed. There was no thought of stopping; it was still thought Jupiter had been torpedoed by a Japanese submarine that would still be in the area. Aboard Perth, Captain Waller did not recognize their cries but assumed them to be either Dutch or Japanese though he was still unaware that any KM ships had been lost.63 Aboard Java, Lieutenant-Commander Bennink thought they were Japanese or survivors from Kortenaer, which was the case. For Lieutenant-Commander Kroese and his surviving crewmen in the water, the night was quiet until the approaching ships were spotted. They initially hoped to be picked up, but it became obvious that this was not the case as the Allied cruisers bore down on them at top speed. They threatened to plough right through the middle of the survivors until De Ruyter shifted course at the last minute. Nonetheless, the propellers of the passing ships turned the water into a churning froth that overturned rafts and flung men into the water. Although nearly pulverized by their comrades, Kortenaer’s men swelled with pride as the formation swept by De Ruyter in the lead, followed by Perth, Houston and Java. It was a majestic sight. Their joy quickly subsided as they realized that

26. “Bravely but not very skillfully” these four lonely cruisers were all that remained of the determined 14-ship squadron which had sortied from Soerabaja. Nor did they have any escorting destroyers. As she passed, Houston threw several life rafts over the side and dropped a single flare. As it burned out the CSF quickly disappeared and a calm silence returned in a matter of minutes. “This is the last time we have seen them,” said one of the officers of the Kortenaer as the ships faded from sight. “I hope they smash the ribs of the Japs before they go down themselves,” said a sergeant vindictively, and from the bottom of his heart, he added, “The bastards!”

Although Lieutenant-Commander Kroese had no idea, their salvation was at hand. Shortly after passing the survivors Captain Waller had signaled Encounter at 2222: “Pick up survivors we just passed in a boat.”64 Encounter trailed far behind the cruisers with no hope of catching up. She was also short of fuel and had to return to the ME. At 0100 the survivors sighted a lone destroyer or small cruiser approaching.65 It was initially feared to be a damaged Japanese ship limping off the battlefield and that they would be captured. But officers recognized the silhouette as British and she was quickly identified as the Encounter. LieutenantCommander E.V.S.J. Morgan dropped nets over the side and brought his ship alongside each raft. Kortenaer’s men quickly scrambled aboard; the wounded and those too weak to climb were brought aboard by Encounter’s crew. In total, 113 of Kortenaer’s 153 crewmen were brought aboard. Lieutenant-Commander Morgan and Lieutenant-Commander Kroese consulted on the bridge as to which heading to take. Admiral Doorman’s last orders at the conference on February 26 were for all ships to make for Tandjoeng Priok. Like his American counterpart earlier in the evening, Morgan now knew that there were “very strong forces to the west” and that he would almost certainly encounter a vastly superior force.66 Based on that knowledge they decided to fall back into the ME.67 En route the survivors received clean clothes, food and rum. Later that morning they reached Soerabaja where the survivors were transferred to a Dutch tugboat that took them ashore. Unfortunately, one of the wounded men had died en route.68 From Soerabaja, Kortenaer’s remaining crew was ordered to prepare for possible evacuation to Australia. In the meantime, Encounter topped off her fuel tanks from the militarized civilian tanker Pendoppo (TAN 4) before moving to join Exeter later that night.69

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“Target the enemy cruisers!” In the meantime, P-5, which had taken off from Morokrembangan several hours earlier, now located the convoy. At 2235 Ensign Campbell signaled: “16 ships at S 06–07 / E 112–05. Course 300; 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer 4 miles to the East, course 300; 12 ships 10 miles to the East, course 330, speed 12 knots.” This triangulated the convoy’s position as being nearly dead center between Java and Bawean and between Rembang and Toeban on the Java shore. It was approximately 100 miles off Java and approximately 80 miles south of Bawean, moving NNW at an estimated speed of 12 knots.70 This report reached Rear- Admiral Koenraad at 2352 who immediately passed it along to Rear-Admiral Doorman, but it remains unknown if he received it. P-5 flew north to make “landfall” at Bawean in order to get her bearings and make a more accurate position report. Returning, Ensign Campbell initially had trouble relocating the convoy. He did so by 0030 on February 28 and maintained contact. Campbell then reported that the convoy had formed two columns of transports with three cruisers and six destroyers in escort. Course was still north at 8 to 10 knots. Ironically, the PBY located the Japanese at a time when they were devoid of air reconnaissance themselves. However, it proved to be too little, too late for the Allies. Although his

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scout planes had lost contact with the CSF around 2120 RearAdmiral Takagi turned Nachi and Haguro south at 2230. At the same time both destroyer flotillas were ordered to form on 5th Cruiser Squadron. Their course was toward the last reported position of the Allied formation.71 This put the two formations on a near collision course and they almost immediately made contact. After nearly running down Kortenaer’s survivors Rear-Admiral Doorman continued northward for slightly more than an hour. Then, at approximately 2300 both sides simultaneously, and quite unexpectedly, sighted each other off their port bows at 9,300 yards.72 Perth made the first report, immediately followed by Houston. At this point, Haguro and Nachi were the only Japanese ships the Allied lookouts could see. Aboard Java, Captain van Straelen had sent half the ship’s AA crews below deck to mess when the klaxon called them back to their battle stations.73 At 2315 Rear-Admiral Koenraad’s headquarters at Soerabaja intercepted one final signal from Rear-Admiral Doorman to the CSF: “Target to port 4 points”74 Haguro and Nachi immediately opened gunplay. They fired very slowly but accuracy was high. Perth answered 2 or 3 salvos and claimed to have straddled and hit one of the Japanese ships. De Ruyter fired a starshell and two salvos; she claimed to have set one of the ships afire. 75 In return, the flagship took an 8-inch hit on her quarterdeck.76 Houston then fired a series of starshells that proved ineffective due to the bright moonlight.77 Together with that of De Ruyter, they fell short and obscured Perth’s vision; this caused her to lose sight of the Japanese cruisers.78 In his after action report Captain Waller wrote: They were a long way off, but one of them fired a salvo shortly after I sighted. I immediately opened a heavy fire on him and both cruisers opened up on us. This fire was extremely accurate again but very slow. Two of my salvoes at least and possibly three, struck home (we were spotting by moonlight). The same ship opened up with a stream of starshell and obliterated the target as they fell short.79

Lookouts aboard Nachi sighted the silhouettes of the Allied cruisers approaching rapidly in the moonlight at 2303. The Japanese heavy cruisers were moving south as Jintsu and Naka were still coming up from the northeast to join them. The CSF was 152 degrees to port at a range of 16,400 yards when Nachi’s lookout reported, “Sighted four enemy ships, port 30 degrees, One-Five-Zero!”80 A bugle called the sleeping Japanese crews to action stations. They were rested, fed and in shape for a fight. In contrast, the exhausted Allied seaman had now been at their battle stations for two straight days with barely a break. As Rear-Admiral Doorman had predicted, they were at a breaking point just as the Battle of the Java Sea reached its climax. Admiral Takagi ordered his ships to prepare for gunnery and torpedo attacks.81 With the moonlight shining behind them, we could see four enemy cruisers in the night rapidly approaching us at high speed. We had two cruisers while the enemy had four cruisers. The enemy had an advantage in guns, but it would be useless in a night battle. While the enemy had cannons, they didn’t have torpedoes; we were

equipped with superior oxygen torpedoes. It would be our time to shine. As I was thinking that the commander ordered, “Captain, starboard, reverse!” He was very confident about this maneuver, turning the ship 180 degrees. The ship made a sharp turn to the right and sailed parallel with the enemy. Haguro followed us. Both cruisers showed their broadsides, daring the enemy to fire. The enemy opened fire at the same time. I saw a flash, then star shells exploded overhead. The scene looked like the famous summer fireworks in Royogoku, Tokyo. What a splendid scene I witnessed! “Target the first warship! Open fire without searchlights!” Nachi fired first at 0052 [2322 JST] at 13,300 meters. Then Haguro fired at 0058 [2328 JST] at 12,000 meters. If we turned on the searchlight, the enemy could see our location easily. We surely would have received heavy fire from the enemy. Both sides fired without having any clear targets. It looked like shooting in the night without knowing the location of the enemy. The enemy’s main weapon were deck guns. They commenced heavy firing. In contrast, our intermittent gun fire was just a maneuver designed to make the enemy believe we were carrying out a counter-attack. Meanwhile, we prepared for a torpedo attack. “Target the enemy cruisers!” “Starboard torpedo tubes, stand ready!” All the torpedo tubes turned toward the enemy. Captain Horie, Chief Torpedo Officer, was very intent on making sure that he would not repeat the same mistake he had made that afternoon. “Chief Horie, be calm!” “Set the target accurately!” The commander advised him of some corrections. “The angle of the enemy is 80 degrees; the distance is 9,500 meters” “Be ready! Fire!” On his order, all torpedoes jumped into the water; eight from Nachi and four from Haguro. The time was 0053 [2323 JST].82

Still to the south, S-37 heard the gunfire and sighted the flashes of this encounter dead ahead. Although approximately 20 miles south of the encounter Lieutenant Reynolds turned away to course 270 degrees to avoid being caught in the line of gunfire. Per the war diary, the gunfire lasted about 12 minutes and then ceased. Given the relative closeness of the gunfire he assumed that the convoy was well north or east of his position.83 Because his orders were to attack the transports he did not approach Doorman’s position. In response to the accurate Japanese shellfire De Ruyter executed a wide starboard turn. The rest of the formation followed; Captain Waller assumed that she had sighted incoming torpedoes. Aboard De Ruyter, Signalman Sholar later recounted a somewhat dubious account of the final moments of the battle84: All the time we were actually fighting the Admiral stayed on the conning tower directing maneuvers to ensure that we made the most of our fire. In the matter of tactics, he was a wizard. And I shall never forget how he fought his last engagement. There had been a very fierce fifteen minutes in which most of our ships were literally emptying their magazines, and we were in full view of Bawean Island, north of Soerabaja. Suddenly, Admiral Doorman, with that vivid sixth sense which had so often helped him during the battle, either expected or felt a torpedo attack. In a flash he ordered me to signal a 90° turn to starboard.85

The 5th Cruiser Squadron then executed a 180 degree turn in order to steer an opposite course that would block Doorman’s

26. “Bravely but not very skillfully” route to the convoy.86 Although the Japanese had stopped firing, Allied lookouts completely missed the launch of their torpedoes. The enemy hadn’t noticed our torpedoes moving horizontally in straight lines. They looked like easy prey ready to be shot down. In contrast, we acted like a fleet to pounce on the enemy in order to maintain the advantage. Hadn’t they reached them yet? One minute, two minutes, three minutes; it seemed to be a long time. The time was now 0106 [2336 JST] when they should hit the targets. I saw a bright flash, followed by a red flare. The first enemy warship exploded. We shouted in excitement. Through my binoculars I saw De Ruyter slowly disappear into the water after breaking into two pieces, with each piece going upright.87 “The first ship sank!” We all held our breath at the splendid scene, which was our first “out-of-sight” experience since being born. Our palms got sweaty with excitement. Then, another flash came out from the fourth cruiser at 0110 [2340 JST]. Soon, a huge flare shot up and the ship sank. “The fourth cruiser sank!” The entire crew just watched the scene. Heavy oil from the sinking ships spread over the water and ignited. The fire now lit up the area. If we had only turned the spotlight on and approached the enemy fleet, we could have destroyed all of their fleet, which had lost its senses. But we just watched our victorious scene and lost ourselves in it. After we recovered and moved toward the enemy they had already withdrawn. We only heard the enemy sailors’ cries for help.88

“She’s out of control!” Halfway through her starboard turn Java was hit by a “Long Lance” torpedo from Nachi at 2340.89 The blast stopped her and ignited a massive fire on the Air Defense Deck.90 The entire aft end of the ship then burst into flames and almost immediately disappeared as it broke away from the rest of the ship.91 The torpedo had struck Java’s aft magazine and severed the stern at the officers wardroom. Her #7 5.9-inch mount, atop the wardroom, was ripped from the ship.92 The aft engine room flooded, knocking out power and Java assumed a heavy list to starboard.93 On her bridge, the helmsman yelled, “She’s out of control!” as he spun the wheel freely with no response.94 Captain van Straelen quickly determined that Java was lost and gave the order to abandon ship. Although there was an orderly evacuation of the bridge, he found pandemonium on the main deck. There was widespread panic and crewmen fought over lifejackets as Java’s list intensified.95 Within minutes it increased to 45 degrees and spent 6-inch shell casings began to roll over the side. All lifeboats and rafts on the stern had been lost when it broke away; the motorized sloop was too heavily damaged to be launched. Due to the loss of power and extreme list, no lifeboats could be launched. A small number of crewmen remained aboard to the end, throwing off anything that would float … bamboo bundles, rafts, floats, etc.96 Executive Officer Lieutenant-Commander J.B. Vinckers was in Central Damage Control when the torpedo hit. There was a heavy crash, followed by an instant list; the lights and all communications went out.97 As a result, he missed the order to abandon ship. On deck, Java’s Chief Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant-

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Commander Jonkheer Alexander van Geen, informed Vinckers that Captain van Straelen had ordered the crew off. Together they went into the water on the port side and swam away. Captain van Straelen initially remained on board. Whether he intended to go down with his ship or to simply oversee the evacuation is not known. He was eventually helped over the side by one of the British signalmen.98 One of these men, Leading Telegraphist A.J. Fowler, would go missing that night. In the water, Lieutenant-Commander Vinckers helped the captain onto a bamboo couch. However, the XO had no lifejacket and the couch was slippery with fuel oil and he had trouble holding onto it. At that point Vinckers left van Straelen to find another raft; the Captain was not seen again.99 Just 15 minutes after the torpedo hit Java rolled to starboard and sank stern straight up. Contrary to Vinckers’ postwar report, it appears that few life rafts and floats were available to the surviving crewmen. Men swimming in the water were pushed away from a few badly overloaded rafts that had managed to get away from the ship.100 As Java disappeared Vinckers and the men around him cheered. He later wrote that it was the most moving moment of his naval career.101 Of Java’s crew of 526 officers and men, 512—a full 97 percent of her crew— went down with the ship or succumbed in the water afterward.102 In the distance they saw De Ruyter burning.

“Boys, try to save yourselves” At the head of the column, De Ruyter turned eight points to starboard to evade the shellfire of Haguro and Nachi. She continued through her turn after Java was hit and assumed a course of 90 degrees. Everyone had turned to watch that drama unfold when a lookout suddenly cried out, “Torpedo Wakes!” which were fast approaching from starboard.103 Barely had the cruiser steadied her course than Signalman Sholar noticed a torpedo track approaching aft from 135 degrees off the starboard beam. Admiral Doorman ordered another turn that Sholar was to communicate to the rest of the formation.104 Neither command was executed. Only a few seconds after Java exploded, De Ruyter was almost simultaneously hit by a torpedo from Haguro.105 A massive explosion lifted the 6,400 ton cruiser out of the water as a huge pillar of flame shot high into the night.106 The torpedo struck her aft engine room which instantly flooded, killing the entire black gang; there were very few survivors from the adjacent gear room. De Ruyter lost steam pressure and the engines stopped; her speed plummeted as power and communications failed. As she coasted to a stop De Ruyter assumed a slight list to starboard.107 Behind her, Perth avoided a collision only by putting the helm hard to port with the port engine at full stop. The blast was so intense that a crewman aboard Perth later wrote, “I thought it would fry us. It was so close you could smell burning paint and a horrible stink like burning bodies.”108 The blast also punctured a bunker directly beneath the Air Defense Deck and showered the entire stern with fuel oil

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that immediately ignited. Without power, damage control proved futile and the flames quickly raged out of control. They quickly jumped to the Air Defense Deck where ready containers of 40mm ammunition stacked on deck began exploding in a fiery display of multi-colored tracers. The shrapnel and blasts caused many casualties. Drenched in fuel oil, the 40mm gun crews were forced from their stations by the flames and intense heat. LieutenantCommander Bennink, the ship’s Anti- Aircraft officer, was knocked unconscious and eight crewmen were wounded and unable to move. Able Seaman M. Siccama and Able Seaman H.H.F. Siemers carried Bennink to safety and then plunged back into the flames to save their wounded comrades. Unfortunately, Siemers was killed along with most of his wounded comrades on the AA deck. Siccama survived and spent the rest of the war as a Japanese POW; he was repatriated in 1945.109 Despite the massive damage De Ruyter was in no immediate danger of sinking.110 The watertight hatches and bulkheads around the flooded compartments initially held so De Ruyter had only a slight list. But with no hope of restoring steam pressure or electricity it was obvious that the fires topside could not be contained. Also, without power for her pumps De Ruyter’s bulkheads could not withstand the enormous pressure exerted on them and eventually failed.111 As her starboard list increased, Rear-Admiral Doorman and Captain Lacomblé determined that De Ruyter could not be saved. Within 30 minutes after the initial torpedo hit Lacomblé gave the order to abandon ship. Below deck, most of the crew heard a thunderous explosion louder and more violent than anything they had yet experienced. Simultaneously all power, communications and lighting, including emergency lights, went out. The ship’s normal hum-drum of activity was suddenly replaced by pitch black and a dead silence. Then suddenly a thunderous bang more violent than all the other sounds together, followed by dead silence. With the blast all the lights went out, everything that relies on electricity is disabled. A man never forgets that indivisible moment of dead silence. But this only lasts a moment, everybody understands this is the end and the terror strikes everyone’s heart. What will happen? Will we sink? The first reaction, a rush to the watertight door closing the compartment. With the flashlight I always carry with me I see the knot of men who, by the open hatch try to wrestle through the narrow shaft that leads upward. On and on they push together and kick against each other in merciless agony. My chief and I walk almost simultaneously to the adjoining room, where instruments and equipment of the damage control station are located. There are two meters which measure the draft of the vessel by its pressure on the water. We instinctively see on the meters that the ship is not sinking. It makes us uneasy, but we let the fighting and squirming know by yelling as loudly as possible that we are not sinking. But it has little effect.112

With internal communications down Lacomblé’s order was not heard throughout the ship. Even then, the absence of emergency lights made it extremely difficult to move through the ship’s interior. A number of watertight hatches, including that of the sickbay, had been dogged from the opposite side, ef-

fectively trapping many crewmen below deck. Thanks to the efforts of Medic A.M. Moorman, some ambulatory patients made it topside via small manholes and a temporary sick bay was established on deck. Tragically, those too severely injured to walk had to be left behind. Moorman remained with these men, trying to get them out of the sickbay, and eventually perished with them when De Ruyter sank.113 From his station in the signal room, Sergeant-Hofmeester W.G.C. van Grunderbeek reported: We no longer had telephone contact [after the torpedo hit], but the instruments showed everything with the ship to be normal. A slight list to starboard was all. The displacement was also normal. After some time we heard hatches overhead open; a little later the C.S.S. ordered the hatch opened sent someone to find out what was wrong. He came back with the message that “abandon ship” had been ordered, whereupon, we were ordered to calmly go on deck. This we did. Lieutenant-Commander Kooyman stood at the hatch as we left one by one until just the C.S.S., the Majoor-Schrijver who suffered from night blindness and I had to lead through the ship, and myself were left. The Lieutenant checked the instruments and the damage control station once more and then handed me back my flashlight, after which we went on deck. This was approximately 20 minutes after the torpedo hit. Above, we saw that the stern was ablaze with rafts and many people were in the water. I saw an Indonesian float by on a bamboo mat. Several swam and floated around freely. A life jacket was nowhere to be found. I met Major-Telegraphist P. Zegers who helped me look. There, I was grabbed from behind by an unknown Sub-Lieutenant; he gave me orders to help the wounded into the lifeboat. The lifeboat was in the forward port davit. Leading Seaman Reijers helped me. First, we lifted Lieutenant-Commander Bennink (he had a sprained ankle) and then Langdendoen. He was badly injured. In the darkness I grabbed him by the hands; they were completely raw and the skin hung as if he was pulling on his gloves. It was the same on his head. We placed him inside the lifeboat’s cabin on the port side.114

On the bridge lookouts sighted two shadows passing at some distance; it was Houston and Perth. They initially turned in as if to approach De Ruyter and Java. However, Rear-Admiral Doorman knew Japanese warships were still in the immediate vicinity and that it was impractical to effect a rescue operation. With this in mind, he sent them the following command by hand lamp: “Do not stand by for survivors.”115 At the same time they received orders to make for Tandjoeng Priok. Thus, Houston and Perth turned away and disappeared back into the night. The Battle of the Java Sea was officially over. A whole new battle for survival was now beginning for the crews of De Ruyter and Java, which unfortunately, the vast majority would lose. As De Ruyter continued to heel over to starboard her bridge was eventually enveloped by steam and had to be abandoned. Rear-Admiral Doorman tried to reach his cabin, but was blocked by fire and fragments from the AA deck.116 The ship was now a mass of flames from the catapult to the fantail, forcing her crew forward. Throughout the battle Marvin Sholar reported no panic or undue excitement. Lieutenant Kolb took photos of the battle and of De Ruyter sinking when not otherwise engaged.117 Unfortunately all his photos were lost when the ship went down; nor did Kolb himself survive.

26. “Bravely but not very skillfully” With the decision made to abandon De Ruyter, RearAdmiral Doorman turned his attention to organizing the growing chaos. Despite their initial discipline, things quickly became disorganized and chaotic as crewmen were displaced from positions aft and others streamed up from the lower decks. They assembled on the forecastle with little or no organized plan to leave the ship. Since De Ruyter did not appear to be in any immediate danger of sinking, most stood around in groups; many had trouble leaving the ship that they had called home for years for the uncertainty of the dark Java Sea. Others leapt over the side and swam away as fast as possible; they feared the intense fire would set off 6-inch shells in the two after turrets and destroy De Ruyter once and for all.118 Most of these men were left miles behind—scattered and abandoned—as she drifted ahead. Doorman ordered Captain Lacomblé to walk amongst the crew and warn them not to leave the ship until she had come to a complete stop.119 Marine 1st Class J.A.W. Huggers remembered his final encounter with Captain Lacomblé: Many crewman were on the bow. I was still smoking a cigarette. Our Commandant [Lacomblé] also came to the bow. He spoke with several men and then said to us: “Boys, try to save yourselves, the ship is lost, there is nothing more to do. God be with you.” He then left the bow and I never saw him again. For me he will always be a great man.120

It appears that Lacomblé was a respected and well-liked skipper. Testimonials by De Ruyter’s crew both during and after the war echoed Huggers’ sentiments and spoke highly of his actions during De Ruyter’s final hours. Engineering Officer 2nd Class N.G.J.W. van Marle encountered his friend Sub-Lieutenant Jonkheer J.J. Storm on the main deck. Storm told van Marle that the order to abandon ship had been issued. Van Marle then asked Storm if he wanted to go over the side together; the latter declined, saying that he first wanted to try and film the exploding AA ammunition from the conning tower. Carrying a camera in his hands he disappeared into the deckhouse. Van Marle then went into the water with another officer and never saw Storm again.121 As De Ruyter’s list to starboard increased it caused extreme difficulty in leaving the ship. Only one motorized whaleboat, from the starboard side, was able to be launched with difficulty. It was into this boat that Lieutenant-Commander Bennink and other wounded were loaded. Sloop B2 had a normal capacity of 50, but carried at least 70 men. Once in the water others quickly hung onto every outside space. It immediately pushed away from the ship due to the exploding 40mm shells.122 No other lifeboats could be launched as they were in the “alarm position” and had been lowered and secured to the deck. Without power the boats could not be raised in their davits, from which they could have been launched manually. Even then, their engines had been drained of gasoline to minimize the risk of fire.123 As the list increased, more of her crew began leaving De Ruyter. Those near the turrets struggled over empty 6-inch shell

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casings littering the deck; as the list increased they began rolling over the side. Several life rafts were lowered from the navigation bridge to the main deck and put over the port side. Several rafts were thrown overboard, but remained tethered to the ship because no one had a knife to cut them loose. Those that did come loose were sucked back into the burning wreck by the suction of the raging inferno.124 “To port there was a loud noise … people screaming … over-loaded rafts capsizing because there are too many people on one side … drowning people.”125 Once in the water finding a life raft was critical; hungry and exhausted—both mentally and physically—after two full days at battle stations and nearly eight hours of combat, many men simply did not have the strength to continue. Rafts closest to the ship were badly overloaded with crewmen who either could not swim or were poor swimmers. Against the backdrop of De Ruyter’s burning stern, and with exploding ammunition whizzing over their heads, the lifeboat and rafts paddled clear of the ship. From all around them came screams of terror and pleas to be picked up by the already overloaded rafts. Marvin Sholar had made it into the lone lifeboat. He saw Lieutenant Kolb in the water and called him to come aboard. Kolb declined, saying that there was an American sailor wearing only a life vest who could not swim who needed to be picked up instead. This would appear to have been Seaman 1st Class Daniel Rafalovich who spent 17 hours in the water wearing only a lifejacket. He was pulled from the water by a Japanese gunboat and transferred to Naka, which later put him ashore on Java.126 Seaman 3rd Class Jack Penhollow also made it off De Ruyter and spent the night alone in a life raft. He was taken aboard the lifeboat the following day. It was already badly overcrowded but he bartered his way aboard by telling the Dutch officers in charge that he would be needed to communicate with any American ships that might come across them.127 Unfortunately, it appears that Lieutenant Kolb drowned during the night, for he was not seen again and was not among those crewmen eventually rescued.128 From the Royal Navy liaison team aboard De Ruyter, Petty Officer Horace R.D. Collins, Ordinary Telegraphist Eric Hurst and Acting Yeoman of Signals Walter H. Sutton were lost. However, Leading Signalman Frank W. Taylor and Lieutenant (Temp.) Arthur W. Jackson, RNVR, were rescued. Both survived the war as POWs and returned home in 1945. Aboard Java, Leading Telegraphist A.J. Fowler went missing, but Lieutenant W.G. Jenkins survived and was taken prisoner; he returned home in 1945 as well.129 There were no USN personnel aboard Java. There were 76 survivors of De Ruyter aboard the lifeboat and seven rafts; they set course for the Java shore. As they got farther from the burning wreck, screams and cries from those left behind slowly faded. The area was littered with debris and men on anything that floated. Most were caked with fuel oil, a thick layer of which covered the water. Java had long since disappeared. Despite the complete absence of damage control, De Ruyter remained afloat for about 2½ hours. But as flooding continued unabated her bulkheads

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could not handle the increasing strain and began to fail. As they did the cruiser steadily slipped lower and lower into the water. Her survivors watched De Ruyter burn for another two hours. For some time she lay half-submerged—stern-down and listing to starboard—with only her conning tower and forward turrets visible. A heavy explosion then occurred, likely her boilers or main magazine exploding, and De Ruyter slipped under the water for good.130 In the distance, those on the raft and lifeboats saw her flames abruptly disappear and the night was silent. All assumed she had finally sunk or capsized. The remnants of her crew, and those of Java, were now truly alone as they floated in the Java Sea some 100 miles offshore.

“He did what heroes do after their work is accomplished; he died.” 131 Lasting more than seven hours—from 1610 to 2340—the Battle of the Java Sea was the longest surface battle since the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Although not the final battle of the East Indies campaign, it cleared the way for the Japanese invasion of Java. In many ways it played out exactly how Dutch military planners had anticipated. A series of smaller skirmishes took place in the outer territories, but the main battle was in the Java Sea by a coalition of Allied air and sea forces. Unfortunately, the final outcome was far from what anyone had envisioned. The end of the battle immediately ignited debate throughout Allied circles as to the competence of Rear-Admiral Doorman. As seen earlier, he was generally well-regarded by his peers within the KM and those men he led into battle. This view was bolstered by the British Royal Navy personnel who largely praised his leadership throughout the Battle of the Java Sea. Captain Gordon aboard Exeter went so far as to later write, “Admiral Doorman’s leadership was excellent.”132 The USN largely comes down on the opposite side of the coin. Doorman was neither trusted nor well-regarded by the officers and men of the Asiatic Fleet. Almost certainly this view was influenced by poor relations at enlisted level. Yet Doorman was also blamed for events that were completely out of his control. The severe damage suffered by Houston and Marblehead

were often attributed his poor leadership. At the same time, these same men attacked Doorman for being too cautious. Nor is much credit given to Doorman for the Badoeng Strait, which at the time was still considered a resounding Allied victory. Others, such as Commander H.E. Eccles aboard John D. Edwards, were more forgiving: “The Dutch fought with unfaltering courage and dogged determination, Admiral Doorman in De Ruyter returning to the attack time after time in a literal obedience to the signal from ABDA-FLOAT on 26 February, ‘You must continue attacks till enemy is destroyed.’”133 Whether he realized it or not after assuming command of the Combined Striking Force, Doorman inherited an impossible situation. As a former commander of the MLD he had firsthand knowledge of airpower and its abilities. Yet, he constantly was forced to operate without its protective benefits by senior officers (Hart and Helfrich) who either failed to see, or simply disregarded, its destructive potential. Nor could he overcome the challenge of leading a diverse multinational force with no operational training. Nonetheless, Doorman became a lightning rod of criticism for far too many of these shortcomings. All of these criticisms about Doorman, fair or not, would have been remedied in the Java Sea. Had he saved Java in the face of impossible odds his legacy would today be remembered in the same terms as Nelson, de Ruyter and Togo. But fate and politics were against him. His own lack of flexibility also worked against him. Although he obediently followed orders to the end, Doorman consistently failed to exhibit the initiative and aggressiveness that would have allowed him to win out in the end.134 For their part, the Japanese considered Rear-Admiral Doorman to be a subpar leader based on his performance in earlier engagements.135 They were also aware of the Allies’ shortcomings in the areas of communications, training and operational doctrine. Nonetheless, he did impress them on many levels. Time after time he returned to the battlefield when they expected the CSF to retire. They admired his courage and obedience to orders, yet found his tactical leadership lacking. Perhaps Japanese evaluation of Rear-Admiral Doorman in the Java Sea best sums up his performance: “Brave but not very skillfully.”136

CHAPTER 27

Aftermath “Let’s finish off the remaining ships”

His gamble paid off, when at 0200, Y-67 unexpectedly flew directly over the invasion convoy. Rijnders remembers it being a

Rear-Admiral Doorman’s orders to Houston and Perth to withdraw were justified. Japanese warships remained in the immediate area and moved aggressively to clear the sea north of Java. Northeast of De Ruyter and Java, Haguro and Nachi ploughed through intermittent rain squalls at full speed; Rear-Admiral Takagi gave the command, “Let’s finish off the remaining ships.”1 After a search of some 20 minutes the Japanese sighted nothing and swung back toward De Ruyter and Java. The latter was already well on her way to sinking and De Ruyter burned heavily in the night. It was obvious that both were finished and Takagi would expend no more ammunition on them; his cruisers were low on 8-inch ammunition and nearly out of torpedoes as it was. He called off the search for Houston and Perth at 0000 and ordered the invasion convoy to turn back toward Java. By that point Houston and Perth were already moving away to the west at top speed. Per Doorman’s final order, their destination was Tandjoeng Priok. At 0050, Perth signaled2: “Returning to Batavia. De Ruyter and Java disabled by heavy explosion S 06-00 / E 112-00.”3 Captain Waller aboard Perth was senior in rank to Captain Rooks aboard Houston. He assumed command and signaled Houston to follow Perth at 0100. The following morning Japanese reconnaissance aircraft picked up their trail and shadowed their movements nearly the entire voyage to Batavia. Still over the convoy during the battle’s final stages, P-5 sighted “firing and gun flashes” bearing 120 degrees and Ensign Campbell turned toward them to investigate.4 At approximately 0130 he spotted two cruisers (Haguro and Nachi?) and four destroyers steaming ahead of the convoy in column formation. They were initially thought to be Rear-Admiral Doorman’s force, but when they maintained a steady course ahead of the convoy Campbell realized they were part of the escort. Twenty minutes later, at 0150, he sent another position report. Y-67 had also departed Morokrembangan at 2335 and was well out over the Java Sea.5 Lieutenant-Commander Rijnders initially flew due north from the mouth of the Westwater Channel and then randomly turned west. He had no clear idea of the Japanese position, other than multiple hours-old reconnaissance reports that put the convoy somewhere in the vicinity of Bawean Island.

“complete hodge-podge” of ships … old and new … large and small … motor and coal-fired … all sailing north in double-column formation.” The PBY’s radio operator immediately sent a position report: “Estimate position transports at 0200 is S 05-40 / E 111-40.”6

So unexpected was their discovery that Y-67 could not fix the exact coordinates in the dark sky. Rijnders had to fly south to the Java coast where the navigator obtained a position fix using Mount Lasem.7 They then returned to the convoy where the navigator was able to provide precise coordinates of 05-50 S / 111-40 E. It was very close to the position report sent by P-5 some 3½ hours earlier. This was roughly 50 miles west of Bawean and 30 miles northwest of where De Ruyter and Java sank. All but invisible in the dark sky, Rijnders loitered overhead and sent position reports to RECGROUP headquarters every 30 minutes. He occasionally flew low and slow down the length of the convoy—so close that Rijnders could see individual crewmen walking on deck. No one seemed to notice; there was no AA fire and the escort remained east of the convoy. Admiral Koenraad ordered Y-67 back to Morokrembangan at 0525. P-5 still hovered over the convoy as well, although not surprisingly, neither PBY sighted each other in the darkness. Lacking airborne radar or IFF equipment, the two Catalinas would have had to virtually fly on top of each other to make contact.8 Ensign Campbell also made a series of passes up and down the convoy’s 20-mile length. He reported later that it took the PBY eight minutes to fly from tip to tail.9 At 0212 P-5 sent its last position report and Campbell turned away for Morokrembangan at 0230. With Allied reconnaissance planes finally over the convoy Koenraad now received a steady stream of fresh and reliable position reports. At that point he still had not yet received Captain Waller’s signal regarding the loss of De Ruyter and Java. So far as he knew, the CSF was still at sea looking for the invasion convoy. At 0335 he combined a series of position reports from P-5 and Y-67 and signaled Doorman: Convoy concentrated to 39 transports in two columns; 1,500 yards between columns; course N. speed 10. 3 destroyers in column right flank; 1,000 yards. 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers in column left flank,

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1,000 yards. 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers concentrate on convoy at high speed, position probably S. 05–56 / E. 112–46, time 0212.10

Unlike his earlier signals, Rear-Admiral Koenraad got no acknowledgement of this last position report being received. Before and during the battle, signals from the Combined Striking Force and other elements of the East Indies Squadron had come in throughout the afternoon and evening via telegram and phone at a rapid fire pace. From these, Doorman’s movements were plotted using the information available. Then around 0000 JST the “War Room” abruptly went silent; telegrams stopped and the phones ceased to ring. Despite the pause no one thought of sleeping. As minutes turned into hours without a response from Doorman there was an evergrowing sense of apprehension. The atmosphere was tense and muted with little talking; all feared the worst but no one dared voice them.11 The silence was deafening. Then at 0400– 3:10 after being sent—Captain Waller’s signal reached RearAdmiral Koenraad: Never have I had such a sinking feeling as when reading this fatal message sent by the Australian cruiser Perth. We knew Doorman’s men well … the commanders and staff officers of the Combined Striking Force … having worked closely with them for a short period of time under critical conditions.12

It was crushing news that broke the tension. Despite the shock which affected everyone in the command center there was still work to be done.13 In response to Waller’s signal, Koenraad ordered the hospital ship Op Ten Noort14 to sail from the ME and make for the last reported position of De Ruyter and Java.15 There she was to locate and rescue survivors.

S-37 and S-38 Meanwhile, S-37 was still on the surface as she continued to charge her batteries. She slowly moved north on a course of 000 at 6½ knots.16 Lieutenant Reynolds wanted the transports and was keeping his course options open depending on what he encountered from the earlier gunfire. But unknown to her lookouts, they had already sighted the death of either De Ruyter or Java: “At about 2350, saw the tremendous pink flash of a torpedo hit over the horizon bearing about 310 T[rue]. Nothing further was seen.”17 At 0134 S-37 turned to course 310 degrees and moved toward the position of the torpedo strike. At 0245 her Officer of the Deck sighted Haguro, Nachi and three destroyers almost due north at a range of 6,000 yards. They were moving south-southwest at a speed of 21 knots.18 Lieutenant Reynolds ordered an attack. Unfortunately, a breakdown in communication resulted in both engines inadvertently being shut down which caused a delay of 1 or 2 minutes as they were restarted and the submarine worked back up to full speed. At the same time the Japanese apparently sighted her. The cruisers turned away to starboard; the destroyers, which had been on their starboard bow, turned to port in col-

umn formation toward S-37. The maneuver disrupted her approach and forced the boat to dive. The destroyers were 4,000 yards out and Reynolds still attempted to attack. However, S-37 was an old boat and suffered from a multitude of mechanical ailments that had already delayed her departure from Soerabaja. While preparing the forward torpedo tubes her forward trim tank drains were not properly closed; this let in several thousand pounds of water and dragged the boat down uncontrollably. A pair of malfunctioning pumps then made it difficult for S-37 to recover and it took Reynolds more than an hour to restore trim and surface.19 By that time the Japanese ships had disappeared. S-37 had to run her engines at full power to maintain any sense of trim and the resulting noise precluded the use of sound equipment so they had no idea of their direction. All Reynolds could do was send a contact report.20

“My God, they’re not finished with us yet!” 21 Meanwhile, S-38 was skirting along the north shore of Java as she returned to the ME after bombarding the Japanese weather station on Bawean. At 0400 she was running on the surface to recharge her batteries when lookouts sighted debris in the water to port. Lieutenant Munson brought his gun crew on deck and turned to investigate. As the submarine neared a distinctly English voice rang out over the water: “My God, they’re not finished with us yet!” To which, Munson challenged, “Who are you?” The reply: “We’re men of His Majesty’s Ship Electra!” Suddenly the water around S-38 was full of men on rafts, floats, flotsam of all kinds and swimming in the water. Munson ordered full stop and launched a small boat to initiate a rescue operation. It was nearly dawn by the time they had all been plucked from the sea. In total, the submarine pulled 54 survivors from Electra out of the water, including 17 wounded; one of the latter would die shortly afterwards. Munson signaled Rear-Admiral Koenraad of the operation and continued on to Soerabaja. At 0605 Koenraad telephoned Helfrich and reported: “Electra lost; 58 survivors, including 5 severely wounded aboard U.S. submarine S-38.” Helfrich and Koenraad spoke again later that morning. Helfrich informed his subordinate that as of 0840, 34 transports and 11 warships were approaching Java. Their position was 05–25 S / 111–25 E, moving south on a course of 170°.22 This placed them approximately 75 miles due north of Rembang, which was their intended landing point. In response, Koenraad repositioned K-8, K-10 and O-19 in a staggered line… • O-19: 06-10 S and west of 111-25 E • K-10: 06-25 S and between 111-25 E and 111-40 E • K-8: 06-30 S and east of 111-40 E

The MTB Flotilla under the command of Lieutenant H.C. Jorissen was also ordered back out for the second straight night.23 Their orders were to take up position in the Bay of Toeban and contest any landings at that location.

27. Aftermath

The Rescue of Sholar and Penhollow At 1400 the head of MLD forces on Java, Captain P.J. Hendrikse, notified Rear-Admiral Koenraad that he had dispatched a Catalina (Y-60 or Y-67) and the Dornier flying boat X-28 to track the convoy and locate De Ruyter and Java.24 At the time it was still not known that both Dutch cruisers had been sunk. Coincidentally, a group of survivors from De Ruyter were located at about the same time by S-37. This was the lone lifeboat launched by De Ruyter. The motorized sloop originally towed several rafts but progress was painfully slow. The senior officer in the lifeboat then made a tough decision to cut the rafts loose and proceed alone to the Java coast.25 If they could reach shore help could be summoned for the remaining men. Nonetheless, his decision caused widespread panic and anger amongst those men left behind. Morale was crushed to a new low as the lifeboat disappeared in the distance. At approximately 1100 the sloop sighted the Java shore in the distance.26 Just after 1400 a submarine periscope appeared.27 Aboard the sloop, Petty Officer Sholar identified it as that of an American submarine and began to hand signal in semaphore code. To everyone’s surprise, the submarine abruptly surfaced, although with only her conning tower above the water. It was S-37; she had sighted the lifeboat at 1145 and changed course to approach. Reynolds surfaced only after examining its occupants at close range. Interestingly, his war diary makes no mention of Sholar’s communication. Unlike S-38, which was already en route to Soerabaja, Lieutenant Reynolds declined to take the Dutch survivors aboard. The rationale given in his postwar report was that he was still in search of the Japanese transports and they would have inhibited the operation of his boat. Nor did he find any seriously wounded who required immediate assistance. However, he did take both Petty Officer Sholar and Seaman 3rd Class Penhollow aboard. Lieutenant-Commander Bennink was senior officer on the lifeboat. He asked Reynolds to signal their position to the ME with a request that the MLD send rescue aircraft as soon as possible. At the same time, S-37 passed five days of supplies to the lifeboat, including cigarettes, 10 liters of bottled water, preserved fruit, tinned sausages and 64 cans of fruit and tomato juice. It was the survivors’ first meal since 2000 the night before.28 They also received a position fix and directions to the Java coast. After approximately 15 minutes on the surface Reynolds bade Bennink farewell and S-37 submerged to continue its patrol. He resurfaced briefly at 1430 to send a report on the lifeboat’s location. Rear-Admiral Koen-

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raad received this signal at 1500 and ordered Op ten Noort to make for the lifeboat’s position. Unfortunately, the Japanese beat her to them. At 1700 a Japanese convoy, comprising some 80 ships and 20 escorts, approached. Bennink had the lifeboat steer directly for the convoy and was soon stopped by a minesweeper. Her skipper took him aboard where he was interrogated about the presence of mines off Toeban. The Japanese captain refused to believe that he was from De Ruyter as she had already been sunk the previous night.29 Bennink was then put back aboard the lifeboat and left behind.30 They were off Rembang by nightfall. The Japanese invasion of Eastern Java was in full swing. Ashore they could see explosions and fires as KNIL engineers demolished the oilfield and refinery at Tjepoe. Later they heard the sound of motors, gunfire and a large explosion about two miles away.31 By dawn they were just four miles offshore when a Japanese floatplane appeared overhead. They rowed at full speed, but just before they reached shore the destroyer Yukikaze appeared and took them prisoner. Various other Japanese ships picked up Allied survivors from De Ruyter, Java and Jupiter. All were in bad shape after drifting all night and the better part of a day without food or water. The survivors of Java were rescued by a Japanese destroyer

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where they were greeted by sailors armed with rifles and bayonets. Only 43 of her 560 crewmen survived the Battle of the Java Sea and Java’s subsequent sinking.32

The Western Strike Force Against this horrific backdrop, another deadly threat was simultaneously developing off Western Java. After leaving Cam Ranh Bay on February 18 the Western Invasion Convoy and its supporting elements moved south.33 Original plans called for the troops to land on the night of February 26 at Merak on Java’s West coast. However, earlier that afternoon Allied aircraft reported a Japanese convoy consisting of 30 transports, escorted by four cruisers and three destroyers, moving south off Banka Island.34 On the strength of this report, Captain Collins, now serving in the role of Commodore Commanding, China Force, ordered Captain Howden aboard Hobart to intercept with the Western Strike Force.35 With the departure of Exeter and her ships this formation was greatly depleted and consisted of only Hobart, Danae, Dragon, Scout and Tenedos. Except for Hobart, all were elderly refugees from convoy duty in the Indian Ocean. They were completely outclassed and had no place in frontline combat. Nonetheless, Howden led them out of Tandjoeng Priok at 2115 on the night of February 26.36 Japanese air reconnaissance had already picked up their presence, which led to the landings being pushed back by two days. Howden steamed north for 90 minutes; making no contact, he reversed course at 0300 on the morning of February 27. At 0345 Collins signaled that Japanese ships had been reported 55 miles north of his position. Although unable to reach them under cover of darkness, Howden turned north again, hoping to receive an early morning reconnaissance report. If the odds were not overwhelming he intended to close and attack. If the Japanese numbers were too great he would refuel in Tandjoeng Priok before moving east to join Admiral Doorman at Soerabaja.37 The anticipated air reconnaissance report did not materialize and Howden turned back to Tandjoeng Priok. Shortly after Howden turned north, a Japanese reconnaissance plane spotted the WSF. Rear-Admiral Hara made preparations to intercept, but was over-ruled by Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita, who had overall command of fleet operations off Western Java. The WSF was so weak that Kurita did not believe they really wanted a fight. He feared they were simply bait to draw the Japanese into an Allied minefield or across a submarine line. At 1200 Hara ordered his convoy back into the Banka Strait and decided to delay the landings on West Java by one day. At approximately 1230 another Japanese aircraft reported that the Allied formation had reversed course and now steamed back toward Tandjoeng Priok.38 En route the WSF was bombed by eight Japanese aircraft; Hobart was near-missed with light damage and suffered five wounded.39 The identity of these planes is unknown; 10 G4M “Bettys” from the Mihoro Air Wing had flown into Kahang Airfield in Johore, Malaysia, the previous day. They were dis-

patched on a long-range strike mission at 0855 on the morning of February 27. A flight of Takao Air Wing G4Ms operating from P.2 had reported three light cruisers, three destroyers and two torpedo boats in the Java Sea.40 No other Allied surface ships were present in the Western Java Sea, so this could only have been Howden’s force. Interestingly though, Japanese records have no record of an air attack on Allied warships in the Java Sea that day. The Mihoro Air Wing “Bettys” saw nothing and landed at 1800 without making an attack. Thus, it would appear that the attack was carried out by aircraft from Ryujo, Chiyoda or Kamikawa Maru.41 When the WSF entered Tandjoeng Priok on the afternoon of February 27 they found Evertsen lying in wait. It will be remembered that the destroyer had only entered service in December and her newly trained crew was still working up the ship. Evertsen had undergone a few air raids while in port to refuel, but had been used only for convoy duty and quiet patrols in the Indian Ocean. The final defense of Java had begun and the situation was now critical. At 0727 on the morning of February 27 Admiral Helfrich signaled that Evertsen was “under command of Western Striking Force for action.”42 In the same signal Helfrich made it clear that her commander, Lieutenant-Commander W.M. de Vries, would return to Tandjoeng Priok or Tjilatjap upon receiving orders to do so from either Commodore Collins or Captain Howden. Even at this late date, Helfrich was not releasing any KM ships from duty in the East Indies. As Howden’s force dropped anchor at 1420 Helfrich still considered sending Hobart and Evertsen to join Doorman off Bawean.43 Literally within minutes of the Western Strike Force’s arrival, Doorman’s Combined Striking Force fired its first salvoes in the Battle of the Java Sea. Helfrich now realized that if he sent them during the day there was a good chance neither would reach Doorman. Instead, he ordered the WSF to make a second night sweep into the Banka Strait on the night of February 28. If no Japanese forces were encountered then Howden was to retire through the Soenda Strait.44 Once through the strait Hobart and Evertsen would make for Tjilatjap where Helfrich intended to gather his remaining naval forces for a final stand.45 Due to their limited offensive capabilities, Danae, Dragon and the British destroyers were to set course for Ceylon. Rear-Admiral Palliser urged Helfrich to have Hobart escort them some distance into the Indian Ocean before turning for Tjilatjap.46 Apparently Palliser was persuasive, for Helfrich later ordered Hobart to continue with the “D Class” cruisers and not return to Tjilatjap. With the destruction of Doorman’s force off Bawean it no longer made sense.47 Any chance of Howden intercepting the Western Invasion Convoy itself was problematic at best. ABDA aircraft reported that the convoy, though still off Banka, was now moving north. Intercepted Japanese reports later revealed that they had mistaken Hobart for a battleship. At the time, Collins believed this was why the convoy had turned away.48 In any event, he recognized that the WSF would be severely overmatched by any Japanese escort that it met. At 1751 he provided Captain Howden

27. Aftermath with a set of precisely worded orders that were apparently intended to minimize his risk of contact: Proceed toward south entrance Banka Strait at 20 knots. Unless enemy sighted reduce to 15 knots and alter course for Soenda Strait, so as to reach Toppers Island by 0630 on the 28th.49 Thence proceed with your force to Tricomalee, sending destroyers into Padang to fuel and bring off evacuees.50 If fueling at Padang proves impracticable, fuel destroyers at sea.51

With his orders in hand, Captain Howden did not pause to fuel his ships, as it would have taken too much time. Although the Japanese had pushed back their invasion date, he believed they intended to land at Bantam Bay as early as the night of February 27–28. He wanted to sail as soon as possible, for any Japanese landings would close the Soenda Strait, effectively trapping his ships in the Java Sea.52 It is also quite possible that Howden wanted to avoid being bottled up in Tandjoeng Priok by the Japanese escort. At 0045 on the morning of February 28 Captain Howden led Hobart, Danae, Dragon, Scout, Tenedos and Evertsen out to sea. Although his orders were to sweep the Banka Strait until 0430 Howden remained in the area until 0500 when he ordered the WSF to turn for the Soenda Strait. It was another rainy night marked by poor visibility. Just before dawn Evertsen lost contact with the formation and was not seen or heard from again.53 In his after action report, Captain Howden would later write, “Evertsen apparently became separated from the force and was not seen after about 4 a.m. on the 28th.”54 Evertsen lost visual contact with the WSF in the stormy conditions at 0430.55 Unable to catch up or reestablish communications, Lieutenant-Commander de Vries turned south on his own accord and signaled Helfrich: Evertsen returning to Tandjoeng Priok. “Striking Force” lost from sight 0228–0430 due to bad weather. Evertsen en route to Noordwachter.56 No details to report. Evertsen had orders to retire on Tandjoeng Priok or Tjilatjap if no enemy signed by dawn. Request further orders.57

Evertsen put into Tandjoeng Priok at 1400 on February 28. There, de Vries topped off his fuel bunkers and awaited further orders. The ship’s black gang had orders to keep her boilers lit and ready to sail at one hour notice.58 In the meantime, the WSF entered the southern mouth of the Soenda Strait at 0616 on the morning of February 28. Although the Japanese invasion force was more than 24 hours to the north, their aircraft heavily attacked anything they found in the Strait. As a result, it was clogged with drifting wreckage and flotsam, including abandoned life boats and rafts. Howden traversed the strait at 24 knots and cleared the north entrance at 0900. He then set course for Padang where his ships took aboard 512 refugees and sailed for Ceylon on March 1.59 With the Japanese knocking on Java’s door there was now a final rush to move as many remaining British merchant ships and auxiliaries out of Tandjoeng Priok. On the night of February 27 a small convoy consisting of the depot ship HMS Anking and tankers British Judge, Francol and War Sirdar slipped of Tandjoeng Priok.60 They were escorted by the sloops HMAS Yarra and HMIS Jumna and HMS Gemas and HMS MMS 51.61

237

War Sirdar grounded soon after sailing and was lost; the remaining ships entered the Soenda Strait and made for Tjilatjap. British Judge was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-58 10 miles south of Prince’s Island. However, she persevered and eventually reached port.

The Loss of Langley Against this backdrop, circumstance was setting another tragic stage south of Java. Per Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s orders, Langley left Convoy MS-5 and was proceeding to Tjilatjap with her load of P-40s and personnel. On the morning of February 24 Vice-Admiral Helfrich signaled the naval commander at Tjilatjap, Commander B.J.G. Schokking (Reserve), to expect her arrival on February 26. Schokking was to provide escort for her in the form of the minelayer Willem van der Zaan and two PBYs from GVT.5, which operated from the port.62 In turn, Schokking ordered the commander of GVT.5, Lieutenant-Commander H.V.B. Burgerhout (KMR), to provide A/S cover for Langley and Willem van der Zaan with two of his PBYs.63 The two commanders traded a number of encrypted messages using the KM’s general code to discuss and organize the operation. However, they did not learn until later that this code had possibly been broken by the Japanese, which led to questions about how much they knew in advance about the final movements of Langley.64 Y-65 and Y-66 departed Tjilatjap Harbor, 30 miles apart, on the morning of February 26. At 0950 Y-65 found Langley in company of Willem van der Zaan some 420 miles south of Java. The two flying boats then proceeded to circle overhead. Willem van der Zaan had been at sea continuously since the outbreak of war and was in need of overhaul.65 As a result, she could only make 10 knots due to a leaking boiler pipe.66 Langley could make 13 knots and Commander R.P. McConnell was not inclined to reduce speed to stay with the minelayer. Within an hour it was obvious to the circling Catalinas that Willem van der Zaan could not keep up with Langley as she steadily fell behind.67 Unable to maintain pace with Langley, Willem van der Zaan’s skipper, Lieutenant-Commander P.G. Küller, finally gave up. At 1345 on February 26 he signaled a request for destroyers to take over.68 In response, Rear-Admiral Glassford dispatched Edsall and Whipple from Tjilatjap; they got under way at 1640 that same afternoon with orders to meet Langley at 0600 on February 27 at 9-50 S / 109-25 E.69 In the meantime, Commander McConnell proceeded ahead independently but was ordered to rejoin the minelayer several hours later.70 Then, shortly after rejoining Willem van der Zaan, yet another order came through; this one informing McConnell that Edsall and Whipple would be his new escorts.71 In the meantime, Lieutenant-Commander Burgerhout informed Commander Schokking that at her current pace, Langley would not reach Tjilatjap until noon on February 27. She would also cover the final 100 miles or so in broad daylight which put the tender at extreme risk from air attack. In turn,

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Schokking approached Captain Lester J. Hudson, the USN port commander at Tjilatjap; he suggested that Langley alter course and speed in order to reach port on the night of February 27–28. Despite the concerns of both Burgerhout and Schokking, Hudson demurred and declined to order a course change for Langley.72 At 0700 on February 27 Edsall and Whipple hove into view and Lieutenant-Commander Küller turned his charge over to them. Willem van der Zaan was then ordered to proceed into Tjilatjap independently.73 Almost immediately they lost additional time to a false submarine scare. All three USN ships then turned north at 13 knots.74 Langley’s arrival time in Tjilatjap was now pushed back to 1700. Regardless of her scheduled arrival time, Langley’s fate was already sealed. Five G4M “Betty” bombers from the Takao Air Wing at Kendari had sighted the tender while on a longrange patrol into the Indian Ocean the previous day. They reported her as being escorted by an Allied submarine.75 At 0900 a reconnaissance plane from the 23rd Air Flotilla at Bali appeared and lingered overhead just long enough to confirm Langley’s position before disappearing.76 Commander McConnell knew full well what the plane’s presence signified and immediately radioed for air cover. Unfortunately, only a handful of fighters remained on Java and they were allocated to provide air cover for Rear-Admiral Doorman in the Java Sea. Armed with only four obsolete 3-inch AA guns and four .50caliber machine guns, Langley was on her own with only the negligible presence of Edsall, Whipple and two Dutch PBYs for support.77 The first Japanese bombers were sighted by Whipple at 1140. These were “Bettys” in two formations of seven and nine planes, respectively. They were part of the Takao Air Wing that had taken off that morning on routine reconnaissance. They were rerouted to attack Langley. Both formations were escorted by six “Zeros” of the 3rd Air Wing and nine “Zeros” of the Tainan Air Wing at Bali.78 It appears that the planes were guided to their target by a Kawanishi H6K “Mavis” flying boat, which retired to the east as soon as the attack began.79 Soon afterward, Lieutenant-Commander Burgerhout aboard Y-65 signaled, “Are in fight with 9 bombers and 5 fighters.”80 Ignoring the destroyers, the first formation targeted Langley at 1150. Attacking from 15,000 feet the first wave of seven bombers was unhindered by the tender’s 3-inch AA guns. Commander McConnell ordered a hard turn to starboard at the last minute and avoided any direct hits from this wave. Two bombs were near misses that buckled plates and split seams in the ship’s hull, allowing water to pour in.81 The second wave of nine “Bettys” followed at 1158. Once again McConnell proved a wily opponent; he made another last-minute change of course which threw off the lead bombardier. This time the Japanese simply aborted their bomb run and went around for another pass. On their second go-round they scored five direct hits with a combination of 551-pound and 132-pound bombs.82 The bridge was badly damaged and steering was knocked offline. Bombs hit on the deck and several

P-40s burst into flames. The fires could not be brought under control as water mains had also been shattered throughout the ship. Combined with flooding from the first attack, Langley assumed a 10 degree list to port. With no sign of Allied fighters the 3rd Air Wing Zeros came down and made an attack of their own at 1219. Disregarding return fire from Langley’s machine guns and Browning Automatic Rifles they strafed the length of the ship. This caused more damage to several undamaged fighters which also burst into flames. The Zeros turned for a second pass but only one made a determined attack. There were several casualties but little new damage. Still circling above, Lieutenant-Commander Burgerhout again signaled Langley’s condition: “Langley is on fire, 3 hits.”83

“Fuck, here they come!” 84 Y-65 and Y-71 took off from Tjilatjap at first light and assumed an A/S position overhead. When the attack started the two PBYs were circling some distance away. Prior to the first bombs being dropped the morning had been routine for the crew of Y-71. The first sign of trouble came when one of the USN destroyers suddenly began circling. In his postwar diary, Flight Mechanic G.H.V.L.A.G. Gillekens wrote: About 1000 we suddenly saw one of the destroyers begin to circle. There was definitely a submarine in the area. We went after it. Suddenly I heard a loud explosion. BOOM…BOOM…BOOM. What was that? Was someone shooting at us? I looked down. Oh no, the ship was being bombed. A pattern of water columns lay next to the ship. The alarm was sounded on board. The Japs, of course, sat above us. I could not see them. It was overcast above. Below the destroyers and freighter fired their AA guns. We saw the muzzle flash after each shot. We cleared our machine guns as there would be fighters around. We continued to circle the ship.85

Gillekens and the crew of Y-71 then witnessed the second attack. Badly hit, Langley was soon hidden by heavy clouds of black smoke. Within five minutes the tender was heavily afire. Through gaps in the smoke the flight crew could see the fire spreading quickly. Shocked at the drama unfolding before his eyes, Gillekens legs shook badly; he felt sick to his stomach and had to momentarily sit down. “Where are the destroyers?” he repeatedly asked himself as Langley was forced to fend for herself.86 Suddenly Gillekens sighted six Zeros and announced over the intercom, “Fuck, here they come! Attack from port, high behind.” Two of the fighters peeled off and made a high-speed attack on Y-71. Gillekens returned fire from a double .30-caliber machine gun mount in the waist. As they roared by 7.7mm bullets and 20mm cannon shells shredded the PBY’s fuselage. A large hole appeared in the glass blister of his position. Several minutes later the Zeros made a second pass and shot up the tail of Y-71 before disappearing. The Langley’s logbook includes the following entry: “Two planes attacked one Dutch Catalina and two hovered observing. No more attacks developed and the fighters withdrew to the eastward.”87 In the distance, they could see Y-65 being hammered by

27. Aftermath

239

more enemy fighters. Despite the threat of fighters Y-65 had continued to circle overhead. Her pilot sent a report requesting air cover and then remained overhead to observe and send reports for 35 minutes after the attack began.88 At 1240 Lieutenant-Commander Burgerhout ordered Y-65 to return to Tjilatjap; two minutes later the PBY was bounced by a formation of six Zeros.89 Although the Dutch pilot hid in a small cloud at about 4,000 feet the Zeros soon found Y-65. They initially attacked from below and concentrated on the PBY’s hull, but soon changed tactics and swarmed from all directions. On their second pass they destroyed an aileron; this forced Y-65 out of the cloud since her pilot could no longer maintain a tight enough turn radius.90 The starboard engine was then shot out and bullets Langley sinks slowly after being abandoned (U.S. Naval Historical Center). sprayed the cockpit, grazing the pilot. in the engine room was knee-high and four-feet deep at the The wireless operator was also hit in the elbow and upper arm. ship’s throttle control station; the fire room decks were awash. Cadet Pilot H.A. van Leeuwen twice manned one of the blister At 1330 Langley’s engineering officer reported that there was gun positions after its gunner had been wounded. At one point, no hope of righting the ship or restarting her engines. With no leaking oil and trailing heavy black smoke, Y-65 plunged into alternatives and fearful of another Japanese attack, Commander a steep power dive and took cover in a nearby cloud bank.91 McConnell gave the order to abandon ship.94 The USN’s first Commander McConnell witnessed the fight of Y-65 from aircraft carrier had been lost. Langley’s bridge. He reported seeing one of the Japanese fighter As her crew went over the side Edsall and Whipple moved squadrons attacking a large flying boat south of his position. in and began plucking them from the ocean. The last was taken There was a large cloud of black smoke and the seaplane dove aboard Whipple at 1358.95 When Langley showed no signs of toward the ocean on a sharp trajectory.92 That was all the time sinking quickly, it was decided to sink her to avoid possible capMcConnell could afford to spend watching the Dutch PBY, for ture. At 1428 Whipple fired nine 4-inch rounds into her hull his own ship was in serious trouble. with no effect other than to start more fires inside the hull; she By 1229 the attack on Langley was over, just 39 minutes then fired a single torpedo in Langley’s starboard side.96 The after the first bombs fell. As the Japanese headed home she lay result was the tender returning to an almost even keel. The dedead in the water, burning heavily and down at the bow with a stroyer then fired a second torpedo into her port side, which 10 degree list to port. Her rudder was also jammed hard over heavily exploded and fire covered the after part of the ship.97 and could not be cleared. With her cargo of P-40s adding 90 Heavy black smoke poured from the interior of Langley tons of weight, the tender was top heavy and McConnell feared and she was down by the head and listing to port. Whipple only that Langley might capsize. He ordered counter-flooding and had four torpedoes left and her captain did not want to expend several aircraft were pushed over the side. Despite these efforts any more on Langley since it appeared that she would soon sink her list quickly increased to 15 degrees. on her own.98 At 1446 Edsall and Whipple left the area and The situation was grim but Commander McConnell was moved south. They were to rendezvous with the USN tanker not ready to give up the ship. In Langley’s damaged condition Pecos and transfer Langley’s survivors to her on the morning it was much too dangerous to navigate Tjilatjap’s narrow, windof February 28.99 ing channel. She could easily strike a mine, run aground or even After her brief engagement with the Japanese fighters sink, completely blocking the entire harbor. But if damage conY-71 returned to Langley about 10 minutes later. The tender was trol could somehow counter the flooding, bring the fires under heavily afire and the two destroyers were standing by. Gillekens control and restore power he intended to make for Java and run assumed that they were taking off her crew. Y-71 then set course Langley aground.93 for Tjilatjap and arrived over the port 45 minutes later. Using Despite his damage control team’s best efforts there had binoculars the crew intently searched for Y-65 but saw no trace. been little progress more than an hour later. The tender was After checking his engines, oil pressure and various other indistill without power and flooding continued unchecked. Water

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later that night. Y-71 made a final search of the area but saw neither any survivors nor their comrades from Y-65. The worst was now feared as the PBY turned for home. Their fear turned to joy when they arrived over Tjilatjap and found Y-65 lying on the muddy river bank. Her unequal fight had lasted 24 minutes before the Zeros broke for home.101 The starboard engine was completely destroyed and the PBY had been riddled with cannon shells and bullets. Two crewmen were seriously wounded. In exchange, one of her gunners shot down the Zero flown by Naval Air Pilot 1st Class Toyo-o Sakai.102 Despite the damage Y-65 limped home on one engine. Landing at 1620 the battered plane had to be beached to prevent it from sinking. Due to the heavy damage Y-65 was immediately written off. Aboard Y-71, the crew made a last To prevent her capture Langley is scuttled with gunfire and a single torpedo from Whipple (U.S. minute check of the Catalina’s hull to Navy and Marine Corps Museum). make sure that there were no leaks becators, the pilot of Y-71 reversed course and headed back out fore setting down. Upon landing the crew then spent the reto sea in search of Y-65.100 mainder of their afternoon making emergency repairs. Only Some time after Edsall and Whipple moved south Y-71 after Y-71 was declared airworthy were they finally allowed to again flew over Langley while searching for Y-65. By now the take a hard-earned rest. Although they had assigned quarters, area was quiet and deserted. Langley still burned but had heeled most of the crew slept in the plane or simply lay next to it completely over to port and drifted on her side. This would be amongst the bushes. At 0600 they were roused from their sleep the last sighting of Langley and she eventually sank unobserved and the war continued for yet another day.103

Chapter 28

Hopeless Fights naval forces. Helfrich still expected reinforcements in the form of Jacob van Heemskerck, Isaac Sweers and Columbia which were en route. He had also been promised the light cruiser Phoenix which handed over convoy MS-5 to the British cruiser Enterprise on February 27.3 Helfrich planned to consolidate his remaining forces with these ships at Tjilatjap and continue the fight.4 Thus, he directed Glassford and Palliser to order their remaining surface units into the Indian Ocean.

By now most remaining Allied warships were damaged, low on ammunition and fuel and widely scattered between Soerabaja, Tandjoeng Priok and Tjilatjap. Glassford, Helfrich and Palliser met to discuss next steps. Glassford and Palliser, in particular, needed to know what orders to give their forces. With Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok under regular air attack, and virtually no fuel left, Java’s use as a base appeared to be at an end. Rear-Admiral Glassford had already received a directive from Admiral King in Washington to fall back on Australia when the end came.1 Until then he was to remain on Java under the command of Vice-Admiral Helfrich.2

“Follow me” After witnessing the cataclysmic demise of De Ruyter and Java and being waved off by Rear-Admiral Doorman, Perth and Houston turned away. The two cruisers were all that remained of the once-defiant Combined Striking Force that had put to sea with 14 warships. At 0050 on the morning of February 28 Captain Waller signaled Commodore Collins as to the loss of De Ruyter and Java.5 He then made a feint to the southeast to throw off any pursuing Japanese.6 At 0100 Perth signaled Houston: “Follow me.” Per their pre-battle orders from Rear-Admiral Doorman, Perth and Houston turned for Tandjoeng Priok.7 With no destroyer escort they zigzagged to avoid Japanese submarines as they moved east at high speed. At dawn the ubiquitous Japanese floatplanes once again appeared. With the Western Invasion Convoy just off the coast of Java these were undoubtedly the same aircraft that had shadowed them the prior day. Perth and Houston were kept under observation throughout the entire morning of March 1. Despite a call for air cover no Allied planes appeared, but for several Dutch Fokker T.IV floatplanes on reconnaissance patrol.8 At 0500 that morning 12 P-40s and four Buffalos were being held in readiness at Ngoro Airfield. Their orders were to fly CAP missions for returning ships of the CSF and to provide air defense for the ME.9 A flight of four Buffalos was launched at 0900 but encountered nothing and returned 1100. Two more Buffalos later carried out another reconnaissance flight with orders to fly CAP over the CSF. They also sighted nothing and returned home without incident. All these flights were made in the vicinity of Bawean and Soerabaja and did not benefit Perth and Houston, which were well east at that point. Again left unmolested, the Japanese spotter planes circled

Chart 22: ABDA Naval Forces, February 28, 1942 Vessel

Type

Houston

Heavy cruiser USN

Navy Location Notes

Exeter

Heavy cruiser RN

Perth

Light cruiser

RAN

Alden

Destroyer

USN

Paul Jones

Destroyer

USN

John D. Edwards Destroyer

USN

John D. Ford

Destroyer

USN

Pope

Destroyer

USN

Encounter

Destroyer

RN

Witte de With

Destroyer

KM

Banckert Evertsen

Destroyer Destroyer

KM KM

Java Sea

Rear turret out of action Soerabaja Heavy damage; speed reduced Java Sea Low on fuel and ammunition Soerabaja No damage: no torpedoes Soerabaja No damage: no torpedoes Soerabaja No damage: no torpedoes Soerabaja No damage: no torpedoes Soerabaja No damage; full load of torpedoes Soerabaja No damage full load of torpedoes Soerabaja Damaged; speed reduced; full load of torpedoes Soerabaja Badly damaged Tandjoeng No damage; full Priok load of torpedoes

The Dutch admiral had no intention of giving up and fully intended to continue the defense of Java using his remaining

241

242

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

well out of range all morning. They eventually turned away, satisfied that Perth and Houston were intent on leaving the area. With two cruisers now just 60 miles from Tandjoeng Priok five British Hurricanes from Tjililitan Airfield belatedly arrived overhead.10 Despite heavy cloud cover they spotted a number of Japanese aircraft to the north but these were not engaged.

“Defeat was everywhere” 11 At 1350 the cruisers put into Tandjoeng Priok and found a scene of destruction. As with Soerabaja, the port was being hit regularly by Japanese bombers operating from newly captured airfields in Southern Sumatra. Damaged and sunken merchant ships dotted the harbor. Ashore, the contents of smashed warehouses lay unguarded and burning storage tanks spewed forth thick black plumes of smoke. The air was filled with the stench of burning oil. As was the case with the ME, Indonesian workers fled when the bombing started; Tandjoeng Priok was deserted and silent.12 Moored in the outer harbor lay Evertsen following her return from the prior night’s sweep with the WSF.13 Near the harbor entrance a Japanese “Jake” floatplane dropped two bombs and strafed a Dutch PT boat which maneuvered at high speed as her gunners returned fire.14 The fight took place just outside the range of Houston’s AA guns so her gun crews were powerless to help. More frustrating was their inability to contact two British Hurricanes which patrolled overhead, unaware of the life and death struggle unfolding below them.15 Fortunately, the seaplane pilot eventually tired of the duel or had to return to his ship to refuel. Houston and Perth moored alongside the naval base pier where they were able to take stock of their predicament and material condition. Perth had not been hit or damaged. Houston had received two 8-inch shell hits during the prior day’s battle. Both were duds and neither caused serious damage. The first penetrated the main deck and then passed through the starboard side. The second buckled the deck of the ship’s laundry compartment and caused leaks in an oil tank; fuel oil in this tank was transferred to other bunkers which eliminated the leak.16 There were no casualties although approximately 70 men from the AA and supply crews suffered heat exhaustion.17 Houston’s fire control director was found to have a frayed cable, which had caused her gunnery calculations to be slightly off during the battle. This was repaired in Tandjoeng Priok. Eightinch rounds were also transferred from the after magazine to the forward magazines, which were nearly empty after the previous day’s fighting. Although these shells had been flooded when Turret #3’s magazine had been destroyed on February 4 there was no other choice.18 Houston sent two engineering officers ashore to obtain instructions for refueling. They found a confused situation in which no one seemed to be in charge or knew where to send them. After being passed around for some time, they were

told that neither Houston nor Perth would be allowed to refuel. What limited fuel oil remained was reserved for KM ships.19 When it was pointed out that almost no sizeable Dutch surface ships remained, port authorities relented … but only slightly. Perth was given 300 tons of fuel oil which brought her bunkers up to 50 percent capacity.20 However, Houston received none for it was deemed that she had enough to make Tjilatjap.21 In the meantime, Captain Rooks spoke with Rear-Admiral Glassford by phone on the afternoon of February 28.22 Glassford ordered him to follow Perth through the Soenda Strait and make for Tjilatjap. Vice-Admiral Helfrich intended to gather his remaining forces there and continue the fight. Glassford told Rooks that Dutch intelligence indicated that the Soenda Strait was clear; the nearest Japanese ships were still at least 10 hours away. Captain Waller received an air reconnaissance update reporting a convoy of 10 transports escorted by two cruisers and three destroyers off Java. It was 50 miles northeast of Tandjoeng Priok as of 1600 on February 28. It was assumed that they would land east of Batavia that night but would be too preoccupied to take notice of Houston and Perth.23 As Captain Waller was senior officer, he remained in command of the small formation. There does not appear to have been any discussion by Rooks, Waller or their respective senior officers about Evertsen joining Houston and Perth. Although no Japanese ships were expected, Rooks and Waller were both warned separately about the possibility of meeting the small Australian and Dutch auxiliaries of the Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol.24 They were cautioned not to fire on them in the darkness. As Houston and Perth made final preparations to leave, a second Japanese “Dave” cruiser floatplane appeared over the harbor at 1800. The pilot brazenly buzzed the harbor at 250 feet and banked, revealing the red “meatball” markings on his wings. Evertsen and Perth immediately opened fire; the observation plane flew directly across Houston’s bow and her gunners opened fire as well, but were seconds late.25 In a defiant gesture, the plane’s observer defiantly fired off several rounds from his rear machine gun. The “Dave” disappeared almost as quickly as it had appeared and calm returned to the port. About 15 minutes later a third cruiser floatplane appeared. As with the first two, it was a double-wing, single engine observation model with a single float. As it approached, almost nonchalantly, Evertsen, Houston, Perth and various other AA guns around the harbor all opened up at the same time. The floatplane was bracketed, but somehow not seriously hit by the massive barrage of gunfire. Its pilot quickly retreated out of range. This was not a Japanese plane. Rather, it was the Curtis SOC “Seagull” Houston put ashore at Soerabaja prior to the CSF sailing for the Java Sea. Lieutenant T.B. Payne had spent the past few days flying courier duty between Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok. He was overjoyed at the unexpected sight of Houston lying in harbor. Payne was less thrilled at the hot reception he received from the port defenses. He landed well out-

28. Hopeless Fights side the range of the AA batteries and slowly taxied in. A Dutch MTB roared out to meet him. Once they determined the SOC was friendly Payne was escorted into harbor and hoisted aboard Houston.

“I cannot get under way for one hour” Houston and Perth had been scheduled to sail at 1630 but were delayed when their harbor pilot failed to appear. After waiting for an hour with no sign of the pilot, Captain Waller elected to navigate the port’s minefield on his own. At 1730 Evertsen spotted the cruisers throwing off their mooring lines and making preparations to get under way. Soon afterward, Perth signaled the destroyer by lamp, “Take station one mile ahead of me.”26 Lieutenant-Commander de Vries replied that he had no orders from the CZM to sail. In response, Captain Waller strongly urged Evertsen to leave Tandjoeng Priok with his force while she still could. De Vries responded, “I cannot 27 get under way for one hour.” This corresponded with de Vries’ earlier order for Evertsen’s boilers to remain lit and ready for action at one hour’s notice. He immediately ordered preparations made for getting under way. At the same time de Vries signaled Tandjoeng Priok’s naval commander, Commander P.F.M. van de Lint, requesting instructions.28 Already delayed and unwilling to wait any longer, Captain Waller continued on. Evertsen was to follow as soon as she was able. To conserve fuel and give de Vries time to catch up, Waller initially maintained a slow speed. When the Dutch destroyer failed to appear he eventually increased speed to 22 knots.29 At 2015 Lieutenant-Commander de Vries received a signal from Vice-Admiral Helfrich directing Evertsen to escort Houston and Perth into Tjilatjap.30 Approximately 15 minutes later the destroyer cast off her mooring lines and got under way. It took de Vries another 45 minutes to clear the port’s minefield and turn west. There was no sign of Houston or Perth so Evertsen proceeded to the Soenda Strait on her own. Although Evertsen was capable of making full speed (34 knots), de Vries only brought two boilers online to reduce the signature of his smoke. This limited the destroyer’s speed to 25 knots.31 By 2245 Houston and Perth were hugging the coast of Java as they neared the mouth of the Soenda Strait. The sea was calm and still; the sky was clear with a full moon, providing excellent visibility of six to seven miles. At 2300 Captain Waller increased speed to 28 knots in preparation for a high-speed run through the Strait and into the Indian Ocean. Transiting the Soenda Strait would take little more than an hour. Aboard Houston, the mood was relaxed and upbeat; all were glad to escape the death trap which the Java Sea had now become. Except for a few senior officers, the majority of her crew thought Houston was leaving the East Indies for a Stateside port where she would undergo a long period of overhaul. The ship was rife with unsubstantiated rumors that spread like wildfire. Everyone aboard both cruisers expected smooth sailing. Little did they know what awaited them just inside the mouth of the Soenda Strait.

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The Loss of Reiger and Sirius Completely unbeknownst and contrary to the intelligence received by Captain Rooks and Captain Waller, the Western Invasion Convoy had already entered the Soenda Strait.32 Arriving four hours ahead of schedule, the main body with 56 transports split into three smaller convoys early on February 28. Each sub-convoy and their respective escorts then set course for separate landing points throughout Western Java.33

Chart 23: Western Invasion Convoy—Bantam Bay/Merak Akagisan Maru 4,634 Hokumei Maru 667 Shinshu Maru 8,160 Akitsu Maru 9,186 Horai Maru 9,192 Somedono 5,154 Maru Atlas Maru 7,347 Kizan Maru 2,841 Sydney Maru 4,105 Atsuta Maru 7,882 Koyo Maru 5,471 Taihei Maru 6,284 Ayatosan Maru 9,788 Maebashi Maru 7,005 Taizan Maru 3,528 Brazil Maru 5,859 Miikesan Maru 3,179 Taketoyo Maru 6,964 Columbia Maru 5,618 Mizuho Maru 8,506 Tatsuno Maru 6,960 Dainichi Maru 5,813 Momoyama 5,217 Tempei Maru 6,094 Maru Erie Maru 5,493 Nichiwa Maru 4,955 Tofuku Maru 5,857 Fushimi Maru 10,935 Pacific Maru 5,872 Toho Maru 4,092 Genkai Maru 3,850 Reiyo Maru 5,445 Tokiwa Maru 6,972 Genoa Maru 6,785 Ryunan Maru 5,106 Tosei Maru 4,363 Gifu Maru 2,934 Sakura Maru 7,167 Toyooka Maru 7,097 Heian Maru 5,346 Shinanogawa 7,503 Tsuyama Maru 6,962 Maru Hoeisan Maru 6,033 Shinshu Maru 4,182 Zuiyo Maru 7,385 (Headquarters Ship)

The main body landed at St. Nicholas Point on the extreme end of western Java. One section dropped anchor in Bantam Bay on the east side of the point just after 2200 on the night of February 28. On the west side, a smaller group of transports prepared to land troops at the small port of Merak. At the same time seven transports—escorted by Sendai and the 20th Destroyer Squadron—were making their way to the small port of Eretenwetan, approximately 140 miles east of the Soenda Strait.

Chart 24: Western Invasion Convoy—Erenwetan Calcutta Maru Glasgow Maru Hofuku Maru Suwa Maru

5,339 5,831 5,825 10,672

Uchide Maru Yae Maru Yamazuki Maru

5,286 6,780 6,435

A supply train of two ammunition ships and two naval tankers—escorted by Yura and the 22nd Destroyer Division— remained west of the Soenda Strait.34 The tankers stayed well clear of the action and remained near Billiton Island.

Chart 25: Western Invasion Convoy—Supply Train Kogyo Maru (Ammunition Ship) 7,190 Nojima Maru (Ammunition Ship) 7,190

Erimo (Tanker) 14,050 Tsurumi (Tanker) 14,050

Providing close escort was the 5th Destroyer Flotilla with the light cruiser Natori and 5th Destroyer Division, 11th De-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

stroyer Division and 12th Destroyer Division. In support was the 9th Base Force. These forces quickly spread out as the convoy entered Bantam Bay. Just outside the bay was the 2/7th Cruiser Squadron with Mogami and Mikuma. They were escorted by the destroyer Shikinami. Farther north was a Distant Covering Force comprising the light carrier Ryujo, seaplane carrier Chiyoda and aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru, which provided air cover. They were, in turn, escorted by the 1/7th Cruiser Squadron and 19th Destroyer Squadron. As the Japanese entered Bantam Bay they encountered the GM patrol boats Reiger and Sirius.35 Both remained in the Soenda Strait, anchored off Merak although their Australian counterparts had withdrawn. Japanese bombers attacked from high altitude twice on February 28, inflicting minor splinter damage on Sirius.36 Although they scored no direct hits ammunition supplies aboard both ships were running low as a result.37 Later that night they received orders to return to Tandjoeng Priok.38 Both ships were just getting under way when the Japanese convoy rolled into Bantam Bay. The two patrol boats were completely surprised when Japanese searchlights illuminated the bay at 2225. Sirius was already under way and escaped into the darkness. Reiger was still warming up her diesels and not yet under way. In the darkness,

a Japanese floatplane circled overhead and began dropping flares.39 Searchlights from the destroyer Hatakaze then suddenly shot out of the night and gripped the patrol boat.40 A volley of cannon fire followed and bracketed Reiger as she quickly raised anchor.41 Reiger responded with rapid fire from her 3-inch gun and the searchlight went out.42 During the fight her Executive Officer and 3rd Mechanic, both apparently stricken by panic, leapt over the side and swam toward Poelau Doea, a nearby island; neither was seen again.43 Captain E.K. van Melle attempted to lose Hatakaze in the dark by maneuvering among the many small islands in Bantam Bay. As he zigzagged Reiger ran hard aground on a reef. At that point van Melle gave the order to abandon ship and her crew went over the side.44 Hatakaze fired several more salvos before abruptly disappearing.45 In the meantime, Captain C. Hokke steered Sirius east in an effort to reach Tandjoeng Priok. A short time later the silhouette of a warship was sighted in the distance and Hokke turned back into Bantam Bay to evade.46 Another searchlight played across the water.47 A single salvo followed and missed. No more followed though; about that time a series of heavy gunfire and starshells erupted to the north. Within minutes Japanese floatplanes dropped a series of flares that illuminated the area.48

28. Hopeless Fights Captain Hokke could see and hear the signs of a major fight as Sirius slipped away. Surrounded with virtually no chance of reaching Tandjoeng Priok, he elected to abandon ship.49 At full speed he ran Sirius onto a mud bank some 50 yards offshore and opened the seacocks as her crew abandoned ship. It was low tide so the lifeboats could not reach the shore. Although the distance was short it took her crew two hours to slog through the thick mud.50 Once ashore, they saw Sirius periodically illuminated by flashes. She listed to one side with her ensign still waving from the mainmast.51

“Prepare to abandon ship? No! Abandon ship” The gunplay witnessed by Reiger and Sirius was Houston and Perth engaging the convoy escort. Barely had the two Allied cruisers entered the strait when they were picked up by the destroyer Fubuki which had orders to patrol the east side of the strait. At 2230 her lookouts sighted two unknown ships heading into the Soenda Strait. Unsure of their identity, her captain proceeded to shadow them but did not attack. Despite the clear night and excellent visibility neither cruiser picked up Fubuki. At around 2300 Houston and Perth were halfway across Bantam Bay, still unaware that Fubuki had been tracking their movements for nearly 45 minutes. Lookouts aboard both cruisers sighted ships off Point St. Nicholas, approximately five miles ahead. Although Captain Rooks had been briefed on the presence of the Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol he knew they were moving too fast for small auxiliaries and sounded General Quarters. At 2306 Perth sighted Harukaze off her port bow; the Japanese destroyer was on a north heading.52 Nine minutes later her lookouts finally picked up Fubuki 3,000 yards off the port stern. Thinking she might be a friendly auxiliary vessel operating with the Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol Captain Waller ordered a challenge. Fubuki responded in an unknown code using a green lamp, indicating that she was not friendly. Waller sent a position report and ordered his forward turrets to open fire.53 Fubuki immediately launched a spread of nine torpedoes and turned away to starboard under cover of smoke.54 Houston and Perth made a hard circle to starboard and easily evaded the torpedoes before continuing south toward the lighthouse on St. Nicholas Point.55 Fubuki made her way north while frantically signaling the rest of the convoy escort. For approximately 15 minutes this left the 1st Minesweeper Division, Harukaze and Hatakaze as the convoy’s only defense as the latter two ships rushed north after engaging Reiger and Sirius. Harukaze laid a smokescreen to shield the transports from view and then pushed through it and continued to the north.56 At that point Hatakaze engaged the cruisers although the particulars of her fight are unclear. At 2326 Perth took her first hit in the forward funnel which did nothing to impair her combat ability.57 It is likely that this hit came from Hatakaze as no other Japanese ships had yet entered the fight at that point. At

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2330 Harukaze returned to the fight with Natori, Hatsuyuki, Shirayuki and Asakaze. Shikinami and Murakumo were also closing from the west but were 3½ miles away and not in position to attack.58 Over the next 20 minutes a close-range brawl raged in which the Japanese launched a total of 28 torpedoes.59 At some point Perth fired four torpedoes of her own, although none hit.60 Perth exchanged fire with Harukaze, Hatakaze and Shirayuki.61 She suffered a second hit at 2332 when a shell exploded on the flag deck, but again suffered little damage.62 In exchange, her gunners hit Harukaze’s bridge, engine room and damaged her rudder; the destroyer suffered three dead and 15 wounded.63 Shirayuki was also hit on her bridge and suffered one dead and 11 wounded.64 The Japanese attempted to press their attacks, but extremely heavy fire from Houston and Perth forced them to break off under cover of smoke.65 As the destroyers withdrew they signaled Mikuma and Mogami for assistance.66 Soon afterward, the Japanese heavy cruisers entered the fight at a range of 12,000 yards.67 At 2350 each launched six torpedoes at a range of 9,300 yards.68 These all missed. Perth was hit for a third time, again by Harukaze, at 2350; the shell exploded in her Ordinary Seaman’s Mess with little damage.69 A second Japanese torpedo attack was repulsed by the Allied cruisers.70 At 2355 Houston scored multiple hits on Mikuma, killing six crewmen and wounding 11 more.71 The Japanese cruiser also temporarily lost electrical power which was quickly restored.72 By 0000 on the morning of March 1 the fight was nearing its climax. When the shooting started Captain Waller took over Perth’s wheel; in true Hollywood form he personally conned the ship throughout the battle. Houston followed some distance behind and conformed to her movements. At this point neither cruiser had taken serious damage. However, the Japanese were now attacking in overwhelming force from virtually every direction. Houston and Perth could not fire on all of them and several destroyers came in very close and raked their decks with machine gun fire. Others illuminated the Allied cruisers with searchlights.73 Perth’s gunnery officer, Lieutenant- Commander P.S.F. Hancox, informed Captain Waller that the ship’s supply of 6-inch ammunition was critically low. The situation aboard Houston was equally critical. Both ships were firing practice rounds and starshells. Figuring that they had done all the damage they could, Waller ordered full speed and turned north in a last-ditch attempt to break through to the Indian Ocean.74 About this time Harukaze, Hatsukaze Murakumo and Shirakumo launched 29 torpedoes.75 Perth had just come about to the new course when one struck her starboard side. The blast knocked out the forward engine room and reduced her speed, killing all but one crewman.76 Lieutenant-Commander Hancox then told Captain Waller that the 6-inch ammunition was all but expended. As they talked, a second torpedo ripped into the forward magazine on the starboard side. At that point, Waller realized the fight over:

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Waller: “Christ! That’s torn it … abandon ship.” Hancox: “Prepare to abandon ship?” Waller: “No! Abandon ship.”77

As the crew abandoned ship a third torpedo hit on the starboard side under her X turret, causing a heavy list to starboard. This was followed by a fourth torpedo on the port side. The ship briefly righted itself but quickly heeled over to port and sank at 0025, some four miles NNE of St. Nicholas Point. She had lost 23 officers and 329 ratings killed. Captain Waller ordered the bridge cleared but remained behind. He was last seen, arms out holding the railing and staring down at Perth’s silent gun turrets.78 Houston was now alone and literally surrounded by the enemy on all sides. Although Captain Rooks evaded several torpedoes, Houston was the sole target of every Japanese ship in Bantam Bay. She was heavily bracketed by salvoes from Mikuma and Mogami. In addition, the latter launched a second spread of six torpedoes. All missed their intended target and ran directly into the convoy anchorage where no less than five of the torpedoes hit friendly ships.79 In a spectacular display, the transports Sakura Maru, Horai Maru, Tatsuno Maru, Landing Craft Depot Ship Shinsu Maru and minesweeper W-2 were all hit. Sakura Maru (one dead), Horai Maru (18 crew / 38 army troops dead), Shinsu Maru80 and W-2 sank. Tatsuno Maru was run aground to prevent the same fate. Ironically, this single instance of friendly fire caused far more damage to the convoy than did either Houston or Perth. At around 0000 Houston was hit by shells several times, including one which exploded in her aft engine room. This killed the compartment’s entire crew and slowed the ship. A torpedo then struck, forcing A and B turrets onto local control. Two more torpedo hits followed. In return, Houston nearmissed Shikinami, which had entered the battle late, and damaged her propeller; this reduced the destroyer’s top speed to 24 knots.81 Houston’s defining moment came at 0020 when B turret suffered a direct hit that ignited its powder room. A huge blast of flame towered over the bridge and the mount burned out of control for several minutes.82 To prevent the flames from reaching their 8-inch shells and destroying the ship, the forward magazines for both turrets were flooded. Although this put the fire out, it also left A turret with only the shells in its ready room. By now, the ship’s 5-inch guns had been reduced to firing starshells. At approximately 1225 on the morning of March 1 Captain Rooks gave the order to abandon ship. Minutes later he was killed by flying shrapnel. Houston rolled over and sank in only 20 minutes, at 0045, taking 643 officers and crew down with her. Among her dead were Lieutenant Jacob Cornelis van Leur and Signalman P.J.A. Stoopman, two KM sailors who were aboard serving as a liaison team. There was no more communication with either Houston or Perth and both ships were assumed lost. In mid–March the British Admiralty and U.S. Navy Department issued a joint communiqué:

After dark on 28 February 1942 HMAS Perth and USS Houston left Tandjoeng Priok, Java with the intention of passing through Soenda Strait. The next day a report from HMAS Perth was received, indicating that it and USS Houston had come in contact with a force of Japanese ships off St. Nicholas Point…. Nothing, however, has been heard from HMAS Perth or USS Houston since that time. The next of kin … are being notified accordingly.

The Loss of Evertsen83 Approximately 25 miles south of Bantam Bay, Evertsen’s crew could see and hear signs of the battle. Flashes of light, starshells and the thunder of heavy gunfire filled the sky. At around 0000 Lieutenant-Commander de Vries signaled, “Sea battle in progress off St. Nicholas Point.”84 In response, Admiral Helfrich sent the following message to Evertsen, Houston and Perth: “If any of addressees are engaged with enemy, others render assistance as possible.”85 Despite this signal, de Vries decided against joining the battle. Although his orders were to escort Houston and Perth he felt his chances of successfully joining them at this point were minimal.86 Both cruisers were already heavily engaged and any approach to the battle on such a clear night would have been extremely difficult. Thus, de Vries elected to skirt the battle and make for Tjilatjap. In any event it was a moot point as Houston and Perth were sunk well before Evertsen reached Bantam Bay. Although the fight died out as Evertsen approached, passage through the Soenda Strait would still be extremely difficult. The Japanese were now on high alert as they searched for additional Allied ships. Lieutenant-Commander de Vries set a course that took Evertsen on a wide berth around the most likely battle terrain. He intended to skirt the shore of Sumatra until reaching the Indian Ocean. Shortly after midnight on the morning of March 1 a Japanese floatplane flew low overhead and Evertsen was likely spotted. A formation of seven enemy destroyers was later reported but the Dutch ship was not sighted.87 Off Dwars in de Weg, a small island, in the Soenda Strait, lookouts spotted two unknown ships silhouetted against the Java shore. They moved at a high rate of speed and de Vries initially thought that they were Houston and Perth. This notion was dispelled when one opened a searchlight and fired a single salvo. The shells fell behind Evertsen and de Vries ordered a hard turn to starboard. After 10 minutes the Japanese were nowhere to be seen and he turned back to the south. With Evertsen’s route along the Sumatra coast compromised, de Vries changed course and attempted to reach the Indian Ocean by going east of Krakatau. Off Lampong Bay on southern Sumatra, Evertsen passed Seboekoe Island and Sebesi Island. There she sighted two large Japanese warships. Lieutenant-Commander de Vries signaled Vice-Admiral Helfrich that he had encountered two Japanese cruisers. They were really the large Fubuki-class destroyers Murakumo and Shirakumo, which had returned to the south flank of the convoy after the fight with Houston and Perth ended.

28. Hopeless Fights

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No doubt already alerted to the presence of Evertsen in de Vries or his crew. Although the fire destroyed everything on the Soenda Strait, both Japanese ships immediately opened fire. the main deck, it left the lower compartments untouched. This Evertsen did not return fire and instead retired under cover of let de Vries to send a salvage party aboard to bring back food smoke; the Japanese continued to fire until she was fully oband supplies. scured. In that short time the Dutch destroyer received seven Seven Evertsen crewmen were killed in the initial firefight hits in rapid succession. One knocked out Evertsen’s fire control and two more died of their wounds upon reaching shore. Two director, forcing her main guns onto local control. Another small groups braved the current and separately paddled to started a large fire that could not be brought under control. Yet Sumatra. The first disappeared and was likely murdered by hosanother shell hit in her forward boiler room so that Evertsen tile locals. The second reached Sumatra and remained at large could no longer make full speed.88 until captured at the end of April. Evertsen’s remaining crewLieutenant-Commander de Vries intended to re-enter the men were captured and the Europeans imprisoned on March fight but soon reconsidered. He still believed that Evertsen 9–10. Lieutenant-Commander de Vries died in Japanese cap89 faced two cruisers that massively outgunned his own ship. tivity on March 25, 1942, thus negating any in-depth postwar Nor did he have confidence in his untested crew; the ship had evaluation of his actions during the battle. been so extensively used on escort duty since the start of war that her crew had very little time to actually train.90 It The Evacuation of Soerabaja is unclear if her torpedo gang had been able to conduct live As dawn broke over Soerabaja on February 28 repair teams fire drills. With Evertsen’s fire control director knocked out aboard Exeter worked feverishly to make her ready for sea. Six their job would have been even more difficult in a night action.91 of eight boilers were still offline; unless additional power was And finally, the fire on deck still raged, exposing Evertsen for restored the cruiser was going nowhere. In addition to her miles. engine room damage, repair crews discovered that Exeter De Vries did not feel that Evertsen was capable of putting had received an 8-inch shell hit below the waterline.93 The ship up an effective fight. He undoubtedly felt that putting his crew had taken on 66 tons of seawater and it is unknown if it was into that situation would have needlessly sacrificed them. Thus, pumped out. Her S.2 4-inch AA mount also remained out of he decided to scuttle the ship between Seboekoe Besar and Seaction. boekoe Ketjil, two islands south of Lampong Bay. But when Although the crew was uncertain if Exeter would be scutEvertsen dropped anchor the current proved too strong to tled in the harbor entrance or put out to sea, work on the damlaunch her lifeboats and rafts; they would have been be swept aged boilers continued.94 At the same time, work parties manout into the Indian Ocean. Instead, Evertsen was run aground handled 8-inch shells from her aft magazine to her forward on Seboekoe Besar where her crew went ashore on the morning magazines. In less than an hour of combat Exeter had fired of March 1. Just before running his ship on the reef, de Vries signaled, “Beached while sinking in Straits of Soenda.”92 The code books and charts were locked in a weighted chest and thrown overboard. Her torpedoes were also launched. Crewmen attempted to arm the scuttling charges, but the approach of a Japanese destroyer prevented them from setting the timers. However, the fire on her deck largely accomplished their objective; several hours later flames reached the aft magazine and blew off most of Evertsen’s stern. Intense heat weakened the foredeck so greatly that the bridge partially collapsed. From the shore her crew watched the Japanese destroyer approach and drop anchor. It sent a boarding party over to Evertsen; the Japanese explored the wreck but took nothing. The destroyer The wreck of Evertsen on Seboekoe Besar Island after the war (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). then departed without contacting

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

nearly 1,000 8-inch rounds, half her ammunition supply. A disproportionate number had been fired from the two forward turrets and the remaining rounds had to be equally redistributed between the forward and aft magazines. What Exeter’s crew did not know was that Captain Gordon already had his marching orders. In a communiqué to RearAdmiral Palliser and Rear-Admiral Glassford earlier that day, Vice-Admiral Helfrich directed Exeter to make for Colombo: Every effort is to be made to sail EXETER from Sourabaya tonight Saturday accompanied by ENCOUNTER and U.S. Destroyer POPE. After clearing harbour she should proceed east along Madura coast for about 20 miles and steer north passing East of Bawean Island. She should then steer north before altering course for Sunda Strait. She is then to proceed to Colombo. CCCF to inform British authorities concerned. COMSOWESPAC to direct U.S. destroyers accordingly.95

At 1500 on the afternoon of February 28 Captain Gordon notified Rear-Admiral Palliser that two boilers had been restored and could be reasonably relied upon for a maximum of 15–16 knots. It was hoped that two more boilers would be brought online shortly, giving a top speed of 23–24 knots.96 Despite the good news, it was somewhat disconcerting that there was no time for a trial run to test the efficacy of the repairs. Gordon and his engineering crew would not know Exeter’s true capabilities until she put out to sea. Palliser ordered Gordon to make for Colombo per Helfrich’s directive. Escorted by Encounter and Pope he was to sail northeast of Bawean before turning west along the south coast of Borneo. This would take Exeter clear of Japanese forces on Java’s north coast. Gordon would turn south that afternoon and make a night run through the Soenda Strait. Rear-Admiral Glassford expressed concern about the possible presence of Japanese ships and recommended that Exeter instead transit the Lombok Strait.97 Palliser overruled him and ordered Gordon to depart for the Soenda Strait that evening. Captain Gordon returned to Exeter and called a meeting of all ship’s captains. There, he laid out plans and course headings for their voyage. The small formation faced a number of harsh realities. There were no other Allied ships to support or reinforce them. And with the Japanese invasion of Java in full swing, it was extremely unlikely that they could expect any air support should the need arise. They would be completely alone in a Java Sea now fully controlled by the Japanese. Departure time through the Westwater Channel was set for 1900 on the evening of February 28. The most logical route would normally have been through Soerabaja’s Eastwater Channel, which offers direct access through the 50-mile-long Bali Strait. It is then a straight shot along the south coast of Java to Tjilatjap. But as Exeter drew 21 feet, 1 inch,98 she was too large to navigate the Eastwater Channel which had a depth of only 13 feet at low tide.99,100 Thus, Exeter would have been forced to exit the much deeper Westwater Channel and loop around the north coast of Madoera. The distance involved meant she would not have been able to reach the north entrance of the Strait before nightfall.101 This would

have exposed her to air attack during daylight hours from bombers at both Makassar and Bali. The Bali Strait was considered to be the best alternative of all the smaller passages east of Java, although it can still today be somewhat treacherous.102 The average depth of the strait is approximately 165 feet which was more than enough to accommodate Exeter.103 The north entrance is only 1½ miles at its widest point and opens to 28 miles wide at its southernmost end. The northern end, in particular, is marked by shifting sandbars, shoals, reefs and extremely fast currents.104 Thus, passage through the Bali Strait was not considered a viable option for Exeter’s escape into the Indian Ocean.105 There remained one final detail for Exeter to attend to before sailing. Despite Japanese air raids on Soerabaja throughout the day, a burial detail went ashore to inter the 14 crewmen killed the day before. At 1700 they were laid to rest with full military honors in a ceremony attended by representatives from all local Dutch military units. The detail then returned to Exeter which was making final preparations to sail. At the last minute Captain Gordon was informed that Witte de With was to join his force. Lieutenant-Commander Schotel got orders to depart the ME by 2100 and join Exeter at sea shortly after midnight.106 Exeter’s anticipated course headings and speeds were passed along to navigation officer aboard Witte de With. However, the Dutch destroyer never joined them and Captain Gordon received no word as to why. It later transpired that Witte de With never sailed. Her warped propeller shaft vibrated heavily with a “constant rattling sound” and Lieutenant-Commander Schotel was doubtful that Witte de With could maintain pace with Exeter, even at the British cruiser’s reduced speed.107 Vice-Admiral Helfrich, who presumably gave the order, was apparently in the dark regarding the extent of the Dutch destroyer’s damage. Thus the sortie to join Exeter was canceled and Witte de With was instead ordered into drydock.108 The first night was quiet and calm; the sky was clear with a full moon and visibility of 10 miles.109 Upon clearing the Westwater Channel minefield, Encounter and Pope took up position—to port and starboard respectively—1,500 yards ahead of Exeter.110 In an ominous sign of what lay ahead, Pope intercepted a series of signals from Houston beginning at 2230. Although they soon died out they indicated a fierce battle in the Soenda Strait. This clearly forewarned the possibility of the Soenda Strait being closed, but Captain Gordon maintained his course rather than deviate to the Lombok or Sapi Strait.111

“Conform in general to my movements” By 0025 on the morning of March 1 the formation was 30 miles southeast of Bawean and had turned north toward the Borneo coast.112 As hoped, two additional boilers had been brought back online and speed was gradually increased to 23 knots, maximum speed for Exeter on four boilers.113 Although it had been smooth sailing up to this point, things would soon rapidly go downhill for Captain Gordon.

28. Hopeless Fights At 0400 lookouts aboard Exeter spotted two Japanese merchant ships escorted by a cruiser or destroyer. Captain Gordon turned west to avoid them and was apparently not seen. At 0730 lookouts spotted the masts of heavy cruisers to the south. They belonged to Haguro and Nachi of the 5th Cruiser Squadron—escorted by Kawakaze and Yamakaze—which covered the landings at Kragan. Between 0730 and 0800 Exeter sent her final signal to Pope: “Conform in general to my movements.”114 Exeter turned north and the Japanese cruisers soon disappeared from sight, having made no indication they had spotted the Allies. Unfortunately, they had been seen; but because Haguro and Nachi had expended so much ammunition the previous afternoon, Admiral Takagi elected not to engage. He instead remained just over the horizon and called up reinforcements.115 At 0935 Exeter sighted additional masts dead ahead. They belonged to the heavy cruisers Ashigara and Myoko with Akebono and Inazuma in escort. Captain Gordon turned east. In the meantime Exeter’s black gang had been able to light a fifth boiler, letting her work up to 25, and later, 26 knots.116 But with two enemy heavy cruisers and two destroyers on its port quarter, and two more heavy cruisers and two destroyers on its starboard beam, the Allied formation was effectively boxed in. At 0920 the first Japanese spotter planes—two E8N “Daves” from Haguro—appeared overhead.117 One of the pilots was Lieutenant Michio, who had spent the previous day over the CSF. During a break on March 1, the order of “Immediate Scramble Preparation” echoed through the ship. After reporting to the bridge, I was told by the captain, “We found the enemy fleet! Take off immediately! We will let you know the course and other detailed information later.” I raced down to the flight deck to an already prepared plane. We departed immediately. Before we reached the assigned altitude, I spotted a heavy cruiser flanked by two destroyers. It was the British heavy cruiser Exeter and destroyers Encounter and Pope. Myoko, Ashigara and Akatsuki [sic] which initially sighted the enemy fleet, engaged first. The Japanese warships seemed to have easy targets and the battle was one-sided. This time I didn’t have many concerns. I was a joyful spectator because firing was done by Myoko and Ashigara. Nachi and Haguro had used up most of their ammunition during the previous battle.118

At 0935 Encounter and Pope opened fire at 12,000 yards on Akebono and Inazuma which closed from the northwest.119 They were joined by Exeter’s 4-inch guns. The Japanese destroyers made smoke and turned away. As they did Ashigara and Myoko opened fire; Exeter replied at 0945 from 27,500 yards.120 Her fire control system immediately suffered a technical malfunction that initially went unnoticed. As a result, her salvos consistently fell wide throughout the battle; the problem was eventually noticed and Exeter resorted to using a Dumaresq and the ship’s clock to calculate her fire.121 With Encounter and Pope on his port quarter, Captain Gordon increased speed to 26 knots but knew full well there was no escape.122 With their speed advantage the Japanese cruisers easily followed; Ashigara and Myoko still on the port quarter with Haguro and Nachi on the starboard beam. Their respective destroyers took up position to port of Exeter. Ashigara

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and Myoko spearheaded the attack as spotter planes from all four cruisers buzzed overhead. Japanese fire was heavy and accurate. Although repeatedly straddled, neither Exeter nor her destroyers had been hit as they zigzagged between the water columns. Captain Gordon split fire between both enemy cruiser formations; but with ammunition stocks at just 20 percent his gunners had to be conservative. To cover her, Encounter and Pope laid smoke which limited visibility on both sides and the Japanese were forced to slow their rate of fire. Likewise, Exeter was unable to fire more than four or five salvoes before visibility was obscured.123 The Japanese slowly closed the range. At around 1100 their destroyers again came into range and were engaged by Encounter, Pope and Exeter’s secondary batteries. Her main batteries also targeted the destroyers when the cruisers were obscured. Exeter also fired on the Japanese observation planes when they periodically drifted into range.124 The range was now well under 10,000 yards—almost pointblank for the cruisers—as the Japanese pressed their attack. At 1105 Exeter launched four torpedoes at Ashigara and Myoko at 6,000 yards. Five minutes later Pope launched two torpedoes at the same cruisers from 7,000 yards out. Lieutenant-Commander Blinn then reversed course and fired four more torpedoes at Ashigara, and five at Haguro and Nachi from 10,000 yards. The Japanese easily evaded all of the torpedoes, but did open the range.125 At 1115 the fight became even more unequal as Haguro and Nachi opened gunplay at 17,000 yards.126 Several minutes later Encounter and Pope engaged Akebono and Inazuma which attempted a torpedo attack. Although it was successfully driven off, the remaining Japanese ships simultaneously launched a series of torpedo attacks, which all missed.

“Sink the ship” The failure of the torpedo attacks turned out to be immaterial as Exeter suffered her first shell hit at 1120, nearly two hours after the fight had started. Ironically, it was another 8-inch shell to her starboard boiler room. In a repeat of her action two days earlier, the shell exploded and again severed her main steam line. Superheated steam flooded the compartment and leaking fuel oil immediately caught fire. As pressure dropped the engines slowed and speed fell off. At the same time electrical power failed, leaving Exeter’s main turrets and secondary mounts frozen on all different bearings.127 Her steering also failed. Within minutes Exeter’s speed dropped to four knots; soon after she stopped completely. The fire in A Boiler Room forced its evacuation. Just four feet from the flames, separated by a single bulkhead, was the ship’s 4-inch magazine. With no way to bring the fire under control the magazine was flooded to prevent a catastrophic explosion.128 Another fire also burned out of control in the officer’s quarters; but without power Exeter’s damage control parties could make little progress toward bringing it under control.

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were undogged and left open.130 As water poured freely into the doomed heavy cruiser demolition charges were simultaneously detonated, further hastening her demise. Listing heavily to port, Exeter coasted to a stop, leaving behind a stream of fuel oil, wreckage and crewmen. Black smoke poured from amidships as fires burned out of control below deck. The Japanese cruisers ceased fire at 1145. Ikazuchi then closed in and fired a spread of four torpedoes, one of which struck Exeter dead amidships on the starboard side. She almost immediately came back upright, then rolled completely horizontal to starboard and sank “in a swirl of water, smoke and steam” at approximately 1150.131 As Exeter slowed, Encounter and Pope pulled ahead as they continued to engage the Japanese destroyers. Captain Gordon ordered them to make a run for it, but Encounter’s bid was short-lived. She had attracted the attention of Ashigara and Myoko which fired several 8-inch salvoes in her direction. At 1135 a shell fragment punctured a suction pipe in her engine room, knocking out Encounter’s forced lubrication system. Her engine bearings then overheated and began smoking heavily, which was sucked into the engine room by the ventilation system. This forced the evacuation of the engine room.132 Encounter’s chief engineer notified Lieutenant-Commander E.V.S.J. Morgan that the damage would require two hours to fix.133 Surrounded on all sides by enemy ships, dead in the water and with only one A torpedo from Ikazuchi administered the coup de grace to Exeter (World War II Database). gun still in action, Lieutenant-Commander Morgan ordered his crew to scuttle Encounter and abandon ship. She went down at 1206 and her survivors were later picked out of the sea by Ikazuchi.

As Exeter’s guns fell silent the Japanese closed in. Ashigara, Myoko, Haguro and Nachi continued to pound her from long range; Exeter was now straddled and hit multiple times. Their destroyers also closed to just within firing range. At 1135 Captain Gordon realized that Exeter was lost and gave the order to abandon ship. To ensure that she was not taken as a prize he gave orders to scuttle Exeter. Although main power was out, her intercom system was still operating and crewmen heard him issue the command: “Sink the ship.”129 With this order, her seacocks and magazine valves were opened. Condenser inlets were opened so that the engine room flooded; watertight hatches

Alone in a Sea of Blood

Exeter’s final moments (United States National Archives).

Now only Pope remained. Chased by Japanese shells and laying smoke, Lieutenant-Commander Blinn took refuge in a nearby rain squall at 1145. When that petered out he briefly passed through a second squall at 1210. Pope had fired 345 rounds of 4-inch ammunition, which emptied the forward magazine. Her crew used the time to redistribute her remaining shells between the fore and aft magazines. They also made temporary repairs to the brick retaining wall around her #3 boiler which had crumbled from the concussion of her own guns.

28. Hopeless Fights At 1215 the ship broke out of the squall into bright sunfilled daylight; there was not a Japanese ship in sight.134 Blinn set course for the Borneo coast; he planned to loop around the Japanese ships and make a run to the south and escape into the Indian Ocean via the Lombok Strait. However, shortly after Pope came out of the weather cell, Lieutenant Michio immediately picked her up again. In contrast [to Encounter and Exeter], the Pope tried to escape east through a squall, while emitting heavy black smoke. I followed the American destroyer to the end. After maneuvering for 30–40 minutes, it suddenly stopped. Then, it started lowering boats and the crew tried to escape. I then received orders to return and was unable to see more.135 The report said that planes from our aircraft carrier Ryujo and destroyers sank it. It was a victory, but I felt a little bit like a wasted weapon.

Michio signaled her position and the Japanese cruisers moved to intercept. In the meantime, a second floatplane appeared. By 1230 six additional floatplanes appeared and they carried out a number of diving attacks.136 Although they scored no direct hits, Pope was near missed several times by a series of 132-pound bombs. One of these caused heavy damage below the waterline. It resulted in heavy flooding and warped the port propeller shaft, so that engine had to be shut down.137 Pope returned fire from her 3-inch AA gun, but the weapon jammed on the 75th round and had to be secured.138 A half hour later, six B5N “Kate” level bombers from Ryujo appeared and made four bomb runs from 3,500 feet. Although all missed, Pope was effectively finished. Her flooding could not be contained and the destroyer was settling at the stern. With only one propeller, Pope was sluggish to respond and becoming unstable. It was obvious that she would be unable to evade her pursuers. At that point Blinn brought Pope to a full stop and issued orders to scuttle the ship. As her crew left the ship a pair of 10-pound scuttling charges went off. They were then surprised to hear the roar of gunfire. Ashigara and Myoko had arrived unnoticed and now opened fire on Pope from about 4,000 yards. Their sixth salvo was a direct hit and Pope sank by the stern in approximately 15 seconds at 1410.139 Unlike the men aboard Encounter and Exeter, who were picked up immediately, Pope’s crew drifted in the open sea for two days before the destroyer Inazuma returned to the area and rescued them. All three Allied ships were sunk in approximately three hours. In return the Japanese reported no damage to any of their ships. Of the 40 torpedoes fired by both sides (25 Japanese and 15 Allied) during the battle only one—from Ikazuchi— struck home. As in the Java Sea two days earlier, Japanese gunnery was not much better. Their cruisers had fired 2,650 rounds with only one of those hitting before Exeter was disabled.

Flight of the “Four Stackers” At the same time Exeter was preparing to sail, the 58th Destroyer Division140 was also making preparations to depart the East Indies altogether. Without torpedoes, the “four stack-

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ers” were of little value to Vice-Admiral Helfrich and he authorized Rear-Admiral Glassford to evacuate them to Exmouth Gulf. In response, Glassford telephoned Commander Binford twice on the afternoon of February 28. On the first call, Binford was ordered to fuel his ships and prepare to leave Soerabaja that evening; but he was to stand by for further orders.141 Binford urged him not to wait much longer; if they were to leave Java it needed to happen very soon before the door slammed shut. Pope was initially to join them. But because she was the only seaworthy Allied destroyer still carrying torpedoes, she was detailed to escort Exeter.142 In his second phone call Glassford directed Binford to detach Pope and sail for Australia. The operational plan called for the American destroyers to depart the ME and make for Exmouth Gulf via the Bali Strait. Unlike Exeter, the small Clemson Class destroyers drew only nine feet, 10 inches of water and could easily transit the Eastwater Channel. Their primary challenge would be clearing the channel minefield without the aid of navigational beacons or buoys which had been extinguished or sunk as soon as the Japanese landed. Alden and John D. Edwards got under way at approximately 1700; they were followed by John D. Ford and Paul Jones at 1730. To deceive any Japanese reconnaissance aircraft that might have been lingering overhead, John D. Ford moved up the Westwater Channel for several miles. She then reversed course and rejoined the others near the Eastwater Channel lightship. In column formation—John D. Edwards, Alden, John D. Ford and Paul Jones—they crept out of the Madoera Strait at two knots, moving between the south edge of the Eastwater Channel minefield and the north coast of Java.143 At 2102 on February 28 they sighted a Dutch patrol boat at 3,000 yards but made no challenge.14 4 Just after 0000 on March 1 they cleared the minefield and entered the Bali Strait.145 Binford ordered General Quarters; a Dutch ammunition ship had recently been sunk in the area and he expected a fight. It was a clear night with visibility to 10,000 yards. To mask themselves the destroyers covered their most reflective spots and hugged the dark Java shore. At 0115 they cleared the narrowest part of the strait and increased speed to 25 knots. By 0210 they neared the southern entrance of the Bali Strait. There lookouts sighted a Japanese destroyer 8,000 yards off the port bow; several minutes later they spotted additional lights and two more destroyers came into view.146 All belonged to the 21st Destroyer Division which patrolled the Southern Bali Strait. They were to prevent any Allied ships from escaping or additional reinforcements from reaching Java. Still masked against the shore, the American destroyers remained unseen for 20 minutes. At 0230 Commander Binford ordered an eastward turn to avoid a large reef and the Japanese destroyers finally picked up his force. They joined up in column formation and opened fire. John D. Ford was straddled by their first salvo and near-missed several times. But she was undamaged and no other ships were targeted. The 58th Destroyer Division increased speed to 27 knots as Binford made a run for the open sea which was just a few miles away.

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942 The Japanese destroyers had been patrolling at slow speed when the fight started. They boosted speed but quickly fell behind after only a few minutes. As soon as they disappeared the American destroyers ceased fire; eventually the Japanese stopped as well. At 0321 they opened fire again but Binford did not re-engage to avoid giving away his position. By dawn the 58th Destroyer Division was well into the Indian Ocean. All expected an air attack from Bali, but none developed and Commander Binford set course for Exmouth Gulf. En route this changed to Fremantle where the destroyers put in on March 4.

A Failed Rescue

The Japanese and American destroyers now paralleled each other briefly and a brisk firefight ensued at a range of 5,000 to 6,000 yards. The Japanese were able to effectively use their range finders in the clear night. The Americans were not able to find the range and scored no hits.147 In an attempt to keep the Japanese out of torpedo range they simulated a torpedo launch of their own using primers and dummy charges.148 Commander Binford’s orders were to avoid a fight and his ships only maneuvered just enough to avoid enemy gunfire and before returning to their original course.149

The Commodore Commanding China Force radio station logbook shows that Captain Waller’s signal regarding the loss of De Ruyter and Java was received at 0050 JST on the morning of February 28.150 It was then retransmitted to Rear- Admiral Koenraad; the CMR logbook indicates that the KM radio station at Soerabaja received it at 0400.151 Upon reading it, Koenraad signaled the pilot of Y-67, which still remained on station over the Eastern Invasion Convoy, to investigate.152 Hundreds of miles to the south in Australian waters, Tromp picked up the following signal from Rear-Admiral Koenraad on the KM frequency at 0432 JST: “De Ruyter and Java Ships disabled by explosions 0227–1730Z 06– 00 S / 12–00 E.153 Abort mission. Investigate ships and report. By dawn return to 2 esgb.154 Hospital ship will depart Soerabaja and pick up survivors.”155 He also directed the hospital ship Op ten Noort to depart Soerabaja and make for the cruisers’ last known posi156 tion. Her commander, Captain G. Tuizinga, received RearAdmiral Koenraad’s initial signal ordering him to sail immediately at 0600.157 Immediately afterward, Tuizinga received additional verbal orders from Koenraad to also search for survivors in the vicinity where Kortenaer had gone down.158 Captain Tuizinga put out of Soerabaja as directed and set course for the coordinates provided in Captain Waller’s original signal. Forty miles southwest of Bawean a Japanese light cruiser (likely Jintsu) and two destroyers (Amatsukaze and Murasame) suddenly appeared at 1400.159 They signaled Op ten Noort by

28. Hopeless Fights flag to halt. In his postwar memoirs, Lieutenant-Commander Hara wrote, We hoisted flags ordering it to stand by for inspection, and sped toward the ship. Through binoculars I watched a small elderly man, apparently the ship’s skipper, on deck hastily putting on a uniform. His hands were shaking and he appeared very nervous. As we closed I read the name Optennote, [sic] and our Ship Register confirmed that it was a Dutch hospital ship.160

As Captain Tuizinga brought Op ten Noort to a stop, Hara sent over an armed boarding party consisting of one officer and six petty officers. An hour later they returned and confirmed the ship’s identity and hospital status.161 Despite it being against the rules of war to detain a hospital ship, Rear-Admiral Tanaka ordered Lieutenant-Commander Hara to detain Op ten Noort and escort her to a rear area. As is common with many of his wartime recollections, Hara omits a number of details. In the case of Op ten Noort these are filled in by the postwar report of her Chief Medical Officer, Lieutenant-Commander A.W. Mellema. He reported that Op ten Noort was boarded by “heavily armed … Japanese sailors and marines” who destroyed the ship’s radio. After “much back and forth” with their ships, Captain Tuizinga was ordered to a position north of Bawean. He was told to remain there until 1200 the following day.162 Afterwards Op ten Noort could operate freely as long as she remained east of Bawean, which precluded her from rescuing any survivors from the prior night’s battle.163 Following this encounter it does not appear that the Japanese kept very close tabs on the hospital ship. At 1300 on March 1 Op ten Noort raised anchor and Tuizinga set an easterly course with the intention of escaping south through the Alas Strait to Australia. Her bid for freedom was short-lived. Just four hours later a Japanese floatplane appeared overhead and its crew ordered Op ten Noort to return to Bawean, which Captain Tuizina did.164 There he again dropped anchor and the ship was left alone. The following day Op ten Noort was escorted into Bandjermasin by a Japanese minelayer.165 There Op ten Noort was to take aboard some 800 survivors from De Ruyter, Java Exeter, Encounter and Pope whom the Japanese had already rescued. She was then to transport them to Makassar. Captain Tuizinga protested his ship being

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detained in violation of the Geneva Convention; transporting the Allied seamen to Makassar would effectively place Op ten Noort in Japanese service. The Japanese naval officer in charge admitted that her detention did violate the rules of war, but that he did not care. The survivors in question had been in the water for 48 hours and were in bad shape. He told Tuizinga that the only other ship available, a Japanese tanker, had no tarps under which to shield the survivors from the sun. If Op ten Noort took over this task the lives of many men would be saved.166

“Many American survivors 5 miles north of Tandjoeng Awar Awar” By now Rear-Admiral Koenraad had received S-37’s signal reporting De Ruyter’s whaleboat in the Java Sea. This likely precipitated his order to the commander of GVT.6 to send out a plane to search for survivors.167 In response X-28 flew north and soon saw Op ten Noort moving north in company of Amatsukaze and Murasame. As the Dornier circled overhead they responded with AA fire.168 X-28 continued on and took AA fire from Japanese ships at regular intervals over the next three hours.169 Soon after the X-boat signaled, “Many American survivors 5 miles north of Tg. Awar Awar”170 This was the same group led by Lieutenant-Commander Bennink, De Ruyter’s AA gunnery officer. The reason for mistaking them for Americans is unknown. Koenraad tried to have Op ten Noort go to their aid but could not raise her. Presumably the pilot did not attempt a rescue because of the heavy enemy presence in the area.171 Thus, the effort to rescue the survivors of De Ruyter and Java failed and all were captured or died at sea as a result. At 1500 on February 28 Rear-Admiral Koenraad received word that S-38 was en route to Soerabaja with survivors from Electra. Unaware that Op ten Noort was already in Japanese hands, at 1700 he ordered her to rendezvous with the American submarine near the Westwater Channel lightship. When the KM radio station at Soerabaja could not raise the hospital ship, the minesweeper Abraham Crinssen was directed to relay the order.172 But with her radio wrecked by Amatsukaze’s boarding party, Op ten Noort never received their signals.

Chapter 29

The Final Line of Defense The British Submarines Withdraw

he did not intend to spend any more time than necessary in the Java Sea. By 1200 on February 28 Truant was north of Rembang at coordinates 06-13 S / 111-20 E. This was her assigned patrol zone but Haggard did not tarry and continued west. At 1200 on the afternoon of March 1 Truant was at coordinates 05-32 S / 108-12 E. This placed her some 115 miles north of Eretenwetan where Japanese troops were going ashore. Haggard sighted two Japanese cruisers (or large destroyers) but was unable to close.9 By the early morning of March 2 Truant was in the Soenda Strait. There she was detected by a Japanese destroyer which dropped seven depth charges.10 They exploded very close but the submarine was undamaged. By 1200 on March 2 Truant had successfully navigated the Soenda Strait and put into Colombo on March 8.11

With the loss or evacuation of the last major Allied surface ships, the naval defense of Java now fell to the American, British and Dutch submarines along with a handful of motor torpedo boats. As the Japanese invasion convoys neared Java they encountered those submarines which Vice-Admiral Helfrich had positioned in the Java Sea. To be effective a submarine relies on the element of surprise, which did not exist off the coast of Java in late February/early March 1942. Strong Japanese A/S countermeasures and a high level of alert reduced their effectiveness to minimal levels. As Lieutenant J.R. Reynolds, commander of the S-37, later commented, only the high concentration of Allied submarines off Java at the time allowed them to be productive by splitting the attention of the Japanese escorts.1

Trusty

The Dutch Submarines

The Allied submarine force had already been reduced in number with the withdrawal of Truant and Trusty from the Java Sea as previously detailed.2 Trusty had not been unable to repair her leaking fuel tank and had seen no action since arriving on February 19. Trusty sailed for Colombo via the Soenda Strait on February 26.3 Lieutenant-Commander W.D.A. King traveled on the surface as much as possible for the sake of speed.4 Trusty was approximately 50 miles northwest of Tandjoeng Priok on February 28 when a Japanese patrol plane forced Lieutenant-Commander King to crash dive. Although strafed on the way down Trusty suffered no serious damage.5 She reached Colombo on March 7.

On February 28, the day after Rear-Admiral Doorman’s crushing defeat in the Java Sea, K-IX, K-XI, K-XII, K-XIII and K-XVIII remained in Soerabaja. K-XVIII was still out-ofcommission after being severely battered off Balikpapan. Everyone knew Soerabaja was a primary objective of the Japanese and emergency repairs continued in a last-ditch effort to get the damaged submarine seaworthy. The remaining three boats were under the direct command of Vice-Admiral Helfrich and were preparing for special sea duty.

K-VIII Despite numerous mechanical failures—including the loss of her starboard electric motor and starboard diesel—Lieutenant-Commander M.A.J. Derksema kept K-VIII on station.12 By February 28 the crippled submarine patrolled the Java Sea between Madoera Island and Bawean Island in a grid at coordinates 6–14 S / 113–00 E. However, the Japanese invasion convoy was farther west and she sighted nothing. On March 2 LieutenantCommander Derksema put back into Soerabaja to refuel.13

Truant Truant had orders from Vice-Admiral Helfrich to take up a picket station north of Rembang. However, after following O-19 through the Westwater Channel minefield on the afternoon of February 26 she never arrived (or remained for any length of time) at her assigned station.6 Lieutenant-Commander H.A.V. Haggard had received an order from General Wavell dated February 25 ordering him to make for Colombo via the Soenda Strait.7 Haggard was directed to operate in the Java Sea until his torpedoes ran out.8 But with one of Truant’s diesels out of commission, which limited his surface speed to 11 knots,

K-IX It will be remembered that K-IX had re-entered service at the end of February after a long period in material reserve. Her

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skipper, Lieutenant-Commander Th. Brunstig, had been ordered to conduct a long-range patrol into the Gulf of Siam. Due to her advanced age, Brunstig’s boat almost immediately suffered engine problems and K-IX was forced to put back to Soerabaja.14 While repairs were in progress Vice-Admiral Helfrich took the submarine under his direct command as well for special duty.

K-X With her repairs complete K-X departed the submarine basin at 0030 on the morning of February 28. LieutenantCommander P.G. de Back had orders to patrol north of Lasem, a small coastal village six miles east of Rembang. En route, RearAdmiral Koenraad directed him to linger just inside the Westwater Channel minefield.15 K-X was to cover the withdrawal of returning ships from the CSF and attack any pursuing Japanese forces.16 Both Rear-Admiral Doorman and Vice-Admiral Helfrich were copied on this signal; but as De Ruyter and Java had been disabled an hour earlier it is unlikely that Doorman ever received it. K-X did not leave the mouth of the Westwater Channel until after 1000 on the morning of February 28.17 By nightfall she was north of Rembang and heading toward her assigned picket station.18 Lieutenant-Commander de Back was making a periodic position check through the periscope when he sighted two cruisers and four destroyers at a range of approximately five miles. He immediately turned toward them at full speed before reducing power as the range closed.19 When de Back went up for his next periscope check he initially saw the cruisers and destroyers now retiring. As he swung the periscope around he was surprised to see no less than seven Japanese destroyers charging in at a range of just one mile. Lieutenant-Commander de Back remained at periscope depth and ordered full speed as K-X turned into them to attempt a risky “down the throat” shot. That failed when one of the destroyers passed directly overhead. Although he dropped no depth charges on that pass, the Japanese captain immediately turned back toward the submarine’s position. K-X now had no choice but to go deep and run silent. Although the elderly submarine was only designed to withstand 130 feet de Back bottomed out at 197 feet! At that depth he was forced to blow his main tanks in order to maneuver as the boat’s ballast pumps refused to work, probably due to the extreme pressure.20 Over the next 22 hours K-X endured four series of three close depth charges each as the Japanese ASDIC pinged nonstop.21 During that time the crew heard the heavy rumble of engines and propellers as the Eastern Invasion Convoy passed overhead.22 When the destroyers finally gave up and the pinging died out, de Back surfaced at 2200 to charge the batteries. As her diesels rumbled to life de Back set course to the southsouthwest in pursuit of the convoy. Only an hour after surfacing K-X was spotted by a Japanese destroyer in the clear night.23 It immediately opened fire

with typical IJN accuracy, forcing de Back to crash dive. Although not directly hit, a shell partially shot away K-X’s radio antenna which was attached to the periscope. Another depth charge followed and de Back again went silent and bottomed out. K-X attempted to reach periscope depth five times during the night and morning, but was punished with a series of depth charges each time. K-X was held down for another 18 hours. Depth charges rocked the submarine; they loosened the conning tower hatch which began leaking and could not be fully stopped. By now, multiple rivets in her hull had been popped and several loose seacocks also leaked. Pumps kept up with the flooding, but if they were damaged or malfunctioned the results would have been catastrophic. Deteriorating conditions inside K-X added to the crew’s misery. At 1200 on March 1 Lieutenant-Commander de Back ordered the use of potassium packets to cleanse the air and help ease their suffering somewhat. By 1600 that afternoon the pinging died out. De Back waited another hour to be certain and then surfaced at 1700.24 On the surface her gunners manned the submarine’s 88mm deck gun and turned back toward Soerabaja. There were no enemy ships in sight. But K-X had been heavily damaged and could not stay at sea, much less take another pounding from the Japanese, who by now were highly alerted to her presence. She limped into Soerabaja at 2200 on the night of March 1. Although they had not scored any successes the crew of K-X was commended for upholding the finest traditions of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

O-19 25 After escorting Trusty through the minefield on the afternoon of February 26, O-19 set course for her assigned picket station. Lieutenant-Commander H.F. Bach Kolling initially had orders to patrol approximately 25 miles north of Tandjoeng Awar-Awar near the mouth of the Bay of Toeban; he was to see “what was going on there.”26 En route he received orders from Vice-Admiral Helfrich to make for a position north of Rembang. By the afternoon of February 27 O-19 was at coordinates 06-09 S / 111-54 E en route to her new patrol station. This put the submarine southwest of Bawean Island as Rear-Admiral Doorman’s cruisers fired the opening salvoes in the Battle of the Java Sea. At 1635 her crew heard a large explosion in the distance and Bach Kolling immediately dove. Although out of range of the immediate battle the submerged submarine heard a series of sounds, including “loud ticks, soft explosions and a series of hard pops.” They also heard a mysterious, unexplained sound “like a heavy cable was scraped along the boat.”27 The sound operator then heard the sound of propellers. By now the CSF was heavily engaged with the Japanese. At 1910 there were more heavy explosions and Bach Kolling sat on the bottom of the Java Sea until they subsided. At 2200 he began steering to the west very slowly while the sound man reported

29. The Final Line of Defense random propeller noises. By 2230 these had died out and O-19 went up to periscope depth at 2240. Seeing nothing, LieutenantCommander Bach Kolling surfaced at 2250 in order to charge his batteries. Running on diesels O-19 continued west at full speed to reach her patrol station off Rembang. Just 20 minutes later lookouts sighted the silhouettes of unidentified warships moving north. Since O-19’s batteries were nearly drained Bach Kolling did not pursue. He was also hamstrung by an order from Rear-Admiral Koenraad to all Allied submarines which forbade them from attacking any warships that night.28 With Rear-Admiral Doorman at sea Koenraad wanted to avoid a case of friendly fire. This was reinforced at 2320 when lookouts spotted a column of ships. From her silhouette the lead ship was identified as De Ruyter trailed by “four destroyers” in column formation.29 Beginning at 2340 lookouts aboard O-19 saw a series of starshells and flares to the east. They were accompanied by muzzle flashes, cannon fire and explosions. These continued periodically until 0230 on the morning of February 28. Unbeknownst to Lieutenant-Commander Bach Kolling and his crew, they had just witnessed the fiery destruction of De Ruyter and Java. Still under orders to make for Rembang, O-19 continued to the west at 15 knots. At 0115 lookouts sighted two additional ships in the distance also moving west. These were Houston and Perth retiring to Tandjoeng Priok after being waved off by Rear-Admiral Doorman. At 0515 Lieutenant-Bach Kolling submerged and set course for Rembang. Upon reaching her patrol station, O-19 assumed a zigzag course while searching for Japanese ships. Bach Kolling was concerned because he had received no instructions or briefing regarding the possible presence of American submarines in the area and did not want to torpedo one of them in error. Nor did he receive a signal from Vice-Admiral Helfrich at 0200 on February 28 which ordered O-19 into Tandjoeng Priok when it came time to refuel. Bach Kolling was then to patrol in the western entrance of the Soenda Strait. Soon after, Bach Kolling received an order to remain in the area of Rembang. A Japanese invasion convoy consisting of 34 transports and 11 warships had been sighted 75 miles north of Rembang at 5–25 S / 111–25 E. It was moving south at 10 knots with a heading of 110 degrees. The Japanese were expected to land somewhere between Rembang and Tandjoeng Awar Awar. An order to attack them followed. This was followed by a signal from Vice-Admiral Helfrich that all KM submarines were to remain on station in the East Indies; they were to fall back on Colombo as their remaining fuel supply dictated.30 Lieutenant-Commander Bach Kolling was then ordered farther west to attack the convoy off Eretenwetan. By the morning of March 2 O-19 was patrolling between Boompjes Island and the Djawa Islands. At 0550, off Boompjes, her soundman heard the unmistakable buzzing of an armed magnetic sea mine. This was followed by two nearby explosions. Bach Kolling immediately turned north and cleared the area. Like Jupiter the night before, O-19 had nearly run into a Dutch minefield laid to help defend the island’s lighthouse.

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O-19 patrolled off the north coast of Java and into the Java Sea for the next two days. She then moved farther east and patrolled off the Lombok Strait. At 1300 on March 6 O-19 was depth-charged by a Japanese destroyer near the north end of the strait. However the destroyer only dropped two depth charges and O-19 was able to escape unharmed into the Indian Ocean. There, Bach Kolling patrolled along the south coast of Java. Then on March 9, the Governor-General issued an order directing all Dutch submarines to evacuate East Indies waters. O-19 put into Colombo on March 21.

K-XIV K-XIV had been patrolling northwest of Banka Island and in the South China Sea since February 4. On February 26 Lieutenant-Commander P.A. Mulock van der Vlies Bik was ordered to take his boat into the western Java Sea in anticipation of Japanese landings on Java. K-XIV remained off west Java for the next week, but saw nothing.31 On the morning of March 1 Lieutenant-Commander Mulock van der Vlies Bik sighted the invasion convoy of 10 transports escorted by Yura and the 22nd Destroyer Division as they lay off Tandjoeng Bobos.32 He initially sighted Yura at 1200 and moved to set up an attack. At 1430 he sighted her again at a range of six miles as the light cruiser stopped to recover her observation plane. Forty- five minutes later, at 1515, K- XIV launched two torpedoes from approximately 3,000 yards, but Yura successfully evaded both.33 With his position now revealed, Mulock van der Vlies Bik pulled the plug and went deep; K-XIV leveled off at 98 feet (30 meters). Between 1522 and 1635 the Japanese aggressively counterattacked the Dutch submarine. They dropped a total of 25 depth charges in six separate attacks, from which K-XIV suffered minor damage.34 After their propellers faded Mulock van der Vlies Bik went up to periscope depth; but when he raised the periscope to assess the situation three explosions quickly roared nearby.35 It would appear these were bombs from Yura’s aircraft, which had lingered in the area for such an occasion. Lieutenant-Commander Mulock van der Vlies Bik again went deep but no more attacks followed. By now, K-XIV had been at sea for just under a month and had three leaking cylinder heads.36 Mulock van der Vlies Bik signaled Vice-Admiral Helfrich requesting permission to put into Tandjoeng Priok. The admiral denied this request as the port was already in the process of being evacuated and destroyed by KNIL engineers. A barrier had also already been laid to prevent the Japanese from making use of the harbor.37 Instead, Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered K- XIV to make for Colombo via the Soenda Strait, where she arrived on March 13.38

K-XV Under the command of Lieutenant-Commander C.W.T. baron van Boetzelaer, K-XV had been on patrol in the Java Sea

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and Indian Ocean since leaving Soerabaja on February 14. On February 26 she and K-XIV were ordered into the Western Java Sea to patrol off Bantam Bay. Two days later, on the evening of February 28, she put into Tandjoeng Priok at 2200 only long enough to refuel. This was completed by 0300 and K-XV put out again. She had barely cleared the harbor when a Japanese plane forced her to dive.39 Two hours later, Lieutenant-Commander baron van Boetzelaer raised his periscope to make a quick observation. He immediately sighted a large oiler screened by a cruiser, three patrol boats (destroyers?) and two aircraft.40 This was the 15,050 ton fleet oiler Tsurumi, which carried 8,800 tons of fuel oil for the Japanese invasion forces operating off west Java.41 Closing the range as much as possible without being detected by the escort, baron van Boetzelaer fired a single torpedo from his stern tubes, which missed. It does not appear that the Japanese were alerted by this attack as Dutch sources make no mention of a counter attack. A short time later baron van Boetzelaer tried again. He fired a second torpedo from his stern tubes, this one from a slightly deeper depth in order to avoid detection in the clear water by the aircraft patrolling overhead. As K-XV went deep her crew clearly heard the thud of a heavy explosion as the torpedo hit Tsurumi. Although not sunk she was damaged and forced to retire to Singapore for repairs.42 K-XV had barely reached a safe depth as the first depth charges began exploding around the boat. For the next five hours Lieutenant-Commander baron van Boetzelaer and his crew were subjected to 67 depth charges and an unknown number of bombs dropped by the patrolling aircraft.43 The Japanese attacks tapered off late in the afternoon and K-XV was finally able to surface that evening. The counter-attacks had been intense, accurate and severely battered the boat; the most visible physical damage was a leak from one of her reserve fuel tanks. The emotional toll was much worse. As K-XV surfaced many crewmen were openly crying as the extreme tension faded and a number of them threw up.44 With his boat damaged and leaking fuel, LieutenantCommander baron van Boetzelaer made a high- speed run through the Soenda Strait. On March 4 K-XV rendezvoused with the KM tanker Petronella (TAN 8) in Veeckens Bay on South Pagai Island. From there the submarine sailed for Colombo where she arrived on March 13.

The American Submarines At this point in the East Indies campaign the majority of the USN submarines were either deployed in the eastern Java Sea, Banda Sea or Flores Sea. Others were engaged in various special missions to the Philippines or had already been withdrawn from the East Indies by Rear-Admiral Glassford. In the case of the latter boats they were en route to Australian ports. As a result, most American submarines missed the Japanese invasion convoys altogether and few saw any action during the final days of February.

S-37 After rescuing Seaman Sholar and Seaman Penhollow from De Ruyter’s lifeboat, S-37 continued on her patrol. Approximately three hours later Lieutenant Reynolds raised his periscope and sighted a Jintsu class light cruiser with four destroyers moving at 12 knots; he turned to attack at 1612. However, the Japanese had seen him as well and the destroyers charged in and initiated a depth charge attack. Reynolds went to 140 feet and the first depth charges followed him beginning at 1631. 45 Although periodically depth charged for several hours, S-37 suffered no damage and Lieutenant Reynolds was able to surface again some 2½ hours later, just two miles from where she had been originally attacked. When Reynolds came to the surface at 1853 on February 28 lookouts sighted Japanese destroyers some distance to the north. However, S-37 was perfectly silhouetted in the bright moonlight and one of the destroyer soon put a searchlight beam directly on the submarine. She immediately dove and Reynolds moved out of the area. Throughout the night he periodically saw searchlights and flares in the distance. At 2247 S-37 heard depth charge explosions in the same area.46 At 0042 on the morning of March 1 Reynolds again turned toward the Japanese convoy in the vicinity of Rembang. At approximately 0130 his lookouts sighted four destroyers and two additional ships that could not be identified. As S-37 tried to close she lost trim control and Reynolds spent an hour recovering and getting his boat back in order. When she surfaced at 0310 the Japanese ships had disappeared into the darkness. At 0430 lookouts sighted gunfire and searchlights at a distance of eight miles. This was most likely a fight which shaped up between Dutch MTBs and Japanese escorts off Tandjoeng Petokol, a small peninsula projecting into the Bay of Toeban midway between Lasem and Rembang. A short while later three Japanese destroyers were spotted; they were not moving and there were no other warships or merchant ships in the area. But because S-37 had only nine torpedoes Lieutenant Reynolds did not attack. He assumed that transports and heavy warships were nearby and wanted to save his “fish” for those targets.47 S-37 continued to patrol her 25-mile square zone throughout the morning and afternoon of March 1 with no other contacts. At around 2100, while traveling on the surface, she spotted another submarine at coordinates 6–23 S / 112–01 E. After a short discussion, Reynolds and his XO decided that it was K-X en route to her assigned picket station north of Rembang.48 At 2120 the other boat submerged. Beginning at 0030, to avoid a potential case of friendly fire, Reynolds changed course to steer a wide berth around the area for the next 20 minutes before coming back on his original course.49 S-37 had barely come back on course when she ran across a large oil slick about 1,500 yards wide at 6–18 S / 111–57 E. Approximately 10 minutes later all on the bridge distinctly heard a male voice yell, “Hey!” Although the submarine maneuvered to pick the man up he could not be found in the dark water. After fruitlessly searching without any other sounds from

29. The Final Line of Defense the man, Lieutenant Reynolds abandoned the effort and continued on course. At 0325 S-37 again heard the sound of nine depth charge explosions in the distance. Fifteen minutes later lookouts sighted two destroyers 9,000 yards distant. Shortly afterwards a parachute flare appeared and it was assumed that a patrol plane had dropped it, for the destroyers immediately turned and headed for that location. Lieutenant Reynolds attempted to follow while submerged, but with a top speed of only three knots the Japanese ships quickly outpaced him and disappeared. About an hour later they heard the sound of depth charges and aircraft bombs but nothing could be seen through the periscope. After lying on the bottom of the Java Sea throughout the day on March 2 to let his crew rest, Reynolds surfaced after dark to recharge his batteries. S-37 was spotted by two Japanese destroyers and was depth charged. Although the submarine was moderately damaged she slipped away and Reynolds moved toward the eastern Java Sea. A leaking hatch gasket proved very troublesome and required constant attention and repair for the remainder of the patrol. S-37 made no more attacks and put into Fremantle on March 19.

S-38 After plucking Electra’s survivors out of the water in the early morning hours of February 28, Lieutenant-Commander H.G. Munson continued on to his assigned picket station north of Rembang. This was reached on the early afternoon of February 28, but Munson was unsure of his exact position. There were heavy ocean currents in the area and he could not risk surfacing or raising his periscope to obtain a position fix during daylight hours. Due to the presence of a Dutch minefield in the Bay of Toeban Munson assumed a stationary patrol until S-38 could surface after dark.50 Soon after surfacing that night lookouts spotted a submarine in the distance which Munson identified as a Japanese “I-53 Type” submarine. Although he attempted to close, it quickly disappeared. His lookouts spotted it again later but his batteries were very low and the bright moonlight made a surprise attack impossible.51 The failure of both these attacks was fortunate, for the Japanese had no submarines in the Java that night. Since the submarine was not American it could only have been British or Dutch. At 1938 Munson received orders from Rear-Admiral Glassford to proceed to Soerabaja. There S-38 was to rendezvous with the hospital ship Op ten Noort near the Westwater Channel light ship and transfer the English sailors. As S-38 got underway a shout from someone in the water was clearly heard. This was most likely a survivor from Jupiter which had gone down nearby the night before. Despite a careful search the voice was not heard again and the submarine abandoned the search and resumed course for Soerabaja.52 By 0000 on the morning of March 1 S-38 had sighted the Westwater Channel lightship. But Op ten Noort was nowhere in sight. Instead, Exeter, Encounter and Pope were seen setting

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out through the minefield’s “B Gate.” Recognition signals were exchanged and both continued on their respective courses. Lieutenant-Commander Munson later learned that S-38 was the last Allied ship to see Exeter and her escorts before their loss.53 The submarine now proceeded through the minefield and transferred Electra’s survivors to the inner lightship at 040354; by 0619 she had again passed through the minefield into the Java Sea. By 2000 that night S-38 was about 70 miles northwest of the Westwater Channel at coordinates 6–29 S / 112–27 E.55 At 2124 lookouts spotted a small black object resembling a Dutch “K-Type” submarine. S-38 challenged but received no reply; in response, the approaching submarine submerged. For his part, Lieutenant-Commander steered well to the north in order to stay out of torpedo range. This was most likely K-X, which was still en route to Soerabaja after being heavily depth-charged north of Lasem. She reached Soerabaja at 2200 on the night of March 22, which would have put her in the general neighborhood of S-38. In any event, no other Dutch boats were in the area at that time. S-38 continued to move north into the Java Sea. Although Japanese troops had already landed, the Java Sea still buzzed with warships as the IJN covered merchant ships offshore and escorted in new supply convoys. At 0315 on the morning of March 2 S-38 sighted two Japanese warships 60 miles north of Toeban. As the range dropped under three miles Munson identified the leader as a “Yubari Class” light cruiser; in reality it was most likely Jintsu, flagship of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla.56 She was escorted by an unidentified destroyer. What followed was a fast-paced and vicious, short-range duel. At 0324 Jintsu sighted S-38’s periscope; Captain Kozai Torazo turned to port and dropped seven depth charges. Two minutes later Lieutenant-Commander Munson launched two torpedoes from the forward tubes at a range of 750 yards; but the angle was incorrect and both missed. Almost simultaneously Jintsu fired torpedoes of her own, which ran ahead of the submarine. With full power on one engine and propeller, S-38 came hard to port and fired two more torpedoes “down the throat” from 1,200 yards. Through the periscope, Munson saw a puff of smoke and water column forward of the bridge; there was also an explosion much stronger than a depth charge.57 Thus, Munson claimed one “probable hit.”58 From 0332 S-38 sat on the bottom of the Java Sea at 186 feet as Jintsu’s destroyer escort pinged overhead. Below, Munson reloaded his tubes, served breakfast and rested the crew. Although the Japanese kept S-38 down for 11 hours they were not able to detect her location despite a destroyer passing directly overhead. They dropped a number of depth charges and aircraft bombs but none were close to S-38. With some effort Munson was able to break free of the mud and start moving again at 1430. At 1843 S-38 surfaced to charge her batteries. Less than half an hour later she spotted a Japanese destroyer at a range of five miles. Munson immediately dove and closed to attack. Again, S-38 was detected as the range closed. At 1921 the de-

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stroyer dropped two depth charges as it passed, but they were 1,200 yards away and did no damage. At 1923 S-38 launched two torpedoes which both missed. Munson then went deep to 120 feet. Not unlike his attack on Jintsu, the destroyers had trouble finding S-38 and there was virtually no counterattack. This let the boat again slip away undamaged. By 2134 Lieutenant-Commander Munson was again on the surface charging his batteries. At 2222 yet another destroyer appeared and his lookouts initially had trouble picking it up. Due to his low battery charge Munson first attempted to evade on the surface but was forced down again. This time the Japanese had no trouble finding S-38 and she was rocked by four very close depth charges that blew out a hatch gasket and caused flooding throughout the boat. When the Japanese moved off about an hour later, the crew pumped 2,400 pounds of seawater out of S-38.59 Shortly afterward Munson received orders from Rear-Admiral Glassford to retire to Exmouth Gulf through the Lombok Strait.

Permit After putting out of the ME, Permit patrolled in the Java Sea 40 miles northeast of Madoera from February 25 to 27. Lieutenant-Commander W.G. Chapple then received orders to take up a new picket station 30 miles north-northwest of the Soerabaja Strait60 which he reached on the morning of February 28.61 The new patrol station became a hot zone very quickly. At 1458 a flying boat flew very low overhead and disappeared over the horizon. Explosions were then heard in the distance to the southwest but nothing was seen. After dark fell Permit surfaced to charge her batteries. At 2230 his lookouts sighted three cruisers and three destroyers at a range of five miles. Chapple initially assumed they were part of the CSF and challenged them twice at 2243. When the ships failed to respond he gave the order to dive at 2245 and prepared for a depth charge attack.62 Five minutes later the destroyers were on top of Permit’s position and dropped four depth charges which fell to port. By 2325 the destroyers had moved off and Lieutenant-Commander Chapple got underway again, moving due south toward the Java shore. Permit was now about 35 miles north-northwest of Toeban and the area was heavily congested with ships from both sides. The Japanese transports anchored about 10 miles offshore and their troops moved ashore under cover of gunfire from several destroyers. Other warships crisscrossed the area to prevent any naval interference. There were so many Allied submarines that the Japanese seemed more focused on keeping them down and unable to attack, rather than on their destruction. Against this backdrop, Permit spent virtually the entire day of March 1 underwater. Her war patrol diary offers the following repetitive litany…63 2351—Still submerged; heard distant explosions. 0003—Depth charged. 0007—Rested on bottom at 200 feet. 0115—Surfaced; sighted three destroyers at range of four miles.

0118—Dived. 0142—Rested on bottom. 0319—Surfaced. 0410—Sighted three destroyers at range of three miles. 0410—Dived on course 250°. 0720—Sighted one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, three destroyers at range of six miles; all zigzagging. Initiated attack. 0759—Fired three torpedoes at destroyer screen from 600 yards; all missed. 0805—Three depth charges close aboard. 0825—One depth charge close aboard. 0843—Three depth charges close aboard. 0845—Rested on bottom. 0930—Underway on course 90°. 1050—Stopped and rested on bottom. 1100—Heard fast screws approaching. 1452—Underway on course 270°. 1722—Heard pinging on port quarter. 1733—Sighted two destroyers at range of five miles. 1801—Changed course to 290°. 1815—Sighted three destroyers at range of 10 miles. 1816—Changed course to 300°. 1825—Changed course to 000°. 1934—Surfaced. 2010—Sighted cruiser and changed course to 45° to intercept. 2023—Dived. 2049—Surfaced after losing contact with cruiser; sighted three destroyers. 2053—Dived. 2100—Four depth charges close aboard. 2130—Received orders to make for Luzon; changed course to 120°.

Even after being ordered to Luzon in the Philippines, Lieutenant-Commander Chapple had difficulty leaving the area. On the evening of March 2 Permit was detected by a Japanese destroyer while charging her batteries and again depth charged. But the destroyer only made two attacks, with three and one depth charges, respectively. After only an hour Permit was able to slip away undamaged. Early on the morning of March 4 Permit was again sighted by a Japanese destroyer which dropped nine depth charges.64 By now she had cleared the immediate area around Java and moved north into Philippine waters.

Sailfish Putting out of Tjilatjap on February 19, Sailfish initially patrolled south of the Postillion Islands between Zandbuis Bank and Longitude 118 degrees East until February 20. She then moved to a 40-mile lane between east Java and Bali. On February 28 her commander, Lieutenant-Commander R.G. Voge, was directed to take up a new 35-mile lane picket station off Tandjoeng Patjinan on the east end of Java.65 At 0030 that morning at his lookouts sighted a cruiser and two destroyers at a range of five miles. Voge stayed on the surface in an attempt to positively identify them. Although he had received Rear-Admiral Koenraad’s earlier order to limit attacks to auxiliary ships on the night of February 28, he interpreted it to mean only in the vicinity of Bawean Island.66 The coordi-

29. The Final Line of Defense nates of the sighting were 7-30 S / 115-17 E, placing Sailfish some 400 miles southeast of Bawean; thus, Voge felt safe in launching an attack. As he closed the cruiser opened a searchlight and drove him under. The ships then quickly sped out of range and contact was lost. Shortly afterwards Voge was ordered to take up position north of the Lombok Strait where he arrived by dawn of March 2. At 1025 Sailfish sighted a lone Japanese destroyer which Lieutenant-Commander Voge attacked with two torpedoes. The destroyer evaded the torpedoes and Sailfish was then bombed by one or two aircraft which had not been observed through the periscope.67 The submarine went deep for the remainder of the day. Sailfish surfaced at 1920 to charge her batteries. At 1937 lookouts sighted what they identified as a “Kaga Class” aircraft carrier escorted by three destroyers. In reality it was the 9,050 ton aircraft transport Kamokawa Maru.68 She was en route to Bali via the Lombok Strait with personnel, supplies, ammunition and “probably A6M fighters” for the 3rd Air Group and Tainan Air Wing at Den Passar Airfield.69 The Japanese were only making eight knots. Vogel assumed they were aware of his presence after his earlier attack and were proceeding slowly with their sound gear at maximum effectiveness. For that reason he elected to make a long-range attack from well outside the destroyer screen. Sailfish submerged and Voge launched four torpedoes at 4,000 yards; he remained at periscope depth throughout the attack. Just over four minutes later the first torpedo slammed into Kamokawa Maru’s port side under her bridge. There was a sharp explosion and a pillar of flame shot some 150 feet into the air.70 One minute later there was a second explosion but the location was not observed. The transport went dead in the water and sank in five minutes with the loss of 326 crew and passengers.71 Voge did not stick around to watch Kamokawa Maru sink. As soon as the first torpedo hit he pulled the plug and took Sailfish deep and ran silent at 250 to 300 feet. The escorting destroyers proceeded to drop 40 depth charges over the next three hours. Several were very close but Sailfish was not damaged and managed to escape. She patrolled along the Greater Soenda Islands for several more days and was depth charged. On March 8 Lieutenant-Commander Voge was ordered to Perth.72

Salmon By the early morning of February 27, Salmon was operating in the eastern fringes of the Java Sea at coordinates 7-30 S / 116-10 E. As reports of the Eastern Invasion Convoy’s position began to filter in Lieutenant-Commander E.B. McKinney changed course and began moving west. At 0040 on the morning of February 27 lookouts spotted three large vessels in the distance. They were identified as three “Naka Class” cruisers escorted by three destroyers.73 To avoid detection McKinney submerged but lost contact with the Japanese ships in the process. Salmon later resurfaced to continue charging her bat-

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teries. Approximately, three hours later at 0324 her lookouts sighted three more ships. Although visibility was bad McKinney submerged to avoid being seen prematurely. His torpedo gang loaded the two aft tubes but Salmon again lost contact in the poor weather.74 The following day a submarine was sighted on the surface at a distance of four miles. McKinney assumed it to be an American boat, but taking no chances, dived without issuing a challenge. Once Salmon was squared away following the crash dive McKinney went back up to periscope depth. By then the submarine had disappeared.75 He then continued on his patrol to the north. At 0736 her soundman heard propellers in the distance but nothing was seen in the periscope and they soon faded out. On the morning of March 2 Salmon was operating in the Java Sea midway between Bawean and Madoera at 6-10 S / 113-27 E. At 0045 Lieutenant-Commander McKinney was notified of a large ship approaching from the west at a range of 9,000 yards. Upon submerging he proceeded to track it by sound. Soon after McKinney made a visual sighting by periscope … a Japanese “Kuma Class” light cruiser at 5,000 yards.76 It was moving in a zigzag pattern at about 12 knots. Salmon fired four torpedoes at long range but all missed. The cruiser then made a wide turn to port and retired at high speed.77 Five hours later, at 0558, lookouts sighted three ships at a range of four miles and Salmon dived. But she had been seen and a destroyer immediately made a beeline to Salmon’s position. McKinney attempted to run silent, but Salmon’s exhaust valves leaked so continuously that he was forced to operate both the trim and drain pumps nonstop just to keep the boat dry. Even then, her diving officer was unable to maintain even trim. Although the destroyer only dropped four depth charges, two fell very close and severely rocked Salmon. It then lingered some distance off, sonar pinging, but was unable to establish contact despite the running pumps. McKinney was then able to slip away after a very stressful encounter.78 Salmon continued east and on the night of March 2 she was northwest of Bawean at coordinates 5-30 S / 112-25 E. This was a major shipping route for the Japanese as they reinforced their forces on Java. At 2235 Salmon spotted a small convoy consisting of two merchant ships escorted by two destroyers. They were moving north at approximately four miles. The submarine was apparently detected almost immediately for one of the destroyers suddenly went to high speed and changed course. Lieutenant-Commander McKinney did not wait to see if he was the target and immediately went to 150 feet. No depth charges were dropped but Salmon was effectively prevented from attacking. Still off Bawean Salmon sighted a single merchant ship at coordinates 5-13 E / 112-35 E at 0228 on March 5. Her soundman also picked up the screws of an escorting destroyer. At just under five miles McKinney fired two torpedoes using his Torpedo Data Computer and one hit with a massive explosion. McKinney reported it as a “Katori Class” light cruiser, but his target was the 4,466 ton naval transport Taito Maru79 which was only damaged.

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Then the escorting destroyer jumped all over Salmon. Its first attack consisted of seven depth charges, which battered the submarine. A series of very close explosions stopped her #4 Blower, blew interior lights, chipped off much interior paint and let water in through the conning tower hatch. A fuel tank was also damaged and Salmon lost 1,000 gallons of fuel.80 A second attack dropped only two depth charges but these too badly rattled the submarine. Although Salmon encountered several more destroyers over the next week she was unable to launch any additional attacks. On March 8 Lieutenant-Commander McKinney was ordered to take up a new station south of the Malay Barrier. Salmon reached Australian waters on March 23.

Saury On the night of February 28 Saury was off Tandjoeng Patjinan on the northeast coast of Java. Her captain, LieutenantCommander J.L. Burnside, Jr., had orders to patrol a lane 35 miles wide between the east coast of Java and Bali. At 2229 she was running on the surface when lookouts sighted what they believed to be a Japanese destroyer. Burnside dived but saw nothing when Saury came back up to periscope depth. He then decided that it had been Sailfish, which at the time, was operating in the area adjacent to his. To avoid a possible friendly fire incident he ordered Saury out of the area.81 Except for a small prauw on March 1 she saw nothing. But at 2150 on March 3 lookouts sighted two silhouettes approaching Saury. Thinking that they might be Japanese destroyers en route to the Soerabaja Strait, Burnside dived. However, his soundman heard no screws and they had disappeared by the time he came up to periscope depth. Several hours later lookouts sighted a submarine 3,000 yards off, which was thought to be S-38. Burnside again dived and changed course to clear the area.82 Saury spent the remainder of the first week of March patrolling the eastern end of the Madoera Strait and north of Mijnderts Reef. The entire area was isolated in terms of shipping activity; the reason for Saury and S-38 being in the area was to guard against a surprise Japanese invasion of Soerabaja from the eastern Java Sea. Saury sighted a number of ships, including another submarine, but was unable to attack. At 0015 on the morning of March 5 Saury spotted a Japanese destroyer in the eastern Madoera Strait. Burnside immediately submerged and went to 125 feet but had been seen by the enemy ship. Although the destroyer was never able to locate the submarine and did not drop any depth charges, her skipper was extremely tenacious. For five hours they played a cat and mouse game and Burnside had extreme difficulty evading his Japanese counterpart.83 Both ships varied their course and speed as Saury ran silently. At 0615 Saury was able to go back up to periscope depth where Burnside saw nothing. At 1440 the following afternoon Saury was surprised by the sudden appearance of an undetected Japanese destroyer. Although it passed without attacking, a second destroyer was then

detected 6,000 yards astern. In turn, this ship was joined by another destroyer. Together, the two destroyers spent the next hour—from 2148 to 2251—searching and periodically depth charging Saury. Several charges exploded close by but she suffered no serious damage and eventually slipped away later that morning.84 From there Lieutenant-Commander Burnside moved north to the Kangean Islands. By the morning of March 8 Saury was west of Sepanjang Island and south of Sapaneur Island. At 0259 her lookouts sighted a “small dark object” at a range of 5,000 yards. Then at 0305 they saw searchlights over the horizon which briefly lit up the Java coast. Ten minutes later they were followed by the muzzle flashes and the distant rumble of explosions. This continued for a short period but died out completely by 0342.85 Approximately 3½ hours later, at 0706, a Japanese destroyer was spotted at a range of 5,000 yards. This was apparently the destroyer Arashio; the engagement witnessed by Saury earlier that night was her sinking the Dutch minesweeper Jan van Amstel which made a late bid to flee Soerabaja. Burnside turned directly into the destroyer but was unable to get an attack off. Shortly afterwards, Saury was ordered to Perth.

Seal By the morning of February 28 Seal was approximately 140 miles southeast of Bawean at coordinates 6-12 S / 113-41.5 E. At 0242 lookouts spotted either a cruiser or large destroyer at between 2,500 and 4,000 yards. The submarine submerged but the target disappeared by the time she came back up to periscope depth and contact could be re-established.86 At 0855 Seal had nearly reached her new picket station south of Bawean. At coordinates 6-10.5 S / 112-48 E LieutenantCommander Hurd spotted the masts of several ships in the distance. As the range closed he was able to make out a Japanese light cruiser escorted by two destroyers in the bright moonlight. They were moving north at a range of 14,000 yards. Hurd took Seal down to 90 feet to close, but when he came back to periscope depth at 0921 Hurd was surprised to find that all three ships had disappeared.87 Seal resurfaced and continued into her assigned patrol area. Her lookouts spotted more ship’s masts, but they proved to be coconut trees on Bawean Island!88 At 2139 a PBY, likely Dutch, flew low overhead and disappeared into the night. At 2300 lookouts sighted a cruiser escorted by several destroyers at 6-12 S / 112-08 E. The range was between 8,000 and 10,000 yards with exceptionally good visibility. Hurd remained on the surface as he turned to close the range. Suddenly at 2316 the cruiser snapped on a large blue-white searchlight and illuminated the submarine. Seal crash-dived and the crew heard three explosions from either shell fire or depth charges as she went under. When Seal surfaced 30 minutes later the Japanese ships were disappearing into the distance.89 Seal made contact with the Japanese again at 0031 on the morning of March 1. At coordinates 6-14 S / 112-07 E she en-

29. The Final Line of Defense countered what her lookouts reported as a light cruiser and two destroyers in column formation at between 7,500 and 15,000 yards. Hurd fired two torpedoes at the third ship in line and went deep to 150 feet. In reality all were destroyers.90 Both torpedoes missed and the destroyers charged in. Although they pinged heavily the destroyers failed to locate Seal and eventually moved off. At 0115 six or seven depth charges exploded in the distance, yet the submarine was noticeably rocked. Later, when Seal came back to the surface, she found herself running parallel to four large oil tracks. There was a strong smell of crude oil in the air. Sometime later AA fire was observed to the south; this was likely the Japanese escorts firing on Allied aircraft from Java attacking the invasion convoy. At this point Seal was in a patch of ocean inhabited by K-X, O-19, Perch and Permit. Anxious to avoid an incident of friendly fire, LieutenantCommander Hurd turned north and cleared the area.91 Dawn on the morning of March 1 found Seal north of the Bay of Toeban at coordinates 6-16 S / 111-09 E. At 0625 Hurd sighted through his periscope what he reported as a light cruiser at 10,000 yards.92 He closed to 4,100 yards and fired four torpedoes from Seal’s stern tubes at 0640. The Japanese ship immediately took evasive maneuvers to port and all the torpedoes missed; it then charged down the torpedo tracks at high speed.93 Hurd took Seal down to 120 feet; as the destroyer passed overhead it dropped three depth charges. One of them shook the boat heavily, knocking off paint chips and blowing out several lights.94 As was often the case in the Java Sea the destroyer then simply disappeared and Seal cleared the area.

Skipjack Despite patrolling off Zandbuis Banks for several days Skipjack had seen no movement of any kind. On February 28, Lieutenant-Commander C.L. Freeman received orders to patrol between Sepandjang Island and Zandbuis Banks. At 0500 he spotted a large destroyer or small cruiser in the distance. But with the range at 10,000 yards and bright moonlight the target was problematic to approach. Eventually the Japanese ships disappeared from sight when Freeman submerged to close for his attack run. On March 1 Skipjack was ordered out of the East Indies and down to Fremantle via the Lombok Strait.

Perch After a routine refit, Perch sailed from Port Darwin on her second war patrol on February 3. Lieutenant-Commander D.A. Hurt had orders to re-enter NEI waters and aid in the defense of Java. On February 25 she passed through the Salajar Strait with orders to patrol along the 100-fathom curve northeast of the Kangean Islands. By that night Perch was off Kendari where her lookouts spotted a Japanese supply ship.95 Hurt initiated a surface attack but was spotted by the merchant vessel which opened fire with a 3-inch deck gun.96 The first round missed and Hurt dived; but a second shell slammed into the submarine’s conning tower.

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The antenna trunk was ruptured, several electrical cables damaged and the magnetic compass was flooded. Temporary repairs were made to the radio antenna trunk that permitted subsequent radio transmission. When Hurt resurfaced later night his crew was able to fix the antenna; he then signaled that Perch was able to receive, but transmission remained uncertain. On the night of February 28 Perch surfaced to charge her batteries. It was at that time that Lieutenant-Commander Hurt first learned of Rear-Admiral Doorman’s defeat off Bawean Island. In the same transmission all USN submarines still patrolling in the Java Sea were ordered to leave their assigned picket stations and move to intercept Japanese invasion convoys approaching the coast of Java.97 On the basis of this directive Hurt moved west and was approximately 12 miles northwest of Soerabaja by the night of March 1–2. While running on the surface, lookouts aboard Perch sighted the Japanese destroyers Amatsukaze and Hatsukaze four to five miles off.98 They initially passed astern and appeared not to notice the submarine. However, a lookout aboard Amatsukaze caught sight of Perch and both destroyers suddenly turned back and charged toward Perch.99 At just over 2,900 yards Amatsukaze opened one of her searchlights and opened fire. Hatsukaze fired as well. Although Lieutenant-Commander Tameichi Hara claimed one hit from Amatsukaze, Perch suffered no damage as Lieutenant-Commander Hurt pulled the plug.100 In response, Hurt quickly came back up to periscope depth and maneuvered for a shot on one of the destroyers with his stern tubes. Then at 600 yards his target changed direction and approached head on at high speed. Hurt’s navigation charts showed that he had 200 feet of water to work with in that part of the Java Sea, so he ordered 180 feet to evade the destroyers. But at just 147 feet Perch slammed into the muddy bottom of the Java Sea with her propellers still churning at full speed.101 Perch had barely reached 100 feet when her crew heard the first depth charges hit the water. The first attack—six depth charges from Amatsukaze102—did no damage; the second consisted of only four depth charges but they all exploded very close and severely damaged the submarine. All motor field relays tripped and had to be reset, power was lost on one of the boat’s shafts, 90 percent of the engine room gauges were broken by the concussion, her hull ventilation supply stop valve was frozen shut and a high-pressure air bank in the aft battery began leaking heavily. Most noticeable was a long indention in Perch’s hull, six to twelve inches deep.103 A third attack further hammered Perch as she lay on the bottom. Most of the damage this time was amidships. The hull exhaust duct flooded, soaking the fire control panel, while the battery exhaust valve was forced open and then closed. Several depth gauges were smashed by the concussion and the conning tower itself was compressed by two inches. Perch was also nearly blind. Her #2 periscope was frozen in place; #1 periscope could be raised but took four crewmen to turn. Gaskets sealing both the engine room and conning tower hatches had also been severely crimped and leaked nonstop. Adding to the water level

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inside Perch was a severe leak from her air conditioning water supply line.104 Although initially glued to the bottom of the Java Sea by thick mud, Hurt was able to work Perch free once the depth charging stopped. Amatsukaze and Hatsukaze remained overhead for another two hours but were unable to reestablish contact. Convinced that Perch had been sunk they eventually moved off. At 0300 on the morning of March 2 Perch resurfaced. There the crew found more damage when they were able to further examine the boat. All her radio antennas were smashed and the lenses of both periscopes had been broken. Her bridge blinker light had also been flattened. Perch was also nearly powerless; the #1 Main Engine “ran away” when started and the cam shaft on her #4 Main Engine was broken.105 Her #2 Main Engine was used to charge the batteries while only #3 Main Engine could be used for propulsion. But although Perch was badly damaged she was not out of the fight and Hurt turned south toward Rembang with the intention of attacking the transports there.106 Just over an hour later, 73 miles west of Bawean, the Japanese destroyers Sazanami and Ushio sighted Perch at a range of 6,650 yards and turned to close the range. At 1,000 yards her lookouts picked up the approaching destroyers.107 Hurt hoped to avoid a fight as Perch leaked heavily and her pumps had to be run nonstop just to maintain trim while submerged. He planned to go down to 200 feet and rest quietly on the bottom as her pumps could be shut down when his boat was stationary. The destroyers’ first attack of five depth charges did no damage.108 But with Perch unable to maneuver, Sazanami and Ushio soon established ASDIC contact. Over the next hour they made three more attacks, dropping 25 depth charges which inflicted more damage. Most disturbing was a 1½ inch deep bubble in the hull measuring 6 × 2½ feet. The bow planes were damaged and had to be operated by hand. Her antenna trunk leaked and the depth gauge indicated 228 feet although the bottom was only 200 feet. Multiple battery cells were cracked; all electric alarm systems and the phone system were knocked out. Her #1 main ballast tank, #1 and #2 air banks would not hold air. Perch’s fuel tanks were also damaged.109 Loss of ASDIC contact, combined with leaking fuel and escaping air, led the Japanese to believe that the submarine had been destroyed and they retired.110 It was now well after dawn and impossible for Perch to surface. Lieutenant-Commander Hurt was forced sit on the bottom all day while his crew made repairs. Pumps had to be run nonstop to prevent the submarine from flooding completely. At 2100 on March 2 Perch finally resurfaced after an hourlong effort to break free of the mud. On deck crewmen found the 3-inch gun had smashed sights and would not elevate. Repairs were attempted on the hatch seals but Perch still leaked heavily. During a shallow test dive she uncontrollably went to 60 feet and only the diving officer immediately blowing the tanks saved the boat. Back on the surface Hurt could only get

the forward deck above water.111 Perch slowly moved east on engine; although his boat was crippled, Hurt’s plan was to slip through the Sape Strait and make for Australia.

“Abandon ship, scuttle the boat!” Hurt’s plans went out the window just before dawn on March 4 when Sazanami and Ushio returned to the scene to confirm their kill. Aboard Ushio, Lieutenant- Commander Yoshitake Uesugi immediately noticed that Perch was damaged. Believing that she might be a Japanese submarine in need of assistance, he tried to make contact by light signal. Receiving no reply, he gave the order to open fire.112 Unable to submerge, fight back or run, Lieutenant-Commander Hurt gave the order,113 “Abandon ship, scuttle the boat!”114 As Perch’s crew abandoned ship her diving officer, 1st Lieutenant K.G. Schacht, and one enlisted man remained behind to destroy classified documents and scuttle the submarine. Schacht opened the engine room valves and ran to get off the submarine. The boat sank very quickly and Perch was already going under by the time he reached the bridge. Schacht had to fight through a torrent of water just to get up the conning tower ladder and off the submarine.115 After the war he received the Navy Cross for his actions.116 Ushio’s action report shows that Perch had disappeared by her third salvo and the destroyer then checked fire; Sazanami did not fire. The destroyers then passed over the sinking submarine and Ushio rolled off a single depth charge to complete the kill.117 Ushio then hove to and launched two whale boats which rescued all of Perch’s crew who were then taken to Makassar.118 En route they were well-treated by the Japanese and Lieutenant-Commander Yoshitake went so far as to seek out Lieutenant-Commander Hurt and offer condolences on the loss of his ship.119 Five weeks later, on April 11, the U.S. Navy Department publicly announced the loss of Perch: Navy Department Communiqué No. 70, April 11, 1942 The Navy Department today issued the following communiqué based on reports received up to 10:30am: Southwest Pacific 1. The U.S. submarine Perch has been overdue for more than a month and must be presumed to be lost. 2. The Perch was one of the U.S. submarines operating in the vicinity of Java and her last position report placed her in the Java Sea. 3. The next of kin have been notified. 4. There is nothing to report from other areas.

The Fight off Rembang 120 As the Japanese fended off a flurry of Allied submarines, the final surface battle of the East Indies campaign was shaping up off the coast of Rembang on the early morning of March 1. Lieutenant H.C. Jorissen, commander of TM 15, had taken a squadron of three Motor Torpedo Boats into the Bay of Toeban the past two nights.121 They loitered about near the protective minefield, but saw nothing. Three more patrolled along the

29. The Final Line of Defense

north coast of Madoera. All put back into the ME at dawn to refuel and rest their crews. On the morning of February 28 Jorissen was ordered to prepare for another night patrol as soon as possible. For this sortie he would have all the flotilla’s operational torpedo boats.122 A reconnaissance report indicated that 35 transports and 11 warships were nearing Java. They were expected to land troops in the vicinity of Rembang. With the destruction of Rear-Admiral Doorman’s force off Bawean, and subsequent evacuation of the remaining major Allied warships, Jorissen’s MTBs were literally Java’s last line of naval defense. As did submarines, torpedo boats relied primarily on stealth and surprise to maximize their offensive potential; thus darkness and limited visibility were preferred operating conditions. Unfortunately the night of February 28–March 1 saw a bright moon overhead with visibility of more than a mile. Likewise, the sea was dead calm with virtually no wind to help muffle the sound of their motors. The latter conditions, however, did allow the Dutch torpedo boats to operate at full speed. Putting out of Soerabaja that afternoon they sighted the 58th Destroyer Division making for the Bali Strait via the Eastwater Channel. Exiting the Westwater Channel the Dutch flotilla set course for the Bay of Toeban. Upon arrival at 2200 the boats split up and deployed to various points throughout the bay.123 A division of three boats—TM 7, TM 8 and TM 15—deployed to the area of Tandjoeng Awar Awar.124 The remainder patrolled various areas off Rembang and Toeban. On station, the torpedo boats sat silently or slowly patrolled with a close eye toward the Java Sea. Then at 0130 on

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the morning of March 1, 1942, Jorissen’s force received a signal from Soerabaja: a coastwatch position had reported five warships 10 miles north of Tandjoeng Awar-Awar and the three boats of his division moved to intercept. This was the Japanese 2nd Covering Force, which had the task of guarding the east flank of the Eastern Invasion Convoy. It consisted of the light cruiser Kinu and four destroyers.125 TM 7 was the first torpedo boat to make contact near Rembang. Some 20 minutes after receiving the position report her skipper, Lieutenant A.M. Thomas, sighted two unidentified Japanese destroyers at a range of 3,300 yards. Despite the bright moonlight he crept forward unseen for 10 minutes before the Japanese spotted the torpedo boat and opened fire. Locked in the beam of their searchlights, Thomas slammed the throttle forward and went to 36 knots almost instantly. He shouted for his crew to lay smoke but the nozzles of the smoke generators were clogged, leaving TM 7 fully exposed in the clear night. To make matters worse, the clutches on two of his engines began to slip. Unable to outrun his pursuers, Thomas put the wheel over and headed straight for the Java shore at full speed. Fearful of mines and running ashore, the Japanese slowed; this put some separation between the torpedo boat and the destroyers. But their searchlights still followed and TM 7 remained in range of their guns. Some 10 minutes later, just 200 yards offshore, he suddenly put the wheel over hard to starboard and escaped into the darkness. Masked against the shore the torpedo boat was all but invisible and the Japanese were unable to find her again. TM 7 circled back but was unable to re-establish contact.

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turned away under cover of smoke. The Japanese were quick to respond; within 15 seconds they had opened searchlights and were firing on TM 15. Some 2,200 yards astern, Jorissen reported seeing an explosion and pillar of flame on the bow of the large warship he had just targeted. At the same time its searchlight went out and her guns stopped firing. The second ship continued to fire for another five minutes. Japanese records indicate that TM 15’s target was the light cruiser Kinu; she was covering the Eastern Invasion Convoy although she had not been involved in the Battle of the Java Sea.128 Kinu was slightly damaged later that night (with three crewmen KIA), but sources state this was the result of British aircraft TM 5 launches a torpedo during a prewar training maneuver (courtesy Gerard Horneman). rather than a Dutch torpedo.129 About this time TM 8 re-entered Lieutenant Thomas continued to patrol the area before retiring the fight after being driven off two hours earlier. With Japanese on Soerabaja before dawn. attention focused on TM 15, TM 8 closed to 1,100 yards and Approximately 45 minutes later, at 0230, TM 8 also made launched both torpedoes. With Japanese gunners beginning to contact with the Japanese covering force off Tandjoeng Awartake serious notice of his presence, Lieutenant van Rees did not Awar. Lieutenant E.H. van Rees attempted to close but he too linger to monitor the results of his attack. As soon as the torwas foiled by the clear night. At around 2,200 yards his boat pedoes cleared their tubes the coxswain threw the wheel hard was also sighted and the destroyers opened fire with accurate over and turned away at full speed. As a result, the Dutch torsalvoes. Van Rees laid smoke and turned away unharmed. He pedo boat was unable to claim any hits. In return, the Japanese then resumed his patrol. destroyer Harusame claimed to have destroyed a Dutch motor Some distance away, Lieutenant Jorissen aboard TM 15 torpedo boat.130 observed flashes of gunfire at 0245, bearing 270 degrees. It came None of the other motor torpedo boats encountered Japafrom Japanese warships as they bombarded Dutch coastal ponese ships and the entire flotilla withdrew to Soerabaja before sitions prior to their troops going ashore. Jorissen changed dawn. The only other action came when a Japanese floatplane course and headed toward the muzzle flashes at low speed to attacked TM 15 as Jorissen entered the harbor. It caused no caremain undetected. At 0315 his navigator got another fix on sualties and the flotilla tied up with no more than light damage their position when the Japanese opened fire again. By 0415 from the night’s action. Lieutenant Jorissen was interviewed TM 15 was north of Tandjoeng Petokol, a small peninsula soon afterward and a story detailing his attack on Kinu aphalfway between Lasem and Rembang. peared in the March 3, 1942, edition of Java’s General Indian At 0430 his lookouts spotted what they reported to be Times daily. two “2,500-ton flotilla leaders.”126 Jorissen targeted the trailing After their action off Rembang several of the motor torship which looked larger than a destroyer; it was not a transport pedo boats required extensive maintenance which there was no or merchant ship and had the “silhouette of a warship,” he stated time, facilities or yard crews to carry out. For this reason they in a postwar interview.127 TM 15 was able to close to within 765 did not sortie again. With their final mission, the Allied naval yards without being detected. She launched both torpedoes and defense of the Netherlands East Indies officially ended.

Chapter 30

Evacuation On February 26 Lieutenant-Commander (USNR) J.S. Mosher visited the Allied headquarters at Lembang while en route to Australia.1 In the War Room he saw the latest operations maps, upon which, yellow markers marked the most recent reported positions of Japanese naval forces closing in on Java. It was a depressing sight, as they filled all the sea lanes to the north, east and west of Java. They were also operating as far south as Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean.2 The latter forces were those of Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s powerful 1st Carrier Fleet.3 The same force which had attacked Pearl Harbor and pulverized Darwin was now operating south of Java. Nagumo had sailed from Staring Bay on February 25 in coordination with the invasion convoys descend-

ing on Java. His carriers were followed by a main battle force under Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo.4 Both formations were to interdict Allied efforts to reinforce Java. They would also prevent an evacuation of Allied personnel similar to those at Dunkirk and Crete earlier in the war.5 Although operating independently the two formations were collectively designated the “Southern Fleet.” They easily moved through the Lesser Soenda Islands into the Indian Ocean without Allied interference. Willem van der Zaan sighted the Japanese carriers on the evening of February 27.6 Still making just 10 knots the Dutch minelayer had parted company with Langley the previous day after her failed attempt to escort the tender into Tjilatjap.7

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At 1610 Willem van der Zaan’s lookouts spotted an aircraft in the distance. By 1800 she was 130 miles southeast of Tjilatjap at coordinates 08–39 S / 109–70 E; 45 minutes later lookouts reported two large warships 12 miles distant, bearing WNW. Five minutes later Lieutenant-Commander Küller turned away to 90°.8 At 1930, it appears that emergency repairs to her leaking pipes allowed the minelayer to make 12½ knots. This let Küller put some distance between his ship and the Japanese. Given their close proximity only good fortune and nightfall saved Willem van der Zaan from destruction. She put into Tjilatjap at 0600 on the morning of February 28 and sailed for Colombo the following day. Activity at Tjilatjap resembled that of an enraged anthill. One morning harbor pilot C.B. Droste counted more than 80 ships moored to wharves, in the river channel and in the roadstead. Warehouses were jammed with goods and equipment of all types; vehicles and even crated aircraft lined the streets. Incoming ships were unable to obtain fuel, water or food for days. Any semblance of efficiency had all but disappeared. Droste and the other harbor pilots worked day and night to keep both ships and the port moving.9 It was amid this chaos that Lieutenant-Commander Küller’s report of Japanese carriers was received. Although Soerabaja and Tandjoeng had been regularly bombed throughout February Tjilatjap remained out of range. Nonetheless, reconnaissance planes visited the port on a regular basis and an air attack was expected any day. On the afternoon of February 27 there were still some 50 ships in port. All it would take was a single vessel being sunk in the narrow channel to trap them for weeks until the wreck could be cleared. Fearing attack from Nagumo’s force, Vice-Admiral Helfrich signaled Tjilatjap’s naval commander, Commander B.J.G. Schokking, to clear the port as soon as possible: “All merchant ships fully seaworthy and with sufficient radius to reach Australia or Colombo must immediately leave the harbor to position 200 miles offshore and wait for orders via radio.”10 Helfrich’s order sparked a beehive of activity in the already frenetic port. It was late in the day and the tide was going out, which meant large merchant ships were at risk of being trapped in the harbor overnight. Those with steam up sailed immediately; others were ordered to vacate Tjilatjap by nightfall. To clear the port harbor pilots convoyed out multiple vessels at the same time.11 A total of 24 ships sailed that night12; 23 others—mostly small inter-island cargo vessels and tankers—remained behind. Nearly all were under 1,000 tons and neither designed nor suited for open-ocean transit. There were several exceptions. The large cargo ships Kota Baroe,13 Sloterdijk14 and Tawali had just put into Tjilatjap carrying aircraft and munitions.15 They remained in port and continued to unload their cargo until March 2.16 Likewise, Sea Witch with her cargo of P-40s also remained in harbor. The KM supply ship Janssens was also held back by Commander Schokking for possible evacuation duty.17 The passenger liner SS Poelau Bras tried to exit the channel several hours after the tide went out and ran aground. She sailed at 0400 on the morn-

ing of February 28 as soon as the morning tide lifted her off the sand bar. Also heavily loaded with war cargo, Tawali put into Tjilatjap on February 26. She was ordered to sail on February 27, but was still unloading. The ship first suffered engine trouble and then ran aground, but eventually left Tjilatjap on the night of February 27. Tawali reached a position 420 miles south of Java where the ship loitered. The 10,909-ton Zaandam was the last ship out of the harbor. She sailed just before Poelau Bras with nearly 10,000 tons of cargo, which meant she drew more than 30 feet of water. Because she was so sluggish and slow to respond it was feared that Zaandam would run aground in the channel. However, she just barely skimmed through the channel with the evening tide and safely reached the Indian Ocean. There were a number of small warships operating at Tjilatjap under the local command of Schokking. They included two small Dutch minesweepers and the gunboats USS Asheville and USS Tulsa; their main duty was to escort merchant convoys out of harbor and into the Indian Ocean. They also conducted harbor patrols and provided local defense. Although rarely in port Willem van der Zaan was also under Schokking’s command. GVT.5 with three PBYs conducted regular A/S sweeps over shipping lanes to and from Tjilatjap and over the Indian Ocean.18 Rear-Admiral Glassford and Rear-Admiral Palliser spent most of the night of February 28-March 1 discussing the situation on Java. At 0000 on March 1 the report of a B-17 en route to Australia reached them. Two Japanese formations—two carriers escorted by light forces and two battleships escorted by cruisers and destroyers—had been seen south of Java. Both were within a few miles of each other moving northwest 150 miles southeast of Tjilatjap.19 After the loss of Langley—together with Willem van der Zaan’s report—all expected Tjilatjap to be bombed on the morning of March 1.20 In light of these reports, both Glassford and Palliser saw Tjilatjap as being seriously threatened and no longer tenable for surface ships.21 In short, it was the end of the line for Java as an Allied base. Nevertheless, Vice-Admiral Helfrich—fighting to preserve the last sizeable piece of Dutch territory free of Axis occupation—was determined to assemble his remaining naval strength at Tjilatjap and continue the fight. At 0900 on the morning of March 1 Glassford and Palliser visited Helfrich’s headquarters in Bandoeng. Palliser, in his capacity as Helfrich’s chief of staff, rather frankly advised the Dutch admiral that there was now no port in Java from which Allied naval forces could safely operate. Palliser stated that there was no longer any useful purpose for continuing the fight on Java. He recommended that Helfrich cancel his orders directing all remaining surface ships to rally at Tjilatjap, and instead, order them to India or Australia.22 The result was a sharp exchange between the Dutch and British officers23: Helfrich: I must decline to accept your recommendation. I must continue resistance as long as long as I have ships that can fight. I have already ordered a greater concentration of submarines against the

30. Evacuation enemy in the Java Sea. The enemy will make another attempt to land tonight near Rembang. He may succeed tonight but I shall attack the next wave of transports. Palliser: Then I must say to you as the senior British naval officer in this area, that my instructions from the Admiralty are to withdraw His Majesty’s ships from Java when resistance will serve no further useful purpose. That time, in my judgment, has come. Therefore, I feel it my duty to order His Majesty’s ships to India at once and this I propose to do! Helfrich: You realize that you are under my orders? Palliser: I do of course. But in this vital matter I cannot do other than my duty as I see it. Helfrich: You know that I lent to the British when Malaya was threatened, all of my fighting fleet—my cruisers, my destroyers, my submarines, my air—all of it was placed at your disposal for operation as you saw fit. In doing so we suffered grave losses. Furthermore, you did not hold Malaya. Singapore is now in the hands of the enemy. You failed. I think the wisest course now is to let me continue to handle this situation and save Java. Palliser: I cannot alter my decision. Helfrich: Will you delay one hour until I see the Governor General and inform him of what you intend to do? Palliser: I cannot delay longer. Every minute counts now. Helfrich: And you, Admiral Glassford, what do you intend to do? Glassford: My instructions are to report to you for duty. Any order you give me will be obeyed at once. I wish to say to you, however, that I concur without reservation in the advice given you by your Chief-of-Staff. I am to retire on Australia by order of my Command-In-Chief if necessary to abandon Java, but that is for you to decide. Helfrich: Very well then, Admiral Palliser, you may give any orders you wish to His Majesty’s ships. Admiral Glassford, you will order your ships to Australia!

With that exchange the meeting ended. Both Admirals remained in Bandoeng and sent a flurry of last-minute orders to their respective forces while Helfrich met with Governor General van Starkenborgh Stachouwer some 30 minutes later. He told the Governor General that he had dissolved the Allied naval command on Java.24 Helfrich then informed Glassford and Palliser that he had ordered the dissolution of the Allied naval command in the NEI. Glassford signaled all USN ships still in NEI waters to make for Exmouth Gulf, Australia.25 In the meantime, Helfrich signaled the following to all Allied commands: I have resigned command of Allied Naval Forces. S.O. China Force ordered withdrawal of British Naval Forces and U.S. Naval Forces excepting (submarines)? are also being withdrawn. This is with my consent. Hope you will provide me all possible escort. I shall try to send all my remaining forces to Colombo.26

At 1030 Helfrich met with Glassford privately and expressed both his gratitude, and that of the Governor General, for the loyal support of the USN in the defense of Java. Glassford was at liberty to leave Java and would need to depart immediately if he intended to beat Helfrich off Java.27 Glassford signaled Rear-Admiral Purnell aboard USS Holland in Exmouth Gulf to temporarily assume command of USN operations while he evacuated. It was the last USN order from Java. By the morning of February 28 all American warships remaining in Tjilatjap—including Asheville, Tulsa, Lark28 and Isabel29—had departed by 1200. By March 1 all were clear of

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the harbor and moving south toward Exmouth Gulf. Asheville experienced engine problems and fell behind the formation30; unable to keep up she was left behind to make repairs and catch up as best she could. The lone American ship in Tjilatjap was now Seawitch. Despite the precarious situation ashore, Commander Schokking had refused her permission to sail until her cargo of crated P-40s had been completely unloaded. This was completed at 2000 on February 28 and her master sailed immediately.31 All USN ships in NEI waters were ordered to proceed to Exmouth Gulf via a common rendezvous point at coordinates 15 00 S / 113 00 E. Palliser separately issued the same orders to all RN and RAN ships then en route to Australia. They were not to remain in the area, just to pass through the area and pick up any vessel that might provide mutual protection or escort.32 However, the number of Allied ships which actually followed through on this order remains unknown. By 1100 on the morning of March 1 Glassford and his staff were en route to Tjilatjap by car where they arrived late that evening. He and Palliser (who arrived previously) immediately reconvened and worked to coordinate the departure of all remaining American and Commonwealth merchant ships and warships still in the port. Several Dutch merchant ships had also been chartered by the British for the evacuation of their remaining civilians, consular staff and surplus military personnel.33 They would also carry a number of U.S. civilians and the staff of Consul General Walter A. Foote. The merchants were escorted to out to sea by USN, RN and RAN auxiliary warships whenever possible. USN personnel were evacuated from Tjilatjap by submarine and aircraft, including PatWing 10 PBYs and a number of Qantas flying boats chartered by the U.S. Army.34 One of the latter aircraft was lost during these flights, killing several American military personnel. It also set off a squabble for reimbursement between Qantas and the U.S. Army which continued well into the war. Glassford and Palliser departed Tjilatjap by PBY around midnight on March 1 and arrived at Exmouth Gulf in the early hours of March 2. In the meantime Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered Willem van der Zaan and all damaged Dutch submarines to make for Colombo. Those ships designated for local defense were to resist for as long as possible; when that broke down they were to break out or be scuttled. Helfrich himself had orders from London to establish a new headquarters at Colombo and continue the war. He departed Bandoeng by car on March 1 and went to Lake Bagendit near Garoet. There he went out aboard Y-56 of GVT.16 and flew to Colombo.35 Upon landing he and a staff of 25 officers and men set up a temporary command post aboard the submarine tender Colombia.

The “Runaway Fleet Memo” Helfrich’s chief of staff, Rear-Admiral J.J.A. van Staveren, remained behind on Java and assumed the title of acting CZM in the East Indies.36 Although he was to continue the fight for

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as long as possible, van Staveren’s primary duty was to oversee the evacuation of KM personnel and equipment from Java. Due to resistance from Vice-Admiral Helfrich and Governor General van Starkenborgh Stachouwer there was virtually no advance planning. As a result, it was a grossly disorganized and chaotic operation that saw thousands of KM military and civilian personnel left behind. Still more were captured or killed at sea. In the summer of 1940, following the German invasion of Holland, Vice-Admiral Helfrich called for maximum resistance from the KM, both on land and at sea, should the NEI come under attack. In the event of Japanese landings on Java all fuel stocks would be destroyed if they could not be moved to another Allied port. Demolitions would be carried out by the respective base commander.37 The possibility was also considered in which ships of the East Indies Squadron might no longer be able to operate from Soerabaja; or that the entire NEI might be controlled by hostile forces. In February 1941 Vice-Admiral Helfrich distributed a classified memo on a limited internal basis. It contained instructions for Dutch warships and aircraft in the event that Soerabaja were occupied and communications with KM headquarters broken.38 Dutch naval commanders in the East Indies were to assume that the CZM would attempt to reestablish command and control over the fleet. In the meantime, they were to make every effort to reach Allied territory. It was heavily emphasized that even if forced from Dutch territory, KM ships and aircraft were to actively continue the war and uphold the “the honor of the Dutch flag.” And finally, Helfrich decreed that no ship or aircraft was to fall into enemy hands while it still had any kind of fighting capability.39 In the event of their being forced to operate from bases outside the NEI, larger seagoing ships received orders to take aboard stocks of cold weather gear and European style uniforms. The orders applied to the cruisers, flotilla leaders, destroyers, submarines, gunboats, large minelayers and “Jan van Amstel” class minesweepers. This directive was fulfilled throughout the pre–Pearl Harbor period as ships put into Soerabaja for routine port calls.40 These directives were eventually scaled back and redistributed on a limited basis. But nowhere was any kind of logistical planning for the actual evacuation of personnel or material mentioned or discussed. This can be attributed to the fact that the topic of any withdrawal from the East Indies was less than warmly received throughout the KM high command. Simply put, no one was prepared to discuss withdrawing from territory that had been part of the Dutch empire for 300 years. Helfrich’s initial memo soon became known throughout the KM as the “Runaway Fleet Memo.”41 As a result there was little planning for any kind of evacuation. Even with the Japanese on the doorstep of Java neither Helfrich nor van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was prepared to act, fearing the adverse effect it would have on the population. Then, on February 16, 1942, Admiral J.T. Furstner—Minister

of the Navy and Commander-in-Chief of all KM forces—signaled Helfrich from London. Citing the difficulty of supplying Dutch forces evacuated to England in May 1940, he urged Helfrich to move stocks of torpedoes, bombs and ammunition in order to supply Dutch ships and aircraft should they be forced to operate outside of Java.42 In response, Helfrich transferred the MLD flight training school from Soerabaja to Australia on February 19.43 At the same time, the KPM freighters Minjack, Moesi and van Neck were ordered to begin loading torpedoes, precision equipment and 5.9-inch ammunition. Their exact destination is unknown, but it can be safely assumed that they were to have been directed to either Australia or Ceylon. On February 17 Helfrich met with a number of commanders from his seagoing warships and large auxiliaries. He indicated that if and when it became necessary to abandon Java, they would receive the signal “KPX.” This would be their signal to abandon the fight in the East Indies and make for Australia where they would continue the war. All present received written orders confirming the directive. But there was still no talk of any logistical planning for the evacuation of naval personnel beyond those ship crews.44 The evacuation of KM civilian and military personnel was first raised in December 1941.45 Vice-Admiral Helfrich flatly refused to discuss the topic at any level; only after the loss of Singapore and Palembang did he begin to entertain the concept. Even then there was little advance planning and no followthrough. Rear- Admiral van Staveren and his chief- of-staff drafted an initial evacuation plan but little was done with it. In November 1945 Rear-Admiral Koenraad stated that the topic of evacuating KM personnel from Java was seriously discussed two weeks before the actual operation was ordered on March 1. Lieutenant-Colonel W.H.J. Roelofsen, commander of the KM’s Marine Battalion on Java, recalled that Koenraad called a meeting at Embong Woengoe on or about February 19 to discuss evacuation. All or most KM department heads attended. But soon after the meeting started, a telegram from Helfrich arrived stating that no evacuation of any kind, not even a temporary one, would take place. 4 6 That effectively ended the meeting.47 Koenraad replied with a lengthy telegram of his own, in which he made a case for the evacuation of excess personnel. He requested permission to evacuate four shiploads of surplus KM personnel.48 Helfrich still refused to budge, citing the adverse effect it would have on the population.49 Any evacuation would be a last-minute affair; in the meantime the personnel would be incorporated into a naval battalion for the defense of Soerabaja. This idea met resistance from Rear-Admiral van Staveren and Helfrich dropped it when reminded that the men were untrained and unequipped for land warfare.50 On February 23 Rear-Admiral Koenraad dispatched the KM’s head of personnel from Soerabaja to Bandoeng to press Vice-Admiral Helfrich in person for the evacuation of training cadres and excess personnel. Again, Helfrich refused; this time he stated that they were needed to man new motor torpedo

30. Evacuation boats scheduled for delivery in May 1942.51 Three days later, on February 26, Helfrich sent Koenraad the following signal: “Although appreciate point of view CMR early evacuation wrong course of action in light of public morale. Accept consequences of late preparation of evacuation to south.”52 Even with Java set to collapse like a house of cards Helfrich stubbornly refused to plan ahead. His intransigence condemned thousands of excess KM personnel unnecessarily to death or 3½ years of brutal captivity. Koenraad stuck to his guns and made a final request that four merchant ships be held in Tjilatjap for the evacuation of KM personnel. He received no response.53 Even as this drama played out various KM officers sought to evacuate radio, signals and merchant marine officer trainees who could play no realistic part in the invasion of Java. The head of the radio communications branch in Soerabaja prepared for evacuation. But on February 26 or 27 he too received a signal that no evacuation would take place. Soerabaja was to be defended to the end.54

“We must evacuate, gentlemen, but we don’t know where yet” With Rear-Admiral Doorman dead and most of his Combined Striking Force destroyed in the Java Sea, Vice-Admiral Helfrich made the decision to evacuate the bulk of his remaining warships, auxiliaries, aircraft and personnel from Java. On the afternoon of February 28 he signaled Rear-Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja, “Make preparations for evacuation.”55 Koenraad assembled his senior officers at approximately 1800. He told them about the loss of the CSF and conveyed that it was time to evacuate Java. Japanese troops were coming ashore and there was no time to lose. He created two committees to coordinate the evacuation of military and civilian personnel from Soerabaja and Tjilatjap, respectively. Tjilatjap was the primary evacuation port and they were responsible for organizing transportation, quarters and provisions for the arrivals with Commander Schokking. MLD aircraft were to make for either Australia or Ceylon.56 Designated warships and auxiliaries were to break out of their respective ports and make for either Australia or Colombo. With the exception of the Marine Battalion at Goebeng Barracks, and demolition crews charged with demolishing the naval facilities, all remaining ground and shipboard personnel were to be moved.57 The priority of evacuation of personnel from Soerabaja was as follows58: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Communications trainees Submarine service personnel MLD personnel from Morokrembangan Ground personnel

Naval commanders across Java began receiving orders for personnel movements on the evening of February 28, but they were not given their destination until the following morning. In the meantime, each man received ƒ40 for food and expenses.59 Most personnel went out on troop trains provided by the KNIL

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and departed from Kotta, Soerabaja’s central station. The KNIL was also transporting large quantities of troops, ammunition and equipment of its own, creating a shortage of rail transport. The KM also utilized military trucks and personal vehicles to help alleviate the shortage. Four trains carrying KM personnel departed Soerabaja throughout the day on March 1. The first—carrying approximately 900 midshipmen, wireless trainees, submarine personnel, MLD mechanics, crewmen from Hr.Ms. Soerabaja and assorted personnel from Oedjoeng Naval Barracks—departed at 0700. There were no officers attached to the group and they were milling around the train station when LieutenantCommander J.J. Logger and another officer found them. Logger phoned Commander de Ronde who ordered him to take command of the train. With no instructions beyond getting the men to Tjilatjap, Logger simply told them, “We must evacuate, gentlemen, but we don’t know where yet.”60 Three additional trains followed at 1800, 1900 and 2000 on March 1 carrying about 1,000 men.61 Others followed by military and personal vehicle. Most were excess ship crews who were not needed for the destruction of the naval base. The exact number of naval personnel, soldiers and civilians who reached Tjilatjap from Soerabaja is unknown, but a figure in the range of 4,000 is considered reasonably accurate.62 Military personnel were not the only evacuees leaving Java. On March 1 a flyer was circulated amongst the ME’s civilian workers. All European employees with a title of Senior Technical Advisor, Technical Advisor, Supervisor or Foreman were deemed vital to the war effort and ordered to evacuate.63 They were to leave that night via train and military vehicle. The leader in each military vehicle received ƒ40 for food and expenses along the way. Most chose to travel by train, but a number followed in personal vehicles. Legal vehicle owners were given ƒ100 for fuel and food.64 If travel by vehicle became untenable they were to complete the trip by train.65 Some 400 civilian workers assembled that night under the command of C.W. Heringa, Director of the Marine Establishment (DME).66 Joining them were civilian workers from the Ordnance Depot on Madoera under the command of G.H.C.A. de Laive. Only the workers were evacuated, which meant most were forced to leave behind family and loved ones. Those families received 75 percent of their current month’s net pay, while the evacuees themselves got 25 percent. Unmarried workers got 100 percent. The families also received an extra month’s full pay.67 It would prove very inadequate compensation for the horror and deprivation they would suffer in Japanese internment camps over the next 3½ years. The KNIL was unable to provide the KM with rail transport until the evening of March 2. The train carrying the ME workers departed Kotta Station at 1900. There was no special train for them and they had no orders other than to be aboard when it left. This train also carried a smaller group of civilian workers from the Ordnance Depot on Madoera.68 They reached Tjilatjap around 0930 the following morning. At Soerabaja’s Central Civilian Hospital, all ambulatory

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patients—including several American sailors—were discharged. Only the seriously wounded remained. The KM’s Chief Medical Officer and his entire staff (including three officers) were ordered to remain on Java to care for the remaining wounded. They were to also assist in the care of any casualties of the fighting on Java.69 Rail transportation was not provided; the wounded were loaded aboard buses and a delivery van. En route to Tjilatjap the convoy was forced to detour by a blown bridge. It then got lost in the dark and was forced to return to Malang where it joined the KNIL’s 3rd Division and was captured. Traveling separately in his private car, the head of the column easily reached Tjilatjap and went aboard Janssens. Two other medical officers with him chose to remain on Java when they learned the rest of the column could not join them.70 There was a KM base at Malang, 50 miles south of Soerabaja, initially built as a rest camp; its garrison totaled about 50 officers and 800 sailors. There were approximately 90 men, mostly teenagers, being trained as aircraft mechanics in March 1942. The station commander had not received orders to evacuate; he first learned of it on March 1 when a convoy of survivors from Kortenaer and Piet Hein passed through en route to Tjilatjap. A final evacuation train left Soerabaja at 1800 on the evening of March 3. It carried primarily ME personnel bound for Tjilatjap. This group arrived too late and the last evacuation ship had already left by the time they arrived. They remained in Tjilatjap and were captured a few days later.71

The Destruction of Soerabaja 72 At 0100 on the morning of March 1, Commander (KMR) J.J. de Wolf signaled the East Indies squadron in Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s name73: • Evacuate: If this not possible, scuttle your ship. • Soenda Strait barricaded with searchlight beams.

These orders set in motion an orgy of destruction, which in sheer number alone, far exceeded the scuttling of the German High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow in June 1919.74 As a result, most of the remaining Dutch warships in the Netherlands East Indies were scuttled on March 2, though the demolitions took over an entire week. By the end of February some 30 merchant ships remained in Tandjoeng Perak. Harbor services were at a near standstill and several had been unable to secure coal, water or food. Three of the ships were the Norwegian freighters SS Proteus (no cargo), SS Tunni (sugar) and SS Bordvik (sugar); their status as combatants was unclear as Norway was not technically at war with Japan. However, that country was an ally of the Netherlands in their common fight against Japan’s ally, Germany.75 There was also a small Philippine cargo ship loaded with supplies for American forces still fighting on Bataan and Corregidor. Her master awaited a dark night to slip out of harbor and run the Japanese naval blockade south of the archipelago. The remaining merchant ships—all Dutch—were given two choices… 1. Make for open sea and escape into the Indian Ocean. 2. If not possible, scuttle their ship in the vicinity of Soerabaja.

All Dutch flagged merchant ships attempting to escape from Soerabaja were ordered to make for Fremantle, Australia, via the so-called “Westgate.” These were the sea lanes east of Kangean Island, including the Lombok, Alas and Sape Straits.76 By now the north coast of Java was effectively blockaded by dozens of Japanese warships. Compounding the situation was a near full moon and nearperfect visibility. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Koenraad tried to convince the merchant captains to sail in order to save the cargo tonnage. But they saw any escape attempt as a 90 percent chance of destruction and refused. Most were unarmed and the civilian captains feared a bloodbath. In the end, most of their native

30. Evacuation crews deserted, making his pleas a moot point. Only the Philippine blockade runner was prepared to leave port, and even she did not sail in the end.77 Approximately 30 Allied merchant ships totaling 75,416 tons were scuttled at Soerabaja when demolition of the civilian port took place on March 2. Major-General G.A. Ilgen, commander of the KNIL 2nd Infantry Division, was in charge of defending Soerabaja. He was also responsible for destroying the port after consulting with Rear-Admiral Koenraad. When he departed from Java Vice-Admiral Helfrich left the final decision up to Koenraad as to when to execute a pre-determined demolition plan. There was a strong fear of a Japanese parachute attack seizing the port before it could be destroyed and its destruction was ordered on March 2.78 Morokrembangan was to be destroyed first, followed by the airfield at Perak and the ME itself.

Morokrembangan The destruction of Morokrembangan began at 0700 on the morning of March 2 and was reported complete by MLD commander Captain P.J. Hendrikse to Koenraad at 0930.79 But

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when Koenraad inspected the base on March 4 he was annoyed to find most of the hangars intact, while many spare engines and bombsights sat untouched.80 He called upon MajorGeneral Ilgen to deploy KNIL engineers to finish the job but they accomplished little more.81

Perak Airfield The buildings and other ground installations at Perak were destroyed at 0900. Demolition of the runway was scheduled for 1000. A 1,500 meter buffer zone around the airfield was cleared and ships at nearby piers were moved to a safe distance. At 0945 air raid klaxons in Soerabaja and Madoera sounded and the first explosions roared 15 minutes later. The demolition teams were then loaded on trucks and sent to Tjilatjap where they went aboard the evacuation ships Janssens and Tawali.82

Marine Establishment Demolition of the ME started on the morning of March 2 and was overseen by Captain J.J. van der Have and Lieutenant-

A capsized floating aircraft docking after being scuttled (author’s collection).

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Banckert was wrecked and scuttled in the 3,000-ton floating drydock. To the right is a destroyed crane. Immediately behind it are the submarine docks (author’s collection).

A Dutch submarine (K-X, K-XIII or K-XVIII) in drydock as the ME is destroyed in early March 1942 (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

Commander C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld.83 The demolition plan consisted of three stages… 1. Physical destruction (i.e., by hand) 2. Destruction by fire 3. Timed explosives

A total of eight hours was allocated for the entire process, which included four hours for the scuttling of ships and floating equipment in the naval basin.84 The first phase began at 0530;

thirty minutes later the first explosions from timed charges could be heard. The destruction of the Ordnance Depot on Madoera began at 1000.85 After being held back from escorting Exeter, Witte de With remained in the ME. She was ordered into drydock for repairs to her damaged propeller shaft but there was no space available. She was then ordered to make a run for Australia through the Bali Strait on the night of March 1–2 but was hit

30. Evacuation

275

by a bomb during a Japanese air raid on that morning.86 Nonetheof the civilian and military harbors. One by one giant cargo less, Rear-Admiral Koenraad gave orders to make her ready for cranes collapsed onto the docks or crashed into the harbor. sea, but Destroyer Division commander Lieutenant-CommanThick black smoke poured from burning warehouses. Ruptured der Krips replied at 1000 on March 2 that Witte de With had storage tanks burned fiercely and streams of burning oil poured already been scuttled at the ME. She had actually been torpeinto the harbor like the tentacles of a fiery sea monster. doed by one or more of the motor torpedo boats, but Krips did Ships were positioned so as to block access to the inner not know who had given the order.87 port and impede future operations in the roadstead. The larger Banckert lay in the ME’s 3,000 ton drydock. She was vessels were scuttled or burned; smaller boats were machinestill undergoing repairs from bomb damage suffered on Februgunned at the waterline until they sank. Burned out with her ary 24 and February 28 and could not be made ready to sail seacocks open, the workship Roggeveen rolled over alongside in time. Both drydock and destroyer were sunk by the 88mm one of the piers, her masts nearly touching an adjacent waredeck gun of K-XVIII. Her crew transferred to the accomhouse. Nearby, an explosion roared and a tanker rolled over on 88 modation ship Koning der Nederlanden. They were then her side. Burning and sinking prauws littered the quays. Music put on a train to Tjilatjap and Koning der Nederlanden was played over the radio as ships disappeared one by one until only burned. Soerabaja had already Chart 26: Merchant Ships sunk next to a pier in the ME Scuttled at Soerabaja on February 18. Although listing slightly her deck and bridge Ship Type Tonnage Line Date Sunk Notes remained above water, allowAmbo Tanker 7,691 NITM 3/6/42 Former Danish ship Jane Maersk taken over by Dutch. Scuttled with 6,000 ing the ship to function as an tons of fuel oil on board. Salvaged by AA battery. When demolition Japanese. teams began destroying the Angelina Tanker 2,086 NITM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. base her remaining crew abanBelawan Freighter 1,330 KPM 3/2/42 doned the ship and Soerabaja Bengalen Freighter 6,339 RL 3/2/42 Benkalis Cargo 1,053 KPM 3/2/42 was captured in a partially subLiran Freighter 4,323 IMP 3/2/42 Former Hungarian freighter Nyugat. merged state. Loa-Koeloe Freighter 1,846 OB 3/2/42 The submarine basin was Juno Tanker 2,345 NITM 3/2/42 Damaged by Japanese air attack 1/30/ initially kept intact to service (TAN 2) 42; further damaged in collision with Allied submarines operating MS Poigair 2/8/42 en route to Soerin the Java Sea.89 It too was deabaja. Scuttled by crew while still under repair. Salvaged by Japanese. stroyed on March 2 along with Pendopo Tanker 5,209 NKPM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. several boats still undergoing (TAN 4) repairs. Badly beat up in the Aldegonda Tanker 2,088 NKTM 3/2/42 Damaged by Japanese air attack 1/1/42. Java Sea, repairs to K-X re(TAN 5) Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja; Salquired two days. They were to vaged by Japanese. begin the morning of March Josefina Tanker 2,594 NITM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. (TAN 6) 2, but Koenraad had to deMinjak Benzine 966 KPM 3/4/42 Scuttled by gunfire from Pieter de Bitter. stroy her before the base was (BEN 1) Transport Salvaged by Japanese. captured. Repairs to K-XVIII Rochussen Passenger 2,333 KPM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. were nearly complete. But as a Speelman Passenger 1,030 KPM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. result of heavy air attacks yard Talang Akar Tanker 2,046 NKTM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. personnel had been unable to Tjikandi Freighter 7,970 JCJL 3/2/42 Tjikarang Freighter 9,505 JCJL 3/2/42 Scuttled as blockship. locate lead gaskets and screws Van Diemen Passenger 1,030 KPM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. needed to seal her pressure hull. Silingdoeng 1,793 KPM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. As a result she too was scuttled. Gina Sea-Going Tug 290 NISHM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. The condition of K-XIII was Jules Sea-Going Tug 121 NISHM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese. unknown.90 Nolly Sea-Going Tug 108 NISHM 3/2/42 Salvaged by Japanese.

Tandjoeng Perak The civilian harbor was simultaneously destroyed by KNIL Genie. Explosions rumbled nonstop from all corners

Rolf Beatrix Kraus Tata Tembusu Tomori

Sea-Going Tug Harbor Tug Tug Sea-Going Tug Tanker Cargo

290 ? 290 147 344 983 68,475

NISHM KM NISHM NISHM BPM KPM

3/2/42 Mar-42 Mar-42 3/1/42 3/2/42 3/2/42

Salvaged by Japanese. Probably scuttled by crew in Soerabaja. Salvaged by Japanese. Salvaged by Japanese. Salvaged by Japanese.

276

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

their bows could be seen just above the water. The harbor was filled with prauws ferrying merchant ship crews and demolition crews to and from the shore. The lone exception was the freighter van Neck. Loaded with spares, ammunition and other supplies, her captain had orders to neither sail nor be destroyed. Surrounded by flames, sinking ships and burning oil she was a lonely castaway amidst the destruction. As the wind and tide changed, van Neck slowly drifted around on her mooring line until her stern gently crashed into a scuttled tanker. Her master eventually hailed a passing naval boat which relayed an order for the crew to go ashore; van Neck was later burned.91 Like Moesie and van Neck, the 966-ton KPM benzene transport Minjak (BEN 1) had also been requisitioned by the KM. She now carried 60 torpedoes and enough equipment to outfit a complete torpedo workshop. She was to make for Australia and set up a base for the evacuating Dutch submarines. But either her native crew deserted or her master declined to sail with such a volatile cargo in the face of near-certain destruction. Minjak was sunk by shells from the 75mm deck gun of the minesweeper Pieter de Bitter.92 Also on March 2, the minesweeper Eland Dubois took off the crew of the inner Westwater Channel lightship West and sank her with gunfire.93 The outer Westwater Channel lightship Pollux was scuttled alongside the Genoa Pier. On March 3 the militarized GM patrol boat Willebrord Snellius was recalled to Soerabaja from her patrol station in the Madoera Strait for the second half of February. En route, she sank the Eastwater Channel lightship and destroyed the navigation lights and buoys.

The Grand Scuttle As demolitions continued the question of what to do with the Gouvernmentsmarine had to be dealt with. A number of its ships had been militarized in September 1939 and their crews were considered part of the KM. The remaining ships technically belonged to government agencies and were manned by civilian personnel. Prior to leaving Java Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered the Gouvernmentsmarine to demobilize. Unless directed otherwise, their weapons were to be detached and transferred ashore for use by the KNIL.94 One of Helfrich’s last duties as CZM in the East Indies was to also oversee the retirement of several KM officers. This was an attempt to avoid their incarceration as prisoners of war by the Japanese.95 On March 3 or 4 Rear-Admiral Koenraad met with the captains and executive officers of the militarized vessels Albatross, Aldebaran, Castor, Eridanus, Gemma and Pollux. Although several large GM ships were ordered to evacuate none of these vessels had the range or armament to escape. Their officers and crews were to be released from duty and the ships scuttled. Several officers protested vigorously to no avail. All then mutually elected to remain part of the KM and not demobilize with their crews. On March 5 Rear-Admiral Koenraad formally closed his headquarters on Java and notified Vice-Admiral Helfrich of his

intention to evacuate by submarine and join him at Colombo. His last action as acting CZM in the East Indies was to turn command of all remaining naval forces on Java over to Lieutenant-Commander J.A.L. Lebeau, commander of the 2nd Minesweeper Division. His final orders read: To: Jan v. Amstel—Pieter de Bitter—Abraham Crijnssen—C— D—Gouden Leeuw—Krakatau—Lieutenant-Commander Morees96 —SLS97—MTBs—SRD98—Maboelian99 From: CMR I. Fill out crews JVA, PdB, AC, ED100 —then KPX II. Fill out crews C-D101—then KPX III. Fill out crew GLW102—then KPX IV. Krakatau to sink Eastwater buoys with gunfire. Scuttle near minefield. Fill out Janssens crew. KPX V. Patrol Service to block entrance. Destroy or scuttle three Norwegian merchant ships and Hr.Ms. SRD and Hr.Ms. Boelian.103 Those P-boats with sufficient range to escape, remaining P-boats to be placed at disposal of Army as communications craft. Tanker Peta transferred to Army and destroyed when of no further use. VI. Willebrord Snellius to be scuttled at entrance of ME VII. MTBs to evacuate.

In accordance with Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s prewar memo, Lieutenant-Commander Lebeau had already been instructed in mid–February, via general order from Rear-Admiral Koenraad, that no ships were to be captured. Those operational ships with sufficient range were to sail for Australia; the remainder were to be scuttled. Non-operational ships had already been scuttled as part of the demolition of the ME and Tandjoeng Perak on March 2–3. At that point the following ships were in still in service at the ME… • 1st Minesweeper Division o C o D • 2nd Minesweeper Division o Abraham Crijnssen o Eland Dubois o Jan van Amstel o Pieter de Bitter • 4th Minesweeper Division104 o Ardjoeno o Kawi o Merbaboe o Rindjani o Salak o Smeroe • Gouden Leeuw • Krakatau • “P-Class” Patrol Boats105 o P-5 o P-7 o P-9 o P-19 • Willebrord Snellius • Moera Boelian • Peta • Urania 2—training sail yacht for KI • K-VIII • K-IX • K-XI • K-XII106

30. Evacuation

277

Chart 27: Military and Gouvernmentsmarine Ships Scuttled at Soerabaja Ship

Type

Location

Date

Notes

Koninklijke Marine Witte de With Banckert

Destroyer Destroyer

Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/2/42 3/2/42

K-XIII

Submarine

Soerabaja

3/2/42

K-XVIII

Submarine

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Krakatau Gouden Leeuw

Minelayer Minelayer

Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/9/42 3/7/42

Bangkalan

Auxiliary Minelayer

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Ram Regulus

Auxiliary Minelayer Auxiliary Minelayer

Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/2/42 3/2/42

Soemenep A

Auxiliary Minelayer Minesweeper

Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/2/42 3/1/42

B

Minesweeper

Soerabaja

3/1/42

C D Eland Dubois

Minesweeper Minesweeper Minesweeper

Soerabaja 3/6/42 Soerabaja 3/6/42 Madoera Strait 3/8/42

Damaged in air raid on March 1. Damaged in air raids on Tg. Perak February 24 and 28. Moved into ME and scuttled. Still under repair after battery explosion suffered at Singapore in December 1942. Still under repair after damage suffered during her attack on Japanese convoy off Balikpapan. Scuttled in Westwater Channel off Batoe Poton, Madoera. Scuttled in Westwater Channel 1,000 meters south of Ordnance Depot pier. Still under repair from damage suffered during Japanese air attack on ME February 18. Salvaged by Japanese. Still under construction at Soerabaja Drydock Company when wrecked and set afire. Only lightly damaged and later salvaged by Japanese. Salvaged by Japanese. Scuttled in shallow water after being damaged in air attack on February 28. Later salvaged by Japanese. Scuttled in shallow water after being heavily damaged aft in Japanese air attack on February 28. Salvaged by Japanese. Salvaged by Japanese.

Pieter de Bitter Ardjoeno Gedeh

Minesweeper Auxiliary Minesweeper Auxiliary Minesweeper

Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/6/42 3/3/42 3/2/42

Holland

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Kawi

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Soerabaja

3/3/42

Lawoe

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Salak

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Soerabaja

3/3/42

OJR 1 OJR 4 OJR 5 OJR 6 B1—B16

A/S Boat A/S Boat A/S Boat A/S Boat Patrol Boat

Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/2/42 3/2/42 3/2/42 3/2/42 ?

Batak

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Belang

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

Biaro

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/1/42 or 3/2/42 3/2/42

Pehe

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Semarang

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Simson

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Part of evacuation effort with Jan van Amstel. Scuttled off Gili Genteng after suffering mechanical problems en route. Scuttled inside the ME. Converted GM patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 9. Converted GM patrol boat. In KM service Auxiliary Minesweeper 14. Either Gedeh or Lawoe salvaged by Japanese. Converted tugboat put into KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 17 on September 30, 1939. Salvaged by Japanese. Converted GM patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 7. Possibly salvaged by Japanese. Converted GM patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 15. Either Gedeh or Lawoe salvaged by Japanese. Former GM patrol vessel. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 8. Possibly salvaged by Japanese; See Ardjoeno. Scuttled by own crew. Either OJR 1 or OJR 4 salvaged by Japanese. Scuttled by own crew. Either OJR 1 or OJR 4 salvaged by Japanese. Not yet operational; destroyed by KM personnel. Not yet operational; destroyed by KM personnel. Only B1 launched as of early March 1942; destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Remainder destroyed on stocks; 8 salvaged by Japanese. Former KPM coaster; taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Drydock holding ship capsized by Japanese air attack March 1, 1942. Ship destroyed by KM personnel. Salvaged by Japanese. Former Celebes Coastal Shipping Company merchant vessel taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. Salvaged by Japanese. Former Celebes Coastal Shipping Company merchant vessel taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. Salvaged by Japanese. Former Celebes Coastal Shipping Company merchant vessel taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. Former KPM coaster; taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew. Salvaged by Japanese. Former Atjeh Trading Company tugboat taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew. Salvaged by Japanese.

278

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

Ship

Type

Location

Date

Notes

Tamako

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Taroena

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Kasuaris

Patrol Boat

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Moeara Boelian

Tender

Soerabaja

3/6/42

Castor

Fleet Repair Ship

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Roggeveen

Accommodation Ship

Soerabaja

3/1/42

Serdang

Torpedo Workship

Soerabaja

3/6/42

Van Neck

Workship

Soerabaja

3/3/42

P 5—P 8

Patrol Boat

See Notes

See Notes

P 11, P 13, P 14, P 15 and P 16

Patrol Boat

See Notes

See Notes

P 17—P 20

Patrol Boat

See Notes

See Notes

P 21—P 23

Patrol Boat

See Notes

See Notes

TM 4—TM 15

Motor Torpedo Boat

See Notes

See Notes

TM 16—TM 21 Schouten

Motor Torpedo Boat Air Defense Ship

Koning Der Nederlanden Willebrord Snellius

Accommodation Ship

See Notes See Notes Madoera Strait 2/28/42 (The Gilis) Soerabaja 3/2/42

Former Celebes Coastal Shipping Company merchant vessel taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. Former Celebes Coastal Shipping Company merchant vessel taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. Former Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company vessel taken over by KM and converted into patrol vessel. Scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. Former Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company tanker taken over by KM and converted into tender for motor torpedo boats. Scuttled by crew alongside Madoera Island wharf. Former GM patrol vessel taken over by KM for conversion into fleet repair ship. Scuttled by crew north of Fort Kodong Tjowek. Salvaged by Japanese. Former KPM passenger liner taken over by KM for conversion into accommodation ship. Work incomplete when ship burned by crew on March 2. Lieutenant C.A.E. van Rhee had orders from Koenraad on March 6 to scuttle his ship as late as possible. Scuttled in ME at Madoera Pier at 1830 along with her two torpedo recovery boats. Former KPM liner taken over for use as workship. Scuttled by KM personnel March 3. Salvaged by Japanese. P 5 scuttled by crew at Pasaroean. P 6 scuttled at Tg. Priok. P 7 and P 8 scuttled by crew at Soerabaja. P 11, P 13 and P 15 scuttled in Tg. Perak harbor; salvaged by Japanese. P 14 and P 16 (probably) scuttled by crew in Tg. Priok; salvaged by Japanese. P 17, P 18 and P 20 probably scuttled at Soerabaja by own crews. P 19 scuttled March 8 by own crew at Soerabaja. P 21 probably not yet in service when scuttled by KM personnel. P 22 and P 23 scuttled by own crews at Soerabaja. TM 4, TM 6, TM 8, TM 9, TM 10, TM 11, TM 12, TM 13, TM 14 and TM 15 scuttled at Soerabaja March 2. TM 5, TM 7 and TM 9 scuttled March 8. All destroyed on stocks March 2; Salvaged by Japanese. KPM passenger liner requisitioned by KM for use as Air Defense Ship. Scuttled by crew in Madoera Strait. Later salvaged by Japanese. Burned and scuttled by crew.

Survey Ship

Soerabaja

3/6/42

Urania 2

Training Ship (Sail)

See Notes

3/8/42

Militarized Gouvernmentsmarine Vessels Albatross Patrol Boat Aldebaran Patrol Boat Castor Patrol Boat Fazant Patrol Boat Fomalhaut Patrol Boat

Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/2/42 3/2/42 3/2/42 3/1/42 3/2/42

Soerabaja Soerabaja

3/2/42 3/1/42

Soerabaja

3/2/42

Gemma Patrol Boat Pollux Patrol Boat Coastal Navigation Service Pollux Light Ship

By March 3 virtually all ships too small to evacuate had been scuttled. At the last minute the remaining “P Boats” were designated for picket duties in the Eastwater and Westwater Channels, communications, ferrying of KNIL troops from Soerabaja to Madoera and the transport of demolition teams and

Scuttled by crew as blockship in entrance of ME. Wreck later blown up and partially removed by Japanese. Training ship for KM midshipmen at Soerabaja. Attempted escape March 8. Captured by Japanese destroyer. Scuttled by crew alongside Endeh Wharf. Later salvaged by Japanese. Scuttled by crew alongside Genoa Wharf. Later salvaged by Japanese. Scuttled at Soerabaja. Scuttled by crew. Later salvaged by Japanese. Damaged in Japanese air raid on February 24. Scuttled by crew March 2 in mouth of Semampir River. Scuttled by crew alongside Endeh Wharf. Later salvaged by Japanese. Scuttled at Soerabaja. Westwater Channel lightship. Scuttled by crew alongside Genoa Pier. Later salvaged by Japanese.

ships crews to and from scuttled merchant vessels. Lacking sufficient range to escape to Australia, they too were gradually scuttled as their operational needs came to an end. Gouden Leeuw laid a minefield that permanently closed the Westwater Channel on the night of March 3–4. The last

30. Evacuation

279

Destruction of the MTBs Although there was plenty of fuel at the MTB base, the boats themselves lacked sufficient range to reach Australia. TM 4, TM 6, TM 8, TM 9, TM 10, TM 11, TM 12, TM 13, TM 14 and TM 15 were scuttled at Soerabaja on March 2. Crewmen first fired their remaining torpedoes into the harbor. They then drained coolant from the engines and ran them at full speed until they seized. Finally, pick axes were used to punch holes in the bottom of each boat and they were left to sink.108 TM 5, TM 7 and TM 9 survived a few days longer as they were needed to transfer evacuatScuttled Dutch vessels sinking alongside the coal wharf March 2. From front to back: Tamako, Kasuris, ing personnel, including RearTaroena and Roggeveen (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). Admiral Koenraad and his staff, to waiting submarines. On March entrance in the Eastwater Channel minefield was to be closed 6, the skipper of TM 9 received orders to evacuate the MTBs.109 by scuttling the Norwegian freighters Proteus, Tunni and BorLieutenant-Commander P.A. Riedel, commander of the MTB dvik. By March 3 they were all that remained afloat in Tandsquadron, counter-ordered that they be destroyed before he joeng Perak. Their masters received written orders from Rearhimself departed aboard K-VIII: “After destroying boats, atAdmiral Koenraad to scuttle by 0500 that morning; however, tempt escape to Tjilatjap, if that not possible, then report to these were refused as Norway was not officially at war with Marine Barracks Goebeng.”110 Japan. Although their crews were put ashore by the KNIL The MTBs had zero chance of escaping Java. With full on March 4 all three ships were captured intact on March 8.107 Per Rear-Admiral Koenraad’s order, Willebrord Snellius was scuttled in the entrance to the ME on March 6. She had been attached to the Soerabaja Patrol Service which operated in the Bali and Madoera Straits to prevent Japanese infiltration from Bali. Her last assignment was picket duty off the Tandjoeng Patjinan minefield. The Patrol Service had orders to operate for as long as possible and its craft slipped through small openings left in the minefields. As these craft completed designated tasks they too were ordered scuttled by the Patrol Service commander. Most remaining MTBs were scuttled at Oejoeng on March 2 (courtesy Gerard Horneman).

280

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

tanks and in excellent condition their maximum range was only 450 miles at 6 knots on one engine. Prior to receiving Riedel’s order, the three boat commanders discussed the escape order; the skippers of TM 5 and TM 9 determined that it was not feasible and decided to scuttle their boats. Riedel’s signal arrived soon after. Lieutenant A.M. Thomas chose to try and break out with TM 7. Heavily loading the boat with extra fuel drums he put out of Soerabaja.111 But the trip was marred by mechanical problems and TM 7 was forced to abandon the voyage.112 TM 9 was destroyed in the same manner as her counterparts. However, when firing off her torpedoes inside the harbor, one ran ashore near a KNIL AA gun. The gun crew was more than a little shocked when the 18-foot steel “fish” suddenly shot out of the water without warning and beached itself nearby, motor and propeller whirring like a buzz-saw. Fortunately, the torpedo had not yet armed and failed to detonate. In the meantime, TM 5 and TM 7 were taken into deeper water and scuttled.113 The Higgins anti-submarine boats OJR 1, OJR 4, OJR 5 and OJR 6 were also ordered to evacuate. They had a normal cruising radius of approximately 520 miles; this could have been stretched to 1,000 miles or more at reduced speed and by carrying additional drums of fuel. They likely could have reached an Australian port. But no attempt was made as none of the boats were equipped with mufflers and they could be easily heard for miles, even at low speed. As a result they were all scuttled on March 2.114 Also destroyed were the small MTB motherships Moera Boelian and Peta; they were loaded with 60 and 80 drums of fuel, respectively.115 On March 5 their Indonesian crews requested to be released from duty, which was honored. Both ships were scuttled alongside the Madoera pier at 1130 on the morning of March 6.116 The remaining torpedoes and fuel stocks at the MTB base were also destroyed.

“Crews reinforce, then KPX” In advance of the signal to evacuate the remaining Dutch warships from Java, the KM high command attempted to send several supply ships to Australia. In accordance with Admiral Furstner’s less than subtle nudge to Vice-Admiral Helfrich on February 16, they were loaded with ammunition, torpedoes and equipment that would allow KM warships to continue fighting after their withdrawal from the East Indies. The first supply ship to leave Soerabaja was the 913-ton auxiliary benzene transport Moesie (BEN 2) on February 26.117 Bound for Australia, she carried 550 tons of 5.9-inch ammunition for Java, Sumatra, Tromp, Soemba and Flores. Captain H.A. Goslinga took Moesie out through the Eastwater Channel and turned south into the Bali Strait; but with a top speed of only 9 knots she did not get very far and went missing on February 28. The details of her loss vary and remain somewhat murky. Some sources state Moesie was sunk by gunfire from Japanese destroyers patrolling the Bali Strait. Multiple others state that

she was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-53. Yet another credible source states that Moesie was intercepted by a Japanese destroyer 25 miles southwest of Banjoewangi, Java. The ship then anchored one mile offshore, where her crew apparently was either ordered ashore or deserted. A short time later she was sighted and torpedoed by the I-53.118 The tanker Pendopo (TAN 4) also attempted to escape from Soerabaja. While refueling Encounter on the morning of February 28 Lieutenant-Commander (KMR) S. Duinker was ordered to break out through the Eastwater Channel. Pendoppo was too deep for the channel so Duinker pumped fuel into the BPM tanker Josephine to reduce her draft. She sailed at 2000 that night, but at 2200, received a signal to anchor near the Eastwater Channel lightship and await further orders. The loss of Moesi had apparently demonstrated that the Bali and Lombok Straits were already blocked for merchant ships; Koenraad ordered Duinker back into Soerabaja where he arrived at 0900 on March 1.119 Following her aborted escape attempt Pendopo (TAN 4) lay moored in the roadstead. At 0700 on March 2 LieutenantCommander Duinker received a verbal secret order from RearAdmiral Koenraad’s chief-of-staff. He was to first burn out Pendoppo using what fuel oil remained aboard and then scuttle the ship off Madoera. She sank at 1800 in 75 feet of water and her crew was taken ashore by small craft.120 On the morning of March 6, Lebeau formally ordered the evacuation of the remaining large warships in Soerabaja: “‘Crews reinforce,’ then KPX.” The minelayers C and D had insufficient range to reach Australia and were scuttled on March 6.121 Although Krakatau was ordered scuttled, LieutenantCommander J. van Hage repeatedly requested permission to break out. Unfortunately he was unable to secure enough fuel and Krakatau was scuttled alongside the Ordnance Depot pier on March 8. Her 75mm cannons and machine guns were unbolted and given to the KNIL. Lieutenant-Commander van Hage with 15 officers and men filled out the crew of Abraham Crijnssen. The remainder were armed and sent to Madoera where they were captured on March 10.122

A Failed Escape The first ships to leave Soerabaja were Eland Dubois (Lieutenant H. de Jong, KMR) and Jan van Amstel (Lieutenant C. de Greeuw, KMR). Neither vessel was in peak condition for the voyage. To start, both were low on fuel. Thanks to the destruction of the port installations neither ship was able to locate additional fuel, meaning their ability to reach a port on the north coast of Australia would be severely stretched. Eland Dubois had a leaking boiler pipe which limited her speed. On the night of March 5–6 Jan van Amstel passed close by two prauws; her propeller wash slammed both boats into the minesweeper, causing heavy damage above the waterline. She suffered further damage the following day when a Japanese bomb killed 23 crewmen.123 Her captain, Lieutenant-Commander Peter van Willigen (KMR), was wounded and replaced by Lieu-

30. Evacuation tenant de Greeuw.124 In addition, both ships had experienced a large number of desertions by Indonesian crewmen. A small number of replacements were rounded up at the naval barracks but both crews were still under-strength when they sailed. Eland Dubois and Jan van Amstel sortied from the ME on the evening of March 6. They sailed through the Eastwater Channel into the Madoera Strait. Their destination was Gili Radja, a small island off the southeast tip of Madoera where they anchored close to shore and camouflaged the ships with tree branches. They sailed again after dark on the morning of March 7 for Gili Genteng, another small island a bit farther east. En route they were sighted by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft.125 Both ships were now low on water and fuel; Eland Dubois had just over 45 tons of fuel oil (41 percent capacity) and Jan van Amstel approximately 60 tons (55 percent capacity). The former’s leaking boiler pipe still affected her speed and her reduced crew had difficulty maintaining the ship.126 After conferring, de Jong and de Greeuw decided to abandon Eland Dubois off Gili Genteng where her crew, fuel and supplies were transferred to Jan van Amstel. She was scuttled by opening the seacocks and detonating one her depth charges.127 Jan van Amstel then sailed south of Sapoedi and Kangean Islands. She anchored in a small bay on the northwest hook of Soembawa Island before dawn on March 9 and got underway again that night.128 At approximately 2230 her starboard engine overheated and had to be shut down. Jan van Amstel continued on one engine for the next 40 minutes until it was repaired and the minesweeper went back to full speed. But just 20 minutes later, at around 2330, a searchlight suddenly shot out of the night. It belonged to the Japanese destroyer Arashio which immediately opened fire. Locked in the beam of her searchlight Jan van Amstel was repeatedly hit and suffered heavy damage almost immediately. The minesweeper soon capsized but Arashio continued to fire at her upturned keel until Jan van Amstel completely disappeared. Casualties totaled 23 dead, including Lieutenant de Jong from Eland Dubois.129 Arashio did not stop to rescue survivors, who were left floating on small life rafts. They drifted for 43 hours until another Japanese destroyer pulled them from the water and took them to Makassar.130

Intentional Disobedience Committed in Time of War With the demolition of the ME and Tandjoeng Perak complete, the ships of the 2nd Minesweeper Division—Eland Dubois, Gouden Leeuw, Jan van Amstel and Pieter de Bitter— were to make a run for Australia. By that point all major channels into the Indian Ocean were blocked and any attempt to break out was considered suicidal by many. So poor were the odds that Lieutenant-Commander Lebeau met with his captains and executive officers. Contrary to the direct orders issued by Rear-Admiral Koenraad, he left the final choice up to them regarding escape or the scuttling of their respective ships.131

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Aboard Pieter de Bitter Lieutenant-Commander J.P.A. Dekker faced a precarious situation. The destruction of Soerabaja and scuttling of ships badly affected morale. By March 3, no less than 24 members of Pieter de Bitter’s crew had deserted. By March 4 desertions from the remaining ships in Soerabaja numbered 135, including eight junior officers. A party of 37 replacement sailors was assembled at Goebang naval barracks to fill out the crews of Jan van Amstel and Pieter de Bitter. But by the time they arrived at the ME all but 13 had deserted; most were Indonesians who did not want to leave Java.132 Short-handed and facing long odds to evade the Japanese, Dekker was unwilling to sacrifice his men. He assembled the crew and told them that he could not justify an attempt to reach Australia. One officer went aboard Abraham Crijnssen; the rest of the crew was armed and sent ashore. At 1550 on the afternoon of March 6 two scuttling charges were detonated and Pieter de Bitter sank alongside the Cruiser Pier. Nearby, K-XII lay on the bottom of the harbor as she prepared to sail that night with Rear-Admiral Koenraad and his staff. Hearing explosions, the admiral inquired as to their source and was informed that Pieter de Bitter had been scuttled and was sinking. Koenraad was livid at what he regarded as a direct violation of his orders and immediately sent a very strongly worded message to Lieutenant-Commander Lebeau: Request immediate investigation Bitter sinking…. STOP. In event it appears that this action taken against orders without valid reason commander must be executed…. STOP. You are acting entirely on my behalf…. STOP.133

At least 30 crewmen left Pieter de Bitter, which was considered enough to have sailed the ship. Nonetheless, it does not appear that any action was taken against Dekker on Java as a result of Koenraad’s note and K- XII sailed later night. Lieutenant-Commander Lebeau also escaped Java aboard Abraham Crijnssen and reached Australia; however, he failed to return from a reconnaissance flight in September 1944. Dekker and his crew were captured on Java and spent 3½ years as POWs. After the war he was court-martialed and found guilty of “Intentional Disobedience Committed in Time of War”134

Gouden Leeuw Upon closing the Westwater Channel minefield without difficulty Gouden Leeuw returned to the ME and tied up alongside the Madoera Pier. On March 5 Rear-Admiral Koenraad signaled Lieutenant-Commander J.C. van der Horst, “Replenish crew Gouden Leeuw. Then KPX.”135 As did Lieutenant-Commander Dekker aboard Pieter de Bitter, Lieutenant-Commander van der Horst felt the KPX operation had very little chance of success and would be certain death for both ship and crew. That said, he may have initially planned to comply. Gouden Leeuw had a very high superstructure which made her easily visible in the bright moonlight and van der Horst initially waited for a darker night to leave harbor. As Koenraad and his staff boarded K-XII on the evening of March 5, he made no mention of Gouden Leeuw still being

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in port. After the war, van der Horst stated that this led him to believe that he was to evacuate Gouden Leeuw at his own discretion. Following Rear-Admiral Koenraad’s departure from Java, the minelayer then was ordered to transport KNIL troops from Java to Madoera. By that point his crew was badly demoralized and incomplete from desertions; van der Horst dropped anchor 1,300 yards south of the Princess Wilhelmina Pier, took a final roll, put the crew over the side and scuttled her on March 7. He too was tried after the war and found guilty of “Intentional Disobedience Committed in Time of War.”136

The Escape of Abraham Crijnssen137 On March 6 Lieutenant-Commander Anthonie van Miert received written orders to evacuate Java. He immediately ordered Abraham Crijnssen painted in a disruptive pattern and camouflaged the ship with nets, tree branches and scrub brush. Van Miert then called an all-hands meeting and gave his crew the choice to participate in the highly dangerous voyage or leave the ship. Approximately half of her 45 crewmen left, including all the Indonesian personnel.138 He then spent much of the day rounding up replacements. The minesweeper departed the ME at 2130 on night of March 6 with the yacht Urania 2 in tow.139 They steamed along the south coast of Madoera and Urania 2 was cut loose in the Madoera Strait at 0200 on March 7. Abraham Crijnssen reached Gili Radja later that morning. There she found Eland Dubois and Jan van Amstel at anchor. However, Lieutenant-Commander van Miert wanted nothing to do with either ship as both were still completely uncamouflaged and easy to spot in the bright moonlight.140 Van Miert continued on to Gili Gententong where the ship was further camouflaged. At 1830 on March 7 she sailed south of Sapoedi Kaas between Goa Goa and Karang Takat Reef before proceeding north of the Kangean and Aloe Islands. There she anchored on the morning of March 8 and remained there throughout the day. At 1845 she sailed between Pageroean and Sekala and set course for Tandjoeng Sarokaja on the island of Soembawa. By the morning of March 9 Abraham Crijnssen anchored at Pot-Paddoe Bay where more camouflage was applied. She then set a course through the Lesser Soenda Islands and into the Alas Strait. On March 10 the camouflage was removed and course set for Australia. Maintaining 10 knots throughout the rest of the voyage, Abraham Crijnssen reached Geraldton on March 15.141

Escape of the Little Ships142 Most dramatic of all the escape attempts from Soerabaja was that of the auxiliary minesweepers from the 4th Minesweeper Division. On March 1 Rear-Admiral Koenraad ordered Lieutenant-Commander J.J.C. Korthals Altes to either evacuate his ships to a safe port or scuttle them and send the crews to Tjilatjap for evacuation. Altes chose to sail and the ships were

brought to the ME where they attempted to fuel; it was difficult since the oil barges had already been destroyed. When fully loaded, they had approximately 800 gallons with a range of 1,100 miles at high speed and 1,700 miles at economical speed. After many crewmen deserted, Lieutenant-Commander Altes gave his remaining personnel the choice to evacuate or remain on Java. Five of six ship captains chose to remain behind; those men remaining behind were demilitarized and sent home.143 Three remaining officers were assigned to the newest boats—Merbaboe, Rindjani and Smeroe—which had just finished construction. The flotilla was under the command of Lieutenant J.P. Rotgans, most recently commander of the sunken minesweeper A.144 The older boats—Ardjoeno, Kawi and Salak—were stripped of fuel, supplies and water and then scuttled. This allowed the newer boats to take aboard extra supplies; they now carried some 1,200 gallons of fuel and 925 gallons of water with food for a month. Carrying extra fuel drums on deck their range was 1,300–2,000 miles depending on speed and fuel consumption; Soerabaja to Broome is 1,200 miles. Due to reported Japanese activity in the Madoera Strait, Merbaboe, Rindjani and Smeroe went out the Westwater Channel and looped around the north coast of Madoera. At 0630 on March 4 they moored close to Boeroean on the northeast coast of Madoera; they sailed again at 1800 and went north of the Kangean Islands. Then they moved through the Kangean and Paternoster Islands. On March 6 they sailed through the Paternoster Islands and through the Molo Strait into the Indian Ocean.145 At 1700 on March 7 they set course for Broome where they arrived at 2030 on March 10.146

“A good trip and goodbye” With the demolition of Soerabaja well underway, RearAdmiral Koenraad called a meeting of his staff officers at 1700 on March 2. He announced that it was time to leave Java. Those officers present were to be taken out aboard K-VIII, K-IX, K-XI and K-XII. K-IX would be the first to go on the evening of March 2, followed by K-VIII and K-XI on the evening of March 3. Koenraad and his staff would follow later aboard KXII after ensuring that all demolitions had been completed. Due to a lack of fuel, K-VIII and K-IX would go to Australia; K-XI and K-XII would continue on to Colombo. On the night of March 1 K-IX moved from the ME and put into Tandjoeng Perak where she took aboard seven officers.147 At 1830 she received orders to sail for Australia. She did so at 1845 and went through the Eastwater Channel and navigated the Patjinan minefield at 0530 before submerging at dawn of March 2. She spent all day of March 4 submerged east of Bali and Lombok before moving through the Alas Strait. K-IX put into Fremantle on March 13 and tied up next to the USN subs. K-VIII sailed at 2000 on the night of March 3 carrying six passengers. Departing from Tandjoeng Perak, she went out through the Eastwater Channel. After clearing minefields in the Madoera Strait she submerged at 1820 and set course for

30. Evacuation Alas Strait. K-XIV spent the following day submerged off Bali and Lombok. After dark she surfaced to charge her batteries and eventually reached Geraldton on March 12 at 1630. K-XI had been undergoing engine repairs in the ME since February 3. On the night of March 1 Lieutenant-Commander A.H. Deketh was ordered into Tandjoeng Perak where he was to await further orders. On March 3 he received the following signal from Koenraad: “K-XIII departed this evening with 6 passengers to the East STOP On own initiative attempt to reach Colombo if necessary Fremantle STOP Avoid action STOP KXI and K-XII to remain ready for departure.” Soon after K-XIV took aboard 10 officers from the Submarine Service staff. She sailed at 2113 on the night of March 3 via the Madoera Strait and Eastwater Channel. Deketh had just cleared the last minefield when he received a signal from Helfrich at 1700 on March 4: “From CZM 0304–0700. Set course for South coast Java STOP Tjilatjap base where fuel available STOP Operate long as possible STOP Boats probably needed to evacuate several persons to other places south coast.” K-XI proceeded through the Lombok Strait and turned west as she entered the Indian Ocean at 0700 on March 5. When he surfaced to charge his batteries that evening Lieutenant-Commander Deketh responded to Vice-Admiral Helfrich at 1918: “Am under orders CMR loaded with evacuees (Submarine Service commander and other officers) en route from Lombok Strait to Colombo STOP Sub-

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ject counter-orders plan to use evacuees supplies to reach Colombo.” Receiving no counter-orders to the contrary, K-XIV continued on to Ceylon and put into Colombo on March 17.148 At 1940 on March 5 Rear-Admiral Koenraad and his staff boarded K-XII. Earlier that day Koenraad had shut down his headquarters and transferred command of all remaining KM forces on Java to Lieutenant-Commander Lebeau of the 2nd Minesweeper Division. The submarine was originally scheduled to depart at 0200 on March 6. However, several crewmen were missing so her departure was delayed until 1830 on March 6 after her skipper, Lieutenant-Commander H.C.J. Coumou, and Koenraad discussed the situation.149 Her crew was filled out at by 0600 and K-XII sailed March 6 at 1750. As the submarine pulled away from the dock the harbor and roadstead were choked with sunken ships of all shapes, sizes and types. Her bridge crew’s last view of Soerabaja was one of utter destruction as heavy flames burned out of control at the nearby Bandaran Oil Complex and all throughout the harbor. As K-XII passed Krakatau, moored alongside the Ordnance Depot Pier, the minelayer signaled a final forlorn message, “A good trip and goodbye.”150 K-XII originally made for Colombo, but her destination was soon changed to Fremantle due to a shortage of fuel.151 She was the last ship to leave Soerabaja; no Dutch warship would enter the port again until September 1945.

Chapter 31

The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok In mid–February Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered all departments of the KM at Batavia to consolidate their operations and personnel at Bandoeng. This move was complete by February 19. Only a small staff from the Bureau of Sea Traffic and a few communications personnel led by Commander H.C.W. Moorman and Lieutenant-Commander M.M. Merens remained behind to oversee headquarters functions at Batavia and Tandjoeng Priok. Although not directly tasked with it, he quickly inherited responsibility for conducting the evacuation of remaining KM personnel and material from Batavia and Tandjoeng Priok.1 Moorman’s responsibilities were poorly defined and he had little direct authority. Although he and Merens were tech-

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nically in command as the official representatives of ViceAdmiral Helfrich, the personnel they oversaw still received orders directly from their respective department heads in Bandoeng.2 At the same time, Commander (KMR) P.F.M. van de Lint was in the senior naval officer in charge of Tandjoeng Priok and was thus in charge of all maritime functions related to the port. Moorman’s job was further complicated when van de Lint ordered him to prepare for sea those KM warships still in port. They were primarily 11 auxiliary minesweepers of the 3rd Minesweeper Division and 5th Minesweeper Division. Most KM personnel remaining in Batavia and Tandjoeng Priok were to be evacuated aboard these ships. Moorman was to ensure that they had fuel, provisions and the maps necessary for the

31. The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok trip to Tjilatjap.3 It was a difficult task made that much harder by Moorman not having the benefit of official command or orders to work with. Luckily, he had an excellent working relationship with both Commander van de Lint and Commodore J.A. Collins who helped facilitate his work.4 By mid–February Tandjoeng Priok was clogged with 146 merchant ships of all sizes, types and nationalities.5 Many of their masters were afraid to sail, believing that the advancing Japanese sat just outside the harbor waiting to sink them on sight. Despite efforts to clear the congestion some 120 merchant ships still remained in port as of February 20. Commander Moorman worked closely with Commodore Collins to obtain the necessary orders to send them out. This was largely accomplished by February 27, although a number of merchant ships still remained in Tandjoeng Priok.6

Massacre at Sea 7 One of the ships sailing on February 27 was MS Augustina, a 3,110 ton tanker belonging to the Netherlands Indies Tanker Company. Captain A.J. Moerman had orders not to let his ship fall into enemy hands; he was to scuttle her if necessary. To avoid the Soenda Strait, Captain Moerman plotted a wide loop to the northeast that took Augustina along the south coast of Borneo. His intention was to avoid the Japanese convoy landing at Rembang and then slip into the Indian Ocean via the Lesser Soenda Islands. By the afternoon of March 1 Augustina was due north of Bawean, some 30 miles south of Borneo. She was sighted by several Japanese aircraft, which initially ignored the tanker. Some distance to the south her lookouts saw several pillars in the water, apparently from exploding bombs.8 If accurate, it would appear they witnessed the death of Pope as she fled the sinking of Exeter and Encounter. The planes then flew overhead again, still ignoring Augustina. A cruiser observation plane appeared; it came in close several times, but did not attack. A short time later smoke was spotted on the horizon and an unknown Japanese destroyer appeared at approximately 1300. The Japanese fired a shot across Augustina’s bow as a signal for the tanker to heave to.9 Captain Moerman immediately ordered the ship scuttled; her hatch covers were loosened and the sea cocks in the engine room opened. The boilers were also vented. Her crew of 42 Dutch and Chinese then abandoned ship in two lifeboats. Captain Moerman and the 1st Engineer were brought aboard the destroyer where they were treated with disinfectant and put before the captain. He sent them back to Augustina with instructions to close the valves and save the ship. They successfully closed some of the valves. However, water in the engine room was already too high and it proved impossible to save the tanker. When they informed the Japanese captain he put them back in the water and cut the lifeboats loose in the falling dusk. The tanker’s crew then watched with growing apprehension as the Japanese began preparing a machine gun and dis-

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tributing submachine guns to crewmen. As they rowed away, the Japanese opened fire, killing most of her crew. The destroyer then came alongside the boat of the Master and 1st Engineer; a Japanese sailor jumped down from the destroyer and sprayed its occupants with bursts of fire from his submachine gun. As the firing started many of the crew jumped overboard. However, the Japanese hunted them down and killed 39 men. Three others—3rd Machinist L. Meyer and two Chinese deck hands—escaped by diving underwater and feigning death as darkness fell. After the destroyer moved off Meyer re-boarded the sinking Augustina and cast off again in an undamaged small boat. He was picked up by a second Japanese destroyer on the night of March 3–4 and taken to Makassar. To avoid being identified as the witness to a war atrocity he said that he was sick in his bunk and had only woken up as the ship sank. Meyer survived the war and was repatriated in September 1945. Following Augustina later that night was a small convoy consisting of the depot ship HMS Anking and the tankers British Judge, RFA Francol and War Sirdar.10 In escort were the auxiliary minesweeper (a converted whaler) Gemas, motor minesweeper MMS 51 and the sloops HMIS Jumna and HMAS Yarra. They sailed around midnight on the night of February 27–28. With no naval radio facilities available on Java, Anking had been operating as a radio relay ship for RN operations in the NEI. Prior to sailing she took aboard several hundred surplus Australian and British personnel. During the night, Yarra and her convoy passed the ships of the RAN’s 21st Minesweeper Division which had been operating as part of the Soenda Strait Patrol.11 After leaving their Dutch counterparts at Bantam Bay they made for Australia via Tjilatjap. Shortly after passing through the south entrance of the Soenda Strait they received a signal that Japanese ships were off Java and were ordered to turn back and assist. When the loss of Houston and Perth became clear the minesweepers turned south again and joined the Yarra convoy. At 0420 War Sirdar ran hard aground on a small island in the Thousand Islands chain. Wollongong was detached to tow her off but air attacks ended the effort. War Sirdar was set afire and her master was advised to ground his ship and put his crew ashore; Wollongong then continued south to rejoin the Yarra convoy. The remainder of the convoy was heavily bombed throughout the day on February 28. Yarra faced a critical shortage of 4-inch AA shells which restricted her fire, but her two 20mm cannon were in constant action. So severe were the attacks that even the crew was issued with small arms. The first attack was by a dozen bombers in the early morning and eventually tapered off around midday. The attacks likely came from Ryujo, Chitose and Mizuho; there were probably attacks from several cruiser floatplanes as well. Held up by the slow speed of Gemas, the convoy moved into the Indian Ocean at 8 knots. Yarra had been heavily strafed but not bombed; her aerial was down, the lifeboats were damaged and her funnel badly holed. MMS 51 was also damaged in this attack. Soon after the air attacks ended, British Judge

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was torpedoed in the bow by I-58 10 miles south of the Soenda Strait. She did not sink but had her speed severely reduced. Unable to keep up with the convoy she dropped behind and gamely struggled on alone. She was later joined by Wollongong, which was still trying to catch up with the 21st Minesweeper Division.

“All ships evacuate” On the night of February 28–March 1 Commanders van de Lint and Moorman received word of the Japanese landings from the staff of the KNIL 1st Infantry Division. At 0730 the captain of Reiger reported to Moorman after being sunk in the Soenda Strait; the GM patrol boats Bellatrix, Merel and Rigel put into Tandjoeng Priok about the same time. The captain of Rigel reported a large naval battle (that of Houston and Perth) taking place off St. Nicholas Point.12 The Soenda Strait was completely flooded with searchlights and impassible. A strong Japanese force was clearly operating off Java. As naval commander at Tandjoeng Priok, Commander van de Lint was responsible for demolishing the port and its installations. In that regard he was under the command of MajorGeneral W. Schilling, commander of the 1st Infantry Division. Schilling was in charge of defending both Batavia and Tandjoeng Priok; van de Lint could not destroy the base or evacuate his demolition crews without the General’s authorization. At around 0815 on the morning of March 1 Commander Moorman phoned Vice-Admiral Helfrich in Bandoeng. In response, Helfrich issued the following order, “All ships evacuate.” Moorman immediately gave the order to evacuate Tandjoeng Priok to all KM ships still in port. They were to sail no later than 1700 that evening. At 0900 Commander van de Lint also phoned Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s headquarters. Helfrich was just entering his meeting with Glassford and Palliser, so van de Lint instead spoke with his chief of staff, Rear-Admiral van Staveren. The Japanese were coming ashore on Java in force and he recommended that demolition of Tandjoeng Priok begin immediately. To which van Staveren replied, “Already?” Commander van de Lint stated that with the Japanese ashore he needed enough time to do the job correctly. The Admiral replied, “Do what you think is best, but do it in coordination with General Schilling.”13 When contacted later that day, General Schilling signaled: I concur with the start of demolitions and blockage of the harbor with the following conditions: 1. If the CZM declares that Tandjoeng Priok is no longer useable as naval base. 2. That you not begin before the civilian evacuation, which is scheduled to begin this afternoon [March 1] is completed. 3. That you not set any fires before 0600 [0600 on March 2].14

When Commander van de Lint asked how long after a general defense it would be before the Japanese occupied Batavia Major-General Schilling told him to expect no more than 24–48 hours.15 This coincided with a separate report that Commander P. Rouwenhorst received from the 1st Infantry Division. It stated that Major-General Schilling intended to fight

only a delaying action and not conduct a prolonged defense of Batavia. The defense of the city would last no more than 24 to 48 hours. It was an important message and Rouwenhorst wanted to avoid spreading rumors, so he asked Major-General Schilling to notify Rear-Admiral van Staveren of his intentions directly.16 Commander Moorman was completely out of the loop regarding the evacuation of Batavia. It was not until 0900 on March 1 that a junior officer and a seaman informed him that that Commodore Collins and the remaining RN elements in Batavia had already evacuated earlier that morning.17 Even before his tense meeting with Helfrich at Bandoeng, RearAdmiral Palliser had phoned Collins in Batavia at 0820 on March 1 and ordered him to depart immediately for Tjilatjap.18 This confirmed a prior written order Collins had already received. Collins was on the road in convoy of British vehicles at 0830; other RN personnel, including survivors from Jupiter, followed by train.19

The Lionesses of Batavia At 1115 Lieutenant-Commander P. Rouwenhorst learned that Rear-Admiral van Staveren had ordered the city evacuated. Rouwenhorst also received permission from van Staveren to attempt to escape from Tandjoeng Priok aboard the auxiliary minesweeper Endeh. The Admiral had no objection to Moorman and Meren joining them. But because their job in Tanjoeng Priok was not yet complete, Moorman decided that they would remain behind.20 Moorman now ordered his remaining staff in Batavia— little more than a handful of officers—back to Bandoeng. Excess naval personnel whom he had originally planned to send out aboard the auxiliary minesweepers were instead transported to Tjilatjap via train and vehicle. Two communications officers were left behind in Batavia to relay coastwatcher reports to the staff of the 1st Infantry Division; they departed for Badoeng on March 2 as well. Civilian employees remained behind and burned paperwork, telegrams, secret codebooks and other materials in a huge open air fire. Sensitive equipment such as telexes and “Scramblers” were disconnected and sent to Bandoeng. “The girls of the departments,” said Moorman after the war, “despite the rain and constant air alarms, in bright white and colored Sunday frocks, behaved like lionesses.” None of them were evacuated; nor were the civilian workers who filled out the harbor demolition gangs.21 With these developments Commander Moorman informed Commander van de Lint at 1130 that any ships planning to leave the harbor should do so by 1700 on March 1. He also instructed van de Lint to begin the demolition of Tandjoeng Priok. This included evacuation of all ships and personnel in Batavia-Tandjoeng Priok according to a plan already prepared by the two officers for such an occasion. However, due to his uncertain status in the command structure, Moorman only issued the order directly to van de Lint.

31. The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok

The Incredible Escape of Hr.Ms. Boenakan 22 At 1600 on the afternoon of March 1 a lone ship entered Tandjoeng Priok following a close escape from the Japanese. It was Hr.Ms. Boenakan, a militarized 142-ton inter-coastal freighter formerly belonging to the Celebes Coastal Navigation Company. She had been taken over by the KM in December 1941 and commissioned as an unarmed watch ship under the command of Sub-Lieutenant (KMR) G. Gielis. Boenakan was initially deployed as a coastwatch boat outside Oosthaven. When it fell in mid–February she was transferred to a patrol station between Tandjoeng Priok and Cheribon, a small port 180 miles east of Batavia. There she was passed over by many Japanese aircraft and reported multiple submarine sightings. At 2330 on February 28 Sub-Lieutenant Gielis reported sighting a light cruiser and two destroyers on a course for the Hook of Indramajoe. Boenakan tried to hide against the shore but was soon sighted because of sparks shooting from her funnel. The Japanese spotlights played over the ship and she was challenged. Although Boenakan ignored the challenge they did not open fire. The Japanese likely believed her to be one of their own transports or did not want to risk damage to their own ships. Boenakan almost immediately found herself in the middle of the Japanese invasion convoy as it landed troops at Indramajoe. Although the searchlights remained locked on her the entire time, the Dutch ship powered through the area completely unmolested. The landings were already underway and several villages between Indramajoe and Point Pamanoekan were burning, as was a ship offshore. Rifle and machine gun fire could be heard as the Japanese engaged KNIL units defending the beaches. As Boenakan rounded Point Pamanoekan the searchlight beams disappeared. She had maintained radio contact with Tandjoeng Priok the entire time but received no response. Skirting the Java shore, Gielis set course for Tandjoeng Priok which Boenakan entered at 1600 on March 1. There he learned that his earlier reports had been received, but the port’s transmitter had already been destroyed. Gielis was immediately sent to Bandoeng to make a personal report on the landings at Indramajoe. In the meantime, Commander van de Lint ordered Boenakan scuttled on the morning of March 2.

The Loss of SS Siaoe The Soenda Strait was firmly closed; nonetheless, several ships attempted to break out of the trap. On the evening of February 28 the KPM merchant ship SS Siaoe put out of Tandjoeng Priok for Australia with a load of rubber.23 She had been delayed several hours in order to load a large number of evacuees from the port.24 Although traveling alone, Captain J. Belger had been ordered to sail no later than 1900 and follow the same path as Houston and Perth in order to receive some measure of escort.25 By 0245 on March 1 Siaoe was off Babi Island when her

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lookouts spotted two warships off St. Nicolas Point. Almost simultaneously, searchlights aboard the ships snapped open and fixed on Siaoe. Belger ordered the helmsman to turn away to port, but the Japanese opened fire and quickly hit the merchant ship eight times. One shell exploded in the boiler room and Siaoe came to a full stop.26 The ship then keeled over and eventually sank at 0500; 22 crewmen were killed and several others seriously wounded.

“You will sail back to Bantam Bay or your ship will die” The last ships to leave Tandjoeng Priok were the auxiliary minesweepers HMS Rahman and HMS Sin Aik Lee.27 Escorted by the harbor defense launch HMS ML 1063, they sailed for Tjilatjap at 1530 on the afternoon of March 1. They had been ordered to sail and none aboard really expected to survive. To this end, Rahman towed the 72-foot sailing yacht White Swan28; crewed by two men, she was to serve as a rescue ship for any of her companions who might be lost along the way. Likewise, ML 1063 was to trail behind the other three ships; if engaged she was to retire and then return to pick up any survivors.29 The convoy went unnoticed in the darkness until it turned into the Soenda Strait. There, despite the onset of a heavy rain squall, they were sighted by two Japanese destroyers off Babi Island. Illuminating the small convoy with searchlights, they opened fire and quickly scored punishing hits on Rahman and Sin Aik Lee. With her captain dead and Sin Aik Lee beginning to sink, Executive Officer Lieutenant F. Taylor, called out, “Every man for himself !”30 With that her remaining crewmen went over the side. Rahman blew up soon after. ML 1063 was heavily shelled but slipped away under cover of darkness and had no opportunity to return. The survivors climbed aboard White Swan, which was briefly shelled without damage before the Japanese moved off.31 Under Taylor’s command, White Swan set course for the Indian Ocean. En route they picked up two RAAF flight crewmen from a small raft. Although challenged twice by Japanese destroyers, they were left alone. Then, on the late afternoon of March 2, a third Japanese destroyer stopped and boarded the yacht. Instructions from the officer leading the boarding party were direct and to the point: “You will sail back to Bantam Bay or your ship will die.”32 At Bantam Bay all those aboard White Swan were made prisoner and sent to a Japanese freighter. There they joined a number of crewmen from Perth who had survived the prior night’s battle. The effects of the previous night’s fight with Houston and Perth were obvious. Lieutenant Taylor reported seeing no less than five sunken or beached merchant ships. A large passenger ship rested on the bottom with her deck just a few feet above the water; two more ships had sunk and two had been beached.33

The Destruction of Tandjoeng Priok At midday of March 1 the entrance to the East Harbor was blocked with two ships that had arrived from Singapore

288

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

with neither proper paperwork nor the legal owners onboard. pendicular so that the entrance was only partially blocked. The Their legal status in question, they had already been positioned patrol boat Rigel and three smaller ships—the largest a British in the East Harbor specifically for this purpose. Their identities boom ship—were then also scuttled to seal the north entrance. are unknown, although one of them was probably the Chinese Several other ships—including Auby, Ipoh, Kinta, De merchant ship Ban Hoe Lie.34 SS Paula was scuttled in the outer Klerck, van Meroengdoeng, van Waerwijck and several prauws— roadstead to prevent entrance to the harbor through the minewere scuttled throughout the harbor between March 1 and 4.38 An unknown KPM cargo ship was scuttled in the entrance to field. the First Inner Basin.39 The floating coal bunker Jan van NISM The destruction of Tandjoeng Priok began on the evening was scuttled in the entrance of the Second Inner Basin. The of March 1. Although not a primary base for the KM, the port last ships in the harbor were burned on the night of March 4– was still a huge complex which contained multiple private and 5 using benzene and petroleum. The last was set ablaze by 0600 governmental entities. As was the case at Soerabaja, demolitions on March 6.40 At least a dozen merchant ships, tugs and support followed a comprehensive program developed before the outvessels totaling just over 20,000 tons were scuttled in the harbor break of war. Ashore, the first phase of the plan called for as complex and roadstead on March 1–2. much as possible to be burned followed by physical (hand tools) The Customs Service was disbanded on March 1 by Comdestruction and then explosive charges. Cranes, warehouses, coal and oil stocks, fuel lines and the floating drydocks were destroyed. Chart 28: Merchant Ships An unknown number of “B Class” patrol Scuttled at Tandjoeng Priok boats still under construction at the TandjoShip Type Tonnage Line Date Sunk Notes eng Priok Drydock Company were also Anastasia Tanker 3,029 NITM 3/3/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng burned or blown up. Little is known about Priok; later salvaged these boats except that they were approxiby Japanese. mately 175 feet long with a beam of some 60 Meroendoeng Freighter 2,464 IMP 3/2/42 Former German feet and displaced 310 tons. As designed, their freighter Friderun; maximum speed would have been 18 knots.35 Scuttled at Tandjoeng Priok as blockship Still on the stocks at Tandjoeng Priok Mijer Passenger Ship 1,873 KPM 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng Drydock Company were the small auxiliary Priok; later salvaged minesweepers Fak Fak, Flores, Garoet and by Japanese Grissee. The former GM patrol boat Tjerimai Siberoet Freighter 1,799 KPM 3/2–3/42 Shelled and sunk near was also undergoing conversion as an auxilTandjoeng Priok by Japanese ships iary minesweeper. At the nearby Prauwenveer Sibolga Freighter 1,370 KPM 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng Shipyard, the GM patrol boats Merapi and Priok; later salvaged Slamat were being converted into auxiliary by Japanese minesweepers. All were destroyed, but the Toendjoek Freighter 6,200 IMP 3/2/42 Former German freighter Japanese were able to bring most of them Rendsburg. Scuttled at Tandjoeng Priok as back into service; the survivors were reblockship; later turned to the KM after the war. salvaged by Japanese At the naval air station demolition Daan Sea-Going Tug 43 ? 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng crews burned the hangars and blocked the Priok; later salvaged by entrance with sunken ships. At 2100 the base Japanese Johan Tug 33 ? 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng commander reported the demolitions comPriok; later salvaged plete and departed for Bandoeng with his by Japanese staff. But when Commander van de Lint inMilo Tanker 322 NITM 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng spected the base he found its destruction inPriok complete. A section of 50 men from the CusTeddy Sea-Going Tug 121 NISHM 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng toms Service finished the job before they Priok; later salvaged by Japanese were evacuated to Bandoeng.36 Paul Tug 108 NISHM 3/2/42 Scuttled at Tandjoeng At the same time, the entrance of the Priok; later salvaged North Harbor was blocked with scuttled by Japanese ships. The largest of these was Toendjoek, Paula (TAN 1) Tanker 2,770 NITM 3/1/42 In KM service as TAN 1. which was towed into the north entrance Scuttled by crew between Tg. Priok and scuttled.37 She was not sinking fast minefields. Later enough so several shells were fired into her salvaged by Japanese. waterline and a fire broke out. Her aft moor20,132 ing line then broke and the ship drifted per-

31. The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok mander van de Lint and its last remaining survey ship was scuttled that same day. The remaining personnel were sent south to Bandoeng.41

Mass Desertion Tandjoeng Priok was not a primary base of operations for KM ships as they operated from Soerabaja. It was mainly used by GM patrol boats and small auxiliaries crewed almost entirely by Indonesian deck hands with European or Eurasian officers. After calling Vice-Admiral Helfrich on the morning of March 1, Commander Moorman also spoke with Rear-Admiral van Staveren regarding the militarized GM crews of those vessels in Tandjoeng Priok. Van Staveren confirmed that they were to be released from service and sent home.42 Their officers were given the choice of demobilizing as well or remaining with the KM. When the captains of Bellatrix, Merel and Rigel got word that the evacuation order did not apply to their ships, all appeared at the desk of Commander Moorman “more or less upset.” In particular, the captain of Rigel; Lieutenant-Commander B.J. ten Brink was a professional officer with a crew of regular KM personnel. Of the militarized GM ships in Tandjoeng Priok, Rigel was the biggest and he wanted to continue the fight.43 No matter if they were in the GM or KM, most Indonesian naval personnel were strongly opposed to any evacuation from the East Indies. Although the demobilization order only applied to the GM, Moorman full expected a mass exodus of native crewmen throughout the East Indies Squadron as soon as he issued the command. In an effort to save as many ships as possible he decided to wait until the last KM warships left port before announcing the demobilization. At the 1300 he held a meeting, at which he ordered all remaining warships to evacuate. Three hours later he signaled van Staveren: “Ships have order to leave harbor by 1700. I am holding demilitarization order until that time.”44 The only warships of notable size left in port were Arend, Bellatrix, Fazant, Merel, Poolster and Rigel.45 Although all were technically Gouvernmentsmarine vessels, they had been militarized in September 1939 and their crews conscripted into the KM. As a result, they would not be demobilized with the other GM personnel. Also present were the small auxiliaries of the 3rd Minesweeper Division and 5th Minesweeper Division.46 The latter unit had brand new ships and was still undergoing training and not yet operational. Before Commander Moorman could officially announce it, word of the demobilization order spread like wildfire throughout the militarized ships. As he feared, their Indonesian crews deserted en masse throughout the day.47 Aboard Rigel, her captain had only one radio operator and two signalmen left from a crew of 67. The other captains returned to the harbor and found that most of their crews had also deserted, leaving the ships all but abandoned. As a result, the planned evacuation by sea did not take place. In reality, it was a blessing in disguise, as everyone knew their chances of escape were remote. The Soenda Strait was completely sealed while the clear sky and bright moonlight offered absolutely no cover.

289

One by one, their commanders reported to Commander van de Lint that they were unable to sail. At 1630 Commander Moorman had no choice but to order the ships scuttled in the harbor.48 Four vessels of the 3rd Minesweeper Division were scuttled immediately; the remaining two were used to help scuttle Meroendoeng and Toendjoek before being sunk themselves on the afternoon of March 2. All of the vessels of the 5th Minesweeper Division, except Endeh, were scuttled.49 Bellatrix was scuttled in the First Inner Basin.50 Merel was ordered to Padang but this was quickly canceled when it became known that the Soenda Strait was blocked. She was instead scuttled in a position to block both the Second and Third Inner Basins. The patrol boat Arend, which had been damaged in an air raid on February 27, was undergoing repairs and scuttled on March 1. Poolster, which had been in service as a tender for MLD aircraft, was scuttled in the First Inner Basin on the night of March 1–2. Rigel was also scuttled at an unknown location in the harbor, as was Fazant. Their losses brought the number of GM ships lost in the NEI campaign to 54 out of a total of 58 at the start of the Pacific War.51

Chart 29: KM Warships Scuttled at Tandjoeng Priok Koninklijke Marine Ships Rigel Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Salvaged by Minelayer Priok Japanese. Alor Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 2. Aroe Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 1. Bantam Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 4. Salvaged by Japanese. Bogor Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 3. Salvaged by Japanese. Ceram Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 5. Cheribon Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 6 Djampea Auxiliary Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Converted GM Minesweeper Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 16. Salvaged by Japanese.

290 Djember

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942 Auxiliary Minesweeper

Djombang Auxiliary Minesweeper

Endeh

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Enggano

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Fak Fak

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Flores

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Garoet

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Grissee

Auxiliary

Merapi

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Converted GM Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 19. Salvaged by Japanese. Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Converted GM Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 20. Salvaged by Japanese. Java Sea 3/2/42 Converted GM patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 18. Sunk by Japanese surface ships and aircraft from Ryujo during escape attempt from Tg. Priok. Sunk 35 miles southeast of Kebatoe. Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Converted GM Priok patrol boat. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 22. Salvaged by Japanese. Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Still under Priok construction at Tg. Priok Drydock Company. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Salvaged by Japanese. Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Still under Priok construction at Tg. Priok Drydock Company. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Salvaged by Japanese. Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Still under Priok construction at Tg. Priok Drydock Company. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Salvaged by Japanese. Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Still under Priok construction at Tg. Priok Drydock Company. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Salvaged by Japanese. Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Former GM patrol Priok vessel still under conversion by Prauwenveer

Salak

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Soerabaja

3/3/42

Slamat

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Priok

Tjerimai

Auxiliary Minesweeper

Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Priok

“B Class Patrol Boat Cruisers”

Tandjoeng ? Priok

Boenakan Patrol Boat

Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Priok

De Klerk

Accommodation Tandjoeng 3/2/42 Ship Priok

Van Workship Waerdwijk

Tandjoeng 3/4/42 Priok

P 1–P 4

See Notes

Patrol Boat

See Notes

Shipyard at Tandjoeng Priok. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Former GM patrol vessel. In KM service as Auxiliary Minesweeper 8. Possibly salvaged by Japanese; see Ardjoeno. Former GM patrol vessel still under conversion by Prauwenveer Shipyard at Tandjoeng Priok. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. Former GM patrol vessel still under conversion by Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company. Destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. 53 foot, 310 ton patrol boats under construction at Tg. Priok destroyed by KM and navy yard personnel. No additional details known about them. Former Celebes Coastal Shipping Company merchant vessel taken over by KM and converted into unarmed watch vessel. Scuttled by crew at Tg. Priok. Former KPM passenger liner taken over by KM for conversion into accommodation ship. Work incomplete when ship scuttled by crew on 3/2. Salvaged by Japanese. Former KPM passenger ship taken over by KM for conversion into workship. Work incomplete when scuttled by crew at Tg. Priok. Salvaged by Japanese. P 1 captured at Samarinda February

31. The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok

P 5–P 8

Patrol Boat

See Notes

1942. P 2 scuttled at Tg. Priok. Fate of P 3 unknown. P 4 scuttled by crew at Tjilatjap; salvaged by Japanese. See P 5 scuttled by crew Notes at Pasaroean. P 6 scuttled at Tg. Priok. P 7 and P 8 scuttled by crew at Soerabaja.

Militarized Governments Marine Arend Patrol Boat Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Damaged in Japanese Priok air raid on 2/27. Scuttled by crew. Salvaged by Japanese. Bellatrix Patrol Boat Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Scuttled by crew in Priok Inner Harbor #1. Fazant Patrol Boat Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Scuttled by crew. Priok Salvaged by Japanese. Merel Patrol Boat Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Scuttled by crew as Priok blockship between entrance of Inner Harbor #2 and Inner Harbor #3. Coastal Navigation Service Poolster Buoy Ship Tandjoeng 3/1/42 Scuttled by crew. Priok Salvaged by Japanese.

“My name is Heymans, Militia Sailor”

52

After receiving permission from Rear-Admiral van Staveren to escape with as many men as possible, Commander Rouwenhorst spent the day of March 1 rounding up volunteers and supplies for the voyage. Commander J.F.W. de Jong van Beek en Donk, the former port commander at Palembang, had the same idea and soon joined him.53 They initially considered using “P Class” patrol boats, but those craft did not have sufficient range. Two minesweepers from the 5th Minesweeper Division were selected, but only Endeh was used as she was the last ship available. Her all-volunteer crew consisted of 24 officers and men from the KM and militarized GM. Rouwenhorst assembled them on the bow of Endeh and put their odds of successfully escaping Java at just 5 percent. They would be accompanying him at their own risk and were free to leave the ship if they wished. Despite the long odds, all stayed aboard and Endeh sailed at 1700 on the afternoon of March 1.54 Their destination was Tjilatjap via the Soenda Strait. Just before departing Rouwenhorst received word that the Strait was heavily patrolled and flooded with searchlights. This forced him to alter the planned route. They would now sail for Kebatoe, a small reef SSE of Billiton Island. Endeh would then make for the Karimata Strait and anchor on the south coast of Borneo before dawn. There they would camouflage the ship with branches. Endeh would continue east and slip through the Lesser Soenda Islands. It would be a treacherous voyage as

291

Endeh only had a top speed of 14 knots so not all the stages could be completed at night. At 0430 lookouts sighted ships off the starboard bow; it was obvious that Endeh had been spotted as they began signaling and turned toward the minesweeper. They were the destroyers Matsukaze and Shiokaze in escort of the light carrier Ryujo.55 The Japanese opened fire at 5,000 yards and destroyed the minesweeper’s engine room with their first salvo.56 With Endeh disabled and heavily afire they moved off. The crew abandoned ship but later returned as she remained afloat. Soon afterwards Ryujo closed and the crew thought they would be picked up. Instead, the carrier opened fire with her 5-inch AA guns and finished off Endeh with five direct hits.57 Seven men had been killed and several others wounded. The 17 survivors scrambled into a lifeboat and floating wreckage as the Japanese sailed away. One of the GM sailors, Ordinary Seaman Heymans, was in the water when he came across a small float; on it sat Commander de Jong van Beek en Donk who helped him climb aboard. Unfazed, Heymans immediately introduced himself: “I see that you are a senior officer, but we are now both shipwrecked; we must work together to save ourselves, so the difference in rank has disappeared somewhat. May I introduce myself, my name is Heymans, militia sailor.”58 The rapid nature and fierceness of the attack left the survivors overwhelmed and demoralized. Leading Seaman H. Tjaden would later write, “It was the only time in all the years that I abandoned all hope of living. A day before, I was still full of courage and ideals in Batavia, but now the end was in sight. My thoughts went back to the life that I had lived in the Indies and Holland, a kind of assessment, and I wondered what the family in Holland was doing at that moment.”59

Ultimately, Rouwenhorst was able to collect his remaining crewmen into a single lifeboat. Several days later they reached the shore of a small island. Thus began a three-week odyssey marked by hardship, betrayal, murder and finally capture by the Japanese just a few miles from their point of origination.60

The Reappearance of ML 1063 In the meantime, the demolition of Tandjoeng Priok continued throughout the night and into March 2. That morning ML 1063 returned to Tandjoeng Priok following the loss of Rahman and Sin Aik Lee. Her commander, one Lieutenant Innes (first name unknown), RNZN, reported the destruction of his compatriots; he also confirmed the loss of Houston, Perth and several other ships in the area of the Soenda Strait.61 Lieutenant Innes then “handed over the keys” of ML 1063 to Commander van de Lint and put his crew on a train to Bandoeng. Commander van de Lint put a Dutch crew aboard the launch and her 47mm deck gun was used to help destroy several installations around the harbor. Two days later, on March 4, ML 1063 inadvertently ran onto the sunken wreck of Merel at full speed. The launch was firmly stuck and could not be backed off. By that point all other craft large enough to provide a tow had been scuttled or destroyed. With no other alternative the

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

patrol boat was abandoned in place and later captured by the Japanese.62 The last vessels of any appreciable size to be destroyed were four “P Class” boats operated by the Patrol Service in the Bay of Batavia. As the base was demolished they too were scuttled. Their crews were then integrated into the harbor’s demolition team and were sent to Bandoeng soon after.63 At 0600 on the morning of March 5 the BPM refinery was destroyed; it was the last installation in the harbor area. At 0800 General-Major Schilling released the remaining 87 men of the KM demolition team still at Tandjoeng Priok. They immediately headed for Bandoeng. The KNIL covering force had withdrawn at 1800 on March 4, making the engineers the last Allied troops to evacuate. Commander van de Lint was the last military representative of any branch to leave Tandjoeng Priok. Behind him, the refinery was a mass of flames and black smoke which blotted out the morning sun.64

The Evacuation of Bandoeng The personnel evacuated from Batavia and Tandjoeng Priok streamed into Bandoeng, the administrative capital of both Java and the entire Netherlands East Indies colony. From here they awaited further orders or moved farther south to Tjilatjap for evacuation to Australia or Ceylon. Located on the Preanger Plateau in the mountains of Central Java, the KNIL planned to make its final stand at Bandoeng. Motivated by the false hope of a successful defense by the KNIL, the city quickly became a massive collection point for KM, GM, KNIL and civilian personnel of all types with nowhere else left to flee. Most Allied naval personnel at Bandoeng, including most staff echelons, were en route to Tjilatjap. Rear-Admiral van Staveren had remained in Bandoeng when he assumed the position of CZM following Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s departure; he was supported by four officers and a small communications team.65 Documents, ciphers and sensitive equipment were destroyed. Unlike Soerabaja and Batavia, there was little in the way of large-scale demolitions at Bandoeng, which was largely an administrative center. In command of local naval forces was Commander P.J.M. Cikot, who also headed the KM’s Marine Battalion. Remaining KM personnel in Batavia in the first week of March consisted of Commander Moorman and his staff (following their withdrawal from Tandjoeng Priok); MLD personnel from the naval air station; coastwatch detachments from the north coast of Java, including Cheribon, Tegal and Pekalongan; mostly European crewmen from scuttled and destroyed GM vessels; miscellaneous KM personnel in transit to and from Tjilatjap; crews from sunken merchant ships; and last but not least, a number of KM convicts who had been released from Bandoeng’s Soekamiskin Prison. There were also a number of reserve personnel in the process of being released from duty as the naval campaign wound down. All of these formations were intermixed. According to Cikot, it was “a huge disorganized mob with little discipline

and virtually no fighting capability.”66 Many of the men who had seen combat appeared to be in a stupor. It appears they suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Van Staveren’s first job was organize these men and return them to military duty.67 Most of the men were to be sent to Tjilatjap for evacuation. Priority was given to pilots, navigators, seagoing officers and certain shipboard specialists. Indonesian crews deserted from civilian and military ships there as well. Commander Cikot was ordered to send men to Tjilatjap to crew several abandoned or stranded vessels, but this did not take place in time. Several officers tried to escape independently from the south coast of Java. These attempts failed when they could not find boats for the journey. Aware that Dutch rule was ending, many Indonesians now refused to provide food or supplies. In some instances they murdered small groups of Allied troops and individual local government officials.68 In the coastal town of Semarang local Javanese rioted when KNIL, Home Guard and Marechaussee units left the area on March 1. They looted and burned a number of homes and businesses. In response to the violence the Home Guard and Marechaussee returned and fought a series of pitched battles to restore order. Although few of the Indonesians had firearms, most had short swords and knives. Between March 2 and 7 several European, Chinese and Indonesian civilians and police were killed along with 800 to 900 rioters. The violence then died down, although riots still occasionally flared up.

The American Consulate Closes 69 The United States Consulate at Medan, Sumatra, closed on February 16 and its staff evacuated to India. However, the Consulate in Batavia still remained open in late February.70 Although several of his staff left earlier in the month, Consul General Walter A. Foote remained with Vice Consul Paul Paddock and Consul Clayson W. Aldridge. Their primary duties at that point were to assist American civilians in leaving Java. State Department policy only allowed essential male personnel to travel to the NEI in the prewar period. In December 1941 there were approximately 500 American civilians in the NEI, including some 350 men and 150 women and children. About 100 men were taken into the U.S. military forces in the NEI. Most worked for Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij (NKPM) and General Motors of Java, Ltd. Both of these firms sent most women and children—numbering around 200—home in early 1941. Others worked for International General Electric of Java, Nederlandsche Pacific Petroleum Maatschappij (NPPM), Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and National Carbon Company, Ltd. The U.S. Consular staff initially had trouble evacuating its citizens. After December 1941 very few American merchant ships visited NEI ports, although Dutch ships still regularly sailed as the East Indies Government sought to sell as much raw material as possible overseas in order to finance the war. However, the British Consul controlled all or most non–Dutch

31. The Evacuation of Tandjoeng Priok shipping into the NEI ports. Thus, Foote’s staff was rarely able to get information on what ships were available to take out civilians. Although some Americans went out before February on Commonwealth ships they carried mostly British civilians. The British made no evacuation plans before the end of February 1942 other than removing women and children. Entire ships were reserved by the British before the Americans or their steamship agents even knew the ship was in port. As a result, only about 10 American civilians were taken out on British evacuation ships. On February 15 a British passenger liner put into Tandjoeng Priok but Dutch naval authorities were never informed. The ship sailed again on February 18 carrying only British evacuees and with unused cabin space for 75 people. A furious Consul General Foote later wrote, “It should be recorded again that the safe and speedy evacuation of Americans was hindered by the British policy of monopolizing all shipping and by the failure of the Allied naval authorities to keep the Consulate General accurately informed of ship move-

293

ments, together with the unfortunate absence from Java waters of American vessels during the month of February. The cooperation of the Netherlands shipping companies, however, was excellent.”71 In the end, most of the remaining American civilians on Java (including those evacuated from Singapore) had been evacuated from Soerabaja, Tandjoeng Priok and Tjilatjap on Dutch passenger liners between February 17 and 20. Approximately 20 Americans and an unknown number of Filipino citizens were captured in the NEI. At midnight on the night of February 26–27, Foote received a call that Japanese landings were expected on Java at any time. Paratroopers were expected to land and cut roads inland. He was to close the consulate and evacuate his remaining staff; the consulate was officially closed at 1200 on Saturday, February 28. Together with six other Americans, including three civilians and three news reporters, Foote, Paddock and Aldridge made their way to Tjilatjap.

CHAPTER 32

“What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” “Give us a rifle and we’ll fight on Java”

1

lowing morning for evacuation by sea to Australia.3 In total, Schokking was told to expect approximately 4,500 men for evacuation by sea. Despite the last minute notice, his orders were to ensure that they were quartered, fed and put aboard their evacuation transports.4 A group of 200 sailor cadets under the command of Lieutenant (KMR) S.E.C. Felger rolled into Tjilatjap’s train station at 0700 on March 2. Officers, junior officers and seamen from a variety of shore-based branches—Administrative, Engineering, Intelligence, Logistics—soon followed. They were joined by warship crews, shipwrecked merchant seamen, civilian work-

Allied personnel from all over Java now converged on Tjilatjap. Commander Schokking received no written orders or formal instructions regarding the evacuation. In fact, he barely got any notice all despite Tjilatjap being the main debarkation point for thousands of evacuees. His first notice of the operation came at 2300 on the night of March 1 when he received a phone call from Rear-Admiral Koenraad who informed him “3,000 men are arriving in the morning.”2 The first group would arrive by train first thing the fol-

294

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” ers and various family members. Senior officers typically followed in their personal cars; as they arrived they met with Commander Schokking at his office.5 After scuttling the GM patrol boat Eridanus at Soerabaja, Captain R. Troost reached Tjilatjap via truck on March 2 with approximately 50 officers and crewmen. Surprisingly, Troost had managed to keep his Indonesian crew intact. Unfortunately, upon arrival he learned the GM had been demobilized and would not be evacuated. Captain Troost was then ordered back to Soerabaja with his crew. As their transport had been confiscated, he dismissed his men with orders to make their way back to Bandoeng or Soerabaja as best they could.6 The transfer of naval personnel continued all week. Most thought they were going to Batavia to continue the fight. Only upon arrival in Tjilatjap did they learn that they were to be evacuated from Java and that their loved ones would be left behind. This caused considerable angst, particularly amongst the Indonesians. Many men, including a number of officers, asked Commander Schokking if the evacuation was mandatory. He replied in the affirmative and stated that anyone who did not go would be considered a deserter.7

Chart 30: Merchant Ships Sailing from Tjilatjap, February 27, 1942 Ship

Tonnage

Line

Abbekerk

7,906

VNS

Bandjarmasin 1,279 Bintoehan

1,021

City of 8,917 Manchester Enggano

5,412

Jagersfontein 10,083 Kota Gede Le Maire Merkus

3,271 865

Modjokerto 8,806

Parigi

1,172

Fate

Safely reached Fremantle on March 5. See Chapter 25 for details. KPM Escaped; port of arrival unknown. KPM Captured by Arashi on March 1; scuttled by captain 70 miles SE of Noesa Baroeng Island on March 3. Ellerman Line Torpedoed and sunk south of Tjilatjap by I-53 on night of February 27–28. SMN Sunk by observation plane from Takao south of Tjilatjap on February 28. VNS Safely reached Australia; port of arrival unknown. Rotterdam Lloyd Safely reached Colombo on March 6. KPM Sailed from Tjilatjap and never seen or heard from again. KPM Sunk by gunfire from I-7 roughly 400 miles south of Sumatra on March 4. Rotterdam Lloyd Sunk by Japanese surface ships approximately 330 miles SSW of Tjilatjap on March 1. KPM Sunk by gunfire from Japanese ships south of Tjilatjap early morning of March 1.

Ship

Tonnage

Line

Poelau Bras

9,278

Mij. Nederland

Siantar

8,667

Sibigo Sigli

1,579

Tawali

8,178

Tinombo

872

Toba

983

Tomohon

983

Toradja

981

Tosari

7,027

Van Goens

1,032

Van 3,237 Spilbergen Zaandam 10,909

295 Fate

Sunk by carrier dive bombers south of Soenda Strait on March 7. Rotterdam Lloyd Sunk by gunfire and torpedo from I-1 800 miles south of Tjilatjap and 300 miles NW of Shark Bay, Australia on March 3. KPM Escaped; port of arrival unknown. KPM Attacked by cruiser aircraft March 1; Captured by Hayashio on March 2 and taken to Makassar. Mij. Nederland Safely reached Colombo on March 14. KPM Escaped; port of arrival unknown. KPM Safely reached Colombo; date unknown. KPM Sunk south of Tjilatjap by Arashi and Nowaki on March 1. KPM Sunk 250 miles south of Tjilatjap by Arashi and Nowaki on March 1. KPM Safely reached Melbourne on March 24. KPM Safely reached Colombo; date unknown. KPM Safely reached Geraldton on March 8. HAL Safely reached Fremantle on March 5.

Slaughter at Sea Of the 24 merchant ships sailing from Tjilatjap on the evening of February 27, no fewer than 11 were sunk or captured. The unescorted Allied ships ran directly into Vice-Admiral Nagumo’s task force south of Java. Others came into contact with the 2nd, 4th and 6th Submarine Squadrons operating in the Indian Ocean between Java and Australia. Their patrol line stretched from the Soenda Strait to the waters off Tjilatjap to the southern entrance of the Lombok Strait. Other boats operated farther south in Australian waters.8

Bintoehan9 By mid–February the merchant ship Bintoehan was in poor condition. Due to the war she had not drydocked for some time. As a result her hull was heavily barnacled and the ship could barely make 5 or 6 knots. Her master repeatedly asked to enter drydock but his requests went unheeded. He became so fed up that when ordered to sail for Tjilatjap on February 20 he left the ship and did not return. 2nd Mate H.J. van Dijk was promoted to Master. Bintoehan sailed from Tjilatjap on the afternoon of Feb-

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

ruary 27. She only had enough coal on board for a 900 mile voyage, nor were there maps of any kind aboard. The faster ships rapidly left Bintoehan behind. Without enough fuel to reach Australia Captain van Dijk awaited instructions. She heard nothing via radio and February 28 passed quietly. At dawn on March 1 a Japanese observation plane appeared overhead and disappeared. Less than an hour later ships were sighted approaching at high speed from the west. Bintoehan changed course but the Japanese destroyers Arashi and Nowaki were soon in range. Neither flew a flag or pennant so van Dijk was unsure of their identity. This became crystal clear when one of the Japanese ships put a 5-inch shell into the starboard side of her bridge. With only machine guns for air defense resistance was futile. Captain van Dijk ordered the engines stopped and the crew to abandon ship over the port side while he threw her secret paperwork overboard in a weighted bag. He then made a final circuit of the ship before going overboard himself. As van Dijk went into the water he realized the Japanese had ceased fire after the initial shot. One of the destroyers closed and a voice ordered from its bridge, “Return Ship!” The Japanese launched a whaleboat and boarded Bintoehan where they hauled down the Dutch tricolor and raised a Japanese flag. Captain van Dijk was brought aboard a destroyer and interrogated regarding his orders and destination. Shortly after he boarded there was a huge commotion when an Allied bomber appeared. The destroyer went to action stations and maneuvered at full speed. The plane, however, showed no interest and passed without notice and the Japanese secured from action stations. Captain van Dijk was then told that Bintoehan was now a prize ship and would sail with the Japanese task force operating south of Java. This quickly changed when her slow speed became known. Van Dijk was ordered to make for Bali flying a Japanese flag; he was to report to the local IJN commander. She was initially told to leave her lifeboats behind, but van Dijk pushed back and was allowed to keep two in case the ship was attacked. The radio was destroyed and Bintoehan sent on her way. By March 3 she was south of Java; but instead of making for Bali Captain van Dijk scuttled the ship after nightfall.

City of Manchester 10 City of Manchester arrived at Tjilatjap on February 23 and moored to a buoy in the roadstead.11 She sailed again in accordance with Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s orders just before 2400 on night of February 27. Just before dawn City of Manchester was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-53 and burst into flames. The Japanese commander then battle-surfaced and administered the coup de grâce to the crippled merchant ship with his deck gun. It only took a few minutes for the merchant ship to sink.12 I-53 then disappeared, leaving Captain Harry Johnson, 126 crewmen, 17 gunners and 13 naval signalmen in lifeboats. They were rescued soon afterward by the American minesweep-

ers Lark and Whippoorwill, which were in the area searching for survivors of Langley. Her wounded were sent to the gunboat Tulsa for medical care. All were then transported back to Tjilatjap where Stronghold put them aboard the Zaandam.

Enggano Enggano carried general cargo, fertilizer and explosives, which had only been partially unloaded before she sailed from Tjilatjap for Fremantle on February 27.13 At 1400 on March 1 she was 270 miles south of Java when the ship was bombed and strafed by an observation plane from the heavy cruiser Takao.14 Although the plane’s first attack failed, it came back around and put a single bomb into Hold #1 and instantly set it ablaze. Within an hour the flames were out of control. When her cargo of explosives and various oxygen bottles began to explode Captain Cor Schoen sent a final position report and ordered Enggano abandoned.15 An hour later a heavy cruiser (possibly the Maya) appeared. She cruised by the burning hulk and nearby lifeboats but did not fire. Judging the merchant ship to be a total loss the cruiser disappeared to the northwest without stopping to rescue survivors.16 At 0130 on the morning of March 2 lookouts aboard Tawali sighted Enggano’s burning hulk and Captain Peters pulled her entire 65-man crew out of the water by 0300.

Le Maire 17 The exact date and cause of Le Maire’s loss remains a mystery. Captain D. Bedeaux sailed from Tjilatjap for Bunbury, Australia, on February 27. She did not arrive in Australia and was never seen or heard from again. Although it was initially believed that Le Maire fell victim to I-7 on March 4, this is impossible. Although sometimes attributed to I-62, it is now known that Merkus was sunk by gunfire from I-7 while en route to Colombo. The coordinates where Merkus sank place I-7 completely opposite from the course that Le Maire would have taken en route to Bunbury. No less than 17 Japanese submarines were operating south of Java in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Australia in late-February to mid–March. At least one researcher states the possibility that she was sunk by I-2, but it too remains unconfirmed.18 They claimed multiple Allied ships sunk. As was often the case, Japanese submarine records were incomplete or destroyed after the war. So it is often unclear (at best) as to which Japanese submarines sank which Allied ships in the final days of the East Indies campaign. As for Le Maire, it cannot be stated how many crew and passengers were lost aboard her.

Merkus 19 Merkus departed Tjilatjap on February 27 with a cargo of rubber and several passengers. She initially sailed for Colombo in company of two other small KPM ships, Toba and van Goens. All three merchant ships were escorted a short way into

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” the Indian Ocean by Valk which then turned back, leaving them to fend for themselves. The merchant ships either did not sail in convoy or Merkus simply fell behind, for she was alone when sighted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane on March 2. Two days later the Japanese submarine I-720 battle-surfaced and stopped the unarmed freighter at 1000 on March 4.21 It appears that Captain B.J.A. le Duc and his crew were ordered to abandon ship. I-7 then dispatched Merkus with her deck gun; the survivors were not harmed but the submarine promptly submerged and made off without picking up any survivors. Merkus went down some 400 miles south of Sumatra at coordinates 8-40 S / 94-30 E. After three weeks at sea her entire crew eventually made it ashore at various points along the coast where the Europeans became prisoners.

Modjokerto22 The exact fate of Modjokerto remains unknown. The only thing certain about her loss is that she sailed from Tjilatjap on the evening of February 27. Except for a final series of radio signals indicating that she had been intercepted by Japanese ships, Modjokerto disappeared with little trace. None of her crew survived the war and contemporary Japanese records are of little help for reasons that will soon become obvious. Perhaps the most credible theory states the 8th Cruiser Division sighted a large merchant ship just before 1000 at coordinates 12 00 S / 106 40 E. At 1013 Chikuma opened fire with her main battery and sank the ship at 1025. Chikuma’s deck log indicates that she sank a merchant ship that day with 49 rounds of 8-inch ammunition.23 It amounted to little more than gunnery practice for her turret crews. This would correspond with a series of signals that her wireless operator sent on March 1. The first was at 1000 and was picked up by Van Spilbergen, Siantar and Tawali. It stated that Modjokerto was being pursued by a Japanese plane at coordinates 12–40 S / 106–40 E. At about 1020 Modjokerto signaled that she was being chased by a warship. At about 1050 Siantar picked up a final signal which indicated that Modjokerto was “sinking.” It was picked up on a little-used bandwidth, indicating that Modjokerto was using her backup transmitter; this meant that her primary transmitter had been destroyed.24 According to both Bezemer and Rowher, Modjokerto was sunk by the submarine I-54.25 The radio operator aboard Zaandam reported picking up a final signal from Modjokerto stating that a submarine had torpedoed the ship and was then shelling her. The position corresponds with the approximate coordinates of where I-54 shows to have sunk an Allied merchant ship on the same day.26 After that Modjokerto disappeared. Virtually no information was found about her loss after the war. But in late 1946 the bodies of 25 crewmen from Modjokerto, including 11 officers, were found in a mass grave at Kendari, Makassar. Rotterdam Lloyd insignia on their tunics identified them as being from Modjokerto. Buried with them were a number of crewmen from the American destroyer Edsall. It appears that all had been

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rescued from the sea and then taken to Makassar where they were executed.27

Parigi 28 Parigi initially sailed from Tjilatjap on the evening of February 27 with a small convoy of other merchant ships. However, she only had a top speed of seven knots so the ship gradually fell farther and farther behind the others. Within a few hours of leaving port she was all alone in the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, she continued on toward Australia and was not sighted during the daylight hours of February 28. Unfortunately, her demise came that night when the ship should have been safest. At around 0330 on the morning of March 1 Parigi was suddenly illuminated by a searchlight from unknown Japanese ships. These were like the destroyers Arashi and Nowake. Cannon fire immediately followed; two lifeboats were destroyed and several crewmen killed or wounded. Unarmed and unable to outrun his pursuers, Captain P.A. Rentema came to a stop and ordered his crew to abandon ship.

Siantar 29 Siantar was a Dutch merchant ship chartered by the British Consulate for the evacuation of Commonwealth military personnel. She sailed for Bunbury, Australia, on the evening of February 27 with around 350 RAF/RAAF ground crew; the patrol boat P 4 escorted her through the minefield. Sailing alone at 13 knots, her radio room picked up a variety of ominous signals. The first was from Modjokerto (100 miles southeast of Siantar) that she was sinking; then from Edsall that she had been engaged by two Japanese battleships; and finally a signal to Tawali ordering her to return to Tjilatjap. At dawn of March 3, the captain of the Japanese submarine I-1 sighted her smoke and submerged to close the range. He first fired torpedoes but somehow missed Siantar; the ship’s lookout did not even sight their tracks. Apparently realizing that she was unescorted, I-1 battle-surfaced off Siantar’s port side at 0630. A short cannon duel followed, but Siantar’s 75mm deck gun jammed after only two rounds. The defenseless ship then received between 30 and 40 direct hits and was heavily damaged. As Siantar began to burn Captain A.S. Voorduyn gave the order to abandon ship. I-1 then put a single torpedo into her and Siantar sank in 10 minutes. Her 37 survivors were rescued the next day by Van Spilbergen and taken to Bunbury.

Sigli 30 Captain D. de Vries sailed from Tjilatjap on the evening of February 27. Sigli was initially unseen, but on the afternoon of March 1 several aircraft (presumably cruiser observation planes) attacked her, causing slight damage. The following day the Japanese destroyer Hayashio hove into view and captured Sigli, sending her toward Makassar. En route, she passed through

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

the area in which Stronghold had been sunk and stopped to pick up about 50 survivors on floats. Suddenly the cruiser Maya appeared and Sigli was ordered to transfer the survivors to her. The merchant ship then continued into Makassar.

Tomohon 31 Tomohon sailed on the night of February 27 with 51 passengers, including the Chinese Consul General. Approximately 230 miles south of the port the destroyers Arashi and Nowaki illuminated Tomohon with searchlights at 0300 on the morning of February 28. One of the Japanese ships fired a single shot which slammed into the crew quarters, killing five Indonesian deckhands and wounding a sixth. The second shell struck the cabin of the 1st Machinist, killing him instantly and setting Tomohon afire amidships. A third shell penetrated the hold, setting her cargo of rubber ablaze. Soon the entire aft end of the ship was ablaze and Captain W. Koning ordered her abandoned. The Japanese made no effort to rescue survivors and moved off, leaving three lifeboats filled with crew and passengers. A few hours later they encountered five survivors from the Norwegian merchant ship Prominent (2,232 tons) which Arashi and Nowaki also likely sank while she was en route from Batavia to Tjilatjap. These men were pulled out of the water and distributed amongst the lifeboats. Progress was slow and they could still see Tomohon burning in the distance; the Dutch flag was still plainly visible. Koning then told each sloop to make its own way to Java independently. The following morning, at dawn of March 2, the lifeboat under the command of 1st Mate B. Leepel was alone and unable to see any of the others. Soon after this boat was sighted by Zaandam which rescued its occupants (28 men and 2 women). None of the survivors of the other two boats were picked up, although they apparently came ashore on Java several days later.

Toradja 32 Toradja’s loss was very similar to that of Tomohon. She also sailed from Tjilatjap on the evening of February 27. On March 1 she too was surprised and sunk by Arashi and Nowaki with 11 killed and four wounded. Again, the Japanese destroyers did not rescue survivors and 30 crew and passengers piled into the lone remaining lifeboat. The following morning they were rescued by Tawali and delivered back to Tjilatjap. At about the same time, Arashi and Nowaki also sank the 620-ton auxiliary minesweeper HMS Scott Harley. This converted merchant ship had been taken over at Singapore in 1941 and entered service with a crew of survivors from Prince of Wales and Repulse.33 She successfully reached Tandjoeng Priok from Singapore in mid–February and was likely en route to Australia when sunk. It does not appear that there were any survivors from Scott Harley. None were picked up by the Japanese or other Allied ships.

Evacuation of the KM At the same time Tjilatjap was cleared of merchant ships, the KM sent away several small warships and auxiliaries. First to sortie was the militarized GM ship Hr.Ms. Zuiderkruis at 2100 on the night of February 27. By 1700 on March 1 she was 400 miles south of Java where Captain W.F. van Rooy signaled Admiral Helfrich: “Zuiderkruis via CMM-TJ. Reached designated position. Requesting further orders.”34 When no response to his signal was received by 1030 on March 3 Captain van Rooy steamed farther south and again signaled: “Zuiderkruis is 200 miles further south STOP Response requested.”35 In response he finally received a signal that Zuiderkruis and all submarines were to refuel from the tanker Petronella (TAN 8) in Veeckens Bay and make for Colombo. She had enough fuel and made directly for Colombo. En route the mostly Indonesian crew wanted to return to Java; they would fight the Japanese there but were not happy about leaving the East Indies.36 She reached Colombo on March 13.37 Zuiderkruis was followed by Willem van der Zaan on March 1. Following her encounter with the Japanese fleet she put into Tjilatjap and bunkered. To avoid the Japanese warships Willem van der Zaan initially stayed close to the Java shore before turning northwest for Ceylon early on the morning of March 3. She successfully avoided any further contact with the enemy and reached Colombo on March 9.38 The non-militarized GM ship Hoofdinspecteur Zeeman had been transferred from Tandjoeng Priok to Tjilatjap in early February. Since then she had been replacing mooring buoys in the roadstead. Her commander, Captain W.C. Tismeer, then received orders to demobilize his Indonesian crew. Although she was an older, unarmed auxiliary, he spoke with Commander Schokking and requested permission to evacuate his ship to Australia. In response, Tismeer received the following telegram: “Evacuation not in force for Gouvernmentsmarine.” With no other alternative Captain Tismeer dismissed his crew on March 1 and Hoofdinspecteur Zeeman was essentially abandoned in place.39

The Roundabout Escape of Soemba On the morning of February 27 Soemba lay off Merak with Sirius and Fazant when three Japanese fighters attacked at around 0530. They focused on Soemba although all three ships were bombed and strafed without major damage. Following the attack the force moved to another anchorage. At 1745 Commander P.J.G. Huijer received a signal from Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordering Soemba to “Immediately steam Emmahaven40 or Veeckens Bay.41 If fuel supply too low Semangka Bay.”42 Huijer sailed through the Soenda Strait to Veeckens Bay and rendezvoused with the tanker Petronella (TAN 8) on the afternoon of March 1. As she refueled Huijer awaited instructions. At about 1800 he received a telegram from Helfrich ordering Soemba to Colombo. She sailed that night at 2000; but at 0543 on the morning of March 3 Huijer received a counter-

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?”

299

( JST), Vice-Admiral Helfrich sent the following signal: “0415 Z/8 D—All submarines—tanker—all gunboats: make for Colombo at best speed.”47 Commander Huijer immediately sailed from Veeckens Bay with a course for Colombo. He followed a NNW course along the most probable track of Siberg, hoping to find the merchant ship en route. He never found her nor TAN 8. Soemba did, however, receive the following signal from Heemskerck and Isaac Sweers, which even at this late date, were still en route to Java to reinforce Helfrich’s forces: “SWR— HMK. RT. 0301–1220 from Isaac Sweers STOP En route together The gunboat Soemba alongside the pier at Makassar (courtesy Jan Klootwijk). from Colombo STOP HMK— order from Rear-Admiral van Staveren: “Soemba return to SWR the CZM STOP Situation Netherlands Indies serious Veeckens Bay for escort of TAN 8, remain there until further STOP When fuel supply sufficient STOP Returning to orders STOP TAN 8 to remain in Veeckens Bay under comColombo STOP If refueling not possible Veeckens Bay or Samand Soemba.”43 bang but not repeat not at Padang STOP To Sabang to remain In response Huijer replied, “TAN 8 departed Veeckens overnight.”48 Bay following reports of Japanese paratrooper in vicinity 0302– Due to Soemba’s critically low fuel situation this directive 1150.”44 was quickly amended so that Huijer could enter Padang or SaSoemba put into Veeckens Bay on the night of March 6; bang. He could only to do so after dark and was to sail before it was deserted with no sign of Japanese activity. Conversations dawn. Due to the presence of Japanese submarines Huijer bywith local villagers indicated nothing out of the ordinary. It passed both ports and proceeded directly to Colombo where later transpired that the report of Japanese paratroopers had Soemba arrived on March 15. originated from a tugboat captain who mistook bags of coconut oil for discarded parachutes.45 Soemba sailed out of the bay at Too Little, Too Late 0000 on March 7. In the meantime, TAN 8 had the following orders: Even while evacuating his small warships and auxiliaries, Vice-Admiral Helfrich still expected reinforcements. Jacob van 1. Remain in Veeckens Bay to Wednesday March 11 2000 ( JST). 2. Soemba shall in course of Sunday March 8 make contact with subHeemskerck had sailed from Colombo for Soerabaja on Febmarines and determine which require refueling. ruary 25. She carried a load of 4.7-inch shells for British de3. If sighted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft is a threat of immediate stroyers operating in the NEI.49 Isaac Sweers followed on the attack. In this case TAN 8 to immediately depart. night of February 27–28.50 Both were still well to sea when 4. In event of subset 3, TAN 8 shall maintain contact with submarines Rear-Admiral Doorman led the CSF into its final battle. K-VIII, K-IX, K-XI, K-XII, O-19 and Siberoet (transport) and rendezvous with them at Telok-Natoerei. Aboard Jacob van Heemskerck, Commander Jonkheer E.J. 5. If desirable TAN 8 can anchor in another part of NW Veeckens Bay. van Holthe received several signals regarding the engagement The departure date of March 11 was established with a in the Java Sea on February 28. They ominously hinted that it safety margin of 48 hours. All speeds and courses of the Dutch did not go well for the Allies and the cruiser was redirected to submarines were set. Soemba had barely left Veeckens Bay when Tjilatjap. The next day Holthe received confirmation that De the following signal was received from Vice-Admiral Helfrich: Ruyter and Java had been lost. A short time later both the cruiser and Isaac Sweers were ordered back to Colombo.51 0306–1830 SMB-TAN8 (Petronella): On the morning of March 1 Jacob van Heemskerck was Siberg departed 0306 evening from Wijnkoops Bay for Emmahaven speed 10 knots. SMB rendezvous 06–20 S / 102–00 E. Escort about 200 miles southwest of the Soenda Strait. A Japanese reSiberg to Emmahaven and to Colombo STOP My radio station is connaissance plane appeared and circled out of range for some temporarily Hr.Ms. Sumatra Colombo.46 time. It left around 1200 but soon after nine Japanese bombers Steaming at 12 knots, Soemba reached the rendezvous appeared and launched two aggressive attacks. Having been repoint at 0400 on March 8. However, Siberg failed to appear built into a modern AA cruiser, Jacob van Heemskerck easily for reasons that will be detailed below. Two hours later, at 1500 sported more firepower than any other Allied ship the Japanese

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The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

pilots would have encountered thus far in the East Indies campaign. This and high-speed maneuvering helped her avoid being hit, although a bomb exploded less than 30 feet away. It lifted the stern out of the water but did no damage.52 The Japanese then withdrew. Although undamaged Jacob van Heemskerck was low on fuel and the situation became critical on the return trip. Although authorized to enter Veeckens Bay or Sabang to refuel, Commander Holthe proceeded directly to Colombo. He arrived on March 6 with just 3 percent fuel capacity remaining in his bunkers.53

The Loss of Stronghold On the afternoon of March 1 Burnie and Bendigo arrived at Tjilatjap and sent ashore the survivors of Boero whom they had rescued off Java Head. The Japanese were close and made multiple contacts with Allied merchant ships. With the approval of Commodore Collins, Bendigo signaled all British ships to avoid Tjilatjap unless necessary to refuel; they were to instead make for Colombo or Fremantle.54 That night Collins boarded Burnie and 89 men went to Bendigo; they included 10 officers from his staff, one RAF officer, one civilian and five officers and 72 ratings from Jupiter.55 Bendigo sailed for Fremantle at 2330 and arrived on March 8.

Commonwealth personnel continued to pour into Tjilatjap throughout the day, including 45 survivors from Electra and another party of Jupiter crewmen. The main group of RN personnel evacuated from Batavia also arrived via convoy. The plan was to take them off aboard Burnie but their numbers were too great. The British Consul General approached Commander Schokking who made available the merchant ship Generaal Verspyck.56 At 1100 on the morning of March 2, Yarra, Jumna, MMS.51, Gemas, Anking, Francol and the remainder of the 21st Minesweeping Flotilla57 arrived off Tjilatjap. A signal from Collins again advised them not to enter the port; Jumna immediately sailed for Colombo while Yarra and her convoy turned for Fremantle. British Judge—now able to make nine knots—and Wollongang continued toward Australia on their own. The minesweepers were already in Tjilatjap’s channel when they received Collins’ signal. Two were low on fuel and all continued in rather than risk being mined while turning in the narrow channel. After mooring they refueled and each ship took aboard evacuees. Goulburn and Toowoomba sailed again at 1800 on March 2. With Commodore Collins aboard, Burnie sailed at 2000. She was followed by Maryborough, which escorted Generaal Verspyck. Ballarat was the last to sail on March 3. She had remained behind to take off the crew and equipment from Gemas. The

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” converted whaler was far too slow to keep up, and in any event, did not have sufficient range to reach Australia or Colombo.58 After being stripped of all useful gear Gemas was scuttled in the Indian Ocean seven miles off Tjilatjap.59 Stronghold was the first British warship to leave Tjilatjap, sailing with Zaandam on March 1. She provided A/S escort until midnight when the passenger liner proceeded ahead at top speed. Stronghold was low on fuel and was limited to 12 to 15 knots. The following morning she was shadowed by a Japanese spotter plane for some time.60 At 1743 the tiny destroyer was intercepted by Atago, Maya, Takao, Arashi and Nowaki 300 miles south of Java. Maya opened fire at a range of 16,600 yards and the destroyers joined her at 1821 from 11,300 yards.61 Atago and Takao remained out of the fight. Japanese gunnery was sloppy and showed none of the vaunted accuracy for which the IJN was widely respected. The range slowly closed until Maya was 3,000 yards off Stronghold’s starboard bow and the destroyers 2,000 yards off her port beam.62 Maya fired 635 rounds of 8-inch ammunition; Arashi fired 290 and Nowaki 345, 5-inch rounds, respectively.63 Given their target was a 1,075-ton destroyer launched in 1919 with only three 4-inch guns, one 12-pounder AA and two torpedo tubes, it was a dismal waste of ordnance. Although massively outgunned, Lieutenant-Commander G.R. Pretor-Pinney turned into the fight without hesitation. For nearly an hour Stronghold defied the odds and held off the Japanese. But by 2028 Pretor-Pinney was mortally wounded and Stronghold heavily damaged and stopped. With her decks covered with the dead and dying, abandon ship was ordered and the destroyer blew up shortly after 1900.64 The Japanese then disappeared. About 50 of Stronghold’s crew were left drifting aboard two Carley floats. Lieutenant-Commander PretorPinney and 74 officers and crew did not survive.65

“Get dressed boy, there are Japs in sight.” In the meantime Yarra and her convoy made steady progress throughout the night of March 2–3. Except for a solitary Japanese plane far on the horizon on the evening of March 2 there was no sign of the enemy. On the morning of March 3 lookouts spotted two lifeboats under sail for the Java coast. They contained 36 Dutch and Javanese survivors from Parigi who were taken aboard Yarra and the convoy continued toward Fremantle.66 The rest of the day and night continued to be smooth sailing at 8½ knots. That changed dramatically on the morning of March 4. At 0630 lookouts aboard Yarra spotted the masts of heavy ships to the NNE. They belonged to Atago, Maya and Takao; with Arashi and Nowaki in escort they were closing fast. Lying wounded in the officers’ mess, Parigi survivor Engineer 4th Class R.C. Berends recalled his conversation with Yarra’s doctor… Doctor: “Get dressed boy, there are Japs in sight.” Berends: “How many?” Doctor: “It looks like the whole bloody Japanese Navy.” Berends: “What are we going to do?” Doctor: “Attack them!”67

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What followed was a ruthless slaughter, punctuated by the steadfast sacrifice of Yarra. As he sounded General Quarters Lieutenant-Commander Robert Rankin signaled the convoy to scatter. He then laid smoke to cloak their escape and ordered his helmsman to close the range. Despite being completely outgunned, outranged and totally overmatched Yarra engaged Atago, Maya and Takao with her three 4-inch guns. In return, giant water columns from their 8-inch shells enveloped the 1,500 ton sloop. As if the Japanese needed any more advantage, they launched two observation planes to spot gunfire.68 Although the convoy had scattered, the Japanese quickly ran them down. Anking was lost almost immediately; battered by heavy gunfire she sank in less than ten minutes. Lightly armed, MMS-51 stood no chance.69 Her captain scuttled the ship and sent his crew over the side. One of the cruisers then came in close and finished off the wooden-hulled minesweeper with her 25mm AA guns. Francol was heavily damaged but still afloat, tankers being notoriously difficult to sink with gunfire due to the added buoyancy of their storage tanks. Nonetheless, she succumbed at 0730 in a hissing mass of flame and smoke.70 That left just Yarra. Badly hit, she was on fire and listing heavily to port, but continued to fire. Just after 0800 LieutenantCommander Rankin gave the order to abandon ship; minutes later he was killed by a direct hit on the bridge. As her crew went over the side, Leading Seaman R. Taylor remained at Yarra’s last operational 4-inch mount and continued to fire until he too was killed. Arashi and Nowaki then closed and circled Yarra as they pumped shell after shell into her burning wreck. The spotter planes also bombed the sloop. Yarra finally sank a little while after 0800, 90 minutes after the action started.71 Aboard Maya were approximately 50 survivors from Stronghold who had been rescued by Bintoehan and transferred to the Japanese cruiser. Toward the end of Yarra’s magnificent fight they were brought on deck to witness her destruction. One of Stronghold’s former crewmen later wrote, We were taken on deck and shown, as they tried to impress us, the might of Japan’s navy. The Yarra was the only ship left afloat, and we could see flames and a great deal of smoke. The two destroyers were circling Yarra which appeared stationary, and were pouring fire into her. She was still firing back as we could see odd gun flashes. The three cruisers then formed line ahead and steamed away from the scene. The last we saw of Yarra was a high column of smoke, but we were vividly impressed by her fight.72

Despite the sea being dotted with survivors the Japanese picked up few survivors. One of the destroyers rescued a single boat from Francol with 12 Chinese crewmen and one English officer.73 Presumably this was done in order to identify their victims. The rest of her passengers and crew were lost. Fourteen survivors from MMS 51 were rescued on the afternoon of March 7 by the Dutch steamer Tjimanoek and taken to Fremantle. Another boat contained 33 RAN ratings and the Dutch captain of Parigi. K-XI sighted their lifeboat on March 9 but 21 of the men, including Parigi’s captain, had died in the meantime. As a result of the two sinkings there were no survivors from Parigi.74

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Just south of Yarra were Ballarat, Bendigo, Burnie, Goulburn, Maryborough, Toowoomba and Wollongong. Close enough to clearly hear her position report the minesweepers moved to clear the area. At any moment a Japanese floatplane could appear overhead and direct a destroyer or cruiser to their position. As they ploughed ahead the coal-burning Generaal Verspyck struggled to maintain pace and threatened to fall behind Maryborough. Annoyed at her slow pace, Maryborough’s captain signaled, “Get all those bloody passengers into the stoke hole.” 75 His candor apparently had the required effect, for the merchant ship maintained pace with Maryborough for the remainder of the voyage. They and the other minesweepers reached Fremantle on March 9–10.

“Give us a rifle and we’ll fight on Java” Admirals Glassford and Palliser left Tjilatjap aboard two Patrol Wing 10 PBYs around midnight of March 1. They arrived at Exmouth Gulf in the early morning hours of March 2.Three Catalinas had originally flown in, but P-3 had suffered engine problems after landing. When she could not be repaired in timely manner, her crew attempted to demolish the plane before flying out aboard P-10 and P-46. P-3 was later taken over by an MLD crew which got the Catalina operational again and flew her to Australia.76 By the morning of March 2 thousands of American, Australian, British and Dutch air, ground, naval and support staff were pouring into Tjilatjap from all corners of Java. Four long troops trains arrived; among their passengers were crewmen from Banckert, Kortenaer, Piet Hein, Van Nes and Witte de With. Most came from Soerabaja, but a number arrived from the KM rest camp at Malang where they had enjoyed a six-day leave.77 There were some 3,000 RAF and RAAF personnel alone.78 Many of the new arrivals were wounded.79 On March 3 approximately 1,000 more civilian workers arrived from the ME and ordnance depot on Madoera.80 They joined stranded oil company employees, war correspondents and multiple women with children. Lieutenant-Commander (USNR) Mosher would later comment on the mass exodus: “Tjilatjap, by no means a popular resort even in peacetime, was not equipped to deal with the flood of transients that descended on it now.”81 Indeed, evacuees found poor accommodations, little food and unsanitary drinking water that first had to be boiled. The water supply at Tjilatjap’s only hotel often failed completely. The Dutch club just down the street from the hotel was also crammed. Arrivals slept on veranda floors, lounge chairs and even parked cars.82 The American forces were being evacuated as fast as possible by plane,83 ship and submarine.84 It is 1,210 miles from Tjilatjap to Broome and the flights aboard chartered seaplanes took eight hours with a strict 1,800-pound weight limit.85 There was a constant roar of aircraft engines as seaplanes almost nonstop landed and took off again, carrying civilian and military evacuees. At the same time, the majority of the British person-

nel were put aboard chartered Dutch merchant ships in the harbor. On the morning of March 2 a Japanese reconnaissance plane flew over the city; all personnel were ordered to stay away from the docks to conceal the evacuation. When it left they were ordered to continue to the harbor. There was little enthusiasm for the evacuation among the KM personnel and most simply treated it as just another order. Morale was poor and desertions, particularly amongst the Indonesian personnel, spiked. Confusion and widespread disorganization greeted the KM forces who had simply been directed to reach Tjilatjap and await further orders. Few were given time to adequately plan or prepare for the operation. Upon arrival many large groups were broken up and spread throughout the city; as a result, some men from Soerabaja were not evacuated. None of their officers knew who was in charge or what their next steps were to be.86 “Tjilatjap … was a madhouse … at the station there were still trains coming in with all kinds of people hoping to get away from Java. Since nobody told us what we were supposed to do, I went to a Dutch navy officer and asked him whether we were supposed to board a ship somewhere (we were still in the town). He told me literally, ‘I’m not going to put you on a ship, I don’t want to be a murderer. Let that be enough for you!’”87

Lieutenant-Commander Schotel kept the entire crew of Witte de With together at the dock. Everyone was hot, tired and dirty as they waited for hours without food or water. Schotel visited the port commander’s office several times to try and get orders. Each time he could plainly see that it was little more than mass chaos. Eventually he returned with news that Japanese warships were running wild across the ocean south of Tjilatjap and that evacuation was impossible. Schotel then told his men that they were free of “naval commitments” and could do what they pleased, thus adding to the mass confusion.88 Lieutenant-Commander Goslings also kept the crew of Banckert together. Upon visiting the port office he was told that all the evacuation ships were full and that there was no room for his men. From the rumors flying about, it appeared that Tjilatjap would be occupied at any minute. He later wrote, “Leadership had completely failed.”89 Goslings gave his men orders to feed themselves and reassemble later that afternoon at the port. Due to the shortage of evacuation space, he released the Indonesians in his crew from duty; most were young militiamen and did not want to leave Java anyway. He ultimately boarded Sloterdijk with six officers and 44 crewmen.90 In his postwar report Commander Schokking was highly critical of the operation. He felt that the evacuation of Tjilatjap was very poorly planned and executed. Other than three of his own officers—all reservists such as himself—Schokking had received no support. Nor did he receive any detailed orders or guidance from his superiors or those officers whom RearAdmiral Koenraad had appointed to assist him. Indeed, on March 3 he reported the arrival thus far in Tjilatjap of approximately 4,500 KM personnel for whom he had received virtually no prior instructions or advance notice for their evacuation.91

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” Another naval officer in Tjilatjap, Captain A.M. Hekking, former KM commander at Ambon, was equally critical. He wrote that no formal seaborne transport had been previously arranged, nor was anyone in overall command. Perhaps most damning was Hekking’s statement that Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s order to evacuate came so late as to be useless.92 At 1000 on the morning of March 2 Commander Schokking telephoned Rear-Admiral Koenraad for directions. He received a single word answer: “Evacuate.” With that directive, Schokking began loading men aboard the merchant ships Sloterdijk, Kota Baroe, Tjisaroea and Duymaer van Twist.93 Vice-Admiral Helfrich had designated six merchant ships— Kota Baroe, Poelau Bras, Sloterdijk, Tawali, Tjisaroea and Zaandam—as evacuation transports. Janssens, which had remained in port, was to take aboard any late arrivals.94 Kota Baroe was just finishing the unloading of her cargo of six DB-7 light bombers. Of the remainder, all but Poelau Bras were recalled to Tjilatjap from their respective positions some 200 to 400 miles south of Java.95 Poelau Bras entered Wijnkoops Bay, a little used anchorage 200 miles west of Tjilatjap and 100 miles south of Bandoeng. Although some officers were specifically assigned to certain ships, there was no formal organization or distribution of personnel at the lower ranks. Most simply went to the docks and boarded whatever ships were in front of them.96 Unbeknownst to them, this completely random choice would mean the difference between escape to freedom, 3½ years of brutal Japanese captivity or even death. At the start of the evacuation Rear-Admiral Koenraad gave orders for there to be no discrimination between European and Indonesian personnel. It soon became apparent that the ships Vice-Admiral Helfrich had recalled were not enough to transport all the men pouring into Tjilatjap. As a result the Europeans were given priority to go aboard the evacuation ships.97 From the Dutch point of view, hundreds of Indonesians had already deserted and the loyalty of those remaining was no doubt in question. It was a kick in the teeth for those loyal Indonesians who had remained at their posts. In any event, several thousand KM personnel—both European and Indonesian— were left stranded in Tjilatjap after the last transport sailed. In the meantime, survivors from City of Manchester and Toradja returned to Tjilatjap where they told tales of Japanese submarines waiting to sink any ship attempting to escape. As rumors spread unchecked they grew more fantastic. As a result, morale collapsed and many personnel of all ranks believed the evacuation doomed when it had barely even started. The prevailing mood, particularly amongst the Indonesians, was: “Give us a rifle and we’ll fight on Java and not get torpedoed.”98 In addition to the wild half-truths of the merchant seamen, there were also ominous, and much more accurate, reports of a Japanese task force operating south of Java. These were the ships sighted by Willem van der Zaan and they were operating in an area directly south of Tjilatjap through which the evacuation ships had to sail. Fears were amplified by the reports of Asheville, Pecos, Stronghold, Yarra and other Allied warships

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being sunk. GVT.5 sent out a series of patrols that found no trace of Japanese ships in the immediate vicinity of the port. This would lead to tragic losses for many of the ships and men they carried. Due to their high speed, Kota Baroe and Sloterdijk were routed directly to Australia via a sea lane 100 to 200 miles south of Java that was regularly patrolled against submarines. The slower ships were sent on a less traveled route that initially kept them closer to shore. Duymaer van Twist and Tjisaroea were sent east and Generaal Verspyck to the west. Once at sea, Generaal Verspyck and Kota Baroe set their own course.

“Chased by aircraft” Tjisaroea also sailed from Tjilatjap on the evening of March 2. She carried 45 KM officers and approximately 500 ratings. This number has been reported as being closer to 700 but most Dutch-language sources place the figure at around 500.99 The majority of these men were from the gunnery training ship Soerabaja, which had been abandoned in situ at the ME. It remains unclear if the remainder of the evacuees were also trainees from the KM Naval Academy at Soerabaja or regular sailors. Once outside the minefield Captain J.J. van Nuys turned southeast. Hope of successfully reaching Australia initially ran high as the ship remained unseen throughout the day of March 3 and morning of March 4. Their hopes were dashed on the afternoon of March 4 when a Japanese cruiser plane appeared overhead. Tjisaroea was approximately 195 miles south of Java when Captain van Nuys sent the following signal: “Chased by aircraft.”100 It was the last communiqué from Tjisareoa. At 1620 (Tokyo time)101 the destroyer Arashi came into view; she ordered Captain van Nuys to stop and put a prize crew aboard her. Atago, Maya, Takao and Nowaki—with a Japanese tanker and Duymaer van Twist in train—joined them and one of the cruisers sent over a replacement detachment.102 Duymaer van Twist and Tjisaroea were escorted into Makassar by the tanker and a destroyer. They arrived on March 8 and all crew and passengers became prisoners.103

“Heave to or I will open fire” Duymaer van Twist had sailed from Emmahaven (Padang) for Tjilatjap with a load of coal on February 24. Her master, Captain J.S.W. Raap, departed at 0330 to avoid a Japanese reconnaissance plane which circled the port every morning. Aboard were 450 Australian troops who had escaped from Malaya and some 100 civilian evacuees, consisting mostly of women and children. By morning of February 27 Duymaer van Twist was off the Soenda Strait where her lookouts sighted wreckage and a swamped, heavily damaged lifeboat. An approaching aircraft was then sighted, which turned out to be a Dutch or British PBY.104 Duymaer van Twist arrived off Tjilatjap on the night of

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February 28 but had to wait until the following morning to enter the port. Her coal was not unloaded, but the Australians were transferred to the passenger liner Zaandam. En route to that ship they were shocked to see crates of P-40s being dumped into the harbor from Seawitch.105 In their place Duymaer van Twist took on approximately 300 KM personnel consisting of MLD ground personnel, militarized KPM crews and 10 officers.106 Duymaer van Twist had orders to sail for Perth immediately and pulled away from the pier at exactly 1800 on March 2. No harbor pilot was available, so her master was forced to navigate the minefield on his own. Two Dutch patrol boats escorted her out, but turned back as soon as Duymaer van Twist cleared the minefield. By March 4 she was 200 miles south of Java. At 1300 a Japanese cruiser observation plane appeared from the south and circled overhead for 30 minutes. Although it disappeared, all aboard knew that the end was near. To throw off any pursuers Captain Raap reduced speed to eight knots; nightfall would occur at 1730 and weather conditions suggested rain, which would help cover her escape. Then at 1800 a lookout in the crow’s nest sighted Japanese warships dead ahead. Raap immediately threw the wheel over and attempted to run, but at 1900 a Japanese warship closed and signaled, “Heave to or I will open fire.” As Duymaer van Twist came to a stop all secret papers, ciphers and charts were thrown over the side. Her machine guns were dismounted and stowed. The ship was not scuttled due to the large number of passengers. At 1915 a whaleboat containing two officers and 20 heavily armed sailors came alongside. Their senior officer demanded the ship’s log and other papers; he was informed that strict regulations required them to be thrown overboard. After many signals between Duymaer van Twist and the Japanese cruiser Captain Raap was ordered to make full speed for the Lombok Strait in company of the Japanese tanker.107 En route they were joined by Tjisaroea which the Japanese captured several hours later. The Japanese remained onboard and routinely signaled by searchlight both day and night. They clearly had no fear of Allied planes or submarines.108 Their behavior throughout the voyage was exemplary. Although there was ample food, the Japanese did not eat until invited to do so. Captain Raap was allowed to keep his own cabin and no passengers were displaced. Her passengers followed normal routine and it was a calm voyage. The Japanese officers bunked with their men in the 1st Class Salon and on the 1st Class Deck. The situation was still tense for Captain Raap and the commander of the MLD detachment. Word leaked out that several MLD men had hidden their service revolvers and now plotted to retake the ship. Only with great difficulty did Raap convince them that their plan stood zero chance of success. Even had they succeeded in retaking the ship, a destroyer was still in the immediate area while the others were just over the horizon. It would only take a signal from the tanker for the Japanese to initiate a search. In the end, the consequences for

everyone would almost certainly have been brutal.109 Thus, Duymaer van Twist entered Makassar at 1800 on March 8 and all aboard officially became POWs.110

Kota Baroe Kota Baroe had reached Tjilatjap from San Francisco on February 27 with a cargo of light bombers, transport aircraft and flight trainers. Despite Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s order to clear the harbor that same afternoon, her cargo was considered critical to the defense of Java. As a result, her Master received orders to remain in port and continue unloading. But unloading proceeded extremely slowly and only by March 2 had she managed to offload all but two of the Lockheed transports. At that point Commander Schokking ordered her master to cease unloading activities and begin taking aboard evacuees. These consisted of 650 KM seamen, 23 junior officers and seven officers.111 Four civilian women, presumably spouses of military personnel, also came aboard. Kota Baroe sailed after dark on March 2; she was the last ship to leave Tjilatjap, sailing several hours after Janssens. Owing to her high speed she was routed directly to Colombo, where Kota Baroe arrived on March 12.112

Janssens113 Janssens had been in Tjilatjap since February 4 as a supply ship for the CSF. Although Commander Schokking kept her in port on February 27, he ordered Lieutenant-Commander G.N. Prass to be underway in 30 minutes if necessary. On March 1 she transferred supplies to Kota Baroe for that ship’s evacuees. On March 2 Prass had orders to sail that night carrying around 600 evacuees. He already had 54 stragglers and more were boarding.114 At 1700 Prass called Schokking and was told to transfer all KM personnel to Sloterdijk. Later that night another group of KM personnel—which included the crew of K-X, members of the torpedo boat squadron and civilian workers from the ME115—came aboard and his sailing orders were pushed back. A number of senior officers also boarded. Their presence was tricky for Prass for he was only a LieutenantCommander and a reservist at that. Nonetheless, he exercised great tact and was well aware of the fact that as captain of the ship, his authority was untouchable.116 On the morning of March 3 Prass was told he would receive approximately 750 evacuees; Janssens was to sail at 1800. During the day survivors from Houston, Marblehead, and War Sultan (a British tanker), several American and Australian war correspondents together with the wives and children of KM officers boarded.117 Due to the extreme danger Prass protested against taking on the women and children, but Schokking overruled him. The militarized GM patrol boat Valk was ordered to escort Janssens to Australia, but her Indonesian crew deserted, forcing Prass to sail alone.118 Janssens threw off her mooring lines at about 1630 on March 3. Barely had she pulled away from the

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” dock when 14 of the ship’s Indonesian crewmen jumped over the side and swam back to the shore where they promptly disappeared.119 Nonetheless, Prass continued down the channel and navigated the minefield without a pilot. Prass planned to stay 10 miles offshore and then turn south at 113 degrees. Dark clouds, rain squalls and stormy weather helped cover their voyage until 1600 on March 4. At 1000 on March 3 approximately 25 Japanese bombers passed but did not attack. At 1145 two Zeros appeared and strafed the ship for 20 minutes. Despite return fire from her improvised AA defenses, the Japanese shot up the ship.120 Given the large number of people aboard, it was miraculous that only 11 people were injured, only one of them seriously.121 Several lifeboats were damaged. The attack badly rattled many passengers who demanded to be put ashore at Patjinan Bay, just one hour away. Prass strongly opposed this as he felt that most of his remaining Indonesian men would desert at the first opportunity. The most senior officer on aboard, a Captain, then gave him a direct order which Prass felt compelled to obey. Barely had Janssens dropped anchor when this officer and another demanded to be taken ashore in one of the lifeboats.122 Morale collapsed following their departure. The pause let the crew treat the wounded and repair the damaged lifeboats and hoists. Prass met with nine KM officers in his cabin where he made it clear that Janssens would sail for Australia after dark. All KM personnel were then assembled on deck where officers addressed them. There was no desire to sacrifice anyone unnecessarily and volunteers were called to man the ship. Nonetheless, many personnel of all ranks went ashore. They included several officers, although it was stressed that they could better serve the Queen abroad, and that their chances of leaving Java at this late date were doubtful. About 250 people left Janssens, including nearly all her crew despite the pleas of Prass. Virtually none of the approximately 200 civilians and crew remained when the lifeboats were hoisted back aboard at 1800. “It was a sorry spectacle, of which the foreigners—all of whom remained aboard—had little understanding.”123 Fortunately, many Dutch sailors with technical skills stayed aboard. They included the entire crew of K-X whom Lieutenant-Commander de Back essentially ordered to remain aboard. The crew was filled out from the remaining evacuees and Janssens weighed anchor at 1845. Watches were extended so that two KM officers were always on the bridge with a helmsman; KM personnel also stood watch. Despite steering and engine problems, Janssens did not encounter the Japanese again and reached Fremantle on March 14.

Sloterdijk As detailed earlier, the date on which Sloterdijk arrived at Tjilatjap is unknown. On or about February 27 she was approaching Java with her cargo of Buffalo fighters and Falcon trainers. She was approximately 400 miles south of Tjilatjap

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when her master, Captain F.H. Dobbinga, dodged a torpedo from a Japanese submarine. In response, the newly arrived corvettes Bendigo and Burnie departed Tjilatjap on the afternoon of March 1 to provide A/S assistance and escort Sloterdijk into port. However, they were unable to make contact with the merchant ship and returned to port. Proceeding alone, Sloterdijk reached Tjilatjap without any further difficulty and moored to a buoy in the harbor. Despite the critical need for aircraft on Java, at this late date there was no talk of her cargo being unloaded. Almost immediately a tug began bringing out evacuees from the wharf. Captain Dobbinga eventually took aboard some 350 KM personnel, including 50 from Witte de With, 50 from Banckert and several cadets from the KM Naval Academy at Soerabaja. Several of the officers had their wives and children. Sloterdijk was to sail immediately as soon as her evacuees were aboard. However, in port most of her Indonesian crew had either deserted or been released from duty, which delayed the ship’s departure by several hours. They were replaced by KM personnel who stood watch, helmed the ship and manned her cannon and machine guns. Others were assigned duties as cooks, seamen, bakers … even babysitters for the children! Sloterdijk sailed after dark on March 2. At 15 knots she was the fastest of the evacuation ships on Java and was routed directly to Australia. At 0900 on March 3 she picked up a signal from USS Asheville that she was under attack by Japanese warships. Asheville was approximately 300 miles south of Sloterdijk, but Captain Dobbinga still temporarily turned east at full speed to increase the distance; he later turned south again. The following day she picked up another signal from Tjisaroea, some 350 miles behind: “Chased by aircraft.”124 Nothing more was heard and Tjisaroea was never seen or heard from again. Sloterdijk continued on to Australia and arrived Fremantle on March 8.125

Tawali Tawali reached Tjilatjap on February 7 with a cargo of explosives. She was only partially unloaded when Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s order to sail came through on February 27. Captain W.A. Peters lingered 400 miles south of Java until ordered to return to the port at 1330 on March 1. An hour later Tawali picked up a signal from Enggano that she was under air attack. Both ships belonged to the Netherlands Steamship Company and Captain Peters altered course to assist. Soon after plucking Enggano’s crew from the ocean, Tawali rescued another lifeboat with 30 survivors from Toradja at 1000.126 At 0900 on March 3 Tawali moored alongside Tjilatjap’s pier.127 Survivors of Toradja went ashore, but Captain Cor and the Chinese crew of Enggano remained aboard and helped with preparations to load evacuees.128 At 1200 Captain Peters met with Commander Schokking who informed him that Tawali would take aboard approximately 600 evacuees, despite only having cabin space for 97. She was to sail for Australia no later than 1900 on March 3.

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Her passengers were primarily civilians and included 359 ME workers, 49 workers from the Soerabaja Drydrock Company, 20 men from the Rotterdam Lloyd and Java-China-Japan Lines and five women with five children. Joining them were 85 Australian and British military personnel. Peters noted in his diary that loading proceeded smoothly as all police and customs officials had disappeared!129 Nonetheless, it took some “arm-twisting” on the part of Commander Schokking to convince Captain Peters to sail. Tawali had suffered a damaged engine piston and her crew had deserted; he was not optimistic of her chances. It took a promise from Mr. Heringa that his civilian workers would help get the ship operational for him to agree. In the meantime, six buses were sent to collect the workers at 1600. They initially refused to board as they had no orders to do so from Heringa; their instructions were to move only with his authorization. This was received at 1700 and the buses took them to the dock.130 Tawali departed around 2100 on the night of March 3; Captain Peters turned due south at full speed. She was the last evacuation vessel to leave Tjilatjap, sailing four hours after Janssens. Fortunately, the weather was in her favor. It was a full moon initially, but dark clouds and heavy rain rolled in, reducing visibility to zero. At 1430 on March 4 she intercepted Tjisaroea’s final signal reporting Japanese aircraft. She was only about 100 miles to the east. As twilight approached lookouts spotted a badly overloaded lifeboat and Captain Peters stopped despite the very real danger of being torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. It contained 57 survivors from HMS Anking, including many wounded.131

Most were Royal Navy personnel, but there were also some Chinese deckhands with a few Australian and British soldiers. After taking them aboard a small light was seen in the dark, but Captain Peters felt the risk of stopping again was too great and reluctantly moved on.132 Tawali’s destination was originally Australia, but on March 5 Peters received orders to make for Colombo. Changing course, he proceeded 400 to 500 miles south of Cocos Island. Tawali then turned west again and reached Colombo on March 14.

“I order you to pull me in!” Tjilatjap was not the only port of embarkation for KM personnel being evacuated from Java. A much smaller evacuation point was also established at Wijnkoops Bay, an undeveloped bay on the southwest coast of Java. Located 175 miles west of Tjilatjap and 75 miles southwest of Bandoeng, the coastal village of Pelaboehan Ratoe was the evacuation hub for administrative staff from Bandoeng. It was also used by late-arriving personnel who oversaw the demolition and evacuation of Bandoeng and Tandjoeng Priok.133 A group of 150 KM personnel was sent by bus to Pelaboehan Ratoe following the evacuation of Bandoeng. Most of this group—100 officers and men—were the headquarters staff of Rear-Admiral van Staveren who was leaving Java now that demolitions were complete and the evacuation was underway. They were joined by Captain G.G. Bozuwa,134 Commander J.B. Meijer and Commander J.J.H. van Rinkhuyzen.135 The large merchant ship Poelau Bras sailed from Tjilatjap on the evening of February 27 and was recalled to the port on

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” March 2. But en route, Captain P.G. Crietee was redirected to Wijnkoops Bay where Poelau Bras arrived on March 4. There he learned Poelau Bras would take on military and civilian evacuees and sail for Colombo on March 6. Also in Wijnkoops Bay was the merchant ship Siberg under the command of Captain D.J.W. van Geest. She arrived the same day with 500–600 KNIL troops from Padang.136 En route Siberg had been strafed by a Japanese plane that killed two soldiers. She too was designated for evacuation duty on March 6, but the strafing attack had badly shaken morale. Not only did Siberg remain in port, but on March 7 her entire crew, including Captain van Geest, left the ship in a panic. As a result, all evacuees at Wijnkoops Bay went aboard Poelau Bras. Siberg was ordered scuttled in the deepest part of the bay, but the ship was simply abandoned and captured completely intact by the Japanese.137 In addition to the group detailed above, there were a number of KNIL officers, ML-KNIL pilots and mechanics who had made their own way to Wijnkoops Bay. Civilian evacuees included 29 technicians and two executives from BPM, crewmen from several sunken merchant ships and a number of women and children. American war correspondents Bill McDougal and Witt Hancock boarded Poelau Bras at the last minute.138 The ship loaded some 275 evacuees though she only had accommodations for 56 passengers.139 Poelau Bras sailed for Colombo at 2000 on March 6. She had sat in the bay for 48 hours and was spotted twice on March 6 by enemy reconnaissance planes. The Japanese were aware of their presence and all aboard knew their warships were operating south of Java. Poelau Bras was armed with one 4-inch deck gun and two 40mm Bofors. Her crew also installed 16 machine guns at various positions around the ship for air defense.140 But if a surface battle developed Captain Crietee would be hopelessly outgunned. To minimize the risk of contact with Japanese ships Commander Meijer recommended radio silence.141 By dawn of March 7 Poelau Bras was south of the Soenda Strait. Captain Crietee hoped to be at least 200 miles offshore by 1100; it was believed this would put them out of range of air attack from Java or Sumatra. At 0900 a Japanese twin-engine bomber appeared and circled overhead; whether correct or not, all aboard suspected that it was looking for them. The ship’s deck gun fired several rounds and the plane disappeared. Everyone aboard held their breath as the ship would be out of range of aircraft on Sumatra within a few hours. Soon after another reconnaissance plane appeared and circled out of range. At 1100 nine Japanese dive bombers also appeared and launched an attack.142 Three approached from the bow, three from astern and three came on the bow; they dropped small bombs of about 110 pounds.143 UPI reporter Bill McDougal later wrote that the “14 minutes that followed seemed like 200 years.”144 Despite heavy return fire from the Bofors and machine guns manned by passengers, the Japanese aggressively pressed their attacks. Only when ordered to abandon ship did the gun crews cease fire. The first bombs were near-misses but then the bridge was hit, killing Captain Crietee and his First Mate. A bomb hit the

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funnel and Poelau Bras burst into flames. In quick succession hits in the engine room ruptured steam pipes and knocked her power plant offline, setting the ship adrift. Other hits destroyed the hatch covers and all but three lifeboats and two floats. Poelau Bras quickly sank stern first; her bow rose vertically and the ship plunged to the bottom amid a huge jet of black water; she disappeared by 1137.145 Several dozen crew—dead and wounded—went down with her. As he went over the side, McDougall saw fellow reporter Witt Hancock on the forecastle. McDougall shouted for him to jump, but Hancock was apparently hit by machine gun fire and did not make it off the ship before she sank. He was the first American war correspondent killed since the start of the Pacific War.146 The Japanese then made several strafing runs on survivors in the water and lifeboats, killing and wounding many. The remaining lifeboats and rafts were overcrowded and some of their occupants used force to keep others, including Bill McDougall, off.147 He swam for several hours before another lifeboat pulled him from the water.148 Also struggling in the water was Captain G.G. Bozuwa, commander of MLD forces on Java. After a failed attempt to escape Java via PBY, he had boarded Poelau Bras. He swam to one of the lifeboats; it had a leaking seam and its occupants were trying to bail it out. As he came alongside the following exchange took place: Bozuwa: “Pull me in!” Boat: “We can’t take you. We’re leaking badly.” Bozuwa: “I’m Bozuwa…. Captain Bozuwa…. I’ll fix the leak myself. I order you to pull me in!”

Despite pulling rank Bozuwa only got aboard the lifeboat when another man recognized him and convinced the others to pull him in.149 Bozuwa then took command of the boat which spent seven days at sea before landing on the southern tip of Sumatra. Those killed in the attack numbered 33; 116 reached the three lifeboats.150 The remainder, including Rear-Admiral van Staveren, drowned.151

The British Evacuate Tjilatjap In addition to the KM personnel, an additional 1,500 British troops—mostly surplus RAF aircrews and ground personnel—had also entered Tjilatjap for evacuation. They were joined by a large number Commonwealth civilians who were still on Java. To take them off the British were allowed to charter the Dutch merchant ships Generaal Verspyck, Kota Gede, Siantar and Zaandam.

Generaal Verspyck Generaal Verspyck put into Tjilatjap on March 1 and was originally designated as an evacuation ship for Dutch personnel. However, when the British requested additional tonnage to move their forces off Java, Commander Schokking made her and Khoen Hoea available on March 2.152 As most of Generaal Verspyck’s Indonesian crew had deserted, the British would

308

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

have to man the engine room themselves if she was to sail. In response, 149 RN crewmen under the command of Commander E.R.A. Farquharson went aboard.153 Her captain remained in command and was joined by three KM officers. In addition to the RN personnel, Generaal Verspijk took aboard the British Consul General, 45 survivors of Electra, 30 British civilians and a number of Dutch civilians.154 She also carried 13 USN personnel and five American civilians stranded in Tjilatjap.155 Commodore J.A. Collins authorized them to board and Generaal Verspyck sailed at around 2245 on March 2 in company of Maryborough. Despite sighting Japanese aircraft and a submarine contact south of Java they safely reached Fremantle on March 10.156

Khoen Hoea Khoen Hoea also sailed on the evening of March 2. She carried 152 Australian and British troops, including 88 RN personnel. Although unescorted she experienced an uneventful trip and saw no sign of the Japanese. Khoen Hoea arrived in Fremantle on March 9.157

Zaandam158 Zaandam left Tjilatjap on February 27 but was called back the following day after the British consulate made arrangements to charter the passenger liner for the evacuation of Commonwealth military personnel and civilians. En route she was sighted by three Japanese planes at 0830 on February 28. They circled several times and disappeared but soon reappeared and made two attacks.159 On the first attack they came in from the sun and dropped four or five bombs; all missed but there was shrapnel damage. On the second attack they dropped another four or five bombs and strafed Zaandam’s bridge. AA fire from the ship’s guns kept them from being too bold and all the bombs were dropped too high and missed. The planes then disappeared for good. They were likely observation planes from the Japanese heavy cruisers as no dive bombers or other carrier aircraft appeared. Zaandam arrived at Tjilatjap during the night of February 28-March 1 but had to wait to enter the channel until the tide came back in. She came alongside the berth at 1000 on the morning of March 1 and began loading evacuees immediately due to the fear of air attack. She took aboard Australian and British personnel,160 several Dutch pilots with their families and a great number of civilians of all nationalities. Amongst the latter were U.S. Consul General Dr. Walter A. Foote, Consul Clayson W. Aldridge, Vice Consul Paul Paddock, three American civilians and three war correspondents. Stronghold also came alongside and transferred 100 survivors from City of Manchester who had been rescued earlier. The captain of the torpedoed merchant ship Boero was also a passenger. Despite having accommodations for only 125 passengers,161 Captain J.M. Stamperius departed at 2000 that night carrying 892 evacuees.162

Zaandam again sailed as the evening tide was going out. Already heavily loaded with cargo she drew 30 feet of water and her additional passengers made the ship even more obstinate. She handled sluggishly in the narrow channel and barely cleared the shallow mudbank at the entrance. She then nearly rammed the naval control vessel, which lay just outside the harbor with no lights showing. Stronghold followed Zaandam through the minefield and both set course for Australia. Several hours later, for reasons unknown, the destroyer suddenly broke away from Zaandam and disappeared without explanation. Zaandam continued alone at her top speed of 17 knots. That morning her lookouts sighted a lone sloop filled with survivors. Despite the extreme risk, Captain Stamperius brought his ship alongside and rescued them before sinking their boat. He had rescued 28 men— including the USN Assistant Naval Attaché to Chunking—and two women from Tomohon. Zaandam then went to full speed and reached Fremantle on March 5 with more than 1,000 passengers aboard.163

Tjilatjap Is Bombed Despite Helfrich’s evacuation order on February 27 more than two-dozen merchant ships and KM auxiliaries remained in Tjilatjap. Nearly all were small inter-island vessels that were either not designed for ocean-going duty or did not have the range to reach Australia or Ceylon. In addition, virtually all had primarily Indonesian crews whose morale hung by a thread. Most had already deserted and those who remained had little enthusiasm for leaving Java. As a result, the ships were effectively stranded in port.164 Following the destruction of Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok large numbers of European merchant ship captains, navigators and mechanics made their way to Tjilatjap. Commander Schokking planned to put these men aboard the myriad of small ships still in port. Although it was risky for them to sail on the open ocean, they represented a final avenue of escape for thousands of desperate military personnel and civilians.165 This plan was disrupted on March 4 when the Japanese launched their first air attack on Tjilatjap. That morning 18 Takao Air Wing “Bettys” and 10 Zeros struck the port, targeting both ships and the port’s “old harbor.”166 Returning Japanese pilots claimed damage to five ships; in reality they had sunk the small merchant ships Kidoel, Manipi and Hr.Ms. Tydeman; several other ships were hit and the harbor facilities badly damaged.167 Damage ashore was massive. The number of dead, mostly civilians, totaled around 60.168 The bombers attacked at an altitude above the range of British and Dutch AA guns defending the port. They were unable to engage the Japanese until the fighters came down to strafe the port after the bombers turned for home. British and Dutch gunners claimed two fighters shot down, but they are unconfirmed in Japanese records.169 In the subsequent confusion British troops looted the warehouses, further adding to the shortage of supplies.170

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?”

309

Chart 31: Ships Lost at Tjilatjap Ship

Type

Alfoer

Oil Lighter

Asahan (BEN 3)

Benzine Transport

Atjeh

Oil Lighter

Banka Barentsz

(Motor Ship) Sea-Going Workship

Dajak

Tonnage Line

Location Date Sunk

473

KPM

Tjilatjap

75

KM

Tjilatjap

495

KPM

Tjilatjap

? 4,819

KPM KM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Cargo Ship

174

KPM

Tjilatjap

Flip Hector Kampar Kidoel

Tug Tug Cargo Ship Cargo Ship

175 ? 574 775

NISHM NISHM KPM KPM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Kraus Makian Mampawa (BEN 4)

Tug Boat Cargo Ship Benzine Transport

290 537 468

NISM KPM KM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Mandar

Cargo Ship

563

KPM

Tjilatjap

Manipi

Cargo Ship

536

KPM

Tjilatjap

Maras Nias

Sea-Going Tug Coaster

134 75

? KPM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Overijssel Paneh Pasir Poseidon

Sea-Going Tug Cargo Ship Cargo Ship Tanker

395 154 1,187 696

? ? KPM KNSM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Rengat

Cargo Ship

512

KPM

Tjilatjap

Reteh Rokan

Cargo Ship Cargo Ship

573 563

KPM KPM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Sipirok Sipora

Cargo Ship Cargo Ship

1,787 1,594

KPM KPM

Tjilatjap Tjilatjap

Tohiti

Cargo Ship

982

KPM

Tjilatjap

van der Hagen

Cargo Ship

3,033

KPM

Tjilatjap

Notes

3/7/42

Already damaged during an earlier attack on Muntok Harbor. Burned and scuttled at Tjilatjap; later salvaged by Japanese.171 3/6/42 Burned and scuttled as blockship; later salvaged by Japanese.172 3/6/42 Evacuated to Tjilatjap from Padang. Hit by bomb during Japanese air raid on Tjilatjap; Partially burnt out and capsized.173 — Captured intact.174 3/5/42 Burned out and scuttled after being hit in Japanese air raid on March 5.175 3/6/42 Burned at Tjilatjap and broke in two prior to sinking; Also reported as being sunk by Japanese aircraft off Tjilatjap on the same day.176 Early March Scuttled and salvaged by Japanese. Early March Scuttled and salvaged by Japanese. 3/6/42 Burned and scuttled in Donan River.177 3/4/42 or 3/7/42 Hit by bomb and heavily burned during March 4 air raid. Either sunk March 4178 or scuttled March 7.179 3/2/42 Scuttled by crew.180 Salvaged by Japanese. 3/6/42 Bombed in air raid March 4; burned sank.181 3/6/42 In KM service as BEN 4. Burned and scuttled by crew; later salvaged by Japanese.182 — Listed as sunk in air raid March 4, but only damaged. Captured intact.183 3/4/42 Sunk alongside pier during air attack; later salvaged by Japanese.184 3/6/42 Scuttled at Tjilatjap.185 3/6/42 Burned and scuttled; later salvaged by Japanese.186 3/6/42 Scuttled at Tjilatjap.190 — Captured intact.187 3/5/42 Scuttled.188 3/6/42 Hit and set afire March 4. Scuttled and later salvaged by Japanese.189 3/6/42 Burned and scuttled; later salvaged by Japanese.191 3/6/42 Burned and scuttled.192 3/5/42 Sunk by Japanese aircraft at Tjilatjap; later salvaged by Japanese.193 3/5/42 Scuttled.194 3/6/42 Damaged during air raid March 5 and later scuttled.195 3/5/42 Sunk by Japanese aircraft on Donan River; ship burned out and sunk. Later salvaged by Japanese.196 ? Damaged during March 4 air attack. Unclear if ship scuttled or captured intact by Japanese.197

21,639

MLD Flight Mechanic G.H.V.L.A.G. Gillekens recalled the attack in his postwar memoirs. The air raid klaxons initially sounded around 1000; approximately 10 minutes later a large formation of Japanese aircraft appeared over Tjilatjap. They made two bomb runs; Gillekens heard no AA fire, only the sound of explosions. The Japanese then disappeared and the “All Clear” sounded 30 minutes later.198

The attack was also described by RAF Squadron Leader A.M. Jardine, Executive Officer of 205 Squadron (RAF); he and 21 men were making their way from Tandjoeng Priok. As they descended from the mountains overlooking Tjilatjap they saw bombers methodically attacking shipping in the harbor; there was little AA fire in return. They pulled off the road and took cover under the trees to avoid drawing attention from the Japanese.199

310

The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier, 1941–1942

RAF Sergeant Dave Russell from 84 Squadron was in the same convoy. His group took cover in the trees of a nearby rubber plantation and fired ineffectively at low-flying aircraft with their rifles. He watched “waves of Betties” attack warehouses, docks and port installations. Bombs set the oil tanks and bamboo naval barracks afire and badly damaged the jetty; even the trees were burning. The destruction was enormous and it was clear that the local fire department was ill-equipped to deal with the damage.200 In the meantime, Gillekens walked through town to survey the damage. Warehouses burned heavily and dead bodies of Indonesian civilians lay everywhere—some beheaded, others torn in two or mangled beyond recognition. Many of the wounded were missing limbs. There was blood everywhere. Firefighters attempted to extinguish the flames but they raged out of control. In the harbor one ship was sunk while another burned heavily. Recent evacuees from Soerabaja told him how the scene resembled Morokrembangan and the ME where millions of guilders worth of installations and equipment went up in flames.201 Tjilatjap’s telephone exchange was destroyed, forcing Commander Schokking to drive 20 miles north to the village of Maos so that he could call Vice-Admiral Helfrich to inform him of the attack. In the meantime, the local police and native inhabitants fled Tjilatjap. They were joined by Indonesian sailors from GM ships who now deserted en masse. The city fire chief brought in convicts from the prison on nearby Noesa Kambangan Island to clean-up; they had to be shackled to prevent them from fleeing.202

“Lord, what a hell!” Their fear was justified, for the Japanese were already planning a second, even stronger combined air-sea strike on the port.203 The first phase would consist of a powerful air strike from the 1st Carrier Fleet. Under cover of their attack, Hiei and Kirishima from the 1/3rd Battleship Squadron would then move up and bombard Tjilatjap.204 On the morning of March 5 Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu launched 149 aircraft—including 80 B5N Kates (1,760-pound bombs), 33 D3A Vals (550-pound bombs) and 36 A6M Zeros— at a rather leisurely one-hour pace. 205 Led by LieutenantCommander Takeshige Egusa, they focused on shipping in the harbor and “new harbor” facilities built prior to the war. As was the case at Darwin, the carrier planes were joined by 27 land bombers from the Takao Air Wing and 20 fighters.206 And as at Pearl Harbor and Broome the results were devastating. At around 1030 on March 5 air raid klaxons again sounded over Tjilatjap. Cloud cover was only about 2,600 feet, so the Japanese remained largely unseen. For half an hour their planes dove through the clouds to drop their bombs and pull up. Between attacks it was eerily silent. There were about 30 ships in port and the dive bombers concentrated on them and warehouses in the harbor area. The floating drydock was sunk and several ships damaged.

The bombers flew lower in the second attack and inflicted even heavier damage. The sky was filled with thick columns of heavy black smoke as they retired.207 As usual, escorting Zeros then came in low to strafe. This time all the Japanese received heavy fire from the British 77th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment (3.7-inch guns) and 21st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (40mm guns) which had arrived from Soerabaja. Five to eight Japanese planes were claimed shot down but these are not confirmed.208 In return, the British suffered nine dead and 28 wounded.209 Then the bombardment by Hiei and Kirishima started and it completely surprised everyone. For the next hour the boom of heavy guns and a non-ending stream of earth-shattering explosions tore through the port and city. As the ground trembled under him and changing air pressure popped his ears, Gillekens thought to himself, “Lord, what a hell!”210 Thirty minutes after the shelling stopped the “All Clear” sounded. As Gillekens staggered to his feet, ash and burning embers fell around him like confetti. Everything was either leveled or on fire. Previously undamaged oil tanks, warehouses and slums were a mass of flame. A number of warehouses filled with ammunition and mines belched a rain of debris as they exploded. Black smoke poured into the air, further blotting out the sun. The attacks destroyed or burned some 200 buildings.211 Total casualties now numbered between 350 and 400 dead with many wounded. Fearing an invasion, the town emptied of all who could leave. The next day only a few senior government and police officials remained at their posts. Trains stopped running and communications were knocked out. The local KNIL commander ironically noted that demolition of the port was no longer necessary as the attacks had already destroyed everything.212 The Japanese claimed 19 ships sunk and one more heavily damaged.213 In reality, only Atjeh, Barentsz, Rokan, Sipora and Tohiti were lost as a direct result of air attack or shore bombardment. Valk, which had essentially been abandoned after her crew deserted, was heavily damaged by fire. Hoofdinspecteur Zeeman had also been hit and sunk during the bombardment. Multiple prauws were hit and the port’s 8,000 ton floating drydock was sunk. Barentsz was a former KPM merchant ship which the KM requisitioned and converted into a seagoing workship. Based at Tjilatjap, she provided Allied warships with repair and engineering support. Although undamaged on March 4, her Chinese crew deserted; plans were made to crew the ship using evacuees from ashore. However, Barentsz was hit several times on March 5; she burst into flames aft and eventually sank.214

The Struggle for Valk As detailed above, Commander Schokking ordered Valk to escort Janssens to Australia. Her Indonesian crew protested that they had already been demilitarized and only wanted to continue the war in the East Indies. Schokking ordered Captain G.G.M. Kool to make the trip anyway. But during the March

32. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die?” 4 attack most of her Indonesian crew deserted and the ship was all but abandoned. On March 5 Commander P.J.M. Cikot, commander of KM forces in Bandoeng, was ordered to form a crew for Valk from the men under his command. Valk was hit again and badly damaged before they arrived.215 In the meantime, RAF Squadron Leader A.M. Jardine reached Tjilatjap with the men of 84 Squadron and 205 Squadron, only to learn that the last evacuation ships had already sailed. Searching for a way off Java they found Valk and attempted to sail her to Australia. Per Jardine, she had been shot up but was operational and needed only a crew. He visited Commander Schokking on March 5 and found him “stoic and uncooperative.”216 When Jardine requested the use of Valk for an escape attempt, Schokking told him that the radio gear had been damaged and that a Dutch crew was already being formed to take her out of harbor. In a later conversation he stated that Valk was to be sunk as a blockship in the harbor. Schokking also rebuffed Jardine’s request for two of his mechanics to examine her engine room. He stated that the ship still had a skeleton crew manning her AA weapons and they would resist any attempt by Jardine’s men to board her.217 In the end Valk was scuttled at Tjilatjap on March 8. After being completely burnt out on March 5 she could not operate under her own power. With only the patrol boat P 4 and several motorized whaleboats left afloat, Schokking had no ship left afloat that was large enough to move the patrol boat. Valk was then unmoored and the current pushed her aground where she was scuttled by opening the Kingston valves.218 The GM patrol boat Canopus reached Tjilatjap on March 2. Captain T.G. Wayenberg, wanted to take his ship to Australia but was told that Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s evacuation order only applied to the KM. Although the GM was officially disbanded on February 28 Wayenberg delayed telling his Indonesian crew until he could discuss his options with Commander Schokking. Most of her crew deserted on March 4 and Canopus was unable to sail. She was then hit on March 5 and set afire; the ship was scuttled soon after. Despite the attack on March 4 Schokking had still planned to send out those undamaged merchant ships manned by naval personnel from Soerabaja and Tandjoeng Priok. However, the events of March 5 created even more damage and convinced him that any further evacuation by sea was futile. Everyone expected another raid on March 6, but Vice-Admiral Nagumo had set course for Makassar. Unaware of this, Schokking believed the bombardment was a prelude to seaborne invasion and ordered all remaining ships scuttled.219 On March 5 Commander Schokking sent an officer to all

311

ships still in the harbor with orders to scuttle themselves if unable to sail. Many captains personally reported to Schokking to confirm the order, while others carried it out immediately. Most reported the completion of their task to him and then left the city. By the end of March 6 the sunken hulks of nearly 30 ships and countless prauws littered the inner and outer harbor. Many had been doused with benzene and petroleum oil and burned before being scuttled. On the morning of March 6 a lone merchant ship appeared and dropped anchor outside Tjilatjap. It was Tjimanoek of the Java-China-Japan-Line; she carried a cargo of cement from Colombo, and incredibly, had not been warned off the port. Commander Schokking spent several hours trying to locate a pilot to bring her into the port. None could be found so Schokking sent a Customs officer out in a patrol boat to guide her in. Unfortunately, before he could reach her Tjimanoek raised anchor and sailed away.220 Tjimanoek had represented the last hope of rescue for thousands of Allied troops stranded in Tjilatjap.221 Commander Schokking reported the arrival of 4,500 KM personnel. Of these, about 3,500 boarded evacuation ships, leaving behind at least 1,000 sailors. Approximately 1,300 RAF also remained. They were joined by 160 USN personnel (most from Soerabaja) who had been ordered to the port in hopes of finding transport off Java. All these men went in the bag when Java surrendered just days later.222 With Tjilatjap no longer having any strategic value it would not be defended. At 1300 on March 6 Lieutenant-Colonel Statius Muller of the KNIL informed Commander Schokking that his garrison was withdrawing. All that remained was a 350-man coast artillery detachment. Rear-Admiral van Staveren signaled Schokking that two Dutch submarines were en route to Tjilatjap and to keep the channel open.223 He was ordered to position a blockship in the narrowest part of the channel, but not to sink it yet224; the coast artillery would do that.225 By 2000 on March 6 the Japanese were only nine miles from Tjilatjap. The submarines bypassed Tjilatjap and the KNIL coast artillery commander now decided to pull out. P 4 transferred his troops to Noesa Kambanegan226; they crossed back over to Java farther up the coast. P 4 and several motorized sloops were then scuttled.227 The last ships to be scuttled were Sipirok, Sipora and Valk. Although abandoned and mostly burnt out, the latter was again attacked by two Japanese planes. Both Tjilatjap and Noesa Kambangan were heavily reconnoitered by air on March 7–8. However, the port was clearly closed and no more attacks followed. Japanese troops occupied Tjilatjap on March 8 and its role in the East Indies campaign officially ended.

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Chapter Notes Introduction 1. ww2db. com/ country/ Nether lands. 2. To this empire, the Netherlands East Indies added approximately 200,000 more inhabitants. 3. Initially known as the Dutch United Provinces Admiralty. 4. The other was Siam, today known as Thailand. 5. Millet, 151. 6. This followed their earlier excursion into Northern China in September 1931. Japanese troops invaded Manchuria using a manufactured provocation and quickly routed weak Chinese forces in the region. They then proceeded to annex it and establish the puppet state of Manchukuo under the nominal leadership of deposed Chinese Emperor Henry Puyi (i.e., “The Last Emperor of China”). Western pressure over this act of aggression eventually resulted in Japan leaving the League of Nations in 1933, thus putting that nation on a path to war in the Pacific some eight years later. 7. French Indochina existed from 1862 to approximately 1958 and included Cochin-China, Annam, Cambodia, Tonkin, Kwangchowan, and Laos. Today, the former French colony consists of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 8. The Imperial Japanese Army had long favored a strike against the Soviet Union in Mongolia and Siberia. But the Imperial Japanese Navy was persistent and succeeded in winning approval for a campaign against the Western colonial powers in Southeast Asia. As a result, the Pacific War 1941–45 was considered a “Navy War” by the IJA. 9. $173,000,000 in 1934/ $2,970,000,000 in 2012, www.measur ingworth.com. 10. Bussemaker, 272.

Chapter 1 1. Regional Study: Siam, Indo China and the Netherlands East Indies, 20. 2. Mendl, 184. 3. Ibid. 4. Mendl, 193. 5. Mendl, 194. 6. Van Mook, 18. 7. Ibid. 8. Van Mook, 18. 9. Bussemaker, 273.

10. Ibid. 11. Van Mook, 22–23. 12. Ibid. 13. The Straits Times, 20 April 1937, 11. 14. Dr. Hart had since died and was replaced by van Mook. 15. Van Mook, 24. 16. Van Mook, 21. 17. The West Australian, 2. 18. Van Mook, 26–29. 19. Van Mook, 29. 20. Jonkheer, or Squire, is the lowest title within the nobility system. In the Netherlands, it is used primarily as a mark of status rather than to denote actual nobility. 21. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Document 236. 22. A Major-General in the KNIL prior to being named Ambassador to Japan in 1923, Pabst had no prior diplomatic experience. He was 68 years old in 1941 and was considered one of the least effective Dutch diplomats posted overseas. Over the years prior to the Pacific War his advice and reporting on the Japanese continued were constantly lacking; thus at a time when it was most needed, Dutch insight into the Japanese was critically lacking. Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer asked for him to be replaced on several occasions but his requests were denied (Bussemaker, 293–94). Although Pabst’s diplomatic tenure in Tokyo started well, dissatisfaction with his performance quickly grew. His reports were often considered alarmist and Pabst was regarded as a “Scare Monger.” He lost more credibility with then Governor General Jonkheer B.C. de Jonge in 1936 when he signaled that an invasion of the NEI was imminent. This activity turned out to be an IJN fleet maneuver that took place three months earlier than planned. To his credit, Pabst early on recognized the dangerous influence of the military in Japanese politics. Dutch officials still considered him to be a diplomat of little significance. But because higher authorities in The Hague—and later London and Batavia—always had final say in important policy matters it was felt that he could do little harm. This lack of respect and trust amongst his own Government almost certainly influenced his demeanor and mannerisms. For the head of a foreign diplomatic

mission, Pabst led a very low-key life. He did not drink alcohol or coffee; nor did he smoke. He rarely went out in public and only entertained guests on official visits. He gave some visitors the impression that he was “walking on eggshells.” Subordinates described him as cynical, suspicious and a difficult supervisor. Foreign colleagues, such as American Ambassador J.C. Grew, who initially had little knowledge of Japanese relations, greatly respected his knowledge of the country and culture. In 1939 Pabst announced that he planned to step down the following year due to health concerns. But he was forced to remain in the position as the Japanese Government would not agree to a temporary successor. Pabst suffered a heart attack and died on January 24, 1942. He was buried on January 29 with full diplomatic honors. Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland:1880–2000. Jean Charles Pabst (1873–1942). 23. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Document 239. 24. The note itself may been politely worded, but its author is widely believed to the driving force behind Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of Economic Influence” concept that essentially called for a new Asian empire under the rule of Japan. 25. Van Mook, 33. 26. Bussemaker, 303–04. 27. Van Mook, 45. 28. The Japanese very reluctantly agreed to confine the talks to strictly trade matters. They also vaguely indicated that several points to be discussed would be the acquisition of oil, raw materials, expansion of Japanese business and the participation of Japan in the “development” of the East Indies. 29. Van Mook, 45. 30. Bussemaker, 319. 31. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1940–42, 23. 32. Bussemaker, 320. 33. Ibid. 34. Randali, October 10, 1940. 35. Foote, The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies. 36. Foote, and Van Mook, 54. 37. Foot. 38. Van Mook, 54. 39. Van Mook, 60. 40. Van Mook, 53. 41. Prior to the arrival of Americanbuilt aircraft, Dutch aircraft engines in

313

the East Indies were powered by 87 octane fuel. 42. The supply of aviation grade crude oil was a one-time sale and no further concessions were made on that product. However, the quantity was considered by the Japanese so small as to be useless. Van Mook, 73. 43. Bussemaker, 320, and Van Mook, 72. 44. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities, 1938–1940. 45. Van Mook, 78. 46. State Department Telegram: Hull to Foote, October 22, 1940. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 190, 192–93. 47. Van Mook, 82–86. 48. Van Mook, 87. 49. Van Mook, 92. 50. Van Mook, 96. 51. Grew, 412. 52. Van Mook, 120. 53. In marked contrast to their drumbeat of hate toward the Dutch, Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union was sharply muted. Shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War the 4,523 ton fishery vessel SS Kehi Maru hit a Russian mine in the Sea of Japan that had drifted into Japanese waters. She sank with the loss of 156 of her 429 passengers and crew. Japan made repeated demands for compensation, which the Soviets ignored for several months. In the end, they simply refused pay anything and Japan was forced to drop the matter. The Japanese press was very muted and said very little about the incident. Grew, 413. 54. Van Mook, 123. 55. Both the Dutch and Japanese knew they would almost certainly be fighting each other soon. This led to an interesting juxtaposition; to conduct their invasion of the East Indies the Japanese would primarily utilize oil and petroleum products obtained from the Dutch. In contrast, to quickly build up their static defenses against a Japanese invasion the Dutch required enormous amounts of material such as concrete. The irony was that large amounts of the concrete not manufactured in East Indies kilns was actually imported from Japan.

Chapter 2 1. Budge, “French Indochina.” 2. Llewellyn, “The Japanese Occupation of Vietnam.” 3. Budge, “French Indochina.”

314 4. Ibid. 5. Llewellyn, “The Japanese Occupation of Vietnam.” 6. “July 17, 1941. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Subject: Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.” 7. Llewellyn, “The Japanese Occupation of Vietnam.” 8. It is mentioned in a contemporary Australian intelligence report dated September 24, 1940, that Consul General Walter A. Foote, Ph.D., had earlier suggested an oil embargo to the U.S. government to ease Japanese pressure on the Dutch during their trade negotiations. The accuracy of this claim, however, remains open to debate. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–1940, 77. 9. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 10. In September 1945, the United States Military Intelligence Services studied Japanese codebreaking efforts in the Second World War and concluded, “The Japanese are not known to have broken into high-grade American, British, or Russian cryptographic systems.” But in 1967, a second review by the Central Intelligence Agency determined that Japan had succeeded in breaking the Allied codes. Kotani, “Could Japan Read Allied Signal Traffic?” 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Llewellyn, “The Japanese Occupation of Vietnam.” 14. Van Mook, 127. 15. The East Indies’ equivalent of the United States Coast Guard. 16. De Jong, Volume 2, 2nd Half, 632. 17. Formed in 1860, Billiton still remains in operation as of 2014. In 2001 it merged with the Australian firm Broken Hill Proprietary to create BHP Billiton, one of the largest diversified mining conglomerations in the world. 18. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Volume 2, 2nd Half, 632. 19. This contract was canceled by the U.S. government and transferred to the U.S. Army which needed the weapons for its own prewar military build-up. 20. De Jong, Volume 2, 2nd Half, 634. 21. Four billion two hundred fifty thousand dollars and three billion three hundred ten thousand dollars, respectively, in 2012. www.measuringworth. com. 22. $1,060,000,000 in 2012. www. measuringworth.com. 23. $409,000,000 in 2012. www. measuringworth.com. 24. Stern, 252–256. 25. Commandant Zeemacht, or CZM. 26. GVT.7 originally operated from the Greater Natoena Islands, but that was little more than a very primitive camp on the beach with virtually no support facilities. Pontianak provided the crews with more livable conditions and increased the squadron’s operational readiness. 27. Bosscher, Volume 2, 118. 28. Bosscher, Volume 2, 480, note 156.

Chapter Notes—3 29. Olson, 396. 30. Bosscher, Volume 2, 480, note 158. 31. Bosscher, Volume 2, 119 and Netherlands East Indies Internal Report Part 5, 143. 32. Bosscher, Volume 2, 481, note 161. 33. Olson, 396. 34. In the Battle of Ko Chang on the morning of January 17, 1941, a French naval flotilla consisting of the light cruiser Lamotte-Picquet with the sloops Admiral Charner, Dumont d’Urville, Marne and Tahure engaged a Thai naval squadron with the coast defense ship Thonburi and torpedo boats Chonburi and Songhkla. In just over an hour the French forced the heavily damaged Thonburi aground and sank both torpedo boats with only light damage to Lamotte-Picquet. It was a huge boost to French naval morale following France’s humiliating surrender to Germany just six months earlier. 35. Lauterpacht, 1825–26. 36. www. combinedfleet. com/ PB104_t.htm. 37. In November 1940 Hungary formally allied itself with Germany. On April 9, 1941, the Netherlands Government in Exile broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary. On July 10, 1941, it also passed a resolution that allowed the seizure of neutral foreign merchant ships if the actions of their country “assumed an attitude contrary to the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.” International Law in the Netherlands, 366. 38. www.easttimorgovernment.com/ history.htm. 39. Despite being colonial neighbors for more than 400 years, it appears that the Dutch and Portuguese administrators on Timor rarely, if ever, spoke or interacted. According to a local British spy in Timor, virtually all the Portuguese spoke French and a smaller number spoke English. Yet, none spoke Dutch, the language of their closest neighbor. 40. Netherlands East Indies Internal Report Part 5, 64. 41. Lee, 178. 42. This was in response to Lisbon granting an oil concession to a equally flimsy Australian consortium in November 1939. Lee, 177. 43. Lee, 179. 44. War in the Outposts, 169. 45. Lee, 179. 46. Lee, 185. 47. Ibid. 48. Queensland and Northern Territories Aerial Services. 49. Lee, 176. 50. Ibid. 51. Lee, 177. 52. In fairness, it must be noted that the Allies used their respective civilian planes for similar duties. Very few, if any, of the ventures at Dili were economically viable. In response to the Australians and Japanese, the Portuguese started their own weekly air service— Servicos Áreas da Colonia Portuguesa— between Dili-Koepang. The plane, its pilot and mechanic were all leased from KNILM (Koninklijke Nederlandsch In-

dische Luchtvaart Maatschappij or Royal Dutch Netherlands Indies Airways). The service was a complete failure and was soon six months behind on their lease and salary payments. But the venture was privately backed by the Dutch East Indies Government, which was prepared to accept the losses in exchange for the intelligence value it provided. Lee, 177. 53. Lee, 177. 54. Points of interest between Palau and Dili included the Dutch bases at Ambon, Kendari, Manokwari, Sorong and possibly even Makassar. All were invaded by the Japanese during the East Indies campaign and a prewar reconnaissance flight would have been of great interest to their military planners. 55. Lee, 177. 56. War in the Outposts, 169. 57. Lee, 188. 58. Bosscher, Volume 2, 122. 59. Bosscher, Volume 2, 483, note 202. 60. Bosscher, Volume 2, 123.

Chapter 3 1.

Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities, 1937–38 Colony/Territory Number of Japanese Expatriates French Indochina Guam Siam British Borneo/ Sarawak British Malaysia Netherlands East Indies Philippines Total

236 280 389 812 5,847 6,538 20,558 34,660

2. Buitenlandsche Belangstelling Voor Riouw Achipel, 389. 3. Sherman and Thurman, 81. 4. Ibid. 5. U.S. Department of State, www. state.gov/ofm/customs/c37011.htm. 6. Sherman and Thurman, 81. 7. Separate from these efforts, although often closely related, Chinese communists were also active with attempts to agitate against the Nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek government. 8. Roughly $1.3 million in 1936; $21,400,000 in 2012. 9. “Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing,” 45. 10. The Japanese requested permission to emigrate large numbers of Japanese families into the area of New Guinea around Geelvink Bay. The Dutch were fearful of their long-range intentions and denied the request. They felt this was paramount to foreign colonization and that it would eventually give the Japanese grounds for intervention in the interest of protecting their citizens. It was the same excuse they had given to justify military action in Formosa, Korea, Manchukuo and Northern China. 11. U.S. Naval Intelligence Report, September 9, 1940. 12. The official mouthpiece of a rabidly Imperialist organization known as the “Fatherland Society.”

13. This followed a similar demand that appeared in the Japanese newspaper Dai Ajia Shugi in November 1934. Reporter Toj Manabe wrote a column titled “Netherlands Indian Solution” that called for the Dutch to turn over the entire island of Celebes to Japan so that it could be more effectively developed to its full potential. 14. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities, 1937–38. 15. De Java Bode, August 8, 1937. 16. The Chinese were very dominant merchants throughout the East Indies. It cannot be all that surprising that they distrusted the Japanese given the atrocities being committed on a regular basis throughout mainland China. 17. Japan—Netherlands East Indies—Japanese Activities 1938–1940, Part 4. 18. Womack, “Sword of the Rising Sun.” 19. “Netherlands East Indies Internal Report Part 5,” 133. 20. Ibid., 79. 21. A paramilitary state police force with both police and military capabilities that was active in Holland and all Dutch colonies. 22. Bussemaker, 287. 23. Bussemaker, 311. 24. Chen, 5. 25. “A Decade Of Japanese Underground Activities in the Netherlands East Indies,” 15–16. 26. Also known as the Ryukyu Islands, the Lu Chu chain was a string of small islands that dot the sea from the south of Japan to the north of Formosa. 27. In some cases, when detained, they overpowered local police, put them ashore and escaped. 28. Not all Japanese fishing boats were engaged in reconnaissance or espionage operations. However, the Dutch clearly recognized that this activity was taking place. At least early on, the East Indies Government took a lighter hand in dealing with them because much of the information being gathered was usually easily available through commercial channels. What was of more concern were the isolated base camps and supply depots for other types of operations that the fishing vessels could set up outside the view of Dutch officials in the more remote regions of the East Indies. 29. “Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40,” 259–60 and 355–56. 30. The body of water separating New Guinea from the northernmost coast of Australia. 31. Japan—Netherlands East Indies—Japanese Activities 1936–1937. 32. Located on the south coast of Sumatra, Benkoelen is only a short distance from the vast oil fields and refineries at Palembang, which were of great interest to the Japanese. 33. “Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1933–35,” 128. 34. Ibid. 35. Chen, 5. 36. Ibid. 37. The name is this fishing boat is also listed as Taishin Maru in contemporary Australian intelligence reports.

Chapter Notes—4 and 5 38. De Java Bode, October 2, 1937. 39. “Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities, 1937–38.” 40. Java Bode, October 2, 1937. 41. Ibid. 42. Her crew of five consisted of the captain, helmsman, engineer, mechanic and assistant mechanic. 43. Java Bode, October 2, 1937. 44. Report of Japanese Fishery Incident, January 10, 1938. 45. Report of Japanese Fishery Incident, January 17, 1938. 46. Although not designed to carry reconnaissance aircraft, for a brief period several Dutch destroyers and civilian coast guard vessels were equipped with single-engine floatplanes in a test program. None carried a catapult so they had to come to a full stop so that the aircraft could be hoisted and recovered over the side by crane. The program was eventually deemed impractical and discontinued as the destroyers were unable to use their after 4.7-inch guns when the plane was aboard. 47. Report of Japanese Fishery Incident, January 17, 1938. 48. The port of Batavia. 49. “Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40,” 412. 50. “A Decade of Japanese Underground Activities in the Netherlands East Indies,” 17. 51. “Ten Years of Burrowing,” 61. 52. Matthews, 46. 53. Netherlands East Indies, File 2. September 1940–November 1941. 54. The penalty for not reporting in or deviating from one’s stated itinerary was a maximum of three months jail term or fine of ƒ500 ($266 or $4,150 in 2012). 55. Roughly $5,300 U.S. or approximately $83,000 in 2012. 56. Netherlands East Indies Internal Report Part 5, 60. 57. Canberra Times, August 23, 1941, Page 2. 58. Aid and Wiebes, 286. 59. Aid and Wiebes, 288. 60. Ibid. 61. Aid and Wiebes, 288–89. 62. Aid and Wiebes, 290. 63. Aid and Wiebes, 288. 64. Rusbridger and Nave, 111. 65. Ibid. 66. Aid and Wiebes, 290. 67. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40, 128. 68. Consistently regarded as the most loyal of all ethnic groups in the East Indies due to the length of time they had been Christianized and under Dutch rule. 69. This claim is in stark contrast to Dutch claims that there was widespread sympathy following the occupation of Holland. Walsh speculated that this show of support was possibly shown to avoid charges of disloyalty. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40, 128. 70. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40, 129. 71. By and large, most ordinary (i.e., uneducated) Indonesians did not fear the Japanese, having believed their promises of autonomy and good treat-

ment. They were, however, opposed by the much better educated Eurasian population who had access to news reports and other information regarding Japan’s actions in Korea, Formosa and Manchukuo. 72. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40, 119. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Netherlands East Indies Japanese Activities 1938–40, 125. 76. Aid and Wiebes, 290. 77. Rusbridger and Nave, 147. 78. Ibid. 79. On November 19, 1941, the following message was decoded by American intelligence. Since it was sent via the Japanese “Purple” diplomatic code, it can be assumed that Dutch codebreakers almost certainly intercepted this cable as well. From: Tokyo To: Washington 19 November 1941 Circular #2354 When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: (1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, “HIGASHI.” (2) Japan-Russia relations, “KITA.” (3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.); “NISHI.” The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. 25392 JD-1: 6850 (Y) Navy Trans. 11– 2641 (S)

Then again, on November 19, 1941 a supplementary signal was sent…. In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. (1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME [“East Wind Rain”]. (2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI [“North Wind Cloudy”]. (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE [“West Wind Clear”]. This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. Forward as urgent intelligence.

Golowski, “Winds Message—Prange’s Research,” http://pearlharboronline. com/winds.htm#Winds_Message%E2 %80%94Pranges_Research. 80. Haslach, 178. 81. Ibid. 82. Haslach, 181. 83. Departement van Oorlog, or Department of War. 84. Thorpe, 51–52. 85. Thorpe, 53.

86. Thorpe, 54. 87. “Communications of Military Significance, December 1941, December 4, 1941.” www.ibiblio.org/pha/time line/411204bpci.html. 88. This is not to say that a stronger warning by Doctor Foote would have changed the outcome of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Government officials in Washington, D.C., already had the same information in hand and it is highly unlikely that anything Foote added would have dramatically altered their course of action. But as one of the most senior U.S. diplomats in the Far East, he could have added credibility to the argument that Japanese action was imminent. But in the end, Foote’s dismissive attitude only reinforced the atmosphere of complacency that permeated the U.S. Government and Military in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Chapter 4 1. An “Opposite Editorial” (abbreviated to Op-ed) is an essay type column in a newspaper or magazine that expresses the opinion of the writer. It is written by someone who is not employed by the newspaper or magazine. It is most often written with the intention of swaying public opinion for or against a particular public topic. 2. These displays of military strength were for Japanese and Indonesian consumption as much as they were for Dutch citizens. 3. Kalhorn, “Han Samethini Remembered.” http://hansamethini.blog spot.com/2009/04/4-waiting-for-war1940-1941.html. 4. Ibid. 5. On several occasions in May 1940 German seaplanes landed on the many canals throughout Holland where they discharged troops and supplies. 6. Kowner, “An Obscure History.” www. insideindonesia. org/ weekly- art icles/an-obscure-history. 7. In contrast to these luxuries, the average Indonesian continued to live day-to-day. In an era when the typical Dutch executive often spoke multiple languages, the literacy rate amongst Indonesians was just 6 percent after 300 years of Dutch rule. Hardly a fair trade when one considers the hundreds of millions worth of dollars in natural resources which the Netherlands extracted from the East Indies annually. 8. Malaysian term for “Sir” or “Mister,” which was used to deferentially describe any white or other individual in a position of authority. 9. $32 in 1929, $429 in 2012 and $1,613 in 1929, $21,600 in 2012. 10. Sato, 227–29. 11. Bosscher, Volume 2, 147. 12. $76,000,000 in 1939 or $1,260,000,000 in 2012, $286,000,000 in 1941 or $4,730,000,000 in 2012. 13. Netherlands East Indies Internal Report, Part 5, 60. 14. “Defence problems of Holland and the Netherlands East Indies.” 15. Foreign Relations of the United States, 407. 16. Ibid.

315 17. Ashton and Hellema, 163. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Bussemaker, 313. 21. Ibid. 22. Ashton and Hellema, 163. 23. Bussemaker, 313. 24. Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer’s biggest concern was that war between England and Japan would break out without involving the East Indies. A military alliance would then obligate the Dutch to enter a fight for which they were not prepared. 25. Bosscher, Volume 2, 82. 26. In reality, the RN deployed little real naval strength to the Far East, the majority being old battleships and small carriers unfit for front line duty. In April 1942, these ships retired to East Africa—well away from the Pacific Theater—until mid 1945. 27. Ashton and Hellema, 175. 28. Bussemaker, 324. 29. Bussemaker, 102–03. 30. It apparently was not uncommon for President Roosevelt to send personal friends on such private intelligence gathering missions. They avoided political entanglements and still allowed him to gain valuable insight on certain topics from trusted sources. 31. Bussemaker, 324–25. 32. Bosscher, Volume 2, 108. 33. Bosscher, Volume 2, 124. 34. Ibid.

Chapter 5 1. Penders, 7. 2. Penders, 6. 3. Penders, 7. 4. Penders, 7–8. 5. Bussemaker, 204. 6. Penders, 8. 7. Ibid. 8. Percentage of raw materials imported by United States from Netherlands East Indies in 1940. Material Percentage Quinine Palm Oil Rubber Rubber Tin Penders, 36.

90% 80% 50% 25% 10%

9. Penders, 8. 10. In 1938 the Dutch Government authorized the expenditure of ƒ2.8 billion for national defense. This was 1/6 of the country’s national capital resources and about 15 percent of Holland’s national income. This was the equivalent of approximately $1.6 billion U.S. or approximately $20 billion in 2012. Penders, 34, and www.measuringworth. com/index.php. 11. The buildup to war was also noticeable in the East Indies Government budget. In 1939 the colonial budget amounted to ƒ414 million. This was partially allocated as shown on next page. Asbeck, 165, and www.measuring worth.com/index.php. 12. H. Egeter worked with the civilian consulting firm of Tiedeman & Van Kerchem, which was tasked with helping the KM evaluate and formulate

316

Chapter Notes—6 and 7

Line Item

Budget (Guilders) 1939

Equivalent (USD) 1939/2012

Military/Defense Administrative Services Education Hygiene/Sanitation Economic Services Public Works

ƒ100,000,000 ƒ84,000,000 ƒ24,000,000 ƒ10,000,000 ƒ4,800,000 ƒ3,800,000

$53,000,000/$876,000,000 $45,000,000/$744,000,000 $13,000,000/$215,000,000 $5,300,000/$87,600,000 $2,600,000/$33,900,000 $2,000,000/$33,100,000

defensive arrangements in the East Indies following the occupation of Holland by Germany. 13. Bosscher, Volume 2, 152. 14. Precisely why Indonesian personnel were not considered is unknown. However, it should be remembered that the 1933 mutiny aboard the coast defense ship De Zeven Provinciën was still fresh in the mind of many officials. There was some trepidation at having large ships predominately manned by native personnel and this could have played into their thought process. 15. Bosscher, Volume 2, 500, note 147. 16. Bosscher, Volume 2, 152. 17. For representative purposes only, the approximate cost of a Douglas DB7 light bomber like those which the Dutch ordered was approximately $74,000; this does not include spare parts or the cost of shipping the completed aircraft to Java. In comparison, the 1942 cost of a Boeing B-17 bomber was approximately $260,000. 18. Netherlands East Indies—Report of War Activities—August 19, 1941. 19. Bosscher, Volume 2, 37. 20. $32,000,000 in 1940, $524,000,000 in 2012. 21. Report of Requirements of Netherlands East Indies For Munitions. 22. Bosscher, Volume 2, 153 and C.W. Heringa 1927–1960, 4. 23. Storage capacity of these two installations was 42,500 barrels of fuel and diesel oil and 108,000 barrels fuel oil, diesel and gas oil, respectively. 24. Tandjoeng Priok Naval Air Stations. 25. Naval Intelligence Division, Volume 2, 354. 26. Netherlands East Indies Internal, Part 5, 1940–1942, 64. 27. “Shipbuilding Cooperation with the Netherlands East Indies.” I. 22593. G.51/1/9. November 1, 1941. 28. It is equally unclear if the two programs were directly connected but it would seem that they were given the timeline of events. 29. Campbell and Lovell, 156–57. 30. H.O. No. 163, 145. 31. Bosscher, Volume 2, 338. 32. Visser, “Tjilatjap.” www.nether landsnavy.nl/Tjilatjap.htm. 33. Ibid. 34. Uitwijken, 85. 35. Queensland and Northern Territories Air Service. 36. Campbell and Lovell, 158. 37. Uitwijken, 85. 38. Ibid. 39. Uitwijken, 97. 40. KMR designates a member of the Koninklijke Marine Reserve, or Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve.

41. Campbell and Lovell, 158. 42. A Nationalist daily newspaper.

Chapter 6 1. Perhaps one should not be greatly surprised at this decision. While the RN surface fleet was a first-rate force, its submarine service was challenged by unimaginative leadership and operational tactics that, in most cases, had not been updated since the First World War. As a result, it lagged considerably behind virtually all of its foreign counterparts in terms of operational effectiveness. 2. Jones, “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due.” 3. Conways, 1922–1946, 347. 4. Krips served as division commander from May 18, 1941, to March 1, 1942. His flagship alternated, depending on which of his destroyers were operational: Witte de With May 18, 1941–December 24, 1941. Van Ghent December 24, 1941–February 15, 1942. Witte de With February 15, 1942–March 1, 1942.

5. Layman, “Sparrows Among the Hawks.” 6. On her trial run Piet Hein touched 36 knots. 7. Originally all four Van Galen class destroyers were based in the East Indies, but Van Galen was ordered back to Holland, April 1940. She would be sunk by German dive bombers on May 10, 1940. 8. Bosscher, Volume 2, 149. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. De Ruyter’s turbines could accept a 15 percent overload for short periods, providing her with a maximum speed of 33½ knots. 12. Although the Dutch Underground was not one of Europe’s most prolific organizations during the Second World War, it did its best to delay the construction of De Zeven Provinciën and Eendracht through sabotage and other subtle acts of resistance. 13. Statistics for Soerabaja after being rebuilt as a gunnery training ship in 1936–37. 14. Van der Pete and Wik, 73. 15. Van der Pete and Wik, 79. 16. Ibid. 17. Kimenai, “Nederlandse torpedomotorboten: Torpedomotorboten van de TM 4-klasse.” www.go2war2.nl/art ikel/3033/Nederlandse-torpedomotor boten.htm?page=3. 18. Mark, 149. 19. Onderzeebootjagers, or Submarine Chasers.

20. Spek, Part 1. 21. Kimenai, “Nederlandse torpedomotorboten: Torpedomotorboten van de TM 4-klasse.” www.go2war2.nl/art ikel/3033/Nederlandse-torpedomotor boten.htm?page=3. 22. The loss of OJR 3 is also attributed to hitting a mine (Spek, Part 1). It is also possible that the fume extractor systems on these boats had not been properly assembled when the boats were put into service at Soerabaja. 23. Mark, 147. 24. Droste, 16. 25. In the process they stopped in the Riouw Islands and evacuated the Dutch harbormaster and his large German Shepherd. 26. Campbell and Lovell, 167–71. 27. Head of the KM’s Mine Branch in the NEI. 28. Visser, “Mines of the Royal Netherlands Navy.” www.netherlands navy.nl/Mines.htm. 29. Bussemaker, 238–39. 30. Although the KM welcomed the proposal, Governor General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was much cooler. Despite the threat Japan posed, he felt the British and Dutch were only allies in their war against Germany. He did not want to form an alliance could drag the NEI into a conflict that might otherwise only involve Britain and Japan. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer was not willing to accept that Japan’s ambitions were not just limited to Malaysia. Thus, he still hoped to antagonize Japan as little as possible. However, he was still interested obtaining mines from the British and suggested that the KM and RN hold secret talks to that end. Bussemaker, 238–39. 31. Bosscher, Volume 2, 149. 32. Mark, 103. 33. Bosscher, Volume 2, 149. 34. National Archives of Australia, “Supply of Naval Mines to Netherlands East Indies.” 35. Visser, “Mines of the Royal Netherlands Navy.” www.netherlands navy.nl/Mines.htm. 36. National Archives of Australia, “Supply of Naval Mines to Netherlands East Indies.” 37. Visser, “Mines of the Royal Netherlands Navy.” www.netherlands navy.nl/Mines.htm. 38. Developed as an anti-submarine weapon, the antenna mine had a copper wire attached to a buoy that floated above the mine. The copper wire was insulated from the steel cable below it. When a submarine’s steel hull touched the copper wire, the voltage produced by the contact between two dissimilar metals was amplified, thus detonating the mine. 39. Campbell, 97–98, 167, 398, and Visser, “Mines of the Royal Netherlands Navy.” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Mines. htm. 40. This was likely a license- built version of a British design, but which model is unknown. 41. Klassen and van ’T Haaf, 508– 12. 42. Willem van der Zaan also conducted a series of minelaying training

exercises in the Riouw Archipelago throughout 1941. 43. The Gouvernementsmarine, Dienst der Gewestelijke Vaartuigen and Dienst der Bebakening en Kustverlichting, respectively. 44. Niehorster, “Mobilized Order of Battle, Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces Colonial Shipping Authority, December 12, 1941.” http://niehorster. orbat.com/016_netherlands/41-12-08/ navy_ggm.html. 45. These were usually small tasks temporary in scope and nature within their assigned patrol areas. Larger transportation jobs were carried out by the ships of the KPM. 46. Hokke, 91. 47. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/arti kel/2506/Gemilitariseerde-schepen-vande-Gouvernements-Marine.htm?page= 2. 48. Ibid. 49. Visser, “Gouvernementsmarine.” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Gouvmar.htm. 50. Fast patrol boats specifically built for interdicting drug runners. 51. Bosscher, Volume 2, 36. 52. Regional Patrol Service craft were generally in the 150 to 200 ton range, while the GM ships were averaged in the 800 to 1,000 ton range. 53. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernementsmarine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/arti kel/ 2506/ Gemilitariseerde- schepenvan- de- Gouvernements- Marine. htm? page=2. 54. One of the Dutch misconceptions about this dedication to service was that it was built around true loyalty and commitment to the colonial cause. In reality, many Indonesians in the land and sea forces served primarily for the prestige, pay and regular meals. 55. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernementsmarine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/arti kel/ 2506/ Gemilitariseerde- schepenvan- de- Gouvernements- Marine. htm? page=2.

Chapter 7 1. Initially founded in Germany in 1912, Fokker Aircraft is one of the oldest aircraft manufacturers in the world. The plant’s founder, Anthony Fokker, gained much fame during the First World War when he designed a series of highly effective and often-feared fighter aircraft for the Imperial German Air Force. He relocated to the Netherlands in 1919 and began building aircraft for the Dutch military and various civilian buyers. Van Berkel was a much smaller, noncommercial aircraft manufacturer. It was jointly formed by the Dutch Government and Air Force in 1917 to help the country’s military obtain aircraft during the First World War. In this capacity Van Berkel supplied the Army and Navy with a foreign-designed aircraft that were built domestically under

Chapter Notes—8, 9 and 10 license. It provided a small number of seaplanes to the MLD before ceasing operations in the early 1920s when its production licenses expired. By then, the Fokker plant was well-established and Holland was able to easily obtain foreign-built aircraft. 2. Portugal also acquired three Fokker T.IV aircraft. Virtual Aircraft Museum. “Fokker T.IV.” www.aviastar. org/air/holland/fokker_t-4.php. 3. Womack, 162. 4. Combat Aircraft of World War Two, 178. 5. Engines from those “Whales” retired from service were rebuilt and used to power the KM’s new squadron of Motor Torpedo Boats described later in this text. 6. X-37 would eventually be destroyed in one of the many Japanese air raids on Java beginning in February 1942. 7. Technically, the Dutch PBYs were Consolidated Model 28-5MNE Catalinas, which were export versions of the Consolidated PBY Catalina. They were the newest model Catalina available and featured better equipment and protection than the older PBYs flown by their American counterparts. 8. One PBY was destroyed during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor while en route to Java. 9. Womack, 14. 10. Today known as Sri Lanka. 11. Manschot, MLD Pilot, 2nd Officer Airman: Tales and Facts of His Life, May 1916–February 1945. October 2014. http://home.hccnet.nl/pa.vd.berg/ Biography%20-%20US.pdf. 12. Roughly $1 U.S. (1940), $16 USD (2012). For comparison purposes only, flight training today can roughly cost between $100 and $150/hour. 13. On the southern coast of Java near the port city of Tjilatjap. 14. https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/ groups/ NEI_ aviation/ conversations/ topics/334, Jos Heyman, March 19, 2007. 15. Womack, 153.

Chapter 8 1. The KNIL was a colonial force completely independent of the Royal Netherlands Army in Europe. Although its officers were trained in Holland the bulk of its personnel were drawn from indigenous personnel. In addition, all recruit and technical training was conducted in the East Indies. 2. Eurasians were mixed- race Indonesians born to Dutch/Indonesian parents and were considered fullblooded Netherlands citizens. 3. The Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine (KIM) is the Royal Netherlands Navy equivalent of the United States Naval Academy. The status of reserve officers called back into active duty was noted by the designation (KMR) following their rank. Bosscher, Volume 2, 139. 4. Bosscher, Volume 2, 141. 5. Vandenbosch, 1. 6. Vandenbosch, 7. 7. The KNIL was also an allvolunteer force. However, its basic entry

requirements made it a much more attractive option for uneducated Indonesians who filled out the majority of its ranks. Service in the KNIL was a status symbol for many Indonesians and it was not uncommon to find enlisted soldiers and NCOs with decades-long family traditions of military service. Its Regular officers were educated at the Royal Military Academy in Breda, Holland. They tended to be extremely well-learned and typically spoke multiple languages— such as English, French or German—in addition to Dutch. In this regard the KNIL was also impacted by the loss of personnel after May 1940. To help close the gap in the East Indies reserve officers were recruited from the general population and sent to the equivalent of Officer Candidate Schools. Bosscher, Volume 2, 658. 8. Ashton and Hellema, 165. 9. It appears that few, if any of these financial seizures were ever paid back. 10. This trade also generated the hundreds of millions of dollars which funded the East Indies’ massive military build-up in 1939–41. 11. Bosscher, Volume 2, 140. 12. Furstner was Chief of Naval Staff with the Netherlands Government in Exile in London and head of all remaining KM forces globally. Even before the outbreak of war, the East Indies Squadron was being tapped to provide reinforcements for KM forces in Europe. In December 1939 Vice-Admiral Helfrich had been asked to send the destroyers Evertsen and Piet Hein back to home waters. They represented 25 percent of his total destroyer force and losing them would seriously weaken Helfrich’s force. After some back and forth, a compromise was reached and the gunboat Flores was sent in their place. She sailed on December 22, 1939, and reached Den Helder Naval Base on February 12, 1940. Then, in January 1940 Helfrich was ordered to send 20 naval specialists. On April 6 the destroyer Van Galen sailed from Soerabaja and reached Den Helder on May 8. Just two days later German paratroopers jumped into Holland and captured Waalhaven airfield outside Rotterdam. On May 10 Van Galen was ordered to bombard the aerodrome, but en route she was caught by German dive bombers and sunk in a rain of bombs. Van Waning. 13. It will be remembered that Isaac Sweers had been under construction in Holland in May 1940. Nearly complete except for her main armament, she was towed to England where she was redesigned and completed using British guns. 14. Bosscher, Volume 2, 143. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Known as the Naval Security Section. 18. Bosscher, Volume 2, 140. 19. Bosscher, Volume 2, 36. 20. Among other requirements, her electrical system was so decayed that the entire ship needed to be rewired. The upgrades were so extensive that the head of the ME required that Sumatra be taken completely out of service for an extended period.

21. Bosscher, Volume 2, 36. 22. Bosscher, Volume 2, 40. 23. Bosscher, Volume 2, 490, note 16. 24. Bosscher, Volume 2, 140. 25. Ibid. 26. Bosscher, Volume 2, 144. 27. Bosscher, Volume 2, 659–60. 28. Bosscher, Volume 2, 38. 29. Van Waning, “Organisatie Van Het Maritieme Operatieve Commando Te Soerabaia.” 30. Only those aircraft not under the command of ABDA-REC were under Koenraad’s command at Morokrembangan. For the most they included older Fokker T.IVs, Dornier Do. 15 Whales and single-engine Fokker observation and Ryan training aircraft. 31. Van Waning, “Organisatie Van Het Maritieme Operatieve Commando Te Soerabaia.” 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Beyond the tactical coordination of land defenses within very specific zones of operation, there was no strategic coordination and little communication between the KM and KNIL. 35. Van Waning, “Organisatie Van Het Maritieme Operatieve Commando Te Soerabaia.” 36. Ibid. 37. A centralized organization which collects and analyzes preliminary battlefield information for distribution to a tactical officer. The data provided is typically raw in nature and is not fully evaluated prior to being forwarded. Dutch military commanders had initially been introduced to the new concept in the United Kingdom following the German invasion of Holland. 38. Van Waning, “Organisatie Van Het Maritieme Operatieve Commando Te Soerabaia.” 39. Ibid. 40. All large ships of the East Indies Squadron communicated on the KM’s designated frequency. Individual branches of the KM, such as the MLD, MTB/Anti-Submarine and AntiAircraft defenses, utilized their own communications frequencies that were not tied into the main KM network. 41. Van Waning, “Organisatie Van Het Maritieme Operatieve Commando Te Soerabaia.” 42. Bosscher, Volume 2, 208. 43. Ibid. 44. Bax report. 45. van der Voort. “Establishment of the “Measurements Building,” Waalsdorp Museum, January 2, 2014. www. museumwaalsdorp. nl/ en/ meetgben. html. 46. Ibid. 47. Personal correspondence with Ron de Bakker, February 8, 2007. 48. Other than being surprised at the advanced nature of Dutch research on Radar technology, the British too little direct interest in Doctor von Wieler’s work. This was likely because Dutch efforts focused primarily on fire control, whereas the British were concerned with its potential for advanced air warning. 49. Howse, 343. 50. Personal correspondence with

317 Ron de Bakker, Ron de Bakker, February 5, 2007.

Chapter 9 1. Hough, 121. 2. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 87– 88. 3. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 90. 4. Helfrich, Volume 1, 174. 5. A 63-year-old New Zealander, Polkinghorn was a Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve officer who had been called into service from his normal career as a merchant marine officer. 6. Hacket and Kingsepp. “Rising Storm—The Imperial Japanese Navy and China 1931–1941: The Seizure of Shanghai’s International Settlement— 1941.” www.combinedfleet.com/Interna tional_t.htm. 7 . w w w. c o m b i n e d fl e e t . c o m / International_t.htm. 8. Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, 77. 9. Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, 96. 10. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 141. 11. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 142. 12. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 152. 13. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 187. 14. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 184. 15. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 210. 16. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 211. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 227–28. 20. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 289. 21. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 232. 22. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 252. 23. Helfrich, Volume 1, 170. 24. Bosscher, Volume 2, 318. 25. Helfrich, Volume 1, 313. 26. Ibid. 27. A 2,071 ton inter-island freighter from the Dutch KPM shipping line. She had been requisitioned by KM on December 1, 1941, for use as a submarine tender. 28. Bosscher, Volume 2, 632, n73. 29. Helfrich, Volume 1, 313. 30. Bosscher, Volume 2, 632, n73.

Chapter 10 1. In the Hands of Fate, 40. 2. Hokke and van Rooij, 99. 3. Bussemaker, “The Story of Cor de Wolf, Sole Survivor of O-16.” www. dutchsubmarines.com/specials/special_ cornelis_de_wolf.htm. 4. Ibid. 5. In November 1995, a diving team visited the wreck of O-16 for the first time. It had been discovered earlier that year by Sven Sjöstrand, a retired shipbuilder living in Singapore. He was acting on reports from local fishermen, who over the years had lost a large number of fishing nets on an unidentified wreck in the vicinity of Tioman Island. Knowing that O-16 had been lost in the area in December 1941, Sjöstrand contacted a reporter he knew at a daily newspaper in Holland, who in turn, contacted Dutch naval officials. Led by Lieutenant-Commander Bussemaker’s two sons, the expedition found the wreck lying upright at a depth of 175 feet and conclusively identified it

318 as the O-16. Although numerous fishing nets obscured much of the wreck, close investigation revealed that the submarine had indeed struck a mine. The subsequent explosion blew a jagged hole in the hull, just forward of the conning tower. In addition, the entire boat was bent at a 30-degree angle from the blast point, which had most likely split her seams and caused her rapid demise. The confirmed position of O-16 also pinpointed the exact cause of her loss. Based on Quartermaster de Wolf ’s original debriefing in Singapore, it had been assumed that she had been lost to a British minefield northeast of Permanggil Island. Although de Wolf estimated that he spent approximately 38 hours in the water and drifted 44 nautical miles, naval officials doubted his ability to survive in the sea that long and placed his position closer to Permanggil. However, the expedition found the wreck 19 nautical miles northeast of Tioman Island, which was 38 nautical miles from her assumed sinking position in December 1941. De Wolf had been correct all along. This was also the same area where Japanese submarines had laid a secret minefield just days before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Laid at the last minute, the purpose of the minefield was to hamper any Allied naval units attempting to interfere with their landings in Malaya. As it turned out, O-16 lay only seven nautical miles from the wreck of K-XVII, which had previously been discovered in 1982. She had been lost to a mine from the same barrage. In August 1998, Unilever Singapore (the subsidiary of a multinational Dutch manufacturer of soap and deodorants) underwrote a $35,000 expedition to visit the wrecks. Initially, divers planned to enter both wrecks and return items to the surface, filming the process for use in a television commercial. However, intense backlash in the Netherlands prompted Unilever to backtrack on its plans to enter the submarines, which are classified as war graves. Bruised by the negative publicity, Unilever quickly promised only to film the wrecks and not to enter or touch them. The company also pledged to forgo using the footage for commercial purposes. 6. Visser, “Who Sank The Shinonome?” www. netherlandsnavy. nl/ Shi nonome.htm. 7. Otto, “O-19.” www.dutchsubma rines.com/boats/boat_o19.htm. 8. Helfrich, Volume 1, 202. 9. It is perhaps easy to attribute this encounter to overexcitement on the part of Knoops. This position was deep inside Dutch territory and the Japanese were still far north at the time. This made an air attack against Java highly unlikely. It must also be remembered that this encounter came less than a week after Pearl Harbor and that attack was also considered highly unlikely. 10. Bosscher, Volume 2, 166, and Bosscher, Volume 2, 511, n84. 11. Otto, “K-XIV.” www.dutchsubmarines.com/boats/boat_kxiv.htm. 12. Ibid. 13. Helfrich, Volume 1, 233.

Chapter Notes—11 14. Although it is often reported that Katori Maru was later salvaged, this was not the case. On May 11, 2003, a diving team located her wreck, which is broken in two pieces. Her identity has been confirmed by Japanese historians. Otto, “K-XIV.” www.dutchsubmarines. com/boats/boat_kxiv.htm. 15. Ibid. 16. Stern, 143. 17. Stern, 144. 18. Ibid. 19. Unlike American submarines, the batteries aboard Dutch boats were exposed. The Americans regarded this as unsafe and put the crew at risk. 20. “Three men came back to move the K-XIII so that our boat could get out to go on patrol. When they opened the hatch they put on a light and there was a huge explosion. Chlorine gas from the batteries had built up inside the hull and exploded. The three sailors were all killed. I ran on board and found one in the front hatch, he had been cut in half across the torso. The other two had used the hatch amidships, one was half hanging out of the hatch, he had been cut from under the arm through the stomach. The worst was yet to come. I heard a sound coming from the third man and tried to pull him through the hatch. He was burnt almost to a cinder. I grabbed him and his skin and flesh was all I held in my hands, it came off like a snake sheds its skin, he stared up at me with eyes that had been burnt to charcoal, and then he died. I shall never forget the look of those eyes.”—Leading Seaman Gerrit Tigchelaar. Otto, “Gerrit Tigchelaar’s WWII naval record.” www.dutch submarines. com/ men/ crew/ men_ g_ tigchelaar.htm. 21. Average depth in the Gulf of Siam is only 130 feet. 22. During prewar drills, American submarine commanders were often severely lectured if their boat was detected during a Fleet Problem. At the same time, attacks at periscope were discouraged as the boat was visible to patrolling aircraft. As a result, they were encouraged to attack using SONAR from depths of 100 feet. This led to some American submarine commanders exhibiting a clear lack of aggression. Those were gradually weeded out as the war progressed and tactics changed. Blair, 67. 23. War in the Outposts, 169. 24. Gill, 1939–42, 496. 25. Ibid. 26. War in the Outposts, 169. 27. Williford, 309. 28. Despite their two nations not being at war, Japan refused to guarantee João Belo and Goncalves Zarco safe passage through Japanese-controlled waters. Unwilling to risk their troops in such an uncertain set-up, the Portuguese turned back. 29. It is unclear if the British were aware of these meetings. 30. Bosscher, Volume 2, 176. 31. This note simply amplifies the question of how much the British Government knew about the Australian and Dutch plans to occupy Portuguese Timor. Their long friendship aside, the

full-blown invasion of Portuguese territory only days after agreeing to a limited occupation almost surely made the British appear as if they had negotiated in bad faith. 32. Presumably they also urged him to stand down his military garrison in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. 33. Bosscher, Volume 2, 176. 34. Afterwards, Soerabaja returned to Soerabaja where she was used a mobile AA battery which moved around different parts of the harbor. She was also used to defend the ordnance plant on Madoera. 35. Bosscher, Volume 2, 175–76. 36. Carlson, “World War II U.S. Navy Armed Guard and World War II U.S. Merchant Marine: Merchant Ship Losses.” www.armed-guard.com/ag84. html. 37. “Ships Purser Robert Feder,” New York Times, March 23, 1942. 38. New York Times, March 23, 1942. 39. Womack, 72. 40. Carlson, “World War II U.S. Navy Armed Guard and World War II U.S. Merchant Marine: Merchant Ship Losses.” www.armed-guard.com/ag84.html.

Chapter 11 1. Brown, 447. 2. Leutze, 253. 3. Ibid. 4. Leutze, 254. 5. Ibid. 6. Hart Narrative, 50. 7. Ron de Bakker, July 26, 2010, www.network54.com/Forum/594514/ message/1280168679/No+so+hidden. 8. McDonald and Swaak-Goldman, 782. 9. Cablegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs London. I. 29812 70/185. December 28, 1941. 10. It appears that Pabst notified London of this proposal through the Swedish Embassy on or about January 10, 1942. After having received the declaration of War the Japanese authorities have twice suggested avoiding of bloodshed in the name of humanity and avoiding on any occasion in the future or any kind of hostile action either direct or indirect against the Japanese forces, probably hoping no valuable raw materials in the East Indies will be destroyed. I referred them to their own diplomatic channels but it seems they will make a certain proposal. Please send instruction which attitude I have to assume when such a proposal was made to me.

The same folder in the Dutch national archives contains a second note, also in the handwriting of Pabst…. The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs suggests avoiding bloodshed in the name of humanity and avoiding on any occasion in the future of any kind of hostile action direct or indirect against the Japanese forces.”

11. Hart’s biographer states that the Admiral was completely surprised by the news. Hart himself asserts in his personal diary, from which the biography is largely drawn, that Helfrich knew of

the news release, yet did not mention it beforehand. This added to Hart’s shock of the news (Leutze, 254–55). One must question how surprised Hart could and should have been. After all, he had already received Admiral Stark’s cable to that effect 24 to 48 hours earlier. There is no proof either way of this claim. Helfrich certainly had an agenda; but in this case, he could have easily assumed that Hart already knew since he was the force commander. Neither Hart nor Leutze mention the Japanese peace proposal as a topic of discussion. Rather, his meeting with the Dutch is portrayed as little more than a blindside ambush. It is a theme repeated more than once throughout his biography, in which the Admiral is painted as a victim. The book is factually correct and offers a great deal of valuable insight into Hart’s leadership; nor is his selfperception as a victim always incorrect. That said, one must review Hart’s biography with some critical analysis, for in some instances it reads as little more than a self-induced “pity party” for the Admiral. 12. Leutze, 256. 13. Leutze, 256–57. 14. Mosher, 12–13. 15. Ibid. 16. Mosher, 14. 17. It was not uncommon for an Indonesian worker’s wife or children to send and receive messages and decode important signals. 18. Mosher, 15. 19. Glassford, 7–8. 20. The Philippines were part of ABDA, which technically put General Douglas MacArthur under the command of Lieutenant-General ter Poorten. However, the Philippines remained an entirely separate theater of operations that was never part of ABDA operations beyond being on organizational chart. In any event, ter Poorten was focused exclusively on trying to maintain Dutch territory with neither the time nor the resources to focus anywhere else. 21. Leutze, 261. 22. It should also be pointed out that Helfrich, or anyone outside the USN for that matter, knew the full extent of the damage suffered at Pearl Harbor. Thus, Helfrich still expected an American task force of carriers, battleships and cruisers to steam into Soerabaja and help defend the East Indies. 23. For all their criticisms of Admiral Hart, it should be noted that the British themselves were never enthusiastic about ABDA in concept or execution. When it was it was first broached by George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff on December 25, 1941, it was met with profound suspicion from those British officials present, particularly when the Americans suggested Wavell as the Supreme Commander. None seemed to think there was much promise in attempting to hold the East Indies should a Singapore fall (a common British theme). There was much discussion internally as to whether the British were being positioned to take the fall for a campaign few expected to be successful. General Sir John Dill went so far as to write, “It

Chapter Notes—12 would, I think be fatal to have a British Commander responsible for the disasters that are coming.” In short, catastrophe was fully expected in the Far East and the British did not want to be in charge when things went south. But at the same time, Admiral Sir Charles Little pointed out that if Wavell accepted the command chair it would make sense to have an American deputy. This could be useful in helping “secure additional U.S. forces.” It was eventually decided that the offer was made in good faith. Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that should the offer be refused, the United States would head ABDA themselves, which could divert their primary focus away from the war in Europe. On December 28 the British accepted the appointment and General Wavell received orders to report to Java as soon as possible. Leutze, 258–60. 24. Leutze, 270. 25. Bosscher, Volume 2, 203. 26. Ibid. 27. The simple truth of the matter is that the Dutch were unhappy with ViceAdmiral Helfrich being left out of the ABDA command structure. They would have likely complained just as long and hard if any other Allied officer had been appointed. But in Admiral Hart, they found a great deal of ammunition, so to speak, with which to support their attacks. 28. One must wonder at the logic of Wavell’s statement. In regards to Japanese efficiency, he apparently discounted the stunning success of their attack on Pearl Harbor, their complete destruction of Cavite Naval Base, the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse and their lightning advance down the Malay Peninsula that routed British defenses and put them on the doorstep of Singapore in late January. Wavell has been accused of underestimating his opponents (http://rethinkinghistory.blog spot.com/2011/11/rating-general-wav ell.html) and this statement tends to validate this claim. 29. Leutze, 272–73. 30. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 31. Ibid. 32. Brown, 453. 33. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 34. Leutze, 266. 35. A semi-derogatory term most often used in public relations, public affairs or politics. It is defined as the activity of trying to present and control the way something (such as an important or controversial event) is described to the public in order to influence what people think about it. www.merriamwebster. com/ dictionary/ spin%20 con trol. 36. Pawle, 116. 37. English, Classical Greek, Hindu, Latin, Russian and Urdu. 38. www. telegraph. co. uk/ culture/ books/ bookreviews/ 4611693/ Archi bald-Wavell-the-Life-and-Times-of-anImperial- Servant- by- Adrian- Fort- re view.html. 39. Martin and Stephenson, 138.

40. The official account of the incident states that Wavell’s car parked too near the edge of the seawall as he returned to the Dutch PBY that was to fly him back to Java. Due to the loss of sight in his left eye he failed to notice being too close the edge and fell down the rocks as he stepped out of the car. A second, unsubstantiated account told to the author by a former MLD crewman of the PBY claims that Wavell was simply inebriated. 41. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 42. Ibid. 43. Much like Admiral Hart, the reports of Doctor Foote should be read, to some extent, with a critical eye. Foote had been based in the East Indies since the mid–1920s and held many deep and long-lasting ties with high-level Dutch officials and was extremely loyal to the colonial administration. “Having relished the entitlements and creature comforts of the old ‘colonial atmosphere’ of the Dutch East Indies for twenty years already, Foote was viewed by more progressive Dutch people as a reactionary colonial diehard, an opinion that London’s Consul General in Batavia, John L.M. Mitcheson, shared” (Gouda and Zaalberg, 170). So while not factually inaccurate, many of his prewar reports cannot be assumed to have been written by a hand of fully detached impartiality. When Foote was transferred from Batavia to a new post on Ceylon in October 1947 his work was considered suspect. Superiors rated his performance as “mediocre and half-hearted” or “disjointed.” Most of his reports were of “appallingly poor quality” and did little more than puppet the colonial views of his many Dutch acquaintances. A State Department official wrote that Foote’s 20+ years at a single station embedded him so deeply in the local culture and politics that it had destroyed his objectivity and ability to critically analyze input from local friends and contacts. Gouda and Zaalberg, 198. 44. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 45. “Dutch Will Fight To Very End,” Sydney Morning Herald. 46. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 47. Prior to the Great Depression, the Governor-General received an annual salary of 80,000 Guilder/$32,000 U.S. ($429,000 in 2012) plus a 100,000 Guilder/$40,000 U.S. ($536,000 in 2012) “representation allowance” and a small traveling stipend. Housing arrangements consisted of two palaces in Batavia and Buitenzorg and a country house in Tjipans, Java. Van den Bosch, 98. 48. Based in the Netherlands, the Remonstrant Church is an extremely liberal church with approximately 6,000 congregants. Remonstrants place strong emphasis on personal faith and many write their own confession of faith on becoming a member. Members are not bound by a centralized core of beliefs and are by no means always in agreement with one another in regards to

319

faith and social issues. Remonstrants 58. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherwere the first church in the world to lands East Indies.” marry same sex couples in 1986. It was 59. Hart, “Events and Circumalso one of the first churches in the stances Concerning the Striking Force.” Netherlands to ordain women as minis60. Leutze, 277. ters. A hallmark of the church is its on61. Leutze, 268. going push for open dialogue with 62. Leutze, 275. members of other Christian denomina63. www. marinematen. com/ php tions and diverse religions (www.link BB3/viewtopic.php?f=1417&t=2514. edin.com/company/remonstrants). 64. Foote, “The Fall of the NetherLikewise, contrary to virtually every lands East Indies.” Dutch politician of the day, Tjarda van 65. This was an easy decision for AdStarkenborgh Stachouwer regarded it as miral Hart, considering that lack of air inevitable that the East Indies would cover made any kind of regular naval opone day become independent. Busseerations from Philippine bases impossimaker, 290. ble. After the destruction of Cavite 49. Visser, “Admiral C. E.L. HelfNaval Yard in early December there was rich, RNN.” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/ no established base from which the Men_helfrich.htm. USN boats could operate. 50. Bussemaker, 333. 66. These numbers do not include 51. Ron de Bakker, Royal Netherthose large warships damaged at Pearl lands Navy Warships of World War II, Harbor which were repaired and put www.network54.com/Forum/594514/ back into service by early 1942: thread/ 12 75 26 1587/ Dutch+ Ship Type Date Rejoined Fleet (1942) Perc ep ti o n + Pennsylvania Battleship Could have rejoined the Of+ Admiral+ fleet almost immediately, Helfrich, July but was overhauled and not 28, 2010. rejoin fleet until August 52. Ron de Maryland Battleship February Bakker, Royal Tennessee Battleship March Ne th erl a n d s Honolulu Light Cruiser January Navy Warships Curtis Seaplane Tender January of World War Vestal Repair Ship February II, www.net work 54. com/ Fo r u m / 5 9 4 5 14/thread/1275261587/Dutch+Percep Chapter 12 tion+Of+Admiral+Helfrich, July 28, 2010. 1. Federal Reserve Bulletin, No53. www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/ vember 1942, 1158. helfrich.html. 2. Dutch “Gold Ships” known to 54. Peter Boer, Royal Netherlands have left Java in February 1942. HowNavy Warships Of World War II, www. ever, the list below should be considered network54. com/ Forum/ 594514/ thre very incomplete. Ship

Departure Port/Date

Destination

Notes

Java

Tandjoeng Priok February 20, 1942

Australia

Jagersfontijn

Tjilatjap February 27, 1942

?

Ruys

?

Australia

Tegelberg

Tandjoeng Priok February 12, 1942 Tjilatjap February 22, 1942

United States

Large amount of gold bullion from Bank of Java. Transited Soenda Strait on night of February 20 and safely reached Australia. Gold reserves from Bank of Java loaded at last minute during evacuation of Tjilatjap. 90 cases of gold valued at ƒ10,000,000. ƒ25,000,000 in gold bullion. Reached Melbourne on March 5.

Tjitjlengka

ad/ 1275261587/ Dutch+ Percep tion+ Of+Admiral+Helfrich, December 17, 2010. 55. Ibid. 56. Peter Boer, Royal Netherlands Navy Warships of World War II, www. network54. com/ Forum/ 594514/ thre ad/ 1275261587/ Dutch+ Percep tion+ Of+Admiral+Helfrich, December 15, 2010. 57. Visser, “Admiral C. E.L. Helfrich, RNN.” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/ Men_helfrich.htm.

Australia

3. $80,000,000 U.S. (1942)/ $1,130,000,000 U.S. (2012), www.mea suringworth.com. 4. These funds were supplemented by the Netherlands Government in Exile seizing the private accounts of Dutch citizens living overseas. In most cases they were never repaid. 5. Langkoeas was the former German merchant ship Stassfurt seized in May 1940. 6. Edwards, 15. 7. Edwards, 18.

320 8. Boero was the former Vichy French ship Dupleix. 9. Djirak was one of several civilian tankers chartered by the KM prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War. These chartered vessels retained their civilian names and were given a military identification number. 10. Womack, 77. 11. To this day the wreck of Liberty lies just offshore where it is a popular diving attraction for locals and tourists. 12. Boyd and Yashida, 74–75. 13. Dutch steamer Ban Ho Guan on February 28, 1942. 14. Probably the Dutch steamer Le Maire on March 4, 1942. 15. www. combinedfleet. com/ I- 60. htm. 16. Ibid. 17. Boyd and Yashida, 76. 18. Orita, 51. 19. Gill, 1939–42, 532. 20. Lawson, “M/S Eidvold.” www. warsailors. com/ singleships/ eidsvold. html. 21. Ibid. 22. www.combinedfleet.com/I-159. htm. 23. www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx? 59369. 24. Bakker, 73. 25. Ibid. 26. After the war Lieutenant-Commander Yoshimatsu Tamori would eventually serve as a Vice-Admiral with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. 27. The harbor of Sabang Island off the northern most tip of Sumatra. 28. This may have been the 1,811 ton Giang Sen. 29. www.combinedfleet.com/I-159. htm. 30. Myoko had returned to Japan as a result of her bomb damage at Davao. 31. The B-339D was the export version of the infamous Brewster Buffalo. 32. Kimenai, “Nederlandse mijnenleggers: Prins van Oranje-klasse mijnenleggers.” www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2080/ Nederlandse-mijnenleggers.htm?page= 6. 33. This was the captured Japanese fishing boat Borneo Maru. 34. Bosscher, Volume 2, 178. 35. Creswell, “The Sandy Young Story.” www.borneopow. info/bugle/ Borneo%20Bugle%2018.pdf. 36. Taylor, “War.” www.far-easternheroes.org.uk/Baldwin/html/war.htm. 37. www. combinedfleet. com/ CH11_t.htm. 38. Ibid. 39. These planes went on to attack Prins van Oranje. 40. Bosscher, Volume 2, 520, note 209. 41. Japanese Monograph No. 28, 5– 6. 42. Although the final decision to initiate war with the Western Allies was not made until December 1, 1941, planning started well beforehand. Occupation currency for the East Indies was ordered in January 1941 and delivered that March. The trade negotiations of 1941 were nothing more than a ruse to conceal Japanese invasion plans. 43. Sherman and Thurman, 82–83.

Chapter Notes—13 and 14 44. Unlike the American and Dutch seaplanes, the Hudson was designed for the bombing role. They were much faster and better armed which dramatically increased their odds of survival.

Chapter 13 1. De Japanse Aanval Op Nederlands-Indië, Deel 2: Borneo, 124. 2. Japanese Monograph 28, 4. 3. Parsifal and her crew were left unharmed and they returned to Tarakan. 4. “Het Laatste Vliegtuig Naar Balikpapan.” 5. The MLD, like all other branches of the KM, suffered from a shortage of personnel. It was particularly acute amongst the navigator ranks. In this case, the entire squadron may very well have been flying with a single navigator in the lead plane. 6. The London News. “Het Laatste Vliegtuig Naar Balikpapan.” http:// kranten. delpher. nl/ nl/ view/ index ? image=ddd%3A010429498%3Ampeg 21%3Aa0015#info. 7. Ibid. 8. Albeit somewhat overstated, the Makassar Strait had a healthy reputation for extensive Japanese air activity. The name given to it by USN flight crews was “Cold Turkey Alley.” In any event, it was not the place where an unarmed aircraft overloaded with evacuees wanted to be during daylight hours. 9. Japanese Monograph 101, 20 and Sakai, 58. 10. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/arti kel/ 2506/ Gemilitariseerde- schepenvan- de- Gouvernements- Marine. htm? page=2. 11. Blair, 168. 12. Ibid. 13. www.combinedfleet.com/Tatsu gami_t.htm. 14. Japanese Monograph 101, 21. 15. Now under the command of Lieutenant- Commander C.A.J. van Well Groenveld, who had previously skippered K-XIV off Kuching. 16. Wegduiken…!, 380. 17. www. combinedfleet. com/ PB37_t.htm and Wegduiken…!, 380. 18. Otto, www.dutchsubmarines. com/boats/boat_kxviii.htm and Wegduiken…!, 380. 19. www. combinedfleet. com/ CH12_t.htm. 20. Wegduiken…!, 380. 21. Shizuo, 92–93. 22. www. combinedfleet. com/ CH12_t.htm. 23. Shizuo, 92–93. 24. Wegduiken…!, 381. 25. www. combinedfleet. com/ CH12_t.htm. 26. Wegduiken…!, 381. 27. Ibid. 28. Wegduiken…!, 382. 29. Ibid. 30. Wegduiken…!, 383. 31. Alford, 93. 32. Mullin, 117. 33. The British heavy cruiser Exeter

was equipped with Radar, but had not yet entered the fight in East Indies waters. 34. Java Sea Campaign, 22. 35. Michel, 45. 36. Shizuo, 92–93. 37. Ibid. 38. Japanese Monograph 101, 21.

Chapter 14 1. Although Jintsu was the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla flagship, she, Arashio and Oshio participated in the Kendari invasion after Rear-Admiral K. Kubo replaced Rear-Admiral Raizo Tanaka as escort commander. 2. Nachi and Haguro; Myoko still had not returned to duty after the bomb hit at Malalang Bay on December 26. 3. Inazami would be replaced by Akebono when she grounded. 4. Womack, 88–89. 5. Japanese Monograph 101, 23. 6. Nortier, “De Japanse Aanval Op Nederlands-Indië,” Volume 1, 162. 7. Hara, 63. 8. 782 Australian, 334 Dutch and 1,066 Indonesians. De Japanse Aanval Op Nederlands-Indië, Volume 1, 162. 9. Most were tied and blindfolded, led into the bushes in small groups where they were bayoneted or beheaded. 10. For all the talk of Ambonese loyalty to the Dutch, these troops performed miserably on both Ambon and Java a month later. In contrast, the best fighters in terms of skill and commitment were the Javanese troops. 11. “Genie” are Dutch army engineers, a designation which still exist today. 12. Helfrich, Volume 1, 304. 13. One must now remember the shortcomings of Vice-Admiral Helfrich’s headquarters in Batavia and its lack of a true “War Room” that would have helped him more effectively manage his forces. 14. Tromp’s floatplane had been lost during a search and rescue operation for the Australian cruiser Perth, which was sunk in November 1941 by the German merchant Kormoran. It was never replaced. In order to launch a floatplane, both ships had to full stop and winch it over the side by crane. During recovery, the ships would reduce speed and either dump fuel oil into the ocean to create an oil slick or turned sharply to calm rough water while dragging a large matt alongside. The plane would land on the calm water and taxi onto the matt, where the observer fitted a hook into a ring attached to the plane’s upper wing, allowing it to be winched aboard. Since both methods were unfeasible in a combat zone where submarines preceding an invasion convoy could loiter, neither cruiser launched a floatplane during the operation. 15. Helfrich, Volume 1, 305. 16. Morison, Volume 3, 297–98. 17. Morison, Volume 3, 298. 18. Helfrich, Volume 1, 321–22. 19. Helfrich, Volume 1, 322–23. 20. Matthews, 48. 21. At the end of the day, one of

must be careful as to how they interpret the relations between Vice- Admiral Helfrich and Admiral Hart. As seen earlier, Helfrich clearly resented Hart on a professional level for his being named head of ABDA-FLOAT. Nor was Helfrich particularly enamored with what he considered to be Hart’s passive attitude at defending Dutch territory. Helfrich could be painfully blunt and many of his actions toward Hart could probably be defined as passive aggressive. For his part, Hart (through his biographer) is often too willing to play the role of a victim while failing to acknowledge his own shortcoming and how his actions were perceived by his British and Dutch Allies. With that in mind, both men wrote postwar memoirs which can quite naturally be considered somewhat revisionist and one-sided in a variety of areas. So when it comes to evaluating the relationship between Hart and Helfrich the true gauge likely falls somewhere in the middle with equal blame on both men. 22. As two Germanic nations, Holland and Germany have long shared many interests and commonalities, including culture and language. During the First World War, Holland remained strictly neutral but there was a strong sense of sympathy toward Germany. Indeed, following Imperial Germany’s defeat in 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II lived in exile in Holland until his death in June 1941. Throughout the interwar years Holland was also a major trade partner with Germany on both the civilian and military markets. Thus, the shock and brutality of Germany’s invasion of Holland in May 1940 generated a sense of intense betrayal that manifested itself very openly in the East Indies. 23. Java Post, “Batavia Seint ‘Berlijn’; Het lot van de Duitsers in NederlandsIndië.” http://javapost.nl/2011/05/25/ batavia- seint-%C2%B4berlijn% C2% B4/. 24. While the majority of the internees were peaceful with little or no intention of causing trouble, there were apparently a number of aggressive trouble-makers amongst the merchant ship crews. 25. Onrust was a small island, approximately 22 acres in diameter, located eight miles northwest of Tandjoeng Priok in the Bay of Batavia. This island was used as both a quarantine station and penal colony. It also housed Dutch sailors after they mutinied aboard the armored cruiser De Zeven Provinciën in 1933. A number of German internees were held there beginning in May 1940. 26. Java Post, “Batavia Seint ‘Berlijn’; Het lot van de Duitsers in NederlandsIndië.” http://javapost.nl/2011/05/25/ batavia- seint-%C2%B4berlijn%C2% B4/. 27. Despite their harsh treatment of Austrians and Germans, Dutch officials took no action against Italian citizens in the East Indies. Although a belligerent partner of Germany, the Dutch did not declare war on Italy when it invaded France in June 1940. The Dutch broke off diplomatic relations and both coun-

Chapter Notes—15 and 16 tries quickly withdrew their respective diplomats from Rome and Batavia. All trade between the NEI and Italy ceased but those Italians residing in Dutch territory were left free without restrictions. Even more curious is the fact that the Italian Air Force was actively fighting their British allies during the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. 28. Bosscher, Volume 2, 225. 29. Also beginning on January 16, Japanese internees were evacuated to India from Tandjoeng Priok aboard the merchant ships Cremer and van Heemskerk. They were escorted by the American gunboat Asheville. Bezemer, Volume 1, 643. 30. Bosscher, Volume 2, 225. 31. Amongst this group were several German Jews who had declared Dutch citizenship in 1938–39, a group of anti– Nazi non–Jewish Germans, virtually all the elderly senior citizens still interned, numerous merchant seamen, 21 missionaries and 14 priests. 32. Ashley, “The Van Imhoff & Portrait for My Opa and Oma.” http://neu tralocean.blogspot.com/2009/11/vanimhoff-portrait-for-my-opa-and-oma. html. 33. Ibid. 34. Apparently the detachment commander requested that Captain Hoekstra load as many of the internees as possible into the lifeboats but he refused. As a result the five lifeboats, which had regular capacity of 250, carried only 146 crewmen and soldiers. 35. Ashley, “The Van Imhoff & Portrait for My Opa and Oma.” http://neu tralocean.blogspot.com/2009/11/vanimhoff-portrait-for-my-opa-and-oma. html. 36. Bosscher, Volume 2, 226. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Bezemer, Volume 1, 654. 40. Bezemer, Volume 1, 654, and Bosscher, Volume 2, 226. 41. Bosscher, Volume 2, 226. 42. Bezemer, Volume 1, 655. 43. Boelongan was briefly bombed by Japanese aircraft while engaged in this operation. Her captain later claimed that because of this attack that he could not enact a rescue operation without endangering the ship. However, it is unclear exactly when this attack took place and just how much it impacted the rescue of German survivors in light of Admiral Helfrich’s orders. Likewise, Y-63 made no attempt to and pick up any of the survivors. Her pilot later claimed that the sea was too rough for a safe landing. However, German survivors testified after the war the sea was glassy calm. 44. Bosscher, Volume 2, 227. 45. Ashley, “The Van Imhoff & Portrait for My Opa and Oma.” http://neu tralocean.blogspot.com/2009/11/vanimhoff-portrait-for-my-opa-and-oma. html. 46. Ibid. 47. The harbor of Padang. 48. Kimenai, Peter. “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” Stichting In-

formatie Wereldoorlog Twee: December 1, 2013. www.go2war2.nl/artikel/ 2506/Gemilitariseerde-schepen-van-deGouvernements-Marine.htm?page=9. 49. Hokke, 96. 50. Hokke, 100. 51. www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2506/ Gemilitariseerde-schepen-van-de-Gou vernements- Marine. htm?page= 9, and The Advertiser, Adelaide, South Australia, January 29, 1942, Page 8. 52. Mark, “The Loss of Deneb,” All Hands Magazine, April 1950. 53. Jan Visser, June 17, 2012, www. network54. com/ Forum/ 594514/ mes sage/1339930145/Re-+canopus,deneb +castor+etc. 54. Hokke, 101. 55. Napier, Nizam and Nestor. 56. To withstand the corrosive ocean saltwater during their voyage on the carrier’s deck, Indomitable’s crew had coated their guns with cosmoline that had to be stripped before they could be armed. 57. Gill, 1939–42, 559. 58. Gill, 1939–42, 560. 59. It appears that these men were massacred by the Japanese Imperial Guards Division shortly after being captured. The Japanese had been ambushed by Australian and British Indian troops several days before and suffered approximately 700 casualties in heavy fighting. According to Japanese witnesses, the survivors of Thanet were killed in retaliation on January 28. Taylor, www.roll-ofhonour. org . uk/ m/ html/ mcg rathmilton.htm and www.thanetwaves.co. uk/2013/07/hms-thanet-revisited.html. 60. www.roll-of-honour.org.uk/m/ html/mcgrath-milton.htm.

Chapter 15 1. Kimenai, “Lichte kruisers van de Java- klasse: Hr. Ms. Sumatra in de Tweede Wereldoorlog” www.go2war2. nl/artikel/1924/Lichte-kruisers-van-deJava-klasse.htm?page=4. 2. Even then, her gun crews were only partially trained. 3. Bosscher, Volume 2, 318. 4. Ibid. 5. An isolated anchorage on the south coast of Madoera approximately 60 miles east of Soerabaja. 6. Helfrich, Volume 1, 332–33. 7. www. combinedfleet. com/ RO34.htm. 8. Kannegieter, 42. 9. Ibid. 10. These same bombers would also pass over and report the position of Admiral Doorman’s Combined Striking Force a short time later. 11. Bosscher, Volume 2, 224 and Kannegieter, 42. 12. Bezemer, Volume 1, 687. 13. Kannegieter, 43. 14. Ibid. 15. BTR was the abbreviated name of Pieter de Bitter. 16. Kannegieter, 43. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. They included the severely injured man whom Kannegieter had as-

sisted in the infirmary and the final survivor rescued from van Lansberge. 21. Bezemer, Volume 1, 687. 22. Officially known as the Hawk 75, this was an export version of the CurtisWright P-36 Mohawk then in frontline service with the U.S. Army Air Corps. It was also flown by the British, Danish and French air forces. 23. These were export versions of the Curtis- Wright CW-21, a lightweight fighter which was tested but never taken into service by the U.S. Army Air Corps. 24. Martin and Stephenson, 117. 25. Reports from Supreme Commander ABDA Area, February 3, 1942. 26. Bennink, Attack On Combined Striking Force South of the Kangean Islands. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Lieutenant Bennink reported three formations of nine aircraft with the fourth formation having 10 bombers. 32. This was an example of one of the prime criticisms regarding the design of De Ruyter’s AA armament. With all the guns clustered together, it would only take a single, well- placed hit to wipe out the ship’s entire AA defenses. And with so much ammunition on deck that a lone hit could also prove catastrophic to the ship, as would later be demonstrated. 33. It is possible that this bomber was the same as that hit by Houston which then also crashed near Marblehead. 34. Bennink, Attack on Combined Striking Force South of the Kangean Islands. 35. Ibid. 36. Tully, “Naval Alamo: The Heroic Last Months of the Asiatic Fleet Dec 1941–March 1942.” www.asiatic fleet.com/javasea.html. 37. Holbrook, 27. 38. There was also a sense of culture shock for American military personnel who were in the Far East for the first time. This was before television, Internet and 24-hour news brought the world to one’s doorstep. The time required to travel abroad was measured in weeks rather than hours. Thus, many American servicemen had not traveled extensively, if at all. Nor had they experienced the finer points of life in colonial society, as evidenced by USAAF Captain Frank Kurtz upon his arrival on Java: “This is quite a place. The men wear dresses and caps and everyone rides a bicycle. The Dutch just drink beer and sit.” Martin and Stephenson, 117. 39. Bennink, Attack on Combined Striking Force South of the Kangean Islands. 40. Michel, 39. 41. Bennink, Attack on Combined Striking Force South of the Kangean Islands. 42. Having graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1897, Tommy Hart was a “Battleship Admiral.” Two USN cruisers had been heavily bombed and one of them crippled to the

321 point of nearly being abandoned at sea. Given his refusal or inability to accept the reality of the outcome, one might logically assume that Hart did not fully grasp the effectiveness of modern air power. Doorman, on the other hand, was a trained naval aviator and former commander of the MLD who fully recognized its potential. As such, he was under no illusions as to the danger his fleet faced when operating in hostile waters without air cover. 43. Gill, 1939–42, 555. 44. Morison, Volume 3, 299. 45. Gill, 1939–42, 555. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Morison, Volume 3, 310–11. 49. Her normal draught was 13 feet, 6 inches. 50. Annex to Report of Action with Japanese Planes—February 4, 1942. 51. Ibid.

Chapter 16 1. Ballarat, Bendigo, Toowoomba and Wollongong. 2. Reports From Supreme Commander ABDA Area, February 2, 1942. 3. Gill, 1939–1942, 561–62. 4. One of these pilots was Flying Officer John G. Gorton, a future Prime Minister of Australia. 5. Third Supplement to the London Gazette, 13 December 1946. 6. Ibid. 7. Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, 80, 86–87. 8. Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, 80. 9. An excellent day-by-day account of the evacuation of Singapore in the final hours of its surrender is provided by Richard Gough’s book, The Escape from Singapore. 10. Bosscher, Volume 2, 245. 11. It is unclear where or when, but P 37–40 were also destroyed on February 15, mostly likely by their own crews. 12. Bosscher, Volume 2, 575, note 343. 13. Bosscher, Volume 2, 575, note 346. 14. Simkins, War in the East. www. bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stor ies/64/a1070164.shtml. 15. The prauw’s cargo consisted of several hundred 100-pound bags of tapioca that were now waterlogged and much heavier than their original weight. Before the ship could be righted and the holes in her hull plugged these bags had to be hauled on deck, cut open and their contents emptied into the sea. It was a backbreaking job made more miserable by the stifling humidity. Local Indonesians were not used to seeing “Tuans” (white Europeans) perform such manual labor. Thus, the salvage project quickly became a carnival-like spectacle for many of the town residents. 16. Simkins, War in the East. www. bbc. co. uk/ history/ ww2peopleswar/ stories/64/a1070164.shtml. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Bosscher, Volume 2, 247. 21. Simkins, War in the East. www.

322 bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stor ies/64/a1070164.shtml. 22. Bosscher, Volume 2, 233. 23. Ibid. 24. Bosscher, Volume 2, 563, note 216. 25. Dutch sources vary; the report of Van Ghent’s navigator states 0430, while that of her captain says at approximately 0500. 26. Bosscher, Volume 2, 234. 27. Bosscher, Volume 2, 564, note 222. 28. Bosscher, Volume 2, 235. 29. It was appears that Exeter was the culprit; at 1500 that afternoon another reconnaissance plane signaled that “battleship” was in reality, a heavy cruiser. 30. Bosscher, Volume 2, 564, note 227. 31. Bloody Shambles, Volume 1, 124. 32. Bosscher, Volume 2, 564, note 231. 33. Bosscher, Volume 2, 236–37. 34. Ibid. 35. Bennink, Gaspar Straits Action. 36. Executive Officer LieutenantCommander J.B. Vinckers, Bosscher, Volume 2, 235. 37. It should be remembered that Java was laid down in May 1916. Due to budget delays and government squabbling she sat on the stocks for five years before being launched in August 1921. She would not enter service until May 1925, nine years after being designed. 38. Bosscher, Volume 2, 236–37. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Peters, 101. 42. Bill, 1939–42, 574. 43. Bosscher, Volume 2, 237. 44. Bosscher, Volume 2, 566, note 249. 45. Bennink, “Gaspar Straits Action.” 46. Tromp’s logbook shows a course change from 326 degree to 117 degrees at 1320. 47. Bosscher, Volume 2, 566, note 249. 48. De Ruyter was near-missed by a bomb to port that exploded under the waterline; her deck was showered with fragments but there were no injuries. Bennink, “Gaspar Straits Action.” 49. In contrast to his pessimistic thoughts on the topics, historians and naval strategists have been kind to Doorman regarding his decision to withdrawal from the Banka Strait. The general belief is that there was no reasonable way for him to have carried out the operation without suffering unacceptable losses. 50. The Japanese were extremely methodical and consistently mounted their air strikes at regular times throughout the war. 51. “After Action Report of Sergeant-Pilot A.J. de Bij.” Provided courtesy of Prudent Staal, January 31, 2014, w w w. d utc hfl e e t . n e t / s h ow thre a d . php/ 12570- Nederlands- Kruiser- Vlie gtuigen. 52. The Zeros were led by IJN fighter pilot Saburo Sakai, who although badly wounded several months

Chapter Notes—17 and 18 later, survived the war as Japan’s top scoring ace. W-12 was his 12th victory. 53. “After Action Report of Sergeant-Pilot A.J. de Bij.” Provided courtesy of Prudent Staal, January 31, 2014, w w w. d utc hfl e e t . n e t / s h ow thre a d . php/12570-Nederlands-Kruiser-Vlieg tuigen. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Apparently these were primarily unarmed RAF ground personnel and members of AA units which had escaped the Japanese invasion. 57. Bosscher, Volume 2, 250–51. 58. Bosscher, Volume 2, 251. 59. Gill, 1939–42, 576. 60. Bosscher, Volume 2, 251. 61. Ibid. 62. Gill, 1939–42, 576. 63. Gill, 1939–42, 578. 64. Bosscher, Volume 2, 262. 65. Helfrich, Volume 1, 356. 66. Ibid. 67. This force consisted of a company from the 12th Infantry Battalion reinforced by a machine gun platoon from the 9th Infantry Battalion. Boer, 91. 68. Kimenai, “Torpedobootjagers van de Admiralen-klasse: Hr. Ms. Van Nes.” www. go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 1906/ Tor pedobootjagers- van- de- Admiralenklasse.htm?page=6. 69. Bosscher, Volume 2, 552, note 108 and Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader. nl/ Lagaaij/ Verhalen/ hr_ ms_ van_ nes. htm. 70. Bezemer, Volume 1, 700. 71. Bezemer, Volume 1, 700. 72. Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader.nl/ Lagaaij/Verhalen/hr_ms_van_nes.htm. 73. Womack, 107. 74. Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader.nl/ Lagaaij/Verhalen/hr_ms_van_nes.htm. 75. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 199. 76. Bezemer, Volume 1, 700. 77. Womack, 107. 78. Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader.nl/ Lagaaij/Verhalen/hr_ms_van_nes.htm. 79. Bezemer, Volume 1, 700. 80. Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader.nl/ Lagaaij/Verhalen/hr_ms_van_nes.htm. 81. It appears that the carrier aircraft arrived as Van Nes was sunk, so they attacked the burning hulk of Van Ghent which was bombed around 1500. 82. Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader. nl/ Lagaaij/ Verhalen/ hr_ ms_ van_ nes. htm. 83. Kimenai, “Torpedobootjagers van de Admiralen-klasse: Hr. Ms. Van Nes.” www. go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 1906/ Torpedobootjagers-van-de-Admiralenklasse.htm?page=6. 84. Rank unknown. 85. Lagaay, “Ondergang van Hr Ms Van Nes in de Java zee.” www.rvader. nl/ Lagaaij/ Verhalen/ hr_ ms_ van_ nes. htm. 86. Another Dutch source lists 55 survivors. 87. Only a handful of the machine gunners from the 9th Infantry Battalion

were lost. However, approximately 70 troops from the 12th Infantry Battalion were lost. However, many were badly shell-shocked after the attack and only a handful could be immediately returned to duty. Boer, 91–92. 88. Virtually every Allied commander who spent time in Tjilatjap during the East Indies campaign was constantly in fear of air attack on the port. However, the Japanese were out of range of the port until the first week of March.

Chapter 17 1. Churchill, 119. 2. Here again, one must be wary of how Admiral Hart’s biographer paints the scenario. Leutze (p. 275) portrays van Mook’s visit to the United States as a dedicated effort to remove Hart from command of ABDA-FLOAT. In reality, van Mook focused on attempting to secure greater and faster military aid for the East Indies. Hart was discussed, but only as part of the overall conversation. 3. Helfrich, Volume 1, 345. 4. Leutze, 274. 5. Leutze, 275. 6. Helfrich, Volume 1, 345. 7. Leutze, 276. 8. Leutze, 277. 9. Tolley, 189. 10. Mullin, 167. 11. Alford, 123. 12. Mullin, 167. 13. Cox, 204. 14. It was to this meeting which Admiral Doorman flew aboard W-12. 15. Mullin, 167–68. 16. Toland, 220. 17. Gill, 1939–42, 556. 18. Admiralty Diaries of World War 2, www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF 1941ChinaStation.htm. 19. Helfrich, Volume 1, 345. 20. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 338. 21. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 338–39. 22. Gill, 1939–42, 601–02. 23. Helfrich, Volume 1, 386. 24. Helfrich, Volume 1, 376. 25. Boer, 150. 26. Head of the United States Army Air Corps. 27. Edmonds, 403. 28. Edmonds, 404. 29. Edmonds, 409. 30. Campbell and Lovell, 181.

Chapter 18 1. It has been debated whether Japan would have occupied Portuguese Timor had the Australians and Dutch not landed there first. The occupation of Dutch Timor alone would certainly have accomplished their strategic goals, as the Allies did not have use of Portuguese airfields. While the Allied presence essentially forced Japan to further violate Portuguese neutrality, there is no guarantee that they would not have occupied the entire island anyway. Japan claimed to respect Portugal’s neutrality. However, they would not guarantee safe

passage through Japanese waters to Portuguese troops en route to Timor after their invasion was complete. Had Japan not invaded Portuguese Timor, the most likely scenario would likely have followed that of their colony in Macau. Although completely surrounded by overwhelming Japanese forces Macau was never formally occupied by Japan and remained nominally under Portuguese rule. A thin veneer of legitimacy was provided by foreign embassies of combatant nations being allowed to remain open and continue flying their respective national flags. That said, the colony had minimal contact with Lisbon and Japanese troops passed through Macau at will without Portuguese protest. Japanese soldiers also had authority to conduct house-to-house searches inside Macau. In retaliation for Portugal allowing American air bases in the Azores Islands, the gunboat Macau was seized and commissioned into the IJN. In short, Japan had de facto control over the colony while being able to claim to the world that it still respected Portuguese neutrality. World War 2 Forums. January 27, 2008. www. ww2f. com/ topic/ 12237- portugal- in- thepacific-in-wwii/. 2. Heavy bombers, such as the B-17 and LB-30 (export versions of the B-24 flown by USAAF forces on Java), could easily make the flight from Australia to Java in a single hop. Short-range fighters, however, were forced to stage through Darwin, Timor and Bali en route to airfields on Eastern Java. 3. X-32 and X-35. 4. Womack, 98. 5. Gill, 1939–1942, 584. 6. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 174. 7. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 174– 75. 8. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 174. 9. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 175. 10. Schultz, 124. 11. Schultz, 125–26. 12. Gill, 1939–1942, 585. 13. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 176. 14. Lieutenant Moorer remained in the USN after the war. He served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1967 to 1970 and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 to 1974. 15. There is some confusion as to Neptuna’s cargo of depth charges. Some sources list it as being 200 tons of depth charges, while others state that she was carrying 200 depth charges. 16. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 179. 17. Edmonds, 356. 18. Bloody Shambles, 180. 19. The Fleet The Gods Forgot, 95. 20. Captain T. Minto, Master of hospital ship Manunda. Gill, 1939– 1942, 592–93. 21. Captain T. Minto. Gill 1939– 1942, 593. 22. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 178, and Gill, 1939–1942, 593. 23. Gill, 1939–1942, 593. 24. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 182. 25. Loane, 73. 26. Allied air fields and other installations on Western Java, including the civilian and naval ports at Tanjoeng

Chapter Notes—19 Priok did not come within range of Japanese bombers until the capture of the P.1 and P.2 airfields on Southern Sumatra in mid February. Even then, the first airstrikes on Western Java did not take place until the last week of February. In contrast, the Japanese bombed Soerabaja on a regular basis beginning with their strike of February 3. 27. The Japanese occasionally struck civilian targets in hope of disrupting ABDA command and control elements that had moved into various commercial buildings, but their primary focus was on the naval and commercial ports. 28. Information on this chart is drawn from Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, and Chronologisch Verslag 8 December 1941–1 Maart 1942. 29. Helfrich, Volume 1, 331 states that this attack comprised of 40 bombers and 20 fighters and that it focused primarily on Morokrembangan. 30. Helfrich, Volume 1, 331. 31. Although Dutch records indicate that an attack took place on this date, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2 (the most modern and authoritative source on the topic), does not support this claim. 32. Helfrich, Volume 1, 331. 33. Ibid. 34. Although Dutch records indicate that an attack took place on this date, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2 (the most modern and authoritative source on the topic), does not support this claim. 35. Helfrich, Volume 1, 331. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. These bombers were from the 23rd Air Flotilla with their escorting Zeros from the Tainan Air Wing. Their primary target on February 19 was Soerabaja, but due to bad weather they instead attacked Bawean Island. The Zeros then left the bombers and continued on to Soerabaja where they engaged a mixed force of American and Dutch fighters over the port. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 210. 39. Although De Ruyter was nearmissed, there was no damage to any other ships or the ME. This was largely because shipboard and land-based AA batteries kept the Japanese bombers above 23,000 feet. Bennink, Night Action in Badoeng Strait. 40. 27 G3M “Nell” bombers on December 10. 41. Chronologisch Verslag 8 December 1941–1 Maart 1942, 84. 42. Helfrich, Volume 1, 332. 43. Ibid. 44. Bosscher, Volume 2, 261. 45. Foote, “The Fall of the Netherlands East Indies.” 46. Van der Pete and Wit, 80. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Van der Pete and Wit, 80 and www.wereldoorlog2.com/index2.php? option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id= 72. 50. Armament: 2 × 280mm, 4 × 150mm, 10 × 75mm, 6 × 40mm, 2 × 37mm and 2 × 12.7mm. 51. Roscoe, 77.

52. Gugliotta, 139. 75. www.e-yearbook.com/yearbooks 53. A young Dutch sailor named / Kansas_ State_ University_ Royal_ Berend van Bon was stationed at SoerPurple_Yearbook/1942/Page_203.html abaja during this attack. In a 2011 teleand personal diary of Lieutenant Boes vision interview he tells of a chance at lanbob.com/lanbob/H-42Auth/BG meeting with a prewar friend who was a 19EO.htm and Dorr, 89. crewman aboard K-VII. Van Bon was as76. Bartsch, 384, note 3. signed to an AA battery at the time and 77. “The SCR-268 was the U.S. his friend tried to convince him to come Army’s first standardized medium-range aboard the submarine because he would mobile radar, which came into service be safer underwater. But van Bon de- with antiaircraft units as early as 1941. clined and several days later his friend Its original primary roles were assisting was killed when K-VII was lost. Flecht searchlight crews in locating approachút Soerabaja yn 1942, Omrop Fryslan ing aircraft and providing aircraft posiTelevyzje 2011, www.youtube.com/ tion information. The SCR-268 rewatch?v=w2qPi1g-bzc. mained a staple of the Antiaircraft 54. On January 22, 1942, the Dutch Artillery and underwent several refineinform the Japanese Ministry of Foreign ments and improvements throughout Affairs via the Swedish embassy in the war. The radar soon plunged older Tokyo of Op ten Noort’s new status as a methods of target location, such as hospital ship. The Japanese Ministry of sound locators, over the precipice of obForeign Affairs and Naval Ministry acsolescence.” www.antiaircraft.org/SCR knowledged this status on February 4. 268.htmillumination. www. kombuispraat. com/ viewtopic. 78. Baldwin Report. php?f=1&t=1849&start=400. The ac79. Williford, 199. knowledgement of OP TEN NOORT’s 80. Williford, 257. status via the Swedish embassy. 81. Unlike the SCR268 which was 55. Visser, “Op ten Noort-Class primarily designed for use with AA Hospitalship.” www.netherlandsnavy. units, the SCR270 was a long- range nl/Noort.htm and www.kombuispraat. early warning system. Although it had a com/ viewtopic. php?f= 1&t= 1849& weight of some 102,000 pounds it was start=400. considered a mobile unit that consisted 56. Shores, Volume 2, 226. of six vehicles. The unit’s range was: 57. www. derbysulzers. com/ shipkotaradja.html. Altitude (feet) 1,000 5,000 20,000 25,000 58. Despite its somewhat misRange (miles) 20 50 100 110 leading name, Queen Olga Rock (aka Karang Queen Olga) is a coral reef in Soerabaja’s Outer Bay. It is http:// www. history. navy. mil/ library/ located just south of Karmal on the is- online/radar-3.htm. land of Madoera. 82. Williford, 194. 59. Spek, Part 1. 83. Williford, 200. 60. Ibid. 84. Baldwin Report. 61. Ibid. 85. Williford, 258–59. 62. It is unclear as to which mine86. Although it does not appear that layer was actually hit; it would seem to they were to operate the Radar units be Ciska, but certain Dutch sources also being delivered to Java, Colonel Arnold list Holland as the damaged ship under was simultaneously preparing to move a the exact same circumstance and on the team of U.S. Army Signal Corps personsame day. nel onto Java. A number of specialists 63. Bosscher, Volume 2, 586, note from the 52nd Signal Service Battalion 65. and 835th Signal Company were in 64. Bakker, 128. transit. But Java fell before they arrived 65. Information on Japanese Activi- and the force was landed in India on ties in the NEI Up to December 1942, March 12. www.kagnewstation.com/ 2–5. earlydays/engstrom/TheEarliestDays. 66. This was the new MTB base in pdf. the northern mouth of the Westwater 87. The Test, 111, and Simmonds Channel; the gun positions were planned and Smith, 31. but never emplaced. 88. Baldwin Report. 67. The gun positions were planned 89. The Test, 111. but never emplaced. 90. A British MRU was exactly what 68. www.overalwagen.com. it sounds like, a smaller, more mobile 69. Military History Section of the version of fixed radar installation. KNIL, Nederlands-Indie Contra Japan, 91. Unlike traditional radar, which Part 1, 225–26. could determine speed, direction and al70. For detailed information on titude, etc, Gun Laying Radar was speDutch attempts to bolster their AA de- cifically designed to determine range, fenses on Java, please see pages 33–35 of azimuth, and elevation of a target. This the author’s text, “The Dutch Naval Air information was then fed to AA batterForce Against Japan: The Defense of the ies. Netherlands East Indies, 1941–1942.” 92. Simmonds and Smith, 30. 71. Winslow, “The Ghost That Died 93. Simmonds and Smith, 31. at Sunda Strait,” 109. 94. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 191. 72. Sergeant Charley Pryor, USMC, 95. Baldwin Report. USS Houston, Schultz, 131. 96. Baldwin Report and Simmonds 73. Don Brain, Seaman 2nd Class, and Smith, 31. USS Houston, Schultz, 131. 97. Ibid. 74. Bartsch, 384, note 3. 98. Located on the north shore of

323 Madoera, Modoeng was approximately 40 miles from Soerabaja. 99. Located on the south shore of Madoera. 100. It appears that all or some of the radar units were operated by RAAF personnel rather than the Dutch military. The Test, 111. 101. In March 1943 Colonel Karl Baldwin, USA, was ordered to determine if the USN had taken proper steps to ensure that the equipment had been destroyed. As Ensign Salisbury was officer in charge of the project he was at substantial risk of censure. Salisbury, who was evacuated from Java with other USN personnel on February 25, could only report that he believed them to have been destroyed. A surviving KNIL signal officer asserted that the radar units had been completely destroyed. But as none of the Dutch or RAAF officers directly in charge of operating the sets on Java had escaped he could only report that the equipment had probably been destroyed. The Japanese would later produce radar units very similar to the SCR268. But since so many units were capture in the Philippines and Java it is impossible to which, if any, the Japanese may have copied. Baldwin Report and The Test, 111. 102. Bosscher, Volume 2, 262. 103. Mark, 47. 104. After the war van der Wel was posthumously awarded the Bronze Lion. On May 3, 1961, the KM launched a minesweeper bearing his name. 105. Mark, 47. 106. Bosscher, Volume 2, 263. 107. Hokke and van Rooij, 1.

Chapter 19 1. Bosscher, Volume 2, 238–39. 2. Helfrich, Volume 1, 350. 3. Gill, 1939–1942, 581. 4. Bosscher, Volume 2, 588, note 98, and Gill, 1939–42, 582. 5. Bosscher, Volume 2, 264, and Spek, Part 2. 6. Spek, Part 2. 7. Bosscher, Volume 2, 264. 8. Spek, Part 2. 9. Edmunds, 366. 10. Edmunds, 365. 11. Martin and Stephenson, 134. 12. Edmunds, 366. 13. Bosscher, Volume 2, 263, and Japanese Monograph No. 66, 8. 14. Japanese Monograph No. 101, 30. 15. Japanese Monograph No. 66, 8. 16. USS Seawolf, War Patrol No: Second/Third. Dates: Dec 1941–Jan 1942/Jan–Feb 1942. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. This was the Native Auxiliary Corps Prajoda, which was largely a ceremonial unit. 22. Bosscher, Volume 2, 263, and Legemaate, 116. 23. Bosscher, Volume 2, 263, and Legemaate, 116. 24. Legemaate, 116.

324 25. Dull, 60. 26. “Report of Action with Japanese Forces in Badung Strait.” 27. Bosscher, Volume 2, 265. 28. Bennink, Night Action in Badoeng Strait. 29. According to the postwar report of Lieutenant (KMR) J. Bennink (Night Action in Badoeng Strait), Java sighted a destroyer with a white band on her funnel to port. This ship was engaged by the cruiser’s 40mm AA guns. In return she took a 5-inch hit amidships which caused light damaged and slightly wounded a crewman. 30. This was likely one of Sasago Maru’s landing craft waiting to be taken aboard. 31. Escadrille Commandant, or Squadron Commander, which was the title most commonly used for RearAdmiral Doorman within the Combined Striking Force. 32. Bosscher, Volume 2, 265. 33. Ibid. 34. It would appear that Sasago Maru was in the process of loading her landing boats when Java opened fire. 35. Bosscher, Volume 2, 265. 36. Japanese ships were not yet equipped with Radar so this was mostly likely her ASDIC or wireless equipment. 37. Bosscher, Volume 2, 589, note 110. 38. By this point not every volley fired by Java was a seven-gun salvo. Due to the ship’s speed and obsolescent design, the number of mounts that could bear on the Japanese ships was quickly reduced as Java passed by. 39. Gill, 1939–1942, 583 and Rohwer and Hummelchen, 123. 40. Bosscher, Volume 2, 589, note 110, and www.combinedfleet.com/as ashi_t.htm. 41. Bosscher, Volume 2, 266. 42. Ibid. 43. Gill, 1939–1942, 583. 44. Various reports state that Sagami Maru was also hit by bombs and torpedoes in the Badoeng Strait. The torpedo damage may come from either John D. Ford, Seawolf or Piet Hein, but the specific damage cannot be verified. 45. Dull, 60, and Java Sea Campaign, 44. 46. Bosscher, Volume 2, 266, 266. 47. Java Sea Campaign, 44. 48. Bosscher, Volume 2, 266, and Bosscher, Volume 2, 589, note 111. 49. All one must do is read the USN destroyer’s post-action reports to see how confused the action was by that point. Both John D. Ford and Pope reported the presence multiple destroyers, light cruisers and transports in various part of the Badoeng Strait, when in reality, they were never faced by more than Asashio and Oshio at any given time. With this in mind, it would appear that they could have easily mistaken Piet Hein for an enemy ship in the darkness and confusion. 50. www.go2war2.nl/artikel/1906/ Torpedobootjagers-van-de-Admiralenklasse.htm?page=7. 51. Slot later recounted this conversation to Lieutenant C.J.M. Kretschmer

Chapter Notes—20 de Wilde in a Japanese prison camp. Slot did not survive his captivity. Bosscher, Volume 2, 590, n116. 52. Kimenai, Peter. “Torpedobootjagers van de Admiralen-klasse: Hr. Ms. Piet Hein.” www. go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 19 0 6/ Torp e dob o otja g ers- van- deAdmiralen-klasse.htm?page=7. 53. Ibid. 54. Klaassen and van het Haaff, 478 and Legemaate, 117. 55. Legemaate, 117. 56. By February 1942 most European civilians had already been evacuated from Bali. All that remained were three male government workers and a single nun who served as a nurse. As the Japanese prepared to land, this group decided to sail to Australia aboard the Zeevaarder, a small sailing yacht with an auxiliary motor. They left Lematang Bay on the east coast of the island on the evening of February 18. Due to engine trouble they were still in the Badoeng Strait on the night of February 19–20 and witnessed the battle. The following morning they came across several groups of survivors from Piet Hein and took them aboard. The total number of men rescued eventually numbered 33, plus the boat’s original crew of four civilians. With so many aboard there was no way Zeevaarder could sail for Australia, so it was decided to make for Banjoewangi on East Java. Later that afternoon they came across the whaleboat which Hein had launched to ferry her seriously wounded ashore. It had been stopped by one of the Japanese destroyers, which took everyone aboard. They left the undamaged boat drifting in the Badoeng Strait where it was found by Zeevaarder. The castaways quickly transferred to the larger whaleboat which had very little fuel. The small supply from Zeevaarder would not last long. There was now a very real danger of the Badoeng Strait’s swift current carrying them out to the open expanses of the Indian Ocean. Then, almost miraculously, they came across a drum of aviation gas drifting in the water. It was from a fuel depot ashore (most likely at Den Passar Airfield) and had been rolled into the water to prevent its capture by the Japanese. When mixed with oil the whaleboat’s engine could be started. Within several days the whaleboat safely reached Banjoewangi. Ten of Piet Hein’s remaining survivors were later rescued by Oshio; others came ashore on Bali. Most landed on the small island of Noesa Penida in the Badoeng Strait. Bosscher, Volume 2, 266–67, and www.indischhistorisch.nl/ tweede/ familieverhalen/ familiever halen- tussen- agoeng- en- gedeh- levens beschrijving-g-a-schotel-1904-1983–2/. 57. Dull, 61. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Dull, 62. 61. Kimenai, “Lichte kruisers van de Tromp-klasse: Hr. Ms. Tromp (deel 1).” www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2272/Lichtekruisers-van-de-Tromp-klasse.htm?page =3. 62. Bosscher, Volume 2, 268.

63. de Rue, www.veteranen-online. nl/wom/badung.htm. 64. Ibid. 65. Bosscher, Volume 2, 268. 66. www.combinedfleet.com/oshio_ t.htm. 67. Legemaate, 117. 68. Kimenai, “Lichte kruisers van de Tromp-klasse: Hr. Ms. Tromp (deel 1).” www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2272/Lichtekruisers-van-de-Tromp-klasse.htm?page =3. 69. Dull, 63. 70. Spek, Part 2. 71. Ibid. 72. Spek, Part 3. 73. “Report of Action with Japanese Forces in Badung Strait.” 74. Because the low profile of the MTBs allowed a poor field of vision, they were able to see little else. 75. Bosscher, Volume 2, 269; de Rue’s war diary states seven bombers attacked Tromp. 76. Bennink, Night Action in Badoeng Strait; Mark, 136; and Kimenai, “Nederlandse Torpedomotorboten en Onderzeebootjagers.” www.go2war2. nl/artikel/3033/Nederlandse-torpedo motorboten.htm?page=9. 77. Bennink, Night Action in Badoeng Strait. 78. Kimenai, “Lichte kruisers van de Tromp-klasse: Hr. Ms. Tromp (deel 1).” www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2272/Lichtekruisers-van-de-Tromp-klasse.htm?page =3. In his postwar diary, Seaman de Rue puts the number at 24 dead and 11 wounded. 79. Ibid. 80. The ship also carried out a number of wounded men. 81. During the day of February 20, Lieutenant-Commander Warder made a routine periscope observation and spotted four men in a rubber raft wearing lifejackets. Neither their identity nor nationality could be determined. Two of the occupants rowed with paddles and the raft quickly passed. Warder made no effort to rescue them since it was daylight and there was extensive air activity overhead; any attempt to surface would have risked immediate attack from both Allied and Japanese aircraft. However, it is safe to assume that these were crewmen from Piet Hein as she was the only ship sunk in the Badoeng Strait during the prior night’s battle. 82. Spek, Part 3. 83. Legemaate, 117. 84. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 212– 13. 85. USS Seawolf, War Patrol No: Second/Third. Dates: Dec 1941–Jan 1942/Jan–Feb 1942. 86. Only in 1940–41 had the KNIL been organized into a “modern” military force, the goal of which was to fight a foreign invader. Since 1927 maintenance of internal order had been the primary consideration and the KNIL had been organized for this purpose. In this regard, it was largely organized into “brigades” of 15–18 men that were deployed in the bush to “show the flag” and maintain civil order. Multiple brigades were brought together as needed to form larger units. Typical weapons were car-

bines, short swords and light machine guns; there were no organic heavy weapons or artillery. Nor was there extensive training in regards to large unit maneuver, either offensively or defensively. Newly reorganized units were based on the much more contemporary “triangular” structure with the regiment, comprised of three battalions, being the primary unit. In most cases, a company consisted of three infantry companies, a heavy weapons company and ancillary units. They were called “Java Companies” as most were still based on Java. The exceptions were those units which had been deployed to Tarakan and Balikpapan. Even then, many “Java” units were under-strength in terms of heavy weapons, anti-tank weapons and artillery. Motorized transport was also lacking. Equipment had been ordered from the United States but had not yet arrived. Nor were many units trained in battlefield maneuver at anything beyond the company level. As a result, trying to get a force organized and ready for a counter-attack on Bali in a short time was all but impossible. 87. Bosscher, Volume 2, 271. 88. Bosscher, Volume 2, 593, note 157. 89. Bosscher, Volume 2, 271. 90. Most likely due to Banckert being put out of action at the last minute. 91. Wigmore, 489. 92. Wigmore, 475. 93. Ibid.

Chapter 20 1. Although attached to the 4th Cruiser Squadron, Chokai operated with the 7th Cruiser Squadron during the Palembang operation. She touched bottom on a reef off Cape St. Jacques, Indochina, on February 22 and flooded several bulge compartments. The damage forced her back to Singapore with the destroyer Ayanami in escort. She was in drydock at Seletar Naval Base until March 9. www.combinedfleet.com/ chokai_t.htm. 2. Gill, 1939–1942, 599. 3. Gill, 1939–1942, 597. 4. Gill, 1939–1942, 598, and Rohwer and Hummelchen, 123. 5. Blair, 183. 6. Ibid. 7. Dull, 78. 8. Ibid. 9. Hara, 73. 10. Thomas, 162. 11. Otto, “K-X.” www.dutchsubma rines.com/boats/boat_kx.htm. 12. The www.DutchSubmarines. com website is unclear in this regard. It states that K- XIV made an attack on February 22 and was forced back into the ME for repairs. But just three days later it states that K-XIV was patrolling off Banka Island. 13. Tarempah Island in the Anambas. 14. Wegduiken…!, 376. 15. Discovery Bank was a light station triangularly located in the Java Sea, approximately 65 miles southeast of Bil-

Chapter Notes—21 liton Island and approximately 65 miles southwest of Borneo. 16. Helfrich. Memoires, Volume I. Pages 391–92. 17. Wegduiken…!, 376. 18. Roscoe, 77. 19. Legemaate, 116. 20. Sibutu Passage is an 18-milewide channel which separates Borneo from the Sulu Archipelago; it was the de facto border between the NEI and Philippines. 21. USS Permit, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 22. www.netherlandsnavy. nl message board, Rob Stuart, January 7, 2012. 23. Kindell, “Admiral Diaries of World War 2: Eastern Theater Operations, The Diaries of Admiral Layton, C- in-C, China Station—November 1941 to March 1942.” www. naval-his tory. net/ xDKWD- EF1941ChinaStat ion.htm. 24. www.netherlandsnavy. nl message board, Rob Stuart, January 7, 2012. 25. Kindell and Smith. “British and Other Navies in World War 2: Day-byDay Naval Events, January 1942 (Part 2 of 2) Thursday 15th–Saturday 31st.” www. naval- histor y. net/ xDKWW24201-41JAN02.htm. 26. Helgason, “Allied Warship Commanders: William Donald Aelian King DSO, DSC, RN.” http://uboat.net/al lies/commanders/1423.html. 27. It appears that this rather pugnacious merchant vessel was the 51-ton coaster Se Go, which reported being attacked off Poulo Condore that day. Another medium-sized merchant ship was also sunk by gunfire at the same Trusty was in the area. But since her postaction report for this patrol did not survive the war there are no particulars. 28. Kindell, “Admiral Diaries of World War 2: Eastern Theater Operations, The Diaries of Admiral Layton, C- in-C, China Station—November 1941 to March 1942.” www. navalhistory.net/xDKWD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm. 29. Helfrich, Volume 1, page 382 and Helgason, “Allied Warship Commanders: William Donald Aelian King DSO, DSC, RN.” http:// uboat. net/ allies/commanders/1423.html. 30. http:// naval- history. net/ x DK WD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm and The Independent, October 29, 2012; www. independent. co. uk/ news/ obit uaries/ commander- bill- king- the- lastsurviving-second-world-war-submarinecommander-8229663.html. 31. Helfrich, Volume 1, page 382 and Helgason, “Allied Warship Commanders: Hugh Alfred Vernon Haggard DSO, DSC, RN.” www. uboat. net/ al lies/commanders/1072.html. 32. Helfrich, Volume 1, 249–50. 33. Helfrich, Volume 1, 250. 34. USS Spearfish, War Patrol No: First/Second. Dates: Dec 1941–Jan 1942/Jan 1942/Feb-Mar 1942. 35. Located several hundred miles south of Celebes this was little more than a small island with a navigational beacon. 36. Pryce acknowledged the error in his patrol report, writing, “It is believed

that had I not altered course to the left just before firing to speed up the problem I would have definitely sunk a heavy cruiser. A hero or a pauper on a hairline decision.” Citing mental exhaustion Pryce requested to be relieved of command which was granted when Spearfish returned to Tjilatjap at the end of her patrol. USS Spearfish, War Patrol No: First/Second. Dates: Dec 1941–Jan 1942/Jan 1942/Feb-Mar 1942. 37. Ibid. 38. Although the identity of these ships is uncertain there are four possibilities…. (1) The 16th Cruiser Squadron which Spearfish had attacked the previous day. Although Ashigara and Myoko loitered some 200 miles north of Java in a distant cover role, they almost certainly would have been well beyond her position some 24 hours later. (2) Jintsu and elements of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla which was moving to join the join the Eastern Invasion Convoy about this time. Having sailed from Koepang, the flotilla refueled at Makassar before moving south to join the rest of convoy escort in the Java Sea. (3) The 21st Destroyer Division with Hatsushimo, Nenohi and Wakaba (Hatsuharu had been detached for repairs on January 25 following a collision with Nagara) moving south to take up position off Bali. These ships operated in the Bali Strait between February 28– March 1 to prevent any evacuation or reinforcement of Java via this route. (4) Arashio and Asashio of the 8th Destroyer Division (the division’s other two destroyers, Michisio and Oshio, were undergoing repairs at Makassar following their action in the Badoeng Strait) were also active in and around Madoera Bay during the last week of February/first week of March. They too may have been moving south to take up position. www.combined fleet.com. 39. At this point in the war many Japanese destroyers were much larger and far more heavily armed than the First World War vintage “four stack” destroyers serving with the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. It was not uncommon for them to be erroneously identified as light cruisers due to their size, which appears to be the case in this instance as well. 40. USS Salmon, War Report No: First/Second. Dates: Dec 1941–Feb 1942/Feb-March 1942. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. USS Seal, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 44. There is indication of the identity of this ship or its fate. In his reference text, U.S. Submarine Attacks During World War II, John D. Alden documents the attack but has no further information other than the date and coordinates. All other information has been drawn from Hurd’s report detailing Seal’s second war patrol. 45. Given that this course was on an approximate heading to Bali, one could logically assume that these were ships of the 21st Destroyer Division (Hatsushimo, Nenohi and Wakaba) escort-

ing a supply convoy to their new base on Bali as they moved to take up position in and around the Bali Strait. 46. Alden, 5 and USS Seal, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 47. As with Seal’s earlier attack that morning, this encounter is also documented in U.S. Submarine Attacks of World War II, but contains no information other than the date and coordinates. 48. The identity of these ships is unknown. From the position given they could easily be elements of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla as it moved to either refuel at Makassar or join invasion convoy escort. But one must be skeptical that Jintsu would only be operating with only two of her destroyers at this point. Unless certain ships were left behind to deal with Allied submarines detected along the way there is no good explanation why Jintsu would only be in company of two destroyers. So again, one must wonder if Lieutenant-Commander Hurd mistook a large Japanese destroyer for a light cruiser. The only other option would be the light cruiser Kinu which sailed from Staring Bay (south of Makassar) on Celebes on February 24 as part of a convoy escort. The CombinedFleet.com website states that she was escorting a convoy but does not specify which one. The main body of the Java invasion force never put into any of the ports on Celebes during the voyage to Java in late February. Kinu joined the Eastern Invasion Convoy in the Java Sea at some point, but her movements are unclear. 49. USS Seal, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 50. Ibid. 51. USS Saury, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 52. There were no Japanese submarines in the Java Sea at this time. It was just as likely another Allied boat or a whale, if it existed at all. 53. USS Saury, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Blair, 184. 57. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 58. Ibid. 59. The engine order telegraph was a communications device on the bridge of a ship or submarine used to convey changes in speed to the engine room. 60. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 61. A small reef with a navigational beacon on the northeast tip of Java. 62. USS S-41, War Patrol No: First/Second/Third. Dates: Dec 1941– Jan 1942/Feb–March 1942/May–Jun 1942. 63. Bosscher, Volume 2, 305. 64. Otto, “K-VIII.” www.dutchsub marines.com/boats/boat_kviii.htm. 65. Otto, “K-IX.” www.dutchsub marines.com/boats/boat_kix.htm. 66. Otto, www.dutchsubmarines. com/boats/boat_kx.htm. 67. Vromans, Part 3, Page 5. 68. Vromans, Part 3, Page 8. 69. Bosscher, Volume 2, 306.

325 70. Mededelingen van de Marine Staff, 128 and Bosscher, Volume 2, 306. 71. Vromans, Part 3, Page 6. 72. Mededelingen van de Marine Staff, 127. 73. Ibid. 74. Brown, “Extracts from the Diary of Telegraphist.” www.rnsubs.co.uk/ crew/biographies/extracts.php. 75. Helgason, “Allied Warship Commanders: Hugh Alfred Vernon Haggard DSO, DSC, RN.” www. uboat. net/ al lies/commanders/1072.html. 76. Ibid. 77. Helfrich, Volume 1, Page 382. 78. Kindell, “Admiral Diaries of World War 2: Eastern Theater Operations, The Diaries of Admiral Layton, C- in-C, China Station—November 1941 to March 1942.” www. naval-his tory. net/ xDKWD- EF1941ChinaStat ion.htm. 79. This is not to say that they do not exist, only that they have yet to present themselves. 80. Helfrich, Volume 1, Page 382. 81. This is not to say that they do not exist, only that they have yet to present themselves. 82. The Inter-Allied leadership command located in Washington, D.C., and London that dictated strategy for the ABDA command on Java. 83. Kindell, “Admiral Diaries of World War 2: Eastern Theater Operations, The Diaries of Admiral Layton, C- in-C, China Station—November 1941 to March 1942.” www. naval-his tory. net/ xDKWD- EF1941ChinaStat ion.htm.

Chapter 21 1. Dull, 75. 2. Messimer, 93. 3. Personal correspondence with Jan Visser, February 15, 2010. 4. Also known as distillate oil, this is a byproduct of crude shale after gasoline and kerosene have been distilled. It is too heavy for use as a common burning fuel, yet too fluid for lubricating applications. “The following fuel types for diesel engines from lightest to heaviest: Stove Oil, Solar Oil, Gas Oil, Distillate, Fuel Oil, Diesel Oil, Desulpherized Fuel Oil, Crude Oil, and Tops … it cannot be classed among the desirable fuels and should be used only where frequent starting and stopping are usual, such as in a Diesel-engined tug. Serious preignitions are of frequent occurrence with this fuel.” Oil Engines by Lacey H. Morrison. In the East Indies solar fuel was primarily used as an additive for enriching gas during the production process. Although it was likely pumped into the bunkers of small vessels, such as tugs, it almost certainly would not have been commonly used in the oil-rich archipelago when standard types of fuel oil were readily available prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War. 5. Morison, Volume 3, 330. 6. Morison, Volume 3, 331. 7. Messimer, 93–94. 8. Perth had recently completed a major refit in November 1941 and then

326 conducted a series of shakedown and convoy cruises to New Caledonia and New Guinea. After much prodding by the United States, the Australian Parliament approved her deployment to the East Indies in February 1942. Gill, 1939–1942, 553 and Royal Australian Navy. “HMAS Perth (I).” www. navy. gov.au/hmas-perth-i. 9. Australian Government Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, 268, Section 20–33. 10. Banckert lay in Tandjoeng Perak when she was heavily damaged by multiple near-misses during a Japanese air attack on February 24. She entered the ME’s 3,000 ton drydock for repairs but was hit again on February 28, which damaged the stern. Van Ghent and Van Nes had been lost in the Stolze Strait and Karimata Strait, respectively. Piet Hein had been lost in the Badoeng Strait. 11. With so many ships being put back into service immediately prior to the outbreak of war there was a shortage of gunners in the surface fleet. 12. Roelse, “De Vergeten Ondergang van Hr.Ms. Evertsen.” http://members. casema.nl/roelse/Evertsen.htm. 13. Aboard ship, the hotwell is a receptacle for hot water drawn from the condenser by the air pump. This water is returned to the boiler, being drawn from the hot well by the feed pump. 14. Both ships were designed at the same time as Java, but were inferior in both displacement and main armament; the British ships did carry 12 × 21-inch torpedo tubes but were still considered suitable for only convoy and patrol duty. Although laid down at the same time, Danae and Dragon were seven to eight years older than Java, which did not enter service until 1925 due to construction delays caused by material shortages during the First World War. They were probably more akin to Japan’s Jintsu class light cruisers in displacement and main armament, although the Jintsu were also 10 years newer. 15. Helfrich, Memories, Volume I. 386. 16. The Princess Irene Brigade was a Royal Netherlands Army unit formed in England from Dutch soldiers who escaped the German invasion of Holland. It was supplemented by civilian volunteers living abroad or who later made their way to England from occupied Europe. Although small, the detachment aboard Columbia was considered to be an “advance force” for the brigade which the Dutch government eventually planned to transfer to the East Indies in its entirety. Helfrich, Memoires, Volume II, 39. 17. On December 12–13, 1941, while attached to the RN’s 4th Destroyer Flotilla, Isaac Sweers had taken part in a night action that sank the Italian light cruisers Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano off Cape Bon, Tunisia. 18. Ibid. 19. In addition to the fighter group personnel, the convoy carried ground crews for the 7th Bombardment Group, 45th Air Base Group and 51st Air Base

Chapter Notes—22 Group along with various other service units. Edmonds, 416. 20. Messimer, Pawns of War, 18–21. 21. Messimer, Pawns of War, 23. 22. Edmonds, 402. 23. Gill, Pages 601–02. 24. Messimer, Pawns of War, 28. 25. Gill, 601–02. 26. A large, enclosed bay just south of Kendari. 27. Gill, 605–06. 28. Rohwer, 148. 29. Ibid. 30. A small passage in the Lesser Soenda Islands separating Alor and Timor and Islands. 31. The 21st Destroyer Division also included Hatsuharu. But on January 25 she was damaged in a collision with the light cruiser Nagara and was escorted by Nenohi to Davao for repairs four days later. As a result Hatsuharu missed the remainder of the NEI campaign. www. combinedfleet.com/hatsuh_t.htm. 32. Lettens, “Jan van Amstel (1942).” www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?180400. 33. Gill, 603. 34. Royal Australian Navy. “HMAS Hobart (I).” www. navy. gov. au/ hmashobart-i. 35. Unless otherwise noted, details of this encounter have been drawn from the article, “Patrol Boat Fight” which originally appeared in All Hands magazine in December 1949. 36. This claim cannot be confirmed in Allied records. 37. The Dutch crew secretly kept the flag for some in their camp after they became prisoners of war. 38. Floor, 26. 39. In fact, not until 2010 and 2011, respectively, would the issue of air cover for the CSF be fully or effectively discussed in English language sources. Even so, there remains a rather pronounced discord between former members of the Royal Netherlands Navy and Royal Netherlands Army, who still disagree on claims that air cover was lacking for Rear-Admiral Doorman in the Java Sea. 40. The Dutch organized and run successor to ABDA-AIR following the dissolution of that command. 41. Boer, 173–74. 42. On February 21. Gill, 600. 43. The KNIL stationed only small coastwatch detachments at most locations along the Java shore. The bulk of their large formations remained some distance inland so that they could instead deploy quickly to the point(s) of greatest need. As it turned out, the KNIL was time and again out-maneuvered by the Japanese. Without effective air cover, long columns of Dutch troops and vehicles were mercilessly pounded by Japanese bombers and fighters before they could get into position. 44. Both De Ruyter and Java normally carried two floatplanes each, but W-12 from De Ruyter had been shot down by Japanese fighters during an air raid. Houston normally carried four planes, but three had previously been lost or were otherwise unavailable to the ship. 45. The author has been informed by several individuals that Dutch naval

doctrine in 1942 did not include the use of ship-board aircraft to spot shell fall during a surface action. Rather, they were utilized exclusively for communications, observation and close-in defense, in much the same way that modern-day helicopters are employed in the A/S role. However, the author has found no formal records to prove or disprove this assertion. 46. Schultz, 138. 47. Kroese, 70. 48. This attack was carried out by 26 “Betty” bombers with the Kanoya Air Group at Makassar with an escort of eight Tainan Air Wing “Zero” fighters from Bali. They bombed through the clouds from high altitude and most of their bombs fell in the water (Boer 174– 75). To avoid the attack, Houston’s last floatplane took refuge in the swamps near Soerabaja. Her pilot was later ordered back to the ME. 49. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 50. www. combinedfleet. com/ asa gum_t.htm, www.combinedfleet.com/ minegu_t.htm and www.combinedfleet. com/natsug_t.htm. 51. Some reports indicate that two platoons (60 to 80 men total) of Japanese troops landed on Bawean that night. The Japanese may have also wanted to occupy the island for use as an advance seaplane base. 52. Roscoe, 82. 53. Ibid. 54. Bosscher, Volume 2, 278. 55. Hara, 74. 56. Boer, 176. 57. Boer, 176. 58. Stummels were large floats attached to both sides of the Dornier’s lower fuselage. They not only stabilized the aircraft on the water, but also served as fuel compartments. 59. Michio and www.combinedfleet. com/haguro_t.htm. 60. Although MLD and PatWing– 10 planes had officially abandoned Morokrembangan in mid–February, the base was still used for maintenance and refueling operations. It was also used as a staging area for reconnaissance missions into and returning from the Java Sea. 61. By that point, all reconnaissance aircraft were under operational control of the Dutch High Command in Bandoeng. 62. Boer, 175. 63. CMR logbook. 64. Van Oosten, 15. 65. Womack, 123. 66. Legemaat, 119. 67. Mullen, 206. 68. Mullen, 205. 69. London Gazette, 6. 70. Sub-Lieutenant Th. Vermeyden. 71. Gregory, “Battle of the Java Sea.” http:// ahoy. tk- jk. net/ macslog/ Battle oftheJavaSeainwhich.html. 72. Once again, it is important to remember that Rear-Admiral Doorman was a former commander of the MLD Squadron in the East Indies. As such, he fully knew and understood the risks of operating in daylight without air cover. 73. Bosscher, Volume 2, 275.

74. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 75. Doorman’s prewar nickname earned in the officer’s club for his ability to drink large quantities of alcohol. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 76. Bosscher, Volume 2, 275. 77. Oosterbaan, “Karel Doorman.” www.charybdis.nl/karel-doorman/. 78. Mullen, 206.

Chapter 22 1. Mullin, 208. 2. Koenraad held the rank of captain at the start of the war and commanded the Soerabaja naval base. However, in early February he was given temporary flag officer rank and ordered to take over day-to-day command of the East Indies Squadron to let Helfrich focus on directing the Allied naval forces. 3. Escadrille Commandant, or Squadron Commander, as Doorman was officially referred to throughout the brief existence of the Combined Striking Force. 4. Van Oosten, 15. 5. Boer, 175. 6. Summary of Air Action, 239. 7. Salecker, 146. 8. Dorr, 96. 9. Lieutenant-Commander F.J.E. Krips. 10. Bosscher, Volume 2, 275. 11. Kroese, 71. 12. Lieutenant-Commander E.N. Parker, commander of Destroyer Division 59, much later stated, “Rear-Admiral Doorman … was a large, serious man. Both [Commander T.H.] Binford [Commander, Destroyer Division 58] and I had operated with the Admiral and knew him fairly well. His English was sufficiently good and permitted him to conduct all conferences in our language; however, I was never sure how much, or how well he understood of what we said.” Mullin, 207. 13. Ibid. 14. Bosscher, Volume 2, 276. 15. Mullin, 207. 16. Kroese, 74. 17. TBD. 18. Mullin, 211–12. 19. Kroese, 74. 20. The Toeban mine field consisted of 100 mines that were laid by Gouden Leeuw on the night of February 26. Van der Horst. 21. Legemaate, 119. 22. Thomas, 156–57. 23. On January 24, 1915, a superior British battlecruiser force surprised a German naval squadron off Dogger Bank in the North Sea. Slower than the battlecruisers she escorted, the armored cruiser SMS Blücher was at the end of the German battle line as it retreated. She was repeatedly hit and came to a stop. In order to save the rest of his force, the German admiral abandoned Blücher and she was quickly pounded into oblivion. 24. Thomas, 157. 25. Kroese, 73. 26. Kroese, 74. 27. Van Waning.

Chapter Notes—23 28. It was not uncommon for Indonesians of all ethnicities in the KNIL to desert in the face of the enemy. Many would remove their uniforms, lay them next to their weapon and simply melt into the surrounding population. Even the predominantly Christian Ambonese, who were widely considered the most loyal of all Indonesians, experienced high levels of desertion. 29. van der Moer, 38. 30. Kroese, 67. 31. Kroese, 70. 32. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 33. Legemaate, 119. 34. During the break prior to Doorman’s rescheduled meeting LieutenantCommander Kroese invited LieutenantCommanders Binford and Parker to his home for drinks. There they met Mrs. Kroese—whom they described as a charming blonde—and their two daughters, age four and six. Mullin, 208. 35. Bosscher, Volume 2, 277. 36. At this point in the war the Allies still believed that they had inflicted significant damage on the Japanese in the Badoeng Strait a week earlier. It was not until well after the war ended that the limited extent of their damage was revealed. 37. Vinckers Report. 38. Bosscher, Volume 2, 277. 39. Legemaate, 120. 40. Ibid. 41. The survivors could not be put ashore and remained aboard De Ruyter. None would survive the looming battle. There may have been another survivor taken aboard Java; she too launched a lifeboat that reportedly took one of the tug’s crew aboard. A civilian was reportedly among the survivors of Java rescued aboard a lifeboat launched as the cruiser sank. There were no other civilians aboard at the time, so this was almost certainly a member of the tug’s crew. Korporaal-Telegrafist F.I. van Esveld. Legemaate, 119–20. 42. Sholar, 1. 43. Vermeyden, 1. 44. Helfrich, Volume I, 398. 45. Vermeyden, 1. 46. “Location Dutch T.M. Boats 3 near Toeban 06-50 S / 112-05 E. 3 near North coast Madoera 06-52 S / 113-20 E.” CMR logbook. 47. The most likely candidates would appear to be Asagumo, Mine gumo and Natsugumo of the 9th Destroyer Squadron, which had landed Japanese troops on Bawean the previous night. 48. Otto, “O-19.” www.dutchsub marines.com/boats/boat_o19.htm. 49. Dorr, 96. 50. Franks, 37. 51. Boer, 178. 52. Vandaarig was a Dutch army rank assigned to an officer recruit who had completed their academy training but had not yet been formally commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant. In the meantime, though, they were accorded all the privileges such a rank would have normally entitled. 53. From the 22nd Air Flotilla at Balikpapan.

54. Whether this was due to malfunctioning radios, range or atmospheric interference is unclear. 55. Bartsch, 294–95, and Boer, 186. 56. Cooper, 1. 57. It appears that there was no contact between Admiral Doorman and JAC regarding orders for all available Allied fighters to provide the CSF with air cover. JAC communicated this directly to Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja, but it remains unclear if Doorman had been notified before the Buffalos arrived overhead. Boer, 186–87. 58. Java Air Command was the Dutch successor following the shut-down of ABDA-AIR. 5th Bomber Command was the formal name of the United States Army Air Corps command structure on Java. 59. Gill, 609. 60. Van Esveld is one hour off, but there were no Japanese air attacks on the CSF that morning so his description can only be the attack of Matthewson’s B-17. 61. Legemaate, 121. 62. Boer, 186–87. 63. Bosscher, Volume 2, 599. 64. Boer, 540, Note 35. 65. Bosscher, Volume 2, 599. 66. Sources vary and put the number of bombs at eight or six. All or most of the bombs dropped by American bombers during the NEI campaign were of Dutch manufacture with their weight listed in kilograms. 67. Boer, 187–88; Dorr, 96; Hara, 75; Salecker, 145–46; Shores, Volume 2, 235; Thomas, 163. 68. Ibid. 69. Bosscher, Volume 2, 279. 70. Ibid. 71. Haguro’s flight detachment consisted of one “Jake” and two “Dave” reconnaissance planes with 30 flight crew and support personnel. “The main duty for the “Jake” was searching, scouting and night flights, while the two- seat “Dave” was responsible for spotting fall of the ship’s gunfire. Both were capable of bombing while the latter could also dogfight. They showed their excellence in the China Incident.” Noriki, 394. 72. Noriki, 396. 73. Ibid. 74. Itoh, 206. 75. Dull, 79. 76. Helfrich, Volume I, 397. 77. Legemaate, 121. 78. Vermeyden, 1. 79. When referencing possible victory in the Battle of the Java historians tend to reference the goal as being one of “total victory.” That meaning RearAdmiral Doorman would first defeat the Eastern Invasion Convoy before moving to next engage the Western Invasion Convoy. In reality, this was level of victory was not necessarily needed. As evidenced by their reluctance to commit large numbers of capital ships in the enclosed confines of the Java Sea, the Japanese were actually quite risk adverse. Thus, Doorman likely would not have needed to destroy the entire Eastern Invasion Convoy. If he had been able to destroy even a quarter or third of its transports he likely would have caused tremendous confusion and uncertainty.

In that case he could very easily have forced it to withdrawal. And in that case, the Japanese almost certainly would have withdrawn the Western Invasion Convoy as well. Allied naval and air reinforcements would have had time to arrive, as would Dutch aircraft on order from the United States. Thus, Java might well have been able to stave off a Japanese invasion for a bit longer. 80. Itoh, 204. 81. Boer, 189. 82. Boer, 186–87 and CMR logbook.

Chapter 23 1. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest.” 2. Bosscher, Volume 2, 278. 3. Even though the Japanese were knocking at the front door, the Dutch were obligated to rest many of their crews. At this point in the campaign MLD air crews flew 15to 18 hour missions daily. With no reserves available, many were near a breaking point in their endurance. The situation had become so bad that the MLD flight surgeon formally recommended that the crews be given leave, which was all but impossible. At the same time, aircraft still required their routine 200-hour and 400hour overhauls to keep them in the air. Thus, the only down-time for many of the MLD flight personnel came when their squadron rotated back to Java for routine maintenance. Even then, some simply transferred to reserve aircraft and went back into the line. 4. Boer, 180. 5. At this point it is unclear if there were any Japanese seaplanes observing the CSF yet. 6. Boer, 188–89. 7. This was the frequency on which Admiral Helfrich’s headquarters in Bandoeng directly communicated with Admiral Doorman and Dutch warships. It was monitored by all KM ships as well as the ME; messages on this frequency were re-broadcast on a regular basis. It also allowed several KM ships to intercept radio traffic between Doorman and Helfrich. 8. Helfrich, Volume I, 400–01. 9. Bax report. 10. Regardless, his lack of information did not stop him from making a series of subsequent caustic observations that did not always jibe with the reality of the situation at hand. 11. Winslow, Ghost, 111. 12. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest.” 13. CMR logbook. 14. Itoh, 206. 15. Ibid. 16. Houston Logbook. 17. Tanaka. 18. Thomas, 165. 19. USS S-37: Report of 4th War Patrol. 20. Ibid. 21. A 25-mile square between the Westwater Channel and Bawean Island with the center being a Latitude of 6-17 South—Longitude 112-10 East. 22. Vermeyden, 2, and Coley, 1.

327 23. Battle Summary 28: Battle of the Java Sea, 22. 24. Coley, 1. 25. Aboard John D. Ford, Lieutenant-Commander Parker erroneously believed that the Allied formation had already entered the minefield when Admiral Doorman turned to intercept the Japanese. He had reviewed maps of the Westwater Channel minefields the previous afternoon and felt that the number of mines was exaggerated although he had no information to the contrary. As a result, he and a British officer in the same meeting concluded that the Dutch could not have possibly had enough mines to cover the area indicated. Mullen, 214. 26. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest.” 27. Coley, 1, and Vermeyden, 2. 28. Franks, 38. 29. Thomas, 171. 30. Legemaate, 121. 31. De Ruyter. USN • Lieutenant Otto Ferdinand Kolb, Junior (formerly Communications Officer, Destroyer Squadron 29; transferred aboard De Ruyter on December 26). • Petty Officer SM1c Marvin Edward Sholar (transferred from Blackhawk with Lieutenant Kolb on December 26). • Petty Officer SM3c Jack Wilber Penhollow (transferred from Marblehead following Battle of Makassar Strait; date unknown). • Seaman 1st Class Daniel Spiro Rafalovich (transferred from Houston; date unknown). RN • Lieutenant W. Arthur Jackson, RNVR. • Horace R.D. Collins, Stores Petty Officer. • Eric Hurst, Ordinary Telegraphist. • Walter H. Sutton, Acting Yeoman of Signals. Java RN • Lieutenant William Gerald Jenkins, RNVR (transferred from HMS Isis). • Leading Telegraphist Albert James Fowler (transferred from HMS Mauritius). Houston KM • Lieutenant Jacob Cornelis van Leur (Dutch government official drafted into KM as communications officer). • Landstorm-Matroos-Seiner Petrus Johannes Alphons Stoopman (a naval reserve seaman). Exeter KM • Sub-Lieutenant Th. Vermeyden. 32. Mullen, 210. 33. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 34. Talk Between Ships; a lowpowered radio communications system that allowed ships to directly communicate with each other at short range. 35. Mullen, 210. 36. Ultra Kort Golf or Ultra Short Wave radio.

328 37. Bosscher, Volume 2, 281. 38. Itoh, 206. 39. Itoh, 207. 40. Thomas, 164–65. 41. Gill, Volume 2, 609. 42. Itoh, 207. 43. Ibid. 44. Itoh, 205. 45. Noriki, 398. 46. Vermeyden, 2. 47. That Allied naval personnel were unable to properly identify a large formation of slow-moving aircraft at 16,000 feet again further demonstrated the lack of prewar training in this area. 48. CMR logbook. 49. Bartsch, 295. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Had Doorman realized that he had air cover he might have delayed sailing from the Westwater Channel long enough to bring his spotter planes back aboard De Ruyter, Java and Houston. 53. Boer, 192–93. 54. Bosscher, Volume 2, 610. 55. Ibid. 56. Kroese, 85. 57. Legemaate, 122. 58. Franks, 38. 59. Kroese, 85. 60. Hara, 77–78. 61. Hara, 78, and Legemaate, 123. 62. Hara, 77–78. 63. Dull, 79. 64. Boer, 190. 65. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest,” and Coley, 2. 66. Coley, 2. 67. Cooper, 2. 68. Bosscher, Volume 2, 282, and Gill, Volume 2, 609. 69. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest,” Cooper, 2, and Park, 2–3.

Chapter 24 1. Cooper, 2. 2. Coley, 2. 3. Vermeyden, 2. 4. Java Sea Campaign, 64. 5. Thomas, 178. 6. Thomas, 180. 7. Schultz, 148–49. 8. Schultz, 149. 9. Coley, 2. 10. Mullin, 215. 11. Masanori, 211. 12. The technique of steering toward the last position of an exploding shell with the assumption that the firing ship would automatically correct its fire, thus resulting in another miss. 13. Masanori, 211. 14. Bosscher, Volume 2, 604. 15. Gill, Volume 2, 610. 16. Bennink. 17. Bennink and Legemaate, 123. 18. Corporal-Machinist Bernawi, Stoker 1st Class J.M. Bookshelf, Seaman-Machinist K.L. Topeé, Stoker 1st Class J.M. Wiedenhof, Sergeant- Machinist P.M.A. Wilders and SergeantMachinist T.A.F. Zijlmans. 19. Coley, 2. 20. Cooper, 2. 21. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest,” 39. 22. Itoh, 209.

Chapter Notes—24 23. Dull, 84, and Vromans, 30. 24. Bosscher, Volume 2, 604, note 284. 25. Dull, 84, and Vromans, 30. 26. Gill, Volume 2, 610. 27. Gill, Volume 2, 611. 28. Ibid. 29. As bad as Allied aircraft recognition skills were, ship recognition skills of Allied pilots were equally abysmal. The “15 destroyers” in this force were, in reality, mostly minesweepers and small patrol boats. 30. Wind: 25–31mph; Waves: 6–8 feet; Fresh freeze; Moderate waves, taking longer form; Many whitecaps; Some spray. Bosscher, Volume 2, 282. 31. Gill, Volume 2, 609. 32. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 238. 33. Shores, Volume 2, 239; Summary of Air Action, Philippines and NEI, 241–42. 34. Bartsch, 296–97. 35. A dive bomber attack on the convoy is also claimed at 1657; this could have been the second attack. Adrian and Stephenson, 140. 36. Bartsch, 296–97. 37. Adrian and Stephenson, 140. 38. Ibid. 39. If Vermeyden was accurate this would have been Nachi at this stage of the battle. 40. Vermeyden, 3. 41. Adrian and Stephenson, 140. 42. Boer, 194–96. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. It would appear that perhaps the Allied AA crews inadvertently provided the Japanese spotter planes with cover by keeping their own fighters away. 46. Thomas, 181. 47. Winslow, Ghost, 225–28. 48. Parker, Page 3. 49. Boer, 194–96. 50. Itoh, 213. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Itoh, 218. 54. Gill, 611. 55. From its infancy as an organized fighting force, the IJN placed great value on torpedoes as an offensive weapon to help offset what would almost certainly be smaller numbers in a potential naval war against the United States. At the same time, night combat was heavily stressed. Every year the IJN sent its ships out to sea for months of rigorous, highly realistic training under combat conditions. The results were closely evaluated so that deficiencies could be addressed

and positive results could be incorporated into the IJN’s operational doctrine. Goldstein & Dillon, 13–16. 56. Itoh, 220. 57. Interrogation of Dutch prisoners later exposed the fallacy of these suspicions. 58. Rear-Admiral Nishimura determined that the problem was either the result of careless firing practices or a defect in the previously flawless Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedo. He wrote in his after action report: “Due to a shallow firing angle, the Type 93 torpedoes exploded soon after being launched. It was unknown how long the torpedoes took to explode, but the number of selfdetonations was many. I recommend investigating this problem as soon as possible.” Itoh, 221. 59. In his postwar report, Vinckers wrote that morale of Java’s crew remained extremely high and they continued to carry out orders with great enthusiasm and maximum effort. The ship maintained a high rate of fire, thanks in part, to the efforts of her black gang, who helped transfer ammunition from the magazines when not needed in the engine room. Vinckers. 60. Cooper, 2. 61. Franks, 39. 62. Itoh, 207–08. 63. Dull, 82. 64. Supplement to London Gazette, July 7, 1948, 3943. 65. http :// www. combinedfleet. com/haguro_t.htm. 66. The entire right-gun crew was killed instantly, while no one on the leftgun was touched. Johns and Kelly, 44– 45. 67. Later investigation revealed that the shell probably did not detonate, but rather broke apart as the complete baseplate and a large portion of the nose were recovered. London Gazette, 6. 68. A superheater is a device used to convert saturated steam or wet steam into dry steam used for power generation or processes. 69. Johns and Kelly, 45. 70. Ibid. 71. Schultz, 151. 72. Vermeyden, 3. 73. Gill, Volume 2, 611. 74. Noriki, 398. 75. Cooper, 2–3. 76. Vermeyden, 3. 77. Thomas, 195. 78. Coley, 3. 79. In contrast, the Allied torpedoes were much smaller with considerably

less destructive power. See below. Campbell, Naval Weapons of War II. 80. Coley, 3. 81. Bosscher, Volume 2, 284. 82. Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest.” 83. Bosscher, Volume 2, 284. 84. Parker, 3. 85. Suddenly, as we were watching the Exeter, we were thrown all in a heap by a terrific explosion. The Kortenaer was laid flat on her starboard side. The unfortunate lookout in the crow’s nest described a wide semi-circle through the air and was thrown into the sea some distance from the ship. I thought those of us on the upper bridge were lost. The upper bridge was surrounded by a high steel wind-screen. It seemed as if the ship would capsize and turn bottom upwards. In that case we would be caught under water between the steel plating of the screen. Luckily the ship remained lying on its side for a moment. We quickly disentangled ourselves from each other, and immediately afterwards the bows of the ship rose up with a heavy sucking sound and the bridge disappeared under water. The spectacle that I then saw I shall never forget. The torpedo, which must have struck us amidships, had broken the Kortenaer in two. The halves stood straight up in the water, the bows here, the stern there, like the twin towers of a cathedral. Survivors climbed up along the steel wire railings. The rudder and two propellers of the Kortenaer stood high out of the water. On the stern the doctor was sitting, dressed in a khaki suit, life-belt and steel helmet. As a result of the explosion, the smoke-apparatus had begun to work and heavy white clouds were rising from the ship. The doctor sat in the midst of it all like some kind of fire god. After a short time the stern turned over on its side, and those still clinging to it jumped hastily into the sea. Soon this half of the Kortenaer sank from sight, but the bows of the ship floated for a long time sticking straight up in the air. The closed portholes created an air cushion of sufficient capacity to carry the weight for a time. After the ship had gone down, a number of rafts, sufficient to support all the survivors, began to float up. We swam or paddled about until we were able to climb onto or had secured a grasp of a rope on one the of the rafts.

Nation

Weapon

Diameter

Length

Weight

Speed/Range

Warhead

Japan

Type 93 “Long Lance”

24 inches

29.63 feet

5,952 lbs

21,900 yards @48–50 knots 35,000 yards @40–42 knots 43,700 yards @ 36–38 knots

1,080 lbs.

Great Britain

Weymouth Mark 9

21 inches

23.10 feet

3,732 lbs

Netherlands

Weymouth

21 inches

23.7 feet

3,638 lbs

United States

Bliss-Leavitt

21 inches

21.43 feet

3,050 lbs

11,000 yards @ 41 knots 15,000 yards @ 35 knots 4,400 yards @ 45 knots 13,100 yards @ 28 knots 16,000 yards @ 26 knots 16,000 yards @ 26 knots 14,000 yards @ 27 knots

810 lbs. 772 lbs. 466 pounds

Chapter Notes—24 The Commander gave orders to tie the rafts together so that we would form a group easily visible to a rescuer. If each raft were thrown about by itself, then we would be scattered over a wide area, and picking us up would be a lengthy job. On the other hand, the ordered concentration made an easy target for Japanese machine gunners should any appear. Our situation was far from comfortable, for much the surface of the water was covered with a heavy film of black fuel oil from the ship’s bunkers. Still, we realized how lucky it was for us that the oil had not caught fire. Most of the survivors were high spirits because of their miraculous escape from death. The younger ones, in particular, were very noisy and boisterous…. The officers gave the order to those who were too noisy to shut up and save their strength. When we had got over the first excitement, we looked round. White and black smoke patches hung over the sea. Guns, invisible to us, boomed in the distance. Suddenly a division of big Japanese destroyers emerged from the gloom. The ships steamed beautifully in formation running at top speed. From their masts the huge war flags of the Rising Sun. The Japs were firing furiously in the direction opposition from where we lay. Salvo followed salvo, but we could not see, on account of the smoke, what target they were firing at. Fortunately they passed us by unnoticed and were therefore not tempted to take a shot at us. As suddenly as they appeared, they were lost in the enshrouding gloom. The sounds of firing grew fainter and, when the smoke lifted, we look over an empty sea. Many of the men on the rafts had swallowed sea water and fuel oil, and with painful noises were trying to get rid of this unwanted ballast. The sun went down, night fell, a full moon rose in the sky. All was now quiet on the rafts. Only an occasional witty remark followed by laughter broke the silence. A native Telegraphist died of his wounds and had to be consigned to the sea. A sailor had a crushed foot and the doctor and sick bay attendant attended to him with what means they had. About midnight we heard the sound of movement on the water. We looked up and suddenly we saw, clearly outlined in the moonlight, the shapes of ships making straight for us. Would we be picked up? The ships loomed nearer, obviously going at top speed. Seen we saw the rising water foaming at the bows. Still they continued on their course directly toward us. But this was getting dangerous! These were not rescuers but monsters which threatened to destroy us. They would run us down in their mad dash and crush us in their furiously churning propellers. We yelled like madmen, not to be picked up but to warn them. And then suddenly we saw that they were our own cruisers racing along in the moon-

light tropical night. Probably they saw us, too, for the leading De Ruyter changed course slightly. As they charged past us, almost touching us, the rafts were turned over and over in the wash. But we cheered and shouted, for there high on the gun turrets we could clearly see our comrades. In noise and turmoil they raced past—the Dutchman, the Australian, the American and last, another Dutchman, four cruisers going at top speed under a tropical moon. I did not know that it could be such an impressive spectacle. While they were speeding past, some Americans on the Houston’s stern dropped a flare. It floated on the water, a dancing flame on the sea. We followed the ships with our eyes until they were out of sight. Sadness filled our hearts. They no longer had destroyer protection and their course was north toward the enemy. “This is the last time we have seen them,” said one of the officers of the Kortenaer as the ships faded from sight. “I hope they smash the ribs of the Japs before they go down themselves,” said a sergeant vindictively, and from the bottom of his heart, he added, “The bastards!” All was quiet again around us. Near us danced the flare. We couldn’t take our eyes off it, for it was like a flame of hope to us. Slowly the hours passed. Then another ship appeared above the horizon. First we saw from the beam. Suddenly the vessel changed course and came straight for us. It was some lonely destroyer or small cruiser, seeming a straggler in this sea of full of action. Perhaps it was Jap that had been damaged and was withdrawing from the scene of battle. We had not been in the water long enough to appreciate being rescued by the enemy to be made prisoners of war. Intently and suspiciously we watched the approaching ship. “An English destroyer,” shouted one of the officers. “It’s the Encounter” shouted another. Cleverly the Commander of the Encounter maneuvered his ship alongside the rafts. Nets were dropped, and all who could climb swarmed monkeylike up the ropes. The wounded and those who were too weak had to be hauled aboard. “Bad luck!” said the British sailors, shaking their heads because we had lost our ship. Poor fellows! The next night the Encounter went down, and there were no Allied ships to pick up her survivors. Early the next morning, February 28, the Encounter handed us over to a Dutch patrol boat in the roadstead of Soerabaja. Rescuers and rescued sealed their friendship with three hearty cheers. After the British funeral service in Kembang Koenig, we buried our fallen comrade. We survivors of the Kortenaer had a picturesque group. We had lost our entire outfits when the ship had gone down, and the clothes we wore were a motley collection from relics in the stores. No detachment of Marines was present to do the last

honors, only his sorrowing shipmates. Several wives of men of the crew were present at the service, partly because they belonged to our ship’s family, and partly because they did not want to be separated from their husbands during their last moments in Soerabaja. The Commander in a few words said that the comrade we were interring had made the highest sacrifice for Queen and Country. In honoring him we were also honoring the other 40 men of the Kortenaer who had been lost when the ship went down. The Commander’s last words were, “Rest in peace, comrade, in Dutch soil.” At the gate of the cemetery we took leave of each other. The Commander shook hands with each of us and expressed the hope that we would meet again in more cheerful circumstances. He thanked us for the willing devoted service which all on board the Kortenaer had given so readily. Then we all went our separate ways. When we returned to the naval barracks, Oedjong, we were told that we were going to be evacuated to Ceylon or Australia.

Kroese, pp. 85–92, and Kroese, De Ondergang van Hr.Ms. Kortenaer. 86. We, however, were hit amidships. At that moment I was on the top bridge, where in my capacity of second gunnery officer I had my alarm post. I grabbed hold of the steel screen in front of me as, after the colossal blow and resulting pillar of water, I felt the ship listing under me. Through the steel windscreen which I was clutching with both hands, I felt how the ship broke. The cracking of the steel plating literally went through all my bones. The lookout in the topmast was flung into the sea in a wide curve. The two halves of the broken ship then stood up vertically. When I was floating in the water, I saw our doctor, still at least ten meters above the water, perched on top of the round stern. For some reason or other the smoke screen apparatus on the stern deck had begun to work, so that the doctor was sitting like some fire god on his altar, with the thick pillar of smoke towering behind him. All this had not taken more than fifteen seconds from the moment the torpedo struck home. Standing side by side like brothers, bow and stern sank into the depths. For hundreds of meters around, the sea was covered with a layer of fuel oil, of which I had swallowed a large gulp when I took an involuntary ducking. Everything which had been lying loose on deck floated to the surface, even the slag from the forge. A few corpses were also drifting around, held up by their life jackets. Covered in oil, we scrambled onto our little rafts, which sank below the surface with so many people on them. One native wireless operator had swallowed so much oil that he was slowly but surely suffocating without our being able to do anything for him. In the meantime, the thundering noise around us appeared to have

329 reached its climax and was now subsiding. We no longer saw any ships as the seas were rather high, which considerably hampered visibility in our position. I looked at my watch and found that the Kortenaer had met her end at 1720 Java Time. The loud reports and short roll of guns continued to fill the air. The fighting had by now been in progress for more than [an] hour; we had not too bad an impression of the first phase of the action…. Our attention was suddenly attracted by a division of Japanese destroyers of a large type with doublebarrelled guns, which came steaming along in column formation as though for a naval review. Close to us they turned, evidently in order to discharge a volley. Again we heard deafening blows and felt violent shocks in the water in which we were immersed up to our chests. We saw how two Japanese destroyers, hit by torpedoes, broke up like Kortenaer and disappeared. The eight destroyers had been reduced to five when they steamed past us once more. Their line plainly showed gaps. A strange silence fell. The sun sank below the horizon, and I felt my hope of being picked up by an Allied ship also sink a little. Ahead of us stretched the night, during which it was certain no one would find us; and tomorrow, of course, the landing on Java would take place. Once that had begun, the Battle of the Java Sea would have come to an end, and the Java Sea would be a Japanese waterway. To be taken prisoner seem to us at that moment worse than death…. The night seemed endless to me, and goodness only knew how many were to follow. I decided to avoid all thought of the immediate future. Night fell, but not darkness. For there was full moon… The stokers began to tell how they escaped from the engine room and landed in the water from the foreship in its vertical position. One of the men had even managed to make a getaway from the magazine in the stern. He had crawled through a long shaft during the few seconds after the ship broke apart, while it was horizontal. His mates had been injured by falling ammunition and were unable to escape. Hours passed. My stomach had calmed down at last. The sea had washed away the layer of oil which surrounded us. The small rafts had assembled and huddled together. Some of the wounded were given drinking water from a flask. Each of these events was discussed, and treated as though nothing else mattered. But somehow time passed, be it at a snail’s pace. As my watch was still going, I had become the informant for the impatient. I had just told them for a change that it was just past 11pm when, from one of the rafts on the outside, a ship was announced with a wild cry. A silhouette, rapidly growing in size, loomed up in the south. It changed gradually from grayish-black

330 to silvery-grey. Thanks to the bright moonlight, it soon took shape. The ship was moving at exceedingly high speed; there was no doubt about that. Suddenly she was unanimously recognized as the De Ruyter. Soon we spotted the other cruisers—Houston, Perth and Java, following behind the flagship as resolutely as ever. The Exeter had dropped out and not a single destroyer escorted them. From the stars I could tell that the course was NNW. They were once more steaming to meet the enemy. It was an unforgettable sight, those beautiful cruisers, at full speed, glittering with the silvery light of the moon, the Dutchmen, the American, the Australian, and another Dutchman. There were coming straight at us, and nearly passed over our heads. The rafts turned over and over, but even all the sea water we swallowed could not drown our shouts. We saw people walking on deck. They went by at such close range that the first three sped past us on one side and the Java on the other. I even though that on the deck of Java I could make out the figure of a contemporary, in white shorts. The wake of the ship made us turn another somersault. When I was able to see, the line of cruisers had merged once more into a black mass on the horizon One of the cruisers [Houston] had thrown out a large flare, and half an hour later the destroyer Encounter, guided by this light, came and picked us up. They gave us whisky, but were careful to add no soda, so as to warm us and remove the taste of seawater. We were laughing again, became voluble, and decided it had not been our turn on the list this time.

Lieutenant J.A.N. Heurn, 2nd Gunnery Officer, Hr.Ms. Kortenaer. Franks, 39–42. 87. Reasons for this reluctance are unclear, but one must presume that they were unable to swim. 88. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 89. Kortenaer would not be seen again for 62 years when a team of divers inadvertently located her bow section in August 2004. Her identity, although strongly suspected, was not confirmed for another six weeks when a second expedition located her shattered stern. Kortenaer lies 172 feet below the surface; her bow section lies bottom up, with the stern 100 to 130 feet distant on its starboard side. Courtesy Kevin Dunlay, www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/Hr Ms/kortenaer.html. 90. Two of the injured would later die, leaving the total number of survivors at 113. 91. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 92. Kroese, De Ondergang van Hr. Ms. Kortenaer. 93. Bennink. 94. Cooper, 3. 95. “Several torpedoes exploded around us, having reached the end of their runs. I saw one pass under the ship.” Moer, “He Who Sees First Lives Longest.”

Chapter Notes—25 96. Franks, 39. 97. Ibid.

Chapter 25 1. Coley, 3; Sholar, 2 and Combat Narratives: The Java Sea Campaign, 69. 2. Bosscher, Volume 2, 608. 3. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 4. Bosscher, Volume 2, 606. 5. Bosscher, Volume 2, 284–85. 6. Coley, 3. 7. Bosscher, Volume 2, 606. 8. The CMR received this signal at 1810. Based on air reconnaissance, initial Japanese strength had been pegged at just three cruisers and six destroyers. This was likely based on reports that sighted individual Japanese formations sailing alone as they moved to link up. Thus, KM Headquarters initially felt Doorman had good chance of success; but as reports of additional Japanese ships came in the odds quickly turned against him. The staff hoped to hear that the CSF had engaged the transports, but all they got was bad news about Exeter, Witte de With and Kortenaer. 9. Bosscher, Volume 2, 606. 10. However, it appears that Doorman was still able to easily communicate with the Dutch ships with little or no problem via shortwave radio. 11. Gill, Volume 2, 612–13. 12. Perth engaged the spotter planes at this time, but was unable to do anything more than keep them at a safe distance. 13. Gill, Volume 2, 612–13. 14. Cooper, 3. 15. Vermeyden, 3. 16. Dull, 86. 17. Dull, 84–85, and Vromans, 29. 18. Bennink. 19. Thomas, 195. 20. Perhaps from De Ruyter as reported by Lieutenant Bennink. 21. Itoh, 215. 22. “Huge water columns shot up around the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla when the shells from the enemy main guns hit the water. Our destroyers disappeared under the spray. We thought they were hit. But after the water came down to the surface, the ships were sailing as normal. Their shells hit continuously. Huge red, blue and white water columns covered our smaller vessels.” Itoh, 214. 23. Hara, 81. 24. Although Tokitsukaze was apparently hit with only minor damage and no casualties, Hara’s account must be scrutinized. Most obviously, no ships from the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla closed within 7,700 yards of the CSF during this attack. Yet, by his account, Amatsukaze and the 16th Destroyer Squadron launched their torpedoes at just 6,600 yards. Given his rather melodramatic account of the attack one must also wonder if it was an effort to polish his own post-war image. Nor is there a clear record of Tokitsukaze suffering any damage during the battle. Although the www.navweaps.com website supports her being hit, there is no mention in Senshi Sosho, Vol. 26, the official Japa-

nese historical record that details the Battle of the Java Sea. That said, Senshi Sosho is known for not always being completely accurate. 25. Lacroix and Wells, 432. 26. Dull, 86, and Vromans, 29. 27. Noriki, 398. 28. Dull states that she launched from 21,000 yards, p. 84. 29. Dull, 84, and Vromans, 29. 30. Morison, Volume 3, 351, and Van Oosten, 28. 31. Gill, Volume 2, 613. 32. The enemy fired on them heavily, splashing many water columns around them. The destroyers disappeared momentarily under the water splashes and reappeared. They continued to charge the enemy without hesitation. Their 12.7-cm cannons and machine guns fired uninterruptedly. One minute, two, three and five, they were still sailing straight. Leaving other friendlies who reversed course behind, only two destroyers were advancing into the middle of the enemy, seven minutes, eight now ten minutes. They fired eight torpedoes. At the same time, two enemy destroyers charged us contrary to the other enemy ships. They were ready to battle despite the danger. Laying a smoke screen to protect damaged Exeter, they started a full-out engagement, firing cannons and machine guns at Asagumo and Minegumo. A fierce battle followed among those [four] destroyers. The distance was 3,000 to 5,000 meters. The distance was so close they could hear each other shout. The battle was heated and hard-fought. Asagumo immediately received multiple hits, which caused damages aft and stopped her. Her electrical supply was knocked out and her main batteries couldn’t return fire.

Itoh, 222. 33. Itoh, 222. 34. Thomas, 195. 35. Thomas, 195. 36. Franks, 36. 37. Van Oosten, 25. 38. Itoh, 222. 39. Noriki, 398. 40. Roughly 2–3 miles, which is point-blank range for a naval gunnery duel. 41. Dull, 86. 42. Gill, 1939–1942, 613. 43. Order of Battle, Battle of the Java Sea, 27–28 February 1942. www.nav weaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_ Pacific/ OOB_ WWII_ Java- Sea. htm. Hara, 82 says five KIA. 44. Dull, 86. 45. A telemotor is a hydraulic device which allows movement of the wheel on a ship’s bridge to directly operate the steering gear. 46. Dull, 81. 47. Thomas, 195. 48. Dull, 86. 49. van der Moer, 40. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. www.navweaps.com/index_oob/ OOB_ WWII_ Pacific/ OOB_ WWII_

Java-Sea.htm and www.combinedfleet. com/minegu_t.htm. 54. From Lieutenant van der Moer’s description and the nature of her selfinflicted collateral damage, it would appear that the forward A and B mounts rotated astern and to starboard, which would have put them in very close proximity to the bridge. 55. Virtually all Dutch and English sources lay blame for the warped propeller shaft on the errant depth charge. 56. Van der Moer, 40. 57. The cloth used to cover the deck and reduce heat. 58. Most KM destroyers and small escorts with any A/S equipment at all were equipped with ASDIC. However, Witte de With was one of the few KM ships that had been outfitted with the much more advanced SONAR kit at Singapore prior to the outbreak of war. 59. Bosscher, Volume 2, 286, 607. 60. Order of Battle, Battle of the Java Sea, 36–37. 61. Her chief torpedo officer, who was the ship’s senior surviving officer, later stated, “Electra did not fire torpedoes. Conditions seem fairly favorable from the tubes, but as we were still in communication with the bridge, I thought we were going for bigger game.” Bosscher, Volume 2, 607. 62. Order of Battle, Battle of the Java Sea, 37. 63. Gill, Volume 2, 612. 64. Itoh, 210. 65. “To add to the wild scene, enemy bombers made runs on our destroyers but got no hits.” Alford, 199. 66. Sholar, 2. 67. It is important to realize that at no point during the battle were communications between the Allied ships anywhere near fluid. When Doorman issued a command to counter-attack or make smoke it was not communicated or received instantaneously. It first had to be relayed to the respective liaison teams on board De Ruyter who then translated and signaled the USN destroyers via flag or signal lamp. Orders were received, converted to text and sent to the respective commanders. In this case, Lieutenant-Commander Parker then had to review and further relay them to his subordinates in the form of an official order via TBS. Without the benefit of radio communications from De Ruyter this all took time; even minutes quickly added up. If Doorman sent a rapid series of commands it is easy to see how the flurry of communications could overwhelm the plodding semaphore system. Various American ships appear to have intercepted conflicting orders from De Ruyter, but they could act until receiving an official order from their own unit commander. 68. Coley, 3. 69. Cooper, 3. 70. Order of Battle, Battle of the Java Sea, 37. 71. Vromans, 118. 72. Sholar, 2. 73. Vromans, 118. 74. Helfrich, Volume I, 414–15. 75. Combat Narratives: The Java Sea Campaign, 70.

Chapter Notes—26 76. Coley, 3. 77. Combat Narratives: The Java Sea Campaign, 71–72. 78. Coley, 3. 79. Parker, 4. 80. “Within a few minutes the opening range and poor visibility forced an end to our cruiser gun action as we moved off on a northeasterly course. Our destroyers trailed. “Darkness set in and we followed the main body endeavoring to regain station, and having not the slightest idea as to his [Doorman’s] plans and still only a vague idea to what the enemy was doing.” Combat Narratives: The Java Sea Campaign, 72. 81. Talbot, 5. 82. There has been some confusion about this order and several variations have been reported over the years. In reality, Doorman’s order was initially conveyed as “Follow Me” to the ships of the CSF by Aldis lamp. However, De Ruyter simultaneously hoisted a flag signal, “All Ships, Follow Me.” 83. Because of the explosions around us, we thought Japanese submarines were taking part in the battle. We did not know that the enemy had exceedingly long-range torpedoes, a great number of which had been launched by the surface ships. Because of our high speed, my precious sonar had not played a part so far, but in my capacity as ASW officer, I asked the captain for permission to launch a few depth charges at random. Our telephone system was out of order, so I went down and launched them myself. As we know now, no Japanese submarines were present, so I only disturbed the peace of mind of our own people and the Exeter’s. That ship could make only 15 knots. After the Witte de With slowed down, I put my sonar on.

84. Van der Moer, 40. 85. Ibid. 86. Reality was much different. The explosions of the enemy mines were by our own Type 93 torpedoes’ self-detonations. Furthermore, although we received a scout report of five enemy submarines advancing, submarines were only effective when they could see us through the periscope while submerged. In a night battle they couldn’t use the periscope due to darkness. They would not be a threat if they sailed on the water to join the battle. Even though we sailed toward the island it was still 20 nautical miles away. The damaged and exhausted enemy was sailing just in front of us. Sunset was at 1950 [1820 JST]. For another 40 to 50 minutes, we could only see things in semi-darkness. Considering all of those factors, I thought it very difficult to justify stopping the battle.

Itoh, 223. 87. Bosscher, Volume 2, 287–88. 88. Ibid. 89. Itoh, 223. 90. Gill, Volume 2, 613. 91. 5th Cruiser Squadron battle report. 92. Itoh, 223.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

Minus Minegumo and Asagumo. Morison, Volume 3, 353–54. Bosscher, Volume 2, 287. Itoh, 223. Bosscher, Volume 2, 288.

Chapter 26 1. Boer, 197–98. 2. “45 transports, 3 cruisers, 12 destroyers, course west. 20 miles West of Bawean. Time 1700.” 3. Bosscher, Volume 2, 610. 4. Ibid. 5. Morison, Volume 3, 354. 6. Cooper, 4. 7. Morison, Volume 3, 354. 8. Gill, Volume 2, 613, and Helfrich, Volume I, 417–18. 9. Doorman would not have even needed to operate any aircraft at night. If he had utilized Allied spotter aircraft throughout the daylight segment of the battle he almost certainly would already have had a fresh fix on the convoy’s approximate position. The CSF could have then set course for the transports after breaking off contact instead of searching blindly in the darkness. 10. Bosscher, Volume 2, 610, and Thomas, 205. 11. Noriki, 399. 12. As with most signals sent by De Ruyter during the Battle of the Java Sea, this signal was intercepted by the KM radio station at Soerabaja. 13. Battle of the Java Sea, 42. 14. Hara, 84. 15. Thomas, 205. 16. As I walked to the bridge to report, more than 10 star shells exploded above us. A large water column shot up near the bow. It was much more dangerous on board than in the air. Now I understood how the flight crew on board had felt during the day’s fighting. After finishing my report to the captain, I went to Chief Gunnery Officer Chusa Nakajima and asked, “Did I give you correct gunnery information because most of the fire was near-hits, sir?” He replied, “No, no. Your reporting was very precise. The problem was that the bridge never turned toward the enemy. The range was kept at maximum. The captain was very cautious until we could fire the Type 93 torpedoes. The torpedoes were very explosive and he didn’t want to get hit while we had them on board. I was surprised that the enemy’s 22-cm [sic] cannon fire was very accurate without any reconnaissance aircraft. I thought we might get hit several times. I praised the enemy.” Thanks to the Chief ’s explanation, I finally understood why our fire didn’t hit the enemy ship, only resulting in near-misses.

Noriki, 399. 17. Bosscher, Volume 2, Page 610, and Itoh, 223. 18. Gill, Volume 2, 614. 19. Battle of the Java Sea, 44. 20. Itoh, 223. 21. Boer, 210–11. 22. Schultz, 157–58. 23. Kroese, 81.

24. Schultz, 157–58. 25. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 26. Bosscher, Volume 2, 288. 27. Cooper, 4. 28. Legemaate, 125. 29. The longroom, or wardroom, was a lounge area where the officers could rest, eat, write letters, play games, etc. 30. Legemaate, 125. 31. Boer, 197. 32. CMR logbook. 33. Ibid. 34. Given that De Ruyter no longer had radio contact with the remaining Allied ships, it can be assumed that this signal was passed via Perth. 35. Combat Narratives: The Java Sea Campaign, 73. 36. Cooper, 4. 37. Dutch naval charts were in metric form. In this instance, the 20-meter line indicated a water depth of 20 meters or approximately 65 feet. 38. Battle of the Java Sea, 45. 39. Parker, 5. 40. London Gazette, 2. 41. A submerged sandbank or bar that is not rocky and which has a water depth of 6 fathoms or less. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. U.S. Department of Defense 2005. 42. London Gazette, 2; Schultz, 158, and Winslow, 122. 43. Cooper, 4. 44. Bosscher, Volume 2, 289. 45. Combat Narratives: The Java Sea Campaign, 74. 46. Parker, 5–6. 47. At this point it is unclear as to exactly how Binford is communicating with Admiral Doorman. Binford reported no contact with Doorman or Houston after dark. But presumably this was simply a result of radio silence among the CSF. As De Ruyter had no direct contact with the destroyers, it must be assumed that Houston was retransmitting Doorman’s signals to Binford. 48. Cooper, 4. 49. Obviously the aircraft was Jintsu’s floatplane which circled overhead throughout the night. However, the identity of the sixth warship is unknown. It could have been a simple miscount on the part of the coastguard personal, or perhaps they somehow picked up the presence of Encounter which still trailed some distance behind the cruiser column. 50. CMR logbook. 51. Gill, 1939–42, 614. 52. Bosscher, Volume 2, 290. 53. “About this time an explosion was heard astern, which I believe was the torpedoing of a Dutch or British destroyer.” Sholar, 2. 54. The Argus (Melbourne), March 18, 3. 55. Tully, “Naval Alamo: The Heroic Last Months of the Asiatic Fleet Dec 1941–March 1942.” www.asiaticfleet. com/javasea.html. 56. Ibid. 57. Bosscher, Volume 2, 611. 58. Battle of the Java Sea, 47, and Bosscher, Volume 2, 611.

331 59. London Gazette, 2 and 4. 60. Sholar, 4. 61. Bennink Report. 62. Ibid. 63. Gill, Volume 2, 614. 64. Legemaate, 125. 65. Ibid. 66. Kroese, 85–92. 67. Bosscher, Volume 2, 612. 68. Legemaate, 125. 69. Uitwijken, 50. 70. The reported speed of 12 knots was probably a bit high; based on Japanese reports, the convoy typically moved at speeds in the range of 8 to 10 knots. 71. Bosscher, Volume 2, 290–91. 72. Sholar, 3. 73. Bennink Report. 74. CMR logbook. 75. Bennink Report. 76. Ibid. 77. Some 20 miles to the south, S-37 sighted a series of flares to the north at 2310. At 2325 she again reported heavy gunfire at a bearing of 300 degrees; her War Diary reports their position as 6-41 S, 112-02.05 E. 78. Sholar, 3. 79. Battle of the Java Sea, 48. 80. Itoh, 223–24. 81. Itoh, 224. 82. Ibid. 83. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 84. Sholar’s account is not completely accurate and paints a somewhat heroic picture of Admiral Doorman. However, one must realize that it appeared in 1944 when the war remained in full swing; thus, the need to propagandize certain events was still deemed necessary. 85. Franks, 44. 86. Bosscher, Volume 2, 290–91. 87. In his postwar account Lieutenant-Commander Tanaka clearly confuses the sinking of De Ruyter with Kortenaer earlier that afternoon. 88. Itoh, 224. 89. Mark, 11. 90. Sholar, 3. 91. Battle of the Java Sea, 48. 92. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 93. Bosscher, Volume 2, 291. 94. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 95. Ibid. 96. Bosscher, Volume 2, 291, and Vinckers Report. 97. Vinckers Report. 98. William Gerald Jenkins, Lieutenant, RNVR, or Albert James Fowler, Leading Telegraphist. 99. Bosscher, Volume 2, 614. 100. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 101. Vinckers Report. 102. Mark, 11. 103. Bennink Report. 104. Franks, 44. 105. www. combinedfleet. com/ na chi_t.htm. 106. Bennink Report. 107. Ibid. 108. De Jong, Part IIa: Second Half, 936. 109. Bennink Report. 110. Legemaate, 127.

332 111. When launched in 1936, De Ruyter was the newest ship in the KM. Her designers boasted that she was capable withstanding 3 or 4 torpedo hits. It appears that their claims were at least partially correct. However, they were also based on the ship having a functional damage control network. 112. Engineer J. Hoogenboom, Legemaate, 127. 113. Legemaate, 127. 114. Ibid. 115. Corporal-Telegraphist F.I. van Esveld, Legemaate, 127–28. 116. Bennink Report. 117. Sholar, 4. 118. Legemaate, 127–28. 119. Legemaate, 127. 120. Ibid. 121. Legemaate, 128. 122. Legemaate, 127–28. 123. Ibid. 124. Corporal-Telegraphist F.I. van Esveld, Legemaate, 127–28. 125. Ibid. 126. Rafalovich Testimony. 127. Chariton, “Jack Wilbur Penhollow.” www.ussmarblehead. com/in dex.html. 128. Rafalovich, Penhollow and Sholar were all rescued and survived the war. 129. Royal Navy casualty information provided courtesy of Ron de Bakker, Ontario, Canada. 130. Kroese, 93. 131. Tolstoy, War and Peace. 132. Later still, Gordon was again quoted as saying, “The leadership of your admiral deserves the highest praise. He was brilliant.” However, his after-action report was somewhat more critical: “I could not understand why the Admiral made no attempt to close the range.” Bosscher, Volume 2, 617, note 443. 133. Bosscher, Volume 2, 295. 134. In fairness, there were many “peace time” offers with the same limitations in the USN to start the war. These men were inevitably weeded out and transferred to non-combat duties as the fighting progressed. 135. Noriki, 391. 136. Bosscher, Volume 2, 292.

Chapter 27 1. Hara, 85. 2. It would appear that this signal went through Royal Navy communications channels, for the signal did not reach Rear-Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja for more than three hours. 3. Based on available information, including various sighting reports, it appears that De Ruyter and Java were probably no more than 30 to 40 miles from the convoy when sunk. Likewise, they were no more than 35 miles from Jupiter’s position. 4. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, 268. 5. By eleven o’clock we departed and flew due north from the Westwater Channel. We headed north on a heading that I cannot remember. The decision to take a westerly course was a complete gamble. But behold, I discov-

Chapter Notes—27 ered after some time a large transport fleet, surrounded by cruisers sailing in column and destroyers, all sharply defined as the moon stood at an angle of about 60 degrees above the horizon. Except for the exhaust of the two engines, I was almost invisible in the dark. The convoy consisted of 39 transports of varying size, sailing due north away from Java in double column. It was a complete “hodepodge” of ships, large and small, modern and old, motor and coal-fired. The smaller coalfired ships, especially, were difficult to keep track of due to the pitch black smoke clouds that rose from their long, thin stacks. After making “landfall” on the Java coast I was able to calculate the correct position of the fleet. Unfortunately I have forgotten the correct position, but it must be somewhere southwest of Bawean Island. Our reconnaissance report was then forwarded to RECGROUP in Bandung. Initial contact with the Japanese transport fleet must have been around midnight. Subsequently, I sent position reports very half hour. The mission got easier for us as the silhouettes became more sharply defined against the background. Flying along the so-called dark side—I approached the fleet very closely; so close that I could see people walking on deck. Curiously, we met no antiaircraft from the escorting warships, which remained east of the transport fleet. Possibly they were deployed to intercept Allied ships coming from the east. We maintained our reconnaissance flight all night until sunrise; during that time the composition and direction of the transport fleet did not change.

Flight Officer/1e G.F. Rijnders, RMWO, Letter to Ph.M. Bosscher, March 25, 1986, Bosscher, Volume 2, 615. 6. Ibid. 7. A mountain measuring 2,644 feet, located on the north coast of Java between the small coastal towns of Rembang and Toeban. 8. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). 9. Messimer, In the Hands of Fate, 268. 10. CMR Logbook. 11. Van Waning, 818. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Launched in 1927, Op ten Noort (6,076 tons, 424 × 55 × 22, 15.5 knots. 1,400 passengers) was originally a passenger ship with the KPM line. She was taken over by the KM on December 1, 1941, for conversion into a hospital ship. She entered service in this capacity at Soerabaja on February 14, 1942. In addition to her normal crew Op ten Noort carried 47 physicians, nurses and medical staff. Jordan, 278; Visser, “Op ten Noort.” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/No ort.htm; Budge, “Op Ten Noort, Dutch Hospital Ship.” www.pwencycl.kgbud ge. com/ O/ p/ Op_ Ten_ Noort_ class. htm; Snyder, “Hospital Ship Op ten Noort.” www.ofshipssurgeons.wordpre

ss.com/2011/03/03/hospital-ship-opten-noort. 15. Bax report. 16. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. These pumps had been sent out for repair at the ME’s submarine base but had not been correctly fixed and only worked at 75 percent capacity. 20. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 21. Roscoe, 83. 22. CMR logbook. 23. TM 4 (Rembang), TM 5 (Rembang), TM 7 (Rembang), TM 8 (Rembang/Tg. Awar-Awar), TM 9 (Toeban), TM 10 (Rembang), TM 11 (Rembang), TM 12 (Rembang), TM 15 (Rembang). TM 6 had been taken out service on February 21 following the damage she suffered during the Badoeng Strait operation. Van den Haaft and Klaassen, 517–18. 24. CMR logbook. 25. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 26. Sholar, 3. 27. S-37’s War Diary records the time of surface as 1302. 28. Bennink Report. 29. Clearly this particular naval officer was not the sharpest tool in the shed. The loss of De Ruyter the prior night might have explained Bennink’s presence in an open lifeboat in the Java Sea. 30. Bennink Report. 31. It would appear that this came from a battle between Dutch motor torpedo boats and the convoy escort. 32. Koppen, The Battle of the Java Sea. 33. The convoy consisted of… Main Body (Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita): 56 transports: • 16th Army Headquarters • 2nd Infantry Division • 230th Infantry Regiment (38th Infantry Division) Close Escort (Rear-Admiral Kenzaburo Hara aboard Natori): • 5th Destroyer Flotilla • Natori • 5th Destroyer Squadron (Asakaze, Harukaze, Hatakaze, Matsukaze) • 22nd Destroyer Squadron (Satsuki, Minatsuki, Fumitsukaze, Nagasuki) • 3rd Destroyer Flotilla • Sendai • 11th Destroyer Squadron (Fubuki, Hatsuyuki, Shirayuki) • 12th Destroyer with Squadron (Murakumo, Shirakumo) 9th Base Force: • Yura • Shirataka • 1st Minesweeper Division (W.1, W.2, W.3, W.4) Distant Cover: • 7th Cruiser Squadron (Kumano, Mikuma, Mogami and Suzuya) • 19th Destroyer Squadron (Isonami, Shikinami, Uranami) • 4th Carrier Squadron (Ryujo)

Air Cover: • 22nd Seaplane Carrier Squadron (seaplane carrier Chiyoda/depot ship Kamikawa Maru). • 20th Destroyer Squadron (Amagiri, Asagiri, Yugiri). 34. Gill, 1939–42, 607. 35. Commanding officer of all Commonwealth naval forces still operating in the NEI. 36. This was roughly the same time at which Rear-Admiral Doorman was leading the CSF out of the ME for their first attempt at intercepting the Japanese off Java. 37. Gill, 1939–42, 608. 38. Bosscher, Volume 2, 301. 39. Gill, 1939–42, 608. 40. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 233; Gill, 1939–42, 616; and Rohwer, 126. 41. Ibid. 42. Bosscher, Volume 2, 621, note 496. 43. In reference to note 33, it should be noted that there is a difference between Gill and Helfrich in regards to whose decision it was to send ships of the WSF to join Doorman. But given that Helfrich was in charge of Allied naval forces in the NEI the weight of credibility would seem to weigh on his side. 44. Helfrich, Volume I, 403. 45. In the meantime, Helfrich intended to keep the remaining Allied submarines in the Java Sea to continue the fight while he organized his defenses at Tjilatjap. 46. Whether Palliser truly believed that Danae and Dragon cruisers needed additional protection … or whether he simply sought to move Hobart as far from Java as possible in its final days … is debatable. At this point, the Royal Navy was less than dedicated to the defense of Java, which the British viewed as a lost cause. Their primary desire was to remove to Ceylon and Australia as many ships as possible so to minimize British losses. And finally, based on subsequent British actions, one must ask if Helfrich fully agreed with Hobart’s withdrawal. In his postwar memoirs, Helfrich states that it was his idea to evacuate Hobart. However, the RN had already withdrawn the submarines Truant and Trusty from Dutch control with minimal notice. Thus, one might question if Helfrich merely acquiesced after the RN arbitrarily ordered Captain Howden to make for Ceylon. 47. Helfrich, Volume 1, 403. 48. Gill, 1939–42, 616. 49. Little more than a rock, Toppers Island lay in the northern entrance of the Soenda Strait and contained a key navigational beacon. 50. Hundreds of Commonwealth soldiers had been trapped in northern Malaya when Japanese forces encircled and trapped them behind enemy lines; many crossed over the Malacca Strait to join the Dutch forces on Sumatra. Many more soldiers, sailors and civilians were shipwrecked or otherwise force-landed on the shores of Sumatra during the evacuation of Singapore. Most found their way to Padang ; although it was under constant threat of Japanese attack

Chapter Notes—28 and considered extremely dangerous for Allied shipping, Howden’s force represented the only hope of evacuation for those trapped at the port. 51. Gill, 1939–42, 616–17. 52. Gill, 1939–42, 617. 53. Although not suggested in any British or Dutch records, there exists the possibility that Howden remained in the area later than planned in order to try to re-establish contact with Evertsen. 54. Gill, 1939–42, 617. 55. Bosscher, Volume 2, 621, note 496. 56. Noordwachter, or North Guard, is a small island 75 miles northwest of Tandjoeng Priok with a lighthouse marking the sea lane from the Banka Strait to Batavia. 57. Bosscher, Volume 2, 621, note 496. 58. Bosscher, Volume 2, 300. 59. Gill, 1939–42, 617. 60. Anking was a former China Navigation Company cargo ship requisitioned by the Royal Navy in 1941. She was commissioned as a depot ship and later transferred to Tandjoeng Priok where she served as the primary communications hub for Commonwealth ships operating in the East Indies. She was carrying a large number of RN and RAN personnel being evacuated from Java. 61. Gemas was a converted Straits Steamship Company passenger ship that had been requisitioned by the Royal Navy for conversion into an auxiliary patrol boat in late 1939. MMS 51 was a motor minesweeper commissioned in November 1941; 119 × feet, 225 × tons, 12 × knots, 2 × .50 machine guns, 20 crew. 62. Willem van der Zaan was returning to Tjilatjap after having escorted MS Tjitjalengka of the Java- China-Japan Line. The 10,972 ton passenger/cargo vessel was a co-called “Gold Ship” meaning that she carried a portion of the NEI Government’s gold reserves from the Java Bank to Australia for safe-keeping. Tjitjalengka sailed from Tjilatjap on February 27 and put into Melbourne on March 5. The minelayer escorted her part of the way before turning back; on the return trip she was ordered to rendezvous with Langley and escort her into Tjilatjap. Bosscher, Volume 2, 298. 63. MLD, 91. 64. Although there were concerns about the integrity of the KM’s general code, it remains unproven that it was ever compromised. The source of this concern is unknown, although a MLD Do. 24 was lost in a landing accident at Balikpapan at the time of the Japanese landings there. No one knew if the plane’s code books had been destroyed in the crash or possibly recovered by the Japanese. In 1977 Dutch historian J.W.F. Nuboer wrote De Japanse Oorlog Uit Japanse Bron (The Japanese War from Japanese Records), which details Japan’s war efforts using surviving records and other documents. According to Nu boer’s work, these records indicate that Langley was located by a reconnaissance plane instead rather than any cryptology efforts. Bosscher, Volume 2, 298.

65. At the time Willem van der Zaan had just escorted a convoy to Australia. She was en route back to Tjilatjap where the minelayer would undergo light repairs while the crew was given shore leave. These plans were put on hold when she was ordered to rendezvous with Langley and escort her into Tjilatjap. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 96. 66. Normal top speed 15½ knots. 67. De Reconnaissance Group van het Supreme Command—van 10 Januari—1 Maart, 1942, 92. 68. Ibid. 69. Edsall War Diary, 1. 70. Many English language sources infer, or claim outright, that Edsall and Whipple were supposed to be Langley’s original escort from the beginning. Although the captain of Whipple kept no ship’s war diary during the East Indies campaign, the war diaries and after action reports of both Edsall and Langley clearly indicate that the two destroyers were not dispatched to meet Langley until late on the afternoon of February 26. This was after Lieutenant-Commander Küller signaled for assistance. Nor is there any mention of them being prepared to meet Langley any earlier than the morning of February 28. Commander McConnell may have been under the impression that his escort was to consist of Edsall and Whipple from the beginning, but there appears to be no documentation supporting this. 71. It would appear that the Allied high command did not want the tender operating alone in what were considered dangerous waters. This was a very legitimate concern, as multiple Japanese submarines were operating south of Java at the time and had already sunk several Allied merchant ships. Losing several hours’ progress toward Java was apparently deemed acceptable in order for Langley to remain under the escort of Willem van der Zaan until her rendezvous with Edsall and Whipple. 72. At this point, Captain Hudson and his USN counterparts at Tandjoeng Priok (Commander P.S. Slawson) and Soerabaja (Commander J.A. Murphy, Ret.) were making preparations to evacuate Java on the night of February 28–March 1 on the orders of RearAdmiral Glassford (Glassford, 30). In any event, Hudson had no authority to alter the course of Langley. RearAdmiral Glassford had discussed her movements with Vice-Admiral Helfrich in detail on February 27. They discussed the possibility of Langley changing course in order to join Sea Witch so that both ships could together transit the final miles into Tjilatjap under the cover of darkness. This would put them in port on the morning of February 28. However, Helfrich felt that the need for additional fighters on Java outweighed the need for any delays. As he pointed out, there had been no air attacks on Tjilatjap or the south coast of Java up to that point. Thus, Helfrich felt that the risk worth the potential reward. In his after action report, Glassford later wrote:

[Helfrich] even asked me to inform the Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Fleet, that he took full responsibility and intimated that this request that I so inform the Commander-In-Chief, was tantamount to an order. I could not permit him to take this stand alone as I did in fact share completely his views as to the necessity for taking the risk and subscribed full to his decision [32].

As will be seen later, Sea Witch reached Tjilatjap unmolested on the morning of February 28. Had Langley joined her the seaplane tender would almost certainly have survived both the inbound and outbound voyages. Thus, the impending loss of Langley must be laid squarely on the shoulders of ViceAdmiral Helfrich. Rear-Admiral Glassford must also accept blame, for as ranking USN officer on Java, he could have overruled the Dutchman. But he too felt the risk was minimal. 73. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 96. 74. The following day Willem van der Zaan was ordered to make for Colombo where she arrived on March 9. 75. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 233. 76. Pawns of War, 33. 77. Langley was also armed with four 5-inch guns. They were not dualpurpose weapons and could not be elevated, rendering them useless in the AA role. The 3-inch guns were of First World War vintage and could only reach an altitude of 12,000 feet. Their rate of fire was also only four rounds/minute; combined with a complete lack of fire control they were of limited effectiveness. Both Edsall and Whipple were each armed with a single 3-inch AA with similar characteristics. The .50-caliber machine guns were supplemented by a number of .30-caliber Browning Automatic Rifles. However, neither weapon could reach the high- flying bombers and could only be effective against strafing fighters. 78. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 241. 79. MLD, 93. 80. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 96. 81. Pawns of War, 43. 82. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 241. 83. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 96. 84. Gillekens, February 26, 1942. 85. Ibid. 86. Completely ignored by the Japanese bombers and fighters, Edsall and Whipple circled some distance from Langley as the attack played out. Only when the bombers departed did they close again. 87. McConnell Post-Action Report, March 9, 1942. 88. Bosscher, Volume 2, 298–99. 89. This was likely the same formation which had also just attacked Y-71. 90. MLD, 93. 91. Gillekens, February 26, 1942. 92. Pawns of War, 60. 93. Pawns of War, 66.

333 94. Pawns of War, 76–77. 95. Pawns of War, 90. 96. USS Edsall War Diary, 5. 97. Pawns of War, 90–91. 98. USS Edsall War Diary, 5. 99. This operation was seamlessly executed despite the unwelcome arrival of three Bettys which carried out an impromptu attack that caused no damage. 100. Gillekens, February 26, 1942. 101. MLD, 93. 102. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 241. 103. Gillekens, February 26, 1942.

Chapter 28 1. Glassford, 52. 2. Palliser also had orders to report to Helfrich for duty; but as will be seen, British commitment to the defense of Java hung by a thread at this point. 3. By 2400 on February 27 Phoenix was approximately 1,000 miles south of Java at coordinates 14-53 S/94-51 E. Upon handing over the convoy to Enterprise, she was to cruise south of Java along the 10th parallel at 15 knots. If no further instructions had been received by the time she reached 114° her captain was to return to Fremantle, which he eventually did. “War Diary: USS Phoenix from February 1, 1942 To February 28, 1942.” 4. Large numbers of Allied submarines also still remained in East Indies waters and Helfrich intended for them to continue the fight as well. 5. This is the same signal that eventually reached Rear-Admiral Koenraad at Soerabaja via ABDA communications channels some three hours later. 6. Gill, 1939–42, 618. 7. Vice-Admiral Helfrich was either unaware of—or chose to ignore— Rear-Admiral Doorman’s pre-battle orders for any surviving Allied ships to fall back on Tandjoeng Priok. For when he received Captain Waller’s signal indicating his intent to make for Tandjoeng Priok Helfrich expressed surprise, for Exeter, Witte de With and the USN destroyers had put back into Soerabaja. It will be remembered that Doorman had repeated these orders to the USN destroyers when they first put into the ME on the night of February 27–28. Nonetheless, Helfrich claimed that the scattered nature of the remaining Allied ships was a primary reason why he dissolved the CSF on February 28 and ordered all remaining ships to evacuate. However, this claim does not quite jibe with Helfrich’s actions. As late as February 28 he was still ordering Allied surface ships and submarines to concentrate at Tjilatjap for a final battle. Nor had he made any provision for a potential evacuation of Java, so these warships clearly were not intended to cover any withdrawal from Java. And again, Helfrich only ordered the evacuation of Allied ships from Java after the Royal Navy’s withdrawal from the area essentially forced his hand. In his postwar memoirs, Helfrich amended his stance to say that he initially thought the remaining ships could still do damage to the Japanese fleet. But

334 soon realized that USN DDs had no torpedoes left and Exeter could only make 16 knots. Helfrich would later write: Strictly speaking, the return of Perth and Houston was against my order 2055/26: “You must continue attacks till enemy is destroyed.” This signal was intended to make it quite clear that I wanted the CSF to continue action whatever the cost and till the bitter. Perth did receive this signal. Both cruisers were undamaged and it was right to say in anticipation: “It is no use to continue action,’ considering the damage inflicted upon the enemy cruisers, which in my opinion, must have been severe. However, it is possible that other facts had to be considered such as shortage of fuel or ammunition. The decision of Captain Perth is even more regrettable as after both cruisers did meet their end, probably on the night of 28/29 they would have sold their lives at even greater cost to the enemy.

8. Schultz, 163, and Enclosure (a)(11): Engagement Off Soerabaja, February 27, 1942. www.ibiblio.org/ hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CA/ca30. html#Encla10. 9. Boer, 204. 10. Shores, Volume 2, 247. 11. Schultz, 167. 12. Schulz, 166–67. 13. Evertsen dropped anchor at 1400 on February 28, at about the same time as Perth and Houston. Bosscher, Volume 2, 621. 14. “Action Report—USS Houston (CA 30) on the Battle of the Sunda Strait, 28 February 1942.” 15. Winslow, The Ghost that Died at Sunda Strait, 129. 16. “Action Report—USS Houston (CA 30) on the Battle of the Sunda Strait, 28 February 1942.” 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Schultz, 166–67. 20. Gill, 1939–42, 618. 21. Winslow, The Ghost that Died at Sunda Strait, 130. 22. Glassford, 52. 23. Gill, 1939–42, 619. 24. Gill, 1939–42, 619, and Winslow, The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, 131. 25. Schultz, 168. 26. Bosscher, Volume 2, 300. 27. Schultz, 172. 28. Bosscher, Volume 2, 300. 29. Winslow, The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, 130. 30. Bosscher, Volume 2, 300. 31. Bosscher, Volume 2, 621, note 501. 32. The accuracy of Captain Rooks’ final intelligence report received from the Dutch has been widely criticized by historians. It stated that the nearest Japanese ships were 10 hours sailing time from the Soenda Strait when Houston and Perth left Tandjoeng Priok. But upon closer investigation this may not be the case. Houston and Perth sailed from Tandjoeng Priok at 1730; using Evertsen’s departure later that

Chapter Notes—28 night as an example, it took them approximately 45 minutes to clear the port’s minefield at 1815; by 2230, five hours later, they entered the Soenda Strait. Now consider that the Japanese convoy arrived four hours ahead of schedule and suddenly the reconnaissance report indicating 10 hours sailing time received by Captain Rooks does not appear quite so faulty. Had the Japanese kept to their original timetable his reconnaissance report would have been accurate and all three Allied ships would have slipped through the Soenda Strait without incident. 33. Gregory, “The Battle of the Sunda Strait.” http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/ macslog/Tryingtostemthesouthwardt. html. 34. Ibid. 35. The remaining Dutch ships of the Soenda Strait Patrol—Merel and Fazant—also continued to patrol in and around the Soenda Strait. At around 2130 on the night of February 28 Merel sighted gunfire, star shells and searchlights off St. Nicholas as Houston and Perth waged their final battle. Shortly afterwards her radio operator picked up Evertsen’s final signal. Merel’s captain held a ship’s meeting and gave them the option “to break out or remain on station.” The crew elected to remain on-station and Merel continued to patrol Bantam Bay until 0400 on March 2 when a signal from RearAdmiral Koenraad directed her to return to Tandjoeng Priok. Merel entered Tandjoeng Priok at 0830. She was immediately ordered to Padang, but this was almost immediately canceled as the Soenda Strait was full of Japanese ships. Her captain was then ordered to demobilize his crew and send them home. The ship was scuttled on the evening of March 1 in the entrance of the 2nd and 3rd Harbor Basins. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 132. Fazant patrolled off St. Nicholas Point until the evening of February 28 when she too was ordered back into Tandjoeng Priok. She arrived early afternoon of March 1; she was refueled and made ready for sea. However, she was scuttled later that evening. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 133. 36. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine.” www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2506/Gemili tariseerde- schepen- van- de- Gou verne ments-Marine.htm?page=8. 37. Hokke, 115. 38. Bosscher, Volume 2, 263. 39. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 132. 40. www.veteranen-online.nl/infor ma tie/ Gedenkrol%20Koninkl ijke% 20Marine.pdf. 41. Based on Japanese ship movements, the destroyer Harukaze may also have been involved in this firefight as well. Gregory, “The Battle of the Sunda Strait.” http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/ Tryingtostemthesouthwardt.html.

42. Hokke, 116, and Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2506/Gemili tariseerde- schepen- van- de- Gouvern ements-Marine.htm?page=8. 43. www. veteranen- online. nl/ in formatie/ Gedenkrol%20Koninklijke %20Marine.pdf. 44. Reiger’s crew swam or waded ashore in small groups near Merak. They then attempted to reach Batavia but were captured by a Japanese army unit near Serang. Captain van Melle and the ship’s wireless operator swam farther down the coast, but were quickly given up to the Japanese by local Javanese when they came ashore. 45. www. veteranen- online. nl/ in formatie/ G e denkrol%20Konin klijke%20Marine.pdf. 46. Hokke, 117. 47. Again, based on Japanese track charts, the Japanese ship in this part of the bay was most likely Hatakaze or Harukaze. Given that Hatakaze was preoccupied with hunting down Reiger, the aggressor in this case was most likely the latter destroyer. 48. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/arti kel/ 2506/ Gemilitariseerde- schepenvan- de- Gouvernements- Marine. htm? page=9. 49. Armed with a 3-inch cannon and one 7.7mm machine gun, Sirius could have inflicted extensive damage to the Japanese landing barges had Captain Hokke decided to sell his ship more dearly. With the convoy’s escort fully engaged against Houston and Perth the patrol boat could almost certainly have inflicted substantial damage had he harbored a more aggressive mindset. 50. Hokke, 118. 51. Unlike the crew of Reiger, the crew of Sirius had no trouble evading the Japanese who apparently had not yet landed in force. A nearby KNIL unit collected the men and took them to their base. They were then transported to Batavia where they arrived the following day. There, the crews were demobilized and sent home. 52. Given the time (2306) and her heading, it would appear that Harukaze was moving northward to protect the transports after prematurely breaking off her engagement with Sirius (sometime around 2225) in response to a warning raised by Fubuki as to the approach of Houston and Perth. 53. Gill, 1939–42, 619. 54. Gregory, “The Battle of the Sunda Strait.” http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/ macslog/Tryingtostemthesouthwardt. html. 55. Many reports indicate that these rogue torpedoes then plowed into the heart of the anchored transports, damaging or sinking several. However, as will be seen shortly, it now appears that Fubuki was not the culprit. 56. At this point it is unclear if the Allied cruisers were sure of the convoy’s position as they were still some distance

from the transports and apparently made no attempt to fire on the convoy. 57. Gill, 1939–42, 620–21. 58. Gregory, “The Battle of the Sunda Strait.” http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/ macslog/Tryingtostemthesouthwardt. html. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http:// perthone.com/psun.html. 62. Gill, 1939–42, 620–21. 63. www. combinedfleet. com/ har uka_t.htm. 64. www. combinedfleet. com/ shi ray_t.htm. 65. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http://perth one.com/psun.html. 66. Ibid. 67. Schultz, 178. 68. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http:// perthone.com/psun.html. 69. Gill, 1939–42, 620–61. 70. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http:// perthone.com/psun.html. 71. www. combinedfleet. com/ mik uma_t.htm. 72. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http:// perthone.com/psun.html. 73. Ibid. 74. Gill, 1939–42, 620–21. 75. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http:// perthone.com/psun.html. 76. Ibid. 77. Gill, 1939–42, 620–21. 78. Gill, 1939–42, 622. 79. Constable, “Battle of Sunda Strait 28th Feb–1st Mar 1942.” http:// perthone.com/psun.html. 80. Shinsu Maru was the command ship for the Imperial Japanese Army units going ashore. As a result of the torpedo hit Lieutenant- General Hitoshi Imamura, commander of the IJA’s 16th Army, was forced to abandon ship. He spent several hours floating on a raft in the bay until being rescued and brought ashore. 81. www. combinedfleet. com/ shi kin_t.htm. 82. Schultz, 180. 83. Bosscher, Volume 2, 300–301. 84. CMR logbook. 85. Glassford, 54. 86. In fairness to de Vries, Houston and Perth were surrounded by Japanese and fired heavily at anything on which their guns could bear. Had Evertsen approached they just as likely would have fired on her as well without asking questions. 87. Bosscher and Nuboer both believe that this sighting of “seven destroyers” was probably not accurate. They think it unlikely that such a large formation of Japanese ships would be in this part of the strait so soon after their battle with Houston and Perth. 88. Bosscher, Volume 2, 622, note 507. 89. Although launched at about the same time as Evertsen, the Dutch destroyer was equally overmatched by both

Chapter Notes—29 Mirakumo and Shirakumo, which were nearly twice her size and had been fully modernized in 1937–38. 90. Bosscher, Volume 2, 622, note 508. 91. In this kind of circumstance all one needs to do is look at the circumstance of the British battleship Prince of Wales against the German battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in May 1941. Prince of Wales had also been pressed into service with an untrained crew just three months after being launched. After just nine minutes of battle, not only had Prince of Wales been hit repeatedly, but more than half her main battery was out of action due to issues unrelated to combat. 92. Glassford, 54. 93. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette, 7 July 1948. 94. Johns and Kelly, 48. 95. www.network54.com/Forum/ 594514/ message/ 138490 4536/ Pri mary+ source+ showing++ order+ to+ HMS+Exeter; original research courtesy of David Verghese, November 20, 2013. 96. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette, 7 July 1948. 97. Glassford, 55. 98. Conways 1922–46. 99. H.O. No. 163: Sailing Directions for Celebes, Southeast Borneo, Java (except from Java Head to Batavia), and Islands East of Java 1935. 100. Because of its shallow depth the Eastwater Channel could not be navigated by the De Ruyter at any time. Java and Sumatra could pass at high tide, but only at great risk. Helfrich, Volume 1, 68. 101. This is not to imply that simply reaching the Indian Ocean would have guaranteed Exeter’s safety. As the sinking of Langley showed, Japanese bombers could reach targets well out into the Indian Ocean, even if they could not yet reach Tjilatjap itself. Thus, Exeter almost certainly would have experienced some form of air attack even had she successfully transited the Bali Strait. 102. H.O. No. 163: Sailing Directions for Celebes, Southeast Borneo, Java (Except from Java Head to Batavia), and Islands East of Java 1935. 103. “Appendix 9: Management Plan for the Lemuru Fishery in Bali Strait.” ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/ field/ 006/ad656e/AD656E02.pdf. 104. Kevin Denlay, www.network 54.com/Forum/594514/message/1206 299413/Bali+Strait. 105. It is interesting to note that numerous American warships, including the Houston, and transports navigated the Bali Strait throughout the East Indies campaign. However, all traversed during the day and with vessels that had full power available. 106. Numerous sources assert that Witte de With was unable to sail with Exeter because Lieutenant-Commander Schotel had given his crew shore leave following the Battle of the Java Sea. Although unsubstantiated (in fact, not even mentioned) in Dutch records, it is

theoretically possible that this could be a reason for her late departure. Just as likely is the simple fact that Schotel received delayed orders from KM headquarters as was the case with Lieutenant-Commander de Vries aboard Evertsen. 107. Although unknown at the time, the British battleship Prince of Wales had suffered similar damage to one of her propeller shafts when attacked by Japanese bombers on December 10. It vibrated badly and eventually the propeller worked itself loose and separated from the ship completely, further reducing the speed of Prince of Wales. This same possibility had to have been on Lieutenant-Commander Schotel’s mind when he was ordered to escort Exeter out of Soerabaja. 108. Bosscher, Volume 2, 605–6, note 303. 109. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette: 7 July 1948. 110. Alford, 206. 111. Alford, 207. 112. Gill, 1934–42, 622. 113. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette: 7 July 1948. 114. USS Pope War Diary. 115. O’Hara, 59. 116. Gill, 1939–42, 622–23. 117. Alford, 207–08, and USS Pope War Diary. 118. Noriki, 400. 119. Alford, 207–08, and USS Pope War Diary. 120. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette, 7 July 1948. 121. Unlike an electronic fire control system, which automatically computes ranges and angle data to determine firing solutions, a Dumaresq is a mechanical analog fire control instrument used to relate the relative motion of one’s own ship to the target ship’s corresponding range rate and speed. It functions by mechanically implementing a flexible means of illustrating the geometry of two independently moving ships to quickly perceive the other ship’s motion along and across the line of bearing. Buckey, Harley, Jellicoe and Lovell. “Dumaresq.” http://dreadnoughtproj ect.org/tfs/index.php/Dumaresq. 122. At this point his strategy was simply to whittle down the Japanese numbers through torpedoes and shell fire to make the numbers a bit more even. Then at some point Allied formation might be able to make a run for it to the south. 123. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette, 7 July 1948. 124. After the battle, a Japanese officer aboard one of the cruisers reportedly told Exeter’s chief gunnery officer that her AA fire had shot down one of these spotter planes. In addition, he showed him the tail of another observation plane which he stated had also been damaged by Exeter. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette, 7 July 1948, and Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 306.

125. O’Hara, 60. 126. During the fight, Haguro carried 19 Dutch and 1 British (Lieutenant Jr. Grade) sailors picked out of the Java Sea following the earlier battle. They were treated according to rank, fed/ clothed, cleaned and given medical attention. They received Western style meals. They wanted to know where Haguro had been damaged and couldn’t believe there was none until shown the ship’s superstructure and upper deck. They seemed disappointed. They were very polite…. When we hoisted our flag, without being requested, they saluted standing. They were locked in the Chief of Staff ready room during the fight with Exeter.

Noriki, 401. 127. Johns and Kelly, 50. 128. Battle of the Java Sea, 27th February, 1942. The London Gazette, 7 July 1948. 129. Johns and Kelly, 48. 130. Cooper, “HMS Exeter’s Final Battle.” http://ww2today.com/1stmarch-1942-hms-exeters-final-battle. 131. Ibid. 132. O’Hara, 60. 133. www. combinedfleet. com/ my oko_t.htm. 134. Alford, 207–08, and USS Pope War Diary. 135. Noriki, 400. 136. Although Vincent P. O’Hara and www.CombinedFleet.com both attribute this attack to 10 “Petes” from the seaplane Chitose, that ship was some 800 miles away covering the landings in Bantam Bay. Although they could theoretically have come from the seaplane tender Mizuho, which covered the Eastern Invasion Convoy, they most likely came from Ashigara, Myoko, Haguro and Nachi. 137. USS Pope War Diary. 138. O’Hare, 61. 139. USS Pope War Diary. 140. Alden, John D. Edwards, John D. Ford and Paul Jones. 141. Glassford, 55. 142. Glassford, 55. 143. Java Sea Campaign, 78. 144. Alford, 242. 145. Java Sea Campaign, 78. 146. Java Sea Campaign, 79. 147. Alford, 216. 148. Java Sea Campaign, 79. 149. Mullin, 243. 150. The radio station was located aboard the 3,470 ton depot ship HMS Anking at Tandjoeng Priok. She functioned as the relay station for operational signals to and from Royal Navy ships in the East Indies after the fall of Singapore. 151. Bosscher, Volume 2, 614, n413. 152. Despite the following signal from Rear-Admiral Koenraad, it is unclear if Lieutenant-Commander Rijnders ever broke away from his patrol station to investigate as ordered. In his postwar report, Rijnders makes no mention of doing so. 153. 0227-1730Z 06-00 S/12-00 E = February 27 at 1730 Zulu Time at coordinates 06-00 S/12-00 E. 154. The meaning of this portion re-

335 mains unknown; it is possibly directing Lieutenant-Commander Rijnders to return to his base by dawn. 155. Bosscher, Volume 2, 615, note 414. 156. Bosscher, Volume 2, 292. 157. www.combinedfleet.com/Hik awa2_t.htm. 158. Bakker, 106. 159. Ibid. 160. Hara, 74–75. 161. Hara, 75. 162. Bosscher, Volume 2, 615–16, n418. 163. Bakker, 106. 164. Bakker, 107. 165. On the evening of March 2 Captain Tuizinga went aboard the Ashigara. There he was told that Op ten Noort was being interned; she was to house Allied seaman from the various Allied ships sunk over the past two days. Despite rules of the Geneva Convention barring the seizure of hospital ships Op ten Noort remained in Japanese hands and eventually housed 970 captured Allied seamen. These men were eventually put ashore at Makassar where Op ten Noort provided them with medical care for a short period. However, on October 16, 1942, the Dutch flag was hauled down and ship transferred to Japan where her crew became prisoners of war. It was obvious early on that the Japanese recognized the illegality of their actions in seizing Op ten Noort. In December 1942 she was commissioned into the IJN as Tenno Maru and then underwent a refit which substantially altered her appearance. A fake funnel was added in late 1944 to further hide her true identity. She was renamed a second time, this time to Hikawa Maru No. 2, in November 1 1944. Finally, as the war ended, Op ten Noort was scuttled off the coast of Japan in international waters in 400 feet of water. Her wreck was discovered in 1952 and the Dutch government filed a claim of ¥700 million yen ($1.9 billion in 2011) against the Japanese government. A quarter century of legal wrangling followed before the two countries agreed to a settlement of ¥100 million ($620 million in 2011) in 1977. www.combinedfleet.com/Hikawa 2_t.htm; Visser, “Op ten Noort-Class Hospitalship.” www.netherlandsnavy. nl/Noort.htm.and Snyder, “Hospital Ship Op ten Noort.” www.ofshipssur geons.wordpress.com/2011/03/03/hos pital-ship-op-ten-noort. 166. Bakker, 107. 167. Bosscher, Volume 2, 292. 168. MLD War Diary, 106. 169. Ibid. 170. CMR logbook. 171. This was the last reconnaissance flight over Java before the MLD began evacuating its remaining planes and personnel. 172. CMR logbook.

Chapter 29 1. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–March 1942. 2. Chapter 28, 22–23 and 33. 3. Kindell, “The Diaries of Admiral Layton, C-in-C, China Station—

336 November 1941 to March 1942.” www. naval- history. net/ xDKWD- EF1941 ChinaStation.htm. 4. Keleny, “Commander Bill King: The Last Surviving Second World War Submarine Commander.” www.inde pendent. co. uk/ news/ obituaries/ com mander-bill-king-the-last-surviving-sec ond-world-war-submarine-commander8229663.html. 5. Helgason, “Allied Warship Commanders: William Donald Aelian King DSO, DSC, RN.” http://uboat.net/al lies/commanders/1423.html. 6. Bosscher, Volume 2, Page 306. 7. Given that Vice-Admiral Helfrich had ordered Truant to patrol off Rembang the day after being ordered to detach her makes one wonder if Helfrich knew of the order or if he was simply ignoring it in order to have another submarine patrolling off the coast of Java. 8. Kindell, “The Diaries of Admiral Layton, C- in-C, China Station—November 1941 to March 1942.” www. naval- history. net/ xDKWD- EF 1941 ChinaStation.htm. 9. Brown, “Extracts from The Diary of Telegraphist Eddie (Buster) Brown, HM Submarine Truant.” www. rnsubs. co. uk/ Crew/ Biographies/ ex tracts.php. 10. Ibid. 11. Navigating the Soenda Strait at this point was definitely a very hazardous undertaking. The landings at Bantam Bay were well underway and the Japanese had sunk no less than five Allied warships the night before. The area was literally a hive of enemy warship activity. 12. Bosscher, Volume 2, 306. 13. Otto, “K-XIII.” www.dutchsub marines.com/classes/class_kviii.htm. 14. Otto, “K-IX.” www.dutchsub marines.com/boats/boat_kix.htm. 15. CMR logbook. 16. Bosscher, Volume 2, 305. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Wegduiken…!, Page 385. 20. Bosscher, Volume 2, 626, note 569. 21. Wegduiken…!, Page 385. 22. Bosscher, Volume 2, 626, note 567. 23. Wegduiken…!, Page 385. 24. Bosscher, Volume 2, 306. 25. Horneman, Part 2, 158–61 and War Diary of Hr.Ms. O-19. 26. Vromans, Part 3, 6. 27. Horneman, Part 2, 159. 28. Ibid. 29. Actually Perth, Houston and Java. 30. This was the last signal that any Dutch ships heard from Vice-Admiral Helfrich during the East Indies campaign. He then left Java and all subsequent signals to the fleet were delivered in the name of the Governor-General. 31. www. dutchsubmarines. com/ boats/boat_kxiv.htm. 32. A point on the north coast of Java which lies approximately halfway between Batavia and Indramajoe. 33. Wegduiken…!, 376. 34. Ibid.

Chapter Notes—29 35. www.combinedfleet.com/yura_ t.htm. 36. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 136. 37. Wegduiken…!, 376. 38. Otto, “K-XIV.” www.dutchsub marines.com/boats/boat_kxiv.htm. 39. Wegduiken…!, 376. 40. Ibid. 41. Launched 1923; 14 knots, 2 × 5.5-inch deck guns and 2 × 80mm AA guns. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869–1945, 249. 42. http :// www. combinedfleet. com/Tsurumi_t.htm. 43. Wegduiken…!, 377. 44. Ibid. 45. USS S-37, War Patrol No: Fourth. Dates: Feb–March 1942. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. At that time K- X would have been headed back to the ME after suffering a heavy pounding at the hands of Japanese destroyers. 49. USS S-37 War Diary. 50. This was the same minefield which had killed Jupiter the previous night. 51. USS S-38, War Patrol No: Third/ Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942/Apr– May 1942. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. From there they were transferred ashore by a Dutch harbor tug. 55. USS S-38, War Patrol No: Third/ Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942/Apr– May 1942. 56. www. combinedfleet. com/ jint su_t.htm. 57. USS S-38, War Patrol No: Third/ Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942/Apr– May 1942. 58. Although Lieutenant-Commander Munson claimed a “probable hit” on Jintsu this could not be confirmed by postwar Japanese records. However, immediately after the attack Jintsu left the Java Sea and proceeded to Kure, Japan via Tarakan and Makassar. There she entered drydock and underwent a refit that lasted until mid–April. Although certainly not proof of damage by S-38, this might could be construed as such although the claim remains unsubstantiated. 59. USS S-38, War Patrol No: Third/ Fourth. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942/Apr– May 1942. 60. The formal name of the Wastewater Channel as was found on topographical maps of the day. 61. USS Permit, War Patrol No: Fourth. Feb–Apr 1942. 62. Later that night, Chapple received a coded signal informing him that other than Exeter and her destroyers there were no other Allied surface ships left in the Java Sea. 63. USS Permit, War Patrol No: Fourth. Feb–Apr 1942. 64. Ibid. 65. USS Sailfish, War Patrol No: First Through Fifth. 12/41, 12/41– 2/42, 2/42–3/42, 4/42–5/42, 6/42– 7/42. 66. Ibid.

67. Ibid. 68. Jordan, 256. 69. www.combinedfleet.com/Kam ogawa_t.htm. 70. USS Sailfish, War Patrol No: First Through Fifth. 12/41, 12/41–2/ 42, 2/42–3/42, 4/42–5/42, 6/42–7/ 42. 71. www.combinedfleet.com/Kam ogawa_t.htm. 72. USS Sailfish, War Patrol No: First Through Fifth. 12/41, 12/41– 2/42, 2/42–3/42, 4/42–5/42, 6/42– 7/42. 73. USS Salmon, War Patrol No: First/Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. No Kuma Class cruisers were in the Eastern Java Sea at this time so the identity of the cruiser remains unknown. They could also just as easily have been misidentified merchant ships. 77. USS Salmon, War Patrol No: First/Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 78. Ibid. 79. Alden, 6. 80. USS Salmon, War Patrol No: First/Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 81. USS Saury, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Mar 1942. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid. 86. USS Seal, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. This was mostly likely either Kinu or one of the large Japanese destroyers which Hurd could have easily misidentified through his periscope at a range of nearly 5½ miles. 93. Following the tracks is when a destroyer would follow the wake created by torpedoes back to their point of origin. 94. USS Seal, War Patrol No: Second. Dates: Feb–Apr 1942. 95. War Damage Report No. 58. Section IV: USS Perch (SS-176). 96. There are also reports which state the merchant ship was escorted by a Japanese destroyer which opened fire on Perch. www.combinedfleet.com/ Perch.htm. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid. 99. Hara, 89. 100. www. combine dfle et. com/ Perch.htm. 101. Roscoe, 96–99. 102. Hara, 90. 103. Roscoe, 96–99. 104. Ibid. 105. Engine run away occurs when uncontrolled amounts of fuel enter the combustion chamber of a diesel engine. Engine speed continues to accelerate for as long as increasing volumes of fuel and air enter the combustion chamber. It will eventually reach such a high rate of speed that parts inside the engine either break down or the engine itself violently breaks apart.

106. Roscoe, 96–99. 107. Blair, 188–89. 108. Roscoe, 96–99 and www.com binedfleet.com/Perch.htm. 109. Roscoe, 96–99. 110. Roscoe, 96–99 and www.com binedfleet.com/Perch.htm. 111. Roscoe, 96–99. 112. www.combinedfleet.com/Perch. htm. 113. It would appear that Hurt gave the order to abandon ship even before Ushio opened fire. 114. Blair, 188–89. 115. Ibid. 116. www.combinedfleet.com/Perch. htm. 117. Ibid. 118. Blair, 188–89 states that 62 crewmen were rescued, while an official Japanese report (www.combinedfleet. com/Perch.htm) states that 59 men were picked out of the water. 119. www.combinedfleet.com/Perch. htm. 120. Unless otherwise noted, the account of this fight has been drawn from Mars Et Historia, 9. 121. On the night of February 24– 25 a division of torpedo boats patrolled between Tanjoeng Patjinan and the coastal village of Djangkar in the Madoera Strait on the north coast of Java’s eastern end. On the night of February 26–27, and again on February 27–28, a division patrolled in the Bay of Toeban. Bosscher, Volume 2, 623, note 533. 122. TM 4, TM 5, TM 7, TM 8, TM 9, TM 10, TM 11, TM 12 and TM 15. Although operational, TM 6 was apparently not fully trusted for combat duty as of the result of the hull damage she had suffered during the Badoeng Strait action. TM 13 and TM 14 were under the command of the harbor commander at Soerabaja for local patrol duty. Van Het Haaff and Klaassen, 517–18. 123. Bosscher, Volume 2, 303. 124. TM 15 was Lieutenant Jorissen’s command boat. 125. According to Bosscher (Volume 2, 623, note 535) these destroyers belonged to the 8th Destroyer Division. However, none of its ships were attached to the East Invasion Convoy close or distant covering forces. Likewise, the Dutch coastwatch position reported four destroyers with Kinu. The Division’s Michisio and Oshio were damaged in the Badoeng Strait a week earlier; both had been withdrawn to Makassar for repairs and missed the invasion of Java (www.combinedfleet. com/michis_t.htm and www.combined fleet.com/oshio_t.htm). The remaining ships of the 8th Destroyer Division— Arashio and Asashio—were in the Madoera Strait just days later where the latter would see action. Thus, it would appear that the destroyers with Kinu belonged to another IJN unit, almost certainly one of the formations attached to either the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla or 4th Destroyer Flotilla. 126. In this instance Jorissen clearly mistook a pair of Japanese destroyers for light cruisers which was not uncommon in the early days of the Pacific War. Although contemporary Japanese war-

Chapter Notes—30 ships were considered cramped and very uncomfortable by Western standards, they were robust, powerful vessels. Many Japanese destroyers approached or exceeded 2,000 tons and severely outclassed their smaller (1,300 tons) Dutch counterparts. Some of the larger Japanese destroyers even approached the light cruiser in size and tonnage, which could explain the early confusion amongst Dutch skippers. 127. Imperial War Museum audio interview, 1991. 128. www.combinedfleet.com/kinu _t.htm. 129. Ibid. 130. Bosscher, Volume 2, 623, note 538.

Chapter 30 1. Lieutenant-Commander Mosher served as the USN’s assistant naval advisor at Singapore from March 2, 1941, to January 14, 1942. He then served as Chief- of-Staff to Admiral Hart while simultaneously serving as naval chief of staff to General Wavell from January 14, 1942, to February 17, 1942. He subsequently served on the staff of Rear-Admiral Glassford from February 17, 1942, to March 6, 1942. 2. Mosher, 15. 3. At this point Nagumo’s force was still completely intact following his earlier operations against Ambon and Darwin. It consisted of the 1st Carrier Squadron, 2nd Carrier Squadron, ⅓rd Battleship Squadron, 8th Cruiser Squadron, 1st Destroyer Flotilla with flagship Abukuma, 17th Destroyer Division and 18th Destroyer Division. In train was a force of six oilers. Rohwer, 148. 4. 4th Cruiser Squadron and ⅔rd Battleship Squadron with 4th Destroyer Division in support. Rohwer, 148. 5. Gill, 605–06. 6. Bosscher, Volume 2, 338. 7. It will be remembered that Willem van der Zaan suffered from leaking boiler pipes which affected her speed. 8. At that same moment, some 300–400 miles to the north, RearAdmiral Doorman’s force was in the process of ending the daylight segment of the Battle of the Java Sea. 9. Droste, 68–69. 10. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 99. 11. Droste, 84. 12. Abbekerk, Bandjarmasin, Bintoehan, City of Manchester, Enggano, Jagersfontein, Kota Gede, Le Maire, Merkus, Modjokerto, Parigi, Poelau Bras, Siantar, Sibigo, Sigli, Tawali, Tinombo, Toba, Tomohan, Toradja, Tosari, Van Goens, Van Spilbergen and Zaandam. 13. Six Douglas DB-7B light bombers, four Lockheed L12A transport aircraft and four Curtis-Wright CW-22B Falcon advanced trainers. Kota Baroe also carried a civilian pilot named Dave Hicks who was an employee of Douglas Aircraft; he was to serve as a technical advisor to the Dutch during their con-

struction and flight training. Boer, “The Story of the Douglas DB-7B Bostons of the Dutch Naval Air Service,” 4. 14. Ten Brewster B339–23 fighters and seven Curtis-Wright CW-22B Falcon advanced trainers. Boer, “The story of the Douglas DB-7B Bostons of the Dutch Naval Air Service,” 4. 15. The exact date of Sloterdijk’s arrival in Tjilatjap remains uncertain, but it is known to be around February 27– March 1. 16. Droste, 84–85. 17. A former KPM merchant ship (2,071 tons) requisitioned by the KM in September 1939 for use as a supply ship and later a submarine tender. 18. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 86. 19. Creighton, 57. 20. Ibid. 21. Glassford, 57–58, and Creighton, 57. 22. Glassford, 58, and Creighton, 58–60. 23. Creighton, 58–60. 24. Glassford, 60. 25. Ibid. 26. Messages from ABDACOM, East Indies [Wavell]. 27. Glassford, 61, and Creighton, 61. 28. A USN Lapwing-class minesweeper. 29. A former civilian yacht converted into a USN gunboat. 30. “USS Tulsa—Patrol Gunboat (PG-22),” www.tulsahistory.org/learn/ online-exhibits/uss-tulsa/. 31. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 99. 32. Creighton, 61, and Glassford, 60. 33. Mostly RAF/RAAF aircrews and ground personnel. 34. Glassford, 62. 35. Bosscher, Volume 2, 321. 36. As Helfrich’s chief of staff, van Staveren’s permanent rank was that of captain which he had held since August 1938. He was temporarily promoted to rear- admiral on January 1, 1942. One month later, on February 3, he was again temporarily advanced to the position of acting Commander-In-Chief of all KM forces in the East Indies which he would hold until his death in March 1942. 37. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 3. 38. Bosscher, Volume 2, 317–19. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Whether this move was already being planned as a result of Japanese air attacks on Java is uncertain. But the signal from Vice-Admiral Furstner almost certainly contributed to the operation being fast-tracked. 44. It was at about this time, though, that Helfrich made the decision to evacuate only naval personnel while their families and loved ones would be left to their fate on Java. Not only were their numbers very large, but there were ex-

traneous considerations such as what to with the family members if the service member were killed in action or were captured after the evacuation. Many of them were also members of civilian defense organizations and were regarded as vital for the war effort and could not simply be released from duty. And of course, in January 1942 the East Indies government had passed regulations forbidding any European or Eurasian civilian from leaving the NEI or from transferring any currency or wealth. All of these factors almost certainly played into his decision to evacuate only military personnel. 45. At the outbreak of the Pacific War there were 280,000 Dutch residents in the Netherlands East Indies, consisting of 80,000 Europeans and 200,000 Eurasians who had the same legal and social status as European Dutch. Not only were there too many to evacuate, but the Dutch Government believed that any occupation would mirror that in Europe, where residents went about their everyday lives under German occupation. The East Indies were also part of the overall Kingdom of the Netherlands and had been so for three centuries. Any evacuation was deemed to be an abandonment of home territory. For these reasons Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer gave orders for Dutch civilians and military forces to resist to the end. The Netherlands Government-In-Exile also felt it necessary to show the Indonesian people that they were willing to sacrifice and suffer the same fate. Unfortunately, they badly underestimated the affinity many Indonesians harbored for independence and the removal of Dutch rule. Only those government and military personnel with the training and equipment necessary to continue the war from abroad were to be evacuated. When possible, European and Eurasian bachelors were to be evacuated so that the married men could remain behind with their families. Not all obeyed the non-evacuation order; the first to leave were the families of ship crews, senior KNIL officers and others who had the means to slip away. No evacuation was legally allowed prior to the fall of Singapore. Dutch residents were forbidden to leave the colony; nor could they withdraw large sums of money from their savings or bank accounts. Currency could not be transferred or wired to offshore bank accounts. It was not until February 19, 1942 that the East Indies government acknowledged the possibility of defeat and agreed to fund the evacuation of certain civilians (Peters, 114– 16). There was also considerable debate as to where the potential evacuees might go. The closest and most logical destination was Australia. However, at least 50,000 of the females were considered mixed-race Eurasians. Australia at the time was still rigidly segregated and the possible influx of so many non-whites concerned Australian officials. Although the East Indies government ap-

337 proached the Australians in January 1942 to discuss a possible evacuation of civilians from Java, any further discussion of the topic was shelved by the Australians until it could be more closely reviewed (Archer, 49–50). 46. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 6–7. 47. Roelofsen recalled the note as coming from “the Government” and the reason given was the adverse effect an evacuation would have on the population. 48. Largely young, untrained officer candidates and various technical school trainees. 49. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 6. 50. Ibid. 51. It is unclear if these were MTBs then under construction in Dutch shipyards on Java or if they were additional Higgins A/S boats being delivered from the United States. 52. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 6–7. 53. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 6. 54. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 6–7. 55. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 10. 56. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 14. 57. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 10. 58. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 13. 59. The equivalent of $21 in 1940 (the last year of World War II in which the Dutch Guilder was publicly traded prior to the German invasion of the Netherlands); approximately $344 in 2012. www.measuringworth.com. 60. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 11. 61. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 17. 62. Bosscher, Volume 2, 330. 63. These men would likely have included naval architects, engineers, draftsmen and a wide range of skilled shipyard workers. 64. Even as their 300-year-old empire collapsed around them, the Dutch maintained a rule of law and took steps to ensure that none of the personal motor vehicles used in the evacuation had been stolen. ƒ100 was the equivalent of $53 in 1940; approximately $867 in 2012. www.measuringworth.com. 65. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 23. 66. Born in 1894, Heringa served in the KM from 1914 to 1932. Upon leaving naval service he was hired as Director of the Marine Establishment; al-

338 though technically a civilian Heringa held the Naval Reserve rank of Lieutenant-Commander. In this capacity he reported directly to the Navy Department in Bandoeng and the Naval Commander at Soerabaja. Heringa had extremely wide latitude in his responsibilities and even his direct superiors had very little input on how he ran things. C.W. Heringa 1927–1960, 4. 67. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 23. 68. Bosscher, Volume 2, 330. 69. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 19–20. 70. Ibid. 71. Java Post, “Tjilatjap, het Duinkerken van Indië.” http://javapost.nl/ 2014/04/04/tjilatjap-het-duinkerkenvan-java/. 72. Demolitions were not limited to military installations and were intended to deny the Japanese use of as much industry and equipment as possible. The Algemeen Vernielings Korps (General Destruction Corps) was comprised of European, Indo-European, Chinese and Indonesian members armed with rifles, pistols and revolvers. When the Japanese landed on Java the AVK began destroying oil tanks, cars and other vehicles and factory machinery. They also dynamited oil mills, rice factories and other civilian installations such as the British-American Tobacco and General Motors plants. 73. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 4. 74. In November 1918, Imperial Germany’s entire High Seas Fleet was interned at the British naval base of Scapa Flow following the armistice which ended the First World War. The once proud ships of Keiser Wilhelm’s fleet were anchored in disgrace with skeleton crews while the Allied powers bickered over how best to break up or distribute its ships to the victorious nations. For six months, the ship sat immobilized with their remaining crews idled by inactivity, poor food, shabby living conditions and despair. Determined to preserve the honor of the High Seas Fleet, German Rear-Admiral Ludwig von Reuter ordered the fleet scuttled on June 21, 1919. Forever, known as the “Grand Scuttle” the operation resulted in the loss of 52 of 74 interned warships, totaling some 400,000 tons. 75. Although technically not at war, Japanese forces had not hesitated to board, capture and even sink Norwegian merchants up to this point in the East Indies campaign. 76. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 4. 77. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 36. 78. After the successful use of paratroopers by Germany in May 1940 the Dutch focused a great deal of their defensive planning in the NEI around the possibility of a Japanese airborne attack.

Chapter Notes—30 79. Koenraad, “Destruction of Soerabaja,” 4. 80. Bosscher, Volume 2, 337 and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 21–22. 81. Although KM demolition teams were ordered to remain in Soerabaja while other naval personnel were evacuated, many of them fled south to Tjilatjap prematurely. Faulty explosive charges and timers developed by KNIL engineers also contributed. The heavy construction of the hangers themselves, which had been built to withstand the blast of heavy bombs, also thwarted demolition efforts. 82. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 22. 83. J.J. van der Have was commander of the torpedo workshop at Soerabaja; he was also in charge of the KM’s torpedo services division. C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld was the former captain of K-XIV. 84. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 24. 85. One of the ordnance depot’s explosive charges failed to go off as planned, leaving Magazine #3 intact. On March 4 van Well Groenveld, van der Have and civilian worker F.H. Ermers visited the facility. Tragically, the faulty charge detonated while they were inside, killing all three men. 86. On March 1 while moored in the ME for repairs, Witte de With took a direct hit forward from a bomb that exploded in her crew quarters. In addition, a near-miss punched a large hole in her hull below the waterline. www.go2war2. nl/print.asp?artikelid=1906. 87. Spek, Part 3, and Uitwijken, 39. 88. Koning der Nederlanden was initially launched as a ram turret ship on October 28, 1874. She was decommissioned in 1895 and eventually converted into an accommodation hulk for the crews of warships under repair and refitting submarines. warshipsresearch. blogspot. com/ 2011/ 11/ dutch- ram tur ret-zrms-koning-der.html. 89. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 21. 90. Bosscher, Volume 2, 641–42, n255. 91. Bakker, 128–30. 92. Bosscher, Volume 2, 318; Mark, 111; and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 37. 93. Lightships were positioned on the inner and outer edges of the Eastwater and Westwater Channel minefields to aid with navigation and provide pilot services. 94. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 4. 95. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 113. 96. Commander of Soerabaja Patrol Service. 97. Ship unknown to author. 98. Ship unknown to author.

99. Moera Boelian. 100. Jan van Amstel, Pieter de Bitter, Abraham Crijnssen and Eland Dubois. 101. Minesweepers C and D. 102. Gouden Leeuw. 103. Moera Boelian. 104. All small auxiliary minesweepers of the Ardjoeno Class. 105. All attached to the Soerabaja Patrol Service. Much like the Soenda Strait Patrol, they patrolled in the Madoera Strait and along the northeast coast of Java to guard against infiltrators from Bali. 106. Standing by to evacuate RearAdmiral Koenraad and his staff. 107. Swedish Embassy Annual Report, 27–28. 108. Spek, Part 3. 109. The commander of the 2nd Minesweeper Division, LieutenantCommander Lebeau become the ranking Dutch naval officer when RearAdmiral Koenraad transferred his flag to Colombo. 110. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 46. 111. According to Part 3 of J.D. Spek’s history of the MTB squadron in the NEI campaign, Thomas’ attempt took place between March 2 and 8. However, this does not match the dates offered by sources which document the destruction of the MTB squadron. As detailed later in this chapter, 12 officers and men from the MTB squadron attempted to escape from Soerabaja aboard the small sailing yacht Urania 2 at about the same time. It could be possible that Spek confused the two events, although Lieutenant Thomas is not one of the officers specifically mentioned by name in that attempt. No other sources mention TM 7; that said, it is important to note that the first week of March was marked by widespread confusion, demolitions and movement of personnel. Add in that most reports on the evacuation of Soerabaja were not written until post-war, it must accepted that conflicting dates are occasionally encountered. 112. TM 7 had also experienced clutch problems on two of her engines which nearly resulted in the boat’s destruction during the engagement off Tandjoeng Awar Awar. One can wonder if the extra weight of the fuel drums might have added to the existing engine clutch problems. 113. Spek, Part 3. 114. Ibid. 115. Moera Boelian was a 173-ton tanker requisitioned from the Netherlands New Guinea Petroleum Company on December 8, 1941. Peta also displaced 173 tons; she too was requisitioned from an unknown source on December 8, 1941. 116. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 46. 117. A former KPM freighter requisitioned by the KM. 118. Bezemer, Volume 1, 710, and Bosscher, Volume 2, 318. 119. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 50–51.

120. Ibid. 121. Bosscher, Volume 2, 331. 122. Bosscher, Volume 2, 335. 123. Visser, “Jan van Amstel Class.” www. netherlandsnavy. nl/ Vanamstel. htm. 124. Helgason, “HNMS Jan van Amstel.” http://uboat.net/allies/war ships/ship/2847.html. 125. Kimenai, “Escape of Hr. Ms. Abraham Crijnssen.” www.go2war2.nl/ print.asp?artikelid=2728. 126. Kimenai, “Stalen mijnenvegers van de Jan van Amstel-klasse: Ondergang van de Jan van Amstel, Pieter de Bitter en Eland Dubois.” www.go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 1887/ Stalen- mijnenvegersvan-de-Jan-van-Amstel-klasse.htm?page =4. 127. www.go2war2.nl/artikel/1887/ Stalen- mijnenvegers- van- de- Jan- vanAmstel-klasse.htm?page=4. 128. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 40–41. 129. Ibid. 130. Kimenai, “Stalen mijnenvegers van de Jan van Amstel-klasse: Ondergang van de Jan van Amstel, Pieter de Bitter en Eland Dubois.” www.go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 1887/ Stalen- mijnenvegersvan- de- Jan- van- Amstel- klasse. htm? page=4. Ibid. 131. Kimenai, “Escape of Hr. Ms. Abraham Crijnssen.” www.go2war2.nl/ print.asp?artikelid=2728. 132. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 18–19. 133. Ibid. 134. It turned out that Rear-Admiral Koenraad had a long memory and Lieutenant-Commander Lebeau’s death proved unfortunate for LieutenantCommander Dekker. After the war the former captain of Pieter de Bitter was called before a court-martial in 1948. Dekker testified that he thought the “KPX signal” to be more “permission” to escape rather than a direct order. He also testified that the order to evacuate was pointless and little more than “suicide.” Without Lebeau present for testimony or cross-examination regarding his meeting with the ships’ captains, Dekker was found guilty of “Intentional disobedience committed in time of war.” The court-martial decision was likely influenced by the attempted escape of Eland Dubois and Jan van Amstel, and the successful attempt bid of Abraham Crijnssen. Although unsuccessful in their escape, the captains of those ships had faced the same hurdles but still chose to sail. Despite his time as a Japanese prisoner of war and 18 years of naval service, the Prosecutor requested a one-year jail sentence and a dishonorable discharge. The Court passed down one month’s detention with a dishonorable discharge. Lieutenant-Commander Dekker spent the remainder of his civilian life as a high school teacher. He passed away on April 30, 1995, at the age of 86. 135. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 44.

Chapter Notes—31 136. As was Lieutenant-Commander Dekker, Lieutenant-Commander van der Horst was court-martialed following his release from a Japanese POW camp. He was found guilty of “Intentional disobedience committed in time of war.” The Prosecutor requested a one-year jail sentence and a dishonorable discharge. The Court passed down one month’s detention with a dishonorable discharge. Van der Horst was dishonorably discharged from the Navy on July 15, 1947, and would pass away just three years later at age 45. 137. Jones, “Escape from Soerabaja.” http://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Crijns sen.htm#1. 138. Kimenai, “Escape of Hr. Ms. Abraham Crijnssen.” www.go2war2.nl/ print.asp?artikelid=2728. 139. Urania 2 was a sailing yacht used for midshipman training at the Soerabaja Naval Academy. Before she could be burned or scuttled several young officers and an executive from the Java Bank of Soerabaja (W. Verploegh Chassé) obtained permission from Rear-Admiral Koenraad to attempt an escape. Her crew consisted of two officers and 10 men from scuttled MTBs along with Mr. Chassé and his family. She was supposed to escape under her own power but the auxiliary motor failed, so Urania 2 sailed along the south coast of Madoera. She turned south for the Lombok Strait on the night of March 7–8. On March 8 Urania 2 was stopped by a Japanese destroyer and boarded off the Bali Strait. The two officers were taken aboard the destroyer along with yacht’s sails and dinghy; she was then towed into the middle of the Bali Strait and left alone. The following day the officers were put back aboard and Urania 2 was ordered to back to the north coast of Java on March 10. She arrived off Toeban amid a fleet of cruisers, destroyers, transports and many landing craft. A transport then towed the yacht back into Soerabaja through the Westwater Channel where her crew were made prisoner on March 16. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 55–56. 140. Kimenai, “Escape of Hr. Ms. Abraham Crijnssen.” www.go2war2.nl/ print.asp?artikelid=2728. 141. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 42. 142. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 43. 143. These ships were crewed almost exclusively by militarized Gouvernmentsmarine personnel. 144. Bosscher, Volume 2, 331. 145. Molo Strait is a dangerous, small strait between Rijana and Flores islands; it is accessible only by small craft due to its narrow northern entrance which creates very strong currents. Seasonal winds and high tides make the Molo Strait even more treacherous. H.O. No. 163, 247 and “Molo Strait Remains a Mystery.” Accessed June 13, 2013. www.youtube.com/watch ?v=8UAaaN5o4Ac.

146. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 43–44. 147. An interesting contrast in the Dutch evacuation of Java versus the American evacuation of the Philippines is the number of passengers typically carried out on their respective submarines. Whereas Dutch boats only carried out a handful of officers, the Americans often packed a dozen or more passengers at a time into their boats. 148. Otto, “K-XIV.” www.dutchsub marines.com/boats/boat_kxiv.htm. 149. It is unclear if the missing crewmen were AWOL and needed to be replaced, or if they simply had not yet returned from other duties. 150. Bosscher, Volume 2, 337. 151. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 47–49.

Chapter 31 1. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 118. 2. Ibid. 3. Although unstated in American, Australian or Dutch records, the fueling difficulties experienced by Houston and Perth following their arrival Tandjoeng Priok on February 28 can almost certainly be directly related to the efforts of Commander Moorman. Officers from Houston and Perth were told that remaining fuel was being reserved for remaining Dutch warships; this would directly coincide with his efforts to ready the remaining KM warships for sea per Commander van de Lint’s orders. 4. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 118. 5. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 122. 6. Ibid. 7. Bezemer, Volume 1, 712–13; van der Wal, 422–23; and von Münching, Volume 1. 8. van Limburg Stirum “Varen in Oorlogstijd.” 9. Allen, Lettens and Vleggeert, “MV Augustina.” www.wrecksite.eu/ wreck.aspx?59264. 10. Anking was a 3,472 ton cargo vessel launched in 1925. She was owned and operated by the China Navigation Company when requisitioned by the Royal Navy in 1941 and commissioned as a depot ship at Malta. She and her original crew were transferred to Tandjoeng Priok in early 1942 where Anking served as the Royal Navy’s communications center throughout the East Indies campaign. 11. Ballarat, Goulburn, Maryborough, Toowoomba and Wollongong. 12. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 125. 13. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 122. 14. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 122–23.

15. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 123. 16. Ibid. 17. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 119. 18. Gill, 1939–42, 625. 19. Ibid. 20. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 119. 21. Bosscher, Volume 2, 328, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 120. 22. Mark, 138, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 131. 23. Bakker, 118. 24. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 126. 25. Bakker 118–19. 26. Bakker 119. 27. A pair of 200-ton coal-burning steamers requisitioned from the Straits Steamship Company in Singapore. Their crews consisted primarily of survivors from Prince of Wales and Repulse. 28. Initially the property of a RAF officer at Singapore, her owner sailed her to Tandjoeng Priok in mid–Feb ruary, where he turned her over to the RN for use. 29. Taylor, “The Rescue Yacht.” www. navyhistory.org.au/the-rescue-yacht/. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 126. 35. Mark, 132. 36. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 121. 37. The former German Rendsberg, which had been seized in May 1940 and leased to Rotterdam Lloyd. Since she was only capable of making five knots it was decided not to send her out of the harbor. 38. Auby was a Sarawak Steamship Company ship. She arrived at Tandjoeng Priok in mid–February where the ship was abandoned in need of repairs and fuel. Ipoh was a Straits Steamship Company ship. She arrived from Singapore in mid–February, but had been bombed en route and was no longer seaworthy. 39. Possibly Sinabang, but that ship was reportedly sunk by aircraft from Ryujo on March 2. 40. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 126–27. 41. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 130. 42. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 125. 43. Bosscher, Volume 2, 637, notes 174 and 175. 44. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en

339 Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 125. 45. Although all were technically Gouvernmentsmarine patrol boats, they had been militarized in September 1939 and their crews conscripted into the regular navy. As a result, they would not be demobilized with the others. 46. 3rd Minesweeper Division— Lieutenant-Commander W. Th. L. van der Berg (KMR). 1. Aroe 2. Alor 3. Bogor 4. Bantam 5. Ceram 6. Cheribon 5th Minesweeper Division—Lieutenant-Commander J.J. de Wolff. 1. Djember 2. Djombang 3. Djampea 4. Enggano 5. Endeh 47. Most of the AWOL crewmen simply went home as they no longer had any military obligations. But many were likely later recalled and served under Japanese commanders as the lightly damaged GM vessels were raised and put back into service. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www. go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 2506/ Gemili ta riseerde- schepen- van- de- Gouverne ments-Marine.htm?page=2. 48. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 125. 49. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 128. 50. The following day her captain reported for duty at the Navigation Office and was simply told to go home. He was made a POW on March 8. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 132– 33. 51. Kimenai, “Gemilitariseerde schepen van de Gouvernements Marine: De Gouvernements Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog.” www.go2war2.nl/arti kel/2506/Gemilitariseerde-schepen-vande-Gouvernements-Marine.htm?page= 2. 52. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 139–30. 53. Since he was superior in rank, Rouwenhorst assumed command of the operation. 54. So dangerous was their attempt that all crewmen not needed in the engine room or on the bridge sat on deck wearing life jackets rather than risk being trapped below. 55. www. combinedfleet. com/ mat suk_t.htm. 56. Kimenai, “Ontsnappingspoging met Hr. Ms. Endeh Intercepts.” www. go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 2882/ Ontsnap pingspoging- met- Hr- Ms- Endeh. htm? page=3. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. The survivors piled into a single

340 remaining lifeboat and drifted for five days. On March 6 they sighted an island in the Thousand Islands chain, on which they landed at various points from March 7 to 12. They found two lifeboats from the sunken tanker Merula that contained water but little food. On March 13 fishermen told them where they were and where they could obtain rice, fish and perhaps a small boat. Three officers and a rating went ahead to the village to buy rice, fish and a prauw. Despite being gone for several days this party did not return. On March 17 a large native prauw appeared but refused to stop. This was the first sign of hostility from the local Bantamese people. In the meantime, they patched up one of Marula’s lifeboats. The four missing men still had not returned, which led Rouwenhorst and his party to distrust the locals. On March 21 they sailed south and reached Pajoeng Island where they found an elderly Indonesian lighthouse keeper. He told them his last orders from the CZM were to remain at his post and relight the lamp when the Dutch returned. He informed the Dutchmen that Java had fallen. He also relayed the sad news that their missing comrades had indeed been murdered by hostile villagers. The locals were now very hostile toward the Dutch and it was difficult to obtain a prauw. On March 22–23 they came ashore on Java five miles from Tandjoeng Priok. Local villagers were friendly until they learned the men were Dutch and not American or Australian. At that point they become extremely aggressive and all were quickly turned over to the Japanese. Endeh had sailed on March 2 and by March 24 all of her survivors were POWs. 61. The “other ships” are not specified, but presumably they included Evertsen and merchant ships lost trying to break out of Tanjoeng Priok. 62. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 130. 63. Ibid. 64. Uitjwijken, 121. 65. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 113. 66. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 114. 67. Ibid. 68. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 115. 69. Paddock and Collins, “The Work of the Consulate General, Batavia, December 8, 1941–February 28, 1942.” 70. The United States had no embassy in the Netherlands East Indies as the East Indies were a colony of the Netherlands. There may only be one Ambassador to a specific nation and that individual’s duties are solely to facilitate diplomatic relations between two nations at a State level. In contrast, there may be one or more Consuls in multiple cities throughout a given nation or their territories. The Consul’s

Chapter Notes—32 duty is to assist their nation’s citizens living or traveling abroad and to provide bureaucratic assistance in business and trade activities. 71. Paddock and Collins, “The Work of the Consulate General, Batavia, December 8, 1941–February 28, 1942.”

Chapter 32 1. “What art thou Faustus, but a man condemned to die? Thy Fatal Time Doth Draw to Final End.” Christopher Marlowe, “Doctor Faustus.” 2. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 92. 3. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 14, 86, 92. 4. After the war Schokking would report that he received little assistance from the steering committee which Rear-Admiral Koenraad had formed on February 28 to organize and oversee the evacuation operations at Tjilatjap. 5. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 88 and 91. 6. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 20. 7. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 18–19. 8. Boyd, 72–5; Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 93–94; and Dunn, Siantar Sunk by Japanese Submarine I-1. www.ozatwar.com/japsubs/siantar.htm. 9. Bakker, 123–26, and Bezemer, 726. 10. “List of Ships Involved in SE Asia,” www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/ships _list.html; and Hyperwar: “Chapter 4: 1942,” www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ USN-Chron/USN-Chron-1942.html. 11. Plowman, 335. 12. Plowman 335–36. 13. General cargo is considered to be non-specialized, non-hazardous cargo such as boxes, barrels, bales, crates, packages, bundles, pallets, etc. 14. Lettens and Tony. “SS Enggano (1942).” www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx? 59260. 15. Bezemer, Volume 1, 728–29. 16. According to www.Wrecksite. edu, Enggano was finished off by Chikuma and destroyer Urakaze after being abandoned. They then retired without rescuing survivors. However, in this case it would appear that Bezemer is the more accurate source. 17. Bezemer, Volume 1, 739. 18. Kolbicz, www.WarShipSailors. comz. warsailors.com/forum/read.php ?1,46156,46157#msg–46157. 19. Bezemer, Volume 1, 739. 20. Although sometimes erroneously listed as being attacked by I-62, that submarine was operating off the coast of India, several hundred miles to the west on March 2. 21. www.combinedfleet.com/I-7.htm. 22. Bezemer, Volume 1, 733, 739 and Visser, “The Modjokerto Mystery.” www. netherlandsnavy. nl/ Special_ modjo kerto.htm.

23. Visser, “The Modjokerto Mystery.” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Special_ modjokerto.htm. 24. Ibid. 25. Bezemer, Volume 1, 733, and Rohwer, 125. 26. It is important to note that this source (Droste) contains numerous errors, inaccuracies or generalized statements in other areas. While useful for certain background information it should not be considered or trusted as a primary source. 27. Bezemer, Volume 1, 734. 28. Bakker, 114, and Bezemer, 730. 29. Bezemer, Volume 1, 735; Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 93–94; and www.ozatwar.com/japsubs/ siantar.htm. 30. Bezemer, Volume 1, 727. 31. Bakker, 123; Bezemer, 723–24; and www.warsailors.com/singleships/ prominent.html. 32. Bezemer, Volume 1, 727–28. 33. “A Little Known Ship of Evacuees from Singapore: HMS Scott Harley, 12 February 1942.” www.cofepow. org.uk/ pages/ civilian_ hms_ scott_ har ley.htm. 34. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 106. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Zuiderkruis and Janssens were the only Governments Marine ships to escape the East Indies. 38. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 106. 39. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 108–09. 40. The port of Padang, Sumatra. 41. A small bay on the southern tip of South Pagai Island, which was part of the Pagai and Nassau Island Chain in the Indian Ocean off the west coast of Sumatra. 42. Located on the extreme southeastern tip of Sumatra. This was an interesting choice of destinations, Semangka Bay was located not particularly far from Oosthaven, which was by then occupied by the Japanese. It was also potentially on the flight path of Japanese bombers and reconnaissance aircraft flying to the Soenda Strait and Western Java. 43. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 109. 44. Ibid. 45. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 110. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Visser, “Jacob van Heemskerck History” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Ja cheem_his.htm. 50. Kimenai, “Torpedobootjagers van de Gerard Callenburgh-klasse Hr. Ms. Isaac Sweers.” www. go2war2. nl/ artikel/ 1984/ Torpedobootjagers- vande- Gerard- Callenburgh- klasse. htm? page=3.

51. Visser, “Jacob van Heemskerck History” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Ja cheem_his.htm. 52. www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2272/ Lichte- kruisers- van- de- Tromp- klasse. htm?page=5. 53. Visser, “Jacob van Heemskerck History” www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Ja cheem_his.htm. 54. Gill, 1939–42, 627. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ballarat, Goulburn, Maryborough and Toowoomba. 58. Swain, 140–41 and Naval Historical Society of Australia, www.navy history. org. au/ category/ navy- day- byday/1942/page/2/. 59. Gill, 1939–42, 627–28. 60. Likely a Type 95 Nakajima E8N Dave from one of the Japanese heavy cruisers. 61. O’Hara, “Other Engagements Involving Forces Fleeing Java: March 1–March 4, 1942.” www.microworks. net/pacific/battles/other_abda_engage ments.htm. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Gill, 1939–42, 628. 65. hwww.combinedfleet.com/atago _t.htm. 66. Bezemer, Volume 1, 730. 67. Ibid. 68. Gill, 1939–42, 630. 69. The armament of MMS 51 is unknown, but minesweepers of that class were typically armed with four 12.7mm machine guns or two 20mm cannon. 70. Gill, 1939–42, 630. 71. Ibid. 72. Gill, 1939–42, 631. 73. White, “The Loss of RFA Francol.” www.historicalrfa.org/archivedstories2/112-the-loss-of-rfa-francol. 74. Swain, 140–41 and Naval Historical Society of Australia, www.navyhistory. org. au/ category/ navy- day- byday/1942/page/2/. 75. Ibid. 76. Womack, 142–43. 77. Java Post, “Tjilatjap, het Duinker ken van Indië,” http://javapost.nl/2014/ 04/ 04/ tjilatjap- het- duinkerken- vanjava/. 78. Mosher, 16–17. 79. Ibid. 80. Bosscher, Volume 2, 340. 81. Mosher, 16. 82. Mosher, 16–17. 83. The U.S. Army reached an agreement with Qantas Airlines to charter the large S.23 Empire Flying Boats Circe, Coriana, Coriolanus and Corinthian for evacuation duties of American personnel between Tjilatjap and Broome, Australia. From February 22 to 28 they made 10 trips between Tjilatjap and Broome carrying out a total of 88 passengers and seven tons of cargo (Gunn, 56). Circe, Coriana and Corinthian were all lost while under charter (Gunn, 67). Barnes, 331. 84. Glassford, 62. 85. Gunn, 56. 86. Bosscher, Volume 2, 339. 87. Zantvoort, “Interview with Franciscus Johannes Zantvoort,” www.oocit

Chapter Notes—32 ies. org/ dutcheastindies/ zantvoort. html. 88. The destroyer’s crew was given the option of surrender, joining a guerilla band then being formed by Lieutenant J.G.M.D. van Grondelle or going aboard the merchant ship Sloterdijk, which although the fastest ship in harbor, had few life rafts and little food. When asked what he planned to do, Lieutenant-Commander Schotel simply answered, “That is none of your business.” But when pressed by an officer, he replied that he intended to return to his wife and children in Soerabaja. Witte de With’s XO elected to join him; most of the others joined the guerillas to whom all their weapons were turned over. Only two crewmen and a female civilian (the wife of a MLD pilot already evacuated to Australia) elected to go aboard Sloterdijk. They each purchased an inner tube from a bike shop and walked toward the harbor. En route, they saw sailors wandering aimlessly while others simply drank and sang. No one was in command. At the harbor, Lieutenant-Commander suddenly reappeared aboard a barge. Definite orders had come through and he now ordered everyone to report for “mandatory evacuation.” However, he refused to let the woman board the barge. In protest, one of the sailors refused to board if she were not allowed to join them and things became tense. Schotel threatened to shoot the man before the unknown female voluntarily left the group to seek evacuation elsewhere. Java Post, “Tjilatjap, het Duinkerken van Indië,” http://javapost. nl/ 2014/ 04/ 04/ tjilatjap- het- duinker ken-van-java/. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid. 91. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 5. 92. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 92. 93. Bosscher, Volume 2, 339. 94. These included a large number of senior-level administrative staff from Bandoeng. 95. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 86. 96. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 89. 97. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 11. 98. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 91. 99. Contemporary Japanese records detailing the seizure also stated that there were “250 marines and 250 student sailors on board.” There were no marines and the evacuees consisted of trainees and regular KM personnel. 100. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 104–05. 101. 1450 Java Standard Time. 102. Presumably this was done because the cruisers, with their larger per-

sonnel complements, were better prepared to spare the manpower needed for prize crews. 103. Bosscher, Volume 2, 340 and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 100. 104. Fisk, 83–88. 105. Fisk, 89. 106. Among this first batch of evacuees to load were the previously disorganized men, of whom, LieutenantCommander J.J. Logger had taken command at the Soerabaja train station the previous days. 107. Bezember, Volume 1, 738. 108. Van Popta, 54–57. 109. Bezemer, Volume 1, 738. 110. Bakker, 132–35; Bosscher, Volume 2, 340; and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 101. 111. The 650 seamen included the 200 cadets under the command of Lieutenant Felger whom had arrived from Soerabaja the previous day. 112. Bosscher, Volume 2, 340; Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 100; and van Popta, 54–57. 113. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 102–04. 114. They also included a party of deserters of unknown nationality who boarded without orders and simply stayed. 115. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 88. 116. Bezemer, Volume 1, 743. 117. The crewmen from Marblehead consisted of 12 seriously wounded sailors, most of whom were too badly injured to walk so they were brought aboard as stretcher cases under the command of USN Commander C.M. Wassell, MD. Because they would be unable to swim if the ship were sunk, Prass did not want to bring them aboard. But he eventually relented as his orders were to evacuate naval personnel from Java. 118. Bezemer, Volume 1, 742. 119. Ibid. 120. Janssens was equipped with two 50mm deck guns for submarine defense. Just prior to sailing she was also fitted with two twin 7.7mm machine mounts salvaged from an abandoned Dutch PBY. 121. Dunn, 129. 122. They stated that they would see about getting some form of escort for the Janssens. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 102–04. 123. Bezemer, Volume 1, 744. 124. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 104–05. 125. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 99–100. 126. Bezemer, Volume 1, 728–29. 127. Bezemer, Volume 1, 729. 128. It is unclear if Enggano’s crew remained aboard or went ashore. But since many of Tawali’s crew apparently deserted in Tjilatjap, it would make

sense that the Chinese crew would have remained aboard. 129. Bezemer, Volume 1, 729. 130. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 104–05. 131. Gill, 1939–42, 631. 132. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 104–05. 133. Bosscher, Volume 2, 323 and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 114. 134. Bozuwa was the commander of all MLD forces on Java. 135. As head of the KM’s mine warfare branch Rinkhuyzen was a highvalue prisoner for the Japanese. He had detailed knowledge, including numbers and locations, of all minefields laid in the NEI before and after the outbreak of war. Captured by the Japanese, he was tortured over a period of three days. Although the Japanese extracted all of his teeth, he steadfastly refused to divulge any information, instead insisting that he had merely been a crewman aboard a minesweeper. Email from Juus Piek (grandson of J.J.H. Rinkhuyzen), July 28, 2013. 136. Bezemer, Volume 1, 746. 137. Bezemer, Volume 1, 746, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 117. 138. United Press International and Associated Press, respectively. 139. Bosscher, Volume 2, 324, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 116. 140. “De Ondergang van de Poelau Bras.” http://home.planet.nl/~persson/WW-II/WW%20II.html. 141. Bosscher, Volume 2, 324, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 116. 142. Those onboard Poelau Bras had not accounted for the possibility of carrier-based attack. The identity of the planes is unclear. But because they were dive bombers, they were most likely Aichi “Vals” from Hiryu or Soryu, which were operating south of Java at the time. Bezemer, 745–46. 143. Dunn, 135. 144. Dunn, 135. 145. Bozuwa, 112–14. 146. Chenoweth, “Chapter III: They Call Them War Correspondents.” www. 54warcorrespondents-kia-30-ww2.com/ chapter3.html. 147. Captain Bozuwa was one of those in the water and had to very forcefully “pull rank” in order to be brought aboard one of the lifeboats. 148. Dunn, 135. 149. Bozuwa, 112–14. 150. All three lifeboats reached the Sumatra shore over the next four to six days, where the survivors were soon captured by the Japanese. 151. Bosscher, Volume 2, 324, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 116. 152. Bezemer, Volume 1, 736.

341 153. Ibid. 154. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 102. 155. The USN personnel consisted of Lieutenant C.B. Smiley, Lieutenant F.E. Clark and seven enlisted personnel from USS Stewart who had been tasked with destroying that ship in the ME; three wounded sailors who had been injured in the Badoeng Strait and just released from Soerabaja Central Hospital); and one wounded crewman from Marblehead. Alford, 244–45, and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 102. 156. Bosscher, Volume 2, 339, and Helfrich, Volume 2, 438. 157. Bezemer, Volume 1, 736. 158. Van Popta, 54–57. 159. Plowman 339–41. 160. Most likely RAF/RAAF air crews and ground personnel, as ground troops were not being evacuated. 161. The women and children were given cabin space while the men remained on deck. The only exception was Doctor Foote, who received a cabin due to his status. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 87. 162. Bezemer, Volume 1, 724. 163. Bezemer,Volume 1, 724–25. 164. Bakker, 127. 165. Ibid. 166. Nortier, Kuijt and Groen, “De Japanse Aanval Op Java,” 178. 167. Tydeman was a militarized survey vessel which Helfrich ordered to Tjilatjap at the end of January to survey the roadstead and river mouth. She later served as an accommodation ship for GM personnel. On March 4 Tydeman was near-missed and then hit directly and sunk. Captain G.M.C. Blok later assembled his Indonesian crew at the harbor office and told them to make their way to the main shipping office at Bandoeng or Batavia or to one of the military installations at Soerabaja. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 108. 168. Nortier, Kuijt and Groen, “De Japanse Aanval Op Java,” 178. 169. Ibid. 170. Ibid. 171. Bakker, 131, 318, and “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941– March 9th, 1942).” kohtaotecdivers. com/wrecks/ww2-wrecks.html. 172. Bakker, 318, Mark, 155, and Swiggum and Kohli, “Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij 1888–1967.” www. theshipslist.com/ships/lines/kpm.shtml. 173. Bakker, 131 and Swiggum and Kohli, “Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij 1888–1967.” www.theshipslist. com/ships/lines/kpm.shtml. 174. Bakker, 131. 175. Bakker, 131, 318; Mark, 145; and Lettens and Nico. “SS Barentsz (1942).” http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck. aspx?107415. 176. Bezemer, Volume 1, 747, Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 328, and Tony, “Dayak (1942).” www.wrecksite.eu/ wreck.aspx?59280.

342 177. Bakker, 140. 178. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 324. 179. Bakker, 319 and Bloody Shambles, Volume, 324. 180. Bezemer, Volume 1, 747, and Mark, 176. 181. Bakker, 140–41, and Swiggum and Kohli, “Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij 1888–1967.” www.the shipslist.com/ships/lines/kpm.shtml. 182. Bakker, 141, 320, and Mark, 156. 183. Bakker, 141, 320 and Bloody Shambles, 328. 184. Bakker, 140, and Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 324. 185. “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941–March 9th, 1942).” kohtaotecdivers. com/ wrecks/ ww2wrecks.html. 186. Bakker, 141, and “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941– March 9th, 1942).” kohtaotecdivers. com/wrecks/ww2-wrecks.html. 187. Bakker, 131. 188. Bakker, 321 and “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941– March 9th, 1942).” kohtaotecdivers. com/wrecks/ww2-wrecks.html. 189. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 328; “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in

Chapter Notes—32 the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941–March 9th, 1942).” koh taotecdivers.com/wrecks/ww2-wrecks. html. www. theshipslist. com/ ships/ lines/knsm.shtml. 190. kohtaotecdivers.com/wrecks/ ww2-wrecks.html and Tony, “Overijssel (1942).” www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx? 59310. 191. Bakker, 141. 192. Bakker, 141, and Bezemer, Volume 1, 747. 193. Bakker, 141, 321; Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 327 and “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941– March 9th, 1942).” kohtaotecdivers. com/ wrecks/ ww2- wrecks. html. www. theshipslist. com/ ships/ lines/ knsm. shtml. 194. Bakker, 322; “Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia (December 7th, 1941–March 9th, 1942).” kohtaotecdivers.com/ wrecks/ ww2- wrecks. html. www. theshipslist. com/ships/lines/knsm.shtml html and “Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij 1888–1967.” www.theshipslist.com/shi ps/lines/kpm.shtml. 195. Bakker, 322, and Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 327. 196. Bakker, 141, 322, and Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 327. 197. Bakker, 140, and “Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij 1888–1967.”

www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/kpm. shtml. 198. Gillekens, February 29–March 1, 1942. 199. Castle, 158–59. 200. Castle, 158–61. 201. Gillekens, February 29–March 1, 1942. 202. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 92–93. 203. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 324; Bosscher, Volume 2, 342; and Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 88. 204. It is important to note that not all sources agree that this naval bombardment. Some state that Japanese warships shelled the port, while others state that it was bombed by a second wave of Japanese aircraft. 205. www.netherlandsnavy.nl, Don Kehn, Jr., August 9, 2011. 206. Nortier, Kuijt and Groen, “De Japanse Aanval Op Java,” 178. 207. Gillekens, February 29–March 1, 1942. 208. Nortier, Kuijt and Groen, “De Japanse Aanval Op Java,” 178. 209. Java Post. “Tjilatjap, het Duinkerken van Indië.” http://javapost.nl/ 2014/04/04/tjilatjap-het-duinkerkenvan-java/. 210. Gillekens, February 29–March 1, 1942.

211. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 328. 212. Nortier, Kuijt and Groen, “De Japanse Aanval Op Java,” 178–79. 213. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 327. 214. Bakker, 131. 215. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 114. 216. Castle, 161–62. 217. Ibid. 218. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 107–08. 219. Bakker, 127. 220. Bosscher, Volume 2, 343. 221. Ibid. 222. Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, 324. 223. K-XI and K-XIV. 224. Given that she was the largest remaining ship in port, this blockship was mostly likely Valk. It would explain Schokking’s comment to Jardine that she was to be used in that capacity and his obstinacy in making sure that the patrol boat remained in port. 225. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 96. 226. The island directly across the channel from Tjilatjap. 227. Het Uitwijken van Schepen en Vliegtuigen en het Evacueeren van Marine Personeel, 94.

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Newspaper Articles “Allied Forces Occupy Portuguese Timor.” The Canberra Times, 19 December 1941, p. 1. “Allied Landings in West Indies Excites Japan.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 May 1940, p. 8. “Anglo-Japanese Conference? Political Issues in Far East.” The Straits Times, April 20, 1937, Page 11. “Barrier Reef to Japan.” The Canberra Times, 7 October 1941, p. 2. “Batavia Forbids Civilians Able to Work to Quit City.” Christian Science Monitor, 23 January 1942, p. 7. “British Assure Japs of Status Quo in East Indies.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 14 May 1940, p. 6. “British Troops in East Indies, Japanese Hear.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 June 1940, p. 1. “Dutch Deal Proposed.” The Washington Post 1 Mar. 1937, Page 3. De Java Bode, October 2, 1937. De Java Bode, August 8, 1938. “Destruction Work by Dutch Renders Big Port Worthless.” The Deseret News, March 17, 1942. “Dutch Apology to Japan.” The Canberra Times, 24 June 1940, p. 1. “Dutch Destroyer Seizes Hungarian Merchant Ship.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 15 June 1941, p. 7. “Dutch East Indies Hopes to Solve Own Problems Under Shadow of U.S. Fleet.” The Washington Post, 23 June 1940, p. B6. “Dutch Envoys See Roosevelt.” The Canberra Times, 9 February 1942, p. 3. “Dutch Firmness: Trade Talks with Japan.” The West Australian, April 15, 1941, p. 2. “Dutch Naval Mission Seeks Arms in U.S.” The Washington Post, 18 February 1939, p. 2. “Dutch Will Fight to Very End.” Sydney Morning Herald, March 6, 1942. “East Indies Bans Rubber Sales to Japan.” The Canberra Times, 30 June 1942, p. 1. “East Indies Prepared to Fight If Necessary.” The Canberra Times, 28 June 1941, p. 3. “Equipped for Defence.” The Canberra Times, 29 January 1941, p. 2. “Fishing Incident; Warship Fires on Boat.” The Canberra Times 19 Oct. 1937, Page 1. “French Ship Seized.” The Canberra Times, 5 August 1941, p. 1. “French Cargo, Coal Treated as Contraband.” The Canberra Times, 8 August 1941, p. 1.

346 “Hands Off Dutch Indies: Hull.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 18 April 1941, p. 1. “Hull Calls for Hands Off Policy in Dutch East Indies Affairs.” Los Angeles Times, 18 April 1941, p. A. “Indies Resent Japanese Interference.” The Canberra Times, 24 January 1941, p. 4. “Japan Contracts for Air Base on East Indies Island.” Christian Science Monitor, 14 October 1941, p. 8. “Japan Makes Demand on East Indies.” The Canberra Times, 31 May 1941, p. 1. “Japan Reveals Concern Over Dutch East Indies.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 16 April 1940, p. 4. “Japan Urges Dutch to Desert Allies.” The Canberra Times, 10 January 1942, p. 1. “Japanese Add to Naval Force in Siam Gulf.” The Washington Post, 19 February 1941, p. 2. “Japanese Begin Occupation of Bases in IndoChina.” The Canberra Times, 26 July 1941, p. 1. “Japanese Exodus from East Indies.” The Canberra Times, 13 June 1941, p. 1. “Japan Expected to Drive to South.” The Washington Post, 18 July 1941, p. 6. “Japan Expected to Land 40,000 in Indo-China.” The Washington Post, 26 July 1941, p. 1. “Japanese Predict Crisis in Indies.” The Canberra Times, 10 June 1941, p. 1. “Japanese Threat to Allies.” The Canberra Times, 16 April 1940, p. 1. “Japanese Warning to Powers.” The Canberra Times, 14 June 1941, p. 3. “Japan Demanded Capitulation of East Indies.” The Canberra Times, 10 September 1941, p. 1. “Lease Advocated in Dutch New Guinea.” The Canberra Times, 25 March 1937, p. 1. “Must Use Force in Dutch Indies, Says Jap Paper.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 October 1940, p. 4. “Naval Building in Java.” The Canberra Times, 19 May 1941, p. 3. “Netherlands East Indies Cry for More Planes.” Los Angeles Times, 26 April 1941, p. 16. “Netherlands East Indies Defence Plans.” The Canberra Times, 22 April 1940, p. 2. “Netherlands Ready for Invasion.” The Canberra Times, 16 August 1940, p. 1. “Netherlands Rejects New Order Plan.” The Canberra Times, 8 February 1941, p. 1. “Portuguese Sovereignty Violated.” The Canberra Times, 23 February 1942, p. 1. “Pro-Japanese Papers Suppressed.” The Canberra Times, 23 August 1941, p. 2. “Survivors of Java Sea Battle: Stoker Tells Thrilling Story.” The Argus (Melbourne), 18 March 1942, p. 3. “To Act If Allies Enter Indies, Japanese Say.” The Washington Post, 13 May 1940, p. 3. “Tokyo Paper Hints Move on East Indies.” The Washington Post, 1 August 1941, p. 3. “Tokyo Press Attacks.” The Canberra Times, 5 February 1941, p. 1. “1,200 Flee Java for Australia in ‘Last Steamer.’” Chicago Daily Tribune, 8 March 1942, p. 3. “2 Netherlands Groups Here to Shop for Arms.” Chicago Daily Tribune, 19 February 1939, p. 2.

Combat Reports Action Report—USS Houston (CA 30) on the Battle of the Sunda Strait, 28 February 1942. Arthur L. Maher, Captain, U.S. Navy. November 20, 1945.

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Index A 61, 277 Abbekerk 156–157, 295, 337, 344 ABDA 3, 34, 52, 80, 99, 100–108, 113, 117, 120–125, 129, 132, 134– 135, 139, 140–142, 146, 148–149, 151–152, 154–156, 158–159, 169– 171, 173–177, 179–180, 189–190, 193, 196, 213, 236, 241, 318; ABDAAIR 3, 102, 130, 134; ABDA-ARM 3; ABDA-FLOAT 3, 102 ABDA-AIR 3, 102, 130, 134 ABDA-ARM 3 ABDA-FLOAT 3, 102 Abraham Crijnssen 52, 61, 276, 280– 282, 338–339 Achilles 89 Africa Maru 123 Aida 113 Aiken, F.L.J. van 191 airfields: Den Passar 169, 171, 177, 190, 261, 324; Kendari II 122–123, 135; Malang 71, 78, 121, 134, 170, 199, 272, 302; Ngoro 134, 191, 195–196, 199, 201, 205, 210, 241; P.1 126, 129– 130, 141–142, 144, 149, 169, 323; P.2 130, 142, 144, 149, 169, 236, 323; Perak 43, 78–79, 134, 163–166, 197, 272–273, 275–279, 281–283, 326; Sinkawang II 115, 117, 119, 121 Akagisan Maru 243 Akebono 123, 139, 177, 184, 193, 249, 320 Akigumo 160 Akita Maru 109 Akitsu Maru 243 Albatross 278 Aldebaran 63, 276, 278 Aldegonda (TAN 5) 275 Alden 110, 158, 188–190, 192, 208– 209, 213, 219, 225, 241, 251, 325, 335–336, 343 Aldridge, Clayson 292–293, 308 Alfoer 309 Alior 58, 61–62, 64, 91, 158, 178, 182, 289, 326, 339 Amatsukaze 90, 124, 180, 193, 199, 205, 216, 252–253, 263–264 Ambo 275 Ambon 16, 18, 23, 25, 36–37, 58–60, 72, 74, 78, 97, 106–107, 114, 122– 124, 160, 169, 177, 190, 303, 314, 320, 337, 346 American ships, civilian: Hawaiian Planter 167; Liberty 87, 109, 269, 320, 347; Lillian Luckenbach 93; Mauna Loa 158–160, 162; Meigs 158–160, 162; Mount Vernon 109; Portmar 158, 160, 162; President Polk 166–167; Ruth Alexander 98; Sea Witch 189–190, 333; Trinity

110, 188; Tulagi 158, 160, 162; Willard A. Holbrook 189, 321 American ships, warships: Alden 110, 158, 188–190, 192, 208–209, 213, 219, 225, 241, 251, 325, 335–336, 343; Ashville 268, 305; Barker 132, 144, 147, 169, 345; Black Hawk 36, 188; Boise 119, 159, 189, 347; Bulmer 119, 121, 132, 144, 147, 153; Canopus 46, 63, 96, 311, 321; Chicago 106, 344–346; Childs 122–123; Colorado 106; Concord 130; Detroit 106; Edsall 89, 110, 158, 189, 237–240, 297, 333; Holland 181, 183, 269; Houston 36, 89, 119, 132, 135–139, 153, 158–159, 166–167, 188–190, 192–193, 198– 199, 203–204, 206, 208–213, 215, 217–219, 222–223, 225–228, 230, 232–233, 241–243, 245–248, 257, 285–287, 291, 304, 321, 323, 326– 331, 334–336, 339, 344, 346; Indianapolis 106, 130, 180; John D. Edwards 132, 144, 147, 169, 174–175, 188–190, 192, 219, 241, 251, 335; John D. Ford 119–120, 169–173, 175, 188–190, 192–193, 208, 210, 213, 216, 219, 222, 225, 241, 251, 324, 327; Langley 155, 189–190, 237–240, 267–268, 296, 333, 335, 344; Lark 90, 296; Liberty 87, 109, 320; Marblehead 36, 83, 119, 121, 132, 135–139, 147, 189, 232, 304, 341; Minneapolis 106, 130; Otus 139; Parrott 119–120, 144, 169–170, 174–175; Paul Jones 109, 120, 132, 188–189, 192, 225, 241, 251, 335; Peary 158–162; Pecos 135, 151, 167, 188, 239, 303, 344; Pensacola 130, 180; Perch 182, 263–264, 336, 345; Permit 10, 182, 260, 263, 325, 333, 336, 347; Phoenix 106, 189–190, 241, 347; Pickerel 117, 177–178, 182; Pike 177–178; Pillsbury 119, 132, 144, 147, 169–170, 174–175, 188– 189; Pope 119–120, 137, 169–174, 188–190, 196, 220, 224–225, 241, 248–251, 253, 259, 285, 324, 335; Porpoise 117, 182; Richmond 106; S-37 139, 181–182, 185–186, 203, 223, 228, 234–235, 253–254, 258– 259, 325, 327, 331–332, 335–336, 347; S-38 180, 182, 186, 192, 234– 235, 253, 259–260, 262, 336; S-39 164, 182; S-40 117, 182–183; S-41 180, 183, 186, 325, 347; Sailfish 182, 260–262, 336, 347; St. Louis 106; Salmon 182, 184, 261–262, 325, 336, 347; San Francisco 130, 166– 167, 180, 304, 315; Saratoga 106;

Sargo 181; Saury 117, 182, 185, 262, 325, 336, 347; Sculpin 134, 181; Sea Witch 189–190, 333; Seadragon 181; Seal 95, 182, 184–185, 262– 263, 275, 288, 325, 336, 347; Sealion 90; Searaven 182; Seawolf 171, 177, 187, 323–324, 347; Skipjack 182, 263; Snapper 181; Spearfish 117, 182–184, 325, 347; Stewart 132, 144, 147, 169–170, 174–176, 189, 197, 341, 344; Stingray 181; Sturgeon 117, 181; Swordfish 123, 181–182; Tarpon 177–178, 181; Trenton 106, 130; Tulsa 268–269, 296, 337, 349; Wake 83, 110, 180, 213–214, 330, 336; Whipple 132, 138, 189, 225, 237– 240, 333; Whippoorwill 90, 296; William B. Preston 90, 160–162 Ammeraal, C. 127 Anambas Islands 72, 84, 179–180, 182–183 Anastasia 288 Anking 101, 237, 285, 300–301, 306, 333, 335, 339 ANZAC 3, 134, 155, 189 Aotaka 122 Arashi 295–296, 298, 301, 303 Arashio 169–171, 173, 175, 190, 262, 281, 320, 325, 336 Ardjoeno 62, 64, 276–277, 282, 290, 338 Arend 18, 63–64, 73, 75, 91, 289, 291 Arnold, Calvin D. 167, 323 Arnold, Henry 156 Aroe 61, 289, 339 Asagai 131 Asagumo 192, 209, 217–218, 221, 327, 330–331 Asahai Maru 18 Asahan (BEN 3) 309 Asakaze 109, 245 Asami Maru 120–121 Asashio 169–175, 190, 324–325, 336 Ashigara 184, 193, 249–251, 325, 335 Ashville 268, 305 Asosan Maru 92 Atago 92, 184, 301, 303, 340 Athene 130, 155, 189 Atjeh 277, 309–310 Atlas Maru 243 Atsuta Maru 243 Auby 288, 339 Augustina 285, 339, 348 Ayanami 95, 324 Ayatosan Maru 243 B 61, 277 Bach-Kolling, H.F. 108–109, 187, 198, 256–257

351

Badoeng Strait 7, 53, 170–171, 173– 176, 182, 188–190, 232, 323–325, 327, 332, 336, 341, 346, 348 Bali Strait 186, 190, 248, 251, 265, 274, 280, 325, 335, 339, 348 Balikpapan 1, 18, 23, 36, 58–60, 71, 74, 76, 78, 83, 107, 111–112, 114–122, 129, 132, 139, 151, 153, 159, 179, 181–182, 190–192, 199–200, 203, 210, 221, 254, 277, 320, 333, 346, 349 Ballarat 149, 300, 302, 321, 339–340 Ban Hong Long 158 Banckert 18, 25, 37, 50–51, 91, 107, 125, 132, 144–145, 165, 169, 177, 197, 241, 274–275, 277, 302, 305, 324, 326 Bandjarmasin 117, 121, 151, 295, 337 Bandoeng 11, 28–29, 46, 70–71, 80, 101, 155, 193, 199, 202, 205, 268– 270, 284, 286–289, 292, 295, 303, 306, 311, 338, 341 Bangkalan 61, 64, 164, 277 Bangkok 26, 28–29, 82–84, 125 Banjoewangi 170, 280, 324 Banka 25, 59, 68, 78, 107, 112, 114, 122–123, 128, 132–133, 141–147, 149, 151, 181, 206, 236–237, 257, 309, 322, 324, 333 Banka 309 Banka Strait 59, 107, 133, 141–145, 147, 149, 151, 181, 206, 236–237, 322 Bantam 1, 61–62, 168, 237, 243–246, 258, 285, 287, 289, 334–336, 339, 344 Barentsz 309–310, 341, 349 Barker 132, 144, 147, 169, 345 Barossa 160, 162 Batak 165, 277 Batavia 3, 9–16, 18, 20–23, 25–30, 37, 39, 42, 45–46, 62, 70, 74, 78, 80, 83, 99–101, 103–104, 107–108, 111, 125–127, 130, 158, 167, 183, 191, 202, 222, 225, 233, 242, 284, 286– 287, 291–292, 295, 298, 300, 313, 315, 319–321, 333–336, 340–341, 345–348 Bats, A.S. de 76 Bawean Island 78, 108, 127, 129, 181, 185–186, 192, 205, 220, 228, 233, 248, 254, 256, 260, 262, 323, 327, 332 Baynain 112–113 Beatrix 113, 275 Belang 277 Belawan 127, 129, 275 Bell, Gerald 167 Bellatrix 19, 63, 149, 286, 289, 291 Bendigo 89, 149, 300, 302, 305, 321

352 Bengalen 275 Benkalis 275 Benkoelen 23, 143–144, 314 Bennink, J. 136, 176, 206, 216, 226, 230, 231, 235, 253, 321–324, 328, 330–332, 346 Berends, R.C. 301 Berg, G.A. 76, 317, 339, 349 Berkum, A.E. van 128 Bermingham, John 161 Besançon, H.C. 47 Biaro 277 Bientjes, J.A. 146–147, 211 Bij, A.J. de 147–148, 322 Bik, Mulock van der Vlies 47, 257 Billiton Island 24, 91, 132, 149, 243, 291 Binford, Thomas 170, 174, 193, 196, 219–220, 225, 251–252, 326–327, 331 Bintoehan 295–296, 301 Black Hawk 36, 188 Blinn, W.C. 119, 220, 225, 249–251 Blücher (German warship) 196, 326 Boelongan 127–128, 321 Boenakan 287, 290 Boes, Glenn H. 166, 323 Boetzelaer, C.W.T. van 47, 257–258 Bogor 61–62, 289, 339 Boise 119, 159, 189, 347 Boom, G.J. van der 30, 37, 113, 148, 160–162, 238, 288, 310 Boompjes Island 257 Bordvik (Norwegian ship) 272 Borneo 1, 5, 17–18, 31, 34–35, 38, 60–61, 63, 72–73, 75, 83, 90, 92– 94, 97–98, 100, 107–108, 112–118, 124–125, 141, 145–147, 151, 169, 179, 182, 186, 248, 251, 285, 291, 314, 320, 325, 335, 344–346, 348 Borneo Maru 320 Bos, A.F. 92 Bounder Roads 132, 134–135, 185 Bozuwa, G.G. 72, 102, 306–307, 341, 343, 346 Brazil Maru 243 Brereton, Lewis H. 156, 166 Brett, George 155, 189 Brink, B.J. ten 289 British Judge 151, 188, 237, 285, 300 British Motorist 160, 162 British ships, civilian: Barossa 160, 162; Baynain 112–113; British Judge 151, 188, 237, 285, 300; British Motorist 160, 162; City of Manchester 296, 303, 308, 337; Derrymore 142, 166–167; Duntroon 189–190; Francol 191, 237, 285, 300–301, 340, 349; Kangaroo 160; Kara Kara 160; Karangi 160; Kelat 162; Koala 160; Kookaburra 160; Lithgow 110; Loch Ranza 141–142, 167; Manunda 160, 162, 322; Manvantara 141, 150; Mavie 162; Neptuna 160, 162, 322; Pinna 143; Plancius 126– 127; Platypus 160, 162; Southern Cross 160; White Swan 287; Wollongong 142, 188, 285–286, 302, 321, 339; Yarra 107, 188, 237, 285, 300–303; Zealandia 160, 162 British ships, warships: Achilles 89; Anking 101, 237, 285, 300–301, 306, 333, 335, 339; Athene 130, 155, 189; Ballarat 149, 300, 302, 321, 339–340; Bendigo 89, 149, 300, 302, 305, 321; Burnie 89, 149, 300, 302, 305; Coongoola 160; Danae 83, 89, 107, 188–190, 236–237, 326, 332; Deloraine 110, 160–161;

Index Dragon 16, 83, 89, 107, 188–190, 236–237, 326, 332; Dragonfly 142; Durban 83–84, 89, 107, 130, 152; Electra 84–85, 88–89, 107, 142, 188, 190, 193, 203, 207, 209, 216– 218, 220, 224, 234, 253, 259, 300, 308, 330; Encounter 50, 84, 89, 91, 107, 133, 182, 188, 190, 193, 203, 207, 209, 217–218, 220, 222–223, 225, 227–228, 231, 241, 248–251, 253, 259, 261, 280, 285, 298, 305, 318, 325–326, 329–331; Enterprise 10, 14, 60, 106, 180, 190, 241; Exeter 89, 133, 139, 144, 146–147, 188–195, 198–199, 204–206, 208– 221, 224–225, 227, 232, 236, 241, 247–251, 253, 259, 274, 285, 320, 322, 327–328, 330–331, 333–336, 346, 348; Express 84, 88–89, 99– 100, 105, 107, 188; Gemas 237, 285, 300–301, 333; Goulburn 89, 300, 339–340; Grasshopper 142; Gunbar 160–161; Hermes 180; Hobart 133, 142, 144, 147, 188–191, 236–237, 326, 332, 343, 349; Indomitable 130, 155, 180, 189, 321; Jeram 149; Jumna 107, 142, 237, 285, 300; Jupiter 84, 89, 107, 109–110, 133, 141, 188, 190, 193, 197, 199, 203, 206–207, 209, 213, 216–218, 220, 222–226, 235, 257, 259, 286, 300, 332, 336; Kanimbla 91; Katoomba 110, 160, 162, 189–190; Kedah 141, 156; Ko Wang 149; Li Wo 142; Maryborough 89, 149, 300, 302, 308; ML 1063 287, 291; MMS 51, 237, 285, 300–301, 333, 340; Perth 188, 190, 193–194, 198, 204, 206, 208–209, 211–213, 215–219, 222– 223, 226, 228–230, 233–234, 241– 243, 245–247, 257, 261–262, 285– 287, 291, 304, 320, 325–326, 330–331, 334, 336, 339, 348–349; Peterel 83; Prince of Wales 35, 82– 89, 107, 319, 335, 339, 344; Rahman 149, 287, 291; Repulse 82–89, 107, 298, 319, 344; Scorpion 142; Scott Harley 298, 348; Scout 24, 82, 84, 89, 147, 188, 190, 200, 204, 217, 228, 236–237, 331; Sin Aik Lee 149, 287, 291; Stronghold 88–89, 107, 141, 188, 296, 298, 300–301, 303, 308; Swan 158–162, 287; Tenedos 84–85, 91, 188, 190, 236–237; Terka 160, 162; Thanet 82, 84, 89, 130–131, 321; Tolga 160, 162; Toowoomba 142, 300, 302, 321, 339–340; Truant 183, 186–187, 254, 332, 336, 346; Trusty 180, 183, 187, 254, 256, 325, 332; Vampire 84, 88–89, 107, 130– 131; War Sirdar 190–191, 237, 285; Warrego 158–161; Wato 162 Broek, J. van den 17, 191 Brooke-Popham, H.R.M. 33 Brown, Wilson 16, 106, 130, 144, 180, 318–319, 325, 336, 343–344, 346 Bruggink, G.M. 195 Brunstig, Th. 186, 256 Bryant, E.H. 185–186 Bulmer 119, 121, 132, 144, 147, 153 Burch, Joseph H. 166 Burgerhout, H.V.B. 72, 237–238 Burnie 89, 149, 300, 302, 305 Burnside, John L. 185, 262 Bussemaker, A.J. 40, 47, 91–92, 313– 317, 319, 343, 347 C 61, 277 Calcutta Maru 243

Callahan, Joseph 117 Campbell, Duncan 224, 227, 233, 316, 322, 343 Camphuijs 108 Cam Ranh Bay 32, 82, 92, 141, 179 Canopus 46, 63, 96, 311, 321 Casand, W.C.C. van 129 Castor 63–64, 276, 278, 321 Catlett, W.J. 162 Cavite Naval Yard 90, 163, 319 Celebes 3, 16, 21, 23, 31, 72, 74, 91, 97, 111, 114, 116, 119, 122–124, 133, 138, 151, 183–184, 186, 277–278, 287, 290, 314, 325, 335, 345 Celebes Coastal Navigation Company 3 Ceram 18, 61–62, 289, 339 Ch 7 93 Ch 9 141 Ch 11 113 Ch 12 113, 118 Chapple 260, 336 Cheribon 6, 289, 339 Chicago 106, 344–346 Childs 122–123 Chitose 90, 139, 285, 335 Chokai 82, 85–86, 141, 146, 179, 324 Chömpff, J.M.L. 50 Christmas Island 75, 110, 130, 188, 267 Churchill, Winston 27, 35, 102–103, 105, 152–156, 319, 322, 344 Cikot, P.J.M. 292, 311 Ciska 63, 165, 323 City of Manchester 296, 303, 308, 337 Clagett, H.B. 35 Cocos Island 190, 306 Coley, J.E. 208, 219, 327–328, 330– 331, 346 Colijn, A.H. 115 Collins, R.D. 107, 149, 156, 190, 231, 236, 241, 285–286, 300, 308, 327, 340, 347 Colombo 54, 65, 73, 89, 91, 128, 155, 183, 187, 189, 248, 254, 257, 268– 269, 271, 276, 282–283, 295–296, 298–301, 304, 306–307, 311, 333, 338 Colorado 106 Columbia 81, 134, 189, 241, 326, 344 Columbia Maru 243 Combined Striking Force (CSF) 132 Concord 130 convoys: DM.1 107; MS.5 189–190 Coongoola 160 Cooper, Duff 100, 120, 211–213, 219, 327–328, 330–331, 335, 346 Cooper, J.E. 346 Creutzberg, H. 105 Crietee, P.G. 307 Crommelin, R.M. 213 D 61, 277 Daan 288 Dainichi Maru 243 Dajak 309 Danae 83, 89, 107, 188–190, 236–237, 326, 332 Darvell, L. 102 Darwin 19–20, 79, 96, 106, 109–110, 119, 123, 130, 139, 152, 158–163, 165, 167, 177, 263, 267, 310, 322 Davao 90, 94, 97–98, 106, 111–113, 123, 183, 320, 326 De Bril Bank 183 Deketh, A.H. 47, 283 Dekker, J.P.A. 281, 338 Deloraine 110, 160–161 Den Passar 169, 171, 177, 190, 261, 324

Deneb 63, 129, 321 Derksema, M.A.J. 47, 186, 254 Derrymore 142, 166–167 De Ruyter 18, 20, 37, 52–54, 67–68, 73, 91, 107, 119, 132, 135–138, 144, 146–148, 166, 169–173, 176–177, 189, 192–194, 197–199, 203–206, 208–210, 212–213, 215–216, 218– 219, 222–226, 228–235, 241, 252– 253, 256–258, 316, 321–323, 326– 332, 335, 344, 346 Detroit 106 Dijirak (TAN 3) 108, 138, 320 Dijk, H.J. van 295–296 Dilly 158 Discovery Bank 181, 324 Djamoeang Reef 44, 166 Djampea 16, 62, 289, 339 Djember 58, 62, 64, 290, 339 Djombang 290, 339 DM.1 107 Dobbinga, F.H. 305 Don Isidore (Filipino ship) 162–163 Doorman, K.W.F.M. 72, 76, 80, 104, 113, 121, 132, 134–135, 137–139, 144–149, 151, 153, 159, 169–173, 177, 185, 190–206, 208–213, 215– 234, 236, 238, 241, 254, 256–257, 263, 265, 271, 299, 321–322, 324, 326–328, 330–333, 349 Dorif, P. 191 Douglas, G.L. 71, 82, 99, 208, 225, 316, 318, 337, 345 Draemel, M.F. 106 Dragon 16, 83, 89, 107, 188–190, 236–237, 326, 332 Dragonfly 142 Droste, C.B. 268, 316, 337, 340, 343 Duc, B.J.A. le 297 Duinker, S. 280, 340–341 Dunn, Archie 163 Duntroon 189–190 Durban 83–84, 89, 107, 130, 152 Dutch ships, civilian: Abbekerk 156– 157, 295, 337, 344; Aida 113; Alfoer 309; Ambo 275; Anastasia 288; Auby 288, 339; Augustina 285, 339, 348; Ban Hong Long 158; Banckert 18, 25, 37, 50–51, 91, 107, 125, 132, 144–145, 165, 169, 177, 197, 241, 274–275, 277, 302, 305, 324, 326; Bandjarmasin 295, 337; Bangkalan 61, 64, 164, 277; Banka 309; Batak 165, 277; Beatrix 113, 275; Belawan 127, 129, 275; Bengalen 275; Benkalis 275; Benkoelen 23, 143– 144, 314; Biaro 277; Bintoehan 295–296, 301; Boelongan 127–128, 321; Boenakan 287, 290; Bogor 61– 62, 289, 339; Camphuijs 108; Daan 288; Dajak 309; Duymaer van Twist 303–304; Enggano 295–296, 305, 337, 340; Flip 309; Generaal Verspyck 300, 302–303, 307–308; Gina 275; Hector 309; Ipoh 288, 339; Iris 143; Jagersfontein 295, 337; Jan van NISM 288; Johan 288, 343–345; Josephine 280; Jules 275; Juno 275; Kampar 109, 309; Khoen Hoea 307–308; Kinta 288; Kota Baroe 303–304, 337; Kota Gede 295, 307, 337; Kota Radja 128, 165, 197; Kraus 275, 309; Langkoeas 108, 319; Le Maire 295–296, 337; Liran 275; Loa-Koeloe 275; Makian 309; Mampawa (BEN 4) 309; Mandar 119, 309; Manipi 308–309; Manvatara 141, 150; Maras 309; Merkus 295–297, 337; Meroendo-

Index eng 288–289; Mijer 288; Milo 288; Modjokerto 295, 297, 337, 340, 349; Nias 127, 309; Nolly 275; Ophir 126–127; Orion 63, 117; Overijssel 309, 342, 349; Paneh 309; Parigi 295, 297, 301, 337; Parsifal 113, 115, 320; Pasir 309; Patras 109; Paul 288; Pehe 277; Peta 276, 280, 338; Pief 127–128; Pijnacker Hordijk 96; Plancius 126–127; Poelau Bras 268, 295, 303, 306–307, 341, 348; Poelau Tello 56, 128; Pollux (lightship) 276, 278; Rengat 309; Reteh 309; Rochussen 275; Rokan 309–310; Rolf 275; Semiramis 143; Siberg 144, 299, 307; Siberoet 288, 299; Sibigo 295, 337; Sibolga 111, 127, 288; Sigli 295, 297–298, 337; Silingdoeng 275; Simson 277; Sipirok 309, 311; Sipora 309–311; Sloet van de Beele 149–151; Sloterdijk 302–305, 337, 341; Speelman 275; Talang Akar 275; Tanimbar 108; Taroena 97, 278; Tata 275; Tawali 268, 273, 295–298, 303, 305–306, 337, 341; Teddy 288; Tembusu 275; Tinombo 295; Tjerimai 288, 290; Tjikandi 275; Tjikarang 275; Tjimanoek 301, 311; Tjisaroea 303–305; Toba 74, 111, 128, 295–296, 337; Toendjoek 288–289; Tohiti 309–310; Tomohon 295, 298, 308; Tomori 275; Toradja 295, 298, 303, 305, 337; Tosari 295, 337; van de Capellen 128; van der Hagen 309; van Diemen 275; van Goens 295, 337; van Imhoff 126–127, 321, 347; van Lansberge 133–134, 321; van Mastijn 112; van Meroengdoeng 288; van Neck 270, 276, 278; van Overstraten 111; van Rees 108, 266; van Riesbeeck 108; van Spilbergen 297, 337; van Waerwijck 288; Zaandam 268, 295–296, 298, 301, 304, 307– 308 Dutch ships, warships: A 61, 277; Abraham Crijnssen 52, 61, 276, 280–282, 338–339; Albatross 278; Aldebaran 63, 276, 278; Aldegonda (TAN 5) 275; Alior 58, 61–62, 64, 91, 158, 178, 182, 289, 326, 339; Ardjoeno 62, 64, 276–277, 282, 290, 338; Arend 18, 63–64, 73, 75, 91, 289, 291; Aroe 61, 289, 339; Asahan (BEN 3) 309; Atjeh 277, 309–310; B 61, 277; Banckert 18, 25, 37, 50–51, 91, 107, 125, 132, 144–145, 165, 169, 177, 197, 241, 275, 277, 302, 305, 324, 326; Bangkalan 61, 64, 164, 277; Bantam 1, 61–62, 168, 237, 243–246, 258, 285, 287, 289, 334–336, 339, 344; Barentsz 309–310, 341, 349; Belang 277; Bellatrix 19, 63, 149, 286, 289, 291; Bengalen 275; Bogor 61–62, 289, 339; C 61, 277; Canopus 46, 63, 96, 311, 321; Castor 63–64, 276, 278, 321; Ceram 18, 61–62, 289, 339; Cheribon 6, 289, 339; Ciska 63, 165, 323; Columbia 81, 134, 189, 241, 326, 344; D 61, 277; Dajak 309; Deneb 63, 129, 321; De Ruyter 18, 20, 37, 52–54, 67–68, 73, 91, 107, 119, 132, 135–138, 144, 146–148, 166, 169–173, 176–177, 189, 192–194, 197–199, 203–206, 208–210, 212–213, 215–216, 218– 219, 222–226, 228–235, 241, 252–

253, 256–258, 316, 321–323, 326– 332, 335, 344, 346; Dijirak (TAN 3) 108, 138, 320; Djampea 16, 62, 289, 339; Djember 58, 62, 64, 290, 339; Djombang 290, 339; Endeh 23, 62, 278, 286, 289–291, 339–340, 348; Enggano 62, 290; Eridanus 63, 276, 295; Evertsen 37, 50–52, 91, 107, 169, 189–190, 236–237, 241– 243, 246–247, 317, 326, 333–334, 349; Fak Fak 288, 290; Fazant 64, 75, 149, 168, 278, 289, 298, 334; Flores 7, 24, 54, 62–63, 151, 153, 158, 170, 177, 181–182, 184, 208, 258, 280, 288, 290, 339; Fomalhaut 63, 165, 278; Garoet 62, 269, 288, 290; Gedeh 62, 277, 324; Gemma 276, 278; Gouden Leeuw 37, 52, 59–60, 124, 198, 226, 276–278, 281–282, 338; Grissee 62, 288, 290; Holland 63, 165, 277; Hoofdinspecteur Zeeman 298; Isaac Sweers 41, 77, 81, 134, 189, 241, 299, 326, 340, 348; Jacob van Heemskerck 189, 241, 299–300, 340, 349; Jan van Amstel 61, 133, 276–277, 280– 282, 326, 338, 348–349; Janssens 18, 92, 268, 272–273, 276, 303– 306, 310, 340–341; Java 34, 37, 39, 41, 52–56, 67–69, 73, 84, 91, 107, 119, 125, 137, 142, 144, 146–147, 169–173, 176–177, 188–190, 192– 193, 197–198, 206, 209, 211–213, 215–216, 218, 220, 222, 225–226, 228–236, 241, 252–253, 256–257, 321–322, 324, 326–328, 330, 333, 335–336; Josefina (TAN 6) 275; KVII 48, 96, 108, 164, 181, 323; KVIII 48, 186, 254, 276, 282, 325; KIX 48, 108, 181, 186, 254, 256, 276, 282, 299, 325, 336, 349; K-X 47, 96, 106, 113, 181, 186, 256, 274, 324, 349; K-XI 48, 83, 108, 181, 183, 254, 276, 282–283, 299, 301, 342; K-XII 48, 83, 92, 94, 108, 181, 183, 254, 281–283, 299; K-XIII 83, 277, 283, 336; K-XIV 48, 93, 106, 117, 181, 257, 318, 336, 339, 349; K-XV 83, 106, 181, 257–258; K-XVI 48, 94; K-XVII 18, 48, 94, 318; KXVIII 18, 48, 106, 108, 117–120, 181, 254, 275, 277, 349; Kasuaris 278; Kawi 62, 276–277, 282; Koning der Nederlanden 275, 338; Korteinaer 19, 24–25, 37–38, 50, 91, 132, 147, 169–170, 189–190, 192, 196–199, 204–206, 209, 211–215, 220, 224, 226–228, 252, 272, 302, 328–330, 346; Krakatau 37, 59–60, 109, 135, 165, 168, 170, 176, 246, 276–277, 280, 283; Lawoe 62, 64, 277; Mampawa (BEN 4) 309; Martha 129; Merapi 58, 62, 288, 290; Merbaboe 58, 62, 65, 276, 282; Merel 64, 75, 149, 286, 289, 291, 334; Minjak (BEN 1) 276; Moera Boelian 276, 338; Moesie (BEN 2) 280; O-16 49, 83, 91–92, 94, 317– 318, 347; O-19 49, 83, 93, 108–109, 181, 183, 186–187, 198, 234, 254, 256–257, 263, 299, 318, 327, 336, 349; O-20 49, 94–95; OJR 1 57, 277, 280; OJR 2 57, 176; OJR 3 57, 176, 316; OJR 4 56–57, 277, 280; OJR 5 57, 277, 280; OJR 6 57, 277, 280; Op ten Noort 164–165, 197, 235, 252–253, 259, 323, 332, 335, 347, 349; Overijssel 309, 342, 349; P 9 57; P 37 58, 120–121, 142, 321;

P 38 58, 142; P 39 123, 142; P 40 58, 142; Paula (TAN 1) 147, 288; Pendopo (TAN 4) 275; Petronella (TAN 8) 258, 298; Piet Hein 18, 30, 37, 50, 91, 107, 125, 132, 139, 144, 147, 169–173, 176, 272, 302, 316–317, 324, 348; Pieter de Bitter 61, 133–134, 275–277, 281, 321, 338, 348; Pollux (patrol boat) 63; Poolster 18, 64, 72, 75, 176, 289; Prins van Oranje 37, 59–60, 113, 320; Pro Patria 59–60, 142–144; Ram 25, 42, 60, 64, 109, 136, 142, 183, 277, 338; Regulus 42, 60, 64, 277; Reiger 64, 75, 243–245, 286, 334; Rigel 37, 52, 59, 61, 64, 72, 149, 286, 288–289; Rindjani 62, 276, 282; Roggeveen 41–42, 275, 278–279; Salak 62, 277, 282, 290; Schouten 278; Semarang 45, 71, 148, 277, 292; Serdang 185, 278; Sirius 19, 63–64, 149, 168, 243–245, 298, 334; Slamat 62, 288, 290; Smeroe 62, 64–65, 276, 282; Soemba 52, 54, 91, 148–149, 168, 222, 280, 298–299; Soemenep 37, 59, 61, 277; Soerabaja 20, 54–55, 303, 316, 318; Sumatra 39, 41, 52– 54, 77, 81, 89, 132, 317, 321, 335; Tamako 278–279; TM 4 55, 170, 278–279, 316, 332, 336, 348; TM 5 170, 266, 278–280, 332, 336; TM 6 170, 278–279, 332, 336; TM 7 198, 265, 278–280, 332, 336, 338; TM 8 170, 198, 265–266, 278–279, 332, 336; TM 9 170, 278–280, 332; TM 10 170, 278–279, 332, 336; TM 11 165, 170, 278–279, 332, 336; TM 12 56, 278–279, 332, 336; TM 13 170, 278–279, 336; TM 14 278–279, 336; TM 15 170, 264, 266, 278– 279, 332, 336; Tohiti 309–310; Tosari 295, 337; Tromp 19, 37, 52– 53, 73, 91, 93, 107, 119, 125, 132, 135, 137, 139, 144, 147, 150, 169– 170, 174–176, 189, 252, 280, 320, 322, 324, 340, 348; Urania 2, 276, 278, 282, 338–339; Valk 18, 24, 64, 75, 158, 297, 304, 310–311, 342; Van Galen 51, 316–317; Van Ghent 25, 38, 50–52, 94, 107, 117, 132, 139, 144–145, 147, 150, 203, 316, 322, 326; Van Nes 37, 50–51, 91, 107, 127, 149–150, 302, 322, 348; Wega 63, 128–129; Willebrord Snellius 64, 165, 276, 278–279; Willem van der Zaan 37, 52, 60–61, 107, 237– 238, 267–268, 298, 303, 316, 333, 337; Witte de With 20, 37–38, 50– 52, 169, 177, 188–190, 192, 197– 198, 203–204, 213–218, 220, 224– 225, 241, 248, 275, 277, 302, 305, 316, 330–331, 333, 335, 338; Zuiderkruis 37, 63–65, 298, 340 Duymaer van Twist 303–304 Dwars in de Weg Island 246 Eastern Fleet 33–36, 82, 89, 179, 187– 189 Eastern Invasion Convoy 179–180, 185, 192, 200, 208, 252, 256, 261, 265–266, 327 Eastern Strike Force 3, 190 Eastwater Channel 37, 43, 59–60, 248, 251, 279–280, 282–283 Eccles, John D. 232, 346 Eck, S.C. Ritsema van 175 Eden, Anthony 35, 100, 347 Edsall 89, 110, 158, 189, 237–240, 297, 333

353 Egeter, H. 40, 315 Egusa, Takeshige 310 Eidsvold (Norwegian ship) 110–111, 320, 348 Electra 84–85, 88–89, 107, 142, 188, 190, 193, 203, 207, 209, 216–218, 220, 224, 234, 253, 259, 300, 308, 330 Encounter 50, 84, 89, 91, 107, 133, 182, 188, 190, 193, 203, 207, 209, 217–218, 220, 222–223, 225, 227– 228, 231, 241, 248–251, 253, 259, 261, 280, 285, 298, 305, 318, 325– 326, 329–331 Endau 130–131 Endeh 23, 62, 278, 286, 289–291, 339–340, 348 Endo, Keiyu 110 Enggano 62, 290, 295–296, 305, 337, 340 Ente van Gils, H.J. 201 Enterprise 10, 14, 60, 106, 180, 190, 241 Eridanus 63, 276, 295 Erie Maru 243 Erimo 243 Esveld, F.I. 327, 332 Eubank, Eugene 156 Evertsen 37, 50–52, 91, 107, 169, 189– 190, 236–237, 241–243, 246–247, 317, 326, 333–334, 349 Exeter 89, 133, 139, 144, 146–147, 188–195, 198–199, 204–206, 208– 221, 224–225, 227, 232, 236, 241, 247–251, 253, 259, 274, 285, 320, 322, 327–328, 330–331, 333–336, 346, 348 Exmouth Gulf 181, 183, 186, 251–252, 260, 269, 302 Express 84, 88–89, 99–100, 105, 107, 188 Fak Fak 288, 290 Far Eastern Council 187 Fazant 64, 75, 149, 168, 278, 289, 298, 334 Felger, S.E.C. 294, 341 Ferreira de Carvalho, Raul Lima 96 Fletcher, Jack 106 Flip 309 Florence D (Filipino ship) 160, 162– 163 Flores 7, 24, 54, 62–63, 151, 153, 158, 170, 177, 181–182, 184, 208, 258, 280, 288, 290, 339 Fomalhaut 63, 165, 278 Foote, Walter A. 13, 15, 28–29, 32, 103–105, 269, 292–293, 308, 313– 315, 319, 323 Force Z 82–89, 91, 344 Fowler, A.J. 229, 231, 327, 331 Francol 191, 237, 285, 300–301, 340, 349 Freeman, C.L. 263 Fubuki 92, 109, 131, 141, 245–246, 332, 334 Fuku Maru 38, 24 Furstner, J.T. 76–77, 105, 270, 317, 337 Fushimi Maru 243 Galbraith, W.J. 225 Galusha, Harry 170, 209–210 Garoet 62, 269, 288, 290 Gaspar Straits 37, 73, 93, 144–147, 150, 197, 322 Gebroeders Islands 144 Gedeh 62, 277, 324 Geen, Alexander van 197, 229 Geest, D.J.W. van 307

354 Gelder, J.A. de 195, 204 Gemas 237, 285, 300–301, 333 Gemma 276, 278 Generaal Verspyck 300, 302–303, 307–308 Genkai Maru 243 Genoa Maru 243 Gielis, G. 287 Gierman, B. 213 Gifu Maru 243 Gili Genteng Island 277 Gili Radja Island 281–282 Gill, G. Herman 343 Gillekens, G.H.V.L.A.G. 343 Gina 275 Glasgow Maru 243 Glassford, W.A. 101, 119, 151, 153, 155–156, 188, 190, 237, 241–242, 248, 251, 258–260, 268–269, 286, 302, 318, 333–335, 337, 340, 346– 347 Glover, John 161 Goebeng Barracks 271 “Gold Ships” 319 Goncalves Zarco (Portuguese warship) 96, 318 Gordon, O.L. 146, 192, 194, 208, 212–213, 216, 220, 232, 248–250, 332, 344, 348 Goro, Yoshii 172 Gortmans, L. 123 Goslinga, H.A. 280 Goslings, L.J. 302 Gouden Leeuw 37, 52, 59–60, 124, 198, 226, 276–278, 281–282, 338 Goulburn 89, 300, 339–340 Gouvernmentsmarine 3, 18, 24, 58, 63, 65, 72, 128–129, 165, 276, 298 Grand Hotel 101, 107 Grasshopper 142 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 8, 13, 24 Greeuw, C. de 280–281 Grissee 62, 288, 290 Grunderbeek, W.G.C. van 230 Guiot, L.F. 143–144 Gulf of Siam 37, 84, 92–93, 108, 183, 186, 256 Gunbar 160–161 Haarlem, G. van 199 Haas, G.J. de 195 Hafthor (Norwegian ship) 83 Hage, J. van 280 Haggard, H.A.V. 183, 187, 254, 325, 348 Haguro 111, 180, 185, 193, 204–213, 215–216, 218–219, 223, 228–229, 233–234, 249–250, 257, 320, 327, 335 Hai Tung (Norwegian ship) 83 Halldor (Norwegian ship) 82 Halong Naval Air Station 97, 114, 122 Halsey, W.F. 106, 180 Hamlin, H.S. 208 Hancock, Witt 307 Hancox, P.S.F. 245–246 Hara, Tameichi 179–180, 193, 205, 216, 236, 253, 263, 320, 324, 326– 328, 330–332, 335–336, 340, 343, 349 Harris, D.A. 153, 345 Hart, G.H.C. 9, 14, 313 Hart, Thomas 36, 82, 89, 99–100, 102–103, 105–107, 121, 125, 137– 139, 152–153, 183, 232, 318–322 Harukaze 245, 332, 334 Haruna 82, 85, 92, 122 Hasegawa, Shun 110

Index Hashimoto, Shintaro 141 Hassing, R. 209 Hatakaze 109, 244–245, 332, 334 Hatsuharu 123, 325–326 Hatsukaze 90, 199–200, 245, 263–264 Hatsuyuki 131, 245, 332 Have, J.J. van der 165, 273, 338 Hawaiian Planter 167 Hayashio 90, 295, 297 Hector 309 Heinan Maru 113, 243 Heito Maru 94 Hekking, A.M. 303 Helfrich, C.E.L. 17–20, 27–28, 36– 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 52, 58, 65, 74– 77, 80, 82–83, 89, 91–96, 99–107, 121, 124–125, 127, 129, 132–135, 137–138, 144, 146–149, 151–153, 155–156, 169–170, 176–177, 179– 183, 187–191, 193–196, 198, 200, 202–203, 205, 209, 211, 215, 221, 225, 232, 234, 236–237, 241–243, 246, 248, 251, 254, 256–257, 268– 271, 273, 276, 280, 283–284, 286, 289, 292, 296, 298–299, 303–305, 308, 310–311, 317–323, 325–327, 330, 332–335, 337, 341, 343–344, 349 Hendrikse, P.J. 72, 273 Hengst, H.W. 191 Heringa, C.W. 271, 316, 346 Hermes 180 Hest, Piet van 147 Heurn, J.A.N. 199, 204, 213, 330 Heynemann, N. 191 Hikawa Maru No. 2 335 Hipps, William 103 Hirose, Sueto 111 Hiryu 160–163, 310, 341 Hitler, Adolf 152 Hiyoshi Maru 24, 93–94 Hobart 133, 142, 144, 147, 188–191, 236–237, 326, 332, 343, 349 Hoeisan Maru 243 Hofuku Maru 243 Hokkai Maru 93–94 Hokke, C. 344 Hokumei Maru 243 Holland 63, 165, 181, 183, 269, 277 Holley, G.M. 186 Holthe, E.J. van 299–300 Hoofdinspecteur Zeeman 298 Horai Maru 243, 246 Horst, J.C. van der 281 Houston 36, 89, 119, 132, 135–139, 153, 158–159, 166–167, 188–190, 192–193, 198–199, 203–204, 206, 208–213, 215, 217–219, 222–223, 225–228, 230, 232–233, 241–243, 245–248, 257, 285–287, 291, 304, 321, 323, 326–331, 334–336, 339, 344, 346 Howden, H.H.L. 147, 236–237, 332– 333 Hudson, Lester J. 238 Huggers, J.A.W. 231 Hughes, Charles 161 Huijer, P.J.G. 149, 298 Hurd, K.C. 184 Hurst, Eric 231, 327 Hurt, D.A. 263 I-21 I-22 I-23 I-24 I-53 I-56 I-58

96, 109–110 96, 109–110 96, 109–110 96, 109–110 109, 280, 295–296 108–109, 142 85, 108–109, 237, 286

I-59 109–111, 122 I-60 109–110 I-62 92, 109, 296, 340 I-64 109, 111, 122 I-65 85, 92, 108–109, 122 I-66 92, 94, 109, 122 Ikazuchi 111, 122–123, 177, 250–251 Ilgen, G.A. 192, 198, 273 Imizu Maru (auxiliary minelayer) 111, 121 Inabasan Maru 144 Inazuma 111, 179, 184, 193, 249, 251 Indianapolis 106, 130, 180 Indochina ( Japanese occupation) 6, 15–16 Indomitable 130, 155, 180, 189, 321 Ipoh 288, 339 Iris 143 Isaac Sweers 41, 77, 81, 134, 189, 241, 299, 326, 340, 348 Ishizawa, Yutaka 25 Ito, Takeo 123 Itsukushima Maru 134 Izumo 83 Jackson, W.A. 204, 231, 327 Jacob van Heemskerck 189, 241, 299– 300, 340, 349 Jagersfontein 295, 337 Jalatarang (Indian ship) 111 Jan van Amstel 61, 133, 276–277, 280–282, 326, 338, 348–349 Jan van NISM 288 Janssens 18, 92, 268, 272–273, 276, 303–306, 310, 340–341 Japanese ships, civilian: Africa Maru 123; Akagisan Maru 243; Akita Maru 109; Akitsu Maru 243; Asahai Maru 18; Asami Maru 120–121; Asosan Maru 92; Atlas Maru 243; Atsuta Maru 243; Ayatosan Maru 243; Borneo Maru 320; Brazil Maru 243; Calcutta Maru 243; Columbia Maru 243; Dainichi Maru 243; Erie Maru 243; Fuku Maru 38, 24; Fushimi Maru 243; Genkai Maru 243; Genoa Maru 243; Gifu Maru 243; Glasgow Maru 243; Heinan Maru 113, 243; Heito Maru 94; Hikawa Maru No. 2 335; Hiyoshi Maru 24, 93–94; Hoeisan Maru 243; Hofuku Maru 243; Hokkai Maru 93–94; Hokumei Maru 243; Horai Maru 243, 246; Inabasan Maru 144; Itsukushima Maru 134; Joko Maru 18; Kamokawa Maru 261; Katori Maru 93, 318; Kehi Maru 313; Kinka Maru 92; Kizan Maru 243; Kogyo Maru 243; Koyo Maru 243; Kuretake Maru 120; Liverpool Maru 118; Maebashi Maru 243; Miike Maru 123; Miikesan Maru 243; Mizuho Maru 243; Momoyama Maru 243; Nana Maru 117, 120; Nichinan Maru 93; Nichiwa Maru 243; Nisso Maru 13; Nojima Maru 243; Pacific Maru 243; Reiyo Maru 243; Ryoyo Maru 123; Ryunan Maru 243; Sagami Maru 169– 171, 173; Sakura Maru 92, 243, 246; San Clemente Maru 134; Sasago Maru 169–172, 174–175; Shinshu Maru 243; Shofu Fu Maru 89; Somedono Maru 243; Sumanoura Maru 120; Suwa Maru 243; Sydney Maru 243; Taihei Maru 243; Tairyu Maru 109; Taishin Maru 314; Taizan Maru 92, 243; Taketoyo Maru 243; Tatsugami Maru 117;

Tatsukami Maru 120; Tatsuno Maru 243, 246; Tempei Maru 243; Tenno Maru 335; Tofuku Maru 243; Toho Maru 243; Tokei Maru No. 7 24; Tokiwa Maru 243; Tonan Maru 97; Toro Maru 92; Tosei Maru 243; Toyooka Maru 243; Tozan Maru 92; Tsukuishi Maru 122; Tsuruga Maru 118; Tsuyama Maru 243; Uchide Maru 243; Unyo Maru No. 2 94; Yae Maru 243; Yamamura Maru 123; Yamazuki Maru 243; Zenyo Maru 123; Zuiyo Maru 18, 243 Japanese ships, warships: Akebono 123, 139, 177, 184, 193, 249, 320; Akigumo 160; Amatsukaze 90, 124, 180, 193, 199, 205, 216, 252–253, 263–264; Aotaka 122; Arashi 295– 296, 298, 301, 303; Arashio 169– 171, 173, 175, 190, 262, 281, 320, 325, 336; Asagai 131; Asagumo 192, 209, 217–218, 221, 327, 330–331; Asakaze 109, 245; Asashio 169–175, 190, 324–325, 336; Ashigara 184, 193, 249–251, 325, 335; Atago 92, 184, 301, 303, 340; Ayanami 95, 324; Ch 7 93; Ch 9 141; Ch 11 113; Ch 12 113, 118; Chitose 90, 139, 285, 335; Chokai 82, 85–86, 141, 146, 179, 324; Erimo 243; Fubuki 92, 109, 131, 141, 245–246, 332, 334; Haguro 111, 180, 185, 193, 204–213, 215–216, 218–219, 223, 228–229, 233–234, 249–250, 257, 320, 327, 335; Harukaze 245, 332, 334; Haruna 82, 85, 92, 122; Hatakaze 109, 244–245, 332, 334; Hatsuharu 123, 325–326; Hatsukaze 90, 199–200, 245, 263–264; Hatsuyuki 131, 245, 332; Hayashio 90, 295, 297; Hiryu 160–163, 310, 341; I-21 96, 109–110; I-22 96, 109– 110; I-23 96, 109–110; I-24 96, 109– 110; I-53 109, 280, 295–296; I-56 108–109, 142; I-58 85, 108–109, 237, 286; I-59 109–111, 122; I-60 109–110; I-62 92, 109, 296, 340; I64 109, 111, 122; I-65 85, 92, 108– 109, 122; I-66 92, 94, 109, 122; Ikazuchi 111, 122–123, 177, 250– 251; Imizu Maru (auxiliary minelayer) 111, 121; Inazuma 111, 179, 184, 193, 249, 251; Izumo 83; Jintsu 90, 122–123, 177–178, 180, 185, 192, 199–200, 205, 211, 216– 221, 223–226, 228, 252, 258–260, 320, 325–326, 331, 336; Kaga 160, 162, 261, 310; Kamikawa Maru (seaplane tender) 92–93, 236, 244, 332; Kashii 84, 141; Kawakaze 193, 204, 249; Kinu 85, 220, 265–266, 325, 336–337; Kongo 82, 85–86, 92, 122, 207; Kumano 92, 332; Kuroshio 90, 139; Matsukaze 291; Maya 122, 296, 298, 301, 303; Michisio 169–171, 173, 175, 190, 325, 336; Mikuma 244–246, 332; Minegumo 192, 209, 217–218, 221, 330–331; Mizuho 139, 177, 243, 285, 335; Mogami 93, 150, 244– 246, 332; Murasame 209, 252–253; Myoken Maru (auxiliary gunboat) 123; Myoko 184, 193, 249–251, 320, 325, 335; Nachi 111, 180, 185, 193, 201, 203–209, 211–212, 215–216, 218–220, 223, 228–229, 233–234, 249–250, 257, 320, 328, 335; Nagara 122–123, 169–170, 187, 325–

Index 326; Nagasa 84; Naka 117–120, 180, 200–201, 205, 207–209, 216–217, 220–221, 223, 226, 228, 231, 261; Natori 185, 243, 245, 332; Natsugumo 192, 200–201, 204, 217, 327; Natsushio 139; Nowaki 295–296, 298, 301, 303; Oshio 90, 169–175, 190, 320, 324–325, 336; P-1 290; P2 291; P-34 122–123, 177; P-36 111, 117, 321; P-37 111, 117; P-38 111, 113, 117; P-39 112, 166; RO-34 109, 133; Ryujo 90, 141, 146–147, 150, 179, 236, 244, 251, 285, 290–291, 332, 339; Sagiri 84, 92, 94; Samidare 209, 217; Sanuki Maru (aircraft tender) 111, 121; Sanyo Maru (aircraft tender) 111, 139; Sazanami 193, 264; Sendai 84, 130–131, 141, 207, 243, 332; Shimushu 84, 141; Shinonome 92–93, 349; Shiokaze 90, 291; Shirataka 90, 332; Shirayuki 131, 245, 332; Sokaitei 84; Soryu 160–162, 310, 341; Suzukaze 134; Suzuya 92, 332; Takao 92, 236, 238, 295–296, 301, 303, 308, 310, 345; Tatara 83; Tatsumiya Maru (auxiliary minelayer) 84, 94; Tokitsukaze 123, 216, 330; Tsurumi 243, 258, 336; Umikaze 177, 179, 200–201, 204, 220; Urunami 95; Ushio 193, 264, 336, 344; W-1 67–68, 73, 131; W-2 68, 246; W-3 94; W-4 68, 73, 131; W-7 68; W-8 67–68, 73; W-9 124; W-11 67–68, 73, 124; W-12 67–68, 73, 124, 148, 322, 326; W-13 67–68, 114; W-14 68, 73, 114; W-15 68, 114, 120; W-16 114; W-17 114; W-18 114; Wakataka 111, 121; Yamakaze 113, 134, 193, 249; Yudachi 209, 217; Yugiri 95, 131, 332; Yukikaze 123, 199–200, 235; Yura 92–93, 243, 257, 332 Jardine, A.M. 309, 311, 343 Java 34, 37, 39, 41, 52–56, 67–69, 73, 84, 91, 107, 119, 125, 137, 142, 144, 146–147, 169–173, 176–177, 188– 190, 192–193, 197–198, 206, 209, 211–213, 215–216, 218, 220, 222, 225–226, 228–236, 241, 252–253, 256–257, 321–322, 324, 326–328, 330, 333, 335–336 Jeekel, C.A. 92 Jenkins, W.G. 231 Jeram 149 Jintsu 90, 122–123, 177–178, 180, 185, 192, 199–200, 205, 211, 216–221, 223–226, 228, 252, 258–260, 320, 325–326, 331, 336 João Belo (Portuguese ship) 96, 318 Johan 288, 343–345 John D. Edwards 132, 144, 147, 169, 174–175, 188–190, 192, 219, 241, 251, 335 John D. Ford 119–120, 169–173, 175, 188–190, 192–193, 208, 210, 213, 216, 219, 222, 225, 241, 251, 324, 327 Johnsen, Lester J. 210 Johnson, Harry 296 Joko Maru 18 Jolo 97–98, 106, 111–112, 114, 116, 179, 183 Jong, H. de 280 Jong, Loe de 194 Jong van Beek en Donk, J.F.W. de 149 Jorissen, H.C. 264 Josefina (TAN 6) 275 Josephine 280 Jules 275

Jumna 107, 142, 237, 285, 300 Juno 275 Jupiter 84, 89, 107, 109–110, 133, 141, 188, 190, 193, 197, 199, 203, 206– 207, 209, 213, 216–218, 220, 222– 226, 235, 257, 259, 286, 300, 332, 336 K-VII 48, 96, 108, 164, 181, 323 K-VIII 48, 186, 254, 276, 282, 325 K-IX 48, 108, 181, 186, 254, 256, 276, 282, 299, 325, 336, 349 K-X 47, 96, 106, 113, 181, 186, 256, 274, 324, 349 K-XI 48, 83, 108, 181, 183, 254, 276, 282–283, 299, 301, 342 K-XII 48, 83, 92, 94, 108, 181, 183, 254, 281–283, 299 K-XIII 83, 277, 283, 336 K-XIV 48, 93, 106, 117, 181, 257, 318, 336, 339, 349 K-XV 83, 106, 181, 257–258 K-XVI 48, 94 K-XVII 18, 48, 94, 318 K-XVIII 18, 48, 106, 108, 117–120, 181, 254, 275, 277, 349 Kaga 160, 162, 261, 310 Kamikawa Maru (seaplane tender) 92–93, 236, 244, 332 Kamokawa Maru 261 Kampar 109, 309 Kangaroo 160 Kangean Islands 182, 262–263, 282, 346 Kanimbla 91 Kannegieter, Adriaan 344 Kara Kara 160 Karangi 160 Karimata Strait 24, 37, 73, 83, 91, 125, 181–182, 193, 291, 326 Karimoendjowo Islands 200 Kashii 84, 141 Kasuaris 278 Katoomba 110, 160, 162, 189–190 Katori Maru 93, 318 Kawakaze 193, 204, 249 Kawi 62, 276–277, 282 Kedah 141, 156 Kehi Maru 313 Keith, H.H. 159 Kelat 162 Kema 111, 114 Kendari II 122–123, 135 Keppel Harbor 183 Khoen Hoea 307–308 King, Ernest J. 103 King, W.D.A. 183, 254 Kinka Maru 92 Kinta 288 Kinu 85, 220, 265–266, 325, 336–337 Kiser, G.E. 210, 222 Kishigami, Koichi 110 Kizan Maru 243 Klabat Bay 181 Kleffens, E.N. van 100 Klijn, K. 165 Klootwijk, Maarten 64 Knoops, F.J.A. 47, 93 Ko Wang 149 Koala 160 Kodok Point 225 Koenraad, Pieter 76, 101, 105 Kogyo Maru 243 Kolb, Otto 204 Kondo, Nobutake 92, 179, 267 Kongo 82, 85–86, 92, 122, 207 Koning der Nederlanden 275, 338 Kookaburra 160 Kool, G.G.M. 310

Korteinaer 19, 24–25, 37–38, 50, 91, 132, 147, 169–170, 189–190, 192, 196–199, 204–206, 209, 211–215, 220, 224, 226–228, 252, 272, 302, 328–330, 346 Korthals Altes, J.J.C. 282 Kosuke, Kunishi 24 Kota Baroe 303–304, 337 Kota Gede 295, 307, 337 Kota Radja 128, 165, 197 Kotani, Tanun 9, 14, 314 Koyo Maru 243 “KPX” Order 270, 276, 280–281, 338 Krakatau 37, 59–60, 109, 135, 165, 168, 170, 176, 246, 276–277, 280, 283 Kraus 275, 309 Kriel, Irvin R. 166 Kriesfeld, A.C.V. 175 Krips, F.J.E. 50, 275, 316, 326 Kroese, A. 344 Kruijdenhof, F. 92 Kubo, Kyuji 90, 111, 169–171, 173, 320 Kuching 72, 83, 93–94, 124–125, 141, 146, 320 Kuiper, J. 65 Küller, P.G. 237 Kumano 92, 332 Kun, L.G.L. van der 103, 106 Kunke, C.J. 136 Kuretake Maru 120 Kurita, Takeo 92, 179, 236, 332 Kuroshio 90, 139 Lagaay, C.A. 50 Laive, G.H.C.A. de 76 Lake Tondano 74, 97 Lamade, Jack 159 Lampong Bay 129, 148, 246–247 Langkoeas 108, 319 Langley 155, 189–190, 237–240, 267– 268, 296, 333, 335, 344 Lark 90, 296 Law, A.T. 148–149 Lawoe 62, 64, 277 Layton, Geoffrey 89, 102 Le Maire 295–296, 337 Lebeau, J.A.L. 276 Lecomblé, E.E.B. 135, 197, 205, 209, 224–226, 230–231 Leeuwen, H.A. van 239 Leur, Jacob van 132 Li Wo 142 Liberty 87, 109, 269, 320, 347 Lillian Luckenbach 93 Lindenfels (German ship) 128 Lint, P.F.M. van de 243, 284 Liran 275 Lithgow 110 Liverpool Maru 118 Loa-Koeloe 275 Loch Ranza 141–142, 167 Logger, J.J. 271, 34 Lombok Strait 37, 109, 137, 171, 177, 182, 184, 186, 248, 251, 257, 260– 261, 263, 283, 295, 304, 339 MacArthur, Douglas 82, 99, 318 Maebashi Maru 243 Maher, A.L. 212 Le Maire 295–296, 337 Makassar 37, 51, 72, 74, 107, 114–121, 123–124, 132–135, 137–139, 158– 159, 169, 171, 175, 179–180, 182, 184–192, 194–196, 210, 248, 253, 264, 281, 285, 295, 297–299, 303– 304, 311, 314, 320, 325–326, 335– 336

355 Makassar Strait 37, 72, 107, 115–121, 134–135, 137–139, 179, 186, 188– 189, 192, 194–196, 320 Makian 309 Malang 71, 78, 121, 134, 170, 199, 272, 302 Malay Barrier 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31–32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 68, 70, 72, 74, 78, 80, 84, 86, 88, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120–121, 124, 126, 128, 130, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150–151, 154, 156, 160, 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 200, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, 224, 226, 228, 230, 232, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 256, 258, 260, 262, 264, 266, 268, 270, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, 282, 286, 288, 290, 292, 296, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 310 Maltby, P.C. 156 Mampawa (BEN 4) 309 Mandar 119, 309 Manipi 308–309 Manunda 160, 162, 322 Manvantara 141, 150 Maras 309 Marblehead 36, 83, 119, 121, 132, 135– 139, 147, 189, 232, 304, 341 Marine Establishment 3, 105, 163, 273, 337 Marle, N.G.J.W. van 231 Marshall, George 156, 189, 318 Martha 129 Maryborough 89, 149, 300, 302, 308 Matsukaze 291 Matsuoke, Yosuke 100 Matthewson, P.L. 199 Mauna Loa 158–160, 162 Mavie 162 May, C.W. 88 Maya 122, 296, 298, 301, 303 McConnell, R.P. 237–240, 333 McDougal, Bill 307 McGrath, John 160 McKinney, E.B. 184, 261 McMahon, Robert 161 ME see Marine Establishment Meester, J.B. de 137, 174 Meigs 158–160, 162 Meijer, J.B. 306–307 Meinderts Reef 186 Melle, E.K. van 244 Mellema, A.W. 253 Menado 91, 111, 114, 122–123, 177 Merak 168, 236, 243–244, 298, 334 Merapi 58, 62, 288, 290 Merbaboe 58, 62, 65, 276, 282 Merel 64, 75, 149, 286, 289, 291, 334 Merens, M.M. 284 Merkus 295–297, 337 Meroendoeng 288–289 Meyer, L. 285 Michisio 169–171, 173, 175, 190, 325, 336 Miert, Anthonie van 282 Miike Maru 123 Miikesan Maru 243 Mijer 288 Mikuma 244–246, 332 Milo 288 Minegumo 192, 209, 217–218, 221, 330–331 Minjak (BEN 1) 276

356 Minneapolis 106, 130 Mizuho 139, 177, 243, 285, 335 Mizuho Maru 243 ML 1063 287, 291 MMS 51, 237, 285, 300–301, 333, 340 Modjokerto 295, 297, 337, 340, 349 Moer, Abraham van der 197, 209, 218, 220, 327–328, 330 Moera Boelian 276, 338 Moesi River 58–60, 141–144, 151, 270, 280 Moesie (BEN 2) 280 Mogami 93, 150, 244–246, 332 Möller, J.K.G. 127 Momoyama Maru 243 Moni Rickmers (German ship) 128 Mook, H.J. van 100, 152 Moorer, Thomas 160 Moorman, A.M. 230 Moorman, H.C.W. 284–286, 289, 292, 339 Moppes, W.M. van 173 Moran, W.T.A. 131 Morgan, E.V.S.J. 227, 250 Morison, Samuel Elliot 125, 138, 320–321, 325, 330–331 Morokrembangan 67–68, 71–75, 78, 80, 108, 116, 134, 158, 163, 165– 166, 192–193, 197, 224, 233, 271, 273, 310, 323 Mosher, J.S. 302, 347 Mount Vernon 109 MS.5 189–190 Mul, Jan de 108 Muller, Statius 311 Munson, H.G. 192 Muntok Harbor 25, 193, 309 Murasame 209, 252–253 Murphy, William H. 166 Myoken Maru (auxiliary gunboat) 123 Myoko 184, 193, 249–251, 320, 325, 335 Nachi 111, 180, 185, 193, 201, 203– 209, 211–212, 215–216, 218–220, 223, 228–229, 233–234, 249–250, 257, 320, 328, 335 Nagahama, Yoshikazu 160 Nagara 122–123, 169–170, 187, 325– 326 Nagasa 84 Nagasawa, Ko 211 Nagumo, Chuichi 159–160, 163, 190, 267, 311 Naka 117–120, 180, 200–201, 205, 207–209, 216–217, 220–221, 223, 226, 228, 231, 261 Nana Maru 117, 120 National Institute for Defense Studies 210 Natori 185, 243, 245, 332 Natsugumo 192, 200–201, 204, 217, 327 Natsushio 139 Nederlands Indisch Luchtvaart Fonds 70 Neptuna 160, 162, 322 Netherlands Government in Exile 11, 17–18, 32, 36, 77, 96, 100, 134 Netherlands Purchasing Commission (NPC) 16 Newton, J.H. 106 Ngoro 134, 191, 195–196, 199, 201, 205, 210, 241 Ngow Hock (Norwegian ship) 83 Nias 127, 309 Nichinan Maru 93 Nichiwa Maru 243

Index Nieuwenhuisen, H.C. 76 Nishimura, Shoji 111, 117, 179 Nisso Maru 13 Nojima Maru 243 Nolly 275 Nowaki 295–296, 298, 301, 303 Nuys, J.J. van 303 O-16 49, 83, 91–92, 94, 317–318, 347 O-19 49, 83, 93, 108–109, 181, 183, 186–187, 198, 234, 254, 256–257, 263, 299, 318, 327, 336, 349 O-20 49, 94–95 Oedjoeng Naval Base 43, 64, 105, 164, 271 OJR 1 57, 277, 280 OJR 2 57, 176 OJR 3 57, 176, 316 OJR 4 56–57, 277, 280 OJR 5 57, 277, 280 OJR 6 57, 277, 280 Olehleh 128 Oosthaven 111, 125, 129, 132, 143, 147–149, 287, 340 Op ten Noort 164–165, 197, 235, 252–253, 259, 323, 332, 335, 347, 349 Ophir 126–127 Oriental Development Company 21 Orion 63, 117 Oshio 90, 169–175, 190, 320, 324– 325, 336 Ostreicher, Robert 160 Otus 139 Overijssel 309, 342, 349 Oyen, Ludolph van 102 Ozawa, Jisaburo 141 P-1 290 P.1 126, 129–130, 141–142, 144, 149, 169, 323 P.2 130, 142, 144, 149, 169, 236, 323 P-2 291 P 9 57 P-34 122–123, 177 P-36 111, 117, 321 P 37 58, 111, 117, 120–121, 142, 321 P 38 58, 111, 113, 117, 142 P 39 112, 123, 142, 166 P 40 58, 142 Pabst, J.C. 10, 13, 100, 313, 318 Pacific Maru 243 Padang 72, 127, 129, 143–144, 237, 289, 299, 303, 307, 309, 321, 332, 334, 340 Paddock, Paul 347 Palembang 24, 37, 42, 58–60, 76, 91, 125–126, 129–130, 141–144, 147– 149, 151, 154, 168, 170, 178, 191, 270, 291, 314, 324, 346 Palliser, A.F.E. 102 Pamangkat 125 Paneh 309 Pang Pang Bay 170, 175–176 Parigi 295, 297, 301, 337 Parker, E.N. 347 Parrott 119–120, 144, 169–170, 174– 175 Parsifal 113, 115, 320 Pasir 309 Paternoster Island 91, 193, 282 Patras 109 Paul 288 Paul Jones 109, 120, 132, 188–189, 192, 225, 241, 251, 335 Paula (TAN 1) 147, 288 Payne, T.B. 242 Peary 158–162 Pecos 135, 151, 167, 188, 239, 303, 344

Pehe 277 Pell, Floyd 161 Pendopo (TAN 4) 275 Penhollow, Jack 231 Pensacola 130, 180 Perak 43, 78–79, 134, 163–166, 197, 272–273, 275–279, 281–283, 326 Perak Harbor 163, 197, 278 Perch 182, 263–264, 336, 345 Percival, A.E. 140 Permit 10, 182, 260, 263, 325, 333, 336, 347 Perth 188, 190, 193–194, 198, 204, 206, 208–209, 211–213, 215–219, 222–223, 226, 228–230, 233–234, 241–243, 245–247, 257, 261–262, 285–287, 291, 304, 320, 325–326, 330–331, 334, 336, 339, 348–349 Peta 276, 280, 338 Peterel 83 Peters, W.A. 305 Petronella (TAN 8) 258, 298 Phillips, Tom 36, 82 Phoenix 106, 189–190, 241, 347 Pickerel 117, 177–178, 182 Pief 127–128 Pierse, Richard 102 Piet Hein 18, 30, 37, 50, 91, 107, 125, 132, 139, 144, 147, 169–173, 176, 272, 302, 316–317, 324, 348 Pieter de Bitter 61, 133–134, 275–277, 281, 321, 338, 348 Pijnacker Hordijk 96 Pike 177–178 Pillsbury 119, 132, 144, 147, 169–170, 174–175, 188–189 Pinna 143 Plancius 126–127 Platypus 160, 162 Playfair, I.S.O. 102 Poelau Bras 268, 295, 303, 306–307, 341, 348 Poelau Tello 56, 128 Poirer, Roger P. 136 Polkinghorn, Stephen 83 Pollux (lightship) 276, 278 Pollux (patrol boat) 63 Pontianak 18, 93, 314 Poolster 18, 64, 72, 75, 176, 289 Poorten, Heinter , 27, 104, 156 Pope 119–120, 137, 169–174, 188–190, 196, 220, 224–225, 241, 248–251, 253, 259, 285, 324, 335 Porpoise 117, 182 Portmar 158, 160, 162 Pownall, Henry 102 Prass, G.N. 304–305, 341 President Polk 166–167 Pretor-Pinney, G.R. 301 Prigi Bay 138 Prince of Wales 35, 82–89, 107, 319, 335, 339, 344 Princess Irene Brigade 134, 189, 326 Prins van Oranje 37, 59–60, 113, 320 Pro Patria 59–60, 142–144 Proteus (Norwegian ship) 272, 279 Pryce, Roland 183 Purnell, W.R. 27, 99 Queen Olga Rock 165, 197, 323 Quezon, Emanuel 181 Raap, J.S.W. 303 Raeder, Erich 152 Rafalovich, Daniel 231 Rahman 149, 287, 291 Ram 25, 42, 60, 64, 109, 136, 142, 183, 277, 338 Rankin, Robert 301

Ratai Bay 147, 149, 169–170 Regulus 42, 60, 64, 277 Reiger 64, 75, 243–245, 286, 334 Reinderhoff, G.L. 115 Reiyo Maru 243 Rembang 59, 187, 192, 195–196, 198– 199, 202, 225, 227, 235, 254, 256– 259, 264–266, 269, 285, 332, 336 Rengat 309 Rentema, P.A. 297 Repulse 82–89, 107, 298, 319, 344 Reteh 309 Reynolds, J.R. 185, 254 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 100 Rice, Burt 161 Richmond 106 Riedel, P.A. 279 Rigel 37, 52, 59, 61, 64, 72, 149, 286, 288–289 Rijnders, G.F. 332 Rindjani 62, 276, 282 Rinkhuyzen, J.J. 58–59, 306, 341 Ritsema van Eck, S.C. 172, 175 RO-34 109, 133 Roach, L.N. 124 Robinson, A.G. 135 Rochussen 275 Roelofsen, W.H.J. 270 Roelse, Jan 189 Roggeveen 41–42, 275, 278–279 Rokan 309–310 Rolf 275 Ronde, F.S.W. de 101 Roodenburg, W.P. 171 Rooks, Albert H. 136 Rooy, W.F. van 298 Rotgans, J.P. 282 Roti Island 73, 158, 163 Rouwenhorst, P. 286, 291, 339–340 Ru, Pieter de 174 “Runaway Fleet Memo” 269 Russell, Dave 310 Ruth Alexander 98 Ryoyo Maru 123 Ryujo 90, 141, 146–147, 150, 179, 236, 244, 251, 285, 290–291, 332, 339 Ryunan Maru 243 S-37 139, 181–182, 185–186, 203, 223, 228, 234–235, 253–254, 258–259, 325, 327, 331–332, 335–336, 347 S-38 180, 182, 186, 192, 234–235, 253, 259–260, 262, 336 S-39 164, 182 S-40 117, 182–183 S-41 180, 183, 186, 325, 347 Sabang 23, 111, 127–129, 299–300, 320 Sagami Maru 169–171, 173 Sagiri 84, 92, 94 Sailfish 182, 260–262, 336, 347 St. Louis 106 Sakai, Saburo 116, 320, 322 Sakai, Toyo-o 240 Sakura Maru 92, 243, 246 Salak 62, 277, 282, 290 Salisbury, John D. 167 Salmon 182, 184, 261–262, 325, 336, 347 Samidare 209, 217 San Clemente Maru 134 San Francisco 130, 166–167, 180, 304, 315 Sanuki Maru (aircraft tender) 111, 121 Sanyo Maru (aircraft tender) 111, 139 Saratoga 106 Sargo 181 Sasago Maru 169–172, 174–175 Saury 117, 182, 185, 262, 325, 336, 347

Index Sazanami 193, 264 Schacht, K.G. 264 Schilling, W. 286 Schokking, B.J.G. 76, 237, 268 Schotel, P. 50, 109 Schouten 278 Scorpion 142 Scott, W.J. 124 Scott Harley 298, 348 Scout 24, 82, 84, 89, 147, 188, 190, 200, 204, 217, 228, 236–237, 331 Sculpin 134, 181 Sea Witch 189–190, 333 Seadragon 181 Seal 95, 182, 184–185, 262–263, 275, 288, 325, 336, 347 Sealion 90 Searaven 182 Seawolf 171, 177, 187, 323–324, 347 Semarang 45, 71, 148, 277, 292 Semiramis 143 Sendai 84, 130–131, 141, 207, 243, 332 Serdang 185, 278 Shafroth, Jack 130 Shimushu 84, 141 Shinonome 92–93, 349 Shinshu Maru 243 Shiokaze 90, 291 Shirataka 90, 332 Shirayuki 131, 245, 332 Shizu, Kato 118, 320 Shofu Fu Maru 89 Sholar, Marvin 230–231 Shoulder Bank 193 Siberg 144, 299, 307 Siberoet 288, 299 Sibigo 295, 337 Sibolga 111, 127, 288 Siccama, M. 230 Siemers, H.H.F. 230 Sigli 295, 297–298, 337 Silingdoeng 275 Simons, H.H.J. 199 Simson 277 Sin Aik Lee 149, 287, 291 Singapore 16, 19–20, 25, 27–28, 31– 37, 39, 43, 46, 52, 56–57, 59, 70, 72–73, 82–85, 87–89, 91–97, 100– 101, 103, 105, 107, 109–110, 119, 124–126, 130–131, 133, 139–143, 145, 151–154, 160, 166–167, 181, 183, 189, 269–270, 277, 287, 293, 298, 317–319, 321, 324, 330, 332, 335, 337, 339–340, 343, 346–347 Sinkawang 94, 115, 117, 119, 121, 125 Sinkawang II 115, 117, 119, 121 Sipirok 309, 311 Sipora 309–311 Sirius 19, 63–64, 149, 168, 243–245, 298, 334 Skipjack 182, 263 Slamat 62, 288, 290 Sloet van de Beele 149–151 Slot, N. 173 Sloterdijk 302–305, 337, 341 Smeroe 62, 64–65, 276, 282 Smith, J.D. 136 Snapper 181 Snippe, P.G.J. 47, 95 Soemba 52, 54, 91, 148–149, 168, 222, 280, 298–299 Soembawa 16, 37, 119, 281–282 Soemenep 37, 59, 61, 277 Soenda Strait 18–19, 37, 54, 64, 91, 107–109, 111, 119, 126, 132–133, 137, 145, 148–149, 168, 181, 187–188, 193, 236–237, 242–248, 254, 257– 258, 272, 285–287, 289, 291, 295,

298–299, 303, 319, 332, 334, 336, 340 Soenda Strait Auxiliary Patrol 149, 168, 245 Soerabaja 1, 18, 20, 22–23, 30, 35–37, 41–46, 50, 55–64, 70–74, 76, 78– 80, 89–90, 93–94, 96, 99, 101, 105, 107, 109–110, 112–113, 116–117, 119, 121, 123, 132–135, 137–139, 145, 148, 151, 155, 163–170, 172, 175– 176, 179, 181–205, 210, 212, 215, 217, 220, 222–228, 234–236, 241– 242, 247–248, 251–254, 256, 258– 260, 262–263, 265–266, 268, 270– 273, 275–278, 280–283, 303, 305–306, 308, 310–311, 316–318, 321, 323, 326–327, 329, 331–336, 338–339, 341 Soerabaja Patrol Service 279 Sokaitei 84 Somedono Maru 243 Sophie Rickmers (German ship) 128 Soryu 160–162, 310, 341 Southern Cross 160 Southern Seas Timber Company 21 Spearfish 117, 182–184, 325, 347 Speelman 275 Stachouwer, A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh 10–11, 15, 32–33, 35–36, 77, 80, 83, 96, 100, 104–105, 125, 151–152, 155, 269–270, 313, 315–316, 319, 337 Stamperius, J.M. 308 Staring Bay 122, 134, 190, 267, 325 Stark, Harold R. 99 Staveren, J.J.A. van 80, 101, 269 Stewart 132, 144, 147, 169–170, 174– 176, 189, 197, 341, 344 Stingray 181 Stolze Strait 145–147, 326 Stoopman, P.J.A. 246 Storm, J.J. 231 Stöve, G.W. 76 Straelen, P.B.M. van 125, 146, 228–229 Stronghold 88–89, 107, 141, 188, 296, 298, 300–301, 303, 308 Sturgeon 117, 181 Sumanoura Maru 120 Sumatra 39, 41, 52–54, 77, 81, 89, 132, 317, 321, 335 Summers, Julius 170 Sutton, Walter H. 231, 327 Suwa Maru 243 Suzukaze 134 Suzuya 92, 332 Swan 158–162, 287 Swordfish 123, 181–182 Sydney Maru 243 Taihei Maru 243 Tairyu Maru 109 Taishin Maru 314 Taizan Maru 92, 243 Takagi, Takeo 90, 179 Takahashi, Ibo 179 Takahiko, Kiyota 208, 223 Takao 92, 236, 238, 295–296, 301, 303, 308, 310, 345 Taketoyo Maru 243 Talang Akar 275 Talbot, Paul H. 119 Tamako 278–279 Tamori, Yoshimatsu 110–111, 320 Tandjoeng Awar Awar 253, 257, 265, 338 Tandjoeng Datoe 124 Tandjoeng Patjinan 260, 279 Tandjoeng Perak 43, 164–165, 272, 275, 281–283, 326

Tandjoeng Petokol 266 Tandjoeng Priok 12, 18–19, 24–26, 37, 42, 45, 57–58, 61–63, 73–74, 76, 91, 93, 101, 107, 125, 128, 132, 137– 138, 147–150, 153, 156, 166, 168, 183, 188, 190, 193, 195–196, 220, 227, 233, 236–237, 241–246, 257– 258, 284–293, 298, 306, 309, 311, 316, 319, 321, 333–335, 339 Tandjoeng Priok Drydock Company 42, 45, 61–63, 138 Tanimbar 108 Tanka, Raizo 90, 179, 320 Tarakan 1, 18, 20–21, 36–37, 58–60, 72, 74, 78, 83, 91, 93–94, 97–98, 108, 111–116, 121, 129, 180, 183, 186, 320, 324, 336, 346 Taroena 97, 278 Taroesan Bay 128 Tarpon 177–178, 181 Tata 275 Tatara 83 Tatsugami Maru 117 Tatsukami Maru 120 Tatsumiya Maru (auxiliary minelayer) 84, 94 Tatsuno Maru 243, 246 Tawali 268, 273, 295–298, 303, 305– 306, 337, 341 Taylor, Frank W. 231, 287 Taylor, R. 301 Teddy 288 Tembusu 275 Tempei Maru 243 Tenedos 84–85, 91, 188, 190, 236– 237 Tenno Maru 335 Terka 160, 162 Thanet 82, 84, 89, 130–131, 321 Thew, N.V.J.T. 109 Thomas, David 180, 345 Timor 19–20, 36–37, 55, 96–97, 107, 109, 119, 123, 130, 139, 158–160, 163–164, 169, 177–179, 188, 200, 314, 318, 322, 326, 344–346, 348 Tinombo 295 Tismeer, W.C. 298 Tjepoe 68, 73, 148, 151, 188, 195, 235 Tjerimai 288, 290 Tjikandi 275 Tjikarang 275 Tjilatjap 1, 42, 45–46, 52, 58–60, 70, 72, 76, 78, 90, 107–108, 119, 137– 139, 147, 151, 155–159, 166, 168– 170, 173, 181, 184, 188–190, 202, 236–243, 246, 248, 260, 267–269, 271–273, 275, 279, 283, 285–287, 291–311, 316–317, 319, 322, 325, 332–333, 335, 337–338, 340–342, 348–349 Tjimanoek 301, 311 Tjisaroea 303–305 TM 4 55, 170, 278–279, 316, 332, 336, 348 TM 5 170, 266, 278–280, 332, 336 TM 6 170, 278–279, 332, 336 TM 7 198, 265, 278–280, 332, 336, 338 TM 8 170, 198, 265–266, 278–279, 332, 336 TM 9 170, 278–280, 332 TM 10 170, 278–279, 332, 336 TM 11 165, 170, 278–279, 332, 336 TM 12 56, 278–279, 332, 336 TM 13 170, 278–279, 336 TM 14 278–279, 336 TM 15 170, 264, 266, 278–279, 332, 336 Toba 74, 111, 128, 295–296, 337

357 Toeban 59, 195–196, 198, 202–203, 225–227, 235, 256, 258–259, 263– 265, 326–327, 332, 336, 339 Toendjoek 288–289 Tofuku Maru 243 Tohiti 309–310 Toho Maru 243 Tokei Maru No. 7 24 Tokitsukaze 123, 216, 330 Tokiwa Maru 243 Tol, F.X. van 92 Toland, John 153, 322 Tolga 160, 162 Tomohon 295, 298, 308 Tomori 275 Tonan Maru 97 Toowoomba 142, 300, 302, 321, 339– 340 Toradja 295, 298, 303, 305, 337 Toro Maru 92 Tosari 295, 337 Tosari 295, 337 Tosei Maru 243 Toyooka Maru 243 Tozan Maru 92 Trenton 106, 130 Tricomalee 130, 139, 154, 237 Trinity 110, 188 Tromp 19, 37, 52–53, 73, 91, 93, 107, 119, 125, 132, 135, 137, 139, 144, 147, 150, 169–170, 174–176, 189, 252, 280, 320, 322, 324, 340, 348 Troost, R. 295 Truant 183, 186–187, 254, 332, 336, 346 Trusty 180, 183, 187, 254, 256, 325, 332 Tsukuishi Maru 122 Tsunayoshi, Ogawa 111 Tsuneji, Tanaka 211 Tsuruga Maru 118 Tsurumi 243, 258, 336 Tsuyama Maru 243 Tuizinga, G. 252 Tulagi 158, 160, 162 Tulsa 268–269, 296, 337, 349 Tunni (Norwegian ship) 272, 279 Tuyll van Serooskerken, A.F. 204 Uchide Maru 243 Umikaze 177, 179, 200–201, 204, 220 Unyo Maru No. 2 94 Urania 2, 276, 278, 282, 338–339 Urunami 95 Ushio 193, 264, 336, 344 Valk 18, 24, 64, 75, 158, 297, 304, 310–311, 342 Vampire 84, 88–89, 107, 130–131 van de Capellen 128 van der Hagen 309 van Diemen 275 Van Galen 51, 316–317 Van Ghent 25, 38, 50–52, 94, 107, 117, 132, 139, 144–145, 147, 150, 203, 316, 322, 326 van Goens 295, 337 van Imhoff 126–127, 321, 347 van Lansberge 133–134, 321 van Mastijn 112 van Meroengdoeng 288 van Neck 270, 276, 278 Van Nes 37, 50–51, 91, 107, 127, 149– 150, 302, 322, 348 van Overstraten 111 van Rees 108, 266 van Riesbeeck 108 van Spilbergen 297, 337 van Waerwijck 288

358 Veeckens Bay 258, 298–300 Vermeulen, F.H. 76, 204 Versendaal, A.C. van 113 Vinckers, J.B. 147, 211, 229, 322 Vlies Bik Mulock, P.A.L. van der 47, 257 Voge, R.G. 260 Voorduyn, A.S. 297 Vooren, M. 123 Vries, D. de 297 Vries, W.M. de 50, 236 Vrijwilliger Vlieger Corps (VVC) 4, 70–71 W-1 67–68, 73, 131 W-2 68, 246 W-3 94 W-4 68, 73, 131 W-7 68 W-8 67–68, 73 W-9 124 W-11 67–68, 73, 124 W-12 67–68, 73, 124, 148, 322, 326 W-13 67–68, 114 W-14 68, 73, 114 W-15 68, 114, 120 W-16 114 W-17 114 W-18 114

Index Wakataka 111, 121 Wake 83, 110, 180, 213–214, 330, 336 Waller, Hector 204, 213, 215, 223– 224, 226–228, 233–234, 241–243, 245–246, 252, 333 Waning, C.J.W. van 79 War Sirdar 190–191, 237, 285 Warder, F.B. 171 Warorada Bay 119 Warrego 158–161 Wasgenwald (German ship) 128 Wato 162 Wavell, Archibald 100–105, 107, 130, 139, 148, 152–156, 158–159, 179– 180, 187, 189, 254, 318–319, 337 Wayenberg, T.G. 311 Wega 63, 128–129 Weissinger, Bill 223 Wel, W.G. van de 168 Well Groenveld, C.A.J. van 47, 93– 94, 118–119, 338 Werdenfels (German ship) 128 Western Invasion Convoy 179, 182, 190, 202, 236, 243 Western Strike Force 4, 188, 190–191, 196, 236 Westwater Channel 43–44, 165, 172, 185–187, 193, 195–196, 198–200,

203, 220, 225, 248, 251, 253–254, 256, 259, 265, 276–278, 281, 327– 328, 338 Whipple 132, 138, 189, 225, 237–240, 333 Whippoorwill 90, 296 White Swan 287 Wieler, J.L.W.C. von 80 Wijnkoops Bay 299, 303, 306–307 Wilkinson, T. 142 Willard A. Holbrook 189, 321 Willebrord Snellius 64, 165, 276, 278–279 Willem van der Zaan 37, 52, 60–61, 107, 237–238, 267–268, 298, 303, 316, 333, 337 William B. Preston 90, 160–162 Willigen, Peter 133 Willinge, J.J.L. 132 Win, G. 199 Winslow, Walter 159, 323, 327–328, 331, 334 Witte de With 20, 37–38, 50–52, 169, 177, 188–190, 192, 197–198, 203–204, 213–218, 220, 224–225, 241, 248, 275, 277, 302, 305, 316, 330–331, 333, 335, 338 Wolf, Cornelius de 92 Wolf, J.J. de 272

Wollongong 142, 188, 285–286, 302, 321, 339 Wright, W.L. 117 Yae Maru 243 Yamakaze 113, 134, 193, 249 Yamamura Maru 123 Yamashita, Tomoyuki 140 Yamazuki Maru 243 Yarra 107, 188, 237, 285, 300–303 Yasuo, Sato 217 Yoshitake, Uesugi 264 Yoshizawa, Kenkichi 13 Yudachi 209, 217 Yugiri 95, 131, 332 Yukikaze 123, 199–200, 235 Yura 92–93, 243, 257, 332 Zaandam 268, 295–296, 298, 301, 304, 307–308 Zandbuis Bank 182, 260, 263 Zealandia 160, 162 Zegers, P. 230 Zenji, Yoshitomi 94 Zenyo Maru 123 Zimmerman, E.C. 17 Zitter, T.J. 129 Zuiderkruis 37, 63–65, 298, 340 Zuiyo Maru 18, 243