Rights and Protest: IB History Course Book: Oxford IB Diploma Program ( PDFDrive.com )

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Mark Rogers & Peter Clinton. (2015) Oxford IB Diploma Programme - Rights and Protest. Oxford: Oxford UP. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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First published in 2015

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Acknowledgements The publishers would like to thank the following for permissions to use their photographs: p20: Peter Magubane ; p21(B): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p21(C): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p21(T): Martin Gibbs/Africa Media Online; p23:Jock Leyden/Natal Daily News ; p27: Hulton-Deutsch CollectionfCorbis; p29: The Star© 1999 - 2015 Independent Online; p32: Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p33:Jurgen SchadebergfGetty Images; p34: DeAgostinifGetty Images; p37: Alain NoguesfSygmafCorbis; p38: Drum Social HistoriesfBaileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p40: Federation of Free States of Africa; p42: Mike AbrahamsfAlamy; p43:JHJackson/Cape Argus; p45: Hul­ ton-Deutsch CollectionfCorbis; p46: The Star© 1999 - 2015 Independent Online; p49:JHJackson/Cape Argus; p50: Drum Social Histories/Africa Me­ dia Online; p52:Jurgen SchadebergfGetty Images; p53:Jurgen Schadeberg/ Hulton Archive/Getty Images; p57: Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p60: Graeme Williams/South Photos/ Africa Media Online; p63: Drum Social HistoriesfBaileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p66: Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p72: Roshan Dadoo; p76: Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p78: Roshan Dadoo; p81: Peter Magubane; p83: Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p86(BL): David TurnleyfCorbis; p86(BR): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Me­ dia Online; p86(CL): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/ Africa Media Online; p86(CR): Gille de VliegfSouth Photos/Africa Media Online; p86(T): UWC-Robbenflsland Museum Mayibuye Archives; p87: Sipa PressfRex Features; p91: Keystone-FrancefGamma-KeystonefGetty Images; p92(BL): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p92(BR): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Af­ rica Media Online; p92(TL): Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; p92(TR): Drum Social Histories/Baileys Afri­ can History Archive/Africa Media Online; p93: Eli Weinburg, UWC-Robben/ Island Museum Mayibuye Archives; p97:Juda NgwenyafReuters; p98: Drum Social Histories/Baileys African History Archive/Africa Media Online; plOD: Punch Limited; p102: KeystonefHulton Archive/Getty Images; p104: Key­ stone Pictures USA/Alamy; p106: IDAF/Rex Features; p108: Punch Limited; p109: Rob CrandallfAlamy; p113(B): Keystone Pictures USA/Alamy; p113(T): Punch Limited; p115: Rob CrandallfA!amy; p119: Dea Picture Library/Getty Images; p120: Adrienne deJongh; p121: The Att ArchivefAlamy; p129: Everett Collection HistoricalfAlamy; p134: Mary Evans; p137: Ella Mahler Collection/Oklahoma Historical Society; p141: Bob AdelmanfCorbis; pl44:

The authors and publisher are grateful for permission to reprint the following copyright material: We are grateful to the authors and publishers for use of extracts from their titles and in particular for the following:

L Callinicos: Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (2004) pp 220-21. Da­ vid Philip Publishers, Cape Town, South Africa. Reproduced by permission of New Africa Books.

The Rise and Fall ofJim Crow: Jim Crow Stories: The Ku Klux Klan (1866) http://www.pbs.org/wnetfjimcrow/stories_events_kkk.html. Reproduced by permission ofWNET.org. Interview with Dave Dennis, conducted by Blackside, Inc. on Novem­ ber 10, 1985, for Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (1954-1965). Washington University Libraries, Film and Media Archive, Henry Hampton Collection. 'Fifty-six Africans killed', from The Guardian, 22 March 1960 http:// www.theguardian.comfcentury/196D-1969/Storyf. Copyright Guardian News & Media Ltd 2015. Martin Luther King, Jr.: speech made on 5 December 1955 at the Holt Street Baptist Church. Reprinted by arrangement with The Heirs to the Es­ tate of Martin Luther KingJr., cfo Writers House as agent for the proprietor New York, NY. Copyright© 1955 Dr. Martin Luther KingJr.© renewal 1983 Caretta Scott King. Cynthia Lee: 'A single act of kindness becomes part of civil rights lore' from a UCLA publication, 10 May, 2011. UCLA Newsroom newsroom.ucla. edu/storiesfcivil-rightsactivists-still-remember-203453. Reproduced by permission of UCLA. T

Lodge: Mandela, A Crirical Life (2006), p.57. Oxford University Press. By permission of Oxford University Press.

T

Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, (1983). Longman. London. Reproduced by permission of Professor Tom Lodge. Rian Malin: A letter to the editors of the New York Review of Books, 21 March 2013. Reprinted by permission of Rian Malin.

Nelson Mandela: The Authorized Portrait© copyright Nelson R. Mandela, 2006 edited by M Maharaj and A Kathrada. Reprinted by permission ofpQ B!ackwell Ltd. B

Martin: Justice Ignited: T he dynamics of baclifire {2006) Rowman & Little­ field. Reproduced by permission of Rowman & Littlefield.

Excerpts from Montgomery City Code (1952), Chapter 6, Sections 10 and 11 TIT Chicago-Kent Library Blog, blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/libraryfexhibits/ montgomery-1955/images-documentsfmontgomery-city-code/. Alaban1a Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama. Reproduced by permission. K

Shillington: Encyclopedia of African History. Vol. 1-3 {2005) p1444. Taylor and Francis, New York. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group LLC Books. E Sisulu: Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In our lifetime (2002) David Philip Pub­ lishers. Cape Town, South Africa. Reproduced by permission. Robert Weisbrot: Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights Movement. Copyright© 1990 by Robert Weisbrot. Used by permission of W.W. Norton & Company Inc. We have made every effort to trace and contact all copyright holders before publication, but if notified of any errors or omissions, the publisher will be happy to rectifY these at the earliest opportunity. Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Cou rse Companion defi nition The IB D iploma Programme C o urse C ompanions are resource materials designed to support students throughout their two -year D iploma Programme course of study in a particular subj e ct. They will help students gain an understanding of what is exp e cted from the study of an IB D iploma Programme subj ect while presenting content in a way that illustrates the purpose and aims of the IB . They refl e ct the philosophy and approach of the IB and encourage a deep understanding of each subj e ct by making conne ctions to wider issues and providing opportunities for critical thinking. The books mirror the IB philosophy of viewing the curriculum in terms of a whole - course approach; the use of a wide range of resources, international mindedness, the IB learner profile and the IB D iploma Programme core re quirements, theory of knowledge, the extended essay, and creativity, activity, service ( CAS ) . E ach book can b e used in conjunction with other materials and indeed, students of the IB are re quired and encouraged to draw conclusions from a variety of resources . S uggestions for additional and further reading are given in each book and suggestions for how to extend research are provided. In addition, the C ourse C o mpanions provide advice and guidance on the spe cific course assessment requirements and on academic honesty protocol. They are distinctive and authoritative without being prescriptive .

I B mission statement The International B accalaureate aims to develop inquiring, knowle dgable and caring young pe ople who help to create a better and more peaceful world through intercultural understanding and resp e ct. To this end the IB works with schools, governments and international organizations to develop challenging programmes of international education and rigorous assessment. These programmes encourage students across the world to b e come active, compassionate, and lifelong learners who understand that other people, with their differences, can also be right.

iii

The IB learner Profile The aim of all I B programmes i s t o develop internationally minded people who, recognizing their common humanity and shared guardianship of the planet, help to create a better and more p eaceful world. IB learners strive to b e : Inquirers They develop their natural curiosity. They acquire the skills necessary to conduct inquiry and research and show independence in learning. They actively enj o y learning and this love of learning will b e sustained throughout their liv e s . Knowledgable They explore concepts, ideas, a n d issues that have local and global significance . In so doing, they acquire in - depth knowledge and develop understanding across a broad and balanced range of disciplin e s . Thinkers They exercise initiative i n applying thinking skills critically and creatively to recognize and approach complex problems, and make reasoned, ethical decision s . Communicators T h e y understand a n d express i d e a s a n d information confidently and creatively in more than one language and in a variety of modes of communication. They work effectively and willingly in collaboration with others. Principled They act with integrity and honesty, with a strong sense of fairness, j ustice, and resp e ct for the dignity of the individual, groups, and communities. They take responsibility for their own actions and the consequences that accompany them. Open-minded They understand and appreciate their own cultures and personal histories, and are open to the perspectives, values, and traditions of other individuals and communities. They are accustomed to seeking and evaluating a range of points of view, and are willing to grow from the experience . Caring They show empathy, compassion, and resp e ct towards the needs and feelings of others. They have a p ersonal commitment to service, and act to make a positive difference to the lives of others and to the environment. Risk-takers They approach unfamiliar situations and uncertainty with courage and forethought, and have the independence of spirit to explore new roles, ideas, and strategies. They are brave and articulate in defending their b eliefs . Balanced They understand the imp ortance of intellectual, physical, and emotional balance to achieve p e rsonal well-being for themselves and others. Reflective They give thoughtful consideration to their own learning and experience . They are able to assess and understand their strengths and limitations in order to supp ort their learning and p ersonal development.

iv

A

note on academic honesty

It is of vital importance to acknowledge and appropriately credit the owners of information when that information is used in your work. After all, owners of ideas ( intellectual property ) have property rights. To have an authentic piece of work, it must b e based on your individual and original ideas with the work of others fully acknowledge d. Therefore, all assignments, written or oral, completed for assessment must use your own language and expression. Where sources are used or referred to, whether in the form of direct quotation or paraphrase, such sources must b e appropriately acknowledge d.

What co nstitutes misco n d u ct? Misconduct i s b ehaviour that results in, or may result in, you or any student gaining an unfair advantage in one or more assessment component. Misconduct includes plagiarism and collusion. Plagiarism is defined as the representation of the ideas or work of another person as your own. The following are some of the ways to avoid plagiarism : •

Words and ideas of another person used to support one's arguments must be acknowledged.

•

Passages that are quoted verbatim must b e enclosed within quotation marks and acknowledge d.

•

C D -ROMs, email messages, web sites on the Internet, and any other electronic media must be treated in the same way as books and journals.

•

The sources of all photographs, maps, illustrations, computer programs, data, graphs, audio -visual, and similar material must be acknowledged if they are not your own work.

•

Works of art, whether music, film, dance, theatre arts, or visual arts, and where the creative use of a part of a work takes place, must b e acknowledged.

How do I acknowledge the work of others? The way that y o u acknowledge that y o u have used the ideas of other people is through the use of footnotes and bibliographies. Footnotes (placed at the bottom of a pag e ) or endnotes (placed at the end of a document) are to b e provide d when you quote or paraphrase from another document, or closely summarize the information provided in another document. You do not need to provide a footnote for information that is part of a 'body of knowledge ' . That is, definitions do not need to b e footnoted as they are part of the assumed knowle dge . Bibliographies should include a formal list of the resources that you used in your work. The listing should include all resources, including books, magazines, newspaper articles, Internet­ based resources, CDs and works of art. 'Formal' means that you should use one of the several accepted forms of presentation. You must provide full information as to how a reader or viewer of your work can find the same information. A bibliography is compulsory in the extended essay.

Collusion is defined as supporting misconduct by another student. This includes: •

allowing your work to be copied or submitted for assessment by another student

•

duplicating work for different assessment comp onents and/or diploma requirements .

Other forms of misconduct inclu de any action that gives you an unfair advantage or affects the re sults of another student. E xamples include, taking unauthorized material into an examination room, misconduct during an examination, and falsifying a CAS record.

v

Contents Your guide for Paper 1

1

United States

1: Apartheid South Africa [1948-1964)

Case study 1.1

Case Study 2: Civil Rights Movement in the 2.1

13

The origins of apartheid

S egregation and education; Brown v. B oard of Education decision ( 1 9 5 4 ) ; Little Rock ( 1 9 5 7 )

The system of segregation The nature and characteristics of discrimination

Virginia: Planned inaction t o Massive Resistance 20

Little Rock, Arkansas, 1 9 5 7

The nature and characteristics o f discrimination under apartheid, 1 948-64

The Lost Year Protests and action

Division and classification of the population

The Montgomery Bus B oycott

Segregation of populations and amenities

The Freedom Rides, 1 9 6 1

Segregation of education

2.2

The Bantu Education Act The Bantustan system

1.3

The Voting Rights Act, 1 96 5

The Defiance Campaign

The role and significance o f key individuals and groups

The Sharpeville massacre and the decision to adopt the armed struggle

Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Rivonia Trial and the imprisonment of the ANC leadership

Lyndon B Johnson

Malcolm X Civil rights organizations 81

The African National C ongress (ANC ) Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating C ommittee ( SNC C )

Albert Luthuli Nelson Mandela South African history prior to 1 948 The arrival of the British and the Great Trek The mineral revolution and the South African War The Act of Union and the segregation era C ountry profile

vi

The National Association for the Advancement of C olored People (NAACP) The Southern Christian Leadership C onference ( S CLC )

The South African C ommunist Party ( SACP)

A profile of South Africa

1 66

The Civil Rights Act, 1 964

Non-violent protests Increasing violence

1.5

Freedom Summer, legislation and key actors & groups

Legislative changes 50

Protests and action

1.4 The role and significance of key individuals and groups

129

Background

Segregation in early practice

1.2

[1954-65)

Introduction to the Civil Rights Movement

The Nation o f Islam (NOI) 1 18

Writing the internal assessment for 18 History

1 96

Index

211

The middle years of the twentieth century saw an explosion o f protest by n o n - White p e ople o f the Unit e d S tates and S o uth Africa against the racist p olici e s of segre gation and dis crimination follow e d by their governments . This struggle for rights, fre e dom and j u stice is a d efining part o f the m o dern history o f the tw o countrie s . The first o f two case studies in this book focuses on the civil rights movement in the US. C overage begins in 1 9 5 4 with the B rown versus B oard of E ducation decision. The book procee ds to examine some of the landmark moments in the struggle for rights, such as the Montgomery bus boycott and the Freedom S ummer. The climax of

the study is the passage of the C ivil Rights Act in 1 9 64 and Voting Rights Act in 1 9 6 5 . In S outh Africa, the focus o f the second case study, the election of a National Part government in 1 948 was followed by a tightening of existing legislation and the imposition of an even harsher racial system known as apartheid. The Black maj ority responded with a series of non-violent, mass­ based protests against the authorities. The peaceful protest of the 1 9 5 0 s was then transformed into armed struggle in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre of 1 9 6 0 . The culmination of the study is the Rivonia Trial, in which life imprisonment terms were handed down to Nelson Mandela and his codefendants in 1 9 64.

Historical concepts The content in this unit is linke d to the six key IB concepts . •

•

The m ove from petty a p a rt h e i d to g ra n d a p a rt h e i d

• •

W a s there a n y rea l d iffe rence

The m ove f r o m peacef u l p rotest to armed str u g g l e

between petty a p a rt h e i d a n d

Sporadic c h a n g e from segregated sch ools t h r o u g h o u t the southern U n ited States in 1954 to m any, but not a majority of sch ools deseg regated by 1965.

•

Seg regated p u b l ic faci l ities l e g a l t h ro u g h o ut the so uthern states; the C iv i l

•

Pres i d ent i a l s u p po rt for civil rig hts a n d civ i l rig hts leg islation rises

R i g hts Act o f 1964 m a kes s u c h segregation i l l e g a l

g rand a p a rt h e i d ? •

•

To what exte nt w e r e t h e v a r i o u s

•

N a t u re and cha racteristics of t he a p a rt h e i d system

p rotests a n d ca m p a i g n s a g a i nst

•

L i m itati ons to the success of a nti-a partheid o p position

a p a rtheid successfu l ?

•

W a s t h e ANC ta ken ove r b y •

t h e S o u t h African •

D r M a rtin Luther King, J r. re m a i n s key civil r i g hts l e a d e r t h ro u g h o u t t he p e r i o d

C o m m u n ist Pa rty?

Seg regationist o p position to c i v i l r i g hts e m p l oys eco n o m ic, pol itica l, a n d v i o l ent means t h ro u g h o u t the

D i d C h ief Luth u l i a u thorize

1950s and 1960s

t h e use of a r med stru g g l e? •

To what exte nt d i d the goals of M a lco l m X a n d M a rt i n L u t h e r K i n g , J r. d i ffe r?

•

In wh a t ways were the views a n d methods of the NAAC P, SCLC,

Key concepts

•

SNCC, and t h e N O I d iffe rent? •

•

What were the s i g n ificant contr i b utions the United

by civ i l r ig hts p rotesto rs? States S u preme C o u rt and the Pres i d e n cy to the r ig hts of Africa n Americas? •

What was the i m po rta nce of the C iv i l R i g hts Act of 1964 and the Vot i n g R i g hts Act of 1965 to civil rig hts?

Why d i d states such as Virg inia p ractice M a ssive

•

What were the reaso ns why S N C C , the S C LC Why d i d seg regationist f i g h t h a rd to m a i nta i n J i m C row l aws a n d p ractices?

s h a p ing t h e a p a rt h e i d system

What were t h e i m pact of n on-vio lent resista nce

e m p loyed by the anti-a partheid m ovem ent? •

a n d C O RE used the tactic of n onvi o l ent p rotest?

were m ost significant in

•

What factors dete r m i n e d the va r i o u s strateg ies

•

i n d iv i d u a ls/org a n izations

and the response of the B lack majority

•

Resi stance after B rown v. B o a rd of Ed ucation?

What events/actions/

to t h i s syste m?

Why d i d t he Nati o n a l Pa rty g overnm ent i m p l e m ent a p a rt h e i d l aws?

•

:

•

•

• •

•

What was the i m pact of the a p a rtheid system on the l ives of South Africa ns?

•

W hat were the resu lts of t he S h a rpevi l l e massacre?

•

What were the res u lts of the Rivonia T r i a l and the ja i l i n g of the leaders of

•

W hat response from the U n ited States g overnm ent d i d Free d o m R i d ers hope

U m k h o nto we Si zwe? to cata lyze? •

H ow d i d overt a n d v i s u a l o pposition to civil ri g hts actions effect the views of the Ame rican p u b l ic?

•

W hat were the i m m ed i ate a n d lasting effects of the v i o l ence by law officers d u ri n g the S e l m a to M o n tg o m e ry M a rch in 1965?

1

Paper 1

History is an exploratory subj e ct that fosters a sense of inquiry. It is also an interpretive discipline , allowing opp ortunity for engagement with multiple p e rspe ctiv e s and a plurality of opinio n s . Stu dying history develops an understanding of the p ast, which leads to a deeper understanding of the nature of humans and of the w o rld to day. "Rights and protest" is a prescrib e d subj ect for Paper l of your IB History examination. This book focuses not only on helping you to cover and understand the content relating to this topic, but will also help you to develop the skills necessary to answer the source questions. The content of this prescrib e d subj e ct may also b e relevant to the topics that you are studying for Paper 3 . This book includes: •

analysis of the key events in each case study

•

activities to develop your understanding of the content and key issues

•

links b etween the content and historical concepts ( s e e previous page )

•

timelines to help develop a chronological understanding of key events

•

a range of sources for each topic

•

practice source questions along with examiner's hints

•

links to theory of knowledge ( T O K ) .

How to use this book This first chapter will explain how t o approach each question on the IB Paper l ; there will then be source exercises to try throughout the book which will give you the opportunity to practise your Paper 1 skills. Where you see this icon, you will find extra help answering the question, either at the end of the chapter or next to the question itself.

Preparing for Paper 1: Working with sou rces As historians, our train ing and discipline is based on documentary evidence.

- David Dixon When you work with sources you are practising a key component of historians' methodology. Paper l skills are the skills that historians apply when they research a question and attempt to draw conclusions . In Paper 1 you will: •

demonstrate understanding of historical sources

•

interpret and analyse information from a variety of sources

•

compare and contrast information between sources

•

evaluate sources for their value and limitations

•

synthesize evidence from the sources with your own detailed knowledge of the topic.

Thinking skills

Read the following comment on sources and then answer the questions that fol low. The p ractice of history begi ns with evidence and with sources. The availability of sou rces is often the key determinant of what becomes most popular, because some a reas, for example nineteenth-century Fra nce, benefit from a greater vol u m e of documents than others, such as ancient Germany. Whereas historians of early modern and medieva l popular cu ltu re face a constant battle to find material ... those concerned with modern political history face a verita ble forest of official documents - more than a n y one person

2

could marshal i n a lifetime. It is vita l, therefore, that students of history become awa re of the scope of historica l sources, and the methods which historians use to order them. Black J and Macraild, D M. 2 0 0 7. Palgrave Study Skills - Studying History. 3 rd edn, page 89. Macmillan. Basingstoke, U K

1 According t o Black a n d Macraild, what makes certain historical subjects more popular than others?

2 What problems do contempora ry historians face?

R I G H T S AND P R O T E S T

Communication skills

Fol l owing the catastrophe of the First World Wa r the new Bolshevi k govern ment in Russia published a l l the Tsa rist documents relating to the outbrea k ofthe wa r. This led to othe r European governments publishing volumes and vol u m es of documents - in what became known as the "colour books" - but in most cases attem pting to demonstrate how their cou ntry had not been responsi ble for causing the wa r. H istorians have subsequently had vast qua ntities of documents to use as more government and m ilita ry sou rces were declassified and released. H owever, as recent historiogra phy has revealed, there is stil l no consensus among historians as to the key causes of the First World Wa r.

Fol l owi ng on from your discussions for q uestion 3 and 4, get into small groups and consider what is the role of the historian ? To what extent do you agree that the key rol e of h istorians is to bring us closer to historica l truth? Or do historians, selection of evidence and use of la nguage tel l us more about their own e ras and societies than those of the past?

3 I n pairs discuss whether each generation of h istoria n can move closer to "historical truth" and can be more objective because they a re fu rther away in time from a n event and have more sou rces to work from. 4

Listen to this discussion on the historiography ofthe causes of the First World War: http://www.bbc.co.uklprogra mmes/b03srqz9?p f added=u rn%3Abbc%3Aradio% 3Aprogram m e%3Ab03srqz9 What different interpretations do historians have on the causes of the First World War? What factors have affected their i nterpretations?

What can you expect on Paper 1? Paper 1 has a key advantage for students a s the question format is given in advance; you can

attain technically. The maj ority of marks on this paper are awarded for skills. This book deals with the prescribed topic of global

predict the nature and style of the four questions

war. As this is an IB prescribed topic you will need

on this paper. This means that you can also learn

to ensure you have learned all of the content in

and practise the correct approach for each of

this book which is linked to each sub-topic from

these questions and maximize the marks you

the bullet point list set down in the syllabus:

Case studies

Material for detailed study

Case study 1 :

Nature and characteristics of discrimination

Apa rtheid South Africa [ 1948- 1 9 64)

•

"Petty Apartheid" and "Grand Apartheid" l egislation

•

Division and "classification"; segregation of popu lations and amenities; creation of townships/forced removals; segregation of education; Ba ntusta n system; impact on individuals

Protests and action •

Non-violent protests: bus boycotts; defiance ca mpaign, Freedom Charter

•

I n creasing violence: the Sharpevi l l e massacre [ 19 6 0 ) and the decision to adopt the a rmed struggle

•

Official response: the Rivonia trial [ 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 64) and the i m p risonment ofthe ANC leadership

The role and significance of key actors/groups •

Key individua ls: N e lson Mandela; Al bert Luth uli

•

Key groups: the Africa n National Congress [AN C) ; the South African Com m u nist Pa rty [SACP) and the MK [ U m khonto we Sizwe-"Spear ofthe Nation") ."'

3

Paper 1

...

Case study 2:

Natu re and characteristics of d iscrimination

Civil rights movement in the U n ited States ( 1 9 54- 1 9 6 5 )

•

Racism and violence against Africa n Americans; the Ku Klux Klan; disenfranchisement

•

Segregation a n d education; B rown versus Board of Education decision ( 1 9 54) ; Little Rock [ 19 5 7 )

•

Economic and social d iscrimination; l egacy of the J i m Crow laws; impact on individuals

Protests and action •

Non-violent p rotests; Montgomery bus boycott ( 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 5 6 ) ; Freedom Rides ( 1 9 6 1 ) ; Freedom Summer ( 1 9 64

•

Legislative cha nges: Civil Rights Act ( 19 64) ; Voting Rights Act ( 1 9 6 5 )

T h e rol e and significance of key actors/groups •

Key actors: M a rtin Luthe r King J r; M a l colm X; Ly ndon B Joh nson

•

Key groups: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) ; Southern Ch ristian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Student N on-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) ; the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims)

The four s o u r c e s o n the e x amination paper will b e a s e l e ction of b o th p rimary and s e c o n dary s o u r c e s . The length o f e a ch s o u rce may vary but the total length of the p a p e r should n o t e x c e e d 7 5 0 words in t o t a l . O n e of the fo u r s o u r c e s will b e a "visual" rath e r th an text - b a s e d s o u r c e , for example a photograph, carto on, table of statistics, graph o r map . This book will thus give you plenty of practice with a wide range of different sources on the topic of rights and protest.

How to approach the sou rce questions on Paper 1 Refer to the guidelines below when attempting the source -based questions in each chapter of the book.

Fi rst q u estio n

Pa rt a The 3 -mark question asks you to comprehend, extract and p o ssibly infer information. Here are some suggestions for answering this que stion : •

Write : firstly . . . , secondly . . . , thirdly . . . to ensure that you make at least three separate points .

•

D o not repeat the same point you have already made .

•

D o not overly rely on quotes - make your point and then briefly quote two or thre e words of the source in support.

Pa rt b •

You should try to make two clear points for this question.

•

For each point, refer specifically to the content of the source to provide evidence for your answer.

This is in two parts . It is made up o f a 3 -mark and a 2 -mark component - giving you a possible total of 5 marks . It is assessing your historical comprehension of the sources . You do not need to give your own detailed knowledge in your response .

For parts a and b you should not need to bring in your own knowledge; however your contextual understanding of the topic and sources should enable you to understand more clearly the content and message of each source .

This is the only question that asks you t o explain the content and meaning of the documents

Second q u estio n As you know, historians need to use and evaluate sources as they research a historical era or event.

4

R I G H T S AND P R O T E S T

For the second question, you need to evaluate one source in terms of its "valu e " and "limitations" by examining its origin, purpose and content. This question is worth 4 marks .

The grid o n pages 7 and 8 gives you an idea o f the kinds of values and limitations connected with different primary sources . Examiner's hint: Note that value and lim itations given in the grid are general or generic points that could be applied to these sources. However, your contextual knowledge and the specific provenance of any source that you get in the examination will allow you to make much more precise comments on the value and lim itations of the sou rce that you evaluate in a document question. Notice also that the value of the sou rce will always depend on what you a re using it for.

To find the origin and purpose look carefully at the provenance of the source :

For origin

Who wrote it/said When did

it/d rew it?

the person write it/say it/d raw it?

Where did the

person write it/say it/draw it?

is the source - a speech/ca rtoon/ textbook, etc.? What

For pu rpose

Why

did the person write it/say it/d raw it?

Who did

For content Is the language objective or does it sound exaggerated or one-sided? What is the tone of the source? What information and exa mples do they select or focus on to support their point? From the information you have on the origins of the source, and what you can infer about the document's purpose, you must then explain the value and limitations the source has for historians researching a particular event or period in history.

Historians

associated with seco n d a r y sou rce s ? T h e m o s t common secondary source that you will have to deal with is one from a text book or historian . Again the key questions of "What is the origin of the source ? " and "What is the source's purpose ? " need to be addressed in order to work out the value and limitation of the source in question. Here are some points you could consider regarding the value and limitations of works by historians and biographers :

Values

Limitations

•

a re usua l l y professionals or experts in field

•

•

have the benefit of hindsight which is not present in contemporary sources

might have a broad focus to their work or might have a very specific and na rrow focus

•

might be a n expert i n a different region or e ra from the one they a re writing a bout

•

may be influenced by their nationality, racia l background, experience, politics or context

•

might have become too involved with their subject and have lost objectivity

•

may focus on the role ofthe subject oftheir biogra p h y at the expense of othe r individuals or factors

•

might not have direct access to the subject and/ o r other relevant sources (the place and date wil l be key h e re)

•

may have limitations due to tone, use of language and expression

•

Biographers

What a re t h e va l ues a n d l i m itations

the person write it/say it/draw it for?

may offe r sou rces based on a ra nge of documents; the more recent the publication, the more sources will be available

•

will have studied the individual in q uestion in much deta i l

•

may provide sources that have val u e due to tone, use of la nguage and expression

•

sometimes have the benefit of hindsight

5

Paper 1

Thinking skills

Consider the following provenance: Tom Lodge, a South African historian who is professor of peace and conflict studies at the University of Limerick in Ireland. Mandela: A Critical Life (2006 ) .

1 Using the points on the previous page, consider the value and limitations of this source for a student analysing Japanese history in this period. ( Remember to research Lodge's credentials as a historian of South Africa.]

2 H ow would a school history textbook differ in va lue a n d limitations compared to the work of a historian?

Communication and thinking skills

Tas k 1

Tas k 2

Find a biography of one key figure from the period of history that you are studying. With reference to the questions above, analyse the value and limitations of the source in providing extra insight into the role and impact of this individual.

What q uestions wou l d you ask about a n autobiography to assess its values and limitations to your research?

Thinking skills

Read the following extract: Pa rt of the p roblem for historians is defining what a source is. Although primary sources a re usual l y closest, or i n d e e d contempora ry, t o the period u n d e r observation, and secondary sources those works written su bseq uently, the distinction is actually q u ite b l u rred. Once we move away from simple cases [such as politicians' diaries, or cabinet minutes] which a re clearly primary, difficulties do a rise. Ta ke Benja min Disraeli's novel of 1845, Sybil; or the Two Nations. This is first and foremost a piece of fiction . . . For historians . . . however, Sybil is something of a primary

Examiner's hint: Note that for the purposes of evaluation, a source has no more or less intrinsic value to historians just because it is primary or secondary.

source: it typifies the milieu (social setting) of the young Tory Radicals of the day [of whom Disraeli was one] . . . Black J and Macraild, 0 M . 2007. Palgrave Study Skills­ Studying History. 3 rd edition, page 9 1 . Macmillan. Basingstoke, U K. Note: Disraeli was a 1 9th-century British Conservative Party leader, and British Prime Ministerfrom 1B?4-BD.

O u estion What is the problem with trying to define sources as "primary" or "secondary"? A lways focus on the specific origins and purpose of a source - not whether it is primary or secondary. You do not need to give this distinction in your answer.

Communication and thinking skills

6

Read the following statements. Why wou l d these statements be considered invalid by examiners?

•

A val u e of this source is that it is a n eyewitness account.

•

A limitation of this source is that the translation could be inaccurate.

•

This source is only a n extract and we don't know what he said next.

•

This source is limited because it doesn't tel l us what happened before or after.

•

This is a primary source and this is a va lue.

•

•

This source is limited because it is biased.

As it is a photograph, it gives a true representation of what actually happened.

•

This textbook was written over 7 0 years after the event took place so it is u n l i ke l y that the author had first­ hand experience. This is a limitation.

R I G H T S AND P R O T E S T

Refer back to the examiner's hint o n page 5 regarding this table . Source

Private l etters

Values

Limitations

These sources:

These sources:

•

can offer insight i n to personal views or opinions

•

•

can indicate the affects of a n event or e ra on an individual

only give individual opinion, not a genera l view or government perspective

•

may give a n opinion that cha nges due to later events or may give a view not held i n public

•

might have the motive of persuading the audience [in the case of private l etters) to act in certain way

•

may have l i mitations because of tone, use of la nguage and expression

•

may revise opinions with the benefit of hindsight, i.e. now the consequences of actions a re known

•

might be written because the author wants to highlight the strengths of his or her a ctions - to improve the author's public image or l egacy

•

may have l i mitations because of tone, use of la nguage and expression

•

could be politica l l y influenced or censored by specific govern ments or regimes

•

may only give "overview" of a situation

•

might only give a one-sided na rrow perspective

•

could emphasize only a minor part of a n issue

•

may have l i mitations because of tone, use of la nguage and expression

[audience - the recipient] Diaries [audience - personal not public at the time of writing]

Memoirs to be published

•

can suggest motives for public actions or opinions

•

can, through tone, use of la nguage and expression give insight into perspective, opinion or emotions

•

[audience - public]

•

Newspapers, television o r radio

might show how the individual wants his or her motive or actions to be viewed by the public

•

could refl ect publ icly held views or popular opinion

•

might offer an expert view

•

can give insight into contempora ry opinion

reports Eyewitness accounts

can offer insight i nto personal views, suggest motives for public actions and might benefit from hindsight - a n eva luation of events after the period

[ N ote that eyewitnesses a re not usefu l just because t h e y a re a t a n event; each eyewitness wi l l notice different aspects and may miss key points a ltogether, which could be a limitation] Novels or poems

•

could inform contemporary opinion

•

•

might offer insight into emotional responses and motives

could provide a "dissenting" voice, i.e. not popular opinion

•

could exaggerate the importance of a n event or individual

•

could have politica l agenda

•

may have l i mitations because of tone, use of la nguage and expression . .� 7

Paper 1

�·s tatiStiCS ..

Photographs

Ca rtoons or paintings

....---

-....---

•

ca n offe r insight i nto growth and decline

•

might suggest correlations between indicators, e.g. unemploy ment and voting patterns

•

are gathered for different purposes [e.g. political, economic) and could be deliberate l y distorted

•

might relate o n l y to one location or time period

•

might suggest incorrect correlations; there could be another causal factor not included in some sets of statistics

•

might suggest the impact of a n event o r its resu lts over time

•

make comparisons easier

•

ca n give a sense of a specific scene o r event

•

are limited as we cannot see beyond the "lens"

•

ca n offe r insight i nto the immediate impact of an event on a particu l a r place, or people's immediate response

•

might distort the "bigger" pictu re because of t h e i r limited view

•

might be staged

•

might reflect the purpose ofthe photographer; what did he or she want to show?

•

could be censored and not refl ect public opinion

•

often play on stereotypes [particu larly cartoons) and exaggeration

•

could be limited to the viewpoint and experience of the ca rtoonist or a rtist [or the publication the cartoon or painting appears in)

•

may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression

•

might offe r information on the e nvironment

•

ca n inform public opinion as ca rtoonists often respond to popularly held views

•

ca n portray the government's line when there is censorship

Govern ment records and documents

•

might show the government's position on an issue

•

often do not offe r insight i nto the resu lts of policies and decisions

Speeches

•

ca n offe r insight i nto the reasons for decisions made

•

might not revea l dissent or divergent opinion

•

might revea l the motives for government pol icies

•

might not show public opinion

•

•

ca n show what the public has been told about a n event or issue by the government

ca n be used to keep sensitive information classified for many years

•

may not explain the motives for a decision or political purpose

might be a well-informed ana lysis

•

may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression

M emoranda

•

Research skills

Fi nd primary sources of the types listed in the grid above for the topic that you a re cu rrently studying. Using the notes in the grid above, anal yse the va l u es and limitations of each of these sou rces.

8

For the sou rces that you have assessed, also look at the content and the language being used. H ow does the tone, sty l e or content help you to assess the val u e and l i m itations of the sources?

R I G H T S AND P R O T E S T

Th i rd q u estio n This will ask you to compare and contrast two sources . Your aim is to identify similar themes and ideas in two sources, and to also identify differences between them. It is marked out of a total of 6 marks . The key to this question is linkage, i . e . you are exp e cted to discuss the sources together throughout your response . The examiner is lo oking for a running commentary. At no time should you talk ab out one source without relating it to the other. " E n d - on accounts " - where you write about the content of one source followed by the content of the s e cond source - do not score well.

Examiner's hint: Note that you m ust make more than one comparison and more than one contrast. You should attempt to identify six points of linkage as this is a 6-mark question. This m ight mean there are three points of comparison and th ree points of dzfference. However, there m ight not be balance - there cou ld be two poin ts of comparison and four points of contrast, or fou r points of comparison and two points of contrast.

How to d raw compa riso ns/s h ow s i m i l a rities Both Source A and Source 8

Source A suggests . . . ; similarly, Source B suggests . . .

H ow do you a pproach t h i s quest ion ?

Source A supports Source 8

You must find both similarities and differences . This i s b e s t presented as two separate paragraphs one for comparisons and one for contrasts . Here are some tip s :

Like Source

•

You could practice using highlighter pens highlight the similarities in each source in one colour and the differences in another colour.

•

You must make sure that you mention both sources in every sentence you write . The skill you are demonstrating is linkage .

•

Always be clear about which source you are discussing .

•

Find both the more " obvio u s " similarities and differences, and then go on to identify the more sp ecific comparisons and contrasts .

•

D eal with similarities in your first paragraph and differences in your second.

•

Ensure that each point you make is clearly state d. If you quote from the sources, make this brief - quote only two or thre e words to supp ort your point.

•

D o not introduce your answer or attempt to reach a conclusion. This is not necessary and wastes tim e .

•

D o not waste time explaining what each source says.

•

D o not discuss why the sources are similar or different.

...

8,

...

Source A says . . .

I n the same way that Source 8 a rgues . . . , Source A points out that . . . H ow to d raw cont rasts I s h ow d ifferen ces Source A suggests . . . ; however, Source B says . . . Source 8 disagrees with Source A rega rding . . . Source A claims . . . as opposed to Source B which asserts . . . Source 8 goes fu rther than Source A i n a rgu ing . . . while A focuses on ... Examiner's hint - what not t o d o : The focus of th is question is how the sources are sim ilar o r differen t - i t is asking you t o look at the con ten t of the source. This question is not asking you why the sources m ight be sim ilar or different.

Do not use grids, charts or bullet points - always write in full paragraphs. It is not a full valid contrast to identify what is simply mentioned in one source but not the other (i. e. "Source A men tions that . . . played a role, whereas Source B does not mention this " is not developed linkage) .

9

Paper 1

Question Three will be assessed using generic markbands, as well as exam specific indicative content. The markbands are: Level descriptor

S-6 3-4

1-2

0

•

There is discussion of both sources. Explicit l i n ks a re made between the two sources.

•

The response includes clear and valid poi nts of comparison and of contrast.

•

There is some discussion of both sou rces, a lthough the two sources may be discussed separately.

•

The response includes some valid poi nts of comparison and/or of contrast, a lthough these points may lack cla rity.

•

There is superficial discussion of one or both sources.

•

The response consists of description of the content of the source (s] , a nd/or genera l comments about the source (s] . rather than va lid points of com parison or of contrast.

•

The response does not reach a sta ndard described by the descriptors above.

E xaminers will apply the "best fit" to responses and attempt to award credit wherever possible .

Fo u rth q u estio n This is worth the most marks, 9 o f the total o f 2 5 . It requires you to write a mini- essay. The key to this question is that an essay is required - not a list of material from each source . However, you are required to synthesize material from the sources with your own knowledge in your essay.

H ow do y o u a p p roach t h i s q uestio n ? It i s recommended that you plan your answer as you would any essay question. The difference here is that you will use evidence from the sources as well as from your own detailed knowledge to support your arguments . •

First make a brief plan based on the sources and group them into either tho s e which support the point in the essay title and those which suggest an alternative argument. or group them under themes if the question is open, e . g . "Examine the reasons for the

changing alliances . . . ". Add the sources to the grid as shown b elow. •

Then add your own knowledge to the grid . This should be detailed knowledge such as dates, events, statistics and the views of historian s .

•

When you start writing, you will need to write only a brief sentence of introduction .

•

When using the sources, refer to the them directly as S ource A, S ource E and so on.

•

You can quote briefly from the sources throughout the essay but quoting two or three words is sufficient.

•

Use all the sources.

•

Include own detailed knowledge

•

Write a brief conclusion which should answer the question and b e in line with the evidence you have given.

Sources that suggest X

Sources that suggest other factors

Source A

Source B

Own knowledge: events, dates, details

Own knowledge: events, dates, d etails

Source 0

Source C Own

Source E

Source A makes more than one point, can be used to support more than one a rgu ment or theme

Own knowledge: events, dates, details .A.

P l a n n i n g grid fo r the fou rth q uestion - m i n i-essay

R I G H T S AND P R O T E S T

The Fourth question will be assessed using generic markbands, as well as exam specific indicative content. The markbands are: Level descriptor

0

•

The response does not reach a sta ndard described by the descriptors below.

1-3

•

The response lacks focus on the q uestion.

•

References to the sources a re made, but at this l evel these references a re l i ke l y to consist of descriptions ofthe content ofthe sources rather than the sources being used as evidence to support the anal ysis.

•

No own knowledge is demonstrated or, where it is demonstrated, it is inaccurate or irrelevant.

•

The response is genera l l y focused on the q uestion.

•

References a re made to the sources, and these references a re used as evidence to support the analysis.

•

Where own knowledge is demonstrated, this lacks relevance or accuracy. There is littl e or no attempt to synthesize own knowledge and source material.

•

The response is focused on the q uestion.

•

Clear references a re made to the sources, and these references a re used effectively as evidence to support the analysis.

•

Accu rate and rel evant own knowledge is demonstrated. There is effective synthesis of own knowledge and source material.

4-6

7-9

Examiners will apply t h e " b e s t fit" to responses a n d attempt to award credit wherever possible .

Here is a summary of the key points for each question with the kind of language that is useful when answering each question.

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a Remember you have to show your understanding of the source and come up with three points. Here are some useful sentence starters:

Second q uestion This question is assessing your ability to analyse a source for its value and limitations by looking at its origin and purpose and content.

M a ke sure that you use the words "origin", "purpose" or "content" in each of your sentences to ensure that you a re focused on what the q uestion needs, e.g.

This source says that . . .

A val u e of the source is that its author . . .

Secondly . . .

A val u e of the purpose is that it . . .

It a lso suggests that . . .

The language of the content of this source indicates that . . .

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b Always start with your key point.

One message of this source is . . . This is supported b y . . . here refer to specific details in the source. Another message of the source is ... You need to make a separate point, not an elaboration of thefirst point: you need two clear points about the message of the sources.

The content also seems to focus on, o r use, exa mples which are ... On the other hand, there are also limitations to using this source for finding out a bout . . . This is because (explain here how origin and purpose can cause problemsfor the historian) or A limitation of the origin is . . . A limitation of the purpose is . . . The content of this source makes it less va luable because . . .

-

Paper 1

-

Th i rd q u estion

Fou rt h q u estion

This is designed to assess your cross-referencing skills.

This is a mini-essay and is assessing your ability to synthesize sources with your own knowledge as we// as your ability to give supported arguments or points that address the specific essay question.

When comparing two sources you could use the following structures:

Sources A and B agree that . . . Moreover, the two sources a re also similar i n that . . . This is supported b y . . . i n Source A and . . . in Source B . . . For a contrasting paragraph:

Source A differs from Source B in that Source A says . . . while Source B a rgues that . . . Another difference between the two documents is that . . . Moreover, Source B goes fu rther than Source A when it suggests/says that . . .

Use your essay writing skills and vocabulary for this question. In addition, as you are using sources as well as your own knowledge, you could use the following to help tie in the sources to your own knowledge:

As it says i n Source C . . . This is supported b y the information given in Source . . . Source A suggests that . . . and this is supported by the fact that in the Soviet Union at this time . . . H istorians have a rgued that . . . This viewpoint is supported by the information in Source E concerning . . .

H ow should I d istribute my time in the Pa per 1 examination? A k e y i s s u e f o r this p a p e r is managing y o u r time effe ctively in the examinati o n . If you d o not w o rk through the q u e stions e fficiently y o u could run o u t o f tim e . You m ust allow enough time to answer the f ourth q u e stion; after all this is w o rth the m o s t marks on the paper. You will have one hour to complete the paper. At the b eginning of the examination you have five minutes reading time when you are not allowed to write anything. We re commend that y o u use your five minut e s r e a ding time to read through the q u e stions firs t . This will give y o u an initial understanding o f what y o u are l o o king f o r when y o u read the s o u r c e s . Read thro u gh the q u e stions and then b e gin to r e a d through the s o u r c e s .

How m u c h time should I spend o n each q u estio n ? S ome examiners have suggested that the time you sp end o n each question could be based on the maximum number of marks that the answer could receiv e . The following is a rough guide : First question, parts a and b

1 0 minutes

5 marks

Second question

1 0 minutes

4 ma rks

Third question

1 5 minutes

6 marks

Fourth question

25 minutes

9 marks

1

A PA R T H E I D S O U T H A F R I C A

( 1948-1964)

In May 1 948, the Whites - only electorate of the Union of S outh Africa voted the Herenigde Nasionale Party (more usually known as the National Party or the NP ) , led by Dr DF Malan, into power. The margin of the NP victory was exceptionally narrow. In fact, the ruling United Party (UP) of sitting Prime Minister Jan Smuts won the maj ority of the popular vote, but the electoral system was weighted in favour of larger, rural constituencies where the NP managed to out-perform its rivals . This meant that Malan was able to form a coalition government with the smaller Afrikaner Party (AP) of Nicolaas Havenga. D e spite the narrown e s s o f the NP mandate, the de cision of the White voters of S outh Africa was momento u s . The NP would remain in p o w e r for more than four decade s . D uring this p eriod, it would implement an extreme version of racial s e gre gation known a s apa rtheid, a word which m e ans " apartn e s s " in Afrikaans . Malan and his s u cce s s o rs enacted a s e ri e s of le gislative m e a s u r e s de sign e d to reinforce the dominance of the minority White population

over the other p e oples of S outh Africa . They also sought to engin e e r the complete sep aration o f the different racial groups in the country. Their a ctions re sulted in an explosion of oppo sition to the apartheid system among the n o n - White p e opl e s o f S outh Africa, and growing disgust and oppo sition to the co untry from the international community, leading to diplomatic pressure and trade sancti o n s . In t h e 1 9 8 0 s , with S outh Africa in a s t a t e o f d e e p e ning p o litical and e conomic crisis, a s e ction of the NP leadership made the de cision to b e gin dismantling the apartheid syste m . T h e country completed its transition from apartheid to n o n - r a cialism with its first fully demo cratic elections in 1 9 9 4 . The s e were won handsomely by the African National C ongress (ANC ) , the p arty which had been at the forefront o f B lack oppo sition to the apartheid system since the NP first won p o w e r in 1 94 8 . Nelson Mandela, the A N C l e a d e r w h o had spent 27 years in ap arth eid pris ons, b e came S o uth Africa's first e ve r B lack p r e sident.

The focus of the case study in this chapter is on the crucial early years in the history of apartheid S outh Africa . It begins with the NP triumph in 1 948 and ends in 1 9 64, when the state completed its crackdown on opposition and dissent by handing down terms of life imprisonment to Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the ANC . The apartheid system erected during these years amounted to an emphatic denial of the political and economic rights of the maj ority of the population by a small White minority. The story of this period is of the protest against this discrimination, first by peaceful means and later through armed struggle .

13

The o rigi ns of a p a rtheid N ote: The origins of apartheid is not included as a bullet point in the 1 8 History: Rights and Protest s y l l a bus, and it wil l therefore not be examined. H owever, it is indispensable to an understa nding of the apartheid system and it is strongly recommended that it is studied by students. A country profi le of South Africa and a discussion of its history prior to 1948 ca n be found on pages 1 1 8 - 1 2 8 . Before p roceeding with the rest of this case study, you may find it usefu l to gain some basic knowledge of South Africa and its p re-1948 history.

Social Darwinism

A p h i loso p h y p o p u l a r in the l ate n i n eteenth and early twentieth centu ries, which a p p l i e d D a rwin's theories of natu ra l selection to h u m a n society. S o c i a l D a rwinists a rgued that "su rviva l of the fittest" is a basic law of h u m a n natu re and that "su p e rior" races s h o u l d aim to d o m i nate "inferior" ones. Calvinism

The a u stere theology of the sixteenth centu ry re l igious reformer John Ca lvi n, who a rgued that h u m a n ki n d is d ivided betwee n the e l ect, or those who have been chosen [or p re-d esti ned ) by God fo r sa lvation, a n d those who have been con d e m n e d to ete rnal d a m nation. Calvin a dvocated a ste rn a n d mora l izing a p p roach to society and govern ment. 14

The idea of apartheid is based on one basic assumption about the nature of humankind. This is that the various ethnic groups, or races, that constitute humanity are essentially different from one another. E ach ethnicity has a set of common physical characteristics that distinguishes it from other racial groups. The argument continues that there must be a natural hierarchy of the races, because some groups will possess certain biological traits which make them inherently superior to others . The apartheid theorists took it for granted that the evident cultural achievements of the White race were proof enough of its superiority, and that it therefore enj oyed a position right at the apex of the pyramid of the races in S outh Africa. They similarly believed that B lack people had achieved nothing of any note and that they were therefore at the bottom of the racial pile . Other groups, including C oloureds and Indians, occupied the intermediate spaces in the hierarchy. According to the apartheid vision, government should acknowledge the reality of these fundamental racial differences . Fundamental racial inequalities should be reflected i n its policies, which should be designed to promote the interests of the superior White race while keeping all of the races separate . Expressed in this way, the idea of apartheid was in many respects similar to the various social Darwinist philosophies (such as Nazism) that were popular in Europe in the first part of the 2 0th century. What made it different is the way in which it sought justification in Calvinist scripture and reasoning as well as through science . According to the C alvinist logic, God created the different races and it was therefore his wish that they should remain separate. It was the destiny of his chosen people, the Afrikaners, to rule in S outh Africa and ensure that this divine will was enforced. The manner in which this sense of Afrikaner exceptionalism developed is an issue that has long interested historians . The traditional account identifies its roots in early Afrikaner history, specifically in the experiences of the trekboers who lived on the colonial frontier. These pious Dutch colonists, cut off from Europe and therefore isolated from its modern intellectual currents, cultivated an Old Testament world view which led them to draw analogies between their experiences and those of the biblical Israelites. Slavery was a part of their everyday life and so racial inequality was taken for granted. They encountered powerful Xhosa kingdoms, and the ensuing clashes contributed to a growing feeling of animosity

C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E O R I G I N S O F A P AR T H E I D

between the B o ers and the B lack people of the region. Afrikaners grew to equate Africans with the biblical "sons of Ham", condemned by God to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water" (Joshua 9 : 2 1 ) . The B ritish decision to abolish slavery in 1 8 3 3 led some B o ers to undertake the famous Great Trek to their "promised land", where they would be free of the interference of the foreign, ungodly B ritish. The fortunate coincidence that many of the lands where they settled had been extensively depopulated as a result of the Mfecane earlier in the century reinforced this sense of divine deliverance. The famous victory of the B oers against the Zulu at the B attle of Blood River in 1 8 3 8 affirmed that the B oers were indeed " God's chosen people " . Following this battle, they made a solemn covenant with God which, if honoured, would allow them to triumph over their enemies. The Blood River victors vowed to bring civilization to Africa in return for God's favour and protection. Their subsequent history - the establishment of the two B oer Republics; the struggle with the B ritish culminating in the South African War; the establishment of the Union of South Africa and the introduction of a segregationist system by Smuts and Hertzog; and finally the NP victory of 1 948 - may be interpreted in this way as the slow unfurling of Afrikaner destiny. Apartheid would be the final triumph, the fulfilment of the Blood River pact between God and his chosen people .

T O K connections

Const ruct i n g h i storica l myths a n d rea d i n g h i story backw a rds Some historians, most notably Andre du To it, have challenged the so-called Calvinist myth about the origins of apartheid. Du To it argues that the assu mption that the 1 9th-century Boers had a sense of their own special destiny is a fiction generated by Afrikaner nationalists in the 1930s. They did this in order to rally Afrikaners around the cause of nationalism and help the NP gain power. Du Toit points to the activities of the Afrikaner Broederbond [a semi-secret organization with close links to the N P) in organizing the centenary celebrations which commemorated the Great Trek and the Battle of Blood River. Popular re-enactments of these events were used to project the attitudes and values of modern Afrikaner nationalists onto the historical Voortrekkers. Du To it a rgues that those who took part in the Great Trek were in fact poorly educated frontier farmers with little interest in theology. They were simply escaping the unwelcome interference of a foreign power and had little sense the journey that they were undertaking held any religious significance.

The s u p positi on that Afri ka n e rs had rega rd ed themse lves as "God's chosen people" fro m a very early p o i nt i n t h e i r history, a n d that the a p a rtheid system was a natura l outgrowth of this c o l l e ctive self-image, is a good exa m p l e of how easy it can be to fa l l i nto the tra p of "re a d i n g h i story backwards". Consi d e ri n g that d u To i t a rgues t h a t t h i s so-ca l l e d Ca lvi n i st m yth is a 1 9 3 0s Afri ka n e r constru ctio n , it seems q u ite odd that m a n y pro- B ritish histori a n s of the l i b e ra l s c h o o l [ s u c h as CW de Kiewiet) were j u st as kee n as Afri ka n e r nati o n a l ists to l e n d their authority to this tra i n of thought. The expla nati o n is q u ite s i m p l e , h oweve r. The "Ca lvi n ist m yth" suggests that ra cial d iscri m i n ation in South Afri ca, and u ltimate l y the a p a rtheid system its e l f, had u n i q u e l y Afri ka n e r roots. H oweve r, recent rese a rch i n d i cates that the fi rm fo u n dations fo r a system of segregation h a d a l re a d y been put i n place i n South Afri ca by the l a t e 1 9th century, if not earlier. M o reove r, it was not the Afri ka n e rs who were resp o n s i b l e fo r this, but the B ritish.

Segregation in ea rl y p ra ctice T h e r e is an alternative v i e w of the origins o f racism and s egregation in S outh Africa. This argu e s that it can b e found not in the C alvinist m entality of the Afrikaners but in the character of e a rly B ritish rule in the C ap e . The p o sition runs contrary to the frequently held a s sumption that B ritish a dministration in S o uth Africa was p aternalistic and lib e ral, the paramount concern b e ing to protect the

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inte r e sts o f Africans . The history o f the C ap e C olony tells a rather different story. F o llowing the e stablishment of B ritish rule, new urban s e ttlements w e r e built o n the far e astern frontier. The larg e s t o f the s e t o w n s were E a s t London and Grahamstown. C ontact with the Xho s a was fairly fre quent, a s Africans travelled to farms and citi e s in s e arch o f work. As t i m e p a s s e d, the attitu d e s of the n ewly s e ttle d B ritish b e came in creasingly racist. Their min d s e t w a s r e fl e ct e d i n the 1 8 5 3 constitution of the C ap e C olony, which distinguished b e t w een tw o typ e s o f p e ople, " civiliz e d " and " u nciviliz e d " , without referring spe cifically to their racial identiti e s . However, the latter category obviou sly referred to the Xho s a population, who would henceforth be subj ected to c e rtain p unitive law s . Th e s e inclu d e d the re quirement that they should carry p a s s e s . These w e r e do cuments they would be oblig e d to produce when travelling outside the imme diate vicinity of their residence or employm ent. P a s s e s would be u s e d to regulate the movement o f B lack p e ople, but could also prevent them from le aving their j ob s and s e eking w o rk elsewh e r e . From an e arly p oint in time , then, the conne ction b e tw e e n s e gregationist laws and e conomic forces was obviou s . Residential segregation, which was supported b y the imp osition o f curfews o n B lacks t o prevent them from entering White areas a t night, was also practise d in municipalities across the colony. In the 1 8 9 0 s, with the rapid expansion of C ap e Town, moves towards a more rigid system of segregation were accelerate d. Large - s cale African migration into the city from as far afield as Mozambique heightened fears among the White population of racial swamping and a deterioration in the standards of sanitation . Following the outbreak of bubonic plague in C ape Town in 1 9 0 1 , legal residential segregation was introduced for the first time with the establishment of the B lacks - only township of Ndabeni, located far away from the city centr e . Racial discrimination w a s also widely practised i n the two B oer Republics in the interior, the Transvaal ( officially known as the S outh African Republic) and the Orange Free State . The B ritish recognized the independence of the republics in the Bloemfontein and S and River C onventions, but the terms of these republics' treaties forbade them from reviving the institution of slavery. Nonetheless, slavery was still widely practised, and the constitutions of the republics were quite explicit in declaring the supremacy of White over B lack. The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1 88 6 led to the sudden and dramatic transformation of the Transvaal. Johannesburg soon emerged as the largest city in the region following a huge influx of mainly English- speaking White workers into the city. In addition, capital became concentrated in the hands of a small number of fabulously wealthy, mainly English- speaking, mining magnates who became known as the Randlords. The disp u t e b e tw e e n the s o - call e d u itla n der p o p ulation and the Randlords o n the one hand, and the Afrikaner g o v e rnment o f Paul Kruger o n the other, o v e r the issue o f whether to extend the right to vote to all White p e ople in the republic, was one of the main cau s e s o f the S o uth African War o f 1 8 9 9- 1 9 0 2 . H o w e v e r, o n e o f the

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C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E O R I G I N S O F A P AR T H E I D

few things that all p arti e s agr e e d u p o n w a s the n e e d to e n s u r e the p e rp e tuation o f White domination o v e r B lack in p o litics and in the wider e c o nomy. The Afrik a n e r farm e r s who supported the Kruger g o v e rnment re quir e d a r e a dy supply o f c h e ap and pliable African lab o ur. It was also imp erative that this w o rkforce w a s r e n d e r e d as immobile a s p o s sible s o that Africans could not leave their farms in s e arch o f employm ent e ls e w h e r e . The Randlords obviou sly s h a r e d th e s e obj e ctiv e s with regard to African lab o u r w o rking in their min e s . The u itlan ders s o u ght lab o u r p r o t e ction against B lack c o m p e tition, an obj e ctive that could o nly b e attaine d through the furthe r e r o sion o f the p o litical rights o f African s . For all o f th e s e g r o u p s , t h e b e st m e an s o f s e cu ring th e s e goals w a s through the entrenchment and extension o f a system o f r a cial s e gregati o n . While the e conomic e ffe cts o f the S o uth African War were d e va stating, the s p e e d o f the r e c o n ciliation b e tw e e n the B ritish and the Afrikaners in the first d e c a d e o f the 2 0th c entury w a s r e m a rkable . One of the m o s t imp o rtant factors in this rapp r o ch e m e nt w a s s u r e ly the r e c o gnition by all o f the p arti e s that the e c o n omic development o f the region w a s ultim ately d e p e n d e n t o n a full p o litical union b e tw e e n all four o f S outh Africa's te rrit o ri e s . The logic h e r e w a s simple . Growth could o nly b e p r o m o t e d t h r o u g h e conomic and infrastructural planning o n a national l e v e l and, crucially, through the rig o r o u s and systematic implem entation o f a s e g r e gationist syst e m . The c o n c o r d b e tw e e n the r e c e ntly w arring White p e op l e s o f S o uth Africa w a s t h u s achieved, b u t at a te rrible c o s t to the n o n ­ White maj o rity o f t h e c o untry.

The system of segregati o n One o f the main obj e ctives o f the new S outh African Party ( SAP ) government led by Louis B otha and Jan Smuts was to entrench in law a comprehensive system of racial segregation. The Act of Union, officially known as the S outh Africa Act, itself restricted all voting rights to the minority White population, with the exception of the very small number of C oloureds and B lacks who had previously met the narrow franchise qualification in the C ap e Province and Natal. Elsewhere, all non-Whites were excluded from the voters' roll. More legislative measures soon followed. The Mines and Works Act of 1 9 1 1 reserved all semi- skilled positions in the mining industry for Whites, meaning that B lacks had no option but to accept poorly paid unskilled j obs in the cities or on rural farm s . The Natives Land Act of 1 9 1 3 was a landmark piece of legislation. The forerunner of the homelands system of the apartheid era, the Natives Land Act prohibited Africans, who made up over two - thirds of the population, from owning or renting land anywhere outside certain parcels of territory that would be designate d as native reserves . The native reserves made up roughly 7 . 5 % of the total area of the country, and they were to be set aside for the exclusive use of African s . The areas selected, which were e conomically marginal to begin with, soon b ecame horribly overcrowded and even more impoverished. The act further stipulated that Africans could reside outside the reserves only on the condition they were employed by Whites . This brought an official end

17

t o the practice o f rural sharecropping, where White farmers allowed Africans to cultivate some of the farmers' land independently in return for a share of the crop, and deprived many Africans of their livelihoods. In practice, the authorities turned a blind eye to an institution that clearly b enefited White landowners, and it was to survive for decades until brought to an abrupt end by the apartheid system after 1 94 8 . The Natives (Urban Areas ) Act of 1 9 2 3 w a s another cornerstone o f the segregationist system. I t decree d that the cities were principally for the use of the White population, and that any Africans residing there would b e required to carry passes. Any B lack person found without a pass was liable to be arrested and expelled to the reserves . An Industrial C onciliation Act passed in 1 9 2 4 allowed for the legal registration of Whites in a trade union, but not their B lack counterparts . B lacks were therefore denied the opportunity to negotiate better pay and conditions . In 1 9 24, the SAP was swept from power and replaced by an NP-led coalition government under JBM Hertzog. Hertzog's approach to segregation, emb o died in his " civilize d labour" p olicy, was more strident and ambitious than that of his predecessors . His Wage Act of 1 9 2 5 p e rmitted the government to instruct private firms to grant preference to White workers in hiring, while the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1 9 2 6 further entrenche d the colour bar in the mining industry. The e conomic devastation of the Great D epression led to the merger of Smuts' SAP and Hertzog's NP, and a new Unite d Party (U P ) government took office in 1 9 3 4 . The risk that the government might b e outflanked by the more radical racialism of Malan's breakaway Ge suiwerde Nasionale Party ( also known as the Purifie d National Party or GNP ) led to a spate of further discriminatory legislation later in the decade . The Representation of Natives Act of 1 9 3 6 removed Africans (but not C oloure ds ) from the electoral roll in the C ap e . It also e stablished an advisory Natives Repre sentative C ouncil, made up largely of traditional African leaders, which lacked any real p ower. The Native Trust and Land Act, also passed in 1 9 3 6 , extended the area of the native reserves to 1 3 % of the total land area of the country ( although this was never achieved in practice ) , but it also enhanced the power of the authorities to evict Africans who lived illegally in White area s . Finally, the 1 9 3 7 Native Laws Amendment Act allowed for the stricter enforcement and tighter regulation of the existing pass law s . T h e e n d of the 1 9 3 0 s s a w a dramatic resurgence of the Afrikaner nationalist spirit. The semi - s e cret group the Afrikaner Broederbond, an extreme wing of populist Afrikaner nationalism, worked with the NP to organize centenary celebrations of the Great Trek and the B attle of B lood River. These events involved hundreds of thousands of participants . By now, the GNP and the Afrikaner B r oederbond were supported by the maj ority of poorer Afrikaners, who felt alienated by the p erceived elitism of the UP and its inability to deliver a better standard of living for all Whites . They demanded an even more radical system of racial discrimination and segregation.

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C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E O R I G I N S O F A P AR T H E I D

S outh Africa's entry into the S e cond World War on the side of the allied powers had a maj or impact on the country. Hertzog resigned from government over Smuts' support of the war, and his sub s e quent reconciliation with Malan led to the renaming of the nationalists, who now b e came known as the Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunite d National Party ) or simply the National Party ( NP ) . Many Akrikaners felt an affinity with Nazi Germany and this led to a surge in support for the Nationalists and a steady undermining of the S muts government. M eanwhile, wartime e conomic demand led to a rapid expansion in manufacturing industry and a sharp increase in the number of urbanized Africans . S quatter camp s mushro omed on the outskirts of the maj o r cities as the B lack labour force grew in confidence and militancy. Trade unions were form e d in defiance of the law. Foremost among the s e was the African Mine Workers' Union ( AMWU ) , which organize d a strike of ne arly 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 gold miners i n 1 9 4 6 . This w a s defeated when the police intervened and killed nine proteste r s. The 1 94 6 miners' strike was a key event for many reasons, not least b e cause it alerted the government to the urgency of the lab our situation. S muts's response was to set up the Fagan C ommission. Fagan's report concluded that the tide of African urbanization was irreversible, and that it was in the best economic interest of the country for the government to bring ab out a partial normalization in the status of B lacks who lived in the citi e s . H i s recommendation included a relaxation of t h e pass law s . T h e Fagan Report form e d the basis of the UP's policy manife sto going into the 1 948 general ele ction. This only s e rv e d to heighten the racial anxieties of many White voters . The NP reacted by forming its own S a u e r C ommission. This b o dy conclu de d that t h e survival of t h e White race in S outh Africa was dependent upon the preservation of the country's exclusively White identity. According to S a u e r, this could only b e achieved through policies de sign e d to reverse t h e trend of B lack u rbanization and engin e e r the complete separation of the race s . The NP's ability t o articulate a clear apartheid vision contrasted sharply with the uneasy complexity of the UP's po sition. It was a message which resonated with many Afrikaner voters in a fearful and embattled White ele ctorate . The party's slogans of swart gevaar ( "black p eril " ) and rooi gevaar ( "red p eril " ) raise d the twin spectres of White cities overwhelm e d by migrant B lack workers on t h e one hand, a n d t h e civilize d Afrikaner way of life threatened by a godless, revolutionary communism on the other. This was enough to see Malan's NP triumph over its UP rival.

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I understanding Key con cept Consequence Key q u estions What were the natu re a n d characteristics of discrimi nation in the apartheid system? H ow did the apartheid system im pact the l ives of South Africa ns?

T h e National Pa rty ( N P) wins the genera l e lection; OF Malan is appointed prime minister The Immora l ity Act, the Population Registration Act, the G roup Areas Act and the Suppression of Commu nism Act a re passed The Native Laws Amendm ent Act and the Pass Laws Act a re passed

The S e p a rate Representatio n of Voters Act and the B a ntu Authorities Act a re passed

OF Malan retires and J G Strijdom is appointed prime minister

Strijdom dies; H F Verwoerd is appointed as prime minister

The Tra nskei Act is passed

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The Extension of U n iversity Ed u catio n Act a n d the Pro m otion of Ba ntu S e l f­ G ove rn m e nt Act a re passed

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

The nature and characteristics of discrimination u nder apartheid, 1 9 48-64 Following the election in 1 948, DF Malan's victorious National Party (NP) issued a spate of laws that became the basis of the system known as apartheid. B y 1 9 5 4, the essential components of the apartheid system had been put in place, and the pace of new legislation slowed somewhat thereafter. Nonetheless, some landmark apartheid laws, such as the Promotion of B antu S elf- Government Act of 1 9 5 9 , were introduced later. In m any ways, apartheid was an extension of the s e gregationist system that had b e e n institut e d by the B otha, Smuts and H e rtzog governments before 1 94 8 . The segregationist and apartheid systems were similar in some very obviou s r e sp e cts, with their common goal of s egregating the races and prioritizing White interests over tho s e o f t h e o t h e r group s . I n o t h e r ways, apartheid was something altogether new. It was mor e profoundly ideological than its s egre gationist forerunner, and its laws were implemented with a rigour and enthusiasm that were unp r e c e dente d . Apartheid was more than just the passage of stricter racial laws and the closing of legislative loopholes, but it was also ab out more than the s e things . Its aim was to create a complete, all - encompassing system of institutionalize d racism b a s e d on t h e complete sup eriority of S outh Africa's minority White p op ulation . Apartheid develop e d i n two stage s . T h e first of these is commonly known as "petty apartheid " , s ometime s lab elled baasskap ( literally "boss rule " ) apartheid. This earlier p e riod of apartheid is commonly a s s o ciated with the first few years of NP rule when Malan and S trij dom s e rv e d as p rime minister s . The defining character of petty apartheid is often p o rtrayed as negativ e . Its principal purp o s e was to ensure the complete domination, e conomic and political, of White over B lack. The two lab els most commonly used to de s crib e this p e riod of apartheid offer insights into its nature . The term baasskap connotes the brutal subj ugation of the B lack maj ority and the firm and de cisive manner with which the government de alt with the anti- apartheid opp o sition. S imilarly, the term petty is suggestive of the officious and unnecessarily fussy nature of many of the apartheid regulatio n s . T h e s e cond a n d later phase of apartheid, known as " grand apartheid", was initiate d by HF Verwoerd in the late 1 9 5 0 s . This version of apartheid was altogether more ideologically sophisticated. At least in the ory, grand apartheid marke d a departure from the more straightforward racial discrimination of the petty apartheid perio d . Its main obj e ctive was the complete territorial segregation of S o uth Africa, leading ultimately to the full independence of each of its component parts . This would enable the completely separate development of the different peoples, each within their own national j urisdiction. B y arguing that Africans would b e allowed to achieve their full independence, grand apartheid aimed to establish a moral legitimacy for the apartheid system in the face of an increasingly hostile global community. These ambitions of grand apartheid are again refl e cted in its label: the word grand has connotations of loftiness and nobility.

.A. Apartheid prime m i n i sters: OF Malan,

J G Strijdom, H F Verwoerd

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Apa rtheid prime m i n i sters D a n i e l Francois M a l a n was born i n Riebeek West in the Western Ca p e in 1 8 74. A m i nister i n the D utch Reformed C h u rch, h e beca m e i nvolved i n politics after the fou n d i n g of the NP i n 1 9 14 a n d edited the national ist newspaper, Die Burger. He h e l d a n u m b e r of m i n istries in H e rtzog's pact govern m e nt, but broke with his mentor to fou n d the G N P i n 1934 fo l l owing H erzog's d e cision to fuse his party with the SAP. H e fina l l y beca m e prime m i n ister i n 1 948. A d ivisive figu re who was kn own fo r his mora l ising a n d u n y i e l d i n g a p p roach, M a l a n fi n a l l y reti red from active p o l itics i n 1 9 54. Johanned Gerhardus Strijdom - a lthough born in 1 8 9 3 in the Cape - was known as the "Lion of the North" because of his domination of the NP in Transvaal. H e was part ofthe Malanite split i n 1 9 34 and was appointed M i n iste r for Agriculture in 1948. Regarded as radical and uncompromising even by the sta ndards of the N P, he was

elected leader after Mala n's retirement and served as prime minister until his death in 1 9 5 8. Dr H e n d ri k Frensch Verwoe rd was born in H o l l a n d in 1 9 0 1 but moved t o South Africa as a child. A bri l l i a nt young scholar, he stu died psychology in Germany, Britai n a n d the US before retu rning t o lecture at the U n iversity o f Ste l l enbosch. Ve rwoerd w a s a n outspoken critic of t h e fusion governme nt's decision t o a l l ow the i m m igration o f G e r m a n J ews fleeing N a z i persecution in the 1 9 3 0 s a n d h e s o o n beca m e active in national ist politics, editi ng t h e pro-N P Die Transvaler n ewspaper. A h u g e l y controversial N ative Affai rs M i n ister under M a l a n a n d Strijdom, h e was chosen as pri m e min ister in 1 9 5 8 and beca m e known as the "architect of apartheid". H igh ly charismatic, and more a m i a b l e than eithe r of his predecessors, Verwoerd was sta bbed to d eath by a menta l l y deranged parliamentary messenger, Di mitri Tsafendas, in Ca pe Town i n 1 9 6 6.

TOK connections

The problems with const ruct i n g h isto rica l categories The tendency among historians is to neatly divide apartheid into the categories of petty apartheid and grand apartheid. Petty apartheid is assu med to be typical of the earlier period of N P ru le, and it is often thought of as fussy and repressive. Typical petty apartheid laws include the Immorality Act and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. Grand apartheid is assumed to have been planned and implemented at a slightly later point in time. The classic grand apartheid law would be the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. It can no doubt be useful to think in terms of petty apartheid and grand apartheid in order to better understa nd the dual nature of the system, in the sense that it was about racial oppression as wel l as racial separation, and how it evolved with different emphases in different periods. H owever, the problem with dividing apartheid into two distinct categories is that you run the risk of genera l izing and oversimplifying a complex phenomenon. This can be an impediment to acquiring a more nuanced understanding of apartheid. I n truth, all of the apartheid laws incorporated elements of both petty and grand apartheid. The long-term goa l of fostering the separate development of the races was impl icit in the "pettiest" ofthe petty apartheid laws. Similarly, the notion that separate development wou ld lead u ltimately to the equality of all of the independent "nations" of South Africa was clearly nothing more than a n apartheid fiction. Each aspect of the system was obviously designed to perpetuate the political and economic domination of White over Black. Some laws very obviously straddled both of the categories. For instance, the Bantu Education Act qualifies as petty apartheid in the sense that it abandoned Black children to a n education that was woefu l l y substa ndard and inferior. At the same time, it can a lso be described as grand apartheid in that its purpose was, at least ostensibly, to allow Black people to evolve at their own pace and in their own communities so that they might, in the fu ll ness oftime, develop their own, self-governing politica l systems.

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C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

Sou rce s ki l l s A cartoon by Jack Leyden, published in the Natal Daily News in 1 949. ,,

'

.A. The figure on the right of the bench is OF M a l a n .

Fi rst q u est i o n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the cartoon with regards to the introduction of apartheid by Malan's government?

Research and communication skills

As you read through this chapter, identify the various ways in which the l ives of ordinary non-White South Africans were affected by apartheid laws, and record this information under each of the five categories identified in

the spider d iagra m below. You ca n also include the effects of some of the pre-a partheid segregationist laws, such as the colour bar which prevented Blacks from seeking skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the mining industry.

E d u cation

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D ivision a n d cl assificati o n ofthe p o p u l ati o n The official division and classification o f the different racial groups in S outh Africa was an essential prerequisite for the enforcement of other forms of apartheid legislation . It is therefore unsurprising that the Population Registration Act of 1 9 5 0, which classified the entire population by race, was one of the first laws to be passed by the new NP government.

Miscegenation

Sexua l re lationships betwee n persons from d ifferent racial grou ps.

D uring the e arlier s e gregation p e riod, the way in which p e ople identifie d their race was a relatively straightforward matter. A person b orn into a "White community " would simply b e considered White, even if their skin was darker than averag e . S ituations like this were fairly common in S outh Africa, a country with a long history of miscegenation . Generations previously, the light - skinne d offspring of master- slave relationship s would have often b e e n accepted as part of the "White " family. Indeed, it was rumoured that B etsie Verw o e rd, wife of the apartheid prime minister Verw o erd, was h e rself of mixed race ancestry. F o r the racially ob s e s s e d ideologues in the NP government, however, the obvious anomalie s thrown up by this state of affairs, where, for instance, Whites were sometim e s " darker" than C oloureds were simply unacceptable . New laws were re quire d . The Population Registration Act provided for the creation of a national population register. E ach citizen was defined according to the racial group to which he or she belonge d. The classification was based on biological rather than cultural factors. Once an individual's race was determined, it was recorded in their official identity documents . A code representing the racial group to which they belonged was also included in their ID number. The act further decree d that S outh Africa's population was made up of thre e basic racial group s : White, C oloured and B antu ( apartheid parlance for "B lack African " ) . The government initially denied that the country's Indian population was S outh African at all, and it was only in 1 9 5 9 that this group was officially classifie d as an "Asian " component of the C oloured race . For the most part, however, the country's Indian and C oloured populations were considered by the authoritie s, and indeed by themselves, as separate racial entities . The act s e t out t o carefully define each o f the country's racial groups according to common physical and intellectual characteristics . However the actual wording of the law suggested that this task was a fool's errand. According to the legislation:

[A white person is someone who] is in appearance obviously white - and not generally accepted as Colou red - or who is generally accepted as White - and is not obviously Non - White, provided that a person shall not be classified as a White person if one of h is natural paren ts has been classified as a Coloured person or a Bantu . F o r a new law that was supp osedly rigorous and scientific, this definition was comically imprecise and circular. The boundaries between these newly - defined populations groups were bound to be fluid and unclear. Yet the Population Registration Act was enforced with an astonishing vigour. A Race Classification B o ard was created to apply the new legislation. This body was charged with drawing up further sub - categories of different groups, and adj udicating in the

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C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

many cases where an individual's racial category was disputed, either by the individual themselves or by the authorities . It embraced the former task with considerable gusto, creating a grand total of seven sub - categories of the C oloured race : C ape C oloured, Malay, Griqua, Chinese, O ther Asiatic and O ther C oloured. Naturally, many people who had previously been considered C oloured now sought official reclassification as White . This was so that they could take advantage of the political rights and economic benefits that only the country's White minority could enj oy. In addition, members of the public would sometimes report individuals whose racial classification they b elieved to be suspect. In order to deal with such cases, the Race Classification B o ard introduced a number of bizarre and often humiliating measures that would act as indicators of a person's racial category. S ome of these were tests of linguistic proficiency, but they also included such indignities as the taking of skull measurements, as well as the infamous "pencil test" . This involved sticking a pencil into a person's hair; if the pencil dropped, the hair was deemed to be sufficiently straight for the person to be classified as White . However, final decisions were often taken on an altogether more subj ective and arbitrary basis . Ayesha Hoorzook, a S outh African Indian woman whose interview is given as S ource A on page 2 8, had two children : the first was classified as Indian, the second as C ap e Malay. One unfortunate individual, Vic Wilkinson, was reclassified not once but twice : from C oloured to White and then from White back to C oloured. The Population C lassification Act had many tragic consequences for ordinary South Africans . Within the same family, certain genetic traits can skip generations only to resurface later. With the introduction of the act, members of the same mono -racial family could find themselves on different sides of the classification divide . A child born to two White parents but with a slightly darker skin could be classified as C oloured under the new law. The implications of this were profound, as later apartheid laws made it difficult, if not impossible, for people from different racial groups to live together. What is more, the social stigma attached to such cases became so strong that there were stories of Afrikaner families abandoning babies who were born with frizzy hair or dark complexions. For children with one parent classified as White and the other belonging to another racial group (miscegenation was still technically legal if a couple had managed to marry before the passage of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1 949 ) , there could only be one outcom e . The government's obsession with preserving the purity of the White race meant that the child would invariably be classified as non-White . As mentioned above, cases where a person would be compulsorily reclassified by the Race Classification B oard were not at all uncommon. This would involve a person being downgraded from White to C oloured, or from C oloured to Black. Quite apart from the humiliation and indignity involved in this process, a person's prospects in the brave new world of apartheid were significantly harmed as a result of reclassification. The Race C lassification B oard was so powerful that a person's fate could hinge on a bureaucratic whim.

T O K connections

H i story a n d et h i cs: t h e m o ra l respo n s i bi l it y o f t h e i n d ivid u a l History students often ask themselves the question: what wou ld I have done if I had been there at the time? If I had been a White South African, would I have been brave enough to speak out against the evils of the apartheid system, or would I have just gone along with or even been part of it? Apart from some notable exceptions such as the White communists, the women of the Black Sash organization, and Progressive Party leader Helen Suzman [see page 126], it seems that few White South Africans during the early apartheid era had the courage or conviction to stand up to the system. With this in mind, would it be fair to hold such a privileged community to account for not doing more to challenge apartheid? Why were so many Whites complicit in a system that oppressed and brutalized the majority of their compatriots? One answer may be found in the famous experiment conducted by Stanley Milgram at Yale University in 1963. Milgram found that when confronted with a choice between complying with the morally uncongenial instructions of a superior or standing on principle and refusing to comply with the order, most people will invariably reject the latter, more difficult course of action. The decision to go with the flow and not put oneself or one's family at risk was obviously made easier by the fact that Whites were the main material beneficiaries of the system. Whatever the case, it can be a rgued that it is inappropriate for the historian to pass ethical judgment on the past. This is because we a re a l l the product of the values of our own time, and the historian, from the point of view of the present, will find it difficult to understand or find sympathy with the moral climate of the past. Racial discrimination was a widely accepted norm in 1 9 5 0s South Africa, and maybe it should n't come as a surprise that many Whites failed to see that there was anything intrinsically wrong with a system based upon the same racist assumptions. The same logic also applies to the historian. The mora l e nvi ro n m e nt of today affects what we choose to research and h ow we interpret our findi ngs. Does this mean that it is impossi b l e for the historian to be tru l y objective?

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Segregatio n of popu lations and a m e n ities Three o ft h e most important apartheid laws governing t h e separation o f popu lations and amenities were the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1 9 5 1 a n d t h e Promotion o f Bantu Self-Government Act o f 1 9 5 9 . These laws were designed to achieve the complete residential separation of South Africa's different population groups. The Group Areas Act dealt with residential segregation in the cities, while the Bantu Authorities Act and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Govern ment Act addressed the matter of the native reserves or the homelands, rural areas where Black people were allowed to reside permanently. The three laws outlined in the box above are covered in more detail in the later sections of this chapter on forced removals, the creation of townships and the B antustan system. This section covers other aspects of the segregation of S outh Africa's populations and amenities.

The Pro h i bition of M ixed Ma rriages Act and t h e I m m o ra l ity Act The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act were designed to promote the separation of the races by outlawing sexual relations and procreation between the different populations. To the apartheid mindset, miscegenation was closely associated with racial degeneration. It therefore had to be abolished. At the same time, one of the more peculiar features of the apartheid state was its obsession with public morality, a factor which disposed it to intruding into the private lives of its citizens. It was especially concerned with the field of human behaviour where contact between racial groups was at its most intimate : sexual relations. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1 949 was the first maj or law passed by the NP government. The act made it illegal for White S outh Africans to marry people of other races . The law was introduced despite the fact that the "problem" of mixed marriages was a tiny one: only 7 5 were recorded in the 3 years prior t o the act's introduction. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act was supplemented by the Immorality Act of 1 9 5 0, which banned all extra-marital sexual relations between Whites and non-Whites . Under existing segregation- era laws, any extra-marital sexual relationships between Whites and B lacks were illegal, but this was now extended to cover sexual relations between Whites and other racial groups as well. Rather tellingly, the law failed to cover sexual relations between people of different non- White races. Clearly, the government only concerned itself with the purity of the White race . The manner in which the authorities enforced the new laws was both intrusive and sordid. The police would react to a tip - o ff, typically from a neighbour, and stake out the home of the suspect. They would then burst into the house in the middle of the night, smashing down doors in the process, in the hope of catching the unfortunate couple together in b e d, ideally in flagrante. The home would often be ransacked and items such as underwear seized for use as prosecution evidence. B rought before a court, the guilty couple would be handed down sizeable fines and prison term s . Even when it came to the punishments, the basic inequality of the apartheid system was still very much in evidence: B lacks convicted of having sexual relations with Whites would inevitably find themselves hit with far harsher punishments than their partners .

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The Reservation of S e p a rate Amen ities Act The Reservation of S eparate Amenities Act, passed in 1 9 5 3, is often seen as the epitome of the petty apartheid system . As its name implies, it provided for the strict segregation by race of all public amenities . Many public services, such as buses, trains, toilets and hospitals, had already been segregated to some extent before the advent of apartheid. This segregation was now taken much further. S eparate entrances and service counters were made mandatory in buildings such as shops and post offices, and there were completely separate waiting rooms and stretches of platform for use by different races at train stations. Parks and other recreational facilities, including beaches and swimming pools, were designated for use by one race only. Hotels and restaurants that were located in city centres and other mainly White areas were instructed to refuse admittance to non-Whites . The separation w a s so thorough that i t extended t o such minor amenities as public benches and water fountains. Signs informing the public that a facility was reserved for "Whites only" were soon ubiquitous, and became a notorious feature of the civic landscape of apartheid S outh Africa.

Sou rce s ki l l s A photograph of a "White Persons Only" sign at a beach near Cape Town, taken during the apartheid era.

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What conclusions can you draw about segregation and discrimination in apartheid S outh Africa from the evidence in the photograph?

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Members of other racial groups risked arrest and imprisonment if they used Whites - only facilities. Naturally, the amenities reserved for Whites were the best available . This distinguished the new law from the segregation- era legislation, which allowe d for the segregation of amenities as long as the amenities provided for the different races were equal in quality. The Group Areas Act of 1 9 5 0 decre e d that city centres were Whites - only for residence purp o s e s . In these areas, where many B lacks nonetheless continue d to work, the government could argue that there was no need to provide decent, or even any, public services for non- Whites, b e cause they had no right to reside there permanently and could use their own amenities when they returned home to the township s . At the same time, the rapid growth of the townships, together with the fact that the s e areas were planne d and constructe d with little thought for the convenience and welfare of Africans, meant that amenities in these areas were extremely rudimentary. It was obviously deme aning for n on -White S o uth Africans to have to use sep arate amenities, e sp e cially when tho s e facilitie s were of a grossly inferior standard. In this sense, the Reservation of Amenities Act symb oliz e d the dramatic de cline in their status under apartheid. Yet it also influenced their lives in other, more subtle ways. It was no longer as easy for White s and non-Whites to cultivate friendships, as they could no longer occupy the same civic space s . Urb an amenities to which Africans had b e e n previously b e e n given limite d access, such as public librarie s, theatres and concert halls, were now out of b o unds . This had the effe ct of limiting the edu cational and cultural horizons of African s .

Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A Interview with Ayesha Hoorzook, a South African of Indian ancestry who grew up during apartheid. She works as a history teacher and tour guide in the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg.

I knew that as a child, we were not allowe d to do man y things, go to man y places that other p e ople could. But I thought that was normal, whatever [amenitie s] was available for u s was m e ant for u s - I never re ally que stioned it . . . I can recall an incident of going to the zoo in those days, first of all, blacks were not allowe d to go. Later on, the law was relaxed a little bit and certain days were allocated to

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blacks only . . . For non-whites, there would b e public buses going to the zoo, but there would b e five seats reserved at the back of the bus for non-white people, only five seats . The entire bus would b e empty, but you could not use a seat anywhere else on the bus. O ften by the time the bus comes to where we are, there are already [non -white p e ople] on the bus and we'd let the bus go by . . . Then w e ' d g e t to [the zoo] , a n d by this stage half the day is gone . . . my father starts looking at his clock, and he says we have to start having to go, there are so many non-whites at the zoo today and the chances are the buses are going to b e very full. http : I I overcomingapartheid.ms u . e d u I video .php ?id= 6 5 - 2 4 F -D 6

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

Sou rce B A cartoon by Abe Berry, published in The Star newspaper in Johannesburg, 1 966 .

...

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks

Second q uestion - 4 m a rks

According to S ource A, in what ways were the lives of non-White S outh Africans affected by the separation of amenities?

With reference to its origin, purp o s e and content, assess the value and limitations of S ource A for historians studying the impact of the separation of p opulations and amenities in apartheid S outh Africa.

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the cartoon in S ource B ?

The Pass Laws Act D e spite the misleading name of this key piece of apartheid legislation, the Pass Laws were yet another means of enforcing the segregation of populations. The Natives ( Ab olition of Passes and C o - ordination of D o cuments ) Act of 1 9 5 2 , more commonly known as the Pass Laws Act, was a misnomer. Rather than abolishing passes, this new law replaced the existing passbooks with more comprehensive documents that Africans would be required to carry on their person at all tim e s .

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The new documents were 9 6 -page booklets that were officially known as " reference books " . These new passes were incre dibly detailed, and contained such information as the person's employment record, tax payments, and reports of any encounters the person may have had with the police . It was made a criminal offence for a B lack person not to present his or her new passbook on demand, at any tim e . A complicated system of spe cial p e rmits was built into this new system; the se permits naturally had to b e stamp e d in the reference book. For example, a permit was required if any B lack person wishe d to travel to the city from a rural area . Once he or she arrived, a further permit had to b e obtained from t h e p olice within a p erio d of 7 2 hours . This would allow the person to remain in the city to look for work, but again only for a fixed p eriod of tim e . If it proved impo ssible to find employment within this time limit, he or she would either have to return to the countryside or remain and break the law. C onsidering that thes e p e ople had come to the city out of e conomic necessity in the first place, many had little choice but to remain . Police checks were so regular that it was rarely long before they were arrested and brought b efore a magistrate . Unable to pay the fine handed down by the court, many were imprisoned, typically for several months, b efore being sent back to their villages . As a result of this, significant numb ers of S outh Africa's B lack population, mainly the poorest and the most desperate, were criminalize d by the syste m . Those who escap e d arrest constantly had to run the gauntlet of police intimidation. The reference books were a menace even for those Africans whose documentation was in order. The police would often stop and harass them on the pretext that they needed to inspe ct their passes . The system was also quite humiliating: any White person, even a child, was entitled to stop a B lack person in a White area and demand to s e e the person's reference book. The Pass Laws Act obviously permitted the authorities to enforce the segregation of the B lack and White communities more effectively through the strict regulation of the movement of B lacks in the cities. However, they also served a secondary purpose, by allowing the government to extend its powers of surveillance over the Black population. The Pass Laws Act was a repressive instrument that could be used against African politicians. It permitted the police to intimidate ANC activists by conducting night-time raids on their residences, simply on the grounds that there may be someone staying there who did not have the right documents . The issue of reference books was also used as a weapon against the regime, however. Many of the most effective anti-government demonstrations used the Pass Laws Act as a means of channelling popular anger, and occasionally as a means of actual protest. The ANC 's D efiance C ampaign of 1 9 5 2 was launched in the wake of the introduction of the new passes . This campaign frequently involved volunteers courting police arrest by attempting to enter a location without their reference books . The mass action called by the ANC and Pan Africanist C ongress (PAC ) , which led to the Sharpeville massacre, required protesters to present themselves at police stations without their reference books . Following the massacre, ANC leader C hief Luthuli burned his reference book in a powerful act of protest at what had happened.

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Other l aws a nd p o l i cies govern i n g t h e segregation of popu l ations The two laws described here were relatively minor pieces of apartheid legislation, but they also contributed to the separation of amenities and populations. The Ba ntu Building Workers Act was passed in 1 9 5 1 to cla rify existing regu lations pertaining to separation of the races in employment. Under existing laws, because of the colour bar, skilled and semi-skilled jobs were reserved for Whites, so the skilled labour requ ired for the construction of homes in the Blacks-on l y townships would have to be performed by Whites. The new law confirmed that Africans were barred from skilled work in the building industry in general, but made a n exception for skilled building work in residential a reas from which Whites were excl uded. Rather than a relaxation of existing labour laws, the 1 9 5 1 act was therefore a means o f reinforcing t h e residential segregation of the races. The Prevention of I l l ega l Squatting Act of 1 9 5 1 permitted the government forcibly to remove Africans who had formally settled in u rban a reas that were to be designated as Whites-only under the terms ofthe Group Areas Act [see below] . H owever, it a lso allowed the authorities to extend fu rther the separation of populations in the countryside by bringing a definitive end to the practice of sharecropping. This involved White farmers allowing Blacks to live, illegally, on their unused land and cu ltivate it in return for a share of the harvest. The 1 9 1 3 Natives Land Act had made

sharecropping i l l egal, but such were the benefits accruing to White landowners, especial l y in agricultura l ly marginal areas, that the authorities (for the most part at least) turned a blind eye to the practice. The 1 9 5 1 act allowed the government to detain Africans residing in rura l a reas and resettle them in specially designated zones, typica l l y in or around t h e townships, or s i m p l y t o dump t h e m in the native reserves. It obviously put an end to the problem of Blacks and Whites l iving in close proximity on farms in the countryside, but it removed the problem of ru ra l squatting only by adding to urban squatting. Apartheid governments also promoted the separation of populations in the cities by continuing the segregation-era practice of housing Black mining workers in compounds. The mineral revolution of the late 19th century had resu lted in an influx into the cities of Black migrant labour from across the subcontinent. These mining workers were housed in enormous barracks-like fenced compou nds, isolated from the outside world; hundreds of men would sleep in dormitories of simple concrete bunks. Their families were not a l l owed to come with them and had to remain in the native reserves or in neighbouring states such as Mozambique or Basutoland (Lesotho ] , leading to a profound gender imbalance in those a reas. The mining compounds were segregated by ethnicity and tribal rivalries were encouraged by the authorities.

Fo rced remova l s and t h e creation of town s h i ps: The Group Areas Act The policies of forced removals and the creation and expansion of townships would not have been possible without the Group Areas Act of 1 9 5 0 . This single piece of legislation was so important that Malan called it "the essence of apartheid" . It was designed to bring about the total residential segregation of the different racial groups in urban areas, specifically by removing non -Whites from inner city areas that would henceforth be designated as Whites- only areas. The Group Areas Act was based on the racist premise that Africans were a rural pe ople in their natural state, and that their permanent exposure to city life would lead to a breakdown in the so cial order. The assumption that Africans should have no place in the cities formed the basis of the NP's S auer Report, commissioned in 1 94 7 . This report concluded that all Africans belonged in the native reserves, and that their presence in and around urban areas was to b e tolerated only insofar as they remained e conomically useful to White p e ople . C ity centres and the inner suburbs would now be the preserve of White residents, while Africans would b e confined to vast townships on the far outskirts of the city, where they could live in a manner appropriate to their lowly status in the apartheid hierarchy. In theory,

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they would b e permitted t o reside i n the s e sprawling settlements only temporarily, before b eing returned to the reserves once they ceased to b e e conomically active . B efore 1 9 5 5 , the Group Areas Act was mainly used to target S o uth Africa's Indian and C oloured populations. Many Indians, in particular, were traders who owned small businesses in the city centr e s. These were now forced to clo s e . Their removal was welcome d by their White business competitors, many of whom had been enthusiastic supporters of the introduction of the legislation. Eventually, one in four C oloured p e ople were forced to move under the terms of the act, as well one in six Indians, typically to outer suburbs that already had established C oloured or Indian communities. The situation regarding Africans was rather more complicated. It was illegal for Africans to own land or property outside of the native reserves . However, the government had no intention of sending them far away from the cities b e cause their labour was needed for the urban e conomy. Rather, the plan was to relocate them to new or existing townships, far from the city centres and inner suburb s but still close enough for a daily commute to the workplace. However, the state would find it a challenge to uproot pe ople to new areas where they had no legal right to own property. It was inevitable, though, that the authorities would soon turn their attention to the matter. Many towns across S outh Africa had s o - called onderdorpe, or mixed-population are a s . Maj o r cities also contained "B lack spots " , or mainly African enclaves, situated in the midst of White suburb s . To deal with the problem, the government passed the Natives Resettlement Act in 1 9 5 4 and the Group Areas D evelopment Act in 1 9 5 5 . The s e laws complemented the 1 9 5 0 Groups Areas Act and arm e d the government with the bureaucratic machinery that would finally allow it to carry out its policies of the forced urban resettlement of Africans . The authorities were now permitted to remove B lacks forcibly from the magisterial district of Johanne sburg. The creation of the Natives Resettlement B o ard, a b o dy e stablished to coordinate forced removals from the western inner suburbs of the city, meant that the authorities were now fre e to focus on the most celebrated of all the B lack sp ots: S ophiatown .

The d est ruction of Soph iatown Sophiatown was a predominantly Black neigh bourhood located just to the west of the city of Johan nesburg. It was surrounded by worki ng class Afrika ner a reas. Despite suffering from the typical inner-city problems of crime and violence, the suburb was a n especially vibra nt place. It was also a n apartheid anomaly. U nusua lly , many Africans had acquired freeholds in the district prior to the Natives La nd Act of 1 9 1 3 . 1 n addition, the a rea was never brought directly under the control of the mu nicipality of Johan nesburg. These two factors meant that it was the one of the few remaining parts of the cou ntry where Africans could stil l lega l l y own property.

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Sophiatown was a n obvious target for the govern ment for othe r reasons too. The suburb was packed with i llega l drinking esta b l ishments, ca lled shebeens, and music hal ls. A creative and cu ltu ra l hub, it prod uced such legendary figures of the South Africa n jazz scene as M i riam M a keba and H ugh Masekela. lt was also a centre of intel lectua l and political a ctivity. The ANC frequently held meetings and ra l l ies there, and many a nti-apartheid activists were residents of the a rea. The destruction of Sophiatown wou l d strike a blow against Black urban culture, and against the liberation movement. In January 1 9 5 5 , the authorities initiated the Western Areas Remova l Scheme and the forced removal of S o p h i atown's res i d e nts bega n . Arm ed police were moved into the a rea in a nticipation of the inevita b l e politica l backlash. O n e by one, residents were forced to load their belo ngings onto trucks before being transported to the Meadowlands a rea fa r to the south, part of what wou l d become the vast township of Soweto. Eve n as the residents were evicted, b u l l d ozers stood by to d estroy their homes. Despite a va lia nt ca mpaign to save Sophiatown, led by the Angl ican priest Trevor H u d d leston and i nvolvi ng leading a nti-a partheid activists such as Nelson Mandela a n d Ruth First, the e ntire suburb was razed to the ground. By the end of the decade, 65,000 resi d ents had been relocated. The entire a rea was re placed with a n ew Afrika ner suburb that the authorities ch riste ned Triomf, the Afrikaans word fo r "triu m p h".

A. A c h i l d p l a y s a m idst the r u b b l e in S o p h iatown

The S ophiatown pattern of forced resettlement was repeated in countless other "B lack spots" across the nation. After the removals had been carried out, those b eing resettled were made to report to a Native Resettlement B oard in their new location . Here they would be given some basic provisions before b eing dumpe d outside their new homes. The sp e e d with which the relocations were executed and the sheer numbers involved meant that the resettlement areas soon b ecame hopelessly overcrowded. Homes were typically small and very cramp ed. Known as "matchboxes" b e cause of their basic design, they were constructed in monotonous rows, one after the other, with no inside toilets and no running water. Anywhere between 7 and 14 p eople would b e housed in a single dwelling. Over a very short p e riod of time, the s e resettlement areas were transform e d into the sprawling township s that were to b e come the dominant feature of S outh Africa's B lack urban landscape in the 1 9 5 0 s . The townships were not a n entirely new phenomenon, however. B lacks had begun to cluster on the margins of the big cities following the advent of s egregated municipal zoning at the turn of the century,

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and the growth of the s e settlements was accelerated after the Natives (Urban Areas ) Act was passed in 1 9 2 3 . However, their populations explo ded in the 1 9 5 0 s as a direct consequence of the forced removals, resulting in the huge townships that w e know to day. The largest and most famous of the s e is S oweto, with a population of nearly 2 million. The policy of forced removals and the resulting creation and expansion of the townships had a maj or impact on the lives of millions of B lack S outh Africans. The townships were located many miles away from city centres or the Whites - only suburbs where the maj ority of B lack people were employed. Many were now faced with a long and expensive .& Rows of "match box" houses in Soweto. The J o h a n n e s b u rg s k � l i n e ca n be seen daily commute to work. D u e to hasty i n the d ista nce construction and the absence of adequate planning, there w a s a lack of even the m o s t basic of amenities in the township s . S anitation was poor, as was infrastructure . There were Communication and few, if any, hospitals, clinics or police stations. Providing education for .... thinking skills Africans was never a priority for the government, so schools were few in number and overcrowded. With police thin on the ground, criminal Go to: overcomi ngapa rtheid.msu.edu/ activity was rife as tsotsis, or urban gangsters, b ecame a common sight m u ltimedia.php?id=65-259-6. on township streets . The disruption to traditional modes of b ehaviour Watch the video clip of the i nterview with brought about by relocation acted as a further stimulus to criminal Mary Burton and Betty Davenport from behaviour. Old neighbourhoods had been obliterated, and so too had the 23 N ovember 2005. Betty Davenport established social norms and support networks that had been fostered was a White a nti-a partheid activist in in these communities. People suffered from a profound loss of identity. the Eastern Ca pe and reca lls the forced C ompounding all of these problems was another new phenomenon: the removals of Black people l iving in the presence of tens of thousands of squatters who, having been denied the ru ral Eastern Cape in the 1 9 60s. right to formal resettlement under the government scheme, simply set up As you read on, try to think of the ways camp on the periphery of the townships, stretching scarce resources and in which the experiences of the Black services still further. All in all, about 3 . 5 million B lack people across the people of the Eastern Ca pe a re similar to nation were uprooted from their homes and forced to live miserably in those of the residents of Sophiatown these overcrowded, crim e - infested township s .

in Johannesburg.

34

T h e Group Areas Act did n o t quite confine all Africans t o the townships. Even after the act was brought into effect, B lack people who had been born and employed in the same city sometimes retained the right to live in municipal areas. However, the Native Laws Amendment Act, passed in 1 9 5 2 , imposed severe restrictions on the right of permanent residence in the cities . B lack people could continue to live in a city only if they had been born there and employed there for more than 1 5 years,

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

or been in continuous employment for more l 0 years . This had the obvious and immediate effect of excluding young Africans who were new to employment. Another exception was made for some B lack women who were allowed to live in the homes of their White employers on the condition that they were engaged in full-time domestic service . However, the families of maids and nannies were prevented from living with them, exacerbating the problems of separation and dislocation that already beleaguered African families and communities . As with other apartheid legislation, exceptions were allowed to the Group Areas Act, but only as long as they benefited the White population. They served, once again, to highlight the hypocrisy of the system.

Segregation of e d u catio n The Ba ntu Education Act The passage of the B antu E ducation Act of 1 9 5 3 was another landmark moment in the development of the apartheid system. This new law made it mandatory for schools to admit children from one racial group only, and brought the education of Africans under the direct control of the Native Affairs D epartment, headed by the apartheid hardliner HF Verwoerd. This new system was to b e used instead of involving the Ministry of E ducation, which from now would b e responsible only for the e ducation of other races . As a result of this switch, the new system of e ducation went much further than simply preventing children of different races from attending the same schools. It disp ensed with the idea of a single educational model for all S outh African children and replaced this with a system of entirely separate school boards for each of the race s . E ach would now have its own distinct, and very different, curriculum . C u rricular content would be tailored to what the authorities believed was appropriate to the intellectual capacity and practical re quirements of each racial group in apartheid S outh Africa . Under the B antu E ducation Act, the education received by B lack children would b e grossly inferior to that enj oyed by Whites . The curriculum for Africans would have almost no academic content. B eyond e quipping B lack children with extremely basic levels of literacy and numeracy, it was designed to furnish Africans with the rudimentary technical skills that would allow them to perform domestic service for Whites or, alternatively, sell their unskilled labour to the mining and manufacturing industries. Under the new system, B lack children would attend school in daily three -hour shifts. More often than not, b o oks and other essential e quipment were non- existent. Teachers and students would often write on the ground using sticks . The ratio of government spending on a White child compared with a B lack child was about 7: l . With the enormous differential in the salaries paid to teachers in B lack and White schools, many of the more talented B lack teachers left the profession altogether. It is e stimated that nearly 8 5 % of all B lack teachers had no professional qualification at all. Unsurprisingly, many parents simply took their children out of school. Attempts were made through B antu education to foster a stronger sense of tribal identity. The me dium of instruction was to b e in mother tongue throughout primary

35

school, with a gradual transition t o Afrikaans and English thereafter. This stipulation further angered many B lack parents, who believed that the hallmark of a decent education was instruction using English. The brainchild of Verw o erd, the B antu E du cation Act reconciled some of the b a sic philo sophical imp erativ e s of baasskap and grand apartheid. The new B antu curriculum was design e d to prepare Africans for a life of e conomic s e rvitu de to their White masters . It thus fulfilled the aim of promoting an institutional framework of White domination over B lack. At the same time , the edu cation re ceiv e d by B lacks would allow them to develop at their own, naturally slower, intelle ctual pace . It would b e pitche d to the ability levels of Africans, which the authoriti e s b e lieved to b e innately low, a s w ell as the s o rt of lowly profe ssional status that B lacks could e xp e ct under the apartheid system. However, the very fact that Africans had now b e e n given a sep arate model of e du cation, and one that stre s s e d the imp ortance of their tribal identity, m eant that e a ch of the B lack p e oples of S outh Africa could now b e gin to evolve sep arately, apart b oth from one another and from the other races in the country. B antu edu cation was thus very much part of the policy of sep arate development, the core idea of the system of grand apartheid. D e spite the many forms of racial discrimination, some young Africans had enj oy e d access to a quality e du cation prior to 1 9 5 3 . This was courtesy of the many mission schools that were found right across the country, mainly in rural areas . These had b e en e stablished by E u ropean missionary groups, m ostly in the 1 9th century. All of them had been partially funde d by the government. After 1 9 5 3 , they were informe d that they should submit to t h e n e w system of B antu education and come under the control of Verwo erd's ministry. If they re sisted, their funding would end. Faced with this choice, many of the s e schools opted to clo s e .

Sou rce s ki l l s Nelson Mandela, writing in his autobiography, The Long Walk to Freedom ( 1 9 9 5 ) .

Under the [B antu E ducation] Act . . . African teachers were not allowed to criticise the government or any school authority. It was "intellectual baasskap " , a way of institutionalising inferiority. Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the minister for B antu education, explaine d that " education m u s t teach a n d train people i n accordance with their opportunities in life " . His meaning was that Africans did not and would not have any opportunities, therefore, why educate them? "There is no place for the B antu in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour, " he said. In short, Africans should be trained to b e menial workers, to b e in a p osition of p erpetual subordination to the white man.

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to the source, why did the apartheid government introduce the system of B antu e ducation?

36

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

The system of B antu education now be came the only one available to Africans . The philosophy that lay behind it was deeply paradoxical. It stressed the importance to African children of maintaining, or rediscovering, their traditional identities of village and tribe, which Afrikaner nationalists argue d had been corrupted by the rootless cosmopolitanism of the city. This implied that traditional African cultures were of valu e . At the same time, B antu education espoused a C hristian nationalist message, one that stood in stark contrast to the lib eral C hristian philosophy of the mission schools. C hristian nationalism was paternalistic and patronizing, and de eply demeaning of African culture . B antu education taught young B lack people that they and their communities were backward, .A. An overcrowd ed classroom in a gove r n ment school for Africans u nder the "system" of Ba ntu e d u cation and that they were incapable of making any progress in life outside the narrow confines of their tribal world. The best they could hope for was that they could be of service to their own people in the native reserves, or of temporary use to S outh Africa's White community.

Steve B i ko

In the short term, the introduction of the B antu E ducation Act drew a fierce and determined response from African nationalists . Perhaps misguidedly, the ANC announced a permanent b oycott of the new system, even though it lacked the resources re quired to provide any sort of a credible educational alternative for B lack children. The b oycott b egan in April 1 9 5 5 and was only a partial succe ss. Verwoerd had threatened to shut any school that supported the boycott, and permanently to exclude any children who did not attend school. The result was that many parents were frightened of taking part in the boycott. Nonetheless, Verwoerd was sufficiently rattled by the determination of the ANC 's respons e . In a small victory for the liberation moment, he ordered the new syllabus to be redrafted in order to tone down the emphasis on tribalism. The ANC , faced with a choice of some education or none at all, cho s e to end the boycott. One of the most powerful and influential critiques of B antu education was elaborated by Steve B iko . B iko argued that B antu education, and the apartheid system of which it was the cornerstone, was designed as a means of denigrating and dehumanizing B lack p e ople . His response was the B lack C onsciousness Movement, with its slogan "B lack is beautiful", as a way of combatting the resulting psychological selfhatred. D e spite B iko's efforts, the political and social fall- out of B antu E ducation was immens e . Across the country, young p eople lost hope and b e came desperate . Many turned to crim e . Whole communities were condemne d to permanent impoverishment, as any slim hopes of material advancement through education evaporated. B antu education resulted in a lost generation .

Born in the Eastern Ca pe i n 1 946, Steve Biko was attracted to the African ism of the PAC fro m a n early age. H e beca m e involved in its a rmed wing, Poqo, while sti l l a teenager. After his expulsion from high school for political activity he studied medicine at the U n iversity of N ata l and joined the mu lti-racial National U n ion of South Africa n Stud ents ( N U SAS) . Biko broke away from N U SAS in to fou n d the B l acks-only South Africa n Stude nts Association (SAS O ] , a rguing that Africans needed to foster a spirit of self-re lia nce free from the influence and i nterference of othe r racial gro u ps. SASO later formed the basis of Bi ko's Black Consciousness Movement ( B C M ) . With t h e ANC a n d PAC crushed, Biko a n d the BCM t o o k the fight t o the apartheid authorities in the 1 9 7 0s, leading the protests that cli maxed i n the Soweto U p rising in 1 9 7 6 . In 1 9 7 7 Biko was beaten to d eath while in police custody. M i n ister of J u stice Jimmy Kruger claimed that Biko had died while on h u nge r strike, and cynica l l y rema rked that his death had "left h i m cold".

37

The youth was only partially e du cated, if at all . The slogan "no edu cation b e fore lib eration" b e came p opular in the township s , and levels of absenteeism skyrockete d . Young p e ople who did attend school were p sychologically brutalize d by the exp erience . It is p o ssible to link B antu education with the explosion of indis criminate violence in the township s in the 1 9 8 0 s, when the anger of young p e ople was dir e cted against their own communities as well as against the authoritie s . The tribalism o f B antu e ducation, which aimed where possible to segregate by ethnicity as well as by colour, denied young people the possibility of sharing a common African experience. The emergence of a single political consciousness among B lack S outh Africans was stymied. In a way, this was the entire point of the exercis e : B antu education had been designed to inhibit the growth of a mass-based African nationalism. Here there was yet another malign long­ term consequence . D riven by the Zulu tribalism of the Inkatha Freedom Party, .A. C h i l d re n protest the i ntroduction of the Ba ntu Education Act i n 1953 violence once again erupted between different communities in the townships and elsewhere in the early 1 9 9 0 s . This descent into near- civil war between the ANC and Inkatha almost derailed the country's transition to a non-racial democracy.

T O K connections

Th e c h a ngi n g m ea n i n g of words ove r t i m e The word Bantu was origi n a l l y used as a label for the l a rge number of ethnicities belonging to the Bantu language group. I n the first part of the 2 0th century, it was rega rded as a neutra l term that could be used to describe South Africa's Black popu lations. After 1 948, it took on a n a ltogether different meaning. Bantu beca m e the official apartheid term for Africa ns and it bega n to carry some very negative connotations. In the 1 9 5 0s, Africa n nationalists rejected the term and instead referred to themselves as B l acks or Africans. Today the word (outside the contexts of history and the study of language and eth nicity) is rega rded as pejorative and insu lting.

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The Extension of U n iversity Education Act The E xtension of University E ducation Act of 1 9 5 9 was introduced to extend apartheid to tertiary education . It brought to an end the practice of allowing a small number of universities, most notably the Universities of C ap e Town and the Witwatersrand, to register students of all races on their academic cours e s . All universities would now b e required to admit students from just a single racial group, or in the case of African universities, a single trib e . The University of Fort Hare, which Nelson Mandela attended and which had previously been open to all African students, was forced to admit only Xhosa students . New universities were built for the Indian and C oloured students who had previously been allowed to attend White universities, in D urban and near C ap e Town respectively. T h e policy was clearly p a r t of Verwo erd's wider strategy of pursuing the entirely separate development of all population groups in S outh Africa. E ach race and tribe would b e endowed with its own set of e ducational facilities and institutions in an attempt to create completely self- contained political and e conomic units for each. The introduction of an act that removed one of the few areas that had managed partly to resist the apartheid onslaught - the university campus - led to an outcry in the academic community. Many senior academics, such as ANC stalwart Professor ZK Matthews, who lectured in anthropology and law at Fort Hare, resigne d their p ositions in protest.

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

The Bantustan system The Ba ntu Auth orities Act a n d t h e Pro m otion of Ba ntu S e l f- Govern ment Act The B antustan or homelands system was hailed by the NP as the flagship of grand apartheid. The plan was to give each of the B lack p e oples of S o uth Africa their own self-governing homeland. This would be achieved by transforming the existing native reserves into a number of small, fully independent states . Over time, all B lack S outh Africans would b e required to reside in these homelands. They would b ecome citizens of the various B antustans rather than of the rest of S outh Africa, which would henceforth b e an exclusively White country. The first stage in this process was undertaken by the Malan government, which passed the B antu Authoritie s Act in 1 9 5 1 . This created new regional authorities for Africans, which were b a s e d in the reserves, and disp ensed with the old Natives Representative C o uncil, an elected national b o dy representing all Africans . The Promotion of B antu S elf- Government Act, the most imp ortant law in the creation of the homelands system, was passed by Verw o erd's government in 1 9 5 9 . This law divided the African population into eight distinct ethnic group s . This was later expanded to 1 0 group s . The members of e ach group were assigned a White commissioner-general, whose task it was to assist them in making the political transition to full self­ government in their de signated are a . The government could now argue that B lack S outh Africans were no longer its political responsibility, and it accordingly abolished the already extremely limited indirect representation of Africans in the S outh African parliament. In return, all B lack S o uth Africans, regardless of whether or not they were actually residents of a homeland, would b e able to vote in homelands election s . In 1 9 7 0 , the government decreed that all B lack S o uth Africans were citizens of the homelands, and not of the Republic of S o uth Africa. This in effect meant that millions of S outh Africans ­ B lacks who did not live in the homelands - imme diately b e came foreigners in their own country, under constant threat of deportation and being dump e d in the B antustans .

Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A An extract from a speech by Prime Minister Verwoerd to the South African parliament, 14 April l 9 6 1.

The basis of our policy is to try to get away from [discrimination] . That is why we adopt the policy that the B antu, wherever he may live in various areas of his own, must be given political control over his own areas and people . Just as the Italians in France retain their vote in Italy, so the B antu, even when they are living temporarily in our urban areas, must be given

a say in their homelands . . . We are also trying to solve the problem of the C oloured and of the Indian by accepting the principle of a state within a state so that . . . each will be given the fullest opportunity to control its own interests . . . One has to cho o s e between the s e three alternativ e s : the United Party's stand of perpetual discrimination and domination; absolute e quality and B lack domination; or apartheid . . . We arrived at this dear standpoint that discrimination must b e eliminated by

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carrying separation far enough . . . as I stated on the occasion of the dissolution of the Natives Representative C ouncil , " O ur policy of parallel development is aimed at domination for you in your areas, j u st as we want domination for ourselves in our areas " . Therefore I indicate d a t a very e arly stage that our moral basis was that we were trying to give everyone full rights for his own people .

Sou rce B K. Shillington. Encyclopedia of African History. Vol l-3 ( 2 0 0 5 ).

The e stablishment of "homelands" for various African communities was a device to divert internal opp osition to apartheid and a failed attempt to convince the international community that S o uth Africa was addressing,

on i t s o w n terms, t h e demands for emancip ation of its maj ority population. It provided for the bogus fragmentation of the population into a colle ction of ethnically distinct "minorities " . O nly the white population had political rights in the Republic of S outh Africa. The indigenous p e oples were deemed not to b e S outh Africans at all, but "nationals " of self-governing "B antustans " . Africans living and working in " white S o uth Africa" were regarded as "temporary soj ourners" ( migrant workers ) , always at risk of deportation to a "hom eland" that many had never even s e e n .

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources A and B on the creation of the homelands system in S outh Africa.

Tra n s ke i : Th e creat i o n of a Ba ntusta n The fi rst of the forme r native reserves to be converted into a fu l l y fledged Ba ntusta n was Tra nskei, which had previously been part of the Eastern Ca pe. Due to the la rge amount of native reserve land in this a rea, it was an obvious choice as the homeland of the Xhosa. Fol l owing the 1 9 5 9 Promotion of Ba ntu Self-Gove rnment Act, the Transkei Constitution Act was passed in 1963. This resulted in the creation of the Tra nskei Legislative Assem bly based in the new ca pital of U mtata. Chief Kaiser M ata nzima was appointed as the first chief minister. Personally selected by Pretoria, Mata nzima was typical of all of the homeland leaders in that he was a tribal chief. The government believed that choosing a trad itional ru l e r as c h i e f minister wou ld serve t o legitimate the authority of the homeland in the eyes of the Xhosa. H owever, M ata nzima was a relatively minor chief. Pa ramount Chief Dalindyebo had refused to collaborate with Pretoria, and the govern ment had no option but to turn to the more junior leader. Verwoe rd's response - huge l y i ronic considering his commitment to separate d evelopment ­ was to declare Mata nzima "paramount chief" in his own right, on a par with Dalindyebo. No one was fooled by this sleight of hand. Even inside their homeland fiefdoms, "traditional leaders" such as M ata nzima were deeply unpopular with their own people.

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.A. The tra p p i n gs of statehood: postage sta m p s issued to

c o m m e m o rate Tra n s keia n "i n d e p e n d e n ce" i n 19? 5

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

I"'"

Reve a l i ngl y , the gove rn m e nt i n Pretoria fe lt that t h e re was l ittl e need to orga n ize e l ectio n s fo r the l e a d e rs of the new h o m e l a nds. In t h e i r vi ew, Afri ca ns were too c h i l d l i ke to be give n responsi b i l ity fo r choosing t h e i r o w n l e a d e rs, a n d d e m o c racy w a s a n i n stitution that was a l i e n and u ns u ited to African societies. N o neth e l ess, the "moral" d i m ension of separate d eve l o p m e nt d i ctated that there wou l d h ave to be some s e m b l a n ce of d e m ocracy, a n d the 1 9 6 3 Tra nskei Act d i d provid e fo r the e l ectio n of so m e of the m e m b e rs of the Tra nske i Legisl ative Ass e m b l y . The fi rst of t h e s e e l e ctions was won e m p h atica l l y by the D e m o c ratic Pa rty , which was a nti-M ata nzima a n d opposed to the wh o l e idea

The homelands only b e came fully "independent" in the 1 9 7 0 s : Transkei in 1 9 7 6 , B ophuthatswana in 1 9 7 7 , Venda i n 1 9 7 9 a n d C iskei i n 1 9 8 1 . Plans to offer full independence to the other homelands, namely KwaZulu, KwaNdeb ele, QwaQwa, Lebowa, KaNgwane and Gazankulu, were put on indefinite hold in the 1 9 8 0 s as the government took its first tentative steps towards dismantling the apartheid system. As in the Transkei, the other B antustans were led by corrupt and brutal oligarchies which brooked no oppo sition o r dissent. The S outh African government provided them with unconditional political b acking as w ell as military assistance whenever it was re quire d .

of the homelands system. H oweve r, the asse m b l y w a s constituted i n such a w a y that i t w a s d o m i nated b y h a n d - p i cked tri b a l l e a d e rs who were Matanzima a l l i es. The op positio n was eith e r ignore d o r a ctive l y p e rsecuted t h e reafter. Matanzima headed a cabinet with five other ministerial portfolios. Crucially, Pretoria retained the responsibility for its internal security and foreign relations, as well as immigration and banking. Clearly, Transkei was not a sovereign state in a meaningful sense, as it had very little real independence. The homeland would become fully "independent" in 19 76, but even then Pretoria insisted that it would remain in charge of its foreign relations and security.

* Wind hoek

NAM I BIA

Cape

� � N

East lan d

Transkei w a s always the most politically Po rt E l izabeth Town viable of the B antustans, in that it was fairly large and had a single, continuous frontier with South Africa. Others were anything but politically viable . .A. The location of the native reserves after the Native Trust and La nd Act of 193 6 B ophuthatswana was a n extreme example of the fragmentation that typified the creation of many of the other homelands. It comprised dozens of tiny individual enclaves of territory, many of them divided by hundreds of kilometres, spanning thre e of the four provinces of the country. According t o apartheid spokesmen, this was because these areas constituted the original "homelands" of the Tswana; they were being disingenuous. D ating back to the 1 9 1 3 Natives Land Act, the land designated for the native reserves was some of the most agriculturally unproductive in the country. The Africans were given land that White farmers didn't want or, alternatively, land where there had been no historical White presence .

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Z I M BABWE

* W i n d hoek

BOTSWANA NAM I BIA

Cape A tlantic Ocean

C a pe Town

Transkei

-

-

Boph uthatswa na

-

-

C iskei

-

-

Gazankulu

-

KwaZu l u

Indian Ocean

'------l .A. The l o cation of the "i n d epend ent"

Africa n h o m e l a n d s

.A. Overcrowd i n g a n d envi ro n m enta l degradation i n "rural" OwaOwa

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-

Most Black S outh Africans felt no political allegiance at all to their assigned homelands and regarded the B antustan leaders as self-interested apartheid stooges . Nor did the international community acknowledge that the B antustans were anything other than an attempt by the government to create a moral fig leaf for apartheid, by pretending that the system had delivered a modicum of genuine independence for Africans. With the partial exceptions of Israel and Taiwan, the B antustans were never officially recognized by any country other than S outh Africa itself. The apartheid authorities never thought of the homeland leaders as their political equals . As with the native reserves in previous Lebowa decades, the government QwaQwa continued to use the Kwa Ndebele B antustans as a rural dumping ground for populations of KaNgwane Africans deemed surplus to Venda employment requirements. At the same time, their very existence ensured a constant supply of extremely cheap labour for South African industry. Workers from the B antustans were now citizens of foreign countries, and as such they had no employment rights under South African law. Always clo se to bursting at the seams, the B antustans b e came even more hopelessly overcrowded after their "indep endence " . The homelands made up only 1 3 % of the total land area of S o uth Africa, and yet as much as 5 5 % of the total population of the country would eventually re side in the m . The squalor and deprivation of the rapidly constructed, semi- rural shanties of the B antustans b e came notoriou s . The land,

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

Sou rce s ki l l s A cartoon by J H Jackson, published in 1 9 5 9 .

.&. Verwo e rd is depicted as the p a i nter a n d world o p i n i o n as the viewer.

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the cartoon with regard to the creation of the homelands system? which had always been marginal, soon b e came over- graze d and its soil exhausted of nutrients . The result was severe environmental degradation . With populations comprising disproportionate numbers of the young and the elderly, the B antustans were never e conomically productive . Men of working age would typically live and w o rk far away in the cities or in the male s - only mining compounds, leaving their families b e hind in the homelands . The apartheid planners and B antustan leaders had harboured some hopes that the homelands could b e made e conomically viable, or at least partially self- supp orting, by encouraging businesses and industries to relo cate close to their borders in order to take advantage of the huge reservoir of cheap labour. This was officially encouraged through the B antu Investment C o rporation Act of 1 9 5 9 . However, these hopes failed to materialize . The B antustans were to remain semi-rural backwaters, with few opportunities for Africans to work. A partial exception was to b e found in the hotel and entertainment industry. The most famous example of this was the vast Sun C ity complex in B ophutatswana, with its casinos, cabarets and nude shows and performance s . There is a deep irony here . The homelands system was designed to "rescu e " traditional cultures from the moral cesspool of the African city. Instead,

43

they b ecame famous among white S o uth Africans for their decadence and licentiousness, as places where strict moral sanction and apartheid law did not apply. Men in particular flocked to places like Sun C ity to experience some of the illicit pleasures which they could not get at hom e .

Other a p a rtheid l aws The Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1 9 5 1 was introduced in order to deal with one of the anomalies of the pre-1948 system of segregation. This was the presence of a small number of Coloureds who stil l remained on the voters' roll in the Cape Province. A legacy of the 1 9 1 0 Act of U nion, it was one of the so-called entrenched clauses of the constitution. The new law simply removed all Coloureds from the electorate. While it was quite predictable that the government would seek to disenfranchise the sole remaining non-White group that could still exercise the vote, it was the manner in which the law was forced through that aroused the ire of its critics. The 1 9 5 1 act was overru led by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, which argued that it violated the 1 9 1 0 Constitution. This was because the government required a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of the parliament if it wished to remove an entrenched clause from the Constitution. The government's response was to meddle in the affairs of the judiciary, itself an unconstitutional act, and increase the size of the Senate, packing it with new NP members. This ensured that the government was able to pass the original act in an amended form in a joint sitting in 1 9 5 6. The episode illustrated the lengths to which the government would go in order to implement apartheid, and clearly demonstrated how it was prepared to ride roughshod over constitutional niceties in order to get its way. Other apartheid legislation tended to fa l l into one of two categories as follows. Repressive l aws These were laws designed to strengthen state security. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 was the most significant. This law made the Communist Party of South Africa [CPSA) illegal. However, it defined communism so broadly as to encompass all forms of opposition to the apartheid system. Anything that involved "the promotion of disturbances or disorder" would fall under the remit of the law, which was clearly designed to target the anti-government activists of the ANC as well as the country's small number of communists. Under the terms of the legislation, those involved in any political activities related to communism, as defined by the law, were liable to be prosecuted and subjected to banning orders, which prevented them from taking part in meetings and confined them to a particular location. These banning orders were a very effective

44

weapon in the government's repression of the AN C. Senior leaders such as Chief Luthuli were effectively removed from day-to-day politics as a result of the successive orders issued against them. The Public Safety Act of 1953 gave the government the authority to suspend the Constitution and declare a state of emergency, something it was to do to great effect in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre. Meanwhile, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, passed in the same year, allowed the courts to impose severe penalties on those found guilty of committing acts of civil disobedience by breaking apartheid laws. It was used to bring an end to the Defiance Campaign. The Native Administration Act of 1956 permitted the state to "banish" Africans found guilty of persistent political offenses to remote rural areas. Two more repressive laws require a brief mention: the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960 allows the government to ban the ANC and PAC after Sharpeville, and, following the launch of Umkhonto we Sizwe [the armed wing of the ANC) , the General Laws Amendment [Sabotage) Act of 1962 made any act of sabotage a capital offense. Taken together, these laws constituted a formidable battery of repressive legislation that the government could deploy against the freedom struggle. Censors h i p l aws Extreme censorship was another key feature ofthe apartheid system. The Customs and Excise Act of 1955 and the Official Secrets Act of 1956 were the most important laws in this area. They allowed the government to establish a Board of Censors that could rule on the restriction or banning of any media publication, book, film or other material, whether produced in South Africa or imported. It worked on the basis that anything that might upset the political, moral or religious sensibilities of the White public in general, and the values of Christian nationalism in particular, should be banned. Censorship would immunize White South Africans against the permissiveness found in other countries, which in the view of the apartheid government led to moral degeneration. Items liable to be banned included anything that was remotely uncongenial to the N P for racial reasons, or that might offend its stern Calvinist values. The popular children's novel Black Beauty was banned solely on the basis of its title. The authorities had a particularly priggish obsession with nudity, depictions of which were strictly prohibited. Even here, though, the double standards that typified the apartheid system were alive and well. I mages of bare-breasted African tribal women were naturally permitted.

C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

Sou rce h e l p a n d h i nts

Examiner's hint: Q u estions like th is one carry 2 ma rks and they req u ire you to mention at least two points in your answer. To be on the safe side it 's a good idea to mention th ree poin ts. These questions are often q u ite stra ightforwa rd, so don 't assume that there m ust be some tricky "h idden " mean ing tha t you cannot see, and don 't forget to state the obvious. An n ota ting a visual sou rce can help you to pick o u t the key points . In the case of th is photograph, there are some very obvious con clusions tha t you can draw.

( S e e page 2 7 . ) A photograph of a "White Persons Only" sign at a beach near Cape Town, taken during the apartheid era.

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What conclusions can you draw about segregation and discrimination in apartheid S o uth Africa from the evidence in the photograph?

Sou rce A Interview with Ayesha Hoorzook, a South African of Indian ancestry who grew up during apartheid.

I knew that as a child, we were not allowed to do many things, go to many places that other p e ople could. But I thought that was normal, whatever [amenities] was available for us was meant for us - I never really questioned it . . . I can recall an incident of going to the zoo - in those days, first of all, blacks were not allowed to go. Later on, the law was relaxed a little bit and certain days were allocated to blacks only . . . For non-whites, there would b e public buses going to the zoo, but there would be five seats reserved at the back of the bus for non-white people, only five seats. The entire bus would b e empty, but you could not use a seat anywhere else on the bus. Often by the time the bus comes to where we are, there are already [non-white people] on the bus and we'd let the bus go by . . . Then we'd

•

Leisure facilitie s such as b eaches were segregated by race .

•

Apartheid signs were used to inform the public that facilities were reserved for use by one particular racial group .

•

The facilities reserved for Whites were well maintained and of a very high standard .

•

There was also ample space for the p eople who used the amenities.

get to [the zoo] , and by this stage half the day is gone . . . my father starts looking at his clock, and he says we have to start having to go, there are so many non-whites at the zoo today and the chances are the buses are going to be very full.

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to the S ource A, in what ways were the lives of non-White S outh Africans affected by the separation of amenities ? Examiner's hint: You need to find three clear points in the source to answer the first question, part A on the document paper. It is a good idea to underline or highlight these points, when you first read the source. Once you have done this, it is an easy process to write out your answer. Here is a sample answer.

S a m p l e a n swer The liv e s o f n o n - White S o uth Africans w e r e affe cted by t h e s e gregation of amenitie s in a numb e r of ways . First, their a c c e s s to leisure facilities, s u ch a s zoos, was very limite d , and o n

45

..tho s e

days when they could use the s e ameniti e s t h e facilities w e r e often overcrow d e d . S e cond, public transp ort was also s e gregated, with only a limited numb e r of s e ats provided for n o n ­ White s . This m e ant that i t was imp o ssible t o u s e b u s e s if t h e n o n - White s e ats were taken, even when the s e ats r e served for Whites w e r e empty. Third, n o n - White children growing up under apartheid were conditi o n e d into thinking that the s e gregation o f ameniti e s was a n o rmal thing, de spite the fact that the facilitie s provided f o r them w e r e inferior.

Second q uestion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the value and limitations of Source A for historians studying the impact of the separation of populations and amenities in apartheid South Africa. Examiner's hint: The key to th is q u estion is to look a t th e introduction to th e s o u rce . Th is will give you th e origin of th e sou rce and th us clues a b o u t its p u rpose. Th e imp o rta n t point to p ick up h e re is th a t th e sou rce is an in terview with a person who is reca lling events tha t h appened m a ny yea rs p revio usly, in her ch ildh ood. A sample answer fo llows .

system that was being put in place at the tim e . There are also some obvious limitations, however. One of the s e relates to the origin of the source : she is recalling events that happ ened many years previously in her childho o d, and it is possible that there are certain aspe cts that she has forgotten or emb ellished in her recolle ctions . One of the purp o s e s of the interview (to highlight the wrongness of apartheid, having herself been a victim of its law s ) could m e an that she had exaggerated certain details. One line of the content - "by this stage half the day is gone" suggests that this may indeed be the cas e . Examiner's comment: This answer makes clear and explicit reference to values and lim itations, as well as to origin, purpose and content. It therefore deserves full marks. Examiner's hint: If there is a general question on the separation ofpopulations and amenities in a Paper 1 examination, don 't forget to include in your answer an analysis of the laws outlined in this chapter.

Sou rce B A cartoon by Abe Berry, published in The Star newspaper in Johannesburg, 1 9 6 6 .

S a m p l e a n swe r The source is an interview conducted with Ayesha Hoorzook, a S outh African Indian woman . In the interview, she recalls some of her exp eriences of growing up at a time when apartheid laws were being introduce d . Her purpose in recording the interview is to help u s understand t h e apartheid period better, a n d t o contribute to t h e archive of te stimonies of what it was like to grow up as a non-White person under apartheid. This is one aspect that makes the source valuable : as a personal, first-hand account it affords us an insight into how apartheid laws such as the Reservation of Amenities Act had an impact on the lives of non- White S outh Africans in a number of different ways . As well as this, Ayesha Hoorzook is a history teacher and guide at the Apartheid Museum. This means that she has a wealth of knowledge ab out different apartheid laws and is able to put her own exp eriences into the context of the discriminatory

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the carto on in S ource B ? Examiner's hint: A s mentioned above, when you have a visual source, annotate it to help you pick out the key poin ts. Here is a possible answer. ---

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C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

..

S a m p l e a n swe r

An obvious point of the cartoon is that S outh Africa has become a strictly segregated society. This is indicated by the Whites - only sign and by the fact that all of the people in the park are White with the exception of the B lack maid, who is looking after a White baby in a pram. The second message is that the apartheid laws are fussy and even ridiculous . The Black woman i s clearly i n the Whites - only section of the park, but she has interpreted the sign to mean that only the grassy area where it has been placed has been segregated. She remains standing on the path, where she believes she is permitted to

Sou rce Nelson Mandela, in his autobiography, The Long Walk to Freedom ( 1 995 ) .

U n d e r the [B antu E du c ation] Act . . . African teachers were n o t all o w e d to criticise the g o v e rnment o r any school autho rity. It was "intellectual b a a s skap " , a way of institutionalising inferio rity. Dr H e n drik Ve rwoerd, the minister for B antu e d u cation, explain e d that " e ducation mu s t t e a ch and train p e ople in accordance with their opportuniti e s in life " . His m e aning was that Africans did n o t and would n o t have any opportuniti e s , the r e fo r e , why e d u cate the m ? "There is n o place for the B antu in the E ur o p e a n community above the level of ce rtain forms o f lab o u r, " h e s a i d . In short, Africans should be train e d to be m e nial workers, to b e in a p o sition o f p e rp e tu a l subo rdination to the w h i t e man .

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to the source, why did the apartheid government introduce the system of B antu e ducation?

stand, while pushing the pram out onto the lawn, where she is not. None of the White people in the park seem perturbed by her presence . This may indicate that many White people do not really care too much for the strict apartheid laws. Examiner's comment: The candidate has made three relevant points about the message of the source, each of which is supported by details from the cartoon. Since only two points are required in this question, the candidate has done more than enough to merit full marks. Note that it is always a good idea to use the phrase 'This may indicate that . . . " zfyou are not entirely sure about a particular aspect of the source.

Examiner's hint: Questions with 3 marks allocated to them are typically very straightforward. In order to gain 3 marks, you simply need to identify three relevant points in the source and write them in your answer. You can highlight or annotate the points as you read the source. Note that you do not need to quote directly from the source. It is better to paraphrase rather than using the same wording as the source because this indicates to the examiner that you have fully understood the source.

Don 't spend any more time on answering a 3 -mark question than is absolutely necessary; you receive 1 mark for each point that you make, not for the style ofyour answer. For this question, the points you should have identified are as follows.

S a m p l e a n swe r The government wanted to stop African teachers from speaking out against apartheid. B antu education meant that the government would not have to waste time and effort in providing Africans with a good e ducation, b e cause they would have no opportunities anyway under the apartheid system. B antu education would train Africans to b e of service to White S outh Africans.

47

..

Sou rces A a nd 8

rights in the R e public o f S outh Afric a . The indig e n o u s p e opl e s were d e e m e d n o t to b e S outh Africans at all, but " n ationals " of s e lfgoverning "B antustans " . Africans living and w o rking in " white S outh Afri c a " w e r e regarded a s " tempo rary s oj o urners" ( migrant workers ) , always at risk of depo rtation to a "homeland" that many had never even s e e n .

An extract from a speech by Prime Minister Verwoerd to the South African parliament, l4 April l 9 6 l.

The b a sis of our policy is to try to get away from [dis crimination] . That is why we adopt the p o licy that the B antu, wherever h e may live in various areas of his own, must be given p o litical control over his own areas and p e ople . Just a s the Italians in France retain their vote in Italy, so the B antu, even when they are living temp orarily in our urban areas, must b e given a say in their homelands . . . We are also trying to solve the problem of the C oloured and of the Indian by accepting the p rinciple of a state within a state s o that . . . e a ch will b e given the fullest opportunity to control its own intere sts . . . One has to cho o s e b etwe e n the se thre e alternative s : t h e Unit e d Party's stand of p e rp e tual discrimination and domination; ab s o lute equality and B lack domination; or apartheid . . . We arriv e d at this clear standp oint that dis crimination must b e eliminated by carrying separation far enough . . . as I stated on the o ccasion of the dis solution of the Nativ e s Representative C ouncil , " O ur policy of parallel development is aim e d at domination for you in your areas, just as w e want domination for ourselves in our areas " . Therefore I indicated at a very early stage that our moral basis was that we were trying to give everyone full rights for his own p e ople .

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources A and B on the creation of the homelands system in S outh Africa. Examiner's hint: Yo u s h o u ld a ttempt to find at least six points of sim ila rity and difference in yo u r answer. Idea lly there s h o u ld be th ree of each in your answer b u t it isn 't a lways p ossib le to ach ieve th is balance, so a b reakdown offo u r comparisons to two con trasts, o r vice versa, is accep tab le . Try to keep up a clear runn ing com m en ta ry between th e two sou rces th ro ugh o u t your answer. An app roach where each of th e sou rces is described in tu rn befo re a short comparison is m ade at th e end is far less effective. In th is case, th e q u a lity of the answer is enhanced by th e use of app rop riate q u o ta tions from the sou rces. No te that even when sources appear to be quite different in their tone and content (as is the case here), it is still possible to identify a n umber of sim ilarities.

Co m p a risons •

The two sources agree that the homelands policy involved the fragmentation of S outh Africa into separate political components, where each group would exercise sovereignty in its own affairs.

•

The two sources agree that under the policy many Africans would be "temporarily" resident in White urban areas. However, S o urce A argue s that the s e migrant workers would enj o y political rights that they did not have before as they could now have a " s ay in their homelands " . S ource B , on the other hand, argu es that their po sition was weakened b e cause they were no longer considered to b e citizens of the Republic of S o uth Africa and were now constantly under the threat of deportation .

Sou rce 8 K. Shillington. Encyclopedia of African History ( 2 0 0 5 ) .

The e stablishment of "homelands" for variou s African communiti e s was a device to divert internal oppo sition to apartheid and a failed attempt to convince the inte rnational community that S outh Africa was addres sing, on its own terms, the demands for emancip ation o f its m aj o rity p o pulation . It provided for the b o g u s fragmentation of the pop ulation i n t o a colle ction of ethnically distinct "minoriti e s " . O nly the white p o pulation had p o litical

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C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : T H E N AT U R E AND C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F D I S C R I M I NAT I O N

..

•

S ource A argues that the policy of separate development had a strong moral foundation b e cause it allowed members of each group to develop in their own sphere without the risk of domination by other groups . S ource B agrees with source A insofar as the government planned to use the homelands as means of establishing a moral basis for the apartheid system. This would allow the government to respond to its domestic critics and the international community. However, S ource B argue s that the government's attempts to do so were insincere and that it completely failed to achieve its obj e ctiv e . S ource B refers t o the B antustan system a s "a device t o divert internal opposition to apartheid" . S ource A, where Verwoerd contrasts his policies with the "perpetual discrimination

and domination" o f the opposition United Party, appears to confirm this.

Cont rasts •

S ource B argues that main purpose of the policy was to deny Africans their "political rights" . In contrast, S ource A argues that the purpose of the policy is to bring an end to " discrimination " .

•

S ource A states that the government would attempt to " s olve the problems " of the C oloured and Indian populations. S ource B makes no mention of the s e communities apart from its reference to "minorities " .

•

S ource A argues that the various units of the new S outh Africa would b e political e quals . In contrast, S ource B implies that White S outh Africa totally dominated the B antustan s .

Sou rce

S a m p l e a nswer

A cartoon by JH Jackson published in 1 9 5 9 .

The cartoon depicts HF Verwoerd, the S o uth African prime minister, showing the world his "painting" of the B antustan system . Verwoerd is trying to fool the world by displaying a false picture of the homelands. He has represented them as b eautiful "promise d land" for Africans (who are presented as simple savages ) , a Garden of E den where they can develop at their own pace and fulfil their dream s . However, world opinion seems unimpressed, as it can see the reality of the B antustans through the window. The world can clearly see that they are desolate dumping grounds where Africans who opp ose the apartheid regime are banishe d for their " crimes " .

A Verwo erd is depicted as t h e p a i nter a n d world o p i n i o n a s

t h e viewer.

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the cartoon with regard to the creation of the homelands system ?

Refe re n ces Mandela, N. 1 9 9 5 . The Long Walk to Freedom . London, UK. Little, B rown & C ompany. Shillington, K. 2 0 0 5 . Encyclopedia ofAfrican History. Vol l - 3 . New York, USA. Taylor and Francis .

49

nderstanding Key con cepts Change Consequence Key q uestions ) What factors determined the va rious strategies adopted by the a nti-a partheid movement between 1948 and 1 9 64? To what extent were the va rious protests and ca mpaigns against apartheid successfu l ? Why did the ANC adopt the a rmed struggle?

The first transport boy cott of the apartheid e ra takes place The ANC adopts the Youth League's Progra mme of Action as its officia l policy

The ANC lau nches the Defiance Campaign against the six "unjust laws" Rioting breaks out in East London, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and Johannesburg

The government introduces the Criminal Law Amendment Act The Defiance Campaign comes to an end The Congress of the People (COP) begins The Congress Alliance adopts the Freedom Charter at a mass rally in Kliptown The Pan Africa nist Congress ( PAC) breaks awa y from the ANC South Africa leaves the Commonwealth and Verwoerd declares a republic The ANC adopts the armed struggle with the formation of U m khonto we Sizwe (known as M K)

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A bus boy cott begins i n Alexa n d ra The govern m e nt backs d own a n d agrees t o subsid ize bus fa res The S h a rpevi l l e massacre takes place The A N C is b a n n e d M e m b e rs of M K H igh Co m m a n d a re a rrested at Liliesleaf Fa rm The Rivo n i a Tria l begi ns

The Rivonia Trial ends with guilty verdicts ANC leaders a re taken to begin their life sentences on Robben Island 50

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

Non-violent protests The D efia n ce Ca m pa ign The Defiance C ampaign was the first in a number of coordinated nationwide campaigns and protests organized by the ANC against the apartheid system. In many respects it was also the most significant, as it marked the opening of a new, more radical phase in the struggle against White minority rule . The campaign incorporated many of the more militant strategies that had been outlined in the ANC Youth League's Programme of Action, a platform which had been adopted as the official policy of the movement in 1 949. The D efiance C ampaign was designed to apply concerted pressure on the government and force it into repealing apartheid legislation and negotiating with the ANC . These obj e ctives would b e achieved using the following methods : •

The political potential of the masses of ordinary Africans would b e harnessed by involving them i n a coordinated campaign of defiance against new apartheid laws. ANC leaders and other volunteers would deliberately break the law while crowds of onlo okers would provide them with support and encouragement.

•

The D efiance C ampaign's philosophy of non-violent civil disobe dience would be contrasted with the heavy- handed response of the authorities. The police would b e given no choice but to arrest thousands of campaigners. As the campaign b e came the focus of global attention, apartheid would b e put in the sp otlight and the ANC would win a moral victory.

•

S o uth Africa's prisons would be filled until they were overflowing. The various institutions of state repression - the police, the courts and the prisons - would b e stretched to breaking p oint.

•

Other racial groups would be involved in the struggle against apartheid by coordinating the D efiance C ampaign with the S outh African Indian C ongress ( SAIC ) as well as activists from other communities.

Why did the ANC leaders h i p decide to l a u n ch the Defi a n ce Ca m p a ign i n 19 5 2 ? The most obvious answer i s that the ANC simply had to find a more effective response to the raft of apartheid laws being passed by the Malan government. By 1 9 5 2 , it was clear that apartheid was different from the old system of segregation. It was much more extreme and entailed the permanent political exclusion and oppression of non-Whites . Unless decisive action was taken, it would be too late to turn back the apartheid tide . The authorities had shown no inclination to engage the ANC in dialogue . Indeed, the government seemed utterly dismissive of African opinion and determined to repress any sort of opposition to its policies. The circumstances demanded a new strategy of resistance. Earlier demonstrations organized by the ANC, most notably a series of one- day strikes, had failed to provide sustained popular resistance to the regime. The old approach of ad hoc protests had to be replaced by a more cohesive and rigorous plan of action, one which would instil a sense of discipline in the people and inspire them to rally and persist in the face of the inevitable government backlash. Another reason for the launch of the D efiance

51

C ampaign is that the ANC risked losing credibility among the masses unless it proved capable of providing a more effective response to government brutality. This was the argument used by the younger, more radical activists of the movement in their struggle against their more established leaders, who had favoured a cautious approach. The D efiance C ampaign confirmed the ascendancy of the Youth Leaguers, who advocated a mass-based activism, over the conservative old guard of the ANC .

Civil disobedience

The strategy of protesting against unjust laws by deliberately breaking them, usually using nonviolent means. The approach was outlined by the American writer and philosopher Henry James Thoreau in the nineteenth century and was used, among others, by Mahatma Gandhi in his struggle against British rule in India, and by Martin Luther King during the civil rights struggle in America.

The immediate stimulus for the D efiance C ampaign was an event organized by the National Party (NP ) . This event was the tercentenary of Jan van Riebeeck's landing at the C ape on 6 April l 6 5 2 , the moment when a White presence was first established in South Africa. It was commemorated by Afrikaners across the nation in a spirit of unbridled triumphalism. The ANC responded by organizing mass rallies of its own in a number of major cities on the day of the tercentenary. These were so well attended that the leaders of the movement were encouraged to take further advantage of the rising popular anger against apartheid. C onsultations between the ANC and anti-apartheid activists from the Indian, C oloured and White communities had already taken place in 1 9 5 1 . At the time, a j oint action committee had recommended a national campaign with civil disobedience at its heart. Now, in June 1 9 5 2 , a National Action C ommittee (NAC ) was created to organize this campaign. The NAC consisted of representatives of the ANC , the S outh African Indian C ongress ( SAIC ) and the Franchise Action Council (FRAC ) , a C oloured organization created in order to protest the NP government's decision to remove C oloureds from the voters' roll. A National Volunteers B o ard (NVB ) was created to coordinate the protests and Nelson Mandela was appointed national volunteer-in-chief, as well as chairman of both the NAC and NVB . The official opening of the D e fiance C amp aign was set for 26 Jun e . This was the se cond anniversary of the D ay of Protest, a mass demonstration that had re sulted in the fatal shooting of 1 9 protesters by the p olic e . T h e official g o a l of t h e campaign was t o force t h e government to repeal s i x "unj ust law s " that had recently b e e n introduced: the Pass Laws Act, the Group Areas Act, the S uppression of C ommunism Act, the B antu Authoritie s Act, the S eparate Repre sentation of Voters Act and the Stock Limitation Act. This final law made it compulsory for Africans to cull their cattle and was hugely unpopular in rural areas; its inclusion was designed to broaden the base of the movement by drawing African p easants into the struggl e .

However, civil disobedience leading t o the repeal of apartheid laws were only part of the organizers' plans: at some later, as yet .A. Nelson M a n d e l a confers with James M o ro ka and Yusuf Dadoo w h i l e unspecified, time, a series of general strikes awa iti n g tria l d u ri n g the Defia nce Ca m p a ign, 19 52 would be launched to coincide with the mounting acts of defiance . The hope was that this would bring the apartheid state to its knees and force its leaders to negotiate with the ANC .

52

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

The D efiance C ampaign began with an ANC meeting in Johannesburg, which broke up after 1 1 pm, even though the curfew time for Blacks in the city centre was 1 1 pm. It soon developed a powerful momentum. Small groups of volunteers, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Yusuf Dadoo, Moses Kotane and JB Marks, deliberately defied apartheid laws in front of crowds of cheering onlookers and in full view of the police. The protests were typically good natured, with volunteers singing freedom songs, shouting political slogans (Mayibuye!, or "Let it return", to which the crowds responded Afrika!) and, following their arrest, giving their supporters the thumbs up sign that became a signature of the campaign. On being sentenced, they would chant "Hey Malan ! Open the j ail doors, we want to enter" . Acts of defiance included burning or damaging passbooks, using segregated amenities and Whites-only entrances to railway stations, post offices and other buildings, illegally entering White suburbs without the required passes, and remaining in Whites - only areas after curfew. Since these infractions were minor ones, volunteers would be given short custodial sentences, typically a day or two in prison, as well a small fine before being released. They would then repeat the offences. Once the campaign was well underway, the volunteers who were most closely involved in its organization would often attend acts of defiance as onlookers in order to avoid rearrest and longer prison sentences . Communication and thinking skills While initially confined t o Johannesburg A South African policeman arresting volunteers during the and the traditional ANC strongholds Defiance Campaign . of Port Elizabeth and East London, the campaign soon spread to other cities and smaller towns. The public response was very positive. Large numbers of B lacks and Indians were involved, both as volunteers and in supporting the defiers, with smaller representations from the C oloured and White communities . Membership of the ANC grew rapidly as a result, from under 2 0 , 0 0 0 members at the start of the D efiance C ampaign to as many as 1 00 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 5 3 . A significant factor in this growth, and in the overall success of the campaign, was the involvement of women. Many of the protesters were female, and the ANC Women's League was at the forefront of organizing acts of defiance . The Black S ash, a group of White women opposed to apartheid, supported the campaign with great enthusiasm .

19 52

The D efiance C ampaign peaked in July and August of 1 9 5 2 . By the end of the year, a total of more than 8, 3 0 0 volunteers had b e e n arrested. The What is the message ofthis photogra p h? campaign lost impetus in early 1 9 5 3 and never recovered. The main cause of the decline w a s the widespread rioting that broke out in the E astern C ap e in O ctober 1 9 5 2 , and which then spread to Kimberley and Johannesburg. The risk that the ANC

53

had been running now became apparent. Arousing popular anger against apartheid meant that peaceful protest could e asily spill over into violence . This defeated the purpose of civil disobedience and provided the authorities with an excuse to use force to crush the campaign. With events now spiralling out of the ANC 's controL the response of the government was typically swift and decisive . It introduced a C riminal Law Amendment Act in March 1 9 5 3 . This allowed the courts to hand down longer sentences and introduced whipping as a punishment for " offences committed by way of protest" . The authorities also issued banning orders against individual organizers under the terms of the S uppression of C ommunism Act. This prevented ANC leaders from meeting and coordinating any further protests . C onfronted with the prospect of draconian punishments, and struggling with the political fallout from the rioting, the ANC decided to wind down the D efiance C ampaign .

Was t h e Defi a n ce Ca m p a ign a success ? It can be argue d that the D e fiance C ampaign was a failure in many crucial respects . •

The ANC failed to achieve any of its main political obj e ctives.

•

Not a single one of the six "unjust laws" was repeale d .

•

The government emerged with even stronger repressive powers with the passage of the C riminal Law Amendment Act and the Public S afety Act, which it also introduced during the campaign .

•

With the exception of Ciskei, rural areas were hardly involved at all. S upport was strongest in Johannesburg and especially in Port Elizabeth and E ast London, cities that were traditional ANC strongholds .

•

The anticipated wave of general strikes that would herald the climax of the campaign and cripple the South African economy never materialized.

•

Most of those who supported the campaign were middle - class B lacks from professional backgrounds . Poorer Africans from the working class and peasantry failed to play a significant part. D espite the impressive growth in its membership, the D e fiance C ampaign indicated that the ANC still had much work to do in expanding its support base before it could call itself a genuine mass movement.

•

Very few members of the C oloured community j oine d in the campaign, a fact that helps to explain why it failed in C ape Town.

•

Moreover, the campaign was viewed with hostility by many in the White community, who viewe d it as a revolutionary challenge to their interests, particularly after the outbreak of rioting.

•

The E nglish language press was largely unsympathetic, as liberal Whites sought to distance themselves from a campaign they believed to b e radical and confrontational.

A White s - only general ele ction held later in 1 9 5 3 saw the NP return e d to government with swe eping gain s . The authorities were clearly far from weakened by the ANC 's display of civil disobedience . It may be argued, however, that the problems faced by the D efiance C ampaign were to be expected if the ANC was to make the j ourney towards becoming a genuine mass movement, capable of challenging

54

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

apartheid. The government was always going to counter civil disobedience with the full force of state repression and the ANC , still in its infancy as a mass movement, was always likely to struggle in the face of this onslaught. Similarly, involving the masses in a struggle that had been dominated by Black elites was never likely to have been an easy task. It could be argued that the failures of the D efiance C ampaign were necessary failures, and that the movement learned some very important lessons as a result. B e sides, few can argue that some of the achievements of the D efiance C ampaign were extraordinary. •

For the first time in its history, the ANC had managed to coordinate an extended national campaign against apartheid. The leadership had proved itself capable of discipline and sacrifice.

•

Thousands of ordinary S outh Africans had demonstrate d their readiness to b e come involved in the struggle, as volunte ers and as supp orters. While popular involvement ebbe d and flowed and the urban poor and the peasantry were largely uninvolved, the stage had been set for the development of a true mass movement.

•

A broad coalition of interest groups was involved in the planning and execution of defiance, from communists and trade unions to members of the Indian community and the ANC Women's Leagu e .

•

Hardly anyone in the party, including members of an emerging Africanist faction that obj ected in principle to working alongside groups that were not African, had openly opposed the campaign. Even the ultra- cautious former leader Alfred Xuma came out strongly in support.

•

Finally, the national and global profile of the ANC grew enormously as a result of the D e fiance C ampaign .

The p eaceful strategy of civil disobe dience adopted by the resistance movement, together with the aggressive and disproportionate response of the government, revealed the brutality and moral bankruptcy of the apartheid system to the global community. In 1 9 5 3 , the United Nations e stablished a C ommission on the Racial S ituation in the Union of S outh Africa. This marke d the true b eginning of the international campaign against apartheid.

Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A

Sou rce B

Defiance Campaign resister arrests by region in 1 9 5 2 , from Tom Lodge, Black politics since 1 945.

Baruch Hirson, a White South African political activist and historian, "The D efiance Campaign, 1 9 5 2 : Social struggle or party stratagem? " in Searchlight South Africa. Vol 1 , number 1 ( 1 988).

Region

Defiance Campaign register arrests,

1952

East Ca tJe

5,941

Tra nsvaal

1,578

West Ca pe

490

O ra nge Free State

125

Natal

192

National tota l

8,326

As a prominent Marxist, Hirson was active in the African labour m ovemen t and in the South African Congress of Democrats in the 1 950s. An early advocate of a rmed struggle, he became increasingly disillusioned by the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups, wh ich he regarded as excessively cau tious and, despite the

55

Defiance Campaign, o u t of touch with the masses of poorer Sou th Africans. The repeal of the six laws in 19 5 2 would have been a remarkable victory for the C ongresses, but it did not envisage [foresee] any fundamental change in land holding, or in the country's economy . . . As the C ampaign unfolded many of the original issues were seemingly forgotten. The C oloured votes ceased to be a factor in the C ampaign - and the B ulletins of the C ampaign were brought out in the names of the ANC and the SAIC , with no reference to the FrAC . There was little response from the C oloured community to the call for defiance, despite the claim that the C oloureds were ready for a fight . . . Finally, it was claimed that . . . the campaign marked a turning p oint in the history of S outh Africa,

T O K connections

H i stori a n s a n d i d e o l ogy Baruch H i rson was a M a rxist historia n. M a rxists a rgue that eco nomic factors [as opposed to politica l, social or cultura l factors] a re crucial in d etermining the course of history. They contend that economic systems such as capita lism give rise to contradictions which the system ca nnot contai n a n d from which revol ution is the inevita b l e resu lt. The preoccupation of M a rxists with the economic causes of change raises a n u m b e r of interesti ng q uestions a bout ideology and the production of history:

2 Are some historians more prone to bias than others? What other factors influence the bias of the historian? What, if anything, can historians do to mitigate this bias?

3 M a rxist h isto rians have been accused of economic red u ctionism (i.e. red u cing com p l ex h isto rica l events a n d processes to single-cause economic expla nations] ? I s this fa i r? Do we need to s i m p l ify history i n ord e r to m a ke sense of it?

4 Marxists claim that they have identified a force which drives history forward, in the form of the changing modes and relations of economic production. Is it possible to see a pattern in history? 56

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource B , why did the D e fiance C ampaign fail to achieve its political obj e ctives?

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of S ource A?

Second q uestion

-

4 m a rks

With reference to origin, purpose and content, assess the value s and limitations of S ource B for historians studying the D efiance C ampaign .

The Congress o f t h e People ( COP) and the Freedom Cha rter The C O P, convened in 1 9 5 5 , was an alliance of anti- apartheid congress movements, of which the ANC was by far the largest. The various congresses came together to create the C OP in order to : •

forge a single popular front by uniting all of S o uth Africa's racial groups in the fight against apartheid

•

expand the membership and broaden the social base of the ANC through the direct involvement of p oorer Africans in the COP and by doing so turn the freedom struggle into a truly mass movement

•

draft a Free dom C harter for the C O P, a document which would encapsulate the political goals of the congress movements as well as the democratic aspirations of all of the people of S outh Africa

•

consolidate the ANC 's strategy of working together with other parties and racial groups opposed to the apartheid system (like the SAIC ) while also involving others, such as the C oloureds, whom had been largely excluded during the D efiance C ampaign .

1 Is it possible for the historian to be objective in their selection and interpretation of sources (Marxists will natura l l y gravitate to economic evidence] ? Can we speak of historical "facts" in a truly objective sense?

and provided the ANC with a mass bas e . The first contention is debatable and the second requires scrutiny [examination] . In comparison with the pre - 1 9 52 showing of the ANC , there was a decided change in the ANC presence, at least in the towns . However, it seems to have been much less than usually claimed.

The idea of summoning a national convention of congress parties was first proposed by Professor ZK Matthews in 1 9 5 3 . In his discussions with ANC President- General Chief Luthuli, Matthews suggested that the convention should be known as the C ongress of the People ( C OP) . The plan was that the C O P would, unlike the national parliament i n C ape Town, represent S outh Africans of all race s . It would draw up a Freedom C harter, a would-be constitution for a democratic, post­ apartheid S outh Africa. Millions of ordinary S outh Africans would contribute to the drafting of this charter. Detailed

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

proposals were presented by Professor Matthews at the C ape provincial congress of the ANC in August 1 9 5 3 , and his plans were adopted to great acclaim at the annual conference in S eptember. Following consultations with the ANC , the plan for the C O P was then separately endorsed by: •

the SAIC

•

the newly - form e d S outh African C oloured Pe ople's O rganization ( later renam e d the C oloured Pe ople 's C ongre s s )

•

the S outh African C ommunist Party

•

the S outh African C ongress of D emo crats, a group of left-wing activists from the White community.

In l 9 5 4, these parties, along with the S outh African C ongress of Trade Unions ( SACTU ) , came together to establish, formally, the C ongress Alliance, a .A. Delegates asse m b l e at Kli ptown for the mass ra l l y of the COP, June 26, 19 55 popular front of congress parties . A meeting was held at Tongaat near D urban, where representatives agreed to establish a National Action C ouncil (NAC ) in order to organize the C O P. The NAC would recruit thousands of "freedom volunteers", whose task it would b e to bring the C OP to the masses. From the very beginning, then, the obj ective of the C O P was to involve as many ordinary S outh Africans as possible. It was hoped that this would transform the perception of the ANC as the party of narrow, middle class anti- apartheid elite. The C OP convened as a series of gatherings, conferences, campaigns and rallies . Many of the meetings were large and well attended, but most were on a much smaller scale . They were organized in factories, mining compounds, farms and homesteads across the nation. These took place during the first few months of 1 9 5 5 . The purpose of many of the smaller events was simply to raise awareness, with volunteers stressing that all B lack S outh Africans should become involved in the struggle by registering as members of the ANC and j oining in acts of protest and resistance . The volunteers also recorded the grievances of ordinary people and collected their signatures for the Million Signatures C ampaign. C ommittees were established to incorporate the suggestions of millions of S o uth Africans into the official draft of the Freedom C harter. The C O P reached a climax on 2 5 and 26 June at a mass meeting held at a football field in Kliptown, to the south of Johannesburg. It was attended by 2 , 844 delegates from all over S outh Africa . C hief Luthuli and ZK Matthews were prevented from leaving their rural homes by banning orders and were unable to be present. Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, who were also banned, discreetly viewe d the proceedings from the fringes of the crowd. A statement by Luthuli was read out to the delegates before the Freedom C harter was pro claimed. C omposed in ringing, declamatory tones, the Freedom C harter b ecame the iconic document of the fre e dom struggle. It called for an end to the apartheid system, the ele ction of a democratic, non- racial government, and the e quitable distribution of the country's wealth and resource s . The full document reads as follows .

57

The Freedom Charter

•

The minera l wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be tra nsferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;

•

All othe r ind ustry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people;

•

All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufa ctu re and to enter a l l trades, crafts and professions.

We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: •

•

that South Africa belongs to a l l who l ive in it, black and white, and that no govern ment ca n justly claim authority unl ess it is based on the wil l of a l l the people; that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of govern ment founded on i njustice and inequality;

The Land Shall be Shared Amongst Those Who Work I t ! •

Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish fa mine and land hunger;

•

The state shall help the peasa nts with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the til le rs;

•

Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to a l l who work on the land;

•

And we p l edge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic cha nges here set out have been won.

All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose;

•

People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.

The People Shall Govern!

All Shall b e Equal Before the Law!

•

Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a ca ndidate for a l l bodies which make laws;

•

•

All people shall be entitled to ta ke part in the administration of the cou ntry;

No-one shall be i mp risoned, deported or restricted without a fair trial; no-one shall be condemned by the order of a n y Govern ment official;

•

The courts shall be representative of a l l the people;

•

I m p risonment shall be o n l y for serious crimes against the people, and shall a i m at re-education, not vengeance;

•

The police force and a rmy shall be open to a l l on a n equal basis a n d sha l l be the helpers and protectors o f the people;

•

All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or bel ief shall be repealed.

•

that our cou ntry wil l never be prosperous or free until all our people l ive in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities;

•

that only a democratic state, based on the will of a l l t h e people, ca n secure t o a l l t h e i r birth right without distinction of colour, race, sex or bel ief;

And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white together equa ls, cou ntry men and brothe rs adopt this Freedom Charter;

•

The rights of the people shall be the same, rega rd less of race, colour or sex;

•

All bodies of minority ru le, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic orga ns of self-govern ment.

All National Groups Shall have Equal Rights ! •

There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for a l l national groups and races;

•

All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to develop their own folk culture and customs;

•

•

•

•

All national groups shall be protected by law against insu lts to their race and national pride;

The law shall gua ra ntee to a l l their right to speak, to orga nise, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to educate their children;

•

The preaching and practice of national, race or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime;

The privacy of the house from police raids shall be protected by law;

•

All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to provi nce, and from South Africa a b road;

•

Pass Laws, permits and a l l othe r laws restricting these freedoms shall be abol ished.

All apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside.

The People Shall Share in the Country's Wealth ! •

58

All Shall Enj oy Equal Human Rights !

The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people;

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

There Shall be Work and Security ! •

All who work shall be free to form trade u nions, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;

•

The state shall recognise the right and duty of a l l to work, and to draw fu l l unemploy ment benefits;

•

M e n and women of a l l races shall receive equal pay for equal work;

•

There s h a l l be a fo rty-hour worki ng week, a nati o n a l m i n i m u m wage, paid a n n u a l leave, a n d s i c k leave fo r a l l workers, a n d mate rnity leave on fu l l pa!:J for a l l worki ng m oth e rs;

•

Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil seNa nts shall have the same rights as all others who work;

•

Child labour, compound labour, the tot S!:JStem and contract labour shall be abol ished.

The Doors o f Learning and Culture Shall be Opened!

•

U n used housing space [shal l ] be made available to the people;

•

Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentifu l and no­ one shall go hu ngry;

•

A preventive health scheme shall be ru n by the state;

•

Free medical ca re a n d hospita l isatio n s h a l l be p rovided fo r all, with special ca re for mothe rs a n d young c h i l d ren;

•

Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where a l l have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields, creches a n d social centres;

•

The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state;

•

Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of a l l ;

•

Fenced locations and ghettoes shall be abolished, and laws which break u p fa milies shall be repealed.

There Shall b e Peace and Friendship!

•

The government shall discover, develop and encourage national talent for the enha ncement of our cultura l life;

•

South Africa shall be a fu l l y independent state which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;

•

All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free exchange of books, ideas and contact with other lands;

•

•

The a i m of education shall be to teach the !:JOuth to love their people and their cultu re, to honour human b rotherhood, Iibert!:! and peace;

South Africa shall strive to mainta i n world peace and the settlement of a l l international disputes by negotiation - not war;

•

Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for a l l children; higher education and tech nical training shall be opened to a l l by means of state allowances and scholarships awa rded on the basis of merit;

Peace and friendship amongst a l l our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportu nities and status of all;

•

The people of the protectorates Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland shall be free to decide for themselves their own future;

•

Adu lt i l l iteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;

•

•

Teachers shall have a l l the rights of othe r citizens;

The right of a l l peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis of close co-operation.

•

The colour bar in cultura l life, in sport and in education shall be abolished.

•

There Shall b e Houses, Security and Comfort ! •

All people shall have the right to l ive where they choose, be decently housed, and to bring u p their famil ies in comfort and secu rit!:J;

Let all people who love their people and their cou ntry now say, as we say here: THESE FREEDO M S WE WI LL FI G HT FO R, S I D E BY S I D E, TH R O U G H O UT O U R LIVES, U NTI L WE HAVE WO N O U R LI BERTY

Thinking and social skills

The apartheid government a rgued that the Freedom Charter was a dangerous and revolutionar!:l document. I n pairs, use this document to prepare a case for the state that the COP aimed to overthrow the established order in South Africa th rough the Freedom Cha rter.

59

Sou rce s ki l l s A poster designed in the later apartheid era to commemorate the COP, and the Freedom Charter.

THE PEOPL E SHALL SO Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of this source ?

Unsurprisingly, the Freedom C harter was unanimously adopted by the C O P. The Kliptown rally ended in chaos, with arm e d police raiding the me eting and taking over the sp e aker's platform . The authorities arrested several of the delegates and many documents were seized. Rattled by the success of the C O P, the government planned to use the se documents as evidence against the ANC leaders in the next phase of its battle against the resistance movement. B eginning in 1 9 5 6 , the next few years of the fre edom struggle were dominated by the marathon legal proceedings undertaken by the state against the accused in what was known as the Treason Trial. The government argue d that t h e C OP was designed to supplant the National C onvention of 1 9 0 8- 1 9 0 9 . This was the b o dy which had agre e d the p o litical union o f t h e four White S outh African provin c e s in 1 9 1 0 and had draft e d the union constitution . T h e government could therefore argue that the Freedom C harter, an embryonic constitution for a new S o uth Africa, amounted to nothing less than treason against the state . The Treason Trial took an enormous toll on the ANC . However, the charges laid against its leaders proved flimsy: all the accused were acquitted of treason in 1 9 6 1 .

Research and thinking skills An extract from Luli Callinicos's biography of senior ANC leader Oliver Tambo, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains

(2004) . Callinicos is a South African social

historian who was herself a member of the Congress of Democrats in her youth.

The outcome of the COP, many have since agreed, was a turning point. Members of the Working Committee concurred. "For the first time, Congress activists had to learn to listen. From that process came a radical Freedom Charter, and the first outlines of a revolutionary new South Africa," observed [Lionel] Bernstein about the process of popular participation.

60

Ofthe Charter itself, Nelson Mandela wrote that "it is more than a list of demands for democratic reforms. It is revolutionary document precisely because the changes it envisages cannot be won without breaking up the economic and politica l set·up of present South Africa"; while Oliver Tambo . . . reported that the Freedom Charter has opened up a new chapter in the struggle of our people. "Hitherto we have struggled sometimes together, sometimes separately against pass laws, and Group Areas, against low wages, against Bantu education and remova l schemes. With the adoption of the Charter, a l l struggles become one: the struggle for the aims of the Charter." . . .

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

[A] y e ar later the Freedom Charter was a d o pted form a l l y b y the ANC without a m e n d m e nts ... thousands of copies were re pri nted ove r the n ext few y e ars, a n d the document beca m e a p o p u l a r reference point - "ou r gu ide a n d orga niser", t o u s e Ta m bo's concept. . . . [The] Freedom Charter was also to cause a major l u rch towa rds a n attem pt by Africanists to challenge the AN C's d i rection a n d re-route it back to the Progra m m e of Action a n d a "go-it-alone" policy. The dissident m ovement had been underground since

the Defiance Ca mpaign, when they supported the ca mpa ign i n pra ctice, but bided their time to see h ow the strategy would pan out. Q u estion I n pairs, identify the various a rgu ments made in this extract to suggest that the decision of the COP to adopt the Freedom Charter was a "tu rning point" in the history of South Africa's freedom struggle. Using resea rch and y o u r own knowledge, identify some of the other conseq uences of the COP and the Freedom Charter.

B u s boycotts B u s b oycotts were a maj o r form of B lack protest against the S outh African authorities, even prior to 1 94 8 . The first maj or boycott was observed in 1 94 0 . Another took place in 1 94 3 , when a young Nelson Mandela marched the nine miles from Alexandra Township into the centre of Johannesburg in solidarity with tens of thousands of other protesters. Yet another boycott was held a year later. The causes of the boycotts tended to b e e conomic rather than political. They were not a planne d form of protest, but o ccurred as a p opular reaction to the de cisions of the variou s bus companies operating from the townships to raise their fares into the city. B oycotts were thus closely related to the extremely low wages paid to Africans and the high unemployment levels in the township s . O n ce a boycott b egan, a committee w a s usually form e d by activists or other community representatives on b ehalf of poor commuters who could not afford the fare increa s e s . The committees negotiated with the bus companies and otherwise coordinated the b oycotts . This was a maj o r task as the boycotts were very well observed by commuters. At one point in 1 944, up to 2 0, 0 0 0 p e ople were involved in b oycotting b u s e s . What was also remarkable ab out bus b oycotts is that, unlike many other forms of demonstration against the authorities, they were often successful. The Johannesburg C hamber of C ommerce, mindful of the impact of boycotts on businesses, would typically intervene in a dispute and persuade the bus companie s to rescind the fare increase s . The success of the s e earlier boycotts h a d indicated the potential o f organiz e d p opular a ction as a n effe ctive m eans of p eaceful political protest. They influenced the various ad hoc protests and " stay - at ­ h o m e s " organize d by t h e A N C during t h e e arly years of apartheid, as well as the D e fiance C ampaign of 1 9 5 2-5 3 . However, boycotts had certain obvious limitations . They could not b e initiated by the lib eration movement, but were instead contingent upon the de cisions of the bus companie s . This m eant that the ANC could not dictate the timing of any protests . S till, b o ycotts of b u s e s and other transport were fairly frequent during the early years of the anti - apartheid struggle .

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They inclu ded a tram boycott i n t h e w e stern suburbs of Johann e sburg in 1 94 9 , as well as bus boycotts in Evaton in 1 9 5 0, 1 9 5 4 and 1 9 5 5 , and in the E ast Rand in 1 9 5 4 and 1 9 5 5 . The most important of all the boycotts was the famous Alexandra bus boycott, which began in January 1 9 5 7 . Predictably enough, it was triggered by the decision of the bus company, PUT C O , to raise fares from the township into the city from four to five pence . The resulting demonstrations were on a scale unlike anything seen before in the country, with hundreds of thousands involved in the boycott and, for the first time, widespread ­ and often sympathetic - coverage in the White media. The sheer magnitude of the Alexandra boycott indicates that there was something more to the protests than a simple decision to increase bus fares. The political temperature, both in the township and nationally, had been steadily rising for some tim e . The forced evictions that had begun in S ophiatown in 1 9 5 5 had b e en extended to "Black spots" across the nation by 1 9 5 7 . Tensions were understandably high in other B lack urban areas, especially Alexandra. Minister of Native Affairs Verwoerd had made no secret of his determination to wipe Alexandra right off the map, and a series of removals, which had the effect of reducing the population of the township by the early 1 9 6 0s, had already started. The government's 1 9 5 6 decision to issue compulsory passes to women had led to an eruption of spontaneous protests . The imposition of native authorities in the reserves was another great source of anger among B lack S outh Africans. At the same time, there had been a significant lull in political activity since the C OP, not least b e cause many ANC leaders had been p olitically sidelined due to successive government banning orders and the Treason Trial. S till, the situation had b e come so tense that it would take little to trigger mass action. In e arly 1 9 5 7, the stimulus duly arrived. The announcement of the one p enny rise in the b u s fare provoked an imme diate response from Alexandra's commuter s . Their existing annual expenditure on bus fares, before the increase, amounted to more than a month's salary and they simply could not afford to pay the additional charg e . On 7 January, thousands came out onto the streets in the morning and b e gan the long trek into the city. From the outset, the m o o d of the protesters was fe stive, the air ringing with the sounds of fre e dom songs and cries of Azikhwelwa !, Zulu for "We will not ride ! " . The b oycott imme diately spread to S ophiatown and to the East Rand, as well as to a numb er of township s in Pretoria . Remarkably, by 1 5 January more than 2 0 , 0 0 0 workers from Moroka and Jabavu ­ squatter settlements on the outskirts of what is today S oweto - had j oined in, even though their bus routes were not affe cted by the fare increase s . O ther cities, including Blo emfontein, C ap e Town, Port E lizab eth and E ast London, initiated their own boycotts in a show of solidarity with the p e ople of Alexandra . All in all, some 7 0 , 0 0 0 p e ople walk e d daily for 12 weeks : from Alexandra, down Louis B otha Avenue, to the centre of Johannesburg. Tens of thousands were involv e d elsewhere . The sense of solidarity a m o n g t h e boycotters was palpable, with fitter marchers assisting the weak and the elderly. The police would regularly stop the marches and demand to s e e the particip ants' passes, and would often puncture bicycle tyr e s . Thunder showers were an additional hazard for the marchers, and yet the b oycott continue d .

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On the very first day of the Communication skills boycott, the Alexandra People's Protesters make their way to work during the Alexandra bus boycott of Transport Action C ommittee (APTAC ) was created in order to coordinate the actions of the boycotters and to present their demands to PUTC 0 and the government. The ANC was well represented in APTAC, with Oliver Tambo and Alfred Nzo both prominent. S everal civic organizations were also involved, and the dominant figure in APTAC seems to have been D an Mokonyane of the Movement for a D emocracy of C ontent. Initially non­ political, the boycotters became increasingly confident and strident as the protests wore on and the influence of the ANC grew. Eventually, the Johannesburg Chamber of C ommerce felt obliged to What is the message of the photogra p h? intervene . A deal was reached whereby the old fare structure was restored and PUTC O was effectively subsidized by the government to make up the difference . C elebrations erupted in the township as commuters won a rare victory against the authorities.

1957.

The b oycott was viewe d as a maj o r threat by the apartheid government. This was not a campaign that had been planne d or initiated by the ANC or any other political party, and for that reason it s e emed all the more dangero u s . Tellingly, the government tried to argue that Africans had only boycotted the buses b e cause of ANC intimidation, a charge that was patently untrue . For the authorities, spontaneous demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of Africans, who felt that they had little to lose by protesting, could seriously threaten the basis of the apartheid regim e . Previous protests that were orche strated by the lib eration movement, most notably the D efiance C ampaign, had b e e n quashed w h e n t h e government clampe d d o w n on its organizers . The boycotts only came to an end only when the demands of the protesters had been met. S imilar protests in future might re sult in the government having little choice but to make maj o r political concessions . The bus b oycott also saw a sudden and unexp e cted outpouring of sympathy in the White community for the victims of apartheid. Liberal E nglish language newspapers carrie d daily reports on the marches from the townships into the cities, as well as article s describing the penury of African s . Large numbers of White s from Johanne sburg's wealthy northern suburb s drove their cars to Alexandra every morning to offer the marchers fre e lifts into the city. This strong display of White fraternity with Africans, which for the first time stretche d b eyond the

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narrow left -wing circle o f the C ongress o f D em o crats and the S outh African C ommunist Party ( SA C P ) , was viewe d by the government as another dangerous development.

E. Sisulu. Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime ( 2 002 ) .

Local groups came together to form an Alexandra Pe ople 's Transport C ommittee . Alfred Nzo, the ANC chairman for Alexandra, and Thomas Nkobi were part of the committee . Nzo and Nkobi regularly briefed the ANC leadership a t D rill Hall about the progress of the b oycott, which soon spread to Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, East London, Uitenhage and other centre s . B eyond all exp ectations, the Alexandra B u s B o ycott continue d f o r over three months, a n d newspapers were filled with compelling images of people trudging their daily 20 miles, while sympathetic white motorists braved police intimidation to provide lifts to the weary walkers . The b oycott finally ended in mid -April; six weeks later, the government introduced a new B ill in Parliament, the Native S e rvices Levy Act of 1 9 5 7, which provide d a subsidy for bus fares. Anthony S ampson noted that "It was the first Act of Parliament in the 47 years of the Union to b e passed directly as a result of African pressure . "

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to the source, in what ways was the Alexandra bus b oycott of 1 9 5 7 a success?

For the ANC , the Alexandra bus boycott was a double - e dged sword. It demonstrated that the government had little effective response to a demonstration that was genuinely popular. If mass public anger could be harnessed more effectively then there was no telling what might be achieved. The trouble was that the ANC might find it very difficult to control and direct a genuine mass movement that it had not itself initiated. This problem was amply illustrated in early 1 9 60, when a breakaway party emerged in the shape of the Pan Africanist C ongress (PAC ) . The ANC 's Africanist foe correctly judged that it could take advantage of mounting public anger against the regime by launching its own rival campaign against the pass laws. The consequences, for the ANC and for the people of S outh Africa as a whole, were nothing short of disastrous.

Increasing violence The Sha rpevi l l e massacre a n d the decision to a d o pt the a rmed struggl e The infamous Sharpeville massacre took place on 2 1 March 1 9 6 0 , when White policemen opened fi r e on a crowd of demonstrators outside a police station at a township on the outskirts of Vereeniging, some 60 kilometres south of Johannesburg. In total, 69 unarmed demonstrators were killed, including 8 women and 1 0 children, and 1 8 6 people were inj ured. It was an event that caused shock around the world as well as within S o uth Africa . It also fundamentally altered the course of the liberation struggle. One of the main results of the massacre was the decision of the ANC to abandon its strategy of peaceful resistance to apartheid and instead embrace armed struggle . The origins of Sharpeville can be traced to the split in the ANC in 1 9 5 9 . Africanists within the ANC, with their slogan o f "Africa for the Africans", believed that best hope of liberation was through political self-reliance and a cultural focus that was rooted in African beliefs and traditions. In contrast to the non-racialism espoused by the mainstream of the movement, the Africanist believed that all of the land and wealth of S outh Africa be returned to its original, B lack, owners . The first prominent Africanist in the organization was Anton Lembede, the first president of the ANC Youth

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League, who died in 1 947. His followers included Robert Sobukwe and Potlako Leballo . These men and their supporters became progressively disillusioned with the ANC 's proximity to leading White communists and the movement's official embrace of other, non-African anti-apartheid groups through its involvement in the C ongress Alliance . They argued that the ANC , with its continued insistence on peaceful protest, lacked dynamism and militancy. The Treason Trial, which began in 1 9 5 6, had the effect of removing leaders such as Mandela and Sisulu from the day-to - day running of the organization. This allowed the Africanists, who until this point had been a relatively small group inside the ANC , the opportunity to mount a challenge from within. In 1 9 5 8, the faction came out in open opposition to the ANC 's national "stay-at-hom e " . Rather ironically, this move won them the approval of the White press, who lauded S obukwe and Leballo as the "respectable face " of Black political opinion. Matters came to a head in November 1 9 5 8, when a group of Africanists attempted to break up a provincial conference chaired by Oliver Tambo in Orlando, S oweto . When they failed to achieve this obj ective, they announced their departure from the ANC . The break away Pan Africanist C ongress (PAC ) , led b y S obukwe, was officially formed in early 1 9 5 9 . The PAC 's strategy was t o hij ack some o f campaigns launched b y the ANC . Hence, when the ANC announced in D e cember 1 9 5 9 that it planned to initiate a series of mass popular protests against the pass laws, a campaign that would culminate in a great bonfire of passes ( also called reference books ) in June 1 9 60, the PAC responded by setting the date for its own anti-pass protest for 2 1 March. This was j ust days before the planned launch of the ANC protests . As the date of the demonstrations approached, the government became increasingly edgy in a political atmosphere that grew more combustible by the day. The PAC 's plan for mass action involved thousands of protestors congregating without their reference books at police stations across the country and presenting themselves for arrest. The response of the authorities was to fortify police stations and put all police on armed alert. Despite this, the PAC was at pains to emphasize that the demonstrations would be non-violent, and S obukwe urged the protesters not to provoke the police in any way. On the morning of 2 1 March, as many as 5 , 0 0 0 demonstrators congregated in a field outside the main police station in Sharpeville . The mood was good-nature d as the crowd sang freedom songs and chanted political slogans. Large numbers of people then moved towards the fenced compound, demanding that they be permitted to enter and surrender themselves for arrest. Exactly what happened next was to be hotly disputed. Police sources alleged there was a fracas involving an armed protester and a police officer. Whatever the nature of this incident, some in the crowd surged forward to get a better look. At this point, the same police sources alleged that many protesters began to throw stones at the officers . Eyewitnesses among the survivors argued that there was no such provocation. A j ittery policeman, fearing that the station was about to be overwhelmed, then opened fire . This caused a chain reaction among his colleagues and a sustained volley of gunfire that lasted for two minutes. Dead bodies were strewn across the field in the aftermath. Almost all were found facing away from the station compound: they had clearly been shot in the back as they attempted to flee the carnage .

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Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A A report published in the left-of-centre UK newspaper, The Guardian, 22 March 1960.

"I don't know h o w many we shot, " said C olonel Pienaar, the local police commander at S harpeville . "It all started when hordes of natives surrounded the police station. My car was struck by a ston e . If they do these things they must learn their lesson the hard way. " . . . The first African was shot dead after the police had been stoned. The Africans retaliated,

causing casualties among the polic e . The police then opened fire with sub -machine guns, Sten guns, and rifles, and eye -witnesses said that the front ranks of the crowd fell like ninepins . . . D r. Verwoerd, the S outh African Prime Minister, told the House of Assembly that last night about two thousand marched through Sharpeville, kicking open the doors of peace -loving people 's homes, intimidating them and taking them on their march.

Sou rce B Protesters fleeing during the Sharpeville massacre, 2 1 March 1968.

Sou rce C An eyewitness account from Humphrey Tyler, assistant editor of Drum magazine, a popular weekly South African publication.

Drum magazine 's readers were mainly middle-class Africans living in the townships. Tyler, who was White, was the only journalist present at the Sharpeville massacre. Protestors were chanting "Izwe Lethu" which means " O ur land" or gave the thumbs up freedom salute, and shouted "Afrika" . Nobody was afraid, in actual fact they were in a cheerful mood. There were plenty of police and more ammunition than uniforms. A Pan Africanist leader approached us and said his organization and the marches were against violence and were

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demonstrating peacefully. Suddenly I heard chilling cries of "Izwe Lethu" . It sounded mainly like the voices of women. Hands went up in the famous black power salute . That is when the shooting started. We heard the clatter of machine guns one after the other. The protesters thought they were firing blanks or warning shots . One woman was hit about 1 0 yards away from our car, as she fell to the ground her companion went back to assist, he thought she had stumbled. Then he tried to pick her up, as he turned her around he saw her chest had been blown away from the hail of bullets. He looked at the blood on his hand and screamed " God, she has been shot." Hundreds of kids were running like wild rabbits, some of them were

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C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

gunned down. Shooting only stopped when no living protester was in sight.

Sou rce D Brian Martin, a lecturer in Social Science at the University of Wollongong in Australia, Justice Ignited: The Dynam ics of Backfire, pages 8-9 ( 2 00 7 ) .

T h e organizers of the rally h a d no well­ develop e d plan of a ction, nor any system of crowd control. A few crowd members had weapons, mainly sticks and knobkerrie s, club - like weapons made from saplings with roots on their ends . There was some anatagonism towards the police, but at the same time there were elements of a carnival, " happy - g o - lucky" atm o sphere . There was no plan to attack the police station . The few weapons carrie d in the crowd served to b o o s t morale rather than a i d an attack . . . At 1 . 3 0 pm, a drunk in the crowd named Geelbooi produced a small caliber pistol. A friend tried to stop him and two shots were fired into the air. At the same time, a key police

officer named Spengler stumbled. S ome in the crowd leaned forward. A constable helped Spengler to his feet. A few pebbles were thrown from the crowd and one hit the constable . The constable heard "shot" or "short" and fired. Spengler deflected the constable's shot but it was too late : the constable's shot triggered the police to fire 4000 rounds into the crowd, killing dozens of people and wounding many more .

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource A, why did the police take action against protesters at Sharp eville?

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the photograph in S ource B ?

Second q uestion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource C for historians studying the Sharpeville massacre .

Th i rd q uestion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the accounts of the S harpe ville massacre in S ources C and D .

M o s t non-White S o uth Africans w e r e outraged by what had happened. They were horrifie d not only by the massacre but also by the response of the government. Prime Minister Verwoerd seemed to embody the callousness and indifference of his government to the human suffering when he addressed a crowd of nationalist supporters shortly afterwards . He reassured them that the huge maj ority of Africans were peace -loving citizens who fully supported his policies of separate development, and that most of the protesters had been coerced into demonstrating by the ANC and the PAC . His opinion was wildly at odds with the violence and bloodshed that now threatened to engulf the country. Repeated clashes between police and protesters - at Langa near C ap e Town on the same day as Sharpeville, and at Langa and elsewhere in the country in the following days and weeks - resulted in many more fatalities. Verwo erd's response to the escalating crisis was typically bold and a state of emergency was de clared on 3 0 March 1 9 6 0 . Thousands of AN C and PAC leaders were arrested and all political gatherings were outlaw e d . O n 8 April, after passing the Unlawful O rganizations Act, the government officially bann e d the two resistance movements . As an illegal organization, the ANC was now clearly running out of options if it wishe d to continu e offering meaningful resistance to

T O K connections

E m otion, memory a n d t h e rel i a bi l ity ( or otherwise ) of eyewit ness accou nts Eyewitness accou nts a re often rega rded as an inva l u a b l e resource for h istorians. They add rich ness a n d colour to our stud y of importa nt historica l events a n d a l l ow us to glimpse proceedings through the eyes of someone who was actu a l l y present as a witness to h isto ry. The problem is that eyewitness accou nts a re based on memory, which is notoriously u n re l i a b l e . This is especially the case when we reca l l events that a re particularl y dramatic or laden with emotion a n d significance. O u r reco l l e ction of what h a p p e n e d i s often, a t least partl y, constructed. It is designed, u nconsciously or othe rwise, to fit with our genera l view of t h e world. W e tend t o exaggerate o r e m b e l l ish certain e l e m e nts that suit o u r preferred na rrative, a n d "reject" others that do not. M e mory is subjective i n that it is a mirror of our basic va l u es and assu m ptions and, in the case of important historica l events, our political sym pathies.

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apartheid. With t h e movement now completely at t h e m ercy of the state, it seemed that only viable route was to go underground and b e gin arm e d struggle against the regim e . Nelson Mandela, by now a fugitive on the run from the authorities and himself long convinced of the necessity of arm e d struggle, finally managed to p e rsuade the ANC leadership at a s e cret party congre ss in July 1 9 6 1 . B y the end of the year, the arm e d wing of the movement, Urnkhonto we S izwe ( known as MK ) had b e en create d. MK imme diately b egan its sabotage operations against the apartheid state .

Was t h e decision to adopt t h e a rmed st ruggle a d i rect resu lt of the S h a rpevi l l e m a ssacre? O n t h e one hand, i t s e e m s evident that t h e Sharpeville massacre and the decision to adopt the armed struggle were closely linked. Sharp eville marked a turning point in the history of the ANC , the moment at which more moderate figures in the leadership such as C hief Luthuli finally saw the apartheid state as incorrigibly vicious and unrepentant. Peaceful campaigns of civil disobe dience had been scorned by the authorities, who had reacted with brutal repression. The old strategies had failed pre cisely b e cause the government was prepared to use in its response all the considerable means at its disposal, and this now included the use of armed force against unarmed protesters . The ANC found itself banned and driven underground, and any lingering possibility of consultations and negotiation had now vanished. At the same time, the ANC now had a serious nationalist rival in the form of the PAC . The Pan Africanists had already created their own armed wing, Poqo, in the aftermath of the massacre . If the ANC failed to respond by launching its own armed struggle, it risked being outflanked by a rival party that had built a strong base of popular support in a very short space of tim e . O n the other hand, a n internal debate about the desirability of armed struggle had been underway for many years b efore Sharpeville. A number of younger ANC leaders who had links with the SACP and were regarded as the "firebrands" of the movement - namely Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tarnbo and Alfre d Nzo - had been toying with the idea of creating an armed wing for some tim e . As early as 1 9 5 3 , Mandela had been asked to formulate a series of contingency measures that the movement could adopt in the event of a government ban. His "M Plan" had recommended that in such circumstances the ANC should dissolve its central organization and instead create a number of small clandestine cells, before launching a full-scale guerrilla insurgency against apartheid.

The wid er sign ifica nce of the S h a rpevi l le m assacre One hugely imp ortant consequence of the Sharpeville massacre was the sea change that it brought about in global opinion. This turned decisively against S o uth Africa after the incident. The historian Torn Lodge argue s that, while the regime was strengthened in the short term by its crackdown on African nationalism, the Sharpeville massacre marked the true b eginning of the international campaign against apartheid. B ritain had already sounded a warning to S outh Africa with Harold MacMillan's "Wind of change " spe e ch in C ap e Town in F ebruary 1 9 6 0 , in which the B ritish prime minister argued that the legitimate

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nationalist aspirations of Africans would eventually have to be met. Now, after the Sharpeville massacre, the country's international isolation began in earnest. E conomic sanctions were applied for the first time, despite the refusal of S outh Africa's maj or trading partners, B ritain and the U S A, to agree to a global trade embarg o . S trong pressure from newly independent states led to S outh Africa being forced out of the B ritish C ommonwealth, its first maj o r diplomatic setback, and becoming a republic in 1 9 6 1 .

The Rivo n i a Tria l a n d the i m p riso n m e nt of the AN C leaders h i p The Rivonia Trial o f 1 9 6 3-64 was named after the suburb in northern Johannesburg where the resistance movement's " safe house " , Liliesleaf Farm, was located. This residence was used by senior leaders of the ANC and the SACP. Many of them had been on the run from the authorities since the resistance movement was driven underground in April 1 9 6 0 . When M K was established in D e cember 1 9 6 1 , the house also b ecame the operational headquarters of its high command. Following his arrest in August 1 9 6 2 , MK Chairman and "B lack Pimpernel" Nelson Mandela could no longer play his key role in organizing acts of sabotag e . Mandela had been stopp e d by police while returning to Johannesburg from D urban disguise d as a chauffeur. After a brief trial, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for leaving the country without permission and inciting strike action. MK continued to operate in his absence, with Walter Sisulu and leading White communists taking the lead. However, Liliesleaf Farm was raided by special forces in July 1 9 6 3 following a tip ­ off from a neighbour. The police found some of the remaining members of the MK high command - including Walter S isulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Lionel B ernstein, Ahm e d Kathrada, Arthur Goldreich and D enis Goldberg - studying a document titled " O p eration Mayibuye " . This was a detailed plan for a revolutionary guerrilla war t o b e waged by MK from clandestine bases in rural parts of the country. Eleven defendants including Nelson Mandela, who was taken from his cell and put on trial once again, now faced charges of treason in a case that commanded the attention of the world. The trial b egan in O ctober 1 9 6 3 . The main law under which the defendants were charge d was the S abotage Act of 1 9 6 2 . This law defined sabotage as a capital offence and the chief prosecutor, Percy Yutar, called for the death penalty. The prose cution argue d that the accused had carrie d out acts of sabotage that had endangered human life, and that they were planning to use violence to overthrow the state . From the outset, Mandela and his c o - accused agree d that they would freely admit the charge of sabotag e . However, they denied that any lives had been put at risk by their campaign . Their strategy was to politicize the trial by arguing that their struggle was morally legitimate, conducted on b ehalf of the pe ople of S outh Africa for fre e dom and democracy and against racial domination and oppression. They contended that the harsh response of the government had given them little choice but to resort to armed struggle in the pursuit of their ideals . As Mandela asserted in his opening statement from the dock:

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Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them o u r disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy. But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism . When it triumphs it will not change that policy. This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live. During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white dom ination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

It is

- Mandela, 19 6 3 The decision t o politicize the trial was very risky and the accused showed great personal courage in pursuing this strategy. Mandela could have argued that he had been in prison since the introduction of the S abotage Act in 1 962 so he could not possibly be guilty under that law. Instead, he stood by his colleagues by confirming to the court that he had continued to act as MK leader while in j ail and took personal responsibility for their acts of sabotage. E ach of the accused agreed that since they considered their trial to be political, they would not appeal the death penalty if that was to be the sentence handed down by the judge . As the trial drew to an end in June 1 9 64, hundreds of j ournalists, photographers and diplomats from around the world descended on the court building in Pretoria . By this time, an international campaign against the trial had been underway for several months, spearheaded from London by veterans of the liberation movement who had managed to elude the authorities before escaping into exile. O n 9 June, the UN S ecurity C ouncil passed a resolution calling on the government to end the trial and offer an amnesty to all of the accused. Just four countries - the USA, France, B ritain and Brazil - abstained from the vote . On 1 1 June, Justice Quartus de Wet delivered his verdict: with the exception of Lionel B ernstein, all of the accused were found guilty of all of the charges. As the ANC leaders braced themselves for a sentence of death by hanging, the defence called the famous novelist Alan Paton, president of the Liberal Party (a parliamentary party that was strongly opposed to apartheid ) , to testify in an appeal for clemency. D e spite his principled obj ection to the armed struggle, Paton argued that the j udge should spare the guilty for the good of the country. To the surprise of everyone, the judge sentenced the men to life imprisonment. Apart from D enis Goldberg, who was sent to a Whites - only prison, the guilty were immediately taken to begin their sentences at the notorious maximum security prison of Robben Island.

Conse q u e n ces of t h e Rivo n i a Tri a l The Rivonia Trial marked the end o f a n era i n the struggle against apartheid. The government had successfully broken the ANC and MK . With the exception of the still banned and physically frail C hief Luthuli,

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all of the leaders were either imprisoned or in exile . For the most part, the townships would remain quiet, if defiant, for over a decade . There would b e little to threaten the s e curity of the apartheid state until the S oweto Uprising of 1 9 7 6 . In the meantime, unprecedented numb ers of White S outh Africans would vote for the NP. Yet the ANC was not quite dead, and nor was the freedom struggle. After the Rivonia Trial, Oliver Tambo became the effective leader of the ANC in exile, working from its principle base in Lusaka, Zambia. While its effectiveness in exile has been called into question (militarily, it failed to land a single telling blow until the 1 98 0 s ) , the ANC did at least manage to remain organizationally intact and was regarded by many around the world as the legitmitate face of the anti-apartheid struggle . The ANC had been shattered in S outh Africa itself, but its imprisoned leaders were never forgotten. In particular, Nelson Mandela became an idol for the millions of S outh Africans who remained implacable opponents of the apartheid system. Meanwhile, new political movements were born and these provided renewed energy and focus for opposition: Steve B iko's South African Students' Organization ( SAS O ) and the Black C onsciousness Movement in the 1 960s and 1 97 0s, and the United D emocratic Front (UD F ) in the 1 980s. In the first major act of Black opposition since the Rivonia Trial, hundreds of thousands of workers went on strike in Durban in 1 97 3 . The strike j olted the authorities and served as a reminder of the power of organized labour and the potency of mass-based political protest. The explosion of violence that accompanied the Soweto Uprising in 1 9 7 6 marked the beginning of a dramatic new phase in the fight against apartheid. In the 1 980s, with the townships in open revolt, and with international isolation and trade sanctions wreaking havoc with the S outh African economy, the NP finally took its first tentative steps towards bringing an end to the apartheid system.

Fu l l docu ment Sou rce A An interview with Ahmed Kathrada, conducted in 2 006, in which he remembers the Rivonia Trial and his early years on Robben Island.

Kathrada was tried alongside the other ANC leaders and sentenced to life imprisonment. The very first night of our sentence they woke us up and handcuffed us. I was bound with leg irons to Govan Mbeki. They didn't even trust us on the airplane . Govan Mbeki got sick on the plane . They wouldn't even release the leg irons and I had to accompany him to the toilet. B ut that's the type of thing they were doing . They built up this fear until they started believing it themselves . I mean, what could we do on that plan e ? Van Wyk [ C aptain Van Wyk, the p olice offi c e r who carried o u t the arrests at

Rivonia and w a s a witn e s s at the trial] had told m e , " Yo u 'll only s e rv e five years . " B u t o n Robben Island, the h e a d o f prison s e cu rity . . . said "In five years' tim e , n o b o dy is going to know the n a m e Mandela . " And they tri e d to do that. Newspapers w e r e not allo w e d to publish anything, p h otographs and articl e s ab o u t p o litical pris o n e r s were n o t all o w e d . . . They did e ve rything p o s sible to induce this amnesia among p e ople - but they failed, o f cours e . O u r leaders were ab solutely exceptional ­ Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Mhlab a . Right from the word go, they had said, " C hap s, we are now prisoners . We are not leaders. We don't make policy. We don't send instructions. The ANC exists outside, O liver Tamb o . . . and C hief Luthuli, tho s e are our leaders, they make policy. "

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-. 71

Sou rce B Yusuf D adoo (chairman of the SAIC and SACP member) and Joe Slovo (a leading figure in the SACP) leading a demonstration against the Rivonia Trial, London, 1 9 6 3 .

SA V£ S I S UL MANDEL FROM RPRRTHCJD GAll

white man among some 45 persons hanged for politically inspired acts of violence since 1 9 6 0 . Such violence was a last flickering o f protest. White South Africa, confident that it faced no dangerous challenge from the United States or other Western states, was facing a period in which white strength was to be consolidated rather than undermined and white initiatives to enlist black collaboration and compliance were to be accelerated. Meanwhile, Luthuli's bitter verdict on Rivonia stood: sentencing "brave just men . . . to be shut away for long years in the brutal and degrading prisons of S outh Africa . . . will leave a vacuum in leadership, " he said. "With them will be interred [buried] this country's hopes for racial co - operation. "

Sou rce D D . D avis and M. Le Roux. Preceden t and Possibility: The (Ab) use of Law in South Africa, pages 5 6-5 7 (2009 ) .

Sou rce C T. Karis and G. Gerhart, professors of political science at the City University of New York and Columbia University respectively. From Protest to Challenge: A documentary history of South African politics in South Africa, 1 882-64. Vol 3 . Challenge and Violence, 1 953-64, page 684 ( 1977).

The ending of the Rivonia trial did not appear to stir white public opinion. The press praised the police, the prosecutor, and the j udge, and evidence of effective security contributed to growing white complacency and support for the government. Within a week of the sentencing, four incidents of sabotage were reported, probably the work of the mainly white African Resistance Movement. Within a month or so, the police had smashed this idealistic and heroic but ineffectual group . Most devastating, however, was the political blow to Alan Paton and the Liberal Party when it was discovered that Liberals were among the members of ARM . O n July 24 whites reacted with horror to the news that a bomb had exploded in the white section of the Johannesburg railroad station, killing one old woman and inj uring some two dozen others . John Harris, a Liberal who had j oined ARM but had broken its basic rule against inj uring human beings, was found guilty of the bombing. He became the first

72

The S outh African government's few foreign friends appeared to adopt a . . . position of pragmatic support for the sentence . Anthony S ampson relates that the B ritish ambassador to S outh Africa, Mr Hugh Stephenson, informe d the B ritish foreign s e cretary, Rab B utler : "We would be thankful that the j u dge did not give a death sentence b e cause it means that a leader of the caliber of Nelson Mandela with his credentials enhanced by a term of imprisonment, should b e available for the dialogue between black and white which must eventually take place in S outh Africa . " The evidence given b y Paton and the comments of S tephenson indicate d that there were many outside of the ANC camp who recognise d how important . . . Mandela, Sisulu and the other leaders . . . would b e to a future S outh Africa. But at the time, it was not how white S outh Africa saw the picture . The prevailing white attitude was well illustrated in an e ditorial in the Sunday Times: "For the p eople of S outh Africa the prevailing lesson of Rivonia is that violence as a political weapon must be discarded once and for all . . . Any reasonable assessment of the forces available leads to this conclusion. Meanwhile, the damage done in the hardening of white attitu des is incalculable . . . "

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

The j udgement in the Rivonia trial was used by politicians to bolster attitudes against the ANC for more than two decades . . . As white attitudes hardened, so black leaders b egan to challenge, with growing intensity, the censure of their political struggle as violent, communist and criminal activity.

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource A, why were the leaders of the ANC put on trial and given life sentences in 1 9 64?

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of S ource B ?

Second q uestion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource C for historians studying the impact of the Rivonia Trial.

Th i rd q uestion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the views presented in S ources C and D concerning reactions to the Rivonia Trial.

Fou rt h q u estion - 9 m a rks Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the claim that the main consequence of the Rivonia Trial was "a period in which white strength was consolidated" ?

Communication, thinking, research and social skills

I n small groups use the sou rces in this chapter, a nd/or othe r sources you find online, to draft your own version of a paper 1 examination. •

You wil l need fou r sources.

•

One source will need to be a non-text source, such as a photograph, cartoon or statistics.

•

You need to ensure that the total word count of your sou rces does not exceed 7 5 0 words.

You cou ld use the following q uestions to help refine the "theme" of the paper.

1. Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the claim that the Defiance Ca mpaign failed to achieve the objective of turning the ANC i nto a mass movement against apartheid?

2. U s i n g the sou rces and your own knowledge, evaluate the impact of the COP and the Freedom Charter in the development of a nti-a partheid resista nce.

3. Using the sou rces and your own knowledge, assess the reasons why bus boycotts were such a n effective means of protest against the apartheid system.

4. Using the sou rces and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the claim that the ANC adopted the armed struggle as a d i rect result of the Sharpevi l l e massacre?

5. Using the sou rces and your own knowledge, exa mine the reasons why the ANC leaders were not sentenced to death at the Rivonia Tria l in 1 9 64.

Refe re n ces C allinicos, L . 2 0 0 4 . Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains. C ap e Town, S outh Africa. D avid Philip Publishers. D avis, D and Le Roux, M . 2 0 0 9 . Precedent and Possibility: The (Ab) use of Law in South Africa . Johannesburg, S outh Africa. D o uble Story Publishers . Hirson, B . 1 9 8 8 . "The D e fiance C ampaign, 1 9 5 2 : S o cial struggle or party stratagem ? " Searchlight South Africa, Vol 1 , number 1 Karis, T and Gerhart, G. 1 9 7 7 . From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of Sou th African Politics in South Africa, 1 882-64 . Vol 3 . Challenge and Vio lence, 1 953-64 . S tanford, C A, USA. Hoover Institution Pres s . Lodge, T. 1 98 3 . Black Politics in South Africa Since 1 945. London, U K . Longman. Martin, B . 2 0 0 7 . Justice Ign ited: The Dynam ics of Backfire Sisulu, E . 2 0 0 2 . Walter and A lbertina Sisulu : In Our Lifetime. C ap e Town, S outh Africa. D avid Philip Publishers.

73

S o u rce h e l p a n d h i nts

Sou rce B

Sou rce A

Baruch Hirson, a White South African political activist and historian, "The D efiance Campaign, 1 9 5 2: Social struggle or party strategem? " in Searchlight South Africa. Vol 1 , number 1 ( 1 988 ) .

Defiance Campaign resister arrests by region in 1 9 5 2 . Region

Defiance Campaign register arrests,

1952

East Ca pe

5,941

Tra nsvaa l

1,578

West Ca pe

490

Orange Free State

125

Natal National tota l

The repeal of the six laws i n 1 9 5 2 would have been a remarkable victory for the C ongresses, but it did not envisage [foresee] any fundamental change in land holding, or in the country's economy . . . As the C ampaign unfolded many of the original issues were seemingly forgotten. The C oloured votes ceased to b e a factor in the C ampaign - and the Bulletins of the C ampaign were brought out in the names of the ANC and the SAI C , with no reference to the FrAC . There was little response from the C oloured community to the call for defiance, despite the claim that the C oloureds were ready for a fight . . . Finally, it was claime d that . . . the campaign marked a turning point in the history of S outh Africa, and provided the ANC with a mass base. The first contention is debatable and the s e cond requires scrutiny [examination] . In comparison with the pre - 1 9 5 2 showing of the ANC , there was a decided change in the ANC presence, at least in the town s . However, it seems to have been much less than usually claimed.

192 8,326

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of S ource A? Examiner's hint: To answer this question, you need to work out what you can from the table. In this case, you can find out the following information. •

The D e fiance C ampaign involved "resisters" who courted arrest by the authorities .

•

It was a nationwide campaign .

•

Thousands of resisters were involved in the campaign and more than 8 , 0 0 0 pe ople were arrested .

•

The campaign was stronger in some areas (in the E ast C ape, for instance ) than in others (Natal, the O range Free S tate and West C ap e ) . Examiner's hint: Questions about statistical data require you simply to interpret the statistics. You should resist the temptation to read your own knowledge in to your answers. For example, in answering the above question you should not conclude that the Defiance Campaign was more successful in the Eastern Cape because it was a traditional ANC stronghold, or in the Transvaal because Johannesburg was the operational headquarters of the organization .

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource B , why did the D efiance C ampaign fail to achieve its political obj e ctives? Examiner's hint: You need to find th ree clear poin ts in the source to answer the First question, part a on the document paper. It is a good idea to underline or h ighlight these poin ts, when you first read the source, before writing them out. •

The D efiance C ampaign never b e came a mass movement b e cause it was too superficial, focusing only on the six "unj ust laws " . It failed to address the real concerns of poor B lack S outh Africans, such as land ownership and White domination of the economy. --

74

·

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

..

•

The campaign failed to exploit C oloured resentment of apartheid and instead focused on issues concerning the B lack and Indian populations . The role of the mainly C oloured FrAC was ignored.

•

The author was active in the anti- apartheid movement during the period. He would have known many of those who were involved in the D e fiance C ampaign personally, and may well have interviewed some of them for his article .

•

The campaign failed to e stablish a significant presence for the ANC outside of the main cities, despite claims to the contrary.

•

The author presents a critical view of the D efiance C ampaign and examines its failings, unlike many historians who simply pro claim it as a landmark moment in the history of the struggl e .

•

The source seems incredibly detailed, with a reference to the bulletins published by the D efiance C ampaign . This suggests that it was meticulously researched.

Second q u estion

-

4 m a rks

With reference to its origin, purp o s e and content, assess the value s and limitations of S o urce B for historians studying the D efiance C ampaign . Examiner's hint: The question is asking you to evaluate the author 's work. It is important that you look carefully at the title of the work and its date of publication, as well as any clues about the author from the information provided.

Li m itations •

As a Marxist, Hirson may be too focused on economic factors in history. In the first part of the extract he refers to land ownership and other economic factors, and he berates the AN C for its lack of radicalism in not basing its campaign on these issu e . He fails to acknowledge the many other ways in which the D efiance C ampaign was radical and ambitious .

•

As someone who b e came disillusioned with the strategies of the liberation movement in the 1 9 5 0 s, Hirson may well have been preoccupied with the failings of the campaign . This may have sto o d in the way of a more balanced analysis. The content of the source, which is on the whole negative and p e ssimistic, would seem to confirm this.

•

The boycott spread from Alexandra to other centres and b ecame a nationwide protest.

•

The boycott confounded expe ctations by continuing for over thre e month s .

•

Newspapers published for Whites carried sympathetic articles about the protesters and White motorists assisted the marchers .

•

The government eventually responded to the pressure of the boycott by providing subsidies for bus fare s . C ancelling the fare increases is pre cisely what the protesters had demanded . ..

Va l ues •

•

Written by a professional historian, the source is a scholarly article focusing exclusively on the D efiance C ampaign. Unlike many of the secondary sources available, it is not a general survey of the apartheid period, or of Black politics as a whole during the liberation struggle . It was written in 1 9 8 8 , towards the end of the apartheid era. It therefore has the benefit of hindsight. The author was also able to make use of the ground-breaking research on B lack politics ( such as the books by Peter Walshe and Tom Lodge ) produced in the 1 9 7 0 s and 1 9 8 0 s .

Sou rce s ki l l s ( S e e page 6 4 . )

Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to the source, in what ways was the Alexandra bus boycott of 1 9 5 7 a success? Examiner's hint: Remember that you need to find three clear poin ts in the source to answer the First question, part a on the document paper. Any three of the following poin ts wou ld be acceptable.

75

..

Sou rce A

•

The crowd threw stones at the police and the police responded with gunfire, to "teach them a lesson " .

•

After the initial shot was fired, the crowd retaliated by attacking the p olice . The p o lice then responded in order to defend themselve s .

•

Acco rding to Verwo erd, the protesters at S harpeville had behaved aggressively towards "pe ace - loving p e ople " . The implication is that strong police a ction was require d in order to contain the situation .

( S ee page 6 7 . )

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource A, why did the police take action against protesters at Sharp eville ? Examiner's hint: Don 't spend any more time on answering a 3 -mark question than is absolutely necessary; you receive 1 mark for each poin t that you make, not for the style ofyou r answer. Here are three reasons you m ight give.

Sou rce B Protesters fleeing during the Sharpeville massacre, 2 1 March 1 9 6 0 .

Fi rst q u estion p a rt b - 2 m a rks

•

The crowd, which contains many women, appears to b e well dressed and resp e ctable .

•

There is no indication that any of the protesters are arm e d .

What is the message of the photograph in S ource B ? Examiner's hint: When you have a visual source, annotate it to help you pick out the key poin ts. Here are some poin ts you m ight make about the message of this photograph . •

•

76

The crowd at Sharpeville was fired upon by the police, some of whom appear to have taken up elevated positions. The maj ority of the protesters were clearly attempting to fle e the scene after the shooting started .

Sou rce C ( S e e page 6 7 . )

Second q uestion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the value s and limitations of S ource C for historians studying the Sharpeville massacre . Examiner's hint: The following values and lim itations wou ld be relevant in your answer.

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

..

Va l ues •

Humphrey Tyler was the only reporter present at the massacre . This means that his testimony is of immense value to historians . His account is especially important b e cause it represents an alternative account to the official version of what happ ened. It also went some way towards moulding the public perception of the Sharpeville massacre at the tim e .

•

As a j ournalist, Tyler offers a dramatic and colourful account of the events of the massacre . He also provides a wealth of detail for the historian, as he is someone with j ournalistic training and experience .

•

Tyler manages to convey the sheer horror of the massacre . This factor is often missing from more sober scholarly accounts of imp ortant historical events .

Examiner's hint: You should attempt to find at least six poin ts of sim ilarity and difference in your answer. Ideally there should be th ree of each in you r answer but i t isn 't always possible to achieve this balance, so a breakdown offou r comparisons to two contrasts, or vice versa, is acceptable. Try to keep up a clear runn ing commentary between the two sources throughout your answer.

Co m p a risons •

B oth sources stress that there was no plan to attack the police station.

•

B oth sources stress the festive atmosphere in the crowd.

•

B oth sources indicate that there were many fataliti e s . S ource C mentions that the police stopped firing when "no living protester was in sight" . S ource D m entions the " dozens of p e ople " who were killed.

Li m itations •

The events witnessed by Tyler were traumatic and distressing. For instance, he describes a woman whose chest was "blown away by a hail of bullets " . This may well have influenced his ability to recollect the exact nature and sequence of what happened.

•

There is no mention of Tyler's location in the crowd during the protest. It is unlikely that he was anywhere near the front. As a result, he may not have witnessed any altercation b etween the police and protesters, and the result is that this aspect of the massacre is missing from his account.

•

Tyler was the assistant editor of Drum magazine, a publication that was strongly opposed to the apartheid system. His impartiality as an eyewitness to the massacre might therefore be called into question. S ome of the heavily emotive language used in his report, such as "kids running round like wild rabbits", would suggest that this may be the case.

Sou rce D ( S e e page 6 7 . )

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the accounts of the Sharpeville massacre in S ources C and D .

Cont rasts •

S ource C stresses a political element in the protests (political chanting, B lack power salutes ) but maintains that the demonstrations were p eaceful. There is no mention of a political dimension in S ource D .

•

S ource D argu e s that there was no o rganization or crowd control. Indeed, the author stre s s e s that there was " n o well - develo p e d p l a n of a ctio n " . S ource C d e s crib e s the presence of a Pan Africanist ( obviou sly pr e s ent a s an o rganiz e r ) who informs the j ournalist that the protest was e ntirely p e aceful.

•

S ource C indicates that the protesters were unarmed. S ource D mentions knobkerries and a pistol.

•

S ource C suggests that the gunfire from the p olice was unprovoked, or that it was in response to political slogans from the protesters . S ource D mentions a drunk who fired a pistol shot and p ebbles thrown from the crowd, as well as " some antagonism towards the police " . It also suggests that the p olice may have opened fire b e cause they panicke d. ------

· 77

..

Sou rce A

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks

( S ee page 7 3 . )

What is the message of S ource B ?

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource A, why were the leaders of the ANC put on trial and given life sentences in 1 9 64? Examiner's hint: You need to make th ree clear points. Here are some examples. •

•

•

The apartheid authorities had started to believe their own propaganda. They feared the ANC leaders, seeing them as dangerous criminals who had to be imprisoned for the rest of their lives. Imprisoning the ANC leaders would mean that they would soon b e forgotten by the outside world. Having been imprisoned, the " exceptional" leaders of the ANC were no longer in a position to dictate policy or otherwise contribute to the party.

Examiner's hint: Remember that annotating a visual source can help you to identify key points about its message. •

The lives of the 1 1 accused at the Rivonia Trial are in danger.

•

An international camp aign against the Rivonia Trial in p articular, and against apartheid in g e n e ral, was alr e a dy u n d e rway in 1 9 6 3 .

•

S enior leaders such as Yusuf D adoo and Joe S lovo have managed to escape into exile and are now leading this campaign .

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks ( S ee page 7 3 . ) C ompare and contrast the views presented in S ources C and D concerning reactions to the Rivonia Trial.

Sou rce B

Examiner's hint: You should attempt to find at least six poin ts of sim ilarity and difference in your answer. If it isn 't possible to achieve three of each in your answer, a breakdown offou r comparisons to two contrasts, or vice versa, is acceptable. Try to keep up a clear running commen tary between the two sources throughout you r answer.

Yusuf D adoo (chairman of the SAIC and SACP member) and Joe Slovo (a leading figure in the SACP) leading a demonstration against the Rivonia Trial, London, 1 9 6 3

Co m p a risons •

B oth sources indicate that, on the whole, the Rivonia Trial resulted in a hardening of White attitu d e s and increasing levels of support for the NP government from the White community.

•

B oth sources indicate that there were reservations about the government's hardline approach from some in the White community. S ource D m entions Alan Paton and quotes the comments of the S outh African ambassador to B ritain, who hoped that the imprisoned ANC leadership could be u s e d for the purp o s e s of political reconciliation in the future . S ource C also refers to Paton and mentions that some members of his party were p art of the ARM .

-------

78

-.

C H AP T E R 1 . 3 : P R O T E S T S AND A C T I O N

..

•

B oth sources suggest that the authorities had little to fear from the reaction of the international community. S ource C mentions that it faced "no dangerous challenge", while S ource D makes reference to the "pragmatic support" of the British. However, Source D does concede that South Africa now has "few foreign friends" .

Cont rasts •

S ource C describ e s a fatal bombing carried out by the ARM and the response of the authorities to this attack. D e spite the mention of Alan Paton, S ource D does not go into the detail of these events .

•

S o urce D m e ntions that B lack leaders eventually r o s e to challenge the o ffi cial censure o f th eir struggle in the aftermath o f the Rivonia Trial. S ource C quotes C hief Luthuli, but only in the context o f his d e sp air at the s e ntencing .

•

S ource D holds out the prospect of inter­ racial cooperation in the future . S ource C is altogether more pessimistic about S outh Africa's prospects after the Rivonia Trial.

Second q u estion

-

•

L i m itations •

The chronological cut- off for the study is 1 9 6 4 . It is unlikely that there will b e a thorough assessment of the impact of the Rivonia Trial in the longer term.

•

The s o u r c e w a s written in 1 9 7 7 . At this p o int, the apartheid system still app e a r e d to b e alive and w e ll, d e spite t h e start o f the S owe t o Uprising a year e a rlier, and s o m e o f t h e longer-term ramifications o f t h e trial and imp ris onment of the ANC l e a d e r s h a d n o t y e t b e co m e e v i d e n t . The p e s simistic tone o f the extract may have b e e n v e ry diffe rent h a d it b e e n written a d e c a d e o r s o later, w h e n t h e aparth e i d system w a s unravellin g .

•

As a related point, the source focu s e s entirely on t h e negative consequences of the Rivonia Trial for the re sistance movement. It sugge sts that S outh Africa was entering into a long p e riod of political darkn e s s from which it has yet to emerge . There is no mention of growing international opp o sition to apartheid, the full imp act of which only b e came evident after 1 9 7 7 .

4 m a rks

( S e e page 7 3 . ) With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource C for historians studying the impact of the Rivonia Trial. Examiner's hint: Here are some examples of the values and lim itations of the source that could be used to answer this question .

Va l ues •

S ou rce C c o m e s from a thre e - volume s u rv e y o f the p o litical history o f S o uth Africa . Its p u rp o s e is to provide a comprehen sive r e c o r d and analysis of the history o f the co untry from a p o litical p e r s p e ctiv e , for use by stu d e nts a s well a s historian s . It is writte n by renowned academics and the likeliho o d is that h a s been very w e ll r e s e arch e d u s ing an ab undance o f supp o rting historical d etail .

The fact that S ource C is a documentary history means that the historians will have a wealth of primary source materials to study.

Fou rt h q u estion

-

9 m a rks

( S ee page 7 3 . ) Using the sources and your own knowle dge, to what extent do you agree with the claim that the main consequence of the Rivonia Trial was " a period in which white strength was consolidated" ? Examiner's hint: Here are some of the poin ts made in the sources that would help you answer the question. •

S o urce A : The attempts of the authoritie s to "induce amn e s i a " ab o u t the impris o n e d ANC l e a d e r s w e r e a failure . T h i s m e ant that the government's efforts to erase the struggle from the minds of B lack S o uth Africans would u ltimately prove futil e . T h e ANC leaders w e r e in prison a n d

79

could n o t m a k e p o licy, which obviou sly strengthe n e d White minority rule . However, the ANC continu e d to function de spite the impris onment o f its leaders, through Alb ert Lithuli in S outh Africa and O liver Tamb o , in exile, in Zambia. •

•

•

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S ource B : An international campaign h a s b e e n launch e d against apartheid S o uth Africa. This obviously put pressure on the government. S enior leaders of the struggle were dire cting this campaign and they continued to b e thorns in the side of the authorities, even in exile . S ource C : White S o uth Africans did not turn against the government as a re sult of the trial. The few Whites who had opp o s e d t h e trial w e r e compromise d as a result of the asso ciation of the Lib e ral Party with the ARM . International opp o sition was muted, espe cially in the USA and other We stern countrie s . The ANC had been left devoid of senior leaders . S ource D : White S o uth Africans were opp o s e d to the violence of arm e d struggle and so sympathized with the government. D e spite the apparent hardening of attitudes, some influential White S o uth Africans held out the prospect of a reconciliation b e twe e n the government and th e imprisoned ANC leaders in the not- s o - distant future . S outh Africa had b e come diplomatically isolated as a re sult of the trial and B lacks were increasingly angry at the government's depiction of their struggle as violent. This would have signifi cant repercussions for White minority rule in the future .

Examiner's hint: The following are some points you could include from your own knowledge. •

The organizational structure of the ANC had been effectively destroyed as a result of the trial, and this obviously strengthened White power. While the resistance movement continued to op erate in exile, its impact was very limited and it failed to make any significant dents in minority rule .

•

The Rivonia Trial and the imprisonment of the ANC leaders created a great deal of anger and resentment in the township s . This simmered for s everal years before exploding in the S oweto Uprising in 1 9 7 6 . This marked the beginning of a new stage of acute crisis for the apartheid system, which would eventually result in its unravelling .

•

The ANC leaders became legendary figures as a result of their imprisonment, and remembered and revered by the huge maj ority of B lack S outh Africans .

•

New resistance movements such as S teve B iko's SAS O and the B lack C onsciousness Movement emerged to replace the ANC .

•

A huge international campaign against apartheid was launch e d during the Rivonia Trial. This continu e d afterwards and intensified in the 1 9 7 0 s and 1 9 8 0 s . The plight of the impriso n e d leaders b e came a maj or focus of this glob al attention . The campaign re sult e d in trade sanctions and the s e led to maj o r e conomic problems which ultimately undermin e d the b a sis of White rule in S outh Africa .

nderstanding Key con cepts Causation Significa nce Key qu estions What was the impact o f key groups such a s the Africa n National Congress (AN C] , the South Africa n Com m u nist Pa rty (SACP) and U n khonto we Sizwe [known as M K) between 1 948 and 1 9 64? To what extent were the key groups successfu l i n their opposition t o t h e apartheid system? How important was the rol e of key individ uals such as Albert Luthu l i and N e lson Mandela? Alfred Xuma is replaced by James Moroka as ANC Secreta ry Genera l T h e Youth League mounts a coup against the ANC old gua rd as the party adopts the Progra m m e of Action Nelson Mandela is appointed volunteer­ in-chief of the Defiance Campaign

The ANC launches the Resist Apartheid Campaign The ANC and SACP come together in the Congress of the People (COP) The ANC annou nces a boycott of schools in protest at the Bantu Education Act

���--1���---

The ANC launches the "May Day stay-at­ home"; 18 people are killed by the police The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) is declared illegal under the Suppression of Communism Act M o ro ka is re placed b y Chief Al b e rt Luth u l i as A N C Secretary G e n e ra l Luth u l i a n d M a n d e l a a re issued with gove rn m e nt b a n n i n g ord e rs fo r their i nvolve m e nt i n d e fiance The CPSA is reconstituted as the South Africa n Co m m u n ist Pa rty (SACP) The A N C a d o pts a "Pl a n of economic adva n c e m e nt" The Treason Tria l begins

There is a split in the ANC as Robert Sobukwe and fellow Africa nists leave the party

Luthuli burns his passbook in protest at the Sharpevi l l e massacre The ANC is driven underground

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The Treason Tria l colla pses Mandela addresses the All-in African Conference

Mandela is arrested and imprisoned

Mandela goes underground as the "Black Pimpernel" Luthuli travels to Oslo to accept the Nobel Peace Prize Mandela and others persuade the ANC to adopt the armed struggle; M K begins operations

Mahatma G a n d h i i n South Africa . Gandhi a rrived in South Africa in 1 8 9 3 at the age of 24, to act as a l ega l representative to the Indian trading commu nity in Pretoria. H owever, he soon experienced racial discrimination first­ hand [most fa mously, he was forcibly ejected from a tra i n because he refused to move from a segregated first-class compartment) a n d beca m e a n increasingly outspoken critic o f t h e authorities, founding the Natal Indian Congress in 1 894. Nonetheless, he vol u nteered for the British and raised a corps of Indian stretcher­ bearers when the South African Wa r broke out i n 1899. It was a round this time that he rea lized that the mighty British Empire could only be defeated by Satyagraha, or truthfu l , nonviolent protest. H e spent the remainder o f his t i m e in South Africa refi ning Satyagraha, both as a philosophy and as a politica l strategy. H e led protests against the i ntroduction of compu lsory identity cards for I ndians by publicly burning his documents, and u rged his followers to wi l l i ngly submit to the violence meted out by the police in reta liation. H e earned t h e grudging respect and admiration o f Smuts for h i s convictions and h i s fea rlessness. H is fame and reputation grew, and in 1 9 1 5 he was invited back to I ndia to take part in that cou ntry's independence movement against the British. While his attitude towa rds Africa ns was complex [he a rgued that I ndians should not be subjected to the same discriminatory policies as Blacks] , he is today rega rded by many as one of the earl y heroes of the freedom struggle.

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-� ·

U m khonto we Sizwe [ M K) plans Operation Mayibuye; mem bers of its H igh Command a re a rrested

1111------ begins its period in exile --� ��

ANC leaders a re i mp risoned; the ANC

The Africa n National Congress (AN C) Fo rmatio n and early histo ry The African National C ongre s s (AN C ) was the dominant force in the African nationalist opp o sition to the apartheid system in the p e ri o d b e tw e e n 1 9 4 8 and 1 9 6 4 . The p arty was founded a s the S ou th African Native National C ongr e s s ( S ANN C ) at a conference in B l o emfontein in 1 9 1 2 . Prominent members o f t h e B lack community had re c o gniz e d t h e n e e d for a nationwide p arty that could e ffe ctively represent the interests o f Africans after the creation o f a Union of S o uth Africa in 1 9 1 0 . It was by now obvi o u s that union m e ant the p e rmanent exclusion and subordination o f Africans, and the l e a d e rs of the B lack community re aliz e d that they could n o t j u st stand by and accept this fate . The i d e a of creating a n o n - White p arty opp o sing racial discrimination was n o t new. Mahatma Gandhi had founded the Natal Indian C ongre s s in 1 8 9 4 , while Ab dullah Ab durahman created the African P e o p l e 's O rganization (a C ol o u r e d p arty ) in 1 9 0 2 . As the S outh African National C onvention n e g o tiated union in 1 9 0 8 and 1 9 0 9 , b o th o f the s e p arti e s , having r e c o gniz e d the c o n s e q u e n c e s for n o n - Whit e s o f a new national g o v e rnment dominat e d by Afrikaner interests, camp aign e d strongly against it. D elegates at the first SANNC conference in B l o emfontein were part of a tiny elite of middle - class B lack professionals . The first pre sident, John D ub e , was an ordain e d minister and scho olteacher. O ther leading members inclu d e d Pixley S em e , a C olumbia and Oxford - e ducated lawyer, and S olomon T Plaatj e , a court translator a n d newspap e r e ditor. From t h e outset, the S ANNC was a p olitically m o derate organization . It worked on the assumption that Africans had benefited in many ways from B ritish colonial rule, not least through C hristian evangelization and edu cation . It app ealed to what it b e lieved were the true B ritish traditions of lib eralism and paternalism, and contended that the b e s t hope for Africans was to p e rsuade White opinion

C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

that B lack p e ople were civilize d and r e sp e ctable, and therefore worthy of greater political inclusion. The strategy of the SANNC was to work with lib eral White p o liticians in attempting to reverse the tide of segregation, and to p e tition politicians in London ( S outh Africa was still formally part of the B ritish E mpire even after 1 9 1 0 ) by arguing that the actions of the union government were a b e trayal of B ritain's colonial traditions of promoting the w elfare of Africans and its valu e s of decency a n d fair play. This strategy did not work out as planned. A delegation was sent to London in 1 9 1 4 to protest the Natives Land Act of 1 9 1 3 , but was informed by the colonial secretary that he was powerless to act. Another deputation was sent all the way back to London in 1 9 1 9, only to be told by Prime Minister D avid Lloyd George that the SANNC should return home and negotiate directly with the Smuts government in Pretoria . This response should not have come as a surprise . Smuts was by now a statesman of considerable international standing: he was a leading delegate at the peace conferences in Paris and would soon play a key role in the creation of the League of Nations.

.A. The SAN N C delegation to London i n 19 14. J o h n D u b e is seated i n the centre with Solomon T

Plaatje on the right

Following the se setbacks, the SANN C fell into a state of abeyance . Its leadership was dominate d by traditional and conservative figure s . The initiative in African politics passed to a more radical and energetic organization in the form of Clements Kadalie's Industrial and C ommercial Workers' Union (IC U ) . The ANC ( it changed its name from the SAC C P to the ANC in 1 9 2 2 ) enj oyed a brief revival in the late 1 9 2 0 s under the more assertive left-wing leadership of Josiah Gumede, but this was followe d by another long p eriod of dormancy in the 1 9 3 0 s, as many Africans suffered severe economic hardship due to the effects of the Great D epression and politics took a back seat. The ANC was viewed, by poor urban Africans in particular, as elitist and out of touch, and its membership shrank to just a few thousand. This p erception of elitism continue d to b e a problem for the ANC well into the 1 9 5 0s . The S e cond World War brought about a dramatic revival i n the ANC 's fortune s . The S outh African manufacturing industry boomed and large numbers of Africans flooded into the cities. New trade unions such as the African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU ) were created, many

83

under the tutelage of the C o mmunist Party of S outh Africa ( C PSA) . A number of the s e were also affiliated to the ANC , as the organization finally b egan to acknowledge the potential of the B lack working class as a political force . An ANC Youth League was formed in 1 944 with Anton Lembede as its first president. Leading members included Walter S isulu, O liver Tambo and Nelson Mandela. The emergence of this new generation of leaders marked a break in the strategy as well as the comp osition of the movement. The Youth League rej e cted the cautious, constitutional approach of the old guard, and instead embraced a more assertive, thrusting political stance . Gone forever was the tried and failed strategy of lobbying and attempting to negotiate with the authorities from a p osition of weaknes s . In its place, finally, was the acknowledgment that Africans could not depend on goodwill from the archite cts of the very system that discriminated against them, but could only look to themselves for their liberation. As Nelson Mandela put it, " the ANC was not going to rely on a change of heart. It was going to exert pressure to compel the authorities to grant its demands . " I n line with its n e w strategy of reaching o u t t o ordinary S outh Africans, the party began to forge links with squatters' groups and community organizations, with trade unions and other centres of opposition to the government. The Youth League drew up a radical Programme of Action, which included proposals for mass strike action and other acts in defiance of the authorities . By the time of the apartheid election of 1 948, the ANC was a movement transform e d . With members of the Youth L e ague at the fore, it was a party that had placed itself in a much stronger po sition to challenge the imp o sition of a new, altogether harsher racial order.

After 1948 T h e A N C acted quickly i n t h e w a k e of t h e nationalist victory. The ineffectual president - general, Alfre d Xuma, was replaced by the more dynamic James Moroka in 1 94 9 , as the Youth League mounted a successful coup against the old guard. This move was accompanie d by the ANC 's official adoption of the Programme of Action . The party was galvanize d as a result, as it enj oyed a spike in membership . It was obvious that increasing numbers of Africans, though by no means all, regarded the movement as the legitimate voice of the p e ople . B uoyed by these events, the party announced a series of o n e - day general strike s i n response to the quick succe ssion of n e w apartheid laws . A "May D ay stay - at-home " in 1 9 5 0, organized in conj unction with the S outh African C ommunist Party ( SA C P ) in response to the S uppression of C ommunism Act, was particularly successful. About half of the B lack workers of Johannesburg refused to go to work. However, the strike also offered an early indication of the sort of response that the ANC would come to exp e ct from the apartheid government: arm e d police were used to fire on protesters and 1 8 p e ople were killed. Flash o n e - day strikes, calle d at short notice and in response to breaking political developments, would b e a weapon that the lib eration movement would use time and again in the years to com e .

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C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A

Sou rce 8

E. Sisulu, a Zimbabwean writer and human rights activist. She is the daughter-in-law of former ANC leader Walter Sisulu, and his biographer. Walter and A lbertina Sisulu: In O u r Lifetime, pages 1 2 5-2 6 ( 2 002 ).

B. Bunting, a South African journalist, political activist and a member of the SACP. Moses Kotane: South African Revolu tionary ( 1 998).

Mandela was one of those who opp osed the May D ay strike and argue d with Walter [ Sisulu] that the ANC should concentrate on its own campaign . . . There was indee d substantial supp ort for the strike, and it is estimated that half the African workforce on the Witwatersrand heeded the call to stay at home on 1 May, 1 9 5 0 . . . A heavy p olice contingent was deployed and meetings and gatherings were banned for the day. O n the evening of the strike, 1 9 p e ople were killed and over 30 inj ured in clashes with the polic e . Walter and Mandela almost found themselves on the casualty list. They were watching protestors marching in O rlando West when a group of p olicemen fired in their direction. They flung themselves to the ground as mounted police gallop e d into the crowd, lashing out with batons . . . Walter's personal experience of the May D ay strikes demonstrated to him the value of thinking carefully about strategy and tactics before embarking on militant action.

Meanwhile, preparations went ahead for May 1 st to b e celebrated as a People 's Holiday ­ b eing a Monday this meant a one- day strik e . N o t all t h e elements i n t h e A N C w e r e happy about this . . . The May l st demonstration was a huge success, and the Rand's industries came to a standstill when about 8 0 per cent of the black workers remained at home in response to the C o nvention's call. But the police resorted to brutal reprisals, breaking up every gathering of more than 1 2 p eople and towards evening the repeated provocations and terrorism of the police inevitably culminated in violence, at least 1 8 p eople being killed and an unknown number injured by police bullets . [In the aftermath of the massacre] the ANC executive decided to launch a campaign for a national day of protest.

Th i rd q uestion

-

6 m a rks

C ompare and contrast the accounts presented in S ources A and B of the "May D ay stay - at-home" strike in 1 9 5 0 .

B y 1 9 5 2 , however, it had b e come obviou s t o the ANC leadership that irregular strike action was no longer generating the desired political traction. The circumstances demanded a new, more coordinated strategy of continuous resistanc e . The result was the D efiance C ampaign, the details and results of which are describ e d on pages 5 1 -5 5 . One unforeseen consequence of the D efiance C ampaign was another change in the leadership of the party. Having taken part in an act of defiance of the apartheid laws, Moroka inexplicably pleaded not guilty to the charges brought against him. His actions compromised the integrity of the campaign, the purpose of which was to offer guilty pleas and fill apartheid prisons with protesters . Moroka's position was untenable and he was forced to resign. He was replaced as president-general by C hief Albert Luthuli. This change was important for the ANC , as Luthuli, a man with impeccable moral credentials, was to prove himself a redoubtable opponent of the apartheid regime. As he was a committed C hristian and a traditional leader, it would be harder for the government to portray the ANC under Luthuli as a communist-dominated revolutionary group with no legitimacy among ordinary Africans .

85

Under Luthuli, the ANC continue d to move in the direction that had been set by the Youth Leagu e . D e spite the rapid growth in its membership, part of its challenge after the D efiance C ampaign was to find a way of successfully tapping into the grievances of the mass e s . Too many B lacks still regarded the ANC as an elite party that had little concern for the hardship s of their daily liv e s . It was perceived as too narrowly political and seemed more • Building a mass base: the Women's League was o n e of the ways i n which the ANC sought concerned with apartheid to extend its support among ord i n a ry Africans i n the 19 5 0 s laws that directly affected the interests of the B lack middle classes than with addressing the more pressing issues of extreme poverty and homelessn e s s . In response, the ANC adopted a "Programme of E conomic Advancement" in 1 9 5 3 in an attempt to highlight its commitment to fighting against the extreme e conomic marginalization of poor Africans under apartheid. The ANC was also determined to reach out to women. The Women's League was immensely successful in attracting women to the party and its president, Lilian Ngoyi, was elected to the ANC National Executive C ommittee in 1 9 5 6 . The party strove to work with other anti­ apartheid groups in building a common front against apartheid. The result was the creation of the C ongre ss Alliance, which in turn organized the C ongress of the People ( C O P ) . This important development, and the hugely symb olic Freedom C harter that stemme d from it, is describ e d on p a g e s 5 6-6 0 .

• S e n i o r leaders o f the ANC i n the 1950s: Wa lter S i s u l u , Gova n M beki, O l iver

Ta m bo, Robert S o b u kwe

86

As seen on page 3 7 , another campaign in which the ANC was involved at this time ( 1 9 5 3-5 5 ) was the campaign against the introduction of Verwoerd's notorious B antu E du cation Act. This was, in the main, a failure . Instead of sending their children to schools that offered the new,

C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

inferior curriculum, the ANC urged parents to observe a b oycott of thes e government schools a n d instead enroll their children i n community- run "cultural centres " . It quickly b ecame evident that the ANC lacked the resources necessary to make this a viable e ducational alternative, and the b oycott s o on lost momentum as the campaign spluttered to a halt. Another notable development during this period was the initiation of the ANC 's Resist Apartheid C ampaign . At the heart of this was the strident opposition of the ANC to the forced evictions from S ophiatown that were planned as part of the government's Western Areas Removal S cheme (see also pages 22-2 3 ) . The campaign was launched at a meeting in Johannesburg in July 1 9 5 4 . This was due to be addressed by Luthuli, whose first two -year banning order was due to expire on that day. Unfortunately, Luthuli was arrested at the airport and issued with a second ban, which prevented him from making his speech. Nonetheless, the speech, which referred to the scheme as the "legalized robbery" of African property, was read out at the meeting. Once the evictions began in January 1 9 5 5, the ANC swung into action with its campaign of resistance to the removals, which rallied people behind the slogan "We shall not move" . This resistance involved a coalition of other anti- apartheid organizations and community groups, led by Sophiatown's charismatic Anglican parish priest, the Englishman Trevor Huddleston. Despite an international outcry and the steadfastness of the opposition to the scheme, the campaign failed to achieve its obj ective of saving S ophiatown. The suburb was completely razed by the end of the decade . The campaign also exposed a still-present chink in the armour of the ANC . Bizarrely, many poor Black tenants appeared ISE D to be visibly elated during their forced removals from S ophiatown. They knew that the new housing provided by the state would free them from exorbitant rents charged by their (mainly Black) landlords, and their failure to resist the resettlement had the effect of undermining opposition to the scheme . As the leading ANC and SACP activist JB Marks noted, the party still had much work to do in overcoming class divisions in Black society and winning the unwavering support of the poorest S outh Africans.

T R E 1\ S Q N T R l Al

�

Two more events are worth mentioning in this section: the Treason Trial of 1 9 5 6-6 1 , and the split in the movement which resulted from the Africanist breakaway and formation of the Pan Africanist C ongress ( PAC ) in January 1 9 5 9 . As mentioned on page 6 0 , the former was a prolonged legal case mounted by the government against hundreds of the organizers of the C ongress of the People ( C OP ) , including all of the leaders of the ANC . The authorities argue d that they were guilty of planning to overthrow the state . The charges were clearly spurious, but the trial did have the effect of temporarily removing from the scene, at a crucial j uncture in the history of the movement, senior

DEC. E M

1 95

.A. The 1 5 6 defenda nts at the D r i l l H a l l i n J o ha n n es b u rg at the

sta rt of the Treason Tri a l

87

leaders such as Luthuli, Mandela and Sisulu . Their absence allowed the emergence of a maj o r Africanist challenge from within the ranks of the party. The final split came in late 1 9 5 8 , when Robert S obukwe and his followers failed to prevent O liver Tambo from formally rewriting the ANC 's constitution to incorporate the ideals and goals of the Freedom C harter. The result was the creation of the PAC in early 1 9 5 9 . The major campaigns and protests in which the ANC was involved for the remainder of the period have also been described at length in earlier sections of the book. They included the bus boycotts, the " stay-at-home " strike and passbook protests, which contributed to the Sharpeville massacre . This was followed by the banning of the movement, the decision to create Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK ) , then finally the defence mounted at the Rivonia Trial. One of the major failures of the ANC in the 1 9 5 0 s - its inability to achieve its obj ective of creating a true mass movement against apartheid, one which included poor Africans as well as the middle classes - has already been alluded to earlier in this section. However, by the early l 9 60s, with the harshly repressive measures of the government and the high national profile it enj oyed following the creation of MK and the publicity of the Rivonia Trial, it came close to achieving this aim. It is enormously ironic that the resistance movement reached the height of its popularity at precisely the time that it was being brought to its knees by the might of the apartheid state, first by its prohibition and then by the arrest, trial and life imprisonment of its leaders .

H ow successfu l was the A N C between 1948 a n d 19 64? It can be argued that the ANC 's successes were many. It completed its transformation from a moribund and largely inactive organization into a radical, more mass-based movement that represented the aspirations of the majority of S outh Africans in the face of massive injustice and repression. D e spite its many setbacks at the hands of overwhelming state power, it time and again carried the fight to the apartheid authorities, first with the D efiance C ampaign, then with the C O P and the bus boycotts, and finally with the decision to embrace armed struggle . It brought the injustices of the apartheid regime to the attention of the world and gained the moral high ground through its early strategy of non-violent resistance . The ANC was also successful in forging alliances with a range of other anti- apartheid groups, including the S outh African Indian C ongress ( SAIC ) , the S outh African C oloured Peoples' O rganization and the S outh African C ongress of D emocrats, through the C ongress of the People ( C OP ) in 1 9 5 5 . The Freedom C harter b e came one of the iconic documents of 2 0th - century struggle. D e spite the government's success in crushing the ANC and MK in 1 9 64, the movement was without question the political voice of the huge maj ority of B lack S outh Africans by the end of the period from 1 948 and 1 9 64. At the same time, the ANC was found wanting on a number of important counts . Its failures include the following: • The movement failed in its ultimate obj e ctive of bringing down the apartheid system. Indeed, it found it impossible to win even simplest concessions from the government. The D e fiance C ampaign and

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C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

the bus boycotts were of symbolic importance but they had no real impact in weakening the NP. •

Attempts to maintain party unity failed with the Africanist breakaway to form the PAC in 1 9 5 9 .

•

C l o s e relations with the S A C P contributed to this bre akaway, and also alienated White lib erals who may otherwise have supported the movement.

•

The decision to adopt the armed struggle confirm e d the suspicion of many Whites that the ANC was at heart a terrorist organization . This playe d into the hands of the government a n d emboldened i t to extend the apartheid system still further.

•

The ANC had no effe ctive answer when the government launched its crackdown in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre .

•

The j ailing of senior ANC leaders in 1 9 64 was followed by a lengthy p eriod of relative quiet. While the townships seeth e d with resentment, the authorities managed to keep a lid on tensions until the sudden eruption of violence in S oweto in 1 9 7 6 . C learly, the authorities had succeeded in de stroying anti- apartheid re sistance by the end of the perio d .

The South African Communist Party (SACP) T h e C ommunist Party of S outh Africa ( C P S A ) was f o u n d e d i n C ap e Town i n 1 9 2 1 . Two maj or events w e r e crucial i n shaping t h e early history of the party. The first was the B olshevik Revolution in Russia in 1 9 1 7 , an event that inspired revolutionarie s across the globe and prompte d many of them to found Marxist p arties of their own. The s e cond was the dramatic growth of the S outh African lab o u r m o v e m e n t i n t h e y e a r s after t h e First World War. T h i s growth took place against the b a ckdrop of the fierce struggle b e tw e e n White workers and the mining h o u s e s . D u e to a fall in the price of gold, the mining magnate s, with the full support of the Smuts government, prop o s e d to cut co sts by lowering the wages of White workers and suspending the s o - calle d colour bar by allowing B lacks to b e employe d i n s o m e semi- skilled a n d supervisory p ositio n s . This prompted a furious reaction from the White proletariat, and a series of strik e s that brought production to a virtual standstill by t h e end of 1 9 2 1 . C onsidering the revolutionary p otential in this situation, the newly form e d C P S A d e cided to throw its lot in with the White protesters . O n e of the leading agitators in the struggle was C P S A leader WH Andrews, popularly known as " C omrade B ill " . Ironically, this m eant that the communists found themselv e s allied to an avowe dly racist lab o u r movement. One of the main goals of the White workers was the reinstatement of the colour b ar, and their protests frequently involv e d random assaults on inno cent B lack passers -by. The struggle climaxed in the Rand Revolt ( also known as the Rand Rebelli o n ) of March 1 9 2 2 , an armed uprising of 2 2 , 0 0 0 White workers against the state . Smuts sent in the army and the revolt was bloo dily suppre s s e d, with 2 0 0 workers killed in the fightin g .

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Smuts w a s punished by White voters f o r his role i n putting down the rebellion and his S outh African Party ( SAP ) lost power in the general ele ction in 1 9 2 4 . It was replaced by a co alition "Pact Government" of H e rtzog's nationalists and the mainly anglophone S outh African Lab o u r Party. The Labour Party had competed with the CPSA for influence over White miners during the 1 9 2 2 revolt. As a revolutionary communist organization, the C P S A was obviously far more radical ( and less racist) than the Lab o u r Party - a p arty that was now willing to j oin a coalition with Afrikaner nationalists in order to s e cure the interests of its White workers at the exp ense of the B lack maj ority. The formation of the co alition was followe d by a flurry of new racist legislation . With its rival, racist White workers' party now in government, the C P S A p e rform e d a dramatic ab out-turn . Under orders from the C ominte rn (the global organization of communist partie s dominated by Moscow ) , the party shifted its focus from White labour to the African proletariat. B y the end of 1 9 2 5 , the maj ority of party members were B lack. In 1 9 2 8 , it called for B lack maj ority rule in the country. Nonethele ss, the C P S A was still a party in which White intellectuals remain e d very prominent. Many leading figures, inclu ding S o lly S achs and B ram Fischer, were also Jewish . B lacks, as well as Indians, were also represented in the upp er e chelons of the party : JB Marks, Johann e s Nkosi and M o s e s Kotane were all imp ortant leaders during its early history. The C P S A first began to forge close links with the ANC in the late 1 9 2 0s . The radical Josiah Gumede be came the leader of the congress in 1 9 2 8 and the party veered sharply to the left under his stewardship . A numb er of B lack communists j oine d the ANC during this perio d. They remain e d influential members of both parties for years to com e . However, t h e close relationship faded i n t h e 1 9 3 0s, as t h e A N C swung back to the right under the conservative leadership of Pixley S e m e . T h e C P S A struggle d at this time, with dwindling membership a n d the attempts of some of its leaders forcibly to S talinize the party. D e spite its troubles, the C P S A worked assiduously to develop the lab our movement, and its influence over workers grew once again in the late 1 9 3 0s . While the principal focus was on the African proletariat, the party was s crupulously non- racial in its approach, always se e king to build a broad coalition of worker s . It formed the S outh African Trades and Labour C ouncil, a federation that affiliated many unions, some of which were Afrikaner. The party was also instrumental in establishing the AMWU in 1 94 1 , who s e first president was the leading B lack communist JB Marks . In the early post-war years, the CPSU was so successful in influencing workers across the racial divide that the NP began to view it as a major threat to its own strategy of creating an Afrikaner nationalist movement that united all social classes. The NP argued that the country was now threatened by a global communist conspiracy. NP members paradoxically contended that communism sought to undermine the unity of the "volk" (Afrikaner people ) by exposing the White working class to ideas of non-racialism, while simultaneously turning B lack against White and

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fomenting civil war. Anti- communist fervour reached a peak in the build­ up to the 1 948 election, when the twin fears of "red peril" ( communism ) and "black peril" (Africans ) were fused in the Afrikaner nationalist mindset. Anti-red paranoia played a significant role in DF Malan's election victory. The historian and political scientist Philip N el ( 1 9 9 0 ) argues that this period marks the beginning of the NP's long-running obsession with communism . He suggests that this stemmed from a need to explain the growth of internal opposition to racial policies in terms of the pernicious influence of an outside actor, in this case the S oviet Union. The official crackdown on communism and African labour was already well underway before the NP took power in 1 94 8 . The AMWU -organized miners' strike of 1 946 was crushed by police action. The strike failed to achieve any of its obj ectives and workers were forced back into the mines a few days later. However, the strike brought about a profound change in political consciousness in the country, with workers and government officials becoming more aware of the potential of communist­ inspired, mass-based protest .& T h e m i ne workers' strike of 1946 against the regim e . The new government took action against the C P S U as soon as Malan assumed office in 1 94 8 . Clearly signalling its intent, the NP immediately closed down the S oviet consular offices in Johannesburg and C ap e Town ( diplomatic tie s had been e stablishe d in 1 942 when S outh Africa and the S oviet Union unexpe ctedly found themselves allies in the S e cond World War ) . The CPSA was an obvious target of the government's S uppression of C ommunism Act, which was passed in 1 9 5 0 . However the legislation was designed as a weapon that could b e used not only against communists, but against the anti- apartheid movement more generally. The conflation of the ANC with communism was part of a deliberate government strategy. This was the time of McC arthyist anti- communist witch hunts in the USA, and the S o uth African authorities believed they could stigmatize the ANC by associating the party with communism. The upshot of the new law was that that the CPSA was declared illegal and driven underground. Many of its leaders were issued with banning orders, which they defied by continuing to speak in public, resulting in their imprisonment. O thers, including JB Marks, Moses Kotane and Solly S achs, organized the D e fiance C ampaign along with the ANC and the SAIC . The party was reconstituted, still illegally, as the S outh African C ommunist Party ( SACP) in 1 9 5 3 . SAIC leader Yusuf Dadoo was elected chairman and Moses Kotane party secretary. The party's change of name was significant. It emphasized that the party, while still part of a wider communist movement, was now primarily S outh African rather than

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internationalist in its orientation. Its principal goal was t o work with other groups to bring an end to apartheid. The emancipation of the global proletariat could come later. In other important resp e cts, however, the party remained much the same as it had been before . Ideologically, it remained true to its revolutionary heritage of se eking the overthrow of a capitalist e conomic order. It argue d that it was capitalism that had given rise to the system of exploitation and racial oppression in the first place, and that apartheid could b e defeated only with a simultaneous assault on the e conomic system that provide d its sustenanc e . The SACP was also a highly disciplined vanguard party, in the sense that it was headed by a small group of professional revolutionaries whose role was to lead the masses from the front. It was also intensely secretiv e : it was only confirmed after his death in 20 l 3 that Mandela had served on the central committee of the party shortly before his arrest in 1 9 6 2 . A s the struggle against apartheid develop ed, the SACP and the ANC drew ever clo s e r. The p arty was a key player in moves to further integrate anti- apartheid groups through the C O P. The White ­ dominate d C ongre ss of D em o crats, an organization at the h eart of the C ongress Alliance, was e s s entially a front for the communist s . The influence of the SACP was obvious in some of the strongly s o cialist principles enshrin e d in the Free dom C harter. For example, the Free dom C harter stated that " The m ineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and m onopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a who le", and that " the land [shall be] re-divided amongst those who work it" ( s e e pages 5 8-5 9 ) . Ruth First, the leading S A C P activist a n d wife of another leading figure in the S A C P, Joe S lovo, played an imp ortant role in founding the C ongress of D em o crats and drafting the Free dom C harter. The government used the Freedom C harter as evidence in its case against .& Leading members of the SACP: Moses Kota ne ( pictured with Nelson Mandela ) . ANC leaders in the famous Treason J B Ma rks, Ruth Fi rst, Lionel Bernstein Trial, which b egan in 1 9 5 6 . It alleged that the movement had been thoroughly infiltrate d by the SACP and that both organizations were guilty of treason by conspiring socialist revolution. SACP member B ram Fischer led the defence of the accused. The state managed to drag the trial on until 1 9 6 1 , but it failed to prove its case and all the defendants were acquitted.

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Communication and research skills

Choose to research the background and career of either Ruth First or O l iver Tam bo. Find a partner who has chosen to research the same leader. As a pair, find information about that leader on the internet, then prepare a 10-minute presentation. Make your presentation to a pair of stud ents who have chosen the other leader. The other pair then make their presentation to you and your partner. The Treason Trial was important because it helped persuade the new generation of ANC leaders that the government was determined to increase its repression of peaceful protest and destroy the resistance movement come what may, and that the time for non-violent opposition had perhaps passed. Following S harpeville and the government's prohibition of the ANC , Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was finally formed in 1 9 6 1 . Its creation was strongly influenced by SACP leaders who were also members of the ANC . An initial decision to launch the armed struggle had been taken at a secret C ommunist Party conference held in Johannesburg in D e cember 1 9 6 0 , with Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu both present on b ehalf of the ANC . Interestingly, the main dissenting voice at this meeting was that of SACP S e cretary - G eneral Moses Kotane, who warned that the movement was not yet ready for military action and would surely b e crushed by its formidable opponent. After the creation of MK, a SACP delegation was sent to Moscow in early 1 9 6 2 . It managed to secure funding, training and other support for MK . SACP funds paid for MK's "safe house", Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia, which was owned by leading party member Arthur Goldreich. D e nis Goldberg, Joe Slovo, Lionel B ernstein and Goldreich were all members of the MK High C ommand. At the Rivonia Trial, the defendants, who included Goldberg and Bernstein (the latter being the only one to be acquitted ) , were represented once again by communist lawyer B ram Fischer. During the trial Mandela, falsely, denied being a communist, although he did admit that the relationship between the ANC and the SACP was a very close one. Following the guilty verdicts, Fischer was himself tried for treason in a separate trial in 1 96 5-6 6 . He died of illness while on compassionate release from his life sentence in 1 9 7 5 . After life sentences had been handed down to the accused, the mantle of leading .A. B r a m Fischer add resses a secret C PSA meeting i n t h e e a r l y 19 50s. The portra its o n the the liberation struggle fell to the ANC left a n d right of the stage a re of Moses Kota ne a n d "C o m ra d e Bill" And rews in exile, headed by Oliver Tambo . At this point, the role of the SACP became even more important, as the movement had little option but to rely on friendly communist governments to provide the necessary funding and logistical support and training for the establishment of its frontline military camps and bases. Tambo, Kotane and Slovo all travelled to the S oviet Union to receive guerrilla training in 1 9 64. The intimate connection between the ANC and Moscow, and the strong influence of the SACP over the ANC , were to continue thereafter.

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Assessm e nt It is evident that the S A C P had a hugely imp o rtant infl u e n c e on development o f the lib e ration movement b e t we e n 1 9 4 8 and 1 9 6 4 . This was d u e i n large p art to i t s clo s e tie s with t h e ANC . T h e party h e lp e d orient the ANC towards n o n - ra cialism and in a m or e militant dire ction, to s u ch an extent that the ANC was eventu ally p e r s u a d e d to e m b r a c e arm e d struggle against t h e apartheid regim e . However, the S A C P 's imp ortance g o e s beyond its links with the AN C . The p arty played a key role in organizing strike a ction through its union affiliations, m o s t notably during the min e r s ' strike of 1 9 4 6 . While this strike obviou sly falls outside the tim e frame of the period b e ing examin e d, it was o f maj o r signifi cance in terms of its imp act on the p o litics that followe d . Ind e e d , some historians have argu e d that the strike marked the tru e b eginning o f the struggle against s e gre gation and aparth e i d . T h e r e are o t h e r perspectiv e s on the degree of S A C P influence during this p e rio d . One is that it is all too easy to exaggerate its role b e ca u s e of t h e inc e s s ant anti - communist propaganda of t h e government. The authorities were never slow to identify the malign hand of global communism b e hind every development in the anti - ap artheid movement, and to argue that all oppo sition was the work of M o s c o w 's handmaiden in S outh Africa, the S A C P. In reality, the ANC was always by far the larger and more influential of the two organizations . S everal of its leading members, including Anton Lemb e de , Alfred Xuma, Jam e s Moroka and Alb ert Luthuli, were never communist s . Some of them were actively ho stile to communism . If one organization was at all dominate over the other, it was m or e probable that it was the ANC over the S A C P. Ind e e d, the S A C P was unique among communist p arties in that it prioritized, at least in the short term, dome stic factors ( th e struggle against apartheid) over proletarian revoluti o n . Another perspective is that t h e r o l e of t h e SACP was inde e d profound, but that its influence was very much to the detriment of the lib eration movement. The association with communism offered the government a convenient stick with which to beat the ANC . The ANC may also have won more sympathy and supp ort from the White population had it not been for its ties with the SACP. Similarly, the ANC 's proximity to the SACP alienated its Africanist wing, which broke away to form the PAC , thus splitting the lib eration movement. The historian Stephen Ellis ( 2 0 1 2 ) has argue d that the SAC P's sway over the ANC was so great that the ANC effectively allowed itself to be taken over by the communists after the Rivonia Trial and the exile of its remaining leaders . SACP leader Joe Slovo b ecame the head of MK, as the movement focused on building relations with communist states instead of taking the fight directly to the apartheid regime by carrying out combat operations on S outh African soil.

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Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A

Sou rce 8

An extract from Nelson Mandela's autobiography, The Long Walk to Freedom ( 1 994).

A letter written by Rian Malan, a well­ known South African writer, journalist and songwriter, to the editors of the New York Review of Books, 2 1 March 2 0 1 3. Malan was at the time embroiled in the controversy surrounding Stephen Ellis' book, External Mission: The ANC in Exile.

Marxism's call for revolutionary action was music to the ears of the fre e dom fighter. The idea that history progresses through struggle and that change o ccurs in revolutionary j umps was similarly appealing . . . I was prepared to use whatever means necessary to spe e d up the erasure of human prej udice and the end of chauvinistic and violent nationalism. I did not need to b e come a communist in order to work with them. I found that African nationalists and African communists generally had far more to unite them than to divide them . . . The cynical have always suggested that the communists where using us. But who is to say that we were not using them?

Second q u estion

-

4 m a rks

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource A for historians studying the role of the SACP and its influence on Nelson Mandela and the ANC during the 1 9 5 0 s and e arly 1 9 6 0 s .

[We] are only just beginning to understand the extent of [the SACP's] influence historically. New research by historian Stephen Ellis shows, for instance, that SACP militants found themselves in an awkward position in 1 960, when their secret plans for armed struggle encountered resistance from South Africa's two most important black politicians - ANC president Albert Luthuli and SACP general secretary Moses Kotane . Rather than back down, these militants co - opted Nelson Mandela onto the C ommunist Party's C entral C ommittee and tasked him to "bounce" the mighty ANC into agreement with their position. The result, said veteran C ommunist Roley Arenstein, was tantamount to "a hijacking" of the mighty ANC by a tiny clique of mostly white and Indian intellectuals.

Th i rd q uestion

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6 m a rks

C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources A and B regarding the influence of the SACP on the ANC .

U m khonto we Sizwe ( M K) Unkhonto we Sizwe (MK ) , which means " spear of the nation" in Zulu and Xhosa, was the armed wing of the ANC . It was created on 1 6 D ecember 1 9 6 1 , on the anniversary of the famous B oer victory over Zulu armies at the B attle of Blood River in 1 8 3 8 , and commenced operations on the same day, carrying out a series of explosions targeting government buildings and electrical installations across the nation.

The d ecisi o n to create M K The ANC 's decision to embrace armed struggle by creating MK was both complex and contentious. It was by no means clear to all in the party that non-violent resistance, which had served the party for over a decade and become part of its moral fabric, should be abandoned. The non-violent approach was embodied in the person of the leader of the ANC , Chief Albert Luthuli. His formidable authority within the party would have to be overcome if armed struggle were to be adopted. Opponents of armed struggle argued that abandoning the path of civil disobedience in favour of armed confrontation would gift the regime with the opportunity to

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T O K connections

H i story a n d eth ics Modern history is filled with exa mples of moments when key individ uals or groups were confronted with decisions that had profound moral implications. One of these was the dilemma facing the ANC when it had to decide between conti nuing its strategy of non-violent resistance or creati ng MK and taking up a rmed struggle against apartheid. The exa m p l e i l l u m i nates many of the issues which a rise in the field of ethics as a n a rea of knowledge. These include the fol l owi ng:

1 Can the circu mstances justify the use of violence? H ow does whether a n action is considered right or wrong depend on the context?

2 Which is the sure r guide to moral action: individual conscience or universa l ethical principle?

3 How can we use different ethica l systems (for example, deontological and consequentialist ethics] as a guide to our moral decision making? Is it possible to resolve the contradictions between these systems? How might these positions apply to the AN C's debate about the armed struggle?

4 Does the example of the anti-apartheid struggle prove that it is possible for people to act against their own interests? Does a ltruism define what is good?

5 Should mora l considerations matter i n politics? Does the end a lways justify the means?

depict the ANC a s a terrorist body and then completely destroy it. This organization lacked any experience of armed struggle and its members had no military training. It was faced with the might of one of the most powerful armed forces in the world. In addition, by embracing violence, the ANC risked surrendering the moral high ground and alienating many of its moderate allies in the anti-apartheid struggle . Global opinion was now increasingly on its side, and it risked squandering some of this international goodwill if it came to be perceived as a movement committed to violence. At the same time, the arguments in favour of armed struggle were compelling. By the early 1 9 6 0s, the ANC risked b eing outflanked by the PAC , which had already launched its own armed wing, Poqo . The ANC stood to lose even more popular ground to its Africanist rival if its response to Sharpeville and the other brutal events of 1 9 6 0 was seen by the masses as ineffectual. There was already a concern at the ease with which the PAC had been able to hij ack the ANC 's anti-pass laws campaign . The party seemed at risk of b eing overtaken by the pace of events in other ways to o . Rural revolts were an increasingly regular feature of the struggle in the 1 9 5 0s . These culminated in peasants taking up arms against alleged government collaborators in Zeerust, Pondoland and S ekhukhuneland in the late 1 9 5 0s and early 1 9 6 0 s . Amid a general atmosphere of violence, the ANC 's principled stance of p eaceful protest was b eginning to look idealistic and untenable . The argument that the government would use the establishment of an armed wing as an ideal excuse to prohibit the movement was rendered moot with its decision to ban the ANC anyway in April 1 9 6 0 . The party was driven underground and the scope for legal protest had dramatically narrowe d . For many, the logical next step was armed struggle . The most powerful of all of the arguments in favour of armed resistance, though, was the sheer implacability of the NP government and its willingness to resort to extreme force to quash any form of protest. Apartheid's planners had proven themselves resistant to any attempts at moral persuasion or peaceful protest, whether from the B lack resistance movement inside the country or from the global community that had turned decisively against S outh Africa. The government had grown steadily more brutal, answering non-violence with the overwhelming force of the state security apparatu s . It had also embarked on an extending and deepening of the country's racist laws with the advent of Verwoerd's grand apartheid. In spite of the peaceful resistance of the ANC , the predicament of Africans had steadily worsened. The idea of an armed wing had been gestating in the minds of leading ANC members for some tim e . Mandela had spoken publicly of armed struggle as early as 1 9 53 when he addressed a meeting in S ophia town, and subsequent developments were to lead to a gradual hardening of his position. His "M Plan" envisioned the government's prohibition of the ANC , and the creation of an armed wing as a necessary precondition for the guerrilla war that would constitute the next stage of the anti­ apartheid struggle . Mandela was not the only member of the party to consider more radical measures . The left-wing youth of the movement, the trade unions and radical Africanists alike grew restive at what they p erceived to be the unduly cautious approach of the leaders . Luthuli's calls for patience could only b e heeded for so long, and he was seen as increasingly out of step with the rank and file of the party.

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The events of 1 9 6 0 proved decisive in swinging the argument in favour of moving the struggle on to a new phase. The scale of the violence unleashed by the police at Sharpeville shocked even the veterans of the movement. The government's response to further protests was to declare a state of emergency that made all political protests illegal. B oth the ANC and the PAC were banned when the authorities passed the Unlawful O rganizations Act in April. Leading ANC and SACP members were arrested and were not released until August. While they were in prison, Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela, along with SACP leaders Joe Slovo and Lionel Bernstein, held discussions about an imminent move to armed struggle . At a secret SACP meeting at the end of the year, the party, with Mandela and Sisulu in attendance, resolved to create its own armed wing, ideally with the involvement of the ANC but if necessary without it. In March 1 9 6 1 , the defendants in the marathon Treason Trial were finally acquitted. Fearing rearrest, Nelson Mandela finally decided to go on the run from the authorities, beginning the period during which he became known as the "Black Pimpernel". With Mandela's decision to go underground, the prospect that the movement as a whole would adopt a more radical strategy moved closer. In May, a planned three- day strike was called to protest against the government's decision to leave the B ritish C ommonwealth. The resulting government crackdown on the "stay-at-home " was emphatic. All police leave was cancelled and tanks were sent into the townships. Predictably, the strike was a failure . .A. Vetera ns of the MK High C o m m a n d meet at Liliesleaf Fa rm in 2 0 0 1 : Lionel Bernste i n , This remarkable show And rew M l a nge n i , D e n i s Gold berg, R a y m o n d M h l a ba a n d Art h u r Gold reich of force left the ANC to question the viability of further peaceful demonstrations. According to Slovo, both the ANC and the SACP were now moving together towards recognising the necessity of armed struggle. In June 1 96 1 , Mandela presented his proposal for an official MK to senior party leaders at an ANC working committee . A decision was finally taken at a Durban ANC Party C ongress in July when, crucially, Luthuli was persuaded that his party had simply run out of other options .

M K o p e rations M K was hastily constituted o n 1 6 D e cember 1 9 6 1 ( ironically, this was the anniversary of the famous B oer victory over the Zulu at Blood River in 1 8 3 8 ) , and it b egan operations on the same day. A National

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High C ommand included Nelson Mandela, Walter S isulu, Joe Slovo and Raymond Mhlaba. This b o dy liaise d with the political leadership of the movement and directed smaller MK regional commands. These regional commands in turn organized small cells of MK cadres, which planne d a n d executed acts of sabotage . Many of t h e regional members were White communists, selected for their technical exp ertise and knowledge of explosives . The first phase of the armed struggle involved a series of sabotage operations . The purpose was to register symbolic strikes against the apartheid state while also hitting the regime financially by destroying high -value installations such as power stations and electricity pylons. Other infrastructural targets such as post offices and telephone exchanges were selected, as well as more obvious symbols of the state, such as police stations and tax offices . Every effort was made to avoid loss of life during these operations . A second phase of the armed struggle envisaged a series of guerrilla campaigns conducted by MK in rural areas. C ontinued acts of sabotage were to be combined with mass political agitation and strike action in the cities. Unfortunately for the movement, this phase was never reached.

A. M K sabotage o f a n electricity

p y l o n , 19 62

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The first phase of the armed struggle gradually petered out towards the end of 1 9 6 3 as daring attacks on government installations became less frequent. The reason lies not with any diminishing appetite for armed struggle, but in the typically forceful response of the Verwoerd government. The General Laws Amendment Act of 1 9 62 (better known as the S abotage Act) made it a criminal offence to plan or execute even the most minor act of sabotage, which was vaguely defined as "wrongful or willful acts " . S entences ranged from a minimum of five years' imprisonment to the death penalty. The police spared no effort in hunting down underground leaders of the movement. Mandela, the "Black Pimpernel", was eventually captured, tried and imprisoned, and then subsequently brought before a court once again to face new charges along with the other MK leaders at the famous Rivonia Trial of 1 9 6 3-64. Following the guilty sentences, attempts were made to reconstitute the MK High C ommand but these efforts met with little success. The authorities had the movement well and truly on the run. Regional commands were in disarray: with all of the major leaders either arrested or in exile there was no direction from the centre. The " spear of the nation trial" of MK cadres in Natal in 1 9 64 extinguished the armed wing in the province where it had been most effective . By the end of the year, all armed activity in S outh Africa had ceased. The next phase of the armed struggle, conducted from exile and on an altogether more limited scale, had begun. With the ANC and MK destroyed on the ground, the anti- apartheid struggle seemed to be at the lowest of ebbs. It would be over a decade before it would rise again.

C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

Assess m ent B y any obj e ctive re ckoning, MK was in many ways a failur e . Its creation gave the government the green light to launch an all - out a s s ault on the lib eration movement. The re sult is that the first phase of the arm e d struggle lasted only a couple of years. B y 1 9 64, MK had been hunte d down and its o rganizational structure in S outh Africa dismantle d . Its most imp ortant leaders were arre sted and imprisoned by the authoritie s, and the others forced into exile . Moreover, its operations were largely limited to acts of sabotage . Not once did MK dire ctly engage in combat with the S outh African s e curity forces, nor did it ever land a re ally de cisive blow against the apartheid stat e . The "M Plan " fail e d to get off the ground, with MK failing to spark its plann e d rural insurgency. Once the first phase of MK ope rations had ended, a lengthy period of almost complete inaction ensued, during which tim e the ANC and MK were organizationally m o ribund in S o uth Africa. Yet the s e criticisms of MK tell only half the story. The S o uth African government was determined to crush the ANC come what may. It can b e argued, then, that the outcome of 1 9 6 4 was nearly inevitable after Sharpeville, and the creation of MK had little b earing on this result. Indeed, the ANC had already been banned and driven underground before MK was even founde d. MK was successful in other ways : •

It showed that Africans were not afraid to take up arms against the might of the government. The courageous acts of sabotage carried out by MK operatives added lustre to the ANC legend. Its cadres struck at the apartheid goliath at great risk to themselves, and in so doing b e came heroes to many S outh Africans .

•

The fact that MK even existed help e d to keep the spirit of resistance alive during the dark days of the late 1 9 6 0 s and early 1 9 7 0 s . Indeed, it can be argue d the first stage of the armed struggle served as an imp ortant precedent and a source of inspiration for the dramatic surge in resistance in the township s during and after the S oweto Uprising of 1 9 7 6 .

Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A An extract from Govan Mbeki, senior leader of the AN C and SACP, and a member of the MK High Command, The Stuggle for Liberation in South Africa: A Short History ( 1 992 ) .

I n its manifesto, Umkhonto pointe d out that it would include in its ranks " S outh Africans of all races " in carrying out a struggle into which it was forced by government policies. "The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choice s : submit or fight. That time has now come to S o uth

Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our fre e dom . . . " The manifesto further emphasise d the point that, by taking the action which it did, MK was seeking to avoid a civil war in the country : "We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought as the lib eration movement to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do still. We hope even at this late hour that our first actions will awaken

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everyone t o a realisation of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading . "

Sou rce B A cartoon by Norman Mansbridge, published by Punch magazine in 1 960.

The manifesto ended b y assuring the pe ople of S outh Africa that there could b e no happiness or peace in the country until the Nationalist government had been overthrown . "In the s e actions, we a r e working i n t h e best interest of all the p eople of this country - black, brown and white - whose future happiness and well-being cannot b e attaine d without the overthrow of the Nationalist government, the abolition of white supremacy and the winning of liberty, democracy and full national rights and equality for all the people of this country. "

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource A, why did the ANC resort to arm e d struggle in 1 9 6 1 ?

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of the carto on in S ource B ?

DRAGON'S TEETH

Albert Luthuli The revered figure of C hief Albert Luthuli ( o ften spelled "Lutuli" ) was president- general of the ANC from 1 9 5 2 until his death in 1 9 6 7 . Albert Luthuli was born near B ulawayo i n S outhern Rhodesia i n 1 8 9 8 . His father was a S eventh- day Adventist minister and Albert was e ducated in a mission school in his ancestral home of Groutville in NataL before training as a teacher. Luthuli's religious background was to be hugely important in influencing his later career. His abiding commitment to the use of non­ violence and moral example as a means of opposing the apartheid system was a product of his Christian upbringing. His background as an educator was also significant. Luthuli constantly stressed the value of education as a means of advancement for Africans. From the early 1 92 0s, he worked on the staff of Adams C ollege near D urban. However, Luthuli's standing in his Zulu community, together with his growing indignation at the p olicies of the Hertzog government, meant that he was drawn towards a career in politics. He j oine d the Natal Native Teachers' Union and was involved in the organization of school b oycotts . In 1 9 3 5 , he was elected by tribal elders to the chieftaincy of Groutville, which had been designated as a native reserve area under the Natives Land Act of 1 9 1 3 . In 1 9 3 6 , the decision of the Hertzog government to introduce the Representation of Natives Act, a law that finally removed B lacks from the common voters' roll in the C ape, contributed to the growing radicalism of Luthuli's outlook. He j oine d the

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ANC in 1 944 and was elected to the Native Representative C ouncil, an advisory body e stablished under the 1 9 3 6 act, a year later. He used his position on the council to lead oppo sition to the government's blo ody suppression of the 1 946 miners' strike, and this resistance influenced the decision of the authorities to disband the council shortly afterwards . Luthuli was able to devote more time to his activities in the ANC thereafter, and he b ecame provincial president in Natal in 1 9 5 1 . Luthuli's increasing prominence as a leader of the resistance movement meant that he was one of the key organizers of the D e fiance C ampaign . His firm C hristian principles and noble b earing made him an ideal figurehead for a series of protests that were designed to highlight the moral inj ustice of the apartheid system . The government reacted to his involvement in the campaign by insisting that he either resign his membership of the ANC or face the prosp e ct of surrendering his chieftaincy. He refused to comply and was duly dismissed as chief of Groutville reserv e . His growing reputation in the ANC was further enhanced when he wrote "The Road to Freedom is via the Cross", a public statement in response to this decision. In this statement, Luthuli argue d that principled non-violence was the only viable strategy in opposing apartheid, and that the system would eventually collapse when the peaceful resistance of Africans finally convinced Whites of the fundamental inj ustice of a racist syste m . Luthuli w a s elected president-general of the ANC i n D e cember 1 9 5 2, after the embarrassing episode involving incumbent president James Moroka ( see page 8 5 ) . His election was important in restoring dignity to the office, especially at a time when the authorities were using the widespread rioting that was threatening to engulf the E astern C ape and other parts of the country to portray the movement as violent and revolutionary. However, Luthuli's effectiveness as ANC leader was curtailed by the government almost as soon as he assumed the office. He was immediately slapped with a two -year banning order under the Suppression of C ommunism Act. This was the first in a series of banning orders that were to dog the remainder of his political career. The bans prevented him from holding large meetings or speaking in public, and confined him to his home in rural Groutville . Following the expiry of an existing ban in July 1 9 54, his attempt to travel to Johannesburg and address a rally marking the launch of the ANC 's Resist Apartheid C ampaign resulted in his arrest and re-banning as soon as he arrived at the airport. D e spite these repeated bans, Luthuli still played a role in formulating the overall strategy of the movement. O ther ANC leaders would visit to consult with him in Groutville before any important de cisions were made . He wrote sp e e ches and could attend the o ccasional ANC conference . It was around this time, in the mid- 1 9 5 0 s, that Luthuli attempted to me diate between the two factions that emerged in the ANC : the Africanists, and the " C harterists " , left-wingers who favoured non-racialism and collaboration with the SACP. Initially wary of committing the ANC to a full alliance with leftist parties, he was eventually accused by the Africanists of openly siding with their opponents . This was a factor in the decision of Robert S obukwe and his supporters to break away and form the PAC .

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Luthuli was arrested in 1 9 5 6 and was held for over a year a s one o f the defendants in the Treason Trial, before being released due to a lack of evidence . Despite enj oying a period of relative freedom in the late 1 9 5 0s, he had little direct involvement in major protests such as the Alexandra bus boycott. Instead, younger, more energetic figures were increasingly taking the lead, men such as Mandela, Sisulu, Tambo, Mbeki and S obukwe. Luthuli symb olically burn e d h i s passb o o k following the S harp eville massacre, and was briefly prominent in the ANC 's campaign of strikes, protests and " stay ­ at-hom e s " that followe d . He was arrested once again and charged under the government's new emergency powers . Found guilty by the court, he e s cap e d a prison s entence due to ill health . However, he was now subj e ct to almost constant banning orders by the government. He had little option but to retire to semi- obscurity in Groutville and allow the .A. A l b e rt Luth u l i accepts the N o b e l Peace Prize i n Oslo, Decem ber 19 61 younger generation to seize effe ctive control of the movement. The e a se with which he capitulated to Mandela and S isulu in the debate over the adoption of arm e d struggle, a move which he had passionately opp o s e d for m u c h of the previous decade, illustrated the degree to which his political influence was waning . Recent studies suggest that he may not even have been consulted when the final de cision to create MK was made . Nonetheless, with the ANC now bann e d and operating underground, Luthuli remain e d a figure of enormous symb olic value to the movement. He was allowed to travel to O slo in D e cemb er 1 9 6 1 s o that he could accept the Nobel Peace Prize he had been awarde d in the previous year, and in 1 9 6 3 he publish e d his celebrate d autobiography, Let My People Go. B y now his health was sharply deteriorating . He had a minor stroke and suffered from poor hearing and eye sight. These factors prob ably contributed to his de ath in 1 9 6 7 , when he was run over at a railway crossing near his Groutville h o m e .

Assessm e nt Alb e rt Luthuli's contribution to the anti - apartheid struggle in the 1 9 5 0 s and early 1 9 6 0 s was pro digiou s . While his o rganizational involvement was often limite d due to the repeated government b anning orders, h e remain e d the symb olic colossus of the lib e ration movement throughout. His moral authority sto o d in stark contrast to the government's appr oa ch of brutal repression and this contributed to

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the international isolation of Pretoria . Luthuli was the first glob al icon of the S outh African lib eration movement. His acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize brought the cau s e of the ANC to international prominence and provided succour during some of the darkest days of the anti ­ apartheid struggle . His commitm ent to p e aceful m e thods of protest also won the ANC the symp athy and support of many White S outh African lib erals . S ome have played down Luthuli's achievements by stressing his limited personal involvement in the various ANC campaigns after 1 9 5 2 . However, this stance overlooks the formidable power o f the apartheid system that opposed him, a factor which made a more hands - o n role impossible . Luthuli was arrested whenever he attempted to defy his banning orders, and typically re -banned as soon as an existing order expired. Another related criticism concerns the way in which he was increasingly sidelined by the end of the 1 9 5 0s and his capitulation to more j unior members of the party in the debate on the arm e d struggle . However, it can be argued that the main cau se s of this defeat were unrelated to his diminished p ersonal standing or weaknesses in his moral argument. Rather the case of continue d non-violence had been fatally undermined by the vigour with which the government banned and repressed the ANC after the Sharpeville massacre . In a recent biography, A lbert Luthuli: Bound by Faith ( 2 0 1 0 ) , S cott C ouper argues that the very characteristics that made Luthuli such a redoubtable opponent of apartheid in the early 1 9 5 0 s - his upstanding C hristian morality and principled opposition to any form of violence - can also be used to explain his increasing irrelevance to the movement later on in that decade and in the early 1 9 60s, when the new circumstances demanded a more strident response. C ouper points out that the "official" ANC accounts of the period attempt to rewrite history by making Luthuli fit into a more mainstream nationalist narrative . This account, propagated among others by Luthuli's early biography, Mary B enson, held that he was eventually and reluctantly persuaded that armed struggle was the only way forward. The result is that Luthuli's opposition to the decision to embrace armed struggle is downplayed or even ignored. C ouper argues that this is a move that Luthuli steadfastly refused to authoriz e .

Sou rce s ki l l s Sou rce A An extract from "The Road to Freedom is via the Cross", a public statement issued by Albert Luthuli on I November 1952 in response to a government order to revoke his chieftaincy.

What have been the fruits of my many years of moderation? Has there been a reciprocal tolerance or moderation from the government? No ! On the contrary, the past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all:

no adequate land for our occupation, our only asset, cattle, dwindling, no security of homes, no decent and remunerative employment, more restriction to freedom of movement through passes . . . in short we have witnessed . . . an intensification of our subjugation to ensure and protect white supremacy. It is with this background . . . [that] I have j oine d my p e ople in the new spirit that moves them today, the spirit that revolts openly and boldly against inj ustice and expresses itself in a determined and non-violent manner.

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Sou rce B The Black Christ, a painting by the White South African artist Ronnie Harrison, 1 96 1 . It depicts Chief Luthuli being crucified by Prime Minister HF Verwoerd and Minister of Justice John Vorster.

Sou rce C A speech by President of South Africa Jacob Zuma, who delivered the Chief Albert Luthuli Centenary Lecture in Kimberley on 7 September 2 0 1 2 .

The membership saw outstanding qualities in [Luthuli] and was convinced that he would take the ANC to greater heights . He did not disappoint them . . . While Inkosi [the Zulu word for " chief"] Luthuli was under his severe ban, he was

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informed that he had been awarded the 1 9 6 0 Nobel Prize for Peace award . . . His acceptance spe e ch helped focus world attention on apartheid and its evil atrocities against Africans . He also emphasized reconciliation a n d unity. He made the fundamental point that it would have been easy for the feelings of resentment at white domination to have been turned into feelings of hatred and a desire for revenge against the white community. He praised the ANC leadership which had preached non­ racialism and restraint in the face of extreme provocation . . . Inkosi Luthuli obtained a long standing ovation after his moving acceptance spe e ch. He rose to sing the National Anthem, locating himself in O slo as a proud African. He made every African, in the continent and the diaspora, extremely proud of themselves . . . We have noted some works doubting President General Luthuli's commitment to the armed struggle . D ominant records indicate that he was a pacifist whose hand was "twisted" to accept the armed struggle even though he did not believe in it. When he took over as President the policy of the ANC had not changed from petition politics. However, when conditions change d and radicalism set in, he was ready to embrace the new approach. Inkosi Luthuli was a man of p eace, but he was also a militant leader. Like all ANC leaders, he detested violence . The armed struggle was adopted as a last resort, in the face of an intransigent, aggressive state that was hell-bent on perpetually riding roughshod over the rights of the black maj ority.

Sou rce D S. Couper, a Christian minister from the USA who worked at the Groutville Congregational Church (Luthuli's former parish) . He is a senior honorary lecturer in the school of religion at the University of KwaZulu-Nalal. "My People Let Go" . International Congregational Journal. Vol 5, issue 1 (200 5 ) .

Luthuli's keen intellect and powerful personality held together in solidarity against incredible

C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

odds Indians, Whites, B lacks, C ommunists, Liberals, Christians, Muslims, modernists and traditionalists within the ANC thus enabling the survival and future growth of the anti­ Apartheid struggle and the creation of the present day democratic S outh Africa. In 1 9 6 0 the Nobel C ommittee selected Luthuli from the midst of obscurity to proclaim to the world the height to which humankind ought to strive . . . As President- General of the AN C for seventeen years, [he] was a s e cular politician, yet he argue d that he was first and foremost a C hristian . . . Perhaps the greatest paradox of Luthuli's life is his consistent advocacy of non-violence previous to and during his last seven years of ANC leadership and the ANC 's sanctioned and sponsored use of violence . . . C le arly, the de cision to resort to violence led his followers to turn away from Luthuli as the leader of the ANC de spite his retention of the titular p o sition as General-President. Luthuli's p e ople had let him g o .

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt a

-

3 m a rks

According to S ource A, what were the results of Luthuli's " many years of moderation " ?

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What is the message of S ource B ?

Second q u estion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource D for historians studying C hief Luthuli's involvement in the fre e dom struggle.

Th i rd q u esti o n - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the views of C hief Luthuli expressed in S ources C and D .

Fou rth q u estion

-

9 m a rks

Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the claim that C hief Luthuli took the ANC " to greater heights " ?

Nelson Mandela A n icon of the fre edom struggle, Nelson Mandela w a s , along with Albert Luthuli, the dominant figure in the lib eration movement between 1 948 and 1 9 6 4 . B orn i n 1 9 1 8, Mandela w a s the scion of minor African royalty. His father was the chief counsellor to the king of the Thembu, a branch of the Xhos a . He studied at the African s - only University of Fort Hare, a college that had a well - deserved reputation as a hotb e d of political activism . Rebellious since his early childhood, Mandela was expelled for taking part in a student protest. After fle eing his home in Qunu at the prospect of an arranged marriage in 1 94 1 , he met Walter Sisulu on his arrival in Johannesburg. S isulu introduced Mandela to a firm of attorneys where he began work while studying to obtain his legal articles . He was involved in cases where he help e d to defend B lack p e ople who had fallen foul of the country's segregation law s . Mandela b e came ever more politicized. Mandela j oined the ANC in 1 944, the same year as Luthuli. He formed the ANC Youth League along with S isulu and his e arly political mentor, the Africanist Anton Lemb e d e . Mandela was soon noted for his organizational capacity and dynamism, as well as for his strong opposition to the old guard of the movement. He found the

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constitutional approach, with its strategy of politely petitioning the authorities, to be dangerously passive and increasingly obsolete in a more repressive post-war political environment. He argue d that the authorities' suppression of the 1 946 miners ' strike, and the menacing emergence of a radical Afrikaner nationalism, j u stifie d a more assertive strategy of non- cooperation and mass action . Following the NP election victory in 1 948, Mandela was a key figure in persuading the party's leaders to adopt the Youth Leagu e 's radical Programme of Action, a document which he had help e d to draft. C apping a heady rise through the ranks of the party, Mandela was elected to the National Executive C ommittee of the ANC in .& ANC Youth League activists and p a rt n ers in l aw: Nelson M a n d e l a a n d late 1 949, and appointed president of the Youth O l iver Ta m b o League i n 1 9 5 0 . H e help e d turn the Programme o f Action into a political reality through his role in the D efiance C ampaign in 1 9 5 2 . Nominated as national volunte er-in - chief, he was perhaps the single most imp ortant member of the party in organizing civil disobedience across the country. It was around this time that Mandela rose to national prominence, with newspapers frequently reporting his involvement in acts of defiance . The D efiance C ampaign was significant in Mandela's career in other ways too . First, his arrest and subsequent six - month banning order meant that he had the time to sit his attorney admission examinations and open S o uth Africa's first B lack law firm in Johannesburg, in partnership with O liver Tambo . Needless to say, the company soon gained a reputation for its fearless representation of the victims of apartheid laws (incidentally, the firm was itself an early victim of the 1 9 5 0 Group Areas Act and had to move its offices from the city centre to a distant outlying suburb ) . S econd, Mandela's experience of working with other groups during the D e fiance C ampaign convinced him of the value of creating a common front against apartheid. Heavily influenced by Lembede, he was known as an Africanist prior to 1 9 5 2 . D e spite a close friendship with SACP S e cretary- General Moses Kotane, he had also been a vocal opponent of communism within the ANC . Indeed, Mandela had opposed the "May D ay stay - at-home" strike of 1 9 5 0 on the grounds that the ANC should b e organizing its own protests rather than working together with the communists . Now, through his involvement with leading communists such as Kotane, Yusuf D adoo and JB Marks, Mandela b e came a firm b eliever in a non- racial approach as his politics swung to the left. Mandela drew clo s e r to the S A C P following the s e cret relaunch of the p arty in 1 9 5 3 . He was an influ ential force b e hind the d e cision to create an alliance with oth e r anti- apartheid groups through the C ongre ss Alliance . He d e fi e d banning orders to take p art in planning the C O P, and help e d comp o s e the F r e e dom C h arter. Mandela, along with S isulu, watch e d silently from the sidelin e s while the C harter was p ro claim e d at the Kliptown rally, lest h e b e rearrested for violating the terms of his b a n .

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In 1 9 5 3 , Mandela drafted the "M Plan" , a series of contingency measures that the movement would have to adopt in the event that it was banned and driven underground by the government. He was also very active in the angry but ineffectual ANC response to Verwoerd's B antu E ducation Act in 1 9 5 3-54, and in the Resist Apartheid C ampaign, the fierce but ultimately futile oppo sition to the forced removals of Africans living in the Johannesburg suburb of S ophiatown during the government's Western Areas Removal S cheme . Mandela was one of the principal defendants in the long-running Treason Trial, which began in 1 9 5 6 and lasted for five years before his eventual acquittal in 1 9 6 1 . Although held in custody for lengthy periods, it was during this time that he b ecame a dominant figure in the ANC , with Albert Luthuli invariably removed from the political action due to the banning orders confining him to rural Stanger. Following the Sharpeville massacre and the government's de cision to ban the ANC , Mandela w a s the main driving force i n persuading the party t o accept the inevitability of the arm e d struggle, a possibility that he had outline d earlier i n t h e "M Plan " . Following the collapse of the Treason Trial i n March 1 9 6 1 , Mandela knew that the government would seek to rearrest him immediately. He had time for one final act of public defiance when he addressed a huge crowd of delegates at the All- in African C onference, a gathering that had been organized by the ANC in Pietermaritzburg. In an audacious spe e ch, Mandela urged the government to admit the error of its ways and e stablish a democratic convention representing all S outh Africans, or else face a general strike which would paralyze the country. Ironically, the NP would accede to precisely the s e demands . However, S outh Africa would have to wait another thre e decades for this development, following consultations between President FW de Klerk and a newly released Mandela in 1 9 9 0 . De Klerk agree d to convene the C onvention for a D emo cratic S outh Africa ( C O D E S A ) , a body representing S outh Africans of all parties and races . This convention finally agree d a new constitution for a non- racial S o uth Africa, leading to the end of the apartheid system in 1 9 9 4 . Following h i s Pietermaritzburg spe e ch Mandela k n e w that he would have to go on the run from the authorities . He went undercover at the ANC 's safe house at Liliesleaf Farm and travelled across the country organizing resistance, often disguise d as a house boy, gardener or driver. His ability to evade the police b ecame legendary and earned him the nickname the "B lack Pimpernel" . From D e cember 1 9 6 1 , he was de eply involved in constituting Umkhonto we S izwe (MK) as its new commander-in - chief, and in organizing its regional command structures. He escap e d the country in early 1 9 6 2 and travelled extensively across Africa, where he met national leaders and received guerrilla training in Algeria . He also arrange d for exiled MK re cruits to train in E thiopia. After returning to S outh Africa, he was finally arrested by the police while returning to Johannesburg from a trip to D urban. He was sentenced to five years in j ail for leaving the country without permission and for inciting strike action . While serving this sentence, the police

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Thinking skills A cartoon, "The Trial", that appeared in Punch magazine after the Rivonia Trial.

arrested the remaining members of the MK High C ommand following a raid of Liliesleaf Farm . They found documents relating to explosives manufacture and a draft of Operation Mayibuye, MK's plan for a guerrilla struggle to be waged against the government. B etween 1 9 6 3 and 1 9 64, Mandela was brought before a court once again, in the famous Rivonia Trial ( s e e pages 6 9-7 1 ) . Following the trial, all but one of the defendants were found guilty and, contrary to exp e ctations, s entenced to life imprisonment instead of death by hanging . They were imme diately transferred in s e cret to their prison on Robben Island . Mandela and his comrades were to disapp ear from the political scene for the next 27 years . A defining era in S outh African politics, the period when the government implemented the apartheid system and the ANC responded, first with non-violent resistance and then with arm e d struggle, c a m e dramatically to a clo s e .

THE TRIAL Under the " Sabotage Act " there is

need for

South Africa to bring accused persons to trial. They ma�- be kept i n prison for an indefinite series of ninety-day periods merely on suspicion, c,·cn whe n - as last wee k - indictments are quashed. no

Assess m ent

Mandela's contribution to the ANC in particular, and to the anti- apartheid movement in general, was immens e . Using your own knowledge, as wel l as the information a bout the Rivonia Tria l He revitalize d the party i n the late found elsewhere in t h i s book, answer the fol l owing q uestions about t h i s ca rtoon. 1 94 0 s through his activism in the 1 Whose is the ubiquitous White face in the ca rtoon? Youth League and was a leading 2 What is the message of the cartoon? Note that you wi l l have to do your own light of the D efiance C ampaign in research in order to understand the meaning of "indictments a re q uashed" 1 9 5 2 , the point at which the party i n the ca ption. really began to make its mark as the vanguard of African resistance to the apartheid system. He was instrumental i n uniting S o uth T O K links Africans of all races in the struggle against apartheid Is it appropriate to place "icons" of the liberation movement, through his advocacy of the C O P. A principal target of the such as Mandela and Luthu l i, on historica l pedestals? apartheid regime, his defence in the drawn -out Treason What are the dangers of elevating historical figu res to hero Trial epitomized the resilience of those struggling against status? Is it correct to portray the fight against apartheid as an unjust racial system . The armed campaign of MK, a simple matter of "good against evil"? which he led, together with his exploits as the "B lack Pimp ernel" and the drama of the Rivonia Trial, where Was Thomas Carl y l e right when he a rgued that "the history he was once again cast as the principal defendant, all of the world is but the biogra p h y of great men"? Do "great ensured that the focus of the world remained on the men", such as Mandela and Luth u l i in South Africa, rea l l y iniquities of apartheid S o uth Africa in the years following change t h e course o f history, or a re social and economic the Sharp eville massacre . forces equally, if not more, importa nt?

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Why Mandela b ecame such an icon of the struggle is a question that has long interested historians. His first biographer, Mary B enson ( 1 9 8 6 ), argues that he came to embody the fre e dom struggle through his leadership of the D efiance C ampaign . The courage and fortitude he demonstrated in inviting arrest and then in persevering with his opposition to apartheid was a source of inspiration for many, both inside and outside the ANC . The historian Tom Lodge acknowle dges that Mandela was a rising star of the ANC in the 1 9 5 0s, but argue s that this was a time when he was still struggling to forge his own political identity, free from the influence of Luthuli on the one hand and his comrades in the SA C P on the other. According to Lodge, the Mandela legend was born after Sharpeville, when he came to b e viewed by many Africans as the saviour of the liberation struggle . He cut a romantic, C h e Guevara - like figure as t h e "B lack Pimpernel" a n d commander of MK. His reputation as a fearless and principled opponent of apartheid was confirmed with his famous spe e ch from the dock at the Rivonia Trial, when he announced that the ideal of demo cracy was one for which he was prepared to die .

Communication skills

�

Go to: https://www.youtu be.com/ watch?v=-Oj4e q7 z4. Watch this video clip to hear another of Mandela's fa mous and passionate speeches, the one he made on the day of his release after 27 years in prison. I n what ways has Mandel a's politica l attitude remained unchanged s i n c e he was sent to prison in 1 9 64? Details of Mandela's speech from the dock at the Rivonia Trial can be found on page 70, and the audio can be listened to here: https://www.youtu be.com/ watch?v=g5 0J 2 0 5 M d KI.

Fu l l docu ment Sou rce A

Sou rce 8

Tom Lodge, a South African historian who is professor of peace and conflict studies at the University of Limerick in Ireland. Mandela: A Critical Life (2006 ) .

Volunteer-in-chief Nelson Mandela prepares to burn his passbook in the back garden of his home in Orlando West during the D efiance Campaign, 1 9 5 2 .

C ertainly, Mandela himself [in the early 1 9 5 0s] was highly conscious of his authority; apparently both Sisulu and his wife Albertina were concerned that he could be rather too domineering [controlling] , although as Albertina conceded later : "it didn't matter because people liked to look up to a leader who was regal and maybe a bit distant" . Matthews remembers him disconcerting [unsettling] a gathering of ANC notables in Port E lizabeth in April 1 9 5 2 , mainly his elders, by informing them in the middle of his after­ dinner spe e ch that "he was looking forward to becoming the first president of a free republic of S outh Africa " . Anthony S ampson's " authorised" biography refl e cts the ANC 's preferred proj ection of the younger Mandela at the time it was written, the early 1 9 9 0 s, as a pioneering militant, one of the more radical ANC leaders, a "maverick" [unorthodox or indep endent-minded person] , increasingly impatient with non-violent methods .

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Sou rce C M. Maharaj and A. Kathrada, eds, senior ANC politicians who were imprisoned with Mandela on Robben Island. Kathrada worked as political adviser to Mandela while Mandela served as president. Maharaj was minister for transport from 1 994 to 1 999 and was appointed as spokesperson for President Jacob Zuma in 2 0 l l. Mandela: The A u thorized Portrait, page 62 (2 006).

D uring a brief lifting of his ban and b e fore fresh and more stringent bans were s e rv e d on him, and galled by t h e recently instituted B antu E du cation Act which further downgraded black edu cation and placed it firmly under the government's authority, Mandela addre s s e d a large gathering in S oweto . He spoke for ninety minutes, every word inaccurately recorded by a p oliceman, and, although the tone was militant, evoking warrior memories of S haka, he suffered no repercussions . . . In the new year Mandela spent time behind the scenes organizing protests in S ophiatown, and time in court defending people who were about to lose their house s . B oth efforts proved hopele s s . E arly in February, the removal trucks and two thousand police and army troops entered the township . The houses were razed; the people dumpe d in a designated area of S oweto known as Meadowlands. Again Mandela realise d how tame were their efforts at nonviolent protest when the state simply lashed out its iron fist.

Sou rce D M. Meredith, a British historian and journalist who has written several books on Africa. Nelson Mandela: A Biography, pages l l4- 1 5 , l l 9-2 1 ( 1 999).

The ANC , stirring itself for the first time since the D efiance C ampaign, decided . . . to launch a j oint protest [against forced removals] at the O din cinema. Among the spe akers invite d were Huddleston, Yusuf C achalia and Mandela, whose six-month banning order had just expired . . . Shortly after Huddleston had finished his spe e ch, a group of armed police

110

strode in, marched to the stage and arrested the next speaker, Yusuf C a chalia, dragging him towards the exit. Mandela, fearing an ugly turn of events, j umpe d on stage and began singing a well-known protest song . . . "I had seen and felt, in those moments, the terrifying spectre of the police state, " Huddleston wrote in his book Naught for Your Comfort. "There was the fiery breath of p olice totalitarianism in every movement . " . . . Opposition to the B antu E ducation Act was widespread, both among churches and in the African community. S ome churchmen decided to shut their schools than submit to the government. The response of the ANC was more confused . . . D e spite his reputation as a firebrand, Mandela favoured a more pragmatic approach. At the end of a heated session, the national executive committee recommended a week's b oycott starting on 1 April 1 9 5 5 . . . The campaign soon collapsed in bitterness and recrimination . O nly a small fraction of parents and schoolchildren were ever involved in the boycott.

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks According to S ource A, in what ways did a young Nelson Mandela stand out as a politician in the early 1 9 5 0s?

Fi rst q u esti o n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks What does S ource B reveal about Nelson Mandela's role in the ANC in 1 9 5 2 ?

Second q uestion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the value s and limitations of S ource C for historians studying Mandela's involvement in ANC protests and campaigns in the 1 9 5 0s .

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources C and D about anti- government protests and Nelson Mandela's role in these demonstrations .

Fou rt h q u estion - 9 m a rks Using the sources and your own knowle dge, evaluate Nelson Mandela's contribution to the struggle against apartheid in the years 1 948-5 5 .

C H A P T E R 1 . 4 : T H E R O L E AND S I G N I F I C AN C E O F K E Y I N D I V I D U A L S AND G R O U P S

Sou rce h e l p a n d h i nts Sou rces A a nd 8

Cont rasts •

The s o u r c e s disagree about s o m e of the d etails of the strik e . S o urce A claims that 5 0 % of the workers o b s e rv e d the strike , while S o urce B giv e s a fi g u r e of 8 0 % . S o urce A m entions 1 9 dead, while S ource B puts the numb e r at 1 8 .

•

S o urce A d e s crib e s the involvement of Mandela and S isulu in o b s e rving strike action and indicates that the y alm o s t b e came casualtie s . S ource B r e f e r s to the role of the ANC 's exe cutive (of which the two were m e mb e r s ) but d o e s n o t d e s crib e their role during the strik e .

•

S ource A mentions that Sisulu had reservations about using militant action in the future . S ource B mentions no such reservations, and states that the ANC executive announced another protest immediately afterwards .

( S e e page 8 5 . )

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the accounts presented in S ources A and B of the "May D ay stay - at-home" strike in 1 9 5 0 .

Co m p a risons •

B oth sources indicate that that there was resistance, from within the AN C , to working with the communists in organizing the strik e .

•

B oth sources emphasize the success of the strike, with a large proportion of the African workforce choosing to stay at home .

•

B oth sources mention that gatherings were banned on the day of the strik e .

•

B oth sources describe brutal police action .

Sou rces A a nd 8

b e twe e n the ANC and S A C P b a s e d on their common ideals and goals. S ource B argue s that he "bounced" t h e A N C into following the S A C P.

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks ( S e e page 9 5 . ) C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources A and B regarding the influence of the SACP on the ANC .

Cont rasts •

S ource B refers explicity to the debate about the armed struggl e . S ource A describ e s relations b etween t h e A N C a n d t h e SACP more generally.

•

S ource B suggests that Mandela had to overcome significant resistance from within the ANC , not least from Luthuli, to the idea of armed struggle. However, S ource A argue s that " revolutionary action " w a s "music to [the ANC 's] ears " .

•

S ource B states that Nelson Mandela j oined the central committee of the SACP. In S ource A Mandela argues that he had no need to j oin the communists .

•

S ource B argues that the ANC was u s e d by the S A C P. S ource A sugge sts that the opposite was tru e .

Co m p a risons •

The sources agree that the influence of the SACP on the ANC was very great. S ource A suggests that the Marxist ideas of the SACP were "music to the ears " of the ANC , and that the two organizations had much in common. S ource B goes even further by arguing that the ANC was "hij acked " by the SACP.

•

B oth sources indicate that Nelson Mandela had a key role to play in the developing relations b etween the ANC and the SACP.

•

B oth sources indicate that Mandela was very sympathetic to the aims of communism. In S ource A he makes a case for coop eration

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• second q uestion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource A for historians studying the role of the SACP and its influence on Nelson Mandela and the ANC during the 1 9 5 0 s and early 1 9 6 0 s .

form e d the b a sis of the state's case against him during the Tre a s o n and Rivonia Trials .

L i m itations •

Mandela may b e delib erately downplaying the extent of his involvement with the S A C P during t h e p erio d . H i s autobiography w a s p ublis h e d i n 1 9 9 5 , o n e y e a r after t h e first n o n - racial ele ctions after which Mandela b e came S o uth Africa's first B lack president. This was a tim e when Mandela was trying to promote r e c o nciliation between the races by p r e s enting him s elf as a unifying figure . He was tru sted by many in the White community, and admitting that he had b e e n a member o f the S A C P may have undermin e d this tru s t .

•

Mandela had denied being a member of the SACP at the Rivonia Trial. He may have been lying in his autobiography in order to avoid accusations of inconsistency.

•

Mandela's discussion of the relationship b e twe e n the S A C P and the ANC is very general in nature . He does not dire ctly refer to the role of the SACP in any particular event or events . However, it may be surmised, since h e refers to accusations that the communists " u s e d " the ANC , that he is alluding to the p eriod of the e arly 1 9 6 0 s and the debate over the arm e d struggle .

Va l u es •

The source is Mandela's autobiography, published more than thre e decades after the events he is describing. His refl e ctions have the b enefit of hindsight, and his views are not mediated by a biographer. Mandela's influence was crucial to the ANC drawing increasingly closer to the SACP during this period, so his reflections on the matter are invaluable to the historian's understanding.

•

The source giv e s us a valuable insight into the way in which Mandela's political philo s ophy was evolving in a left- wing direction in the 1 9 5 0 s and early 1 9 6 0 s . It also helps u s understand why communist ideas were attactive to many others in the fre edom struggl e .

•

The source provides us with Mandela's definitive answer to a que stion that has long intrig u e d historian s : that of whether h e had ever b e e n a m e m b e r of t h e S A C P. The accusation that he was a communist also

Sou rce A Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks ( S ee page 1 0 0 . )

manifesto, "there remain only two choices : submit or fight" . •

MK has been formed not to cause civil war but to avoid it, by awakening all S outh Africans to the errors of the NP government and the inj ustices of apartheid.

•

Armed struggle has been adopted in order to overthrow the government and bring an end to racial oppression

According t o S ource A , why did the ANC resort to arm e d struggle in 1 9 6 1 ? •

The ANC has been given little option but to adopt armed struggle; according to the MK

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..

Sou rce B

What is the message of the carto on in S ource B ?

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks

•

The cartoon shows a field which has b e e n ploughed a n d s o w n by a tractor. T h e tractor is lab elled "Apartheid" . Rows of spears are b eginning to e m e rge in the soil b e hind the tractor. This indicates that the apartheid system will reap a bitter harve st: arm e d struggle, represented by r o w s of spears .

•

One of the spears is held aloft, meaning that Africans will finally take the fight to the apartheid system by adopting arm e d struggle . The message is that the S outh African government, which is shown seated with a gun in the tractor, is responsible for African re sistance b e cause of its apartheid policies and repression of the ANC .

•

The caption "D ragon's teeth" implies that Africans will prove to be a formidable foe for the government. This is confirmed by the many spears emerging from the soil. The detail of the low dark clouds implies that there will be difficult times ahead for the country.

A cartoon by Norman Mansbridge, Punch magazine, 1 960.

DRAGON'S TEETH

Sou rce A

Sou rce B

Fi rst q u estion, p a rt a - 3 m a rks

The Black Christ, a painting by the White South African artist Ronnie Harrison, 1 96 1 . It depicts Chief Luthuli being crucified by Prime Minister HF Verwoerd and Minister of Justice John Vorster.

( S e e page 1 0 5 . ) According to S ource A, what were the results of Luthuli's "many years of moderatio n " ? T h e results of Luthuli's "many years o f mo deration " were : •

a reluctance on the part of the government to reciprocate his moderation

•

the tightening of discriminatory legislation resulting in an "intensification of our subj ugation "

•

an awareness that the strategy of mo derate oppo sition has not worked

•

a realization that a " spirit of revolt" is now re quired.

113

..Fi rst q u estion, p a rt b - 2 m a rks

•

What is the message of S ource B ? •

C hief Luthuli, with his C hristian compassion and non-violence, is a C hrist- like figure .

•

B lack people, symbolized by the figure of Luthuli, have been " crucified" by the apartheid system.

•

The government ( represented by Verwo erd and Vorster) has destroyed the peaceful resistance of Africans.

Sou rces C and D Second q uestion - 4 m a rks

Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks C ompare and contrast the views of C hief Luthuli expressed in S ources C and D .

Co m p a risons •

S ources C and D agree that C hief Luthuli's acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize was a crucial moment in the history of the lib eration struggle b e cause it focused the attention of the entire world on the inj ustice of racial oppression in S outh Africa .

•

The sources agree that Luthuli was a conciliatory figure . S ource C argues that he prevented African feelings of resentment from turning into a desire for revenge, while S ource D claims he was responsible for holding together a broad coalition of competing interests .

•

The sources agree that Luthuli was a pacifist who hated violenc e .

( S ee pages 1 04 and 1 0 5 . ) With reference to its origin, purpose and content, assess the values and limitations of S ource D for historians studying C hief Luthuli's involvement in the fre e dom struggle.

Va l u es •

The article is written by an academic and is likely to have been well researched.

•

As a minister and theologian himself, C ouper is likely to have an intimate knowledge of Luthuli's religious b eliefs and how the s e may have influenced his politics.

•

•

C ouper worked in Luthuli's Groutville parish, and may well have interviewed p eople who knew Luthuli personally in the place where he spent most of his time, even after he b e came ANC leader. C ouper provides an alternative viewpoint to the mainstream position of the ANC . This position is that Luthuli came around to the idea of armed struggle after being perusaded by Mandela and others that the movement had run out of options .

L i m itations •

As a lecturer in religion, C ouper is likely to emphasize the spiritual dimensions of Luthuli's leadership, perhaps at the expense of a more rounded political analysis .

•

The article was published in the International Congregational Jou rnal, which is obviously a C hristian publication. It is therefore hardly a surprise that C ouper concludes that Luthuli was " first and foremost a C hristian " .

C ouper has set out to provide a revisionist account of Luthuli's role in the armed struggle controversy. This may have caused him to neglect certain evidence that contradicts his thesis, such as the testimony of other ANC leaders who argue d that he finally agreed to the proposal and who were present at key meetings with Luthuli when the issue was b eing debated.

Cont rasts •

S ource D argues that while Luthuli was a s e cular politician, he was primarily a C hristian . S ource C makes no mention of his C hristianity and suggests that he was entirely dedicated to the secular struggle against apartheid.

•

S ource C emphasizes Luthuli's role in pointing the ANC away from "petition politics" towards a more radical approach. S ource D , on the other hand, emphasizes that his approach remained constant throughout.

•

S ource C suggests that Luthuli was "ready to embrace the new approach" of armed struggle. S ource D disagrees, referring to his "consistent advocacy of non -violenc e " in the final years of his leadership .

•

S ource D argues that the mainstream of the ANC turned away from Luthuli after it embraced armed struggle. S ource C, on the other hand, argues that Luthuli always remained at the heart of the ANC . ---

1 14

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..

.

Fou rth q uest i o n - 9 m a rks

Using the sources and your own knowle dge, to what extent do you agree with the claim that C hief Luthuli took the ANC "to greater heights " ? •

•

•

S ource A : Luthuli exhibits the qualities of a fearless and inspirational leader in his statement. The statement indicate s that he is willing to adopt new, more radical strategies . S o u r c e B : The subj e ct matter of the p ainting ( cru cifixi o n ) might s u g g e s t t h a t the ANC h a s b e e n d e s tro y e d by t h e g o v e rnment u n d e r Luthuli's l e a d e rship . H o w e v e r, the fact that it h a s b e e n p aint e d by a White artist s u g g e s t s t h a t L u thuli's dignity h a s w o n the ANC the admiration and sympathy o f some White S o uth Africans . It also impli e s that L u thuli has b e co m e an ico n o f the struggl e . S ource C : Luthuli's achievement in winning the Nobel Peace Prize was a source of great pride for Africans at a time when the government was clamping down on the ANC . He was prepared to take the movement forward and embrace

Sou rce A Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt a - 3 m a rks ( S e e page 1 1 0 . )

new strategies, for example armed struggle, as the situation demanded. •

S ource D : Luthuli succeeded in unifying a diverse range of groups within the AN C . However, his commitment to n o n - violence b e came obsolete in the harsher context of the e arly 1 9 6 0 s and the ANC left him b ehind.

•

Luthuli played an important role in the D efiance C ampaign, and in planning the Resist Apartheid C ampaign and the C ongress of the People ( C OP ) .

•

There were consecutive government banning orders against Luthuli, which limited his effectiveness as ANC leader.

•

Luthuli failed to prevent the Africanists from breaking away from the ANC and forming the PAC .

•

Luthuli carried out a symbolic burning of his passbook after the Sharpeville massacre and he organized other acts of resistance at the tim e .

•

Luthuli's enduring legacy is as a moral leader and a man of p eace .

Volunteer-in-chief Nelson Mandela prepares to burn his passbook in the back garden of his home in Orlando West during the D efiance Campaign, 1 9 5 2

According t o S ource A, in what ways did a young Nelson Mandela stand out as an ANC politician in the early 1 9 5 0s ? •

As a young man Mandela was highly conscious of his own authority and could appear haughty and arrogant.

•

He had a tendency to dominate others .

•

He was not afraid to upset his seniors by expressing his political ambitions.

•

He was a radical who was determined to force the movement away from its p olicies of mo deration and non -violence .

Sou rce 8 Fi rst q u estio n , p a rt b - 2 m a rks ( S e e page 1 0 9 . ) What does S ource B reveal about Nelson Mandela's role in the ANC in 1 9 5 2 ?

115

..

•

•

•

Mandela was volunteer-in - chief in the D efiance C ampaign, the most senior organizer in the first maj o r campaign against apartheid laws launched by the movement. As well as an organizer, Mandela was also involved in acts of defiance : in this photograph he is seen burning his passbook. Even though many of the acts of defiance were on a small scale (in this image he is acting alone in a deserted backyard ) , Mandela made sure that photographers were present to record the event and achieve maximum publicity for the D efiance C ampaign .

to the B antu E ducation Act. S ource D does the oppo site . •

Second q u estion - 4 m a rks With reference to its origin, purp o s e and content, assess the value and limitations of S ource C for historians studying Mandela's involvement in ANC protests and campaigns in the 1 9 5 0 s .

Va l ues •

The book is e dite d by Maharaj and Kathrada, two ANC veterans who knew Mandela well. They were politically active in the 1 9 5 0s and would have been involved in the organization of some of the events they are describing, giving them intimate first-hand knowledge of the subj e ct matter.

•

The b o o k was written in 2 0 0 6 , som e 5 0 years after the events that are b e ing des crib e d . The authors have the benefit of hindsight and are able to put the events of the 1 9 5 0 s into the context of sub s e qu ent p o litical developments in S outh Africa, of which they were also a part. Apartheid had been dead for more than a decade by the time that the book was written. In the meantime, a process of reconciliation had taken place between the perpetrators and victims of the system . The authors are therefore less likely to b e swayed by bitterness or other emotional factors .

Sou rces C a n d D Th i rd q u estion - 6 m a rks ( S ee page 1 1 0 . ) C ompare and contrast the views expressed in S ources C and D about anti-government protests and Nelson Mandela's role in these demonstrations.

S ource C refers to Mandela as a militant. S ource D indicates that he a favoured " a more pragamatic approach " .

Co m p a risons •

B oth sources describe Mandela's involvement in two important events : the protests against the B antu E ducation Act and oppo sition to the forced removals in S ophiatown.

•

B oth sources stress Mandela importance to the ANC at an early stage in his political career: S ource C shows him making spe e ches and organizing resistance, while S ource D describes him as rescuing a dangerous situation at a protest meeting and playing a leading role in a party debate .

•

•

B oth sources indicate that Mandela was involved in the protests only b e cause his banning orders had recently expired.

L i m itations

•

B oth sources describe the toughness of the government's response, and suggest that this was one the reasons for the failure of the campaigns in which Mandela was involved.

Cont rasts •

S ource C focuses solely on Mandela and his role in the protests. S ource D mentions other figures as well, such as Huddleston and C achalia .

•

S o urce C indicate s that the campaign to save S ophiatown was a failure but makes no mention of the outcome of the opposition

•

Maharaj and Kathrada are very senior members of the ANC . Their assessment of the 1 9 5 0 s - a dramatic time in the history of the movement and ind e e d in the career of Mandela - is unlikely to b e entirely impartial.

•

The two spent many years with Mandela on Robben Island. Mandela was of course still alive in 2 0 0 6 , and it is highly unlikely that the authors would produce a critical biography of man who they revered and still regarded as a mentor and leader. The words " authorized portrait" in the title suggests that this may b e a text i n which details of h i s political career have been airbrushed. -----

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..

•

•

The p a s s a g e s d e s cribing the protests against the B antu E du cation Act and the forced rem ovals of S ophiatown are very brie f . T h e r e is n o in - d epth analysis o f Mandela's role in either. This sugge sts that the real focus o f the book is Mandela 's p e rs o n ality and celebrity rath e r than the protest and campaigns o f the 1 9 5 0 s .

•

S ource C : Mandela played an important role in organizing the campaigns against B antu education and forced removals . However, the success of the s e campaigns was limite d - not for any shortcomings on his part, but because of the might of the apartheid state .

•

S ource D : Mandela was very quick -witted and was capable of defusing potentially dangerous situations. He was also prepared to b e pragmatic, despite his radical reputation . However, s o m e of the campaigns i n which he was involved, such as that against B antu education, were a failure .

•

Mandela's leadership of the ANC Youth League and his success in radicalising the ANC in 1 94 9 by persuading it to adopt the Programme of Action .

•

He wrote the "M Plan", which later became the basis for founding Umkhonto we Sizwe ( MK ) .

•

Mandela's role in r e a ching out to other n o n - white anti - ap artheid groups by forming the C ongre ss Alliance, as w e ll as his role in organising the C O P and drafting the F r e e dom C h arter.

•

As a radical, Mandela took the ANC closer to the SACP and advocated turning the ANC into a genuine mass movement.

There is no indication in the source that the oppo sition to the B antu E ducation Act was a failure . This suggests that some of the less successful aspects of the ANC 's campaigns have been glossed over.

Fou rth q u estion - 9 m a rks Using the sources and your own knowle dge, evaluate Nelson Mandela's contribution to the struggle against apartheid in the years 1 948-5 5 . •

•

S ource A : Mandela was a confident and ambitious leader who refused to defer to his seniors . He had a natural authority and was not afraid to challenge accepted ways by advo cating new, more radical strategies of re sis tan c e . S ource B : Mandela was the main organizer of the D efiance C ampaign, one of the most important campaigns in the struggle against apartheid. He led by example and was brave enough to court his own arrest by defying apartheid laws.

Refe re n ces B unting, B. 1 9 9 8 . Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary . C ape Town, S outh Africa. Mayibuye B o oks, University of the Western C ap e . C ouper, S . 2 0 0 5 . " M y People L e t G o " . International Congregational Journal. Vol 5, issue l . Lodge, T. 2 0 0 6 . Mandela: A Critical Life. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press. Maharaj , M and Kathrada, A, eds. 2 0 0 6 . Mandela : The A u thorized Portrait. Rowville, VIC , Australia. The Five Mile Pres s . Mandela, N. 1 9 9 5 . The Long Walk t o Freedom . London, UK. Little, B rown & C ompany. Mbeki, G. 1 9 9 2 . The Struggle for L iberation in South Africa : A Short History. M e r e dith . M. 1 9 9 9 . Nelson Mandela : A Biography . New York, U S A . Public Affairs . Sisulu, E . 2 0 0 2 . Walter and A lbertina Sisulu : In Our Lifetime. C ape Town, S outh Africa. D avid Philip Publishers.

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South African history prior to 1 9 48 The first maj o r clash of B lack and White peoples i n S outh Africa took place on the far frontiers of the E astern C ap e in the late 1 8th century. A definitive moment in the history of the region, it marked the point at which the vanguards of two great colonizing migrations came face to face for the first tim e . The first of these, the B antu Migration, had already been underway for well over a millennium . It consisted of several waves of population movements, originally stemming from central parts of the continent (probably modern- day C ameroon ) , which had, over hundreds of years, swept slowly eastwards and then southwards along the African continent. As they pressed into S outhern Africa, they displaced the indigenous S an and Khoikhoi populations in the proce ss. The Xhosa were at the farthest south-westerly prong of this great migration .

..A. The routes of the Ba ntu m igration

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C H AP T E R 1 . 5 : A P R O F I L E O F S O U T H AF R I C A

The s e cond of the s e migrations was on a smaller s cale . The chartered D utch East India C ompany ( V O C ) had e stablished a tiny s e ttlement at the C ap e of Good H o p e in 1 6 5 2 , o n the site of m o d e r n ­ day C ap e Tow n . I t s p u rp o s e was to a c t a s a refreshment p o st, supplying fresh fruit and vegetabl e s to V O C ship s plying the long and ardu o u s j ourney to the s p i c e islands of the D utch E ast Indi e s . As time w e n t o n , t h e tiny group of V O C emplo y e e s grew slowly in number. The s e ttlement crept e astwards a s s o m e s e ttlers trie d to e s cape re strictive company rules and s e t up their own independent farm s . The s e w e r e the original Trekboers . There was little .A. Va n Riebeeck of the D u t c h East I ndia C o m p a n y (VO C ) l a n d i n g a t the Cape, i n a 19th·cent u r y p a i nt i n g to stand in their way apart by Charles B e l l . T h e Africans depicted i n the i mage a r e i n d igenous Khoikhoi from the o c casional Khoikhoi re sistan c e . By the late 1 8th century, the s e e a rly B o e r s ettlers had reached a s far e astwards a s the Great Fish River. Now they w e r e confronted with a f a r mo re formidable fo e : t h e Xhosa, who had reached the w e stward limit of their own migrati o n . The r e sulting skirmishes were the first in a series o f frontier wars that lasted a century. They went s o m e way to shaping future relations between the race s .

The a rriva l of the B ritish and the G reat Tre k B y this tim e the B ritish, who had e stablishe d their own empire b a s e d on chartered company r u l e in India, had begun to t a k e a k e e n interest in the region. The D utch colony, on the southe rly tip of the continent, o ccupied a strategically vital p o int on the sea route to the east. With D utch power on the wane, the B ritish u s e d the Napoleonic Wars and the French o ccupation of Holland as an ideal opportunity to seize the C ap e . F o rmal sovereignty was c e d e d by the Netherlands in 1 8 0 6 . I n the 1 8 2 0 s, the B ritish e stablishe d the new s ettler towns o f Port E lizab eth, E ast London and Grahamstown in the eastern p art of the colony. Many B o er farm ers were pre dictably disenchant e d with the arrival of the B ritish. They straine d against the authority of the crown and resented what they felt to b e undue bureau cratic interference in their tra ditional way of life . The B ritish ab olition of slavery across its empire in 1 8 3 3 was the final straw. B eginning in 1 8 3 5 , tho u s ands of B o ers packed their o x - wagons and, unable to go any furthe r east

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b e cause of the Xhosa presence there, travell e d d e ep into the more arid sub continental interior. They spilled northwards and e a stwards into what would later b e come the O range F r e e State and the Transvaal, and then finally s outhwards into Natal . This series of j o u rneys b e came known as the Great Tre k .

•

Schoemansdal

200 0

300

400 m i les 600 kms

.6. The m a i n routes of the Great Trek, 1835- 1846

.6. Roma ntic depiction of the G reat Tre k by li nus

de J on gh

120

M e anwhile , a formidable new military force had e m e r g e d in the Natal regio n . Towards the end of the 1 8 1 O s , t h e expanding Z u l u nation u n d e r S haka fought a s e r i e s of aggressive wars against its neighb o urs . T h e s e conflicts initiat e d t h e te rrible events that b e came known a s the Mfecan e . Groups that managed to fl e e S haka's armi e s attack e d other p e ople where they s e ttled, and this s e t o ff a chain r e a ction o f warfare and destruction that r e s ulted in the depopulation of much o f the S outh African interior by the 1 8 2 0 s . Ironically, the Mfecane proved a maj o r b o o n to the Voo rtrekkers ( th e name given to the B o ers who took p art in the Great Tre k ) , who s ub s e q u e ntly encountered little re sistance when they e stablished their h o m e s t e a d s . Nonetheless, arm e d engagements b e tw e e n B o ers and Africans w e r e not uncomm o n . The B o ers had

C H AP T E R 1 . 5 : A P R O F I L E O F S O U T H AF R I C A

an overwhelming edge in weaponry, and w o n a fam o u s victory over D ingaan's Zulu army at the B attle o f Blood Riv e r ( B attle of "Ncome Riv e r " in Zulu ) in 1 8 3 8 . The indep endence o f the Republic of Natalia that the B oers e stablish e d in the wake of their victory was short - lived, however. Mindful of the strategic imp ortance of controlling the entire coastline of the subcontinent, the B ritish annexed Natal in 1 84 3 . • Artist's i l l ustration of the Batt l e of B lo o d River. The Boers formed a laager of ox-wago n s However, they agre e d a n d k i l l e d as m a n y as 3 , 0 0 0 of the Z u l u wa rriors who w e r e sto r m i n g the e n c a m p ment. to recognize Afrikaner Accord i n g to the legend, the nearby Nco me River turned red with blood sovereignty in the Transvaal and the O range Free S tate in conventions signe d at S and River in 1 8 5 2 and i n Blo emfontein i n 1 8 5 4 . Growing E u ropean interest i n the rest o f the continent soon p u t a n e n d t o this status quo . The B ritish attempte d to federate S o uth Africa by force in 1 8 7 7 when an exp e ditionary p arty was sent to the Transvaal from Natal. It met with no initial re sistance from the B o e r s . However, the Transvaalers organize d their forces and won a famous victory over the B ritish at the B attle of Majuba in 1 8 8 1 . This brought to an end the brief conflict that is sometimes known as the First Anglo-B o e r War.

The m i n e ra l revo l ution a n d the South Africa n Wa r Following this setback, it s e e m e d as if B ritish attempts to quash B o er indep endence might b e put on hold indefinitely. However, some dramatic new developments completely altered this state of affair s . D iamonds had already b e e n discovered i n Kimb erley i n 1 8 6 7 . Now, in 1 8 8 6 , gold was found on the Witwatersrand in the h e art of the S outh African Republic (the offi cial name for the Transvaal ) . It soon b e came evident that the deposits were enorm o u s . Lab o u r and capital, from the rest of the sub continent as well as from overseas, flo o d e d into the reef. This movement of workers into the burgeoning city of Johannesburg would b e of tremendous imp ortance for two main reasons . First, it marked the real b eginning of the mass migration of Africans into the cities, a phenomenon which sub s e quent segregationist laws tried to control and which the apartheid authorities would attempt, in vain, to revers e . S e cond, the flow of Whites into Johannesburg spark e d a political contest b e tween t h e government of t h e Transvaal led by Paul Kruger, which wanted to preserve the conservative Afrikaner character of the republic, and the s o - called u itlander community of mainly E nglish -speaking Whites, who s e demand for the vote was

121

J a n S m uts Jan S m uts was b o rn in the Ca pe i n 1 8 ? 0 and stu d ied law at Ca m b ridge U n iversity. When h e retu rn ed to South Africa h e m oved to the Tra nsva a l a n d served as p o l itica l advisor to President Kruge r, befo re l e a d i n g a B o er com m a n d o u n it d u ri n g the South African Wa r. H e took p a rt i n n egotiatio n s leading to the Treaty o f Vereen igi n g a n d beca m e a ctive i n the p o l itics of the Tra nsva a l thereafter. A key figure i n the nati o n a l co nve ntion which resu lted i n the U n i o n of South Africa, S m uts was i n stru m e nta l i n the creation of the South African Pa rty ( which later beca m e the U n ited Pa rty ) a n d was give n th ree m i n istries i n the fi rst u n i o n gove rn m e nt l e d b y Lou i s Botha. H e c o m m a n d e d South African troops aga i n st the Germans i n the Fi rst Wo rld Wa r and headed h i s cou ntry's d e l egation at the Pa ris Peace Conference, where h e made a sign ificant contri bution to the c reati o n of the League of Nations. He was a p p o i nted p ri m e m i n ister fo l l owing the d eath of Louis Both a, a n d conti n u e d t o serve, on a n off, as nati o n a l l e a d e r u ntil the NP victory of 1 948. The p ri n c i p a l a rch itect of the system of segregation, S m uts was n o n ethel ess p l a n n i n g t o reve rse s om e of its m o re discri m i n atory l aws before h i s defeat i n the 1948 e l e ction. He died in 1950.

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backed by the colonial authorities i n C ap e Town. I n 1 8 9 5 , C ap e C olony Prime Minister C e cil Rhodes was implicated in an abortive coup attempt which b e came known as the Jameson Raid. A small arm e d party was s e n t to invade t h e Transvaal a n d spark an u itlander uprising . Following its failure, the B ritish appointed Alfred Milner to the post of high commissioner for S o uth Africa. A self - describ e d " B ritish race imp erialist", Milner was determin e d to bring the indep endence of the Transvaal to an end and u s e d the u itlander franchise issue as a pretext for upping the political ante . The re sult was the S o uth African War ( s ometimes known as the Anglo-B o e r War or simply the B o er War ) , fought b e twe e n the B ritish and the two B o er Republics b e twe e n 1 8 9 9 and 1 9 0 2 . E a rly B ritish hopes of a quick victory were confounded, but the imp e rial power gradually wrested back the initiative from the B o er armie s . In the final two years of the war, the B o ers waged a prolonged guerrilla campaign . They were finally brought to the negotiating table not by defeat in the field, but by the scorched e arth tactics of the B ritish and the internment of hundreds of thousands of B o er women and children in concentration camp s .

The Act of U n io n a n d the segregatio n e ra D e spite the bittern e ss of the conflict, the B o er defeat was followe d by an unlikely political reconciliation b e tween the two White p e oples of S outh Africa. The terms of the Tre aty of Ver e eniging offered to the B o ers were relatively lenient. The B o e r Republics, which had been brought under the direct control of the B ritish, were soon grante d a me asure of self-government. I n 1 9 0 8 , a S outh African National C onvention (a b o dy containing representatives from each region ) , met to consider the p o ssibility of a full political union of the four colonie s . The re sult w a s the agreement of the S o uth African Act ( also known as the Act of Unio n ) of 1 9 0 9 . The new Union of S o uth Africa, which came into being a year later, was given full dominion status in the B ritish Empir e . This me ant that the country was now in effect a fully independent state . Ironically, those Afrikaners who had fought the B ritish with such tenacity j ust eight years previously now assumed political office . With the S o uth African Party ( SAP) winning the first general ele ction, the former B oer War general Louis B otha was appointed prime minister, with Jan Smuts as his deputy. Africans were to be completely excluded from the new dispensation. With some very minor exceptions, only Whites could exercise the vote . Laws segregating White and B lack p e ople, which had been enforced to a greater or lesser degree in the B ritish colonies and B o e r Republics, were now applied with more vigour than before . In 1 9 1 2 , educated Africans responded to the s e worrying developments by forming t h e S o uth African Native National C ongress ( SANNC ) , the forerunner of the ANC , in a vain attempt to defend their political interests . At the same time, die - hard Afrikaner nationalists obj e cted to the "one stream" policy of the B o tha-Smuts government, a strategy designed to promote further reconciliation

C H AP T E R 1 . 5 : A P R O F I L E O F S O U T H AF R I C A

between the two White populations. The radical National Party ( NP ) , under the leadership of JB M Hertzog, w a s formed i n 1 9 1 4 . S outh African entry into the First World War and the failed Afrikaner rebellion which followed only served to harden these political division s . Labour disputes in the e arly 1 9 2 0 s led to the Rand Revolt of White mine workers in 1 9 2 2 , which the Smuts government was able to end only by resorting to armed force . Meanwhile, agitation among the B lack population was also growing, with tens of thousands of African workers j oining the Industrial and C ommercial Workers' Union ( I C U ) led by C lements Kadali e . In 1 92 4, the SAP was swept from power as Hertzog replaced Smuts as prime minister. The NP leader extended the systematic discrimination of Africans still further through his s o - called " civilize d labour" policy. The Great D epression of the early 1 9 3 0 s had a big imp act on S outh African politics. With the e conomy reeling as countries across the world abandoned the gold standard, Hertzog and S muts came together and unifi e d their p artie s, forming the new United Party or UP. A new fusion government was form e d . This was the cue for a se cond Afrikaner s chism, with D F Malan breaking away from the Hertzogite nationalists to form the Ge suiwerde Nasionale Party ( also known as the Purifie d National Party or GNP ) . The outbreak of the S e cond World War, and Smuts' decision to side with the B ritish once again, m eant that divisions among the White s were again compounde d . M o r e radical Afrikaners, led by Malan, n o w sto o d clearly opp o s e d to the m o derates led by S muts, who was supported by the maj ority of E nglish - sp e akers . Hertzog left the UP and rej oin e d the GNP, which was now renamed the Herenigde Nasionale Party ( Reunified National Party ) or simply the National Party ( NP ) . The political climate b e came even more tense with the creation of pro - Nazi organizations such as the O ssewabrandwag ( O x - wagon S entinels ) , a group which counted future NP Prime Minister John Vorster as a member. M eanwhile, African politics was sharply radicalize d by the war. S o uth African industry expanded in order to meet the increa s e d allied demand during wartime, and more and more Africans moved to the cities to fill the new j ob s in manufacturing. S trike a ction b e came increasingly common. The ANC ( which form e d a radical Youth L e ague in 1 94 4 ) and t h e C ommunist Party of S outh Africa ( C P S A ) were b oth very prominent in the organization of strikes and other prote sts . With the war over, White S o uth Africa s e e m e d to b e at a crossroads. Millions of B lack Africans now lived alongside White s in the citi e s . They were increasingly confident and vo cal in demanding an end to the policy of racial discrimination. What should White policy makers do next? Was the dream of segregating the races still p o s sible, or even de sirable? In the 1 948 general ele ction, the White p e ople of S o uth Africa delivered their verdict. Their answer was Malan's National Party ( NP ) and its policy of apartheid.

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Cou ntry profile Po l iti ca l geogra p h y D uring the apartheid era, S outh Africa was made up o f four separate provinc e s . These were the C ape Province, Natal, the Transvaal and the O range Free S tate . The se areas had been independent of one another prior to 1 9 1 0 but came together to form the Union of S outh Africa in that year. Two of the four, the C ap e Province and Natal, had been B ritish colonies of settlement and still, to a greater or lesser degree, retained a B ritish identity; this very much depended on the area, and was truer in Natal than in the C ap e . The other two areas, Transvaal and the O range Free S tate, had formerly been B o er Republics, and for that reason were more typically Afrikaner in character ( although the city of Johannesburg was a partial exception here, with its split Anglo -Afrikaner identity ) . In the C ap e Province, the main urban settlement was C ap e Town in the far south-west, the s o - called mother city and the se cond most populous city in the nation . As the seat of the nation's parliament, C ap e Town was also the legislative capital. There were also two large port towns in the eastern part of the C ap e Province, Port Elizabeth a n d E ast London, as well as t h e diamond mining centre of Kimberley in the C ap e interior. In Natal, the inland

Z I M BABWE � 0 N

•

W i n d hoek

OJ

B OTSWANA G a borone

NAM I B IA

C a pe Prov i n ce A tlan tic Ocean

Indian Ocean

.6. The fou r p rovi n ces of South Africa, 19 10-94

124

� �

0 •

c m

C H AP T E R 1 . 5 : A P R O F I L E O F S O U T H AF R I C A

town of Pietermaritzburg was the provincial capital. However, by far the largest town in this province was the port city of D urban, which was also the third largest city in the country. Transvaal was the home of the country's seat of government, Pretoria . This meant that the city was also the national capital. However, the province's economy was dominate d by the gold-mining city of Johannesburg, the largest city in the country as well as its financial powerhou s e . The huge conurbation clustered around Johannesburg was known as the Witwatersrand. Located in the geographical heart of S outh Africa, the O range Free S tate was very much a rural province . Its largest city, Bloemfontein, was also the j u dicial capital of the nation . The existence of three capitals - one administrative, one legislative, and one j u dicial - was a legacy of the Act of Union of 1 9 1 0 . The two B ritish colonies, as well as the Transvaal and the O range Free S tate, were each reluctant to concede the political initiative to their rival provinces in the new union . The re sult was a compromise whereby three national capitals were create d.

0 0

100 km 100 m l

P I E T E RS B U RG e

P R ETO RIA •

N

•

J O H AN N E S B U RG e VE R E E N I G I N G

Vaai R

•

WELKOM

ULUNDI •

30"

South A tlantic Ocean Indian Ocean EAST LO N D O N G RA H A M STOWN • 3 . C A P E TOWN

.A. The m a i n cities of South Africa

125

Peo p l e Known to day a s the Rainbow Nation, S outh Africa, with its p opulation of 52 million, has an amazingly diverse range of ethnicities. D u ring the e arly apartheid period, the overall population of the country was significantly lower than it is today, ranging from 1 2 million in 1 948 to 1 8 million in 1 9 64. D u ring this time, Whites, of whom there were roughly 3 million, constituted nearly one-fifth of the total p opulation .

Boer

This term, which means "farmer" and refers to the Afrikaner people, is perfectly acceptable to use in a historical context. However, it is considered pejorative when used to describe Afrikaners today.

T h e White population of S outh Africa is m a d e u p of two main group s . T h e first group a r e t h e Afrikaners, sometimes referred to as Boers . The Afrikaners make up nearly 6 0 % of the total White p opulation . They are the descendants of the D utch E ast Indies C o mpany employees who first settled at the C ap e of Good Hope in the 1 7th century, as well as of other European p e oples, such as the French Huguenots who fle d to the C ap e to e scape religious persecution at hom e . Their language still b e ars strong similarities to D utch . Among the White population, the Afrikaners tend to b e more numerous than the E nglish in rural areas generally, in all of the O range Free S tate, in the Transvaal (with the partial exception of Johannesburg ) , in the northern parts of Natal, and in some areas of the C ape, especially the western parts of the province and the northern C ap e interior. The large maj ority of Afrikaners are C hristians . Many are members of the protestant D utch Reformed C hurch (D R C ) , a C alvinist denomination . This brand of C hristianity is strict and conservative, and some historians argue that it had a strong influence on the ideological development of apartheid. D uring the e arly era of apartheid, the vast maj ority of Afrikaners supported the ruling NP led by D F Malan, JG S trij dom and HF Verwoerd. The E nglish, who make up much of the remaining 4 0 % o f the White pop ulation, are d e s c e ndants of the B ritish s e ttlers who emigrate d to the C ap e and Natal in the 1 9th century, after b o th of the s e colonies were ann e x e d by their government. They make up the maj ority o f t h e White p o pulation i n m o s t of Natal and t h e E astern C ap e . Many E nglis h - sp e aking White s moved to the Witwatersrand following the discovery of gold in 1 8 8 6 , a fact which explains the high proportion o f E n glish - sp e akers in the Johannesburg a r e a . Most anglophone S outh Africans are members o f vario u s protestant church e s . D uring the e a rly apartheid era, they tended to support the United Party ( UP ) . The UP was opp o s e d to what was p erceived a s the Afrikaner favouritism of the NP. It was also against s o m e o f the m or e extre m e elements of aparth e i d . However, with the n o table exception of the fam o u s anti - ap artheid camp aigne r Helen S uzman, who was a member o f the UP until 1 9 59, this p arty supported the basic tenets of a system o f ra cial s e gregati o n . White S outh Africans as a whole w e r e t h e main beneficiaries of the apartheid system. They were the only group who could exercise the vote and they held the vast maj ority of the country's wealth .

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C H AP T E R 1 . 5 : A P R O F I L E O F S O U T H AF R I C A

D uring the early apartheid period, of S outh Africa's maj ority non-White population, some 1 . 5 million were C oloured and nearly half a million Indian. The C oloureds were a group with an extraordinarily rich ethnic heritag e . B roadly speaking, they were the descendants of the interracial offspring of D utch farmers and their slav e s . The se slaves were mainly S an, Khoikhoi or Malay. The latter group had been imp orted from the D utch East Indies in the 1 7th and 1 8th centurie s . The C oloured p e ople also have a strong element of African ancestry. Most C oloureds are Afrikaans speakers, and many feel a strong cultural affinity with their White co - linguists, despite the legacy of the apartheid system. They constituted a maj ority of the population in the we stern and northern parts of C ap e Province, but there were also large numbers of C oloureds in other maj o r citie s . Most C oloureds were Christian, and many were members of the D R C . Others, espe cially tho s e who were considered " C ap e Malay C oloure d " during the apartheid years, were Muslim . The Indian community was mainly based in the cities of D u rban and Johanne sburg, although there were sizeable p opulations in other urban centres. Many of S outh Africa's Indians were descendants of indentured labourers who had been brought from India to work on Natal's sugar plantation in the 1 8 6 0 s . O thers had arrived from India voluntarily to work as traders . Indian S outh Africans were mo stly either Hindu or Muslim . In the complex hierarchy of apartheid, the C oloured and Indian populations occupied a sort of interme diate p osition . They were considered subordinate to Whites but superior to B lack pe ople . Most C oloureds and Indians were oppo s e d to the apartheid system. The various B lack peoples who make up the large maj ority of S outh Africa's population can be divided into two main ethno -linguistic groupings : the Nguni and the S otho -Tswana. Of the two, there are marginally more speakers of Nguni languages than S otho - Tswana. B y f a r the largest Nguni groups a r e the Zulu a n d the Xhosa, although there are sizeable populations of other groups such as the Tsonga ( also called the Shangaan ) , Venda, Ndebele and Swazi. The main S otho -Tswana populations are the Northern S otho ( s ometimes known as the Pedi ) , the S outhern S otho and the Tswana. Under the old system of provinces, the Zulu were the dominant group in Natal and the south - e astern Transvaal, the Xhosa in the Eastern C ape, the S outhern S otho and Tswana in the O range Free State, and the Northern S otho, Tswana, Tsonga, Venda and Ndebele in the Transvaal. The large cities tend to b e more mixed, with Johannesburg and Pretoria in particular containing large numbers of all of the country's African ethnicities. This was the result of huge numb ers of Africans flo o ding into the cities from all parts of the country during the mineral revolution in the late 1 9th century, and again during the manufacturing boom of the S e cond World War. Many Africans still live in the enormous townships that skirt all of S o uth Africa's maj o r cities. The most famous of the s e is S oweto, whose population exceeds that of Johannesburg, the city it was built to serve .

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Domi nant lang uages i n South Africa

c=J

Afri kaans

c=J

Tso n g a

c=J

E n g l i sh

c=J

Tswa n a

c=J

N o rthern Sotho

c=J

Ve n d a

c=J

Sotho

-

Xh osa

c=J

Southern Ndebele

c=J

Zulu

-

Swa zi

c=J

N o n e d o m i n a nt

.A. The d o m i n a nt l a n gu a ge a n d eth n i c groups by a rea in South Africa

Most B lack S outh Africans are C hristians, a legacy of nineteenth century European missionary activity. However, especially in rural areas, C hristianity is often syncretize d with traditional beliefs and cultural practices . A large number of B lacks belong to the s o - called Africanist churches. These are independent C hristian churches with a strongly African flavour, and they emerged in the early 2 0th century as a response to the p erception among Africans that the missions churches were dominated by E uropeans. The largest single denomination in S outh Africa to day is the Zion C hristian C hurch . There are a number of other minority B lack groups in S o uth Africa. These are the descendants of the indigenous groups that had first settled the subcontinent and include the S an, the Khoikhoi and the Griqua . T h e Griqua are, strictly speaking, a C oloured people, descended from Whites as well as the S an and Khoikhoi. These groups were heavily marginalize d by the apartheid system, and were mostly confined to the arid interior of the C ape Province . D u ring the period covered in this case study, the huge maj ority of the B lack people of S outh Africa was opposed to the apartheid system and supported the lib eration struggle of the ANC .

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understanding Key con cept Consequence �

Continuity Change Perspective

Key qu estions H ow were African America ns discriminated against socially, economically, and political l y ? What methods, and with what effects, d i d opponents of desegregation employ to maintain the status quo?

.A. Civi l Rights leaders i n 19 63 at the M a rch on Was h i ngton for Jobs a n d

Freedom

The US Supreme Court agrees to hear public school segregation cases brought by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP) in what wi l l become known as Brown v. Board of Education Malcolm X joins Nation of Islam. The issue of remedy in Brown II is announced by the US Su preme Cou rt, which declares that schools should desegregate with "a l l deliberate speed"

The US Su preme Cou rt overtu rns Plessy v. Ferguson's "sepa rate but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka; M ississippi responds by abolishing a l l public schools, sta rti ng the reaction to Brown that culminates in Massive Resistance The White Citizens' Council is formed in M ississippi

Rosa Pa rks refuses to give u p her bus seat, beginning the Montgomery Bus Boycott

129

Virginia declares the state policy of Massive Resista nce to school desegregation Southern US senators and representatives issue the Southern M a nifesto opposing desegregation

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference ( SCLC ) is formed with Martin Luther King, J r. as chairman Desegregation at Centra l H igh School in Little Rock, Arkansas, triggers the Little Rock Crisis Woolworth's lunch counter sit-in, Greensboro, North Ca rolina; this is fol l owed by sit-ins in Nashvi l le, Ten n essee

Montgomery, Alabama, desegregates its buses after a successfu l year-long bus boycott a n d court ru ling Following a federal court ruling, Virginia, the leader of Massive Resistance, allows public schools to desegregate The Freedom Rides begin and continue through much of the year

The Student Nonviolent Coordi nating Com m ittee ( S N CC ) is formed The SCLC heads the Birmingham, Alabama, campaign to integrate downtown businesses economically; the ensuing police violence against adults and children is televised, shocking the nation and much of the world

The SNCC begins its voter registration project in M ississippi under the leadership of Robert Moses.

The March on Washington featu ring M a rtin Luther King, J r.'s "I Have a D ream" speech The African American C ivil Rights Movement b egan long b efore the years covered by this case study. Its origins can b e traced back to ab olitionism during the anteb ellum period in the United States . However, the years b eginning with the U S Supreme C ourt's unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education in 1 9 5 4, which largely overturned the "separate but equal" doctrine firmly establishe d in the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1 8 9 6 , set forth a period of mass action by African American s . This marked a significant change in the quest for civil rights . In the first half of the 2 0th century, organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of C olored People (NAA C P ) a n d t h e C ongress of Racial E quality ( C ORE ) formed i n order to fight for the rights, and often the lives, of African American s . The NAACP led the decade s - long legal fight to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson and C O RE organized small - s cale "freedom rides " j ust after the S e cond World War, but the era of the C ivil Rights Movement was one of protests of all siz es . These protests interacted with institutions i n t h e United States that largely resisted b oth change and the legal, political, e conomic and social equality of African American s .

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To understand the imp ortance of this chapter, which b e gins with Brown v. Board of Education and ends with the Voting Rights Act of 1 9 6 5 , it is helpful to know some of the history and the g e ography of the United S tate s . The b a ckground to this can be found in C h apters 8 and 9 of the History of the Americas C ourse C ompanion and will briefly b e reviewed here .

Sou rce s ki l l s A s you read through this chapter, identify motives, actions and events that provide evidence in supp ort of each of these five factors of racial

discrimination. C opy the spider diagram and add any evidence you find.

V i o l e n ce

Backgro u n d Following the end o f the American C ivil War, the 1 3th, 1 4th and 1 5 th Amendments were added to the US C onstitution . The 1 3th Amendment abolished slavery, the 1 4th Amendment established citizenship and stated

nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws and the 1 5 th Amendment provided for the right to vote regardless of " race, color, o r condition of p revious servitude [slavery] " . The intent of the s e Amendments was, along with the abolition of slavery, to provide for the legal and political equality of African Americans . Additionally, several civil rights laws were p a s s e d to guarantee rights further, regardle ss of rac e . The C ivil Rights Act of 1 8 6 6 added equal rights in contracts and employment, attempting to provide for equality of economic opportunity. White oppo sition to racial e qu ality found many forms, inclu ding the intimidation and violence implemented by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan ( KKK ) . Whatever gains African Americans had made in the states comprising the C onfe deracy during the Reconstruction p e riod, the s e eroded quickly following the withdrawal of federal troops in 1 8 7 7 in the deal that resulted in Rutherford B Hayes becoming president. C ombin e d with U S S upreme C ourt de cisions that weakened and narrowed the 1 4th Amendment so that states had a great deal of latitu de in application and enforcement, the

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The Great Migration was the movement of many ru ra l southern Africa n Americans to northern cities, beginning a tra nsition to the u rban centers that would continue through much of the 2 0th century. By 1 9 7 0, approximatel y 7 m i l l ion African America ns had moved out of the South.

Peonage

Debt slavery, in which business owners req u ired workers to labor u ntil they paid off a debt. The wages paid were often so low that it took years or decades to pay the debt.

end of Reconstruction m e ant legal, e conomic and political inferiority for African Americans in the S outh . The legal and so cial structure that upheld the system of apartheid was known as Jim C row. Laws defined a system that designate d almost every area as "white " or " colore d " . Police, courts a n d group s such as the KKK punished any violation a s a challenge to the syste m . ( It should b e noted that African Americans living in the northern states did not enj oy political or e conomic equality either, although there were significantly fewer legal obstacles and less racial violence in the North. However, the great maj ority of African Americans lived in the southern state s, even after the first Great Migration of 1 9 1 0- 1 9 3 0 . ) African Americans in many places in the United States, but more s o in the S o uth, lived under a legal system that supported white supremacy, the constant threat of e conomic co ercion and violence, state backed, individual, and mob . The legal system was used for the maintenance of political power and the e conomic gain of white American s . According to D o uglas A B lackmon ( 2 0 0 9 ) , shortly after the b eginning of the 2 0th century approximately half of all African Americans lived in virtual servitude . Many were sharecroppers and worked in a system in which the owner of the land retained complete control over what African Americans produced, setting prices, rents and loan rates, and keeping African Americans in peonage, even though this was against federal law. The federal government did not enforce this law in the S outh . S outhern states also used the p enal system to set up and run a system of slavery. B lack men were arrested for crimes such as vagrancy, drunkenness, or other minor violations, and were quickly convicted. The penalty was usually a choice between six months to a year in prison or a fine that was too high to pay. Imprisonment resulted in forced labour, where convicts were rented out by the prison system to private enterprises in agriculture or industry; the prison officials were monetarily comp ensated and the businesses gained labour at a rate well b elow going wages, while working conditions were often deplorable . In the case of a fine, either the fine -payer or the j udge could opt for the fine to b e worked off; either way the convict worked for months with no pay and usually in miserable working conditions . This system kept farms, factories and mines supplied with cheap labour. One example B lackmon ( 2 0 0 9 ) points to is the Tennessee C o al, Iron and Railroad C o mpany ( T C I ) , which was purchased by U S Steel in 1 9 0 7 . The founder and chairman of U S Ste el, E lbert H Gary, was an ab olitionist and was opposed to convict labour, ordering it to b e stoppe d . However, T C I maintained the system for two reasons: it had contracts for the next four years to use thousands of such workers, and the prison contracts forestalled labour union difficulties. U S Steel did implement modest improvements in the mines' working conditions, but T C I nonetheless signed new contracts for more convict labour. In fact, when the prison system cut the number of labourers available for the mines, U S Steel complained. Thus, there was a substantial integration of northern e conomic interests with institutionalize d involuntary servitude of African Americans in the S outh . However, since the federal government did not view these practices as involuntary servitude, it was able largely to ignore them.

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T O K connections

H istorian Robert Weisbrot ( 1 9 9 0 ) explains: Daily humiliation of Negroes was woven into the fa bric of Southern life in patterns as va riegated as a community's imagination permitted. I n 1 9 0 5 Georgia prohibited N egroes and whites from using the same park facilities; donors of land for playgrounds had to specify which race cou ld use them. U ntil 1940 Negroes and whites in Atlanta, Georgia, were not able to visit the municipal zoo at the same time. In 1 9 1 5 O klahoma authorized separate telephone booths for white and N egro ca l l e rs . . . Many public l i b ra ries permitted black and white to mingle only in the pages of books, whi l e otherwise reserving the buildings excl usively

fo r white use. Separate B i b l es for oath-ta king in courts, separate doors for wh ites a n d N egroes, separate e l evators and stai rways, separate d ri n king fou ntains, a n d separate toi l ets existed even where not req u i red b y law. TO K guid i n g q u estions •

From what perspective does Weisbrot write? H ow does this perspective guide his construction of the paragra p h ?

•

H ow does Weisbrot use voca bulary and the listing of evidence to help readers understa nd life in the J i m Crow South?

The killing of African Americans was commonplace from 1 8 8 8 to 1 9 2 3 . In this period, more than 2 , 5 0 0 African Americans were lynched by white mobs. Individual African Am ericans were often hanged or burned for alleged crim e s . A common accusation was sexual assault, or even the flirtation of an African American man with a white woman. Indeed, in 1 9 5 5 , African American teenager E mmitt Till was lynche d simply f o r saying a f e w words to a white woman. While lynchings were not reserved for African Americans ( white Americans had b e e n lynche d i n t h e We st f o r alleged h o r s e theft or cattle rustling ) , the overwhelming maj ority of victims of lynchings during this p e riod were African American s .

Ly nching

Extra-judicial homicide. Sometimes referred to as "Frontier Justice" when a group of people ta ke law into their own hands and hand down, then carry out, a death sentence.

The group most infamous for its racial violence was the Ku Klux Klan, or KKK. The Klan was formed in Tennessee in the winter following the end of the American C ivil War. It was initially formed as a secret social organization but in a short time evolved into a vigilante group whose principal goal was to negate Reconstruction; b eginning in 1 8 6 9 , the organization intimidated, assaulted and murdered African Americans and white Americans who were sympathetic to them. The Klan b ecame active in all southern states and targeted African American political leaders and office holders . Acts of brutality were common, including the whipping of senior citizens and adults who refused to work for white Americans, lynchings, even in front of children, and the burning of churches. Many white government officials and police employees were Klan members . African Americans in the S outh lived in constant fear of extreme racial violence . The E nforcement Acts of 1 8 7 0 and 1 8 7 1 were used by federal officials to crack down on Klan activity, and the states of Arkansas, Tennessee and Texas did organize police to target violent Klan actions. Government enforcement had some effect and, as Jim C row laws achieve d success in disenfranchising African Americans as well as forcing them into pe onage, the Klan lost its reason for being and largely faded away. In 1 9 1 5 , however, in light of the great wave of immigration that began in 1 8 9 0 , the Klan app eared again, this time as a patriotic and anti­ C atholic, anti - S emitic and anti -African American organization . It grew

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t o its largest membership within a decade . Intere stingly, the film Birth of a Nation, which glorifie d the Reconstructio n - era KKK and was screened in the White House for an enthusiastic President Wo o drow Wilson, b e came effe ctive pro - Klan propaganda, motivating more symp athizers to j oin. By 1 9 2 5 , the Klan counted an e stimate d four million adherents ' including numerous elected officials. However, due to a combination of infighting, unfavourable newspap e r coverage and public disapproval, the Klan faded once more as the United S tates b e came a combatant in the S e cond World War. The Klan was reviv e d a decade later by the B rown decisio n .

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